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The unsoldierly conduct displayed on this occasion was not attributable to a want of personal courage, but to other causes. The apprehensions excited by the defeat on Long Island had not yet subsided; nor had the American troops recovered their confidence either in themselves or in their commanders. Their situation appeared to themselves to be perilous; and they had not yet acquired that temper which teaches the veteran to do his duty wherever he may be placed; to assure himself that others will do their duty likewise; and to rely that those, who take into view the situation of the whole, will not expose him to useless hazard; or neglect those precautions which the safety and advantage of the whole may require.
Unfortunately, there existed in a great part of the army, several causes, in addition to the shortness of enlistments and reliance on militia, which were but too operative in obstructing the progress of these military sentiments. In New England, whence the supplies of men had been principally drawn, the zeal excited by the revolution had taken such a direction, as in a great degree to abolish those distinctions between the platoon officers and the soldiers, which are indispensable to the formation of an army suited to all the purposes of war. It has been already said that these officers, who constitute an important part of every army, were, in many companies, elected by the privates. Of consequence, a disposition to associate with them on the footing of equality, was a recommendation of more weight, and frequently conduced more to the choice, than individual merit. Gentlemen of high rank have stated that, in some instances, men were elected, who agreed to put their pay in a common stock with that of the soldiers, and divide equally with them. It is not cause of wonder, that among such officers, the most disgraceful and unmilitary practices should frequently prevail; and that the privates should not respect them sufficiently, to acquire habits of obedience and subordination. This vital defect had been in some degree remedied, in new modelling the army before Boston; but it still existed to a fatal extent.
{September 15.}
Having taken possession of New York, General Howe stationed a few troops in the town; and, with the main body of his army, encamped on the island near the American lines. His right was at Horen's Hook on the East river, and his left reached the North river near Bloomingdale; so that his encampment extended quite across the island, which is, in this place, scarcely two miles wide; and both his flanks were covered by his ships.
The strongest point of the American lines was at Kingsbridge, both sides of which had been carefully fortified. M'Gowan's Pass, and Morris's Heights were also occupied in considerable force, and rendered capable of being defended against superior numbers. A strong detachment was posted in an intrenched camp on the heights of Haerlem, within about a mile and a half of the British lines.
The present position of the armies favoured the views of the American General. He wished to habituate his soldiers, by a series of successful skirmishes, to meet the enemy in the field; and he persuaded himself that his detachments, knowing a strong intrenched camp to be immediately in their rear, would engage without apprehension, would soon display their native courage, and would speedily regain the confidence they had lost.
Opportunities to make the experiments he wished were soon afforded. The day after the retreat from New York, the British appeared in considerable force in the plains between the two camps; and the General immediately rode to his advanced posts, in order to make in person such arrangements as this movement might require. Soon after his arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Knowlton of Connecticut, who, at the head of a corps of rangers, had been skirmishing with this party, came in, and stated their numbers on conjecture at about three hundred men; the main body being concealed in a wood.
The General ordered Colonel Knowlton with his rangers, and Major Leitch with three companies of the third Virginia regiment, which had joined the army only the preceding day, to gain their rear, while he amused them with the appearance of making dispositions to attack their front.
[Sidenote: Skirmish on the heights of Haerlem.]
This plan succeeded. The British ran eagerly down a hill, in order to possess themselves of some fences and bushes, which presented an advantageous position against the party expected in front; and a firing commenced—but at too great a distance to do any execution. In the mean time, Colonel Knowlton, not being precisely acquainted with their new position, made his attack rather on their flank than rear; and a warm action ensued.
In a short time, Major Leitch, who had led the detachment with great intrepidity, was brought off the ground mortally wounded, having received three balls through his body; and soon afterwards the gallant Colonel Knowlton also fell. Not discouraged by the loss of their field officers, the captains maintained their ground, and continued the action with great animation. The British were reinforced; and General Washington ordered some detachments from the adjacent regiments of New England and Maryland, to the support of the Americans. Thus reinforced, they made a gallant charge, drove the enemy out of the wood into the plain, and were pressing him still farther, when the General, content with the present advantage, called back his troops to their intrenchments.[44]
[Footnote 44: The author received the account of this skirmish from the Colonel of the third Virginia Regiment, and from the Captains commanding the companies that were engaged.]
In this sharp conflict, the loss of the Americans, in killed and wounded, did not exceed fifty men. The British lost more than double that number. But the real importance of the affair was derived from its operation on the spirits of the whole army. It was the first success they had obtained during this campaign; and its influence was very discernible. To give it the more effect, the parole the next day was Leitch; and the General, in his orders, publicly thanked the troops under the command of that officer, who had first advanced on the enemy, and the others who had so resolutely supported them. He contrasted their conduct with that which had been exhibited the day before; and the result, he said, evidenced what might be done where officers and soldiers would exert themselves. Once more, therefore, he called upon them so to act, as not to disgrace the noble cause in which they were engaged. He appointed a successor to "the gallant and brave Colonel Knowlton, who would," he said, "have been an honour to any country, and who had fallen gloriously, fighting at his post."
In this active part of the campaign, when the utmost stretch of every faculty was required, to watch and counteract the plans of a skilful and powerful enemy, the effects of the original errors committed by the government, in its military establishment, were beginning to be so seriously felt, as to compel the Commander-in-chief to devote a portion of his time and attention to the complete removal of the causes which produced them.
The situation of America was becoming extremely critical. The almost entire dissolution of the existing army, by the expiration of the time for which the greater number of the troops had been engaged, was fast approaching. No steps had been taken to recruit the new regiments which congress had resolved to raise for the ensuing campaign; and there was much reason to apprehend, that in the actual state of things, the terms offered would not hold forth sufficient inducements to fill them.
{September 24.}
[Sidenote: Letter on the state of the army.]
With so unpromising a prospect before him, the General found himself pressed by an army, permanent in its establishment, supplied with every requisite of war, formidable for its discipline and the experience of its leaders, and superior to him in numbers. These circumstances, and the impressions they created, will be best exhibited by an extract from a letter written at the time to congress. It is in these words: "From the hours allotted to sleep, I will borrow a few moments to convey my thoughts, on sundry important matters, to congress. I shall offer them with that sincerity which ought to characterize a man of candour; and with the freedom which may be used in giving useful information, without incurring the imputation of presumption.
"We are now, as it were, upon the eve of another dissolution of our army. The remembrance of the difficulties which happened upon that occasion last year; the consequences which might have followed the change, if proper advantages had been taken by the enemy; added to a knowledge of the present temper and disposition of the troops; reflect but a very gloomy prospect upon the appearance of things now, and satisfy me, beyond the possibility of doubt, that unless some speedy and effectual measures are adopted by congress, our cause will be lost.
"It is in vain to expect that any, or more than a trifling part of this army, will engage again in the service, on the encouragement offered by congress. When men find that their townsmen and companions are receiving twenty, thirty, and more dollars, for a few months service, (which is truly the case,) this can not be expected, without using compulsion; and to force them into the service would answer no valuable purpose. When men are irritated, and their passions inflamed, they fly hastily and cheerfully to arms; but after the first emotions are over, to expect among such people as compose the bulk of an army, that they are influenced by any other motives than those of interest, is to look for what never did, and I fear never will happen; the congress will deceive themselves therefore if they expect it.
"A soldier, reasoned with upon the goodness of the cause he is engaged in, and the inestimable rights he is contending for, hears you with patience, and acknowledges the truth of your observations; but adds, that it is of no more consequence to him than to others. The officer makes you the same reply, with this further remark, that his pay will not support him, and he can not ruin himself and family to serve his country, when every member of the community is equally benefited and interested by his labours. The few, therefore, who act upon principles of disinterestedness, are, comparatively speaking, no more than a drop in the ocean. It becomes evidently clear, then, that as this contest is not likely to become the work of a day; as the war must be carried on systematically; and to do it, you must have good officers; there is, in my judgment, no other possible means to obtain them, but by establishing your army upon a permanent footing, and giving your officers good pay. This will induce gentlemen, and men of character, to engage; and, until the bulk of your officers are composed of such persons as are actuated by principles of honour and a spirit of enterprise, you have little to expect from them. They ought to have such allowances as will enable them to live like, and support the character of gentlemen; and not be driven by a scanty pittance to the low and dirty arts which many of them practise, to filch the public of more than the difference of pay would amount to, upon an ample allowance. Besides, something is due to the man who puts his life in your hands, hazards his health, and forsakes the sweets of domestic enjoyments. Why a captain in the continental service should receive no more than five shillings currency per day, for performing the same duties that an officer of the same rank in the British service receives ten shillings sterling for, I never could conceive; especially, when the latter is provided with every necessary he requires, upon the best terms, and the former can scarcely procure them at any rate. There is nothing that gives a man consequence, and renders him fit for command, like a support that renders him independent of every body but the state he serves.
"With respect to the men, nothing but a good bounty can obtain them upon a permanent establishment, and for no shorter time than the continuance of the war ought they to be engaged; as facts incontestably prove that the difficulty and cost of enlistments increase with time. When the army was first raised at Cambridge, I am persuaded the men might have been got, without a bounty, for the war: after that, they began to see that the contest was not likely to end so speedily as was imagined, and to feel their consequence, by remarking, that to get their militia, in the course of the last year, many towns were induced to give them a bounty. Foreseeing the evils resulting from this, and the destructive consequences which would unavoidably follow short enlistments, I took the liberty, in a long letter, (date not now recollected, as my letter book is not here,) to recommend the enlistments for and during the war, assigning such reasons for it, as experience has since convinced me, were well founded. At that time, twenty dollars would, I am persuaded, have engaged the men for this term: but it will not do to look back—and if the present opportunity is slipped, I am persuaded that twelve months more will increase our difficulties four fold. I shall therefore take the liberty of giving it as my opinion, that a good bounty be immediately offered, aided by the proffer of at least a hundred, or a hundred and fifty acres of land, and a suit of clothes, and a blanket, to each non-commissioned officer and soldier, as I have good authority for saying, that however high the men's pay may appear, it is barely sufficient, in the present scarcity and dearness of all kinds of goods, to keep them in clothes, much less to afford support to their families. If this encouragement, then, is given to the men, and such pay allowed to the officers, as will induce gentlemen of liberal character and liberal sentiments to engage; and proper care and caution be used in the nomination, (having more regard to the characters of persons than the number of men they can enlist,) we should, in a little time, have an army able to cope with any that can be opposed to it, as there are excellent materials to form one out of: but whilst the only merit an officer possesses is his ability to raise men; whilst those men consider and treat him as an equal, and in the character of an officer, regard him no more than a broomstick, being mixed together as one common herd; no order nor discipline can prevail, nor will the officer ever meet with that respect which is essentially necessary to due subordination.
"To place any dependence upon militia, is assuredly resting upon a broken staff. Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life; unaccustomed to the din of arms; totally unacquainted with every kind of military skill, which, being followed by a want of confidence in themselves, when opposed to troops regularly trained, disciplined, and appointed—superior in knowledge, and superior in arms—makes them timid, and ready to fly from their own shadows. Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living, particularly in their lodging, brings on sickness in many, impatience in all; and such an unconquerable desire of returning to their respective homes, that it not only produces shameful and scandalous desertions among themselves, but infuses the like spirit into others. Again, men accustomed to unbounded freedom and no control, can not brook the restraint which is indispensably necessary to the good order and government of an army; without which, licentiousness, and every kind of disorder, triumphantly reign. To bring men to a proper degree of subordination, is not the work of a day, a month, or a year; and unhappily for us, and the cause we are engaged in, the little discipline I have been labouring to establish in the army under my immediate command, is in a manner done away by having such a mixture of troops as have been called together within these few months."
The frequent remonstrances of the Commander-in-chief; the opinions of all military men; and the severe, but correcting hand of experience, had at length produced some effect on the government of the union;—and soon after the defeat on Long Island, congress had directed the committee composing the board of war, to prepare a plan of operations for the next succeeding campaign. Their report proposed a permanent army, to be enlisted for the war, and to be raised by the several states, in proportion to their ability. A bounty of twenty dollars was offered to each recruit; and small portions of land to every officer and soldier.
{October 4.}
The resolutions adopting this report were received by the Commander-in-chief soon after the transmission of the foregoing letter. Believing the inducements they held forth for the completion of the army to be still insufficient, he, in his letter acknowledging the receipt of them, urged in the most serious terms, the necessity of raising the pay of the officers, and the bounty offered to recruits. "Give me leave to say, sir," he observed, "I say it with due deference and respect, (and my knowledge of the facts, added to the importance of the cause, and the stake I hold it in, must justify the freedom,) that your affairs are in a more unpromising way than you seem to apprehend.
"Your army, as mentioned in my last, is upon the eve of political dissolution. True it is, you have voted a larger one in lieu of it; but the season is late, and there is a material difference between voting battalions, and raising men. In the latter, there are more difficulties than Congress seem aware of; which makes it my duty (as I have been informed of the prevailing sentiments of this army) to inform them, that unless the pay of the officers (especially that of the field officers) is raised, the chief part of those that are worth retaining will leave the service at the expiration of the present term; as the soldiers will also, if some greater encouragement is not offered them, than twenty dollars and one hundred acres of land."
After urging in strong terms the necessity of a more liberal compensation to the army, and stating that the British were actually raising a regiment with a bounty of ten pounds sterling for each recruit, he added, "when the pay and establishment of an officer once become objects of interested attention, the sloth, negligence, and even disobedience of orders, which at this time but too generally prevail, will be purged off;—but while the service is viewed with indifference; while the officer conceives that he is rather conferring than receiving an obligation: there will be a total relaxation of all order and discipline; and every thing will move heavily on, to the great detriment of the service, and inexpressible trouble and vexation of the general.
"The critical situation of our affairs at this time will justify my saying, that no time is to be lost in making fruitless experiments. An unavailing trial of a month, to get an army upon the terms proposed, may render it impracticable to do it at all, and prove fatal to our cause; as I am not sure whether any rubs in the way of our enlistments, or unfavourable turn in our affairs, may not prove the means of the enemy's recruiting men faster than we do."
After stating at large the confusion and delay, inseparable from the circumstance that the appointments for the new army were to be made by the states, the letter proceeds, "upon the present plan, I plainly foresee an intervention of time between the old and new army, which must be filled with militia, if to be had, with whom no man, who has any regard for his own reputation, can undertake to be answerable for consequences. I shall also be mistaken in my conjectures, if we do not lose the most valuable officers in this army, under the present mode of appointing them; consequently, if we have an army at all, it will be composed of materials not only entirely raw, but, if uncommon pains are not taken, entirely unfit: and I see such a distrust and jealousy of military power, that the Commander-in-chief has not an opportunity, even by recommendation, to give the least assurance of reward for the most essential services.
"In a word, such a cloud of perplexing circumstances appears before me, without one flattering hope, that I am thoroughly convinced, unless the most vigorous and decisive exertions are immediately adopted to remedy these evils, the certain and absolute loss of our liberties will be the inevitable consequence: as one unhappy stroke will throw a powerful weight into the scale against us, and enable General Howe to recruit his army, as fast as we shall ours; numbers being disposed, and many actually doing so already. Some of the most probable remedies, and such as experience has brought to my more intimate knowledge, I have taken the liberty to point out; the rest I beg leave to submit to the consideration of congress.
"I ask pardon for taking up so much of their time with my opinions, but I should betray that trust which they and my country have reposed in me, were I to be silent upon matters so extremely interesting."
On receiving this very serious letter, congress passed resolutions conforming to many of its suggestions. The pay of the officers was raised, and a suit of clothes allowed annually to each soldier: The legislatures of the states having troops in the continental service, either at New York, Ticonderoga, or New Jersey, were requested to depute committees to those places in order to officer the regiments on the new establishment: and it was recommended to the committees to consult the General on the subject of appointments.
CHAPTER VI.
The British land at Frog's Neck.... The American army evacuates York Island, except fort Washington.... Both armies move towards the White Plains.... Battle of the White Plains.... The British army returns to Kingsbridge.... General Washington crosses the North river.... The lines of fort Washington carried by the British, and the garrison made prisoners.... Evacuation of fort Lee.... Weakness of the American army.... Ineffectual attempts to raise the militia.... General Washington retreats through Jersey.... General Washington crosses the Delaware.... Danger of Philadelphia.... Capture of General Lee.... The British go into winter quarters.... Battle of Trenton.... Of Princeton.... Firmness of congress.
{1776}
{October 9.}
The armies did not long retain their position on York Island. General Howe was sensible of the strength of the American camp, and was not disposed to force it. His plan was to compel General Washington to abandon it, or to give battle in a situation in which a defeat must be attended with the total destruction of his army. With this view, after throwing up entrenchments on M'Gowan's hill for the protection of New York, he determined to gain the rear of the American camp, by the New England road, and also to possess himself of the North river above Kingsbridge. To assure himself of the practicability of acquiring the command of the river, three frigates passed up it under the fire from fort Washington, and from the opposite post on the Jersey shore, afterwards called fort Lee, without sustaining any injury from the batteries, or being impeded by the chevaux-de-frise which had been sunk in the channel between those forts.
{Twelfth.}
[Sidenote: The enemy land at Frog's Neck.]
This point being ascertained, he embarked a great part of his army on board flat bottomed boats, and, passing through Hurl Gate into the Sound, landed at Frog's Neck, about nine miles from the camp on the heights of Haerlem.
In consequence of this movement, Washington strengthened the post at Kingsbridge, and detached some regiments to West Chester for the purpose of skirmishing with the enemy, so soon as he should march from the ground he occupied. The road from Frog's Point to Kingsbridge leads through a strong country, intersected by numerous stone fences, so as to render it difficult to move artillery, or even infantry, in compact columns, except along the main road, which had been broken up in several places. The General, therefore, entertained sanguine hopes of the event, should a direct attack be made on his camp.
General Howe continued some days waiting for his artillery, military stores, and reinforcements from Staten Island, which were detained by unfavourable winds.
{October 16.}
[Sidenote: The American army evacuates York island except Fort Washington.]
In the mean time, as the habits of thinking in America required that every important measure should be the result of consultation, and should receive the approbation of a majority, the propriety of removing the American army from its present situation was submitted to a council of the general officers. After much investigation, it was declared to be impracticable, without a change of position, to keep up their communication with the country, and avoid being compelled to fight under great disadvantages, or to surrender themselves prisoners of war. General Lee, who had just arrived from the south, and whose experience as well as late success gave great weight to his opinions, urged the necessity of this movement with much earnestness. It was, at the same time, determined to hold fort Washington, and to defend it as long as possible. A resolution of congress of the 11th of October, desiring General Washington, by every art and expense, to obstruct, if possible, the navigation of the river, contributed, not inconsiderably, to this determination.
In pursuance of this opinion of the military council, measures were taken for moving the army up the North River, so as to extend its front, or left, towards the White Plains, beyond the British right, and thus keep open its communication with the country. The right, or rear division, remained a few days longer about Kingsbridge under the command of General Lee, for the security of the heavy baggage and military stores, which, in consequence of the difficulty of obtaining wagons, could be but slowly removed.
{October 18.}
General Howe, after uniting his forces at Pell's Point, moved forward his whole army, except four brigades destined for the defence of New York, through Pelham's manor, towards New Rochelle. Some skirmishes took place on the march with a part of Glover's brigade, in which the conduct of the Americans was mentioned with satisfaction by the Commander-in-chief; and, as General Howe took post at New Rochelle, a village on the Sound, General Washington occupied the heights between that place and the North River.
{October 21.}
[Sidenote: Both armies move towards the White Plains.]
At New Rochelle, the British army was joined by the second division of Germans, under the command of General Knyphausen, and by an incomplete regiment of cavalry from Ireland; some of whom had been captured on their passage. Both armies now moved towards the White Plains, a strong piece of ground already occupied by a detachment of militia. The main body of the American troops formed a long line of entrenched camps, extending from twelve to thirteen miles, on the different heights from Valentine's Hill, near Kingsbridge, to the White Plains, fronting the British line of march, and the Brunx, which divided the two armies. The motions of General Howe were anxiously watched, not only for the purposes of security, and of avoiding a general action, but in order to seize any occasion which might present itself of engaging his out-posts with advantage. While the British army lay at New Rochelle, the position of a corps of American loyalists commanded by Major Rogers was supposed to furnish such an occasion. He was advanced, farther eastward, to Mamaraneck, on the Sound, where he was believed to be covered by the other troops. An attempt was made to surprise him in the night, by a detachment which should pass between him and the main body of the British army, and, by a coup de main, bear off his whole corps. Major Rogers was surprised, and about sixty of his regiment killed and taken. The loss of the Americans was only two killed, and eight or ten wounded; among the latter was Major Green of Virginia, a brave officer, who led the detachment, and who received a ball through his body.
Not long afterwards, a regiment of Pennsylvania riflemen, under Colonel Hand, engaged an equal number of Hessian chasseurs, with some advantage.
The caution of the English general was increased by these evidences of enterprise in his adversary. His object seems to have been to avoid skirmishes, and to bring on a general action, if that could be effected under favourable circumstances; if not, he calculated on nearly all the advantages of a victory from the approaching dissolution of the American army. He proceeded therefore slowly. His march was in close order, his encampments compact, and well guarded with artillery; and the utmost circumspection was used to leave no vulnerable point.
{October 25.}
As the sick and baggage reached a place of safety, General Washington gradually drew in his out-posts, and took possession of the heights on the east side of the Brunx, fronting the head of the British columns, at the distance of seven or eight miles from them. The next day, he was joined by General Lee, who, after securing the sick and the baggage, had, with considerable address, brought up the rear division of the army; an operation the more difficult as the deficiency of teams was such that a large portion of the labour usually performed by horses or oxen, devolved on men.
General Washington was encamped on high broken ground, with his right flank on the Brunx. This stream meandered so as also to cover the front of his right wing, which extended along the road leading towards New Rochelle, as far as the brow of the hill where his centre was posted. His left, which formed almost a right angle with his centre, and was nearly parallel to his right, extended along the hills northward, so as to keep possession of the commanding ground, and secure a retreat, should it be necessary, to a still stronger position in his rear.
On the right of the army, and on the west side of the Brunx, about one mile from camp, on a road leading from the North River, was a hill, of which General M'Dougal was ordered to take possession, for the purpose of covering the right flank. His detachment consisted of about sixteen hundred men, principally militia; and his communication with the main army was open, that part of the Brunx being passable without difficulty.
Intrenchments were thrown up to strengthen the lines.
General Howe, having made arrangements to attack Washington in his camp, advanced early in the morning in two columns, the right commanded by Sir Henry Clinton, and the left by General Knyphausen; and, about ten, his van appeared in full view, on which a cannonade commenced without much execution on either side.
{October 28.}
[Sidenote: Battle of the White Plains.]
The British right formed behind a rising ground, about a mile in front of the American camp, and extending from the road leading from Mamaraneck towards the Brunx, stood opposed to the American centre.
On viewing Washington's situation, Howe, who accompanied Knyphausen, determined to carry the hill occupied by M'Dougal, as preliminary to an attack on the centre and right of the American camp. He therefore directed Colonel Rawle, with a brigade of Hessians, to cross the Brunx and make a circuit so as to turn M'Dougal's right flank, while Brigadier General Leslie, with a strong corps of British and Hessian troops should attack him in front. When Rawle had gained his position, the detachment commanded by Leslie also crossed the Brunx, and commenced a vigorous attack.[45] The militia in the front line immediately fled; but the regulars maintained their ground with great gallantry. Colonel Smallwood's regiment of Maryland, and Colonel Reitzimer's of New York, advanced boldly towards the foot of the hill to meet Leslie, but, after a sharp encounter, were overpowered by numbers, and compelled to retreat. General Leslie then attacked the remaining part of M'Dougal's forces, who were soon driven from the hill, but kept up for some time an irregular fire from the stone walls about the scene of action. General Putnam, with Real's brigade, was ordered to support them; but not having arrived till the hill was lost, the attempt to regain it was deemed unadviseable, and the troops retreated to the main army.
[Footnote 45: General Howe's letter.]
In this animated engagement, the loss was supposed to be nearly equal. That of the Americans was between three and four hundred in killed, wounded, and taken. Colonel Smallwood was among the wounded.
General Washington continued in his lines expecting an assault. But a considerable part of the day having been exhausted in gaining the hill which had been occupied by M'Dougal, the meditated attempt on his intrenchments was postponed until the next morning; and the British army lay on their arms the following night, in order of battle, on the ground taken during the day.
{October 30.}
This interval was employed by General Washington in strengthening his works, removing his sick and baggage, and preparing for the expected attack by adopting the arrangement of his troops to the existing state of things. His left maintained its position; but his right was drawn back to stronger ground. Perceiving this, and being unwilling to leave any thing to hazard, Howe resolved to postpone farther offensive operations, until Lord Percy should arrive with four battalions from New York, and two from Mamaraneck. This reinforcement was received on the evening of the thirtieth, and preparations were then made to force the American intrenchments the next morning. In the night, and during the early part of the succeeding day, a violent rain still farther postponed the assault.
Having now removed his provisions and heavy baggage to much stronger ground, and apprehending that the British general, whose left wing extended along the height, taken from M'Dougal, to his rear, might turn his camp, and occupy the strong ground to which he designed to retreat, should an attempt on his lines prove successful, General Washington changed his position in the night, and withdrew to the heights of North Castle, about five miles from the White Plains.
{November 1.}
Deeming this position too strong to be attempted with prudence, General Howe determined to change his plan of operations, and to give a new direction to his efforts.[46]
[Footnote 46: General Howe's letter.]
While forts Washington and Lee were held by the Americans, his movements were checked, and York Island insecure. With a view to the acquisition of these posts, he directed General Knyphausen to take possession of Kingsbridge, which was defended by a small party of Americans placed in fort Independence. On his approach, this party retreated to fort Washington; and Knyphausen encamped between that place and Kingsbridge.
{November 5.}
[Sidenote: The British army returns to Kingsbridge.]
In the mean time, General Howe retired slowly down the North River. His designs were immediately penetrated by the American general, who perceived the necessity of passing a part of his army into Jersey, but was restrained from immediately leaving the strong ground he occupied by the apprehension that his adversary might, in that event, return suddenly and gain his rear. A council of war was called, which determined unanimously, that, should General Howe continue his march towards New York, all the troops raised on the west side of the Hudson should cross that river, to be afterwards followed by those raised in the eastern part of the continent, leaving three thousand men for the defence of the Highlands about the North river.
In a letter to congress communicating this movement of the British army, and this determination of the council, the general said, "I can not indulge the idea that General Howe, supposing him to be going to New York, means to close the campaign, and to sit down without attempting something more. I think it highly probable, and almost certain, that he will make a descent with part of his troops into the Jerseys; and, as soon as I am satisfied that the present manoeuvre is real, and not a feint, I shall use all the means in my power to forward a part of our force to counteract his designs.
"I expect the enemy will bend their force against fort Washington, and invest it immediately. From some advices, it is an object that will attract their earliest attention."
He also addressed a letter to the governor of New Jersey, expressing a decided opinion that General Howe would not content himself with investing fort Washington, but would invade the Jerseys; and urging him to put the militia in the best possible condition to reinforce the army, and to take the place of the new levies, who could not, he suggested, be depended on to continue in service one day longer than the first of December, the time for which they were engaged.
Immediate intelligence of this movement was likewise given to General Greene, who commanded in the Jerseys; and his attention was particularly pointed to fort Washington.
As the British army approached Kingsbridge, three ships of war passed up the North River, notwithstanding the fire from forts Washington and Lee, and notwithstanding the additional obstructions which had been placed in the channel.
{November 8.}
On being informed of this, another letter was addressed to General Greene, stating that this fact was so plain a proof of the inefficacy of all the obstructions thrown in the river, as to justify a change in the dispositions which had been made. "If," continued the letter, "we can not prevent vessels from passing up, and the enemy are possessed of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer to attempt to hold a post from which the expected benefit can not be derived? I am therefore inclined to think it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington; but as you are on the spot, I leave it to you to give such orders respecting the evacuation of the place, as you may think most adviseable; and so far revoke the orders given to Colonel Magaw to defend it to the last."
Measures were now taken to cross the North River with the troops which had been raised on its western side, and General Washington determined to accompany that division of the army. The eastern regiments remained on the eastern side of the river, under the command of General Lee, with orders to join the Commander-in-chief, should the British army cross the Hudson.
[Sidenote: And General Washington with a part of his army crosses the North River.]
After visiting the posts about Peekskill, and making all the arrangements in his power for their defence, General Washington passed the North River in the rear of the troops designed to act in the Jerseys, and proceeded to the quarters of General Greene, near fort Lee.
From too great a confidence[47] in the strength of fort Washington, and a conviction of its importance, General Greene had not withdrawn its garrison under the discretionary orders he had received, but still indulged a hope that the post might be maintained, or, should its situation become desperate, that means might be found to transport the troops across the river to the Jersey shore, which was defended by fort Lee.
[Footnote 47: Extract of a letter from General Greene, dated September 11th, 1778.
"Remember the effect that the loss of the garrison of fort Washington had; there were men enough to have defended themselves against all the army had they not been struck with a panic; but, being most of them irregular troops, they lost their confidence when the danger began to grow pressing, and so fell a prey to their own fears."—Life of Greene, v. 1, p. 121.]
Mount Washington is a high piece of rocky ground, near the North River, very difficult of ascent, especially towards the north, or Kingsbridge. The fort was capable of containing about one thousand men; but the lines and out-works, which were chiefly on the southern side, towards New York, were drawn quite across the island. The ground was naturally strong, the approaches difficult, and the fortifications, though not sufficient to resist heavy artillery, were believed to be in a condition to resist any attempt to carry them by storm. The garrison consisted of troops, some of whom were among the best in the American army; and the command had been given to Colonel Magaw, a brave and intelligent officer, in whom great confidence was placed.
{November 13.}
{Fifteenth.}
General Howe, after retiring from the White Plains, encamped at a small distance from Kingsbridge, on the heights of Fordham; and, having made the necessary preparations for an assault, summoned the garrison to surrender, on pain of being put to the sword. Colonel Magaw replied, that he should defend the place to the last extremity, and communicated the summons to General Greene at fort Lee, who transmitted it to the Commander-in-chief, then at Hackensack. He immediately rode to fort Lee, and, though it was late in the night, was proceeding to fort Washington, where he expected to find Generals Putnam and Greene, when, in crossing the river, he met those officers returning from a visit to that fort. They reported that the garrison was in high spirits, and would make a good defence; on which he returned with them to fort Lee.
{November 16.}
Early next morning, Colonel Magaw posted his troops, partly on a commanding hill north of the fort, partly in the outermost of the lines drawn across the island on the south of the fort, and partly between those lines, on the woody and rocky heights fronting Haerlem River, where the ground being extremely difficult of ascent, the works were not closed. Colonel Rawlings, of Maryland, commanded on the hill towards Kingsbridge; Colonel Cadwallader, of Pennsylvania, in the lines, and Colonel Magaw himself continued in the fort.
The strength of the place had not deterred the British general from resolving to carry it by storm; and, on receiving the answer of Colonel Magaw, arrangements were made for a vigorous attack next day. About ten, the assailants appeared before the works, and moved to the assault in four different quarters. Their first division consisting of Hessians and Waldeckers, amounting to about five thousand men, under the command of General Knyphausen, advanced on the north side of the fort, against the hill occupied by Colonel Rawlings, who received them with great gallantry. The second, on the east, consisting of the British light infantry and guards, was led by Brigadier General Matthews, supported by Lord Cornwallis, at the head of the grenadiers and the thirty-third regiment. These troops crossed Haerlem River in boats, under cover of the artillery planted in the works, which had been erected on the opposite side of the river, and landed within the third line of defence which crossed the island. The third division was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Stirling, who passed the river higher up; and the fourth by Lord Percy, accompanied by General Howe in person. This division was to attack the lines in front, on the south side.[48]
[Footnote 48: General Howe's letter.]
The attacks on the north and south by General Knyphausen and Lord Percy, were made about the same instant, on Colonels Rawlings and Cadwallader, who maintained their ground for a considerable time; but, while Colonel Cadwallader was engaged in the first line against Lord Percy, the second and third divisions which had crossed Haerlem River made good their landing, and dispersed the troops fronting that river, as well as a detachment sent by Colonel Cadwallader to support them. Thus being overpowered, and the British advancing between the fort and the lines, it became necessary to abandon them. In retreating to the fort, some of the men were intercepted by the division under Colonel Stirling, and made prisoners.
The resistance on the north was of longer duration. Rawlings maintained his ground with firmness, and his riflemen did vast execution. A three gun battery also played on Knyphausen with great effect. At length, the Hessian columns gained the summit of the hill; after which, Colonel Rawlings, who perceived the danger which threatened his rear, retreated under the guns of the fort.
[Sidenote: The lines of Fort Washington carried by the enemy, and the garrison made prisoners.]
Having carried the lines, and all the strong ground adjoining them, the British general again summoned Colonel Magaw to surrender. While the capitulation was in a course of arrangement, General Washington sent him a billet, requesting him to hold out until the evening, when means should be attempted to bring off the garrison. But Magaw had proceeded too far to retreat; and it is probable the place could not have resisted an assault from so formidable a force as threatened it. The greatest difficulties had been overcome; the fort was too small to contain all the men; and their ammunition was nearly exhausted. Under these circumstances the garrison became prisoners of war.
The loss on this occasion was the greatest the Americans had ever sustained. The garrison was stated by General Washington at about two thousand men. Yet, in a report published as from General Howe, the number of prisoners is said to be two thousand and six hundred, exclusive of officers. Either General Howe must have included in his report persons who were not soldiers, or General Washington must have comprehended the regulars only in his letter. The last conjecture is most probably correct. The loss of the assailants, according to Mr. Stedman, amounted to eight hundred men. This loss fell heaviest on the Germans.
[Sidenote: Evacuation of Fort Lee.]
{November 18.}
On the surrender of fort Washington, it was determined to evacuate fort Lee; and a removal of the stores was immediately commenced. Before this operation could be completed, a detachment commanded by Lord Cornwallis, amounting to about six thousand men, crossed the North River below Dobb's ferry, and endeavoured, by a rapid march, to enclose the garrison between the North and Hackensack Rivers. An immediate retreat from that narrow neck of land had become indispensable, and was with difficulty effected. All the heavy cannon at fort Lee, except two twelve-pounders, with a considerable quantity of provisions and military stores, including three hundred tents, were lost. After crossing the Hackensack, General Washington posted his troops along the western bank of that river, but was unable to dispute its passage at the head of about three thousand effectives, exposed, without tents, in an inclement season; he was in a level country, without a single intrenching tool, among people far from being zealous in the American cause. In other respects this situation was dangerous. The Passaic, in his rear, after running several miles nearly parallel to the Hackensack, unites with that river below the ground occupied by the Americans, who were consequently still exposed to the hazard of being inclosed between two rivers.
{November 21.}
[Sidenote: Weakness of the American army.]
This gloomy state of things was not brightened by the prospect before him. In casting his eyes around, no cheering object presented itself. No confidence could be placed on receiving reinforcements from any quarter. But, in no situation could Washington despond. His exertions to collect an army, and to impede the progress of his enemy, were perseveringly continued. Understanding that Sir Guy Carleton no longer threatened Ticonderoga, he directed General Schuyler to hasten the troops of Pennsylvania and Jersey to his assistance, and ordered[49] General Lee to cross the North River, and be in readiness to join him, should the enemy continue the campaign. But, under the influence of the same fatal cause which had acted elsewhere, these armies too were melting away, and would soon be almost totally dissolved. General Mercer, who commanded a part of the flying camp stationed about Bergen, was also called in; but these troops had engaged to serve only till the 1st of December, and, like the other six months men, had already abandoned the army in great numbers. No hope existed of retaining the remnant after they should possess a legal right to be discharged; and there was not much probability of supplying their places with other militia. To New England he looked with anxious hope; and his requisitions on those states received prompt attention. Six thousand militia from Massachusetts, and a considerable body from Connecticut, were ordered to his assistance; but some delay in assembling them was unavoidable, and their march was arrested by the appearance of the enemy in their immediate neighbourhood.
[Footnote 49: See note No. VII. at the end of the volume.]
Three thousand men, conducted by Sir Henry Clinton, who were embarked on board a fleet commanded by Sir Peter Parker, sailed late in November from New York, and, without much opposition, took possession of Newport. This invasion excited serious alarm in Massachusetts and Connecticut, and these states retained for their own defence, the militia who had been embodied at the instance of the Commander-in-chief.
Not intending to maintain his present position, General Washington had placed some regiments along the Hackensack to afford the semblance of defending its passage until his stores could be removed; and, with the residue of the troops, crossed the Passaic, and took post at Newark. Soon after he had marched, Major General Vaughan appeared before the new bridge over Hackensack. The American detachment which had been left in the rear, being unable to defend it, broke it down, and retired before him over the Passaic.
[Sidenote: Ineffectual attempts to raise the militia.]
Having entered the open country, General Washington determined to halt a few days on the south side of this river, make some show of resistance, and endeavour to collect such a force as would keep up the semblance of an army. His letters, not having produced such exertions as the public exigencies required, he deputed General Mifflin to the government of Pennsylvania, and Colonel Reid, his Adjutant General, to the government of New Jersey, with orders to represent the real situation of the army, and the certainty that, without great reinforcements, Philadelphia must fall into the hands of the enemy, and the state of Jersey be overrun.
While thus endeavouring to strengthen himself with militia, he pressed General Lee to hasten his march, and cautioned him to keep high enough up the country to avoid the enemy, who, having got possession of the mail containing one of his late letters, would certainly endeavour to prevent the junction of the two armies.
This perilous state of things was rendered still more critical by indications of an insurrection in the county of Monmouth, in Jersey, where great numbers favoured the royal cause. In other places, too, a hostile temper was displayed, and an indisposition to farther resistance began to be manifested throughout that state. These appearances obliged him to make detachments from the militia of his army, to overawe the disaffected of Monmouth, who were on the point of assembling in force.
[Sidenote: General Washington retreats through Jersey.]
{November 23.}
As the British army crossed the Passaic, General Washington abandoned his position behind that river; and the day Lord Cornwallis entered Newark, he retreated to Brunswick, a small village on the Raritan.
{December 1.}
At this place, the levies drawn from Maryland and Jersey to compose the flying camp, became entitled to their discharge. No remonstrances could detain them; and he sustained the mortification of seeing his feeble army still more enfeebled by being entirely abandoned by these troops, in the face of an advancing enemy. The Pennsylvania militia belonging to the flying camp were engaged to serve till the 1st of January. So many of them deserted, that it was deemed necessary to place guards on the roads, and ferries over the Delaware, to apprehend and send them back to camp. The Governor of New Jersey was again pressed for assistance, but it was not in his power to furnish the aid required. The well affected part of the lower country was overawed by the British army; and the militia of Morris and Sussex came out slowly and reluctantly.
While at Brunswick, attempts were made to retard the advance of the British army by movements indicating an intention to act on the offensive; but this feint was unavailing. Lord Cornwallis continued to press forward; and, as his advanced guards showed themselves on the opposite side of the bridge, General Washington evacuated the town, and marched through Princeton to Trenton. Directions had already been given to collect all the boats on the Delaware, from Philadelphia upwards for seventy miles, in the hope that the progress of the enemy might be stopped at this river; and that, in the mean time, reinforcements might arrive which would enable him to dispute its passage.
{December 2.}
Having, with great labour, transported the few remaining military stores and baggage over the Delaware, he determined to remain as long as possible on the northern banks of that river.
The army which was thus pressed slowly through the Jerseys, was aided by no other cavalry than a small corps of badly mounted Connecticut militia, commanded by Major Shelden; and was almost equally destitute of artillery. Its numbers, at no time during the retreat, exceeded four thousand men, and on reaching the Delaware, was reduced to less than three thousand; of whom, not quite one thousand were militia of New Jersey. Even among the continental troops there were many whose term of service was about to expire.
Its defectiveness of numbers did not constitute its only weakness. The regulars were badly armed, worse clad, and almost destitute of tents, blankets, or utensils for dressing their food. They were composed chiefly of the garrison of fort Lee, and had been obliged to evacuate that place with too much precipitation to bring with them even those few articles of comfort and accommodation with which they had been furnished. The Commander-in-chief found himself at the head of this small band of soldiers, dispirited by their losses and fatigues, retreating almost naked and bare-footed, in the cold of November and December, before a numerous, well appointed, and victorious army, through a desponding country, much more disposed to obtain safety by submission, than to seek it by a manly resistance.
In this crisis of American affairs, a proclamation was issued by Lord and General Howe, as commissioners appointed on the part of the crown for restoring peace to America, commanding all persons assembled in arms against his majesty's government, to disband and return to their homes; and all civil officers to desist from their treasonable practices, and relinquish their usurped authority. A full pardon was offered to every person who would, within sixty days, appear before certain civil or military officers of the crown, claim the benefit of that proclamation, and testify his obedience to the laws by subscribing a declaration of his submission to the royal authority. Copies of it were dispersed through the country, after which numbers flocked in daily, to make their peace and obtain protection. The contrast between the splendid appearance of the pursuing army, and that of the ragged Americans who were flying before them, could not fail to nourish the general opinion that the contest was approaching its termination.
Among the many valuable traits in the character of Washington, was that unyielding firmness of mind which resisted these accumulated circumstances of depression, and supported him under them. Undismayed by the dangers which surrounded him, he did not for an instant relax his exertions, nor omit any thing which could obstruct the progress of the enemy, or improve his own condition. He did not appear to despair of the public safety, but struggled against adverse fortune with the hope of yet vanquishing the difficulties which surrounded him; and constantly showed himself to his harassed and enfeebled army, with a serene, unembarrassed countenance, betraying no fears in himself, and invigorating and inspiring with confidence the bosoms of others. To this unconquerable firmness, to this perfect self-possession under the most desperate circumstances, is America, in a great degree, indebted for her independence.
{December 5.}
After removing his baggage and stores over the Delaware, and sending his sick to Philadelphia, the American General, finding that Lord Cornwallis still continued in Brunswick, detached twelve hundred men to Princeton in the hope that this appearance of advancing on the British might not only retard their progress, but cover a part of the country, and reanimate the people of Jersey.
Some portion of this short respite from laborious service was devoted to the predominant wish of his heart,—preparations for the next campaign,—by impressing on congress a conviction of the real causes of the present calamitous state of things. However the human mind may resist the clearest theoretic reasoning, it is scarcely possible not to discern obvious and radical errors, while smarting under their destructive consequences. The abandonment of the army by whole regiments of the flying camp, in the face of an advancing and superior enemy; the impracticability of calling out the militia of Jersey and Pennsylvania in sufficient force to prevent Lord Cornwallis from overrunning the first state, or restrain him from entering the last, had it not been saved by other causes, were practical lessons on the subjects of enlistments for a short time, and a reliance on militia, which no prejudice could disregard, and which could not fail to add great weight to the remonstrances formerly made by the Commander-in-chief, which were now repeated.
{December 6.}
{Seventh.}
The exertions of General Mifflin to raise the militia of Pennsylvania, though unavailing in the country, were successful in Philadelphia. A large proportion of the inhabitants of that city capable of bearing arms, had associated for the general defence; and, on this occasion, fifteen hundred of them marched to Trenton; to which place a German battalion was also ordered by congress. On the arrival of these troops, General Washington commenced his march to Princeton, but was stopped by the intelligence that Lord Cornwallis, having received large reinforcements, was advancing rapidly from Brunswick by different routes, and endeavouring to gain his rear.
{Eighth.}
[Sidenote: General Washington crosses the Delaware.]
[Sidenote: Danger of Philadelphia.]
On receiving this intelligence, he crossed the Delaware, and posted his army in such a manner as to guard the fords. As his rear passed the river, the van of the British army appeared in sight. The main body took post at Trenton, and detachments were placed both above and below, while small parties, without interruption from the people of the country, reconnoitred the Delaware for a considerable distance. From Bordentown below Trenton the course of the river turns westward, and forms an acute angle with its course from Philadelphia to that place; so that Lord Cornwallis might cross a considerable distance above, and be not much, if any, farther from that city than the American army.
The British general made some unsuccessful attempts to seize a number of boats guarded by Lord Stirling, about Coryell's Ferry; and, in order to facilitate his movements down the river, on the Jersey shore, repaired the bridges below Trenton, which had been broken down by order of General Washington. He then advanced a strong detachment to Bordentown, giving indications of an intention to cross the Delaware at the same time above and below; and either to march in two columns to Philadelphia, or completely to envelop the American army in the angle of the river. To counteract this plan, the American General stationed a few gallies to watch the movements of his enemy below, and aid in repelling any effort to pass over to the Pennsylvania shore; and made such a disposition of his little army as to guard against any attempt to force a passage above, which he believed to be the real design.
Having made his arrangements, he waited anxiously for reinforcements; and, in the meantime, sent daily parties over the river to harass the enemy, and to observe his situation.
The utmost exertions were made by government to raise the militia. In the hope that a respectable body of continental troops would aid these exertions, General Washington had directed General Gates, with the regulars of the northern army, and General Heath, with those at Peekskill, to march to his assistance.
[Sidenote: Capture of General Lee.]
Although General Lee had been repeatedly urged to join the Commander-in-chief, he proceeded slowly in the execution of these orders, manifesting a strong disposition to retain his separate command, and rather to hang on, and threaten the rear of the British army, than to strengthen that in its front. With this view he proposed establishing himself at Morristown. On receiving a letter from General Washington disapproving this proposition, and urging him to hasten his march, Lee still avowed a preference for his own plan, and proceeded reluctantly towards the Delaware. While passing through Morris county, at the distance of twenty miles from the British encampment, he, very incautiously, quartered under a slight guard, in a house about three miles from his army. Information of this circumstance was given by a countryman to Colonel Harcourt, at that time detached with a body of cavalry to watch his movements, who immediately formed and executed the design of seizing him. Early in the morning of the 12th of December, this officer reached Lee's quarters, who received no intimation of his danger until the house was surrounded, and he found himself a prisoner. He was carried off in triumph to the British army, where he was, for some time, treated as a deserter from the British service.
This misfortune made a serious impression on all America. The confidence originally placed in General Lee had been increased by his success in the southern department, and by a belief that his opinions, during the military operations in New York, had contributed to the adoption of those judicious movements which had, in some measure, defeated the plans of General Howe in that quarter. It was also believed that he had dissented from the resolution of the council of war for maintaining forts Washington and Lee. No officer, except the Commander-in-chief, possessed, at that time, in so eminent a degree, the confidence of the army, or of the country; and his loss was, almost universally, bewailed as one of the greatest calamities which had befallen the American arms. It was regretted by no person more than by General Washington himself. He respected the merit of that eccentric veteran, and sincerely lamented his captivity.
General Sullivan, on whom the command of that division devolved after the capture of Lee, promptly obeyed the orders which had been directed to that officer; and, crossing the Delaware at Philipsburg, joined the Commander-in-chief. On the same day General Gates arrived with a few northern troops. By these and other reinforcements, the army was augmented to about seven thousand effective men.
[Sidenote: The British go into winter quarters.]
The attempts of the British general to get possession of boats for the transportation of his army over the Delaware having failed, he gave indications of an intention to close the campaign, and to retire into winter quarters. About four thousand men were cantoned on the Delaware at Trenton, Bordentown, the White Horse, and Mount Holly; and the remaining part of the army of Jersey was distributed from that river to the Hackensack. Strong corps were posted at Princeton, Brunswick, and Elizabethtown.
To intimidate the people, and thereby impede the recruiting service, was believed to be no inconsiderable inducement with General Howe, for covering so large a portion of Jersey. To counteract these views, General Washington ordered three of the regiments from Peekskill to halt at Morristown, and to unite with about eight hundred militia assembled at that place under Colonel Ford. General Maxwell was sent to take command of these troops, with orders to watch the motions of the enemy, to harass him in his marches, to give intelligence of all his movements, to keep up the spirits of the militia, and to prevent the inhabitants from going within the British lines, and taking protection.
{December 20.}
The short interval between this cantonment of the British troops, and the recommencement of active operations, was employed by General Washington in repeating the representations he had so often made to congress, respecting preparations for the ensuing campaign. The dangers resulting from a reliance on temporary armies had been fully exemplified; and his remonstrances on that subject were supported by that severe experience which corrects while it chastises. In the course of the campaign, he had suffered greatly from the want of cavalry, of artillery, and of engineers. His ideas on these important subjects had been already stated to congress, and were now reurged. With respect to the additional expense to be incurred by the measures recommended, he observed, "that our funds were not the only object now to be taken into consideration. The enemy, it was found, were daily gathering strength from the disaffected. This strength, like a snow ball by rolling, would increase, unless some means should be devised to check effectually the progress of their arms. Militia might possibly do it for a little while; but in a little while also, the militia of those states which were frequently called upon would not turn out at all, or would turn out with so much reluctance and sloth, as to amount to the same thing. Instance New Jersey! Witness Pennsylvania! Could any thing but the river Delaware have saved Philadelphia?
"Could any thing," he asked, "be more destructive of the recruiting business than giving ten dollars bounty for six weeks service in the militia, who come in, you can not tell how; go, you can not tell when; and act, you can not tell where; who consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last in a critical moment.
"These, sir," he added, "are the men I am to depend upon ten days hence. This is the basis upon which your cause will rest, and must for ever depend, until you get a large standing army sufficient of itself to oppose the enemy."
[Illustration: Washington Crossing the Delaware
From the painting by Emanuel Leutze, in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York City.
On December 8, 1776, following his retreat across New Jersey, with the British army under Cornwallis pressing him closely, Washington transported his army of 6,000 men across the Delaware into Pennsylvania and to safety. He had seized all the boats within seventy miles, leaving Cornwallis to wait until the river froze over before he could follow.
In recrossing the Delaware (as here depicted) to strike the British at Trenton, Washington executed the most brilliant military maneuver of his career.
In his sesquicentennial address delivered at Cambridge, Massachusetts, July 3, 1925, President Coolidge related this incident which gives us Cornwallis's estimate of the importance of the Trenton victory:
"It is recorded that a few evenings after the surrender of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown a banquet was given by Washington and his staff to the British commander and his staff. One likes to contemplate the sportsmanship of that function. Amiabilities and good wishes were duly exchanged, and finally Lord Cornwallis rose to present his compliments to Washington. There had been much talk of past campaigning experiences, and Cornwallis, turning to Washington, expressed the judgment that when history's verdict was made up 'the brightest garlands for your Excellency will be gathered, not from the shores of the Chesapeake, but from the banks of the Delaware.'"]
He also hinted the idea, extremely delicate in itself, of enlarging his powers so as to enable him to act, without constant applications to congress for their sanction of measures, the immediate adoption of which was essential to the public interests. "This might," he said, "be termed an application for powers too dangerous to be trusted." He could only answer, "that desperate diseases required desperate remedies. He could with truth declare that he felt no lust for power, but wished with as much fervency as any man upon this wide extended continent, for an opportunity of turning the sword into a ploughshare; but his feelings as an officer and a man had been such as to force him to say, that no person ever had a greater choice of difficulties to contend with than himself."
After recapitulating the measures he had adopted, which were not within his power, and urging many other necessary arrangements, he added, "it may be thought I am going a good deal out of the line of my duty to adopt these measures, or to advise thus freely. A character to lose; an estate to forfeit; the inestimable blessing of liberty at stake; and a life devoted, must be my excuse."
The present aspect of American affairs was gloomy in the extreme. The existing army, except a few regiments, affording an effective force of about fifteen hundred men, would dissolve in a few days. New Jersey had, in a great measure, submitted; and the militia of Pennsylvania had not displayed the alacrity expected from them. General Howe would, most probably, avail himself of the ice which would soon form, and of the dissolution of the American army, to pass the Delaware and seize Philadelphia. This event was dreaded, not only on account of its intrinsic importance, but of its peculiar effect at this time, when an army was to be recruited on which the future hopes of America were to rest. It was feared, and with reason, that it would make such an impression on the public mind as to deter the American youth from engaging in a contest becoming desperate.
Impelled by these considerations, General Washington meditated a blow on the British army, while dispersed in its cantonments, which might retrieve the affairs of America in the opinion of the public, and recover the ground that had been lost.
He formed the daring plan of attacking all the British posts on the Delaware at the same instant. If successful in all, or any of these attacks, he hoped not only to wipe off the impression made by his losses, and by his retreat, but also to relieve Philadelphia from immediate danger, and to compel his adversary to compress himself in such a manner as no longer to cover the Jerseys.
The positions taken to guard the river were equally well adapted to offensive operations.
The regulars were posted above Trenton from Yardley's up to Coryell's Ferry. The Pennsylvania flying camp, and Jersey militia, under the command of General Irvine, extended from Yardley's to the ferry opposite Bordentown; and General Cadwallader with the Pennsylvania militia lay still lower down the river.
In the plan of attack which had been digested, it was proposed to cross in the night at M'Konkey's Ferry, about nine miles above Trenton; to march down in two divisions, the one taking the river road, and the other the Pennington road, both which lead into the town; the first, towards that part of the western side which approaches the river, and the last towards the north. This part of the plan was to be executed by the General in person, at the head of about two thousand four hundred continental troops. It was thought practicable to pass them over the river by twelve, and to reach the point of destination by five in the morning of the next day, when the attack was to be made. General Irvine was directed to cross at the Trenton Ferry, and to secure the bridge below the town, in order to prevent the escape of the enemy by that road. General Cadwallader was to pass over at Dunk's Ferry, and carry the post at Mount Holly. It had been in contemplation to unite the troops employed in fortifying Philadelphia, to those at Bristol, and to place the whole under General Putnam; but such indications were given in that city of an insurrection of the royal cause, that this part of the plan was abandoned. The cold on the night of the 25th was very severe. Snow, mingled with hail and rain, fell in great quantities, and so much ice was made in the river that, with every possible exertion, the division conducted by the General in person could not effect its passage until three, nor commence its march down the river till near four. As the distance to Trenton by either road is nearly the same, orders were given to attack at the instant of arrival, and, after driving in the out-guards, to press rapidly after them into the town, and prevent the main body from forming.
[Sidenote: Battle of Trenton.]
{December 26.}
General Washington accompanied the upper column, and arriving at the out-post on that road, precisely at eight, drove it in, and, in three minutes, heard the fire from the column which had taken the river road. The picket guard attempted to keep up a fire while retreating, but was pursued with such ardour as to be unable to make a stand. Colonel Rawle, who commanded in the town, paraded his men, and met the assailants. In the commencement of the action, he was mortally wounded, upon which the troops, in apparent confusion, attempted to gain the road to Princeton. General Washington threw a detachment into their front, while he advanced rapidly on them in person. Finding themselves surrounded, and their artillery already seized, they laid down their arms, and surrendered themselves prisoners of war. About twenty of the enemy were killed, and about one thousand made prisoners. Six field pieces, and a thousand stand of small arms were also taken. On the part of the Americans, two privates were killed; two frozen to death; and one officer, Lieutenant Monroe,[50] of the third Virginia regiment, and three or four privates wounded.
[Footnote 50: Since President of the United States.]
Unfortunately, the ice rendered it impracticable for General Irvine to execute that part of the plan which was allotted to him. With his utmost efforts, he was unable to cross the river; and the road towards Bordentown remained open. About five hundred men, among whom was a troop of cavalry, stationed in the lower end of Trenton, availed themselves of this circumstance, and crossing the bridge in the commencement of the action, escaped down the river. The same cause prevented General Cadwallader from attacking the post at Mount Holly. With great difficulty a part of his infantry passed the river, but returned on its being found absolutely impracticable to cross with the artillery.
Although this plan failed in so many of its parts, the success attending that which was conducted by General Washington in person was followed by the happiest effects.
Had it been practicable for the divisions under Generals Irvine and Cadwallader to cross the river, it was intended to proceed from Trenton to the posts at and about Bordentown, to sweep the British from the banks of the Delaware,[51] and to maintain a position in the Jerseys. But finding that those parts of the plan had failed, and supposing the British to remain in force below, while a strong corps was posted at Princeton, General Washington thought it unadviseable to hazard the loss of the very important advantage already gained, by attempting to increase it, and recrossed the river with his prisoners and military stores. Lieutenant Colonel Baylor, his aid-de-camp, who carried the intelligence of this success to congress, was presented with a horse completely caparisoned for service, and recommended to the command of a regiment of cavalry.
[Footnote 51: A fact has been stated to the author which shows to what an extent the plan might have been executed had it been possible to cross the river. Colonel Reed, who was with the division of Cadwallader, passed the ferry with the van of the infantry, and immediately despatched some trusty persons to examine the situation of the troops at Mount Holly. The report made by his messengers was, that they had looked into several houses in which the soldiers were quartered, and had found them generally fast asleep, under the influence, as was supposed, of the spirituous liquors they had drunk the preceding day, which was Christmas-day. That there appeared to be no apprehension of danger, nor precaution against it.]
Nothing could surpass the astonishment of the British commander at this unexpected display of vigour on the part of the American General. His condition, and that of his country, had been thought desperate. He had been deserted by all the troops having a legal right to leave him; and, to render his situation completely ruinous, nearly two-thirds of the continental soldiers still remaining with him, would be entitled to their discharge on the first day of January. There appeared to be no probability of prevailing on them to continue longer in the service, and the recruiting business was absolutely at an end. The spirits of a large proportion of the people were sunk to the lowest point of depression. New Jersey appeared to be completely subdued; and some of the best judges of the public sentiment were of opinion that immense numbers in Pennsylvania, also, were determined not to permit the sixty days allowed in the proclamation of Lord and Sir William Howe, to elapse, without availing themselves of the pardon it proffered. Instead of offensive operations, the total dispersion of the small remnant of the American army was to be expected, since it would be rendered too feeble by the discharge of those engaged only until the last day of December, to attempt, any longer, the defence of the Delaware, which would by that time, in all probability, be passable on the ice. While every appearance supported these opinions, and the British General, without being sanguine, might well consider the war as approaching its termination, this bold and fortunate enterprise announced to him, that he was contending with an adversary who could never cease to be formidable while the possibility of resistance remained. Finding the conquest of America more distant than had been supposed, he determined, in the depth of winter to recommence active operations; and Lord Cornwallis, who had retired to New York with the intention of embarking for Europe, suspended his departure, and returned to the Jerseys in great force, for the purpose of regaining the ground which had been lost.
Meanwhile, Count Donop, who commanded the troops below Trenton, on hearing the disaster which had befallen Colonel Rawle, retreated by the road leading to Amboy, and joined General Leslie at Princeton. The next day, General Cadwallader crossed the Delaware, with orders to harass the enemy, but to put nothing to hazard until he should be joined by the continental battalions, who were allowed a day or two of repose, after the fatigues of the enterprise against Trenton. General Mifflin joined General Irvine with about fifteen hundred Pennsylvania militia, and those troops also crossed the river.
Finding himself once more at the head of a force with which it seemed practicable to act offensively, the General determined to employ the winter in endeavouring to recover Jersey.
{December 30.}
With this view, he ordered General Heath to leave a small detachment at Peekskill, and with the main body of the New England militia, to enter Jersey, and approach the British cantonments on that side. General Maxwell was ordered, with all the militia he could collect, to harass their flank and rear, and to attack their out-posts on every favourable occasion, while the continental troops, led by himself, recrossed the Delaware, and took post at Trenton. On the last day of December, the regulars of New England were entitled to a discharge. With great difficulty, and a bounty of ten dollars, many of them were induced to renew their engagements for six weeks.
{1777}
{January 1.}
The British were now collected in force at Princeton under Lord Cornwallis; and appearances confirmed the intelligence, secretly[52] obtained, that he intended to attack the American army.
[Footnote 52: In this critical moment, when correct intelligence was so all important, Mr. Robert Morris raised on his private credit in Philadelphia, five hundred pounds in specie, which he transmitted to the Commander-in-chief, who employed it in procuring information not otherwise to have been obtained.]
Generals Mifflin and Cadwallader, who lay at Bordentown and Crosswix, with three thousand six hundred militia, were therefore ordered to join the Commander-in-chief, whose whole effective force, with this addition, did not exceed five thousand men.
{January 2.}
Lord Cornwallis advanced upon him the next morning; and about four in the afternoon, the van of the British army reached Trenton. On its approach, General Washington retired across the Assumpinck, a creek which runs through the town. The British attempted to cross the creek at several places, but finding all the fords guarded, they desisted from the attempt, and kindled their fires. The Americans kindled their fires likewise; and a cannonade was kept up on both sides till dark.
The situation of General Washington was again extremely critical. Should he maintain his position, he would certainly be attacked next morning, by a force so very superior, as to render the destruction of his little army inevitable. Should he attempt to retreat over the Delaware, the passage of that river had been rendered so difficult by a few mild and foggy days which had softened the ice, that a total defeat would be hazarded. In any event, the Jerseys would, once more, be entirely in possession of the enemy; the public mind again be depressed; recruiting discouraged; and Philadelphia, a second time, in the grasp of General Howe.
In this embarrassing state of things, he formed the bold design of abandoning the Delaware, and marching, by a circuitous route, along the left flank of the British army, into its rear, at Princeton, where its strength could not be great; and, after beating the troops at that place, to move rapidly to Brunswick, where the baggage and principal magazines of the army lay under a weak guard. He indulged the hope that this manoeuvre would call the attention of the British general to his own defence. Should Lord Cornwallis, contrary to every reasonable calculation, proceed to Philadelphia, nothing worse could happen in that quarter, than must happen should the American army be driven before him; and some compensation for that calamity would be obtained by expelling the enemy completely from Jersey, and cutting up, in detail, all his parties in that state.
{January 3.}
[Sidenote: Of Princeton.]
This plan being approved by a council of war, preparations were made for its immediate execution. As soon as it was dark, the baggage was removed silently to Burlington; and, about one in the morning, after renewing their fires, and leaving their guards to go the rounds as usual; the army decamped with perfect silence, and took a circuitous route along the Quaker road to Princeton, where three British regiments had encamped the preceding night, two of which commenced their march early in the morning to join the rear of their army at Maidenhead. At sunrise, when they had proceeded about two miles, they saw the Americans on their left, advancing in a direction which would enter the road in their rear. They immediately faced about, and, repassing Stony Brook, moved under cover of a copse of wood towards the American van, which was conducted by General Mercer. A sharp action ensued, which, however, was not of long duration. The militia, of which the advanced party was principally composed, soon gave way; and the few regulars attached to them were not strong enough to maintain their ground. While exerting himself gallantly to rally his broken troops, General Mercer was mortally wounded, and the van was entirely routed. But the fortune of the day was soon changed. The main body, led by General Washington in person, followed close in the rear, and attacked the British with great spirit. Persuaded that defeat would irretrievably ruin the affairs of America, he advanced in the very front of danger, and exposed himself to the hottest fire of the enemy. He was so well supported by the same troops who, a few days before, had saved their country at Trenton, that the British, in turn, were compelled to give way. Their line was broken, and the two regiments separated from each other. Colonel Mawhood, who commanded that in front, and was, consequently, nearest the rear division of the army, under Lord Cornwallis, retired to the main road, and continued his march to Maidenhead. The fifty-fifth regiment, which was on the left, being hard pressed, fled in confusion across the fields into a back road, leading between Hillsborough and Kingston towards Brunswick. The vicinity of the British forces at Maidenhead secured Colonel Mawhood, and General Washington pressed forward to Princeton. The regiment remaining in that place took post in the college, and made a show of resistance; but some pieces of artillery being brought up to play upon that building, it was abandoned, and the greater part of them became prisoners. A few saved themselves by a precipitate flight to Brunswick.
In this engagement, rather more than one hundred British were killed in the field, and near three hundred were taken prisoners. The loss of the Americans, in killed, was somewhat less, but in their number was included General Mercer, a valuable officer, who had served with the Commander-in-chief during his early campaigns in Virginia, and was greatly esteemed by him. Colonels Haslet and Potter, Captain Neal of the artillery, Captain Fleming, and five other valuable officers, were also among the slain.
On the return of day-light, Lord Cornwallis discovered that the American army had decamped in the night; and immediately conceived the whole plan. Alarmed at the danger which threatened Brunswick, he marched with the utmost expedition for that place, and was close in the rear of the American army before it could leave Princeton.
The situation of General Washington was again perilous in the extreme. His small army was exhausted with fatigue. His troops had been without sleep, all of them one night, and some of them, two. They were without blankets, many of them were bare-footed and otherwise thinly clad, and were eighteen miles from his place of destination. He was closely pursued by a superior enemy who must necessarily come up with him before he could accomplish his designs on Brunswick. Under these circumstances he abandoned the remaining part of his original plan, and took the road leading up the country to Pluckemin, where his troops were permitted to refresh themselves. Lord Cornwallis continued his march to Brunswick, which he reached in the course of that night.
The sufferings of the American soldiers had been so great from the severity of the season, and the very active service in which they had been engaged; their complaints, especially on the part of the militia, were so loud; their numbers were reducing so fast by returning home, and by sickness; that General Washington found it impracticable to continue offensive operations. He retired to Morristown, in order to put his men under cover, and to give them some repose.
The bold, judicious, and unexpected attacks made at Trenton and Princeton, had a much more extensive influence than would be supposed from a mere estimate of the killed and taken. They saved Philadelphia for the winter; recovered the state of Jersey; and, which was of still more importance, revived the drooping spirits of the people, and gave a perceptible impulse to the recruiting service throughout the United States.
The problem, that a nation can be defended against a permanent force, by temporary armies, by occasional calls of the husbandman from his plough to the field, was completely disproved; and, in demonstrating its fallacy, the independence of America had nearly perished in its cradle. The utmost efforts were now directed to the creation of an army for the ensuing campaign, as the only solid basis on which the hopes of the patriot could rest. During the retreat through the Jerseys, and while the expectation prevailed that no effectual resistance could be made to the British armies, some spirited men indeed were animated to greater and more determined exertions; but this state of things produced a very different effect on the great mass, which can alone furnish the solid force of armies. In the middle states especially, the panic of distrust was perceived. Doubts concerning the issue of the contest became extensive; and the recruiting service proceeded so heavily and slowly as to excite the most anxious solicitude for the future.
The affairs of Trenton and Princeton were magnified into great victories; and were believed by the body of the people to evidence the superiority of their army and of their general. The opinion that they were engaged in hopeless contest, yielded to a confidence that proper exertions would ensure ultimate success.
This change of opinion was accompanied with an essential change of conduct; and, although the regiments required by congress were not completed, they were made much stronger than was believed to be possible before this happy revolution in the aspect of public affairs.
[Sidenote: Firmness of Congress.]
The firmness of congress throughout the gloomy and trying period which intervened between the loss of fort Washington and the battle of Princeton, gives the members of that time a just claim to the admiration of the world, and to the gratitude of their fellow citizens. Undismayed by impending dangers, they did not, for an instant, admit the idea of surrendering the independence they had declared, and purchasing peace by returning to their colonial situation. As the British army advanced through Jersey, and the consequent insecurity of Philadelphia rendered an adjournment from that place a necessary measure of precaution, their exertions seemed to increase with their difficulties. They sought to remove the despondence which was seizing and paralyzing the public mind, by an address to the states, in which every argument was suggested which could rouse them to vigorous action. They made the most strenuous efforts to animate the militia, and impel them to the field, by the agency of those whose popular eloquence best fitted them for such a service.
{1776}
{December 20.}
When reassembled at Baltimore, the place to which they had adjourned, their resolutions exhibited no evidence of confusion or dismay; and the most judicious efforts were made to repair the mischief produced by past errors.
{December 27.}
Declaring that, in the present state of things, the very existence of civil liberty depended on the right execution of military powers, to a vigorous direction of which, distant, numerous, and deliberative bodies were unequal, they authorized General Washington to raise sixteen additional regiments, and conferred upon him, for six months, almost unlimited powers for the conduct of the war.
Towards the close of 1776, while the tide of fortune was running strongest against them, some few members, distrusting their ability to make a successful resistance, proposed to authorize their commissioners at the court of Versailles to transfer to France the same monopoly of their trade which Great Britain had possessed.[53] This proposition is stated to have been relinquished, because it was believed that concessions of this kind would impair many arguments which had been used in favour of independence, and disunite the people. It was next proposed to offer a monopoly of certain enumerated articles; but the unequal operation of this measure gave to the proposition a speedy negative. Some proposed offering to France an offensive and defensive league; but this also was rejected. The more enlightened members argued that, though the friendship of small states might be purchased, that of France could not. They alleged that, if she would risk a war with Great Britain by openly espousing their cause, she would not be induced to that measure by the prospect of direct advantages, so much as by a desire to lessen the overgrown power of a dangerous rival.[54] It was therefore urged that the most certain means of influencing France to interfere, was an assurance that the United States were determined to persevere in refusing to resume their former allegiance. Under the influence of this better opinion, resolutions were again entered into, directing their commissioners in Europe to give explicit assurances of their determination at all events to maintain their independence. Copies of these resolutions were sent to the principal courts of Europe; and agents were appointed to solicit their friendship to the new formed states.[55] These despatches fell into the hands of the British, and were published by them; a circumstance which promoted the views of congress, who were persuaded that an apprehension of their coming to an accommodation with Great Britain constituted a material objection to the interference of foreign courts, in what was represented as merely a domestic quarrel. A resolution adopted in the deepest distress, to listen to no terms of reunion with their parent state, would, it was believed, convince those who wished for the dismemberment of the British empire, that sound policy required their interference so far as to prevent the conquest of the United States.
[Footnote 53: Ramsay.]
[Footnote 54: Ramsay.]
[Footnote 55: Secret Journals of Congress, vol. ii. p. 38, and post.]
CHAPTER VII.
American army inoculated.... General Heath moves to Kingsbridge.... Returns to Peekskill.... Destruction of stores at Peekskill.... At Danbury.... Expedition to Sagg Harbour.... Camp formed at Middlebrook.... Sir William Howe moves out to Somerset Court House.... Returns to Amboy.... Attempts to cut off the retreat of the American army to Middlebrook.... Lord Cornwallis skirmishes with Lord Stirling.... General Prescot surprised and taken.... The British army embarks.
{1777}
The effect of the proclamation published by Lord and General Howe on taking possession of New Jersey, was, in a great degree, counteracted by the conduct of the invading army. Fortunately for the United States, the hope that security was attainable by submission, was soon dissipated. Whatever may have been the exertions of their General to restrain his soldiers, they still considered and treated the inhabitants rather as conquered rebels than returning friends. Indulging in every species of licentiousness, the plunder and destruction of property were among the least offensive of the injuries they inflicted. The persons, not only of the men, but of that sex through which indignities least to be forgiven, and longest to be remembered, are received, were exposed to the most irritating outrage. Nor were these excesses confined to those who had been active in the American cause. The lukewarm, and even the loyalists, were the victims of this indiscriminating spirit of rapine and violence. |
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