17. There are some who have put forth an account, stating, that when in the territory of Beneventum, near the river Calor, having gone out from his camp with his lictors and three servants, for the purpose of bathing, he was slain while naked and unarmed, and endeavouring to defend himself with the stones which the river brought down, by a party of the enemy which happened to be concealed among the osiers which grew upon the banks. Others state, that having gone out five hundred paces from the camp, at the instance of the aruspices, in order to expiate the prodigies before mentioned on unpolluted ground, he was cut off by two troops of Numidians who happened to be lying in ambush there. So different are the accounts respecting the place and manner of the death of so illustrious and distinguished a man. Various also are the accounts of the funeral of Gracchus. Some say that he was buried by his own friends in the Roman camp; others relate, and this is the more generally received account, that a funeral pile was erected by Hannibal, in the entrance of the Carthaginian camp; that the troops under arms performed evolutions, with the dances of the Spaniards, and motions of the arms and body, which were customary with the several nations; while Hannibal himself celebrated his obsequies with every mark of respect, both in word and deed. Such is the account of those who assert that the affair occurred in Lucania. If you are disposed to credit the statement of those who relate that he was slain at the river Calor, the enemy got possession only of the head of Gracchus; which being brought to Hannibal, he immediately despatched Carthalo to convey it into the Roman camp to Cneius Cornelius, the quaestor, who buried the general in the camp, the Beneventans joining the army in the celebration.

18. The consuls having entered the Campanian territory, while devastating the country on all sides, were alarmed, and thrown into confusion, by an eruption of the townsmen and Mago with his cavalry. They called in their troops to their standards from the several quarters to which they were dispersed, but having been routed when they had scarcely formed their line, they lost above fifteen hundred men. The confidence of the Campanians, who were naturally presumptuous, became excessive in consequence of this event, and in many battles they challenged the Romans; but this one battle, which they had been incautiously and imprudently drawn into, had increased the vigilance of the consuls. Their spirits were restored, while the presumption of the other party was diminished, by one trifling occurrence; but in war nothing is so inconsiderable as not to be capable, sometimes, of producing important consequences. Titus Quinctius Crispinus was a guest of Badius, a Campanian, united with him by the greatest intimacy. Their acquaintance had increased from the circumstance of Badius having received the most liberal and kind attentions at the house of Crispinus, in a fit of illness, at Rome, before the Campanian revolt. On the present occasion, Badius, advancing in front of the guards, which were stationed before the gate, desired Crispinus to be called; and Crispinus, on being informed of this, thinking that a friendly and familiar interview was requested, and the memory of their private connexion remaining even amidst the disruption of public ties, advanced a little from the rest. When they had come within view of each other, Badius exclaimed, "I challenge you to combat, Crispinus; let us mount our horses, and making the rest withdraw, let us try which is the better soldier." In reply, Crispinus said, that "neither of them were in want of enemies to display their valour upon; for his own part, even if he should meet him in the field he would turn aside, lest he should pollute his right-hand with the blood of a guest;" and then turning round, was going away. But the Campanian, with increased presumption, began to charge him with cowardice and effeminacy, and cast upon him reproaches which he deserved himself, calling him "an enemy who sheltered himself under the title of host, and one who pretended to spare him for whom he knew himself not to be a match. If he considered; that when public treaties were broken, the ties of private connexion were not severed with them, then Badius the Campanian openly, and in the hearing of both armies, renounced his connexion of hospitality with Titus Quinctius Crispinus the Roman. He said, that there could exist no fellowship or alliance with him and an enemy whose country and tutelary gods, both public and private, he had come to fight against. If he was a man, he would meet him." Crispinus hesitated for a long time; but the men of his troop at length prevailed upon him not to allow the Campanian to insult him with impunity. Waiting, therefore, only to ask his generals whether they would allow him to fight, contrary to rule, with an enemy who had challenged him; having obtained their permission, he mounted his horse, and addressing Badius by name, called him out to the combat. The Campanian made no delay. They engaged with their horses excited to hostility. Crispinus transfixed Badius with his spear in the left shoulder, over his shield. He fell from his horse in consequence of the wound; and Crispinus leaped down to despatch him as he lay, on foot. But Badius, before his enemy was upon him, ran off to his friends, leaving his horse and buckler. Crispinus, decorated with the spoils, and displaying the horse and arms which he had seized together with the bloody spear, was conducted amid the loud plaudits and congratulations of the soldiery into the presence of the consuls, where he was highly commended, and was presented with gifts.

19. Hannibal, having moved his camp from the territory of Beneventum to Capua, drew out his troops in order of battle the third day after his arrival; not entertaining the least doubt but that, as the Campanians had fought successfully a few days ago when he was absent, the Romans would be still less able to withstand him and his army, which had been so often victorious. After the battle had commenced, the Roman line was distressed chiefly from the attack of the cavalry, being overwhelmed with their darts, till the signal was given to the Roman cavalry to direct their horses against the enemy; thus it was a battle of the cavalry. But at this time the Sempronian army, commanded by Cneius Cornelius the quaestor, being descried at a distance, excited alarm in both parties equally, lest those who were approaching should be fresh enemies. As if by concert, therefore, both sounded a retreat; and the troops were withdrawn from the field to their camps, in an equal condition; a greater number, however, of the Romans fell in the first charge of the cavalry. The consuls, to divert the attention of Hannibal from Capua, departed thence on the following night in different directions, Fulvius into the territory of Cuma, Claudius into Lucania. The next day Hannibal, having received intelligence that the camp of the Romans was deserted, and that they had gone off in different directions in two divisions, doubtful at first which he should follow, commenced the pursuit of Appius; who, after leading him about whichever way he pleased, returned by another route to Capua. Hannibal, while in this quarter, had another opportunity of gaining an advantage. Marcus Centenius, surnamed Penula, was distinguished among the centurions of the first rank by the size of his person, and his courage. Having gone through his period of service, he was introduced to the senate by Publius Cornelius Sulla, when he requested of the fathers that five thousand men might be placed at his disposal. He said, that "as he was acquainted with the character of the enemy, and the nature of the country, he should speedily perform some service; and that he would employ those arts by which our generals and armies had been hitherto ensnared against the inventor of them." This was not promised more foolishly than it was believed; as if the qualifications of a soldier and a general were the same. Instead of five, eight thousand men were given him, half Romans, half allies. He himself also got together a considerable number of volunteers, in the country, on his march; and having almost doubled his force, arrived in Lucania, where Hannibal had halted after having in vain pursued Claudius. No doubt could be entertained of the issue of a contest which was to take place between Hannibal, as general on one side, and a centurion on the other; between armies, one of which had grown old in victory, the other entirely inexperienced, and for the most part even tumultuary and half-armed. As soon as the troops came within sight of each other, and neither of them declined an engagement, the lines were formed. The battle, notwithstanding the utter disparity of the contending parties, lasted more than two hours, the Roman troops acting with the greatest spirit as long as their general survived. But after that he had fallen, for he continually exposed himself to the weapons of the enemy, not only from regard to his former character, but through fear of the disgrace which would attach to him if he survived a disaster occasioned by his own temerity, the Roman line was immediately routed. But so completely were they prevented from flying, every way being beset by the cavalry, that scarcely a thousand men escaped out of so large an army; the rest were destroyed on all hands, in one way or other.

20. The siege of Capua was now resumed by the consuls with the utmost energy. Every thing requisite for the business was conveyed thither and got in readiness. A store of corn was collected at Casilinum; at the mouth of the Vulturnus, where a town now stands, a strong post was fortified; and a garrison was stationed in Puteoli, which Fabius had formerly fortified, in order to have the command of the neighbouring sea and the river. Into these two maritime forts, the corn recently sent from Sicily, with that which Marcus Junius, the praetor, had bought up in Etruria, was conveyed from Ostia, to supply the army during the winter. But, in addition to the disaster sustained in Lucania, the army also of volunteer slaves, who had served during the life of Gracchus with the greatest fidelity, as if discharged from service by the death of their general, left their standards. Hannibal was not willing that Capua should be neglected, or his allies deserted, at so critical a juncture; but, having obtained such success from the temerity of one Roman general, his attention was fixed on the opportunity which presented itself of crushing the other general and his army. Ambassadors from Apulia reported that Cneius Fulvius, the praetor, had at first conducted his measures with caution, while engaged in besieging certain towns of Apulia, which had revolted to Hannibal; but that afterwards, in consequence of extraordinary success, both himself and his soldiers, being glutted with booty, had so given themselves up to licentiousness and indolence, that all military discipline was disregarded. Having frequently on other occasions, as well as but a few days ago, experienced what an army was good for, when conducted by an unskilful commander, he moved his camp into Apulia.

21. The Roman legions, and the praetor, Fulvius, were in the neighbourhood of Herdonia, where, receiving intelligence of the approach of the enemy, they had nearly torn up the standards and gone out to battle without the praetor's orders; nor did any thing tend more to prevent it than the assured hope they entertained that they could do so whenever they pleased, consulting only their own will. The following night, Hannibal having obtained information that the camp was in a state of tumult, and that most of the troops were in a disorderly manner urging the general to give the signal, and calling out to arms, and therefore feeling convinced that an opportunity presented itself for a successful battle, distributed three thousand light troops in the houses in the neighbourhood, and among the thorns and woods. These, on a signal being given, were to rise up from their lurking-place with one accord; and Mago, with about two thousand horse, was ordered to occupy all the roads in the direction in which he supposed their flight would be directed. Having made these preparations during the night, he led his troops into the field at break of day. Nor did Fulvius decline the challenge; not so much from any hope of success entertained by himself, as drawn by the blind impetuosity of his soldiers. Accordingly, the line itself was formed with the same want of caution with which they entered the field, agreeably to the whim of the soldiers, who came up as chance directed, and took their stations just where they pleased; which they afterwards abandoned, as fear or caprice suggested. The first legion and the left wing of the allied troops were drawn up in front. The line was extended to a great length, the tribunes remonstrating, that there was no strength in it, and that wherever the enemy made the charge they would break through it: but no salutary advice reached their minds, nor even their ears. Hannibal was now come up, a general of a totally different character, with an army neither similar in its nature, nor similarly marshalled. The consequence was, that the Romans did not so much as sustain their shout and first attack. Their general, equal to Centenius in folly and temerity, but by no means to be compared with him in courage, when he saw things going against him, and his troops in confusion, hastily mounting his horse, fled from the field with about two hundred horsemen. The rest of the troops, beaten in front, and surrounded on the flank and rear, were slaughtered to such a degree, that out of eighteen thousand men, not more than two thousand escaped. The enemy got possession of the camp.

22. When these disastrous defeats, happening one upon another, were reported at Rome, great grief and consternation seized the city. But still, as the consuls had been hitherto successful when it was most important, they were the less affected by these disasters. Caius Lastorius and Marcus Metilius were sent as ambassadors to the consuls, with directions carefully to collect the remains of the two armies, and use every endeavour to prevent their surrendering themselves to the enemy, through fear or despair, (which was the case after the battle of Cannae,) and to search for the deserters from the army of volunteer slaves. Publius Cornelius was charged with the same business; to him also the levy was intrusted. He caused an order to be issued throughout the market and smaller towns, that search should be made for the volunteer slaves, and that they should be brought back to their standards. All these things were executed with the most vigilant care. The consul, Appius Claudius, having placed Decius Junius in command at the mouth of the Vulturnus, and Marcus Aurelius Cotta at Puteoli, with directions to send off the corn immediately to the camp, as each of the ships from Etruria and Sardinia arrived with it, returned himself to Capua, and found his colleague Quintus Fulvius at Casilinum, conveying every requisite thence, and making every preparation for the siege of Capua. Both of them then joined in besieging the city, summoning Claudius Nero, the praetor, from the Claudian camp at Suessula; who, leaving a small garrison there, marched down to Capua with all the rest of his forces. Thus there were three generals' tents erected round Capua; and three armies, applying themselves to the work in different parts, proceeded to surround the city with a ditch and rampart, erecting forts at moderate intervals. The Campanians attempting to obstruct the work, a battle was fought in several places at once; the consequence of which was, that at length the Campanians confined themselves within their gates and walls. Before, however, these works were carried quite round, ambassadors were sent to Hannibal to complain that Capua was abandoned, and almost given up to the Romans, and to implore him, that he would now, at least, bring them assistance, when they were not only besieged, but surrounded by a rampart. A letter was sent to the consuls from Publius Cornelius, the praetor, directing that before they completely enclosed Capua with their works, they should grant permission to such of the Campanians as chose to quit Capua, and take their property with them. That those should retain their liberty, and all their possessions, who quitted it before the ides of March, but that those who quitted it after that day, as well as those who continued there, would be considered as enemies. Proclamation was made to the Campanians to this effect, but it was received with such scorn, that they spontaneously used insulting language and menaces. Hannibal had marched his legions from Herdonea to Tarentum, with the hope of getting possession of the citadel of that place, by force or stratagem. But not succeeding there, he turned his course to Brundusium, thinking that town would be betrayed to him, but, while fruitlessly spending time there also, the Campanian ambassadors came to him with complaints and entreaties. Hannibal answered them in a proud manner, that he had before raised the siege of Capua, and that now the consuls would not sustain his approach. The ambassadors, dismissed with these hopes, with difficulty effected their return to Capua, which was by this time surrounded by a double trench and rampart.

23. At the time when the circumvallation of Capua was carrying on with the greatest activity, the siege of Syracuse, which had been forwarded by intestine treachery, in addition to the efforts and bravery of the general and his army, was brought to a conclusion. For in the beginning of spring, Marcellus being in doubt whether he should direct the operations of the war against Himilco and Hippocrates at Agrigentum, or press the siege of Syracuse, though he saw that it was impossible to take the city by force, which, from its situation, both with respect to sea and land, was impregnable, nor by famine, as it was supported by an uninterrupted supply of provisions from Carthage, yet that he might leave no course untried, directed the Syracusan deserters (and there were in the Roman camp some men in this situation of the highest rank, who had been driven out of the city during the defection from the Romans, because they were averse to a change of measures) to sound the feelings of those who were of the same party in conferences, and to promise them, that if Syracuse was delivered up, they should have their liberty, and be governed by their own laws. There was no opportunity however, of having a conference; for as many were suspected of disaffection, the attention and observation of all were exerted, lest any thing of the kind should occur unknown to them. One of the exiles, who was a servant, having been allowed to enter the city in the character of a deserter, assembled a few persons, and opened a conversation upon the subject. After this, certain persons, covering themselves with nets in a fishing smack, were in this way conveyed round to the Roman camp, and conferred with the fugitives. The same was frequently repeated by different parties, one after another; and at last they amounted to eighty. But after every thing had been concerted for betraying the city, the plot was reported to Epicydes, by one Attalus, who felt hurt that he had not been intrusted with the secret; and they were all put to death with torture. This attempt having miscarried, another hope was immediately raised. One Damippus, a Lacedaemonian, who had been sent from Syracuse to king Philip, had been taken prisoner by the Roman fleet. Epicydes was particularly anxious to ransom this man above any other; nor was Marcellus disinclined to grant it; the Romans, even at this time, being desirous of gaining the friendship of the Aetolians, with whom the Lacedaemonians were in alliance. Some persons having been sent to treat respecting his ransom, the most central and convenient place to both parties for this purpose appeared to be at the Trogilian port, near the tower called Galeagra. As they went there several times, one of the Romans, having a near view of the wall, and having determined its height, as nearly as it could be done by conjecture, from counting the stones, and by forming an estimate, in his own mind, what was the height of each stone in the face of the work; and having come to the conclusion that it was considerably lower than he himself and all the rest had supposed it, and that it was capable of being scaled with ladders of moderate size, laid the matter before Marcellus. It appeared a thing not to be neglected; but as the spot could not be approached, being on this very account guarded with extraordinary care, a favourable opportunity of doing it was sought for. This a deserter suggested, who brought intelligence that the Syracusans were celebrating the festival of Diana; that it was to last three days, and that as there was a deficiency of other things during the siege, the feasts would be more profusely celebrated with wine, which was furnished by Epicydes to the people in general, and distributed through the tribes by persons of distinction. When Marcellus had received this intelligence, he communicated it to a few of the military tribunes; then having selected, through their means, such centurions and soldiers as had courage and energy enough for so important an enterprise, and having privately gotten together a number of scaling-ladders, he directed that a signal should be given to the rest of the troops to take their refreshment, and go to rest early, for they were to go upon an expedition that night. Then the time, as it was supposed, having arrived, when, after having feasted from the middle of the day, they would have had their fill of wine, and have begun to sleep, he ordered the soldiers of one company to proceed with the ladders, while about a thousand armed men were in silence marched to the spot in a slender column. The foremost having mounted the wall, without noise or confusion, the others followed in order; the boldness of the former inspiring even the irresolute with courage.

24. The thousand armed men had now taken a part of the city, when the rest, applying a greater number of ladders, mounted the wall on a signal given from the Hexapylos. To this place the former party had arrived in entire solitude; as the greater part of them, having feasted in the towers, were either asleep from the effects of wine, or else, half asleep, were still drinking. A few of them, however, they surprised in their beds, and put to the sword. They began then to break open a postern gate near the Hexapylos, which required great force; and a signal was given from the wall by sounding a trumpet, as had been agreed upon. After this, the attack was carried on in every quarter, not secretly, but by open force; for they had now reached Epipolae, a place protected by numerous guards, where the business was to terrify the enemy, and not to escape their notice. In effect they were terrified; for as soon as the sound of the trumpets was heard, and the shouts of the men who had got possession of the walls and a part of the city, the guards concluded that every part was taken, and some of them fled along the wall, others leaped down from it, or were thrown down headlong by a crowd of the terrified townsmen. A great part of the inhabitants, however, were ignorant of this disastrous event, all of them being overpowered with wine and sleep; and because, in a city of so wide extent, what was perceived in one quarter was not readily made known through the whole city. A little before day, Marcellus having entered the city with all his forces, through the Hexapylos, which was forced open roused all the townsmen; who ran to arms, in order, if possible, by their efforts, to afford succour to the city, which was now almost taken. Epicydes advanced with a body of troops at a rapid pace from the Insula, which the Syracusans themselves call Nasos, not doubting but that he should be able to drive out what he supposed a small party, which had got over the wall through the negligence of the guards. He earnestly represented to the terrified inhabitants who met him, that they were increasing the confusion, and that in their accounts they made things greater and more important than they really were. But when he perceived that every place around Epipolae was filled with armed men, after just teasing the enemy with the discharge of a few missiles, he marched back to the Achradina, not so much through fear of the number and strength of the enemy, as that some intestine treachery might show itself, taking advantage of the opportunity, and he might find the gates of the Achradina and island closed upon him in the confusion. When Marcellus, having entered the walls, beheld this city as it lay subjected to his view from the high ground on which he stood, a city the most beautiful, perhaps, of any at that time, he is said to have shed tears over it; partly from the inward satisfaction he felt at having accomplished so important an enterprise, and partly in consideration of its ancient renown. The fleets of the Athenians sunk there, and two vast armies destroyed, with two generals of the highest reputation, as well as the many wars waged with the Carthaginians with so much peril arose before his mind; the many and powerful tyrants and kings; but above all Hiero, a king who was not only fresh in his memory, but who was distinguished for the signal services he had rendered the Roman people, and more than all by the endowments which his own virtues and good fortune had conferred. All these considerations presenting themselves at once to his recollection, and reflecting, that in an instant every thing before him would be in flames, and reduced to ashes; before he marched his troops to the Achradina, he sent before him some Syracusans, who, as was before observed, were among the Roman troops, to induce the enemy, by a persuasive address, to surrender the city.

25. The gates and walls of the Achradina were occupied principally by deserters, who had no hopes of pardon in case of capitulation. These men would neither suffer those who were sent to approach the walls, nor to address them. Marcellus, therefore, on the failure of this attempt, gave orders to retire to the Euryalus, which is an eminence at the extremity of the city, at the farthest point from the sea, and commanding the road leading into the fields and the interior of the island, and is conveniently situated for the introduction of supplies. This fort was commanded by Philodemus, an Argive, who was placed in this situation by Epicydes. Marcellus sent Sosis, one of the regicides, to him. After a long conversation, being put off for the purpose of frustrating him, he brought back word to Marcellus, that Philodemus had taken time to deliberate. This man postponing his answer day after day, till Hippocrates and Himilco should quit their present position, and come up with their legions; not doubting but that if he should receive them into the fort, the Roman army, shut up as it was within the walls, might be annihilated, Marcellus, who saw that the Euryalus would neither be delivered up to him, nor could be taken by force, pitched his camp between Neapolis and Tycha, which are names of divisions of the city, and are in themselves like cities; fearful lest if he entered populous parts of the city, he should not be able to restrain his soldiers, greedy of plunder, from running up and down after it. When three ambassadors came to him from Tycha and Neapolis with fillets and other badges of supplicants, imploring him to abstain from fire and slaughter, Marcellus, having held a council respecting these entreaties, for so they were, rather than demands, ordered his soldiers, according to the unanimous opinion of the council, not to offer violence to any free person, but told them that every thing else might be their booty. The walls of the houses forming a protection for his camp, he posted guards and parties of troops at the gates, which were exposed, as they faced the streets, lest any attack should be made upon his camp while the soldiers were dispersed in pursuit of plunder. After these arrangements, on a signal given, the soldiers dispersed for that purpose; and though they broke open doors and every place resounded in consequence of the alarm and confusion created, they nevertheless refrained from blood. They did not desist from plunder till they had gutted the houses of all the property which had been accumulated during a long period of prosperity. Meanwhile, Philodemus also, who despaired of obtaining assistance, having received a pledge that he might return to Epicydes in safety, withdrew the garrison, and delivered up the fortress to the Romans. While the attention of all was engaged by the tumult occasioned in that part of the city which was captured, Bomilcar, taking advantage of the night, when, from the violence of the weather the Roman fleet was unable to ride at anchor in the deep, set out from the bay of Syracuse, with thirty-five ships, and sailed away into the main without interruption; leaving fifty-five ships for Epicydes and the Syracusans; and having informed the Carthaginians in what a critical situation Syracuse was placed, returned, after a few days, with a hundred ships; having, as report says, received many presents from Epicydes out of the treasure of Hiero.

26. Marcellus, by gaining possession of the Euryalus, and placing a garrison in it, was freed from one cause of anxiety; which was, lest any hostile force received into that fortress on his rear might annoy his troops, shut up and confined as they were within the walls. He next invested the Achradina, erecting three camps in convenient situations, with the hope of reducing those enclosed within it to the want of every necessary. The outposts of both sides had remained inactive for several days, when the arrival of Hippocrates and Himilco suddenly caused the Romans to be attacked aggressively on all sides; for Hippocrates, having fortified a camp at the great harbour, and given a signal to those who occupied the Achradina, attacked the old camp of the Romans, in which Crispinus had the command; and Epicydes sallied out against the outposts of Marcellus, the Carthaginian fleet coming up to that part of the shore which lay between the city and the Roman camp, so that no succour could be sent by Marcellus to Crispinus. The enemy, however, produced more tumult than conflict; for Crispinus not only drove back Hippocrates from his works, but pursued him as he fled with precipitation, while Marcellus drove Epicydes into the city; and it was considered that enough was now done even to prevent any danger arising in future from their sudden sallies. They were visited too by a plague; a calamity extending to both sides, and one which might well divert their attention from schemes of war. For as the season of the year was autumn, and the situation naturally unwholesome, though this was much more the case without than within the city, the intolerable intensity of the heat had an effect upon the constitution of almost every man in both the camps. At first they sickened and died from the unhealthiness of the season and climate; but afterwards the disease was spread merely by attending upon, and coming in contact with, those affected; so that those who were seized with it either perished neglected and deserted, or else drew with them those who sat by them and attended them, by infecting them with the same violence of disease. Daily funerals and death were before the eye; and lamentations were heard from all sides, day and night. At last, their feelings had become so completely brutalized by being habituated to these miseries, that they not only did not follow their dead with tears and decent lamentations, but they did not even carry them out and bury them; so that the bodies of the dead lay strewed about, exposed to the view of those who were awaiting a similar fate; and thus the dead were the means of destroying the sick, and the sick those who were in health, both by fear and by the filthy state and the noisome stench of their bodies. Some preferring to die by the sword, even rushed alone upon the outposts of the enemy. The violence of the plague, however, was much greater in the Carthaginian than the Roman army; for the latter, from having been a long time before Syracuse, had become more habituated to the climate and the water. Of the army of the enemy, the Sicilians, as soon as they perceived that diseases had become very common from the unwholesomeness of the situation, dispersed to their respective cities in the neighbourhood; but the Carthaginians, who had no place to retire to, perished, together with their generals, Hippocrates and Himilco, to a man. Marcellus, on seeing the violence with which the disease was raging, had removed his troops into the city, where their debilitated frames were recruited in houses and shade. Many however, of the Roman army were cut off by this pestilence.

27. The land forces of the Carthaginians being thus destroyed, the Sicilians, who had served under Hippocrates retired to two towns of no great size, but well secured by natural situation and fortifications; one was three miles, the other fifteen, from Syracuse. Here they collected a store of provisions from their own states, and sent for reinforcements. Meanwhile, Bomilcar, who had gone a second time to Carthage, by so stating the condition of their allies as to inspire a hope that they might not only render them effectual aid, but also that the Romans might in a manner be made prisoners in the city which they had captured, induced the Carthaginians to send with him as many ships of burden as possible, laden with every kind of provisions, and to augment the number of his ships. Setting sail, therefore, from Carthage with a hundred and thirty men of war and seven hundred transports, he had tolerably fair winds for crossing over to Sicily, but was prevented by the same wind from doubling Cape Pachynum. The news of the approach of Bomilcar, and afterwards his unexpected delay, excited alternate fear and joy in the Romans and Syracusans. Epicydes, apprehensive lest if the same wind which now detained him should continue to blow from the east for several days, the Carthaginian fleet would return to Africa, put the Achradina in the hands of the generals of the mercenary troops, and sailed to Bomilcar; whom he at length prevailed upon to try the issue of a naval battle, though he found him with his fleet stationed in the direction of Africa, and afraid of fighting, not so much because he was unequal in the strength or the number of his ships, for he had more than the Romans, as because the wind was more favourable to the Roman fleet than to his own. Marcellus also seeing that an army of Sicilians was assembling from every part of the island, and that the Carthaginian fleet was approaching with a great want of supplies, though inferior in the number of his ships, resolved to prevent Bomilcar from coming to Syracuse, lest, blocked up in the city of his enemies, he should be pressed both by sea and land. The two hostile fleets were stationed near the promontory of Pachynum, ready to engage as soon as the sea should become calm enough to admit of their sailing out into the deep. Accordingly, the east wind, which had blown violently for several days, now subsiding, Bomilcar got under sail first, his van seeming to make for the main sea, in order to double the promontory with greater ease; but seeing the Roman ships bearing down upon him, terrified by some unexpected occurrence, it is not known what, he sailed away into the main sea; and sending messengers to Heraclea, to order the transports to return to Africa, he passed along the coast of Sicily and made for Tarentum. Epicydes, thus suddenly disappointed in such great expectations, to avoid returning to endeavour to raise the siege of a city, a great part of which was already in the hands of the enemy, sailed to Agrigentum, intending to wait the issue of the contest, rather than take any new measures when there.

28. Intelligence of these events having been carried into the camp of the Sicilians, that Epicydes had departed from Syracuse, that the island was deserted by the Carthaginians, and almost again delivered up to the Romans; after sounding the inclinations of the besieged in conferences, they sent ambassadors to Marcellus, to treat about terms of capitulation. They had not much difficulty in coming to an agreement, that all the parts of the island which had been under the dominion of their kings should be ceded to the Romans; that the rest, with their liberty and their own laws, should be preserved to the Sicilians. They then invited to a conference the persons who had been intrusted with the management of affairs by Epicydes; to whom they said, that they were sent from the army of the Sicilians, at once to Marcellus and to them, that both those who were besieged and those who were not might share the same fortune; and that neither of them might stipulate any thing for themselves separately. They were then allowed to enter, in order to converse with their relations and friends; when, laying before them the terms which they had made with Marcellus, and holding out to them a hope of safety, they induced them to join with them in an attack upon the prefects of Epicydes, Polyclitus, Philistion, and Epicydes, surnamed Sindon. Having put them to death, they summoned the multitude to an assembly; and after complaining of the famine, at which they had been accustomed to express their dissatisfaction to each other in secret, they said, that "although they were pressed by so many calamities, they had no right to accuse Fortune, because it was at their own option how long they should continue to suffer them. That the motive which the Romans had in besieging Syracuse was affection for the Syracusans, and not hatred; for when they heard that the government was usurped by Hippocrates and Epicydes, the creatures first of Hannibal and then of Hieronymus, they took arms and began to besiege the city, in order to reduce not the city itself, but its cruel tyrants. But now that Hippocrates is slain, Epicydes shut out of Syracuse, his praefects put to death, and the Carthaginians driven from the entire possession of Sicily by sea and land, what reason can the Romans have left why they should not desire the preservation of Syracuse, in the same manner as they would if Hiero were still lining, who cultivated the friendship of Rome with unequalled fidelity? That, therefore, neither the city nor its inhabitants were in any danger, except from themselves, if they neglected an opportunity of restoring themselves to the favour of the Romans; and that no so favourable a one would ever occur as that which presented itself at the present instant, immediately upon its appearing that they were delivered from their insolent tyrants."

29. This speech was received with the most unqualified approbation of all present. It was resolved, however, that praetors should be elected before the nomination of deputies; which being done, some of the praetors themselves were sent as deputies to Marcellus, the chief of whom thus addressed him: "Neither in the first instance did we Syracusans revolt from you, but Hieronymus, whose impiety towards you was by no means so great as towards us; nor afterwards was it any Syracusan who disturbed the peace established by the death of the tyrant, but Hippocrates and Epicydes, creatures of the tyrant; while we were overpowered, on the one hand by fear, and on the other by treachery. Nor can any one say that there ever was a time when we were in possession of our liberty, when we were not also at peace with you. In the present instance, manifestly, as soon as ever we became our own masters, by the death of those persons who held Syracuse in subjection, we lost no time in coming to deliver up our arms, to surrender ourselves, our city, and our walls, and to refuse no conditions which you shall impose upon us. To you, Marcellus, the gods have given the glory of having captured the most renowned and beautiful of the Grecian cities. Every memorable exploit which we have at any time achieved by land or sea accrues to the splendour of your triumph. Would you wish that it should be known only by fame, how great a city has been captured by you, rather than that she should stand as a monument even to posterity; so that to every one who visits her by sea or land, she may point out at one time our trophies gained from the Athenians and Carthaginians, at another time those which you have gained from us; and that you should transmit Syracuse unimpaired to your family, to be kept under the protection and patronage of the race of the Marcelli? Let not the memory of Hieronymus have greater weight with you than that of Hiero. The latter was your friend for a much longer period than the former was your enemy. From the latter you have realized even benefits, while the frenzy of Hieronymus only brought ruin upon himself." At the hands of the Romans all things were obtainable and secure. There was a greater disposition to war, and more danger to be apprehended among themselves; for the deserters, thinking that they were delivered up to the Romans, induced the mercenary auxiliaries to entertain the same apprehension; and hastily seizing their arms, they first put the praetors to death, and then ran through the city to massacre the Syracusans. In their rage they slew all whom chance threw in their way, and plundered every thing which presented itself; and then, lest they should have no leaders, they elected six praetors, so that three might have the command in the Achradina, and three in the island. At length, the tumult having subsided, and the mercenary troops having ascertained, by inquiry, what had been negotiated with the Romans, it began to appear, as was really the case, that their cause and that of the deserters were different.

30. The ambassadors returned from Marcellus very opportunely. They informed them that they had been influenced by groundless suspicions, and that the Romans saw no reason why they should inflict punishment upon them. Of the three praefects of the Achradina one was a Spaniard, named Mericus. To him one of the Spanish auxiliaries was designedly sent, among those who accompanied the ambassadors. Having obtained an interview with Mericus in the absence of witnesses, he first explained to him the state in which he had left Spain, from which he had lately returned: "That there every thing was in subjection to the Roman arms; that it was in his power, by doing the Romans a service, to become the first man among his countrymen, whether he might be inclined to serve with the Romans, or to return to his country. On the other hand, if he persisted in preferring to hold out against the siege, what hope could he have, shut up as he was by sea and land?" Mericus was moved by these suggestions, and when it was resolved upon to send ambassadors to Marcellus, he sent his brother among them; who, being brought into the presence of Marcellus, apart from the rest, by means of the same Spaniard, after receiving an assurance of protection, arranged the method of carrying their object into effect, and then returned to the Achradina. Mericus then, in order to prevent any one from conceiving a suspicion of treachery, declared, that he did not like that deputies should be passing to and fro; he thought that they should neither admit nor send any; and in order that the guards might be kept more strictly, that such parts as were most exposed should be distributed among the prefects, each being made responsible for the safety of his own quarter. All approved of the distribution of the posts. The district which fell to the lot of Mericus himself extended from the fountain Arethusa to the mouth of the large harbour, of which he caused the Romans to be informed. Accordingly, Marcellus ordered a transport with armed men to be towed by a quadrireme to the Achradina during the night, and the soldiers to be landed in the vicinity of that gate which is near the fountain of Arethusa. This order having been executed at the fourth watch, and Mericus having received the soldiers when landed at the gate, according to the agreement, Marcellus assaulted the walls of the Achradina with all his forces at break of day, so that he not only engaged the attention of those who occupied the Achradina, but also bands of armed men, quitting their own posts ran to the spot from the island, in order to repel the furious attack of the Romans. During this confusion, some light ships which had been prepared beforehand, and had sailed round, landed a body of armed men at the island; these suddenly attacking the half-manned stations and the opened door of the gate at which the troops had a little before run out, got possession of the island without much opposition, abandoned as it was, in consequence of the flight and trepidation of its guards. Nor were there any who rendered less service, or showed less firmness in maintaining their posts, than the deserters; for as they did not repose much confidence even in those of their own party, they fled in the middle of the contest. When Marcellus learnt that the island was taken, one quarter of the Achradina in the hands of his troops, and that Mericus, with the men under his command, had joined them, he sounded a retreat, lest the royal treasure, the fame of which was greater than the reality, should be plundered.

31. The impetuosity of the soldiers having been checked, time and opportunity to escape were given to the deserters in the Achradina; and the Syracusans, at length delivered from their fears, threw open the gates of the Achradina, and sent deputies to Marcellus, requesting only safety for themselves and children. Having summoned a council, to which the Syracusans were invited who were among the Roman troops, having been driven from home during the disturbances, Marcellus replied, "that the services rendered by Hiero through a period of fifty years, were not more in number than the injuries committed against the Roman people in these few years by those who had had possession of Syracuse; but that most of these injuries had justly recoiled upon their authors, and that they had inflicted much more severe punishment upon themselves for the violation of treaties, than the Roman people desired. That he was indeed now besieging Syracuse for the third year, but not that the Romans might hold that state in a condition of slavery, but that the ringleaders of the deserters might not keep it in a state of thraldom and oppression. What the Syracusans could do was exemplified, either by the conduct of those Syracusans who were among the Roman troops, or that of the Spanish general, Mericus, who had delivered up the post which he was appointed to command, or, lastly, by the late but bold measure adopted by the Syracusans themselves. That the greatest possible recompence for all the evils and dangers which he had for so long a time undergone, both by sea and land, around the walls of Syracuse, was the reflection, that he had been able to take that city." The quaestor was then sent with a guard to the island, to receive and protect the royal treasure. The city was given up to be plundered by the soldiery, after guards had been placed at each of the houses of those who had been with the Roman troops. While many acts exhibited horrid examples of rage and rapacity, it is recorded that Archimedes, while intent on some figures which he had described in the dust, although the confusion was as great as could possibly exist in a captured city, in which soldiers were running up and down in search of plunder, was put to death by a soldier, who did not know who he was; that Marcellus was grieved at this event, and that pains were taken about his funeral, while his relations also for whom diligent inquiry was made, derived honour and protection from his name and memory. Such, for the most part, was the manner in which Syracuse was captured. The quantity of booty was so great, that had Carthage itself, which was carrying on a contest on equal terms, been captured, it would scarcely have afforded so much. A few days before the taking of Syracuse, Titus Otacilius passed over from Lilybaeum to Utica with eighty quinqueremes, and entering the harbour before it was light, took some transports laden with corn; then landing, he laid waste a considerable portion of the country around Utica, and brought back to his ships booty of every description. He returned to Lilybaeum, the third day after he set out, with a hundred and thirty transports laden with corn and booty. The corn he sent immediately to Syracuse; and had it not been for the very seasonable arrival of this supply, a destructive famine threatened alike the victors and the vanquished.

32. Nothing very memorable had been done in Spain for about two years, the operations of the war consisting more in laying plans than in fighting; but during the same summer in which the events above recorded took place, the Roman generals, quitting their winter quarters, united their forces; then a council was summoned; and the opinions of all accorded, that since their only object hitherto had been to prevent Hasdrubal from pursuing his march into Italy, it was now time that an effort should be made to bring the war in Spain to a termination; and they thought that the twenty thousand Celtiberians, who had been induced to take arms that winter, formed a sufficient accession to their strength. There were three armies of the enemy. Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, and Mago, who had united their forces, were about a five days' journey from the Romans. Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar, who was the old commander in Spain, was nearer to them: he was with his army near the city Anitorgis. The Roman generals were desirous that he should be overpowered first; and they hoped that they had enough and more than enough strength for the purpose. Their only source of anxiety was, lest the other Hasdrubal and Mago, terrified at his discomfiture, should protract the war by withdrawing into trackless forests and mountains. Thinking it, therefore, the wisest course to divide their forces and embrace the whole Spanish war, they arranged it so that Publius Cornelius should lead two-thirds of the Roman and allied troops against Mago and Hasdrubal, and that Cneius Cornelius, with the remaining third of the original army, and with the Celtiberians added to them, should carry on the war with the Barcine Hasdrubal. The two generals and their armies, setting out together, preceded by the Celtiberians, pitched their camp near the city Anitorgis, within sight of the enemy, the river only separating them. Here Cneius Scipio, with the forces above mentioned, halted, but Publius Scipio proceeded to the portion of the war assigned to him.

33. Hasdrubal perceiving that there were but few Roman troops in the camp, and that their whole dependence was on the Celtiberian auxiliaries; and having had experience of the perfidy of the barbarian nations in general, and particularly of all those nations among which he had served for so many years; as there was every facility of intercourse, for both camps were full of Spaniards, by secret conferences with the chiefs of the Celtiberians, he agreed with them, for a large consideration, to take their forces away. Nor did they conceive it to be any great crime; for the object was not that they should turn their arms against the Romans, while the reward which they were to receive to abstain from the war was large enough to remunerate them for their service in it. At the same time the mere rest from labour, the return to their homes, with the pleasure of seeing their friends and property, were pleasing to the generality. Accordingly, the multitude were prevailed upon as easily as their leaders. They had, moreover, nothing to fear from the Romans, in consequence of the smallness of their numbers, should they endeavour to detain them by force. It will indeed be the duty of all Roman generals to take care, and the instances here recorded should be considered as strong arguments, never to place so much confidence in foreign auxiliaries, as not to retain in their camps a preponderance of their own strength and of that force which is properly their own. The Celtiberians, suddenly taking up their standards, marched away, replying only to the Romans, who asked the cause of their departure and entreated them to stay, that they were called away by a war at home. Scipio seeing that his allies could be detained neither by prayers nor force, and that he was neither a match for his enemy without them, nor could again effect a junction with his brother, no other course which promised safety offering itself, resolved to retire as far as possible, carefully using every caution not to encounter the enemy any where on level ground. On his departing, the enemy, crossing the river, pursued him almost in his footsteps.

34. During the same period an equal terror and a greater danger pressed upon Publius Scipio. Masinissa was a young man at that time an ally of the Carthaginians, whom afterwards the friendship of the Romans rendered illustrious and powerful. He not only opposed himself with his Numidian cavalry to Scipio on his approach, but afterwards harassed him incessantly day and night, so as both to cut off his stragglers, who had gone out to a distance from the camp in search of wood and forage, and riding up to the very gates of his camp, and charging into the midst of his advanced guards, to fill every quarter with the utmost confusion. By night also alarm was frequently occasioned in the gates and rampart by his sudden attacks. Nor was there any time or place at which the Romans were exempt from fear and anxiety; and driven within their rampart, and deprived of every necessary, they suffered in a manner a regular siege; and it appeared that it would have been still straiter, if Indibilis, who it was reported was approaching with seven thousand five hundred Suessetani, should form a junction with the Carthaginians. Scipio, though a wary and provident general, overpowered by difficulties, adopted the rash measure of going to meet Indibilis by night, with the intention of fighting him wherever he should meet him. Leaving, therefore, a small force in his camp, under the command of Titus Fonteius, lieutenant-general, he set out at midnight, and meeting with the enemy, came to battle with him. The troops fought in the order of march rather than of battle. The Romans, however, had the advantage, though in an irregular fight; but the Numidian cavalry, whose observation the general supposed that he had escaped, suddenly spreading themselves round his flanks, occasioned great terror. After a new contest had been entered into with the Numidians, a third enemy came up in addition to the rest, the Carthaginian generals having come up with their rear when they were now engaged in fighting. Thus the Romans were surrounded on every side by enemies; nor could they make up their minds which they should attack first, or in what part, forming themselves into a close body, they should force their way through. The general, while fighting and encouraging his men, exposing himself wherever the strife was the hottest, was run through the right side with a lance; and when the party of the enemy, which, formed into a wedge, had charged the troops collected round the general, perceived Scipio falling lifeless from his horse, elated with joy, they ran shouting through the whole line with the news that the Roman general had fallen. These words spreading in every direction, caused the enemy to be considered as victors, and the Romans as vanquished. On the loss of the general the troops immediately began to fly from the field; but though it was not difficult to force their way through the Numidians and the other light-armed auxiliaries, yet it was scarcely possible for them to escape so large a body of cavalry, and infantry equal to horses in speed. Almost more were slain in the flight than in the battle; nor would a man have survived, had not night put a stop to the carnage, the day by this time rapidly drawing to a close.

35. After this, the Carthaginian generals, who were not slow in following up their victory, immediately after the battle, scarcely giving their soldiers necessary rest, hurry their army to Hasdrubal, son of Hamilcar; confidently hoping, that after uniting their forces with his, the war might be brought to a conclusion. On their arrival, the warmest congratulations passed between the troops and their generals, who were delighted with their recent victory; for they had not only destroyed one distinguished general and all his men, but looked forward to another victory of equal magnitude as a matter of certainty. The intelligence of this great disaster had not yet reached the Romans; but there prevailed a kind of melancholy silence and mute foreboding, such as is usually found in minds which have a presentiment of impending calamity. The general himself, besides feeling that he was deserted by his allies, and that the forces of the enemy were so much augmented, was disposed from conjecture and reasoning rather to a suspicion that some defeat had been sustained, than to any favourable hopes. "For how could Hasdrubal and Mago bring up their troops without opposition, unless they had terminated their part of the war? How was it that his brother had not opposed his progress or followed on his rear? in order that if he could not prevent the armies and generals of the enemy from forming a junction, he might himself join his forces with his brother's." Disturbed with these cares, he believed that the only safe policy for the present was to retire as far as possible; and, accordingly, he marched a considerable distance thence in one night, the enemy not being aware of it, and on that account continuing quiet. At dawn, perceiving that their enemy had decamped, they sent the Numidians in advance, and began to pursue them as rapidly as possible. The Numidians overtook them before night, and charged; sometimes their rear, at other times their flanks. They then began to halt and defend themselves as well as they could; but Scipio exhorted them at once to fight so as not to expose themselves, and march at the same time, lest the infantry should overtake them.

36. But having made but little progress for a long time, in consequence of his making his troops sometimes advance and at others halt, and night now drawing on, Scipio recalled his troops from the battle, and collecting them, withdrew to a certain eminence, not very safe, indeed, particularly for dispirited troops, but higher than any of the surrounding places. There, at first, his infantry, drawn up around his baggage and cavalry, which were placed in their centre, had no difficulty in repelling the attacks of the charging Numidians; but afterwards, when three generals with three regular armies marched up in one entire body, and it was evident that his men would not be able to do much by arms in defending the position without fortifications, the general began to look about, and consider whether he could by any means throw a rampart around; but the hill was so bare, and the soil so rough, that neither could a bush be found for cutting a palisade, nor earth for making a mound, nor the requisites for making a trench or any other work; nor was the place naturally steep or abrupt enough to render the approach and ascent difficult to the enemy, as it rose on every side with a gentle acclivity. However, that they might raise up against them some semblance of a rampart, they placed around them the panniers tied to the burdens, building them up as it were to the usual height, and when there was a deficiency of panniers for raising it, they presented against the enemy a heap of baggage of every kind. The Carthaginian armies coming up, very easily marched up the eminence, but were stopped by the novel appearance of the fortification, as by something miraculous, when their leaders called out from all sides, asking "what they stopped at? and why they did not tear down and demolish that mockery, which was scarcely strong enough to impede the progress of women and children; that the enemy, who were skulking behind their baggage, were, in fact, captured and in their hands." Such were the contemptuous reproofs of their leaders. But it was not an easy task either to leap over or remove the burdens raised up against them, or to cut through the panniers, closely packed together and covered completely with baggage. When the removal of the burdens had opened a way to the troops, who were detained by them for a long time, and the same had been done in several quarters, the camp was now captured on all sides; the Romans were cut to pieces on all hands, the few by the many, the dispirited by the victorious. A great number of the men, however, having fled for refuge into the neighbouring woods, effected their escape to the camp of Publius Scipio, which Titus Fonteius commanded. Some authors relate that Cneius Scipio was slain on the eminence on the first assault of the enemy; others that he escaped with a few attendants to a castle near the camp; this, they say, was surrounded with fire, by which means the doors which they could not force were consumed; that it was thus taken, and all within, together with the general himself, put to death. Cneius Scipio was slain in the eighth year after his arrival in Spain, and on the twenty-ninth day after the death of his brother. At Rome the grief occasioned by their death was not more intense than that which was felt throughout Spain. The sorrow of the citizens, however, was partly distracted by the loss of the armies, the alienation of the province, and the public disaster, while in Spain they mourned and regretted the generals themselves, Cneius, however, the more, because he had been longer in command of them, had first engaged their affections, and first exhibited a specimen of Roman justice and forbearance.

37. When it seemed that the Roman armies were annihilated, and Spain lost, one man recovered this desperate state of affairs. There was in the army one Lucius Marcius, the son of Septimus, a Roman knight, an enterprising youth, and possessing a mind and genius far superior to the condition in which he had been born. To his high talents had been added the discipline of Cneius Scipio, under which he had been thoroughly instructed during a course of so many years in all the qualifications of a soldier. This man, having collected the troops which had been dispersed in the flight, and drafted some from the garrisons, had formed an army not to be despised, and united it with Titus Tonteius, the lieutenant-general of Publius Scipio. But so transcendent was the Roman knight in authority and honour among the troops, that when, after fortifying a camp on this side of the Iberus, it had been resolved that a general of the two armies should be elected in an assembly of the soldiers, relieving each other in the guard of the rampart, and in keeping the outposts until every one had given his vote, they unanimously conferred the supreme command upon Lucius Marcius. All the intervening time, which was but short, was occupied in fortifying their camp and collecting provisions, and the soldiers executed every order not only with vigour, but with feelings by no means depressed. But when intelligence was brought them that Hasdrubal, son of Gisgo, who was coming to put the finishing stroke to the war, had crossed the Iberus and was drawing near, and when they saw the signal for battle displayed by a new commander, then calling to mind whom they had had for their leaders a little while ago, relying on what leaders and what forces they used to go out to fight, they all suddenly burst into tears and beat their heads, some raising their hands to heaven and arraigning the gods, others prostrating themselves upon the ground and invoking by name each his own former commander. Nor could their lamentations be restrained, though the centurions endeavoured to animate their companies, and though Marcius himself soothed and remonstrated with them, asking them "why they had given themselves up to womanish and unavailing lamentations rather than summon up all their courage to protect themselves and the commonwealth together, and not suffer their generals to lie unavenged?" But suddenly a shout and the sound of trumpets were heard; for by this time the enemy were near the rampart. Upon this, their grief being suddenly converted into rage, they hastily ran to arms, and, as it were, burning with fury, rushed to the gates and charged the enemy, while advancing in a careless and disorderly manner. This unexpected event instantly struck terror into the Carthaginians, who wondering whence so many enemies could have sprung up so suddenly, as the army had been almost annihilated; what could have inspired men who had been vanquished and routed with such boldness and confidence in themselves; what general could have arisen now that the two Scipios were slain; who could command the camp, and who had given the signal for battle; in consequence of these so many and so unexpected circumstances, at first, being in a state of complete uncertainty and amazement, they gave ground; but afterwards, discomfited by the violence of the charge, they turned their backs; and either there would have been a dreadful slaughter of the flying enemy, or a rash and dangerous effort on the part of the pursuers, had not Marcius promptly given the signal for retreat, and by throwing himself in the way of the front rank, and even holding some back with his own hands, repressed the infuriated troops. He then led them back to the camp, still eager for blood and slaughter. When the Carthaginians, who were at first compelled to fly with precipitation from the rampart of their enemy, saw that no one pursued them, concluding that they had stopped from fear, now on the other hand went away to their camp at an easy pace, with feelings of contempt for the enemy. There was a corresponding want of care in guarding their camp; for though the enemy were near, yet it seemed that they were but the remains of the two armies which had been cut to pieces a few days before. As in consequence of this all things were neglected in the enemy's camp, Marcius having ascertained this, addressed his mind to a measure which on the first view of it might appear rather rash than bold: it was, aggressively to assault the enemy's camp, concluding that the camp of Hasdrubal, while alone, might be carried with less difficulty than his own could be defended, if the three armies and as many generals should again unite; taking into consideration also that either if he succeeded he would retrieve their prostrate fortune, or if repulsed, still, by making the attack himself, he would rescue himself from contempt.

38. Lest, however, the suddenness of the affair, and the fear of night, should frustrate a measure which was in itself ill adapted to his condition, he thought it right that his soldiers should be addressed and exhorted; and having called an assembly, he discoursed as follows: "Soldiers, either my veneration for our late commanders, both living and dead, or our present situation, may impress on every one the belief that this command, as it is highly honourable to me, conferred by your suffrages, so is it in its nature a heavy and anxious charge. For at a time when I should be scarcely so far master of myself as to be able to find any solace for my afflicted mind, did not fear deaden the sense of sorrow, I am compelled to take upon myself alone the task of consulting for the good of you all; a task of the greatest difficulty when under the influence of grief. And not even at that critical moment, when I ought to be considering in what manner I may be enabled to keep together for my country these remains of two armies, can I divert my mind from the affliction which incessantly preys upon me. For bitter recollection is ever present, and the Scipios ever disturb me with anxious cares by day and dreams by night, frequently rousing me from my sleep, and imploring me not to suffer themselves nor their soldiers, your companions in war, who had been victorious in this country for eight years, nor the commonwealth to remain unrevenged; enjoining me also to follow their discipline and their plans; and desiring that as there was no one more obedient to their commands while they were alive than I, so after their death I would consider that conduct as best, which I might have the strongest reason for believing they would have adopted in each case. I could wish also that you, my soldiers, should not show your respect for them by lamentations and tears, as if they were dead; (for they still live and flourish in the fame of their achievements;) but that whenever the memory of those men shall occur to you, you would go into battle as though you saw them encouraging you and giving you the signal. Nor certainly could anything else than their image presenting itself yesterday to your eyes and minds, have enabled you to fight that memorable battle, in which you proved to the enemy that the Roman name had not become extinct with the Scipios; and that the energy and valour of that people, which had not been overwhelmed by the disaster at Cannae, would, doubtlessly, emerge from the severest storms of fortune. Now since you have dared so much of your own accord, I have a mind to try how much you will dare when authorized by your general: for yesterday, when I gave the signal for retreat while you were pursuing the routed enemy with precipitation, I did not wish to break your spirit, but to reserve it for greater glory and more advantageous opportunities; that you might afterwards, when prepared and armed, seize an occasion of attacking your enemy while off their guard, unarmed, and even buried in sleep. Nor do I entertain the hope of gaining an opportunity of this kind rashly, but from the actual state of things. Doubtless, if any one should ask even himself, by what means, though few in number and disheartened by defeat, you defended your camp against troops superior in number and victorious, you would give no other answer than that, as this was the very thing you were afraid of, you had kept every place secured by works and yourselves ready and equipped. And so it generally happens: men are least secure against that which fortune causes not to be feared; because you leave unguarded and exposed what you think is not necessary to be cared about. There is nothing whatever which the enemy fear less at the present time, than lest we, who were a little while ago besieged and assaulted, should aggressively assault their camp ourselves. Let us dare, then, to do that which it is incredible we should have the courage to attempt; it will be most easy from the very fact of its appearing most difficult. At the third watch of the night I will lead you thither in silence. I have ascertained by means of scouts that they have no regular succession of watches, no proper outposts. Our shout at their gates, when heard, and the first assault, will carry their camp. Then let that carnage be made among men, torpid with sleep, terrified at the unexpected tumult, and overpowered while lying defenceless in their beds, from which you were so grieved to be recalled yesterday. I know that the measure appears to you a daring one; but in difficult and almost desperate circumstances the boldest counsels are always the safest. For if when the critical moment has arrived, the opportunity of seizing which is of a fleeting nature, you delay ever so little, in vain do you seek for it afterwards when it has been neglected. One army is near us; two more are not far off. We have some hopes if we make an attack now; and you have already made trial of your own and their strength. If we postpone the time and cease to be despised in consequence of the fame of yesterday's irruption, there is danger lest all the generals and all the forces should unite. Shall we be able then to withstand three generals and three armies, whom Cneius Scipio with his army unimpaired could not withstand? As our generals have perished by dividing their forces, so the enemy may be overpowered while separated and divided. There is no other mode of maintaining the war; let us, therefore, wait for nothing but the opportunity of the ensuing night. Now depart, with the favour of the gods, and refresh yourselves, that, unfatigued and vigorous, you may burst into the enemy's camp with the same spirit with which you have defended your own." This new enterprise, proposed by their new general, they received with joy; and the more daring it was the more it pleased them. The remainder of the day was spent in getting their arms in readiness and recruiting their strength, the greater part of the night was given to rest, and at the fourth watch they were in motion.

39. At a distance of six miles beyond their nearest camp lay other forces of the Carthaginians. A deep valley, thickly planted with trees, intervened. Near about the middle of this wood a Roman cohort and some cavalry were placed in concealment with Punic craft. The communication between the two armies being thus cut off, the rest of the forces were marched in silence to the nearest body of the enemy; and as there were no outposts before the gates, and no guards on the rampart, they entered quite into the camp, as though it had been their own, no one any where opposing them. The signals were then sounded and a shout raised. Some put the enemy to the sword when half asleep; others threw fire upon the huts, which were covered in with dry straw; others blocked up the gates to intercept their escape. The enemy, who were assailed at once with fire, shouting, and the sword, were in a manner bereaved of their senses, and could neither hear each other, nor take any measures for their security. Unarmed, they fell into the midst of troops of armed men: some hastened to the gates; others, as the passes were flocked up, leaped over the rampart, and as each escaped they fled directly towards the other camp, where they were cut off by the cohort and cavalry rushing forward from their concealment, and were all slain to a man. And even had any escaped from that carnage, the Romans, after taking the nearer camp, ran over to the other with such rapidity, that no one could have arrived before them with news of the disaster. In this camp, as they were far distant from the enemy, and as some had gone off just before daylight for forage, wood, and plunder, they found every thing in a still more neglected and careless state. Their arms only were placed at the outposts, the men being unarmed, and either sitting and reclining upon the ground, or else walking up and down before the rampart and the gates. On these men, thus at their ease and unguarded, the Romans, still hot from the recent battle, and flushed with victory, commenced an attack; no effectual opposition therefore could be made to them in the gates. Within the gates, the troops having rushed together from every part of the camp at the first shout and alarm, a furious conflict arose; which would have continued for a long time, had not the bloody appearance of the Roman shields discovered to the Carthaginians the defeat of the other forces, and consequently struck them with dismay. This alarm produced a general flight; and all except those who were overtaken with the sword, rushing out precipitately wherever they could find a passage, abandoned their camp. Thus, in a night and a day, two camps of the enemy were carried, under the conduct of Lucius Marcius. Claudius, who translated the annals of Acilius out of Greek into Latin, states that as many as thirty-seven thousand men were slain, one thousand eight hundred and thirty made prisoners, and a great booty obtained; among which was a silver shield of a hundred and thirty-eight pounds' weight, with an image upon it of the Barcine Hasdrubal. Valerius Antias states, that the camp Of Mago only was captured, and seven thousand of the enemy slain; and that in the other battle, when the Romans sallied out and fought with Hasdrubal, ten thousand were slain, and four thousand three hundred captured. Piso writes, that five thousand were slain in an ambuscade when Mago incautiously pursued our troops who retired. With all, the name of the general, Marcius, is mentioned with great honour, and to his real glory they add even miracles. They say, that while he was haranguing his men a stream of fire poured from his head without his perceiving it, to the great terror of the surrounding soldiers; and that a shield, called the Marcian, with an image of Hasdrubal upon it, remained in the temple up to the time of the burning of the Capitol, a monument of his victory over the Carthaginians. After this, affairs continued for a considerable time in a tranquil state in Spain, as both parties, after giving and receiving such important defeats, hesitated to run the hazard of a general battle.

40. During these transactions in Spain, Marcellus, after the capture of Syracuse, having settled the other affairs in Sicily with so much honour and integrity as not only to add to his own renown, but also to the majesty of the Roman people, conveyed to Rome the ornaments of the city, together with the statues and pictures with which Syracuse abounded. These were certainly spoils taken from enemies, and acquired according to the laws of war; but hence was the origin of the admiration of the products of Grecian art, and to that freedom with which at present all places, both sacred and profane, are despoiled; which at last recoiled upon the Roman gods, and first upon that very temple which was so choicely adorned by Marcellus. For foreigners were in the habit of visiting the temples dedicated by Marcellus near the Capuan gate, on account of their splendid ornaments of this description, of which a very small portion can be found. Embassies from almost all the states of Sicily came to him. As their cases were different, so were also the terms granted to them. Those who had either not revolted or had returned to the alliance before the capture of Syracuse, were received and honoured as faithful allies. Those who had been induced to submit through fear after the capture of Syracuse, as vanquished, received laws from the conqueror. The Romans, however, had still remaining a war of no small magnitude at Agrigentum, headed by Epicydes and Hanno, generals in the late war, and a third new one sent by Hannibal in the room of Hippocrates, a Libyphoenician by nation, and a native of Hippo, called by his countrymen Mutines; an energetic man, and thoroughly instructed in all the arts of war under the tuition of Hannibal. To this man the Numidian auxiliaries were assigned by Epicydes and Hanno. With these he so thoroughly overran the lands of his enemies, and visited his allies with such activity, in order to retain them in their allegiance, and for the purpose of bringing them seasonable aid as each required it, that in a short time he filled all Sicily with his fame, nor was greater confidence placed in any one else by those who favoured the Carthaginian interest. Accordingly the Carthaginian and Syracusan generals, who had been hitherto compelled to keep within the walls of Agrigentum, not more at the advice of Mutines than from the confidence they reposed in him, had the courage to go out from the walls, and pitched a camp near the river Himera. When this was announced to Marcellus, he immediately advanced and sat down at a distance of about four miles from the enemy, with the intention of waiting to see what steps they took, and what they meditated. But Mutines allowed no room or time for delay or deliberation, but crossed the river, and, charging the outposts of his enemy, created the greatest terror and confusion. The next day, in an engagement which might almost be called regular, he compelled his enemy to retire within their works. Being called away by a mutiny of the Numidians, which had broken out in the camp, and in which about three hundred of them had retired to Heraclea Minoa, he set out to appease them and bring them back; and is said to have earnestly warned the generals not to engage with the enemy during his absence. Both the generals were indignant at this conduct, but particularly Hanno, who was before disturbed at his reputation. "Is it to be borne," said he, "that a mongrel African should impose restraints upon me, a Carthaginian general, commissioned by the senate and people?" Epicydes, who wished to wait, was prevailed upon by him to agree to their crossing the river and offering battle; for, said he, if they should wait for Mutines, and the battle should terminate successfully, Mutines would certainly have the credit of it.

41. But Marcellus, highly indignant that he who had repulsed Hannibal from Nola, when rendered confident by his victory at Cannae, should succumb to enemies whom he had vanquished by sea and land, ordered his soldiers immediately to take arms and raise the standards. While marshalling his army, ten Numidians rode up rapidly from the enemy's line with information that their countrymen, first induced by the same causes which brought on the mutiny, in which three hundred of their number retired to Heraclea, and secondly, because they saw their commander, just on the approach of a battle, sent out of the way by generals who wished to detract from his glory, would not take any part in the battle. This deceitful nation made good their promise in this instance. Accordingly the spirits of the Romans were increased by the intelligence, which was speedily conveyed through the lines, that the enemy were abandoned by the cavalry, which the Romans principally feared; while at the same time the enemy were dispirited, not only because they were deprived of the principal part of their strength, but further, because they were afraid lest they should themselves be attacked by their own cavalry. Accordingly, there was no great resistance made: the first shout and onset determined the business. The Numidians who stood quiet in the wings during the action, when they saw their party turning their backs, accompanied them in their flight only for a short time; but when they perceived that they were all making for Agrigentum with the most violent haste, they turned off to the neighbouring towns round about, through fear of a siege. Many thousand men were slain and captured, together with eight elephants. This was the last battle which Marcellus fought in Sicily, after which he returned victorious to Syracuse. The year was now about closing; the senate therefore decreed that Publius Cornelius, the praetor, should send a letter to Capua to the consuls, with directions that while Hannibal was at a distance, and nothing of any great importance was going on at Capua, one of them, if they thought fit, should come to Rome to elect new magistrates. On the receipt of the letter, the consuls arranged it between themselves, that Claudius should hold the election, and Fulvius remain at Capua. The consuls created by Claudius were Cneius Fulvius Centumalus, and Publius Sulpicius Galba, the son of Servius, who had never exercised any curule magistracy. After this Lucius Cornelius Lentulus, Marcus Cornelius Cethegus, Caius Sulpicius, and Caius Calpurnius Piso, were created praetors. Piso had the city jurisdiction; Sulpicius, Sicily; Cethegus, Apulia; Lentulus, Sardinia. The consuls were continued in command for a year longer.



BOOK XXVI.

Hannibal encamps on the banks of the Amo, within three miles of Rome. Attended by two thousand horsemen, he advances close to the Colline gate to take a view of the walls and situation of the city. On two successive days the hostile armies are hindered from engaging by the severity of the weather. Capua taken by Quintus Fulvius and Appius Claudius, the chief nobles die, voluntarily, by poison. Quintus Fulvius having condemned the principal senators to death, at the moment they are actually tied to the stakes, receives despatches from Rome, commanding him to spare their lives, which he postpones reading until the sentence is executed. Publius Scipio, offering himself for the service, is sent to command in Spain, takes New Carthage in one day. Successes in Sicily. Treaty of friendship with the Aetolians. War with Philip, king of Macedonia, and the Acarnanians.

* * * * *

1. The consuls, Cneius Fulvius Centumalus and Publius Sulpicius Galba, having entered on their office on the ides of March, assembled the senate in the Capitol, and took the opinion of the fathers on the state of the republic, the manner of conducting the war, and on what related to the provinces and the armies. Quintus Fulvius and Appius Claudius, the consuls of the former year, were continued in command; and the armies which they before had were assigned to them, it being added that they should not withdraw from Capua, which they were besieging, till they had taken it. The Romans were now solicitously intent upon this object, not from resentment so much, which was never juster against any city, as from the consideration that as this city, so celebrated and powerful, had by its defection drawn away several states, so when reduced it would bring back their minds to respect for the former supreme government. Two praetors also of the former year, Marcus Junius and Publius Sempronius, were each continued in command of the two legions which they had under them, the former in Etruria, the latter in Gaul. Marcus Marcellus also was continued in command, that he might, as proconsul, finish the war in Sicily with the army he had there. If he wanted recruits he was to take them from the legions which Publius Cornelius, the propraetor, commanded in Sicily, provided he did not choose any soldier who was of the number of those whom the senate had refused to allow to be discharged, or to return home till the war was put an end to. To Caius Sulpicius, to whose lot Sicily had fallen, the two legions which Publius Cornelius had commanded were assigned, to be recruited from the army of Cneius Fulvius, which had been shamefully beaten, and had experienced a dreadful loss the year before in Apulia. To soldiers of this description the senate had assigned the same period of service as to those who fought at Cannae; and as an additional mark of ignominy upon both, they were not allowed to winter in towns, or to build huts for wintering within the distance of ten miles from any town. To Lucius Cornelius, in Sardinia, the two legions which Quintus Mucius had commanded were assigned; if recruits were wanted, the consuls were ordered to enlist them. To Titus Otacilius and Marcus Valerius was allotted the protection of the coasts of Sicily and Greece, with the legions and fleets which they had commanded. The Greek coast had fifty ships with one legion; the Sicilian, a hundred ships with two legions. Twenty-three legions were employed by the Romans in carrying on the war this year by land and sea.

2. In the beginning of the year, on a letter from Lucius Marcius being laid before the senate, they considered his achievements as most glorious; but the title of honour which he assumed (for though he was neither invested with the command by the order of the people, nor by the direction of the fathers, his letter ran in this form, "The propraetor to the senate") gave offence to a great many. It was considered as an injurious precedent for generals to be chosen by the armies, and for the solemn ceremony of elections, held under auspices, to be transferred to camps and provinces, and (far from the control of the laws and magistrates) to military thoughtlessness. And though some gave it as their opinion, that the sense of the senate should be taken on the matter, yet it was thought more advisable that the discussion should be postponed till after the departure of the horsemen who brought the letter from Marcius. It was resolved, that an answer should be returned respecting the corn and clothing of the army, stating, that the senate would direct its attention to both those matters; but that the letter should not be addressed to Lucius Marcius, propraetor, lest he should consider that as already determined which was the very point they reserved for discussion. After the horsemen were dismissed, it was the first thing the consuls brought before the senate; and the opinions of all to a man coincided, that the plebeian tribunes should be instructed to consult the commons with all possible speed, as to whom they might resolve to send into Spain to take the command of that army which had been under the conduct of Cneius Scipio. The plebeian tribunes were instructed accordingly, and the question was published. But another contest had pre-engaged the minds of the people: Caius Sempronius Blaesus, having brought Cneius Fulvius to trial for the loss of the army in Apulia, harassed him with invectives in the public assemblies: "Many generals," he reiterated, "had by indiscretion and ignorance brought their armies into most perilous situations, but none, save Cneius Fulvius, had corrupted his legions by every species of excess before he betrayed them to the enemy; it might therefore with truth be said, that they were lost before they saw the enemy, and that they were defeated, not by Hannibal, but by their own general. No man, when he gave his vote, took sufficient pains in ascertaining who it was to whom he was intrusting an army. What a difference was there between this man and Tiberius Sempronius! The latter having been intrusted with an army of slaves, had in a short time brought it to pass, by discipline and authority, that not one of them in the field of battle remembered his condition and birth, but they became a protection to our allies and a terror to our enemies. They had snatched, as it were, from the very jaws of Hannibal, and restored to the Roman people, Cumae, Beneventum, and other towns. But Cneius Fulvius had infected with the vices peculiar to slaves, an army of Roman citizens, of honourable parentage and liberal education; and had thus made them insolent and turbulent among their allies, inefficient and dastardly among their enemies, unable to sustain, not only the charge, but the shout of the Carthaginians. But, by Hercules, it was no wonder that the troops did not stand their ground in the battle, when their general was the first to fly; with him, the greater wonder was that any had fallen at their posts, and that they were not all the companions of Cneius Fulvius in his consternation and his flight. Caius Flaminius, Lucius Paullus, Lucius Posthumius, Cneius and Publius Scipio, had preferred falling in the battle to abandoning their armies when in the power of the enemy. But Cneius Fulvius was almost the only man who returned to Rome to report the annihilation of his army. It was a shameful crime that the army of Cannae should be transported into Sicily, because they fled from the field of battle, and not be allowed to return till the enemy has quitted Italy; that the same decree should have been lately passed with respect to the legions of Cneius Fulvius; while Cneius Fulvius himself has no punishment inflicted upon him for running away, in a battle brought about by his own indiscretion; that he himself should be permitted to pass his old age in stews and brothels, where he passed his youth, while his troops, whose only crime was that they resembled their general, should be sent away in a manner into banishment, and suffer an ignominious service. So unequally," he said, "was liberty shared at Rome by the rich and the poor, by the ennobled and the common people."