[Page Head: THE KING OF HANOVER'S APARTMENTS.]

Yesterday, at dinner at Normanby's, I met Lord Duncannon,[3] who showed me the correspondence between him and the King of Hanover about the apartments at St. James's. The case is this: When the Queen was going to be married, the Duchess of Kent told Duncannon that she must have a house,[4] and that she could not afford to pay for one (the greater part of her income being appropriated to the payment of her debts). Duncannon told her that there were no royal apartments unoccupied, except the King of Hanover's at St. James's; and it was settled that he should be apprised that the Queen had occasion for them, and be requested to give them up. Duncannon accordingly wrote a note to Sir F. Watson, who manages the King's affairs here, and told him that he had such a communication to make to his Majesty, which he was desirous of bringing before him in the most respectful manner, and that the arrangement should be made in whatever way would be most convenient to him. Watson informed him that he had forwarded his note to the King, and shortly after Duncannon received an answer from the King himself, which was neither more nor less than a flat refusal to give up the apartments. Another communication then took place between Duncannon and Watson, when the latter said that it would be very inconvenient to the King to remove his things from the apartments without coming over in person, as the library particularly was full of papers of importance. Duncannon then proposed that the library and the adjoining room, in which it was said that his papers were deposited, should not be touched, but remain in his possession; that they should be walled off and separated from the rest of the suite, which might be given up to the Duchess for her occupation. This proposal was sent to the King, who refused to agree to it, or to give up the apartments at all. Accordingly the Queen was obliged to hire a house for her mother at a rent of L2,000 a year. I told Duncannon that they were all very much to blame for submitting to the domineering insolence of the King, and that when they thought it right to require the apartments, they ought to have gone through with it, and have taken no denial. It was a gross insult to the Queen to refuse to give up to her an apartment in her own palace, which she desired to dispose of; and they were very wrong in permitting such an affront to be offered to her. So Duncannon was himself of opinion; but Melbourne, who is all for quietness, would not allow matters to proceed to extremities, and preferred knocking under—a mode of proceeding which is always as contemptible as it is useless. The first thing is to be in the right, to do nothing unbecoming or unjust, but with right and propriety clearly on your side, to be as firm as a rock, and, above all things, never to succumb to insolence and presumption.

[3] [Lord Duncannon was at this time First Commissioner of Works, and the arrangements with reference to the Royal Palaces fell within his department.]

[4] The Duchess, for particular reasons, objected to going back to Kensington.

We had M. Guizot at dinner.[5] They all say he is agreeable, but I have not been in the way of his talk. He is enchanted and elated with his position, and it is amusing to see his apprehension lest anybody should, either by design or inadvertence, rob him of his precedence; and the alacrity with which he seizes on the arm of the lady of the house on going out to dinner, so demonstrative of the uneasy grandeur of a man who has not yet learnt to be familiar with his own position. With reference to diplomatic rank, I only heard last night, for the first time, that the Duke of Sutherland had, some time ago, addressed a formal remonstrance to Palmerston, against Foreign Ministers (not Ambassadors) having place given them at the Palace (which means going first out to dinner over himself et suos pares), a most extraordinary thing for a sensible man to have done, especially in such high favour as his wife and her whole family are. He got for answer, that Her Majesty exercised her own pleasure in this respect in her own palace. The rule always has been that Ambassadors (who represent the persons of their Sovereigns) have precedence of everybody; Ministers (who are only agents) have not; but the Queen, it appears, has given the pas to Ministers Plenipotentiaries, as well as to Ambassadors, and ordered them to go out at her dinners before her own subjects of the highest rank.[6]

[5] [M. Guizot had just been appointed French Ambassador in London under the Government of M. Thiers, who took office on the 1st March of this year.]

[6] [It was afterwards settled by Her Majesty that Foreign Ministers should take precedence after Dukes and before Marquesses.]

April 3rd, 1840 {p.282}

They have made Lady Cecilia Underwood a duchess. Everybody considers it a very ridiculous affair, but she and the Duke are, or affect to be, enchanted, though nobody can tell why. She is Duchess of Inverness, though there would have been more meaning in her being Countess of Inverness, since Earl of Inverness is his second title. However, there she was last night at the ball at Lansdowne House, tucked under the Duke's arm, all smiles, and shaking hands vehemently in all directions in acknowledgement of congratulations. I was curious (as others were) to see what it would all come to, and what, in fact, she was to take (in the way of royalty) by her motion, and, as I thought, this was just nothing. The Queen sat at the end of the room, with the Duchess of Cambridge on one side of her, and a chair (for Prince Albert) on the other. The Duke of Sussex took the Duchess of Inverness half way up the room, deposited her amidst a cluster of people, and then went alone to pay his respects to the Queen. Lady Lansdowne wrote to the Queen to ask her pleasure whether the Duchess of Inverness should be asked to sup at her table. Her Majesty replied that she could not object to the Duchess of Inverness supping there, provided care was taken that she did not go out or take place before any other duchess. I saw Prince Albert for the first time. He is exactly like the drawing of him: a handsome face without much expression; but without speaking to him and hearing him speak, it is difficult to judge of his looks. Everybody speaks well of him.

April 13th, 1840 {p.283}

[Page Head: WAR WITH CHINA.]

The China debate[7] went off on the whole well enough for the Government, though they only got a majority of ten, owing in great measure to the number of casualties on their side. Poyntz died the night before the division, and the breath was hardly out of his body before an express was despatched by the Tory whipper- in, to desire that nobody would on any account pair with Captain Spencer (his son-in-law). In this nice balance of parties, human life seemed only to be of interest as votes are influenced by it. Macaulay recovered his reputation on this occasion, and made a good speech. Palmerston closed the debate with a capital speech, but neither side appears to me to have really hit the right nail on the head, or to have worked out the strong parts of the case. Follett did more than anybody. Thesiger made his first appearance, but not with any great success. We had on the Friday a Council for the Order to seize Chinese ships, &c., and on the Saturday another for completing the forms. There was a considerable discussion as to whether the Order (being of a warlike nature) should be signed by the Privy Councillors, and there was no case exactly in point. However, they decided, after much enquiry and examination into precedent, that it should not be.[8]

[7] [On April 7 Sir James Graham moved a Vote of Censure on Ministers for the measures which had plunged the country in hostilities with China. Mr. Macaulay followed him, and made an able speech. The Resolution was rejected after three nights' debate by 271 to 261 votes.]

[8] [Orders in Council for Reprisals and Capture of Ships constitute a Declaration of War, and are signed by all the Privy Councillors present. This course was taken in 1854 on the Declaration of War against Russia.]

May 15th, 1840 {p.284}

A month, and nothing written here, or written, read, or done, elsewhere. Went to Newmarket for the Craven meeting, then to Bretby for a week, then Newmarket again, and back to London on Friday.

Just after I got back to Newmarket, the intelligence arrived of the extraordinary murder of Lord William Russell, which has excited a prodigious interest, and frightened all London out of its wits. Visionary servants and air-drawn razors or carving- knives dance before everybody's imagination, and half the world go to sleep expecting to have their throats cut before morning. The circumstances of the case are certainly most extraordinary, and though every day produces some fresh cause for suspecting the man Courvoisier, both the fact and the motives are still enveloped in great mystery. People are always ready to jump to a conclusion, and having made up their minds, as most have, that he must have done the deed, they would willingly hang him up at once. I had the curiosity to go the day before yesterday to Tothill Fields Prison to see the man, who had just been sent there. He is rather ill-looking, a baddish countenance, but his manner was calm though dejected, and he was civil and respectful, and not sulky. The people there said he was very restless, and had not slept, and that he was a man of great bodily strength. I did not converse with him.

May 17th, 1840 {p.284}

Just after writing the above, I went to the house in Norfolk Street, to look at the premises, and the places where the watch and other things were found hidden. It was impossible not to be morally convinced that the house had not been broken into, that the indications of such violence were fabricated, and that the goods must have been secreted by Courvoisier, consequently, that by him the murder was committed; but there is as yet no evidence to convict him of the actual commission of the deed, and though I believe him to be guilty, I could not, on such a case as there is as yet, find him so if placed on a jury. I am very sceptical about evidence, and know how strangely circumstances sometimes combine to produce appearances of guilt where there may be none. There is a curious case of this mentioned in Romilly's Memoirs, of a man hanged for mutiny upon the evidence of a witness who swore to his person, and upon his own confession after conviction, and yet it was satisfactorily proved afterwards that he had been mistaken for another man, and was really innocent. He had been induced to confess at the instigation of a fellow- prisoner, who told him it was his best chance of escaping.

[Page Head: NARROW ESCAPE OF A CULPRIT.]

Lord Ashburton, when we were talking of this, told me an anecdote of General Maitland (Sir Thomas), which happened at some place in the West Indies or South America. He had taken some town, and the soldiers were restrained from committing violence on the inhabitants, when a shot was fired from a window, and one of his men killed. They entered the house, went to the room from the window of which the shot had been fired, and found a number of men playing at billiards. They insisted on the culprit being given up, when a man was pointed out as the one who had fired the shot. They all agreed as to the culprit, and he was carried off. Sir Thomas considering that a severe example was necessary, ordered the man to be tied to the mouth of a cannon, and shot away. He was present, but turned his head away when the signal was given for blowing this wretch's body to atoms. The explosion took place, when to his amazement the man appeared alive, but with his hair literally standing 'like quills upon the fretful porcupine,' with terror. In the agony of the moment he had contrived to squeeze himself through the ropes, which were loosely tied, and get on one side of the cannon's mouth, so that the ball missed him. He approached Maitland and said, 'You see, General, that it was the will of Heaven my life should be spared; and I solemnly assure you that I am innocent.' Maitland would not allow him to be executed after this miraculous escape, and it turned out, upon further enquiry, that he was innocent, and it was some other man who had fired the shot.

[Page Head: DUKE OF WELLINGTON SUPPORTS GOVERNMENT.]

For the last month there has been something like a cessation of political warfare, not from any diminished desire on the part of the Opposition to harass the Government, but from want of means to do so. In the House of Lords the other night, Lord Stanhope brought on the China Question; when the Duke of Wellington got up, and to the delight of the Government, and the dismay and vexation of the Tories, threw over Stanhope (in a very good speech), asserted the justice of our quarrel with China, refused to discuss the question of policy at all, warmly defended and eulogised Elliot, moved the previous question, and then quitted the House, without waiting to hear Stanhope's reply. It was gratifying to see his energy and vigour, and to see them exerted on one of those occasions when his great mind and patriotic spirit never fail to show themselves. Whenever a question has, in his view, assumed a national character, he scatters to the wind all party considerations; such he now considers the Chinese war to be. We are involved with China, nation against nation, and he will not by word or deed put in jeopardy the smallest of the mighty interests at stake, for the sake of advancing some party purpose, and damaging the Government. In like manner, he thinks that Elliot has bravely, faithfully, and to the best of his ability, done his duty; that if he has committed errors of judgement they should be overlooked, and that he should be supported, encouraged, and defended. This is the real greatness which raises him so far above all the ordinary politicians of his day, and which will confer on his memory imperishable renown. It is rendered the more striking by his conduct on Friday on the Irish Municipal Bill, which is a mere party question, where he showed that he could be as violent as any Tory could desire. I called on Barnes[9] on Saturday, and found him much disgusted at the Duke's China speech, and anxious to know how it could have happened. When I told him that it was always so with him, and that he never would be merely factious, Barnes said (which, is true enough) that it is extraordinary, if he had intended to adopt such a tone in the House of Lords, that he should have allowed Graham to bring forward his motion in the House of Commons, and it certainly does place Graham in a mortifying position, for the Duke's speech is a complete answer to Graham's motion.

[9] [The editor of the 'Times' newspaper.]

May 26th, 1840 {p.287}

At Newmarket last week. While there the debate took place on the Registration Bill, carried by a majority of only three, by the defection of Howick and Charles Wood, which was caused, as is said, entirely by the influence of Lord Grey, who is always out of humour with the Government, glad to give them a knock, though ostensibly their friend. However this may be, there was nothing inconsistent in their conduct, and Wood accounted for his vote very fairly. The Tories were triumphant for a moment, but these defeats are now so common and so unproductive of any consequences, that after the first shouting was over nobody seemed to attach much importance to it. The Cambridge and Ludlow elections having gone against them is of greater consequence, because they show that the tide is running that way, and that a dissolution must in all probability be ruinous to them. The Chancellor of the Exchequer's budget seems to have been very successful, and all agree that he did his part exceedingly well.

Yesterday I met the Duke of Wellington. He was walking in the garden of the park adjoining his own, promenading two young ladies—Lord Salisbury's daughters—arm in arm. He left them and took me to walk with him to Lansdowne House. He began discoursing about the state of affairs, and lamenting that there was, and could be, no strong Government, and that there never would be till people were convinced by experience of the necessity of having one. He then said, 'If other people would do as I do, support the Government when they can, and when the Government ought to be supported, it would be much better.' I said I agreed with him, and that it had given me the greatest pleasure to read his speech on China. He said, 'All I know is, that it is absolutely necessary that question should be settled, and the justice of our cause be made manifest.' I said, I was sure it was what he would feel, and that he had done just what I expected, but that he must be aware there were many of his own people who were by no means so well pleased, but, on the contrary, to the last degree annoyed and provoked at his speech. He replied, 'I know that well enough, and I don't care one damn. I was afraid Lord Stanhope would have a majority, and I have not time not to do what is right.'

June 12th, 1840 {p.288}

[Page Head: THE QUEEN SHOT AT.]

On Wednesday afternoon, as the Queen and Prince Albert were driving in a low carriage up Constitution Hill, about four or five in the afternoon, they were shot at by a lad of eighteen years old, who fired two pistols at them successively, neither shots taking effect. He was in the Green Park without the rails, and as he was only a few yards from the carriage, and, moreover, very cool and collected, it is marvellous he should have missed his aim. In a few moments the young man was seized, without any attempt on his part to escape or to deny the deed, and was carried off to prison. The Queen, who appeared perfectly cool, and not the least alarmed, instantly drove to the Duchess of Kent's, to anticipate any report that might reach her mother, and, having done so, she continued her drive and went to the Park. By this time the attempt upon her life had become generally known, and she was received with the utmost enthusiasm by the immense crowd that was congregated in carriages, on horseback, and on foot. All the equestrians formed themselves into an escort, and attended her back to the Palace, cheering vehemently, while she acknowledged, with great appearance of feeling, these loyal manifestations. She behaved on this occasion with perfect courage and self-possession, and exceeding propriety; and the assembled multitude, being a high-class mob, evinced a lively and spontaneous feeling for her—a depth of interest which, however natural under such circumstances, must be very gratifying to her, and was satisfactory to witness.

Yesterday morning the culprit was brought to the Home Office, when Normanby examined him, and a Council was summoned for a more personal examination at two o'clock. A question then arose as to the nature of the proceeding, and the conduct of the examination, whether it should be before the Privy Council or the Secretary of State. We searched for precedents, and the result was this: The three last cases of high treason were those of Margaret Nicholson, in 1786; of Hatfield, in 1800 (both for attempts on the life of the Sovereign); and of Watson (the Cato Street affair), for an attempt on the Ministers in 1820. Margaret Nicholson was brought before the Privy Council, and the whole proceeding was set forth at great length in the Council Register. There appeared no entry of any sort or kind in the case of Hatfield; and in that of Watson there was a minute in the Home Office, setting forth that the examination had taken place there by Lord Sidmouth, assisted by certain Lords and others of the Privy Council. There was, therefore, no uniform course of precedents, and Ministers had to determine whether the culprit should be brought before the Privy Council, or whether he should be examined by the Cabinet only—that is, by Normanby as Secretary of State, assisted by his colleagues, as had been done in Watson's case. After some discussion, they determined that the examination should be before the Cabinet only, and consequently I was not present at it, much to my disappointment, as I wished to hear what passed, and see the manner and bearing of the perpetrator of so strange and unaccountable an act. Up to the present time there is no appearance of insanity in the youth's behaviour, and he is said to have conducted himself during the examination with acuteness, and cross-examined the witnesses (a good many of whom were produced) with some talent. All this, however, is not incompatible with a lurking insanity. His answers to the questions put to him were mysterious, and calculated to produce the impression that he was instigated or employed by a society, with which the crime had originated, but I expect that it will turn out that he had no accomplices, and is only a crackbrained enthusiast, whose madness has taken the turn of vanity and desire for notoriety. No other conjecture presents any tolerable probability. However it may turn out—here is the strange fact—that a half-crazy potboy was on the point of influencing the destiny of the Empire, and of producing effects the magnitude and importance of which no human mind can guess at. It is remarkable how seldom attempts like these are successful, and yet the life of any individual is at the mercy of any other, provided this other is prepared to sacrifice his own life, which, in the present instance, the culprit evidently was.

August 13th, 1840 {p.290}

[Page Head: REVIEW OF THE SESSION.]

Two months have elapsed since I have written anything in this book, owing to an unaccountable repugnance, which daily grew stronger, to take up my pen for that purpose. It is true that I had nothing of great interest to note down, but I could frequently have found something worth recollecting if I had not been too idle, too occupied with other things, or paralysed by the disgust I had taken to the task of journalising. It is now too late to record things as I was told them, or events as they occurred, and all is confusion in my recollections. If I were now to begin to describe the transactions of the late two months, I should be writing history, for which I am in no way qualified. However, as I must make up my mind to begin again, and write something, or give up the practice altogether, and as I don't choose (just yet, at least) to do the latter, I will scribble what occurs to me, and take a short survey of the Parliamentary campaign that is just over. The danger, whether real or supposed, which the Queen ran from the attempt of the half-witted coxcomb who fired at her, elicited whatever there was of dormant loyalty in her lieges, and made her extremely popular. Nothing could be more enthusiastic than her reception at Ascot, where dense multitudes testified their attachment to her person, and their joy at her recent escape by more than usual demonstrations. Partly, perhaps, from the universality of the interest evinced, and partly from a judicious influence or more impartial reflection, she began about this time to make her Court much less exclusive, and all these circumstances produced a better state of feeling between the Court and the Tories, and helped to soften the acrimony of political warfare.

Throughout the Session the Ministerial majorities continued to be small and uncertain; but it was all along evident that the Government would not be turned out, that the leaders of the Opposition did not wish to turn them out, and that the differences which prevailed in the Tory party rendered it anything but desirable a change should take place. Consequently, for one reason or other, the Government were never pressed hard upon any points on which defeat would have compelled them to resign. The greatest, most hard-fought, and lengthened contest was upon Stanley's Irish Registration Bill, which was admirably devised as a party measure, very ably worked, and in support of which the whole body of the Tories came down, night after night, with a constancy, zeal, and unanimity, really remarkable. Their repeated majorities elated them to such a pitch that they were ready, one and all, to relinquish everything else, to come and vote on these questions. It was evident, however, that all their exertions would be foiled by the determination of their opponents to interpose such delays and obstacles as must prove fatal to the measure; and it was not the least judicious part of Stanley's management when he came down to the House, and, after his long series of victories, announced that he had abandoned his Bill for this year. It was an extremely embarrassing question to Government, and one upon which they could not appear in a favourable point of view. On one hand they were compelled to aid and abet their Irish allies in their opposition to this Bill, so fatal as it would have been to their influence in all the vexatious and unfair modes which they adopted; and on the other hand it showed how little this self-called Reform Ministry cared for any measure of Reform, or rather how heartily they were opposed to any of which the tendency would be injurious to their own political influence. There never was a simpler question of Reform than this, a clearer case of wrong, or one which more loudly demanded a remedy; but the wrong was one by which they largely benefited, and the correction of it would have the effect of augmenting the power of their opponents. Accordingly, by every species of sophistry, by falsehoods of all kinds, by vehement denunciations and endeavours to arouse the passions of the Irish people, they moved Heaven and earth to thwart and defeat the measure. There was, however, only one moment at which the Government were in any jeopardy, for they very early resolved not to let the majorities against them shake them out of their seats. But when Stanley, complaining of the unfair means which had been employed to prevent his bringing on his measure in its different stages, announced that he would invade the days reserved for Government business, Lord John Russell began darkly to hint at the impossibility of the Government conducting the public business if the House sanctioned such an encroachment, and much irritation was exhibited for a short time. Both parties, however, got calm, and a compromise was the result. The Government offered Stanley certain days, which he immediately accepted, acknowledging that nothing but an extreme provocation would justify the course he had threatened to adopt, and so the storm blew over; and this question was nearly the only one which produced any violent debates and close divisions. Besides the usual light skirmishing and the taunts, accusations, and reproaches, here and there thrown out against the Government, there were no serious attacks upon their policy and measures, either domestic or foreign; and upon the whole, setting apart the smallest of their dependable majority, they got through the Session with remarkable success, and have closed it apparently stronger, and with more of public confidence and approbation by many degrees than they enjoyed at the opening. And I believe this to be the truth, notwithstanding the fact that almost all the elections occurring during the Session (in which there have been contests) have been carried by the Tories.

August 18th, 1840 (continued at the Grove) {p.292}

This improved condition of the Ministry is attributable partly to the success of their measures and the efficient manner in which the most important offices have been filled, and partly to the dissensions which prevailed among their adversaries, some striking symptoms of which were exhibited to the public. At the end of the Session, Sir Robert Inglis said to one of the Government people: 'Well, you have managed to get through the Session very successfully.' 'Yes,' said the other, 'thanks to your dissensions among yourselves.' 'No,' said Sir Robert, 'it is not that, but it is the conduct of your leader, his honesty, courage, and ability, which has enabled you to do so.' Ley, the Clerk of the House of Commons, and a man of great experience, said he had never seen the business so well conducted as by John Russell. Besides this, his reputation in his office is immense, where all his subordinates admit that Colonial affairs never were so well administered. But there can be no doubt that the ill- humour, which on several occasions broke out, sometimes between the leaders and sometimes among the masses of the party—'The Tory Democracy,' as the 'Standard' calls them—was of essential service to the Government. This first began at the end of last year upon the Privilege question, which Peel took up vehemently, and at once identified himself with John Russell in support of the privileges of the House of Commons. The moment Parliament opened, this matter came under discussion, and for some time exclusively occupied the attention of the House of Commons. There could be no doubt that if Peel had changed his mind and taken the adverse side, he would have thrown the Government into great difficulty and embarrassment, but instead of doing so he took the Privilege side still more warmly than before, threw himself into the van of the contest, and was the most strenuous and the ablest advocate in the cause. Nothing could exceed the disappointment and annoyance of the great body of the Tories at his conduct. Many of them opposed him, and though Graham, Stanley, and others of the principal men voted with him, they did so very reluctantly, and maintained an invincible silence throughout all the discussions. When at last it was settled that a Bill should be introduced, and that Bill had passed the House of Commons, considerable doubt existed whether it would pass the Lords, the Duke of Wellington's opinion being decidedly at variance with Peel's on the question. Nothing could have gratified his party more than the rejection of this Bill by the Lords, but however well inclined the Duke was to reject it, he knew that this would be too desperate a game to play, and while it might lead to the dissolution of the Government, it would entail that of the Tory party also. Many conferences took place between Graham and Arbuthnot and Lyndhurst, the result of which was, that the Duke was persuaded to let the Bill pass, but this was not accomplished without much murmuring against the obstinacy of Peel.

[Page Head: THE DUKE CONTROLS THE TORIES.]

Soon afterwards the China question was brought forward by Graham, but whatever benefit they expected to derive from this attack on the Government was entirely marred by the Duke's speech in the House of Lords, in which he completely threw over Graham, as well as all who supported him; and while this vexed and offended the Tory leaders in the Commons, the 'Democracy' were as indignant with the Duke as they had lately been with Peel. After this, a sort of running fight went on (Stanley's battles presenting the only important results) up to the period of the introduction of the Canada Bill.[10] To this Peel offered no opposition whatever, and it passed the House of Commons with his concurrence, and consequently without difficulties or even divisions. But as soon as it got into the Lords, the Duke broke out in fierce hostility against it, denounced its provisions in the most unmeasured terms, and for a considerable time nobody knew whether they would throw it out or not. Peel (it appeared) had taken his line and supported the Bill, without any previous concert with the Duke, and the latter, as well as all the Tory Lords, were exceedingly indignant at finding themselves so far committed by his conduct that it became absolutely impossible for them to throw it out. Why Peel did not communicate with the Duke, I cannot divine, or why it was not made a great party measure, and a resolution taken to act in concert. Lyndhurst spoke to me (one day that I met him) with great bitterness against Peel. I asked him, 'What do you mean to do?' 'Oh, God knows; pass the Bill, I suppose, there's nothing else left for us to do.' Wharncliffe, while bewailing the schism, and the bad effect of its manifestation, attributed Peel's reserve to temper, and some remains of pique at what had previously passed about the Privilege and China questions. But whatever was the cause, Peel was quite right not to oppose this Bill, unless he was prepared with a better measure, and to take office with the intention of acting upon a different principle, and he distinctly said that he had nothing better to suggest. The subsequent conduct of the Duke throughout the whole proceeding in the House of Lords was curiously indicative of the actual state of his mind, of his disposition, and his faculties. His disposition is become excessively excitable and irritable, his faculties sometimes apparently weakened, and at others giving signs of all their accustomed vigour. He came down to the House and attacked this Bill with an asperity quite inconsistent with his abstaining from throwing it out. He loaded it with every sort of abuse, but allowed it to pass almost without any alteration. In thus doing to the measure all the moral damage he could, he gave way to his passion, and acted a part which I am convinced he would not have done in his better days, and which was quite at variance with the patriotic spirit by which he is usually animated. His violence not unnaturally encouraged his equally ardent but less prudent followers, to a more practical attack, and Hardwicke gave notice of his motion. The Duke, however, was fully alive to all the consequences that would result from the rejection of a Bill to which Peel had given an unqualified support in the House of Commons, and he resolved to exert all his great authority to restrain the zeal that his own speeches had so highly inflamed. He accordingly summoned the Lords to Apsley House, and made them a speech in which he stated all the reasons for which it was desirable not to throw out the Bill; and Aberdeen told Clarendon that in his life he had never heard a more admirable statement. It required, however, all his great influence to restrain them, and though they acquiesced (as they always do at his bidding) with surprising docility, they did so with the greatest reluctance.

[10] [This was a Bill for dealing with the Canada Clergy Reserves.]

London, August 19th, 1840 {p.296}

In the conversation at which Aberdeen told Clarendon this, he dilated upon the marvellous influence of the Duke, and the manner in which he treated his followers, and the language they endured from him. Clarendon asked him whether, when the Duke retired, he had any hopes of being able to govern them as well; to which he replied that he had not the slightest idea of it; on the contrary, that it would be impossible, that nobody else could govern them, and when his influence was withdrawn, they would split into every variety of opinion according to their several biases and dispositions. He said he did not think the Duke of Wellington had ever rendered greater service in his whole life than he had done this session in moderating violence and keeping his own party together and in order, and that he could still do the most essential service in the same way, and much more than by active leading in Parliament.

[Page Head: ADVANTAGES OF A WEAK GOVERNMENT.]

Out of this state of things a practical consequence has ensued of no slight importance, and one which has shown that if there are evils and disadvantages incident to a weak Government, these are not without some counterbalancing good. Both parties began to feel the necessity of dealing with certain questions of pressing importance in a spirit of compromise and mutual concession. Neither were strong enough to go on insisting upon having everything their own way, and each was conscious that the other had a fair right to require some sacrifice, so far as it could be made without compromising on either side any vital principle. Accordingly several questions were amicably and quietly settled, in all probability in a more just, expedient, and satisfactory way than they would have been by either party uncontrolled and unrestrained. The Irish Corporation Bill, which for years has been a topic of bitter contention, has at last been carried with very little difficulty and discussion. The alterations of the Lords were quietly accepted by the Commons, and the ultras on both sides were alone dissatisfied at the consummation. Then the Education Question, which last year raised a regular storm, both in Parliament and out, has been arranged between the Government and the heads of the Church, and the system is permanently established in such a manner as to allay all fears and jealousies. In the same spirit, I expect that next year some mode will be found of conciliating Stanley's Bill with the Government Bill of Irish Registration, and that some measure not quite but tolerably satisfactory to all parties will be devised, and the evil complained of, to a certain degree, be checked. These are advantages of no small moment, and it is very questionable whether the work of government and legislation is not more wisely and beneficially done by this concurrence of antagonistic parties, and compromise and fusion of antagonistic opinions, than it could be in any other way. All strong Governments become to a certain degree careless and insolent in the confidence of their strength, but their weakness renders them circumspect and conscientious. Governments with great majorities at their back can afford to do gross jobs, or take strong party measures; but when their opponents are as strong as themselves, and their majorities are never secure, they can venture upon nothing of the kind. All oppositions must affect a prodigious show of political virtue, and must be vigilant and economical, no matter how lax may have been their political morality when in power. But no politician, or party man, has any tenderness for an abuse the profit of which is to accrue to his adversary, and in this way good government may happen to be the result of a weak Ministry and a strong Opposition.

August 24th, 1840 {p.297}

[Page Head: THE TREATY OF JULY.]

Passed the greatest part of last week at the Grove, where Clarendon talked to me a great deal about the Eastern Question, and Palmerston's policy in that quarter. Palmerston, it seems, has had for many years as his fixed idea the project of humbling the Pasha of Egypt.[11] In the Cabinet he has carried everything his own way; all his colleagues either really concurring with him, or being too ignorant and too indifferent to fight the battle against his strong determination, except Lord Holland and Clarendon, who did oppose with all their strength Palmerston's recent treaty; but quite ineffectually. They had for their only ally, Lord Granville at Paris, and nothing can exceed the contempt with which the Palmerstonians treat this little knot of dissentients, at least the two elder ones, who (they say) are become quite imbecile, and they wonder Lord Granville does not resign. Palmerston, in fact, appears to exercise an absolute despotism at the Foreign Office, and deals with all our vast and complicated questions of diplomacy according to his own views and opinions, without the slightest control, and scarcely any interference on the part of his colleagues. This apathy is mainly attributable to that which appears in Parliament and in the country upon all foreign questions. Nobody understands and nobody cares for them, and when any rare and occasional notice is taken of a particular point, or of some question on which a slight and evanescent interest is manifested, Palmerston has little difficulty in dealing with the matter, which he always meets with a consummate impudence and, it must be allowed, a skill and resolution, which invariably carry him through. Whether the policy which he has adopted upon the Eastern Question be the soundest and most judicious, events must determine; but I never was more amazed than at reading his letters, so dashing, bold, and confident in their tone. Considering the immensity of the stake for which he is playing, that he may be about to plunge all Europe into a war, and that if war does ensue it will be entirely his doing, it is utterly astonishing he should not be more seriously affected than he appears to be with the gravity of the circumstances, and should not look with more anxiety (if not apprehension) to the possible results; but he talks in the most off-hand way of the clamour that broke out at Paris, of his entire conviction that the French Cabinet have no thoughts of going to war, and that if they were to do so, their fleets would be instantly swept from the sea, and their armies everywhere defeated. That if they were to try and make it a war of opinion and stir up the elements of revolution in other countries, a more fatal retaliation could and would be effected in France, where Carlist or Napoleonist interest, aided by foreign intervention, would shake the throne of Louis Philippe, while taxation and conscription would very soon disgust the French with a war in which he did not anticipate the possibility of their gaining any military successes. Everything may possibly turn out according to his expectations. He is a man blessed with extraordinary good fortune, and his motto seems to be that of Danton, 'De l'audace, encore de l'audace, et toujours de l'audace.' But there is a flippancy in his tone, an undoubting self-sufficiency, and a levity in discussing interests of such tremendous magnitude, which satisfies me that he is a very dangerous man to be entrusted with the uncontrolled management of our foreign relations. But our Cabinet is a complete republic, and Melbourne, their ostensible head, has no overruling authority, and is too indolent and too averse to energetic measures to think of having any, or to desire it. Any man of resolution and obstinacy does what he will with Melbourne. Nothing was ever so peremptory and determined as John Russell about Poulett Thomson's peerage, which the others did not at all like, but which he not only insisted upon, but actually threatened to resign unless it was done by a given day. It was with the greatest difficulty they could prevail on him to defer its being gazetted till Parliament was up, Duncannon and others dreading that it would excite the choler of the Duke of Wellington, and very likely provoke him to fall foul of some of their Bills.

[11] [The Treaty between England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia for the settlement of the affairs of the East, by compelling the Pasha of Egypt to relinquish Syria, and to restrict his dominion in Egypt, was signed in London on July 15, 1840. France having declined to concur in this policy, the Treaty was signed without her, and without her knowledge. This event was of the gravest consequence, and brought Europe to the brink of war.]

M. Dedel[12] told me the other day that he thought, without reference to his policy, Palmerston had conducted himself with a legerete quite unaccountable; that the Duke of Wellington, when he was at Windsor, had talked over the state of affairs with Melbourne, and said to him, 'I do not say that I disapprove of your policy as far as regards Mehemet Ali; perhaps I do not think that you go far enough; not only would I not leave him in possession of a foot of ground in Syria, but I should have no scruple in expelling him from Egypt too. But what is Mehemet Ali or the Turk in comparison with the immeasurable importance of preserving peace in Europe? this is the thing alone to be regarded, and I give you notice that you must not expect our support in Parliament of the policy which you have chosen to adopt.'[13] In the meantime there is an increasing impression here that no war will take place; public opinion is not yet much excited, and is nothing like so excitable as it is in France upon questions of foreign policy, where everybody thinks and talks on the subject; but if it ever is effectually roused, it will be much stronger and probably more consistent here than there. My brother writes me word that the King is most anxious to preserve peace, and is now feeling the pulse of the country, and doing his utmost to ascertain what the state of public opinion is, for his own guidance in the approaching crisis. Though now acting in apparent unison with Thiers, he would have no scruple in resisting the course of policy in which Thiers is embarked, if he found he could count upon the support of the country in his own pacific views; and it is the possibility of such a contest occurring in France which renders the question so very delicate and difficult, and makes the issue dependent on contingencies which no sagacity can foresee or provide for. Out of this complication Palmerston's wonderful luck may possibly extricate him, though it must be owned that he is playing a very desperate game.

[12] [Dutch Minister at the Court of St. James.]

[13] Clarendon, to whom I told this, said it was not true: he had said nothing about their support, but had said, 'I approve of your policy, but you must have no war.'

September 5th, 1840 {p.300}

[Page Head: OPPOSITION TO LORD PALMERSTON.]

I have been more in the way of hearing about the Eastern Question during the last week than at any previous time, though my informants and associates have been all of the anti-Palmerston interest—Holland House, and Clarendon, Dedel (who objects to the form more than the fond), and Madame de Lieven, who is all with Guizot, because he is devoted to her, and she feels the greatest interest where she gets the most information. Clarendon showed me the other day a long letter which he wrote to Palmerston in March last, in which he discussed the whole question, stating the objections to which he thought Palmerston's policy liable, and suggesting what he would have done instead. It was a well- written and well-reasoned document enough.

Those who are opposed to Palmerston's policy, and even some who do not object to the policy itself so much as to the manner in which it has been worked out, feel confident that the means will fall very short of accomplishing the end, and that peace will be preserved by their very impotence at a great expense of the diplomatic reputation of the parties concerned; and they are confirmed in this notion by the failure of some of the anticipations in which Palmerston so confidently indulged, especially the conduct of the Pasha and the Syrian insurrection. Clarendon says that, 'whatever his opinions may have been, now that they are fairly embarked in Palmerston's course, he must as earnestly desire its success as if he had been its original advocate.' But both he and Lord Holland have been so vehemently committed in opposition to it, that, without any imputation of unpatriotic feelings, it is not in human nature they should not find a sort of satisfaction in the frustration of those measures which they so strenuously resisted, and this clearly appears in all Lord Holland said to me, and in Lady Holland's tone about Palmerston and his daring disposition.

September 6th, 1840 {p.301}

On arriving in town this morning, I found a note from M. Guizot, begging I would call on him, as he wanted to have a few minutes' conversation with me. Accordingly I went, and am just returned. His object was to put me in possession of the actual state of affairs, and to read me a letter he had just received from Thiers, together with one (either to Thiers or to him) from their Consul-General at Alexandria.

[Page Head: THE POLICY OF FRANCE.]

Thiers' letter expressed considerable alarm. After describing the failure of Walewski and the other French agents, and enlarging upon the efforts they had made, and were still making, to restrain the Pasha, and prevent his making any offensive movement, he said that this was the Pasha's ultimatum. He offered, if France would join him and make common cause with him, to place his fleets and armies at her disposal, and to be governed in all things by her advice and wishes, a thing utterly impossible for France to listen to. Upon the impossibility of this alliance being represented to him, the prudence of keeping quiet strenuously urged upon him, and the utmost endeavours made to convince him that a defensive policy was the only wise and safe course for him, he had engaged not to move forward, or take any offensive course unless compelled to do so, by violence offered to him; his army was concentrated at the foot of the Taurus, and there (but in a menacing attitude) he would consent to its remaining; but if any European troops were to advance against him, or be transported to Syria, any attempt made to foment another insurrection in Syria, or any attack made upon his fleet, or any violence offered to his commerce, then he would cross the Taurus, and, taking all consequences, commence offensive operations. In that case, said Guizot, Constantinople might be occupied by the Russians, and the British fleet enter the Sea of Marmora; and if that happened, he could not answer for the result in France, and he owned that he (and Thiers expressed the same in his letter) was in the greatest alarm at all these dangers and complications. He had seen Palmerston this morning, and read Thiers' letter to him. I asked him if it had made any impression on Palmerston. He said, 'Not the slightest;' that he had said, 'Oh! Mehemet Ali cedera; il ne faut pas s'attendre qu'il cede a la premiere sommation; mais donnez-lui quinze jours, et il finira par ceder.' Guizot said that the failure of so many of his predictions and expectations had not in the slightest degree diminished Palmerston's confidence, and that there was in fact no use whatever in speaking to him on the subject. Guizot is evidently in great alarm, and well he may be, for there can be no doubt that his Government are in a position of the greatest embarrassment, far from inclined to war, the King especially abhorring the very thoughts of it, and at the same time so far committed that if the four allies act with any vigour and drive Mehemet Ali to desperation, France must either kindle the flames of war, or, after all her loud and threatening tone, succumb in a manner not only intolerably galling to the national pride, but which really would be very discreditable in itself.

Guizot dwelt very much upon their long-continued and earnest efforts to make the Pasha moderate and prudent, and on the offers he had made to join the allies, and unite the authority of France to that of all the others for the purpose of preventing the Pasha from advancing a step further, provided they would leave him in his present possessions. I certainly never saw a man more seriously or sincerely alarmed, and I think (now that it is so near) that the French Government would avoid war at almost any cost; but the great evil of the present state of affairs is, that the conduct of the question has escaped out of the hands of the Ministers and statesmen by whom it has hitherto been handled, and henceforward must depend upon the passions or caprice of the Pasha, and the discretion of the numerous commanders in any of the fleets now gathered in the Mediterranean, and even upon the thousand accidents to which, with the most prudent and moderate instructions from home, and the best intentions in executing them, the course of events is exposed. As Guizot said, Europe is at the mercy 'des incidents et des subalternes.' He promised to keep me informed of everything that might occur of interest.

September 10th, 1840 {p.303}

The day after I saw Guizot I related to Clarendon all that had passed, when he told me that Melbourne was now become seriously alarmed, so much so that he had written to John Russell, 'he could neither eat, nor drink, nor sleep,' so great was his disturbance. Lord John was also extremely alarmed, and both he and Melbourne had been considerably moved by a letter the former had received from the Duke of Bedford, enclosing one from Lord Spencer, in which he entered into the whole Eastern Question; and said that it was his earnest desire to give his support to the Government in all their measures, but that it would be contrary to his judgement and his conscience to support them in their policy on this question. This appears to have made a great impression upon them, but not the least upon Palmerston, who is quite impenetrable, and who always continues more or less to influence his colleagues; for Lord John, after meeting Palmerston at Windsor, came back easier in his mind, and, as he said, with a conviction (not apparently founded on any solid reason), 'that they should pull through.' Palmerston, so far from being at all shaken by anything Guizot said to him, told him that the only fault he had committed was not taking Lord Ponsonby's advice and proceeding to action long ago. The second edition of the 'Times' mentions a violent note delivered by Pontois to the Porte. I thought this of such consequence that I sent the paper to Guizot, and begged him, if he could, to afford the means of contradicting it. He wrote me word he would, as soon as he had des renseignements plus precis. In the meantime, I find Metternich has protested against the tone of Pontois' communication, which was verbal and not written. His own account of it to Thiers exhibited strong, but not indecent language.

In the evening (day before yesterday), Guizot dined at Holland House, and met Clarendon and Lord John Russell, with the latter of whom he had a long talk, and he hoped that he had made an impression on him. Yesterday morning I was enabled to read the Cabinet minute, submitting to the Queen the expediency of making the Treaty, to which was appended the dissent of Clarendon and Holland, with their reasons assigned in a short but well-written and well-reasoned paper. The Queen desired to keep it, and there can be little doubt that in her heart she coincides with them, for Leopold is frightened out of his senses, and is sure to have made her in some degree partake of his alarm. She told Melbourne that, of all things, what astonished her most was the coolness and indifference of Palmerston. It is remarkable that Clarendon, who expresses himself with energy, was never asked to Windsor while Leopold was there, Palmerston being there the whole time; and the day that Leopold departed, Clarendon was invited.

[Page Head: ADMIRAL NAPIER'S PROCLAMATION.]

Yesterday morning arrived a fresh budget of alarming news, amongst the rest a proclamation of Admiral Napier, which people are disposed to consider a forgery and an impossibility, but which was believed at Paris and by Guizot here, and consequently raised a storm there, and put the Ambassador in despair. Clarendon went to him in the afternoon, when he broke out: 'Mon cher Comte, I appeal to you, as representing the Government, to tell me what I am to think of such a proceeding as this, and how is it possible that I can continue to 'gerer les affaires de mon gouvernement' here, if such provocations as this proclamation are to occur.' Clarendon acknowledged that if this proclamation was authentic, nothing was to be said in its defence, but urged that no definite judgement should be formed till they had some conclusive information; but he told me, that he should not be surprised to find that it was authentic and in virtue of instruction from Ponsonby, and he fully expected Palmerston would highly approve of it. When it was suggested to Palmerston that it might with every effort be impossible to prevent the Pasha from crossing the Taurus, he said, 'So much the better if he did, that he would not be able to retreat, his communication be cut off, and his ruin the more certainly accomplished.'

September 12th, 1840 {p.305}

Yesterday at Windsor for a Council, when Prince Albert was introduced. The Ministers who were there had a sort of Cabinet afterwards, and a discussion about increasing the naval force, which Lord Minto thought they could not venture to do without calling Parliament together; but they agreed that this was to be avoided, and would be on every account objectionable. They might incur any expense for naval affairs on their own responsibility, and Parliament would be sure to bear them out. After dinner, a messenger came, and Melbourne went out to read the contents of his box. I remarked that nobody occupied his chair next the Queen; it was left vacant, like Banquo's, till he came back, so that it was established as exclusively his. I heard this morning what this box contained: letters from Sir F. Lamb,[14] to Palmerston, in which he told him that he wished him every success in his present undertaking, would do everything that he could to assist him, but acknowledged that he had not the least notion what he could do, or how anything could be done by anybody; intimating his conviction, in short, that their Convention was not executable. As for Metternich, he is at his wit's end, and occupied night and day in thinking how he can se tirer d'affaire. He tells Lamb that as to contributing a guinea or a soldier towards the operation, it is quite out of the question, and begs him never to mention such a thing, and that if the Treaty could quietly fall to the ground it would be a very good thing. It is, however, entirely contemplated by the other Powers that Russia shall occupy Constantinople, and march to the assistance of the Sultan if necessary; but it is quite clear that Metternich is resolved to prevent a war by any means, and that he would not care for his share of humiliation or the object of the Convention being baffled. All this, however, does not damp the ardour or diminish the confidence of Palmerston, who says, 'Everything is going on as well as possible.'

[14] [Sir Frederic Lamb, afterwards Lord Beauvale, was at this time ambassador at the Court of Austria.]

When I got to town I found a note from Guizot begging I would call on him. I went, and he read me a letter from Thiers about 'the note' of M. de Pontois at Constantinople, in which he explained that it was a verbal communication, and not a note, and that it had been grossly exaggerated; and he read me Pontois' despatch to Thiers. I then asked him if he knew anything of Metternich and his disposition; and when he said, no, and asked me very anxiously if I could tell him anything, I told him that I thought it was so strongly turned towards peace, and he was so anxious to relieve himself from the embarrassment in which he was placed, that they might turn it to good account, if they were to set about it.

September 13th, 1840 {p.307}

All last week at Doncaster; nothing new, but a considerable rise in the funds, indicating a reviving confidence in peace. Have seen nobody since I came back.

September 22nd, 1840 {p.307}

[Page Head: ALARM OF LORD MELBOURNE AND LORD JOHN.]

Came from Gorhambury yesterday. Got a letter from the Duke of Bedford, in which he says, 'John has been here for the last week and has spoken very freely and openly to me on the state of our foreign relations. Matters are very serious, and may produce events both at home and abroad which neither you nor I can calculate upon. John is very uneasy and talks of going to town. You are aware that he came up from Scotland unexpectedly. Between ourselves, I think he is disposed to make a stand, and to act, if occasion requires it, a great part—whether for good or evil, God alone knows. Nobody, not even his colleagues, except Melbourne, knows what is passing.' In a postscript he said that Lord John had urged Melbourne to summon a Cabinet, and, accordingly, one is summoned to meet next Monday. This is mysterious, but it can only mean one thing. Lord John, already alarmed by Lord Spencer's letter, and dreading the possibility of a war, is resolved to oppose Palmerston's headlong policy, and, if it be necessary, to risk a rupture in the Cabinet, and take upon himself the administration of Foreign affairs. The Foreign Office was originally that which he wished to have, and when Melbourne returned to office, they proposed to Palmerston to take either the Home or Colonial, but he would not hear of anything but the Foreign department.

I talked over this letter with Clarendon last night (from whom I have no secrets), and he, while fully agreeing in the propriety of calling the Cabinet together, and making the future transaction of foreign affairs a matter for the Government and not for the Foreign Office only, and of course well disposed to buckle on his armour on this question, acknowledged that Palmerston would have very good reason to complain of any strong opposition from that quarter, inasmuch as he had been all along encouraged to proceed in his present line of policy by the concurrence and support of John Russell, who was in fact just as much responsible as Palmerston himself for the present state of affairs.

The beginning of the business may be traced to a Cabinet held at Windsor last autumn, when the general line of policy, since acted upon by Palmerston, was settled. From that time, however, the rest of the Ministers seem never to have interfered, or taken any interest in the matter, and Palmerston conducted it all just as he thought fit. This year Cabinet after Cabinet passed over, and no mention was ever made of the affairs of the East, till one day, at the end of a Cabinet, Palmerston, in the most easy nonchalant way imaginable, said that he thought it right to mention that he had been for a long time engaged in negotiation upon the principles agreed upon at the Cabinet at Windsor, and that he had drawn up a Treaty, with which it was fit the Cabinet should be acquainted. At this sudden announcement his colleagues looked very serious, but nobody said a word, except Lord Holland, who said, 'that he could be no party to any measure which might be likely to occasion a breach between this country and France.' No discussion, however, took place at that time, and it was agreed that the further consideration of the matter should be postponed till the next Cabinet. The following day, Palmerston wrote a letter to Melbourne, in which he said that he saw some hesitation and some disapprobation in the Cabinet at the course which he had recommended for adoption, and as he could only hope to succeed by obtaining unanimous support, he thought it better at once to place his office at Melbourne's disposal. Melbourne wrote an answer begging he would not think of resigning, and reminding him that the matter stood over for discussion, and then sent the whole correspondence to Clarendon. Clarendon immediately wrote word that he felt under so much obligation to Palmerston that it was painful to him to oppose him; but as he could not support him in his Eastern policy, it was much better that he should resign, and begged Melbourne would accept his resignation. Melbourne however said, 'For God's sake, let there be no resignations at all,'[15] that his and Lord Holland's retirement would have the effect of breaking up the Government; and then it was suggested that they might guard themselves by a minute of Cabinet (that which they subsequently drew up and gave the Queen) from any participation in the measures they objected to. After this, Palmerston continued to do just as he pleased, his colleagues consentientibus or at least non dissentientibus, except Holland and Clarendon, with whom nevertheless he seems (especially the latter) to have gone on upon very good terms. Latterly, however, since the affair has got so hot and critical, though their social relations have been uninterrupted, and the Palmerstons have been constantly dining at Holland House, Palmerston has never said one word to Lord Holland on the subject, and he is unquestionably very sore at the undisguised manner in which Lord Holland has signified his dislike of Palmerston's foreign policy, and the great civilities that Lord and Lady Holland have shown to Guizot for some time past.

[15] I own I cannot see why. Their retirement would have proved the unanimity of the rest, and would rather have strengthened Palmerston than not.

The manner in which business is conducted and the independence of the Foreign Office are curiously displayed by the following fact. Last Wednesday a Protocol was signed (very proper in itself), in which the four Powers disclaimed any intention of aggrandising themselves in any way. The fact of this Protocol was told to Clarendon by Dr. Bowring, who had heard it in the City, and to Lord Holland by Dedel, neither of these Ministers having the slightest notion of its existence. In the meantime, while the apprehensions of Melbourne and John Russell, thus tardily aroused, have urged them to the adoption of a measure which may possibly break up the Government, or at all events bring about some important changes of one sort or another, the French are making vigorous preparations for war, and, having persuaded the Pasha to send a new proposal to Constantinople, Thiers has intimated that, if this be rejected, France will give him active support, and then war will be inevitable. The crisis, therefore, seems actually on the point of arriving, and while all the world here fancies that war is impossible, it appears to be nearer than ever it was.

Guizot committed a great gaucherie the other day (the last time he was at Windsor), which he never could have done if he had had more experience of Courts, or been born and had lived in that society. The first day, the Queen desired he would sit next to her at dinner, which he did; the second day the Lord-in-waiting (Headfort) came as usual with his list, and told Guizot he was to take out the Queen of the Belgians, and sit somewhere else; when he drew up and said, 'Milord, ma place est aupres de la Reine.' Headfort, quite frightened, hastened back to report what had happened; when the Queen as wisely altered, as the Ambassador had foolishly objected to, the disposition of places, and desired him to sit next herself, as he had done the day before.

September 23rd, 1840 {p.310}

[Page Head: DIFFERENCES IN THE CABINET.]

I called on Guizot yesterday morning, found him apprised of the meeting of the Cabinet on Monday next, when I told him that I could not help thinking he might materially contribute to the adoption of some resolution conducive to peace, that I had no doubt there would be very lively discussions at this Cabinet, and it was of great importance he should, if he could, afford an appui to the peace party. He said he would willingly do anything he could. I said, 'for example, could he say on the part of his Government, that, in the event of the new terms proposed by Mehemet Ali being accepted, France would guarantee their due performance on the part of the Pasha, and that she would join in coercive measures against him if he attempted to infringe them, or commit any act of aggression against the Porte?' He said, 'that he was not authorised to make such a declaration, but he had no doubt he could engage so far, and that France would not hesitate to pledge herself to join the other Allies and act against Mehemet Ali in such a case as I had supposed.' I asked him if he would write to his Government forthwith, as there was still time to get an answer before the Cabinet met, and he promised he would; but, he added, that with every desire to say what might furnish an argument for those in the Cabinet who are disposed to accept the proffered arrangement, he did not know how to hold any communications—for with Palmerston he could not, and Melbourne and John Russell were out of town. I told him, however, that Lord John would be in town on Thursday, and he promised he would call on him on Friday and talk to him; adding that he thought the last time he saw him he was well disposed. I told him that Lord John was not a man who said much, and that I could not answer for his opinions, but that I was quite convinced Palmerston would find some of his colleagues seriously alarmed, and no longer disposed to submit quietly to whatever he might be pleased to settle and to dictate. He asked me who were the Ministers with the greatest influence, and whose opinions would sway the Cabinet; and I told him Melbourne and John Russell, without a doubt, and whatever they resolved upon, the rest would agree to. But it is most extraordinary that while all reflecting people are amazed at the Government being scattered all abroad at such a momentous crisis, and instead of being collected together for the purpose of considering in concert every measure that is taken, as well as the whole course of policy, with any changes and modifications that may be called for, the Ministers themselves, such of them at least as are here, cannot discover any occasion for any Cabinets or meetings, and seem to think it quite natural and proper to leave the great question of peace or war to be dealt with by Palmerston as a mere matter of official routine. Lord Minto and Labouchere could not imagine why a Cabinet was called, nor by whom, and Palmerston still less. The day before the summons, he told Labouchere he might safely go into the country, as there was no chance of a Cabinet; and now Minto can only imagine that they are summoned to discuss the time to be fixed for the prorogation or the meeting of Parliament.

September 26th, 1840 {p.310}

[Page Head: LORD JOHN CALLS A CABINET.]

On Wednesday I went to Woburn, and, as soon as I arrived, the Duke carried me off to his room and told me everything that had taken place, and the exact present posture of affairs. John Russell has for some time past been impressed with the necessity of bringing the Eastern Question to a settlement, to avert all possibility of a war with France, and he has repeatedly urged Melbourne in the strongest terms to do something to prevent the danger into which the policy of the Treaty is hurrying us. None of the Ministers, except Melbourne himself, and Palmerston, have been apprised of these remonstrances, nor are any of them at this moment aware of what has been and is passing. Palmerston has been indignant at the opposition thus suddenly put forward by Lord John, and complains (not, I think, without very good cause), that after supporting and sanctioning his policy, and approving of the Treaty, he abandons him midway, and refuses to give that policy a fair trial. This he considers unjust and unreasonable, and it must be owned he is entitled to complain. Lord John, however, as far as I can learn, not very successfully justifies himself by saying that it was one thing to defend the treaty, of which he approved and does still, and another to approve the measures which are apparently leading us into a war. Between the urgent remonstrances of Lord John and the indignant complaints of Palmerston, Melbourne has been at his wit's end. So melancholy a picture of indecision, weakness, and pusillanimity as his conduct has exhibited, I never heard of. The Queen is all this time in a great state of nervousness and alarm, on account of Leopold; terrified at Palmerston's audacity, amazed at his confidence, and trembling lest her uncle should be exposed to all the dangers and difficulties in which he would be placed by a war between his niece and his father-in-law. All these sources of solicitude, pressure from without, and doubt and hesitation within, have raised that perplexity in Melbourne's mind which has robbed him (as he told Lord John) of appetite and sleep. At length, after going on in this way for some time, matters becoming so bad between Palmerston and Lord John that Palmerston refused to have any communication with him, Lord Spencer's letter, the continued state of danger, and the prospect of some arrangement growing out of the new propositions, made Lord John determine to take a decided course, and he accordingly requested Melbourne to call a Cabinet, which was done, and this important meeting is to take place on Monday next. At this Cabinet, Lord John is prepared to make a stand, and to propose that measures shall be taken for bringing about a settlement on the basis of mutual concession, and he is in fact disposed to accept the terms now offered by the Pasha with the consent and by the advice of France. He anticipates Palmerston's opposition to this, and his insisting upon a continuance of our present course; but he is resolved in such a case to bring matters to an issue, and if he is overruled by a majority of the Cabinet, not only to resign, but to take a decisive part in Parliament against Palmerston's policy, and to do his utmost there, with the support which he expects to obtain, to prevent a war. He is aware that his conduct might not only break up the Whig Government and party, but that it may bring about an entirely new arrangement and combination of parties, all of which he is willing to encounter rather than the evils and hazards of war. On the other hand, if Palmerston refuses to accede to his terms, and if unsupported by the Cabinet he tenders his resignation, Lord John is ready to urge its acceptance, and himself to undertake the administration of our foreign affairs. In short, he has made up his mind, and that so strongly, that I do not think it possible he can fail either to carry his point or to break up the Government, or at least bring about very material changes in it.

Prepared as I was, by the Duke of Bedford's letter, for something of this sort, I was not prepared for anything so strong and decisive; and while I expressed my satisfaction at it, I did not conceal my opinion that Lord John's course had not been at all consistent, and that Palmerston, when the moment of discussion came, would have a good case against his antagonist colleague. While I was at Woburn, I had constant running talk about this matter with the Duke, but not a word with Lord John, to whom I never uttered, nor he to me.

Yesterday I returned to town, when I found that Lord John had written both to Lord Holland and Clarendon, shortly, but saying that he thought the new proposals made the matter stand very differently. I dined at Holland House, where the Palmerstons dined also. My own opinion from the first moment was, that Palmerston never would agree to any arrangement, but I thought it just possible, if he became impressed with the magnitude of the danger, that he might anticipate Lord John, by himself suggesting some attempt to profit by the disposition of the Pasha to make concessions. But any such possibility was speedily dissipated, by a conversation which I had with Lady Palmerston, who spoke with the utmost bitterness and contempt of these proposals, as totally out of the question, not worth a moment's attention, and such as the other Powers would not listen to, even if we were disposed to accept them; and that we were now bound to those Powers, and must act in concert with them. She told me a great deal, which I knew (from other sources) not to be true, about Metternich's resolution not to make the slightest concession to France and the Pasha; and her brother Frederic's strenuous advice and opinion to that effect. She complained, and said that Frederic complained, of the mischief which was done by Cabinets which only bred difficulties, intrigues, and underhand proceedings, and plainly intimated her opinion that all powers ought to be centred in, and all action proceed from, the Foreign Office alone. I told her that I could not see the proposals in the same light as she did, that some mutual concessions in all affairs must be expected, and that she was so accustomed to look at the matter only in a diplomatic point of view that she was not sufficiently alive to the storm of wrath and indignation which would burst upon the Government, if war did ensue upon the rejection of such terms as these, which, as far as I had been able to gather opinions, appeared to moderate impartial men fair and reasonable in themselves, and such as we might accept without dishonour. We had a very long talk, which was principally of importance as showing the state of her husband's mind, and I told Lord Holland afterwards what I had said to her, at which he expressed great satisfaction. I found afterwards that there has been a correspondence between Palmerston and Holland, begun by the former, and the object of it to vent his complaints at the undisguised hostility of Holland House to the Treaty and its policy. It ended by Holland's refusing to continue it, and referring Palmerston to the Cabinet on Monday, when the whole question would come under consideration.

[Page Head: COUNT WALEWSKI'S MISSION TO EGYPT.]

This morning I received a note from Guizot, begging I would call on him as soon as I could. I went almost directly, when he produced a letter from Thiers, in which he desired Guizot to go immediately to Palmerston, and in the most formal and solemn manner to deny, in his name and in the name of France, that the mission of Walewski[16] had had any such object as that which had been imputed to it; that he had not endeavoured to persuade the Pasha not to accede to the terms imposed upon him, and that if he was disposed to accept them, 'La France ne se montrerait pas plus ambitieuse pour lui qu'il ne l'etait pour lui-meme,' and would certainly not interfere to prevent the execution of the Treaty. Moreover, he was to say that Walewski had not gone to Constantinople as the agent of the Pasha, but only to convey to M. de Pontois the intelligence of the communication which the Pasha had made to the Sultan through Rifat Bey, Rifat Bey having been despatched on the 6th with a very submissive letter from Mehemet Ali to the Sultan, in which he asked him to grant certain terms, the substance of which has been already made known. Guizot then said that he had likewise received authority to declare that if the Sultan accepted the terms proposed by Mehemet Ali, or even some modification of them (such as France could approve of), with the consent and concurrence of his Allies, and if he invited France to be a party to the new arrangement, and to join in guaranteeing a due execution of its provisions, France would accept such invitation, and would join the other Allies in compelling Mehemet Ali to a strict observance of the arrangement, and would, if necessary, use measures of coercion and hostility against him if he failed in a due performance, or infringed the limits assigned to him. I told M. Guizot that nothing could be more satisfactory than these communications, and he said that he had already asked for an interview with Palmerston, in order to impart the same to him. He then wanted to know if he might speak to Lord John if he met him at Holland House or elsewhere; but I advised him not, and told him that Palmerston was suspicious and jealous, and would take umbrage at any of his colleagues holding communications upon affairs which were his peculiar concern. He acquiesced altogether, and it was agreed that I should call on him to-morrow morning and hear what had passed between Palmerston and him. I took the opportunity of telling him on that occasion that the great evil, and that which rendered all negotiation and arrangement so difficult, was the absence of all reciprocal confidence, that we had none in his Minister (Thiers), and that the national pride and vanity (of which we, like themselves, had a share) were wounded by the ostentatious preparations for war, and the menacing and blustering tone of the press. He acknowledged these evils and their bad effects, and only shrugged up his shoulders at what I said about Thiers, of whom he has no good opinion himself, as is well known.

[16] [Count Walewski had been despatched to Alexandria with a mission from M. Thiers, and one of the grievances of Lord Palmerston against France was that this emissary was supposed to have been sent either to encourage Mehemet Ali in his resistance to the Allied Powers, or to negotiate a separate arrangement between the Pasha and the Sultan, under the auspices of France, so as to cut the ground from under the other Powers. This M. Thiers stoutly denied in his correspondence, and he denied it to me with equal energy when I dined with him at Auteuil on October 8.]

When I left him, I wrote a long letter to the Duke of Bedford, detailing all that had passed, and as I cannot now doubt that Lord John knows his brother communicates with me, and it was of importance that he should be apprised immediately of what had passed, I resolved to send him my letter to read, and desired him to forward it to Woburn. He afterwards dined with me, and when he came to dinner, he said he had read my letter, and that it was very important.

September 27th, 1840 {p.317}

[Page Head: CONCILIATORY PROPOSALS.]

Went to Guizot, who began by telling me he had been with Palmerston yesterday, who had acknowledged tres loyalement that there was not and could not be any truth in the report (about Walewski), said his manner to him (as it had always been) was excellent. Guizot then complained of the facility with which he gave ear to reports like these and to all that was said against France; but he left him well enough satisfied with his reception. He then asked in what state the question was, and I told him that it was in such a state that I had no hesitation in saying war was impossible, and that if the 'transaction' was such as we could in honour accept, we should accept it; that the best thing to be hoped was, that Palmerston would make up his mind to a 'transaction' in the Cabinet, and would himself take the initiative; but that at all events there were others who were resolved not to pursue any longer this course of policy, and that if he was inexorable it must end in his resignation.

Before I went to Guizot I saw Clarendon, who had had a good deal of talk with Lord John, who spoke to him just in the strain which the Duke of Bedford had already described to me. Melbourne is to be in town to-day, and what Lord John expected and hoped was, that he would be able to persuade Palmerston to give way, and himself propose to acquiesce in Mehemet Ali's proposals. In that case, Lord John said, he should not say a word. If Palmerston would not do so, then it would be for him to take his own course, and he and Clarendon have both agreed to resign if they should be overruled; and the latter said he thought he could answer for Lord Holland doing the same. While returning home I was overtaken by Palmerston, who was on his way to Lord John's house; and they are now closeted together, so that at least they will have it all out before the Cabinet to-morrow. Guizot gave me a copy of Cochelet's despatch, with an account of what had passed between Mehemet Ali, himself, Walewski, and the four Consuls-General, which ended in the transmission of his new proposal to the Porte.

September 28th, 1840 {p.318}

Lord John and Palmerston had a long conversation, amicable enough in tone, but unsatisfactory in result. However, Lord John did not appear to be shaken in his determination, but rather inclined to an opinion that Palmerston would himself be disposed to give way. Any such expectation ought to have been dissipated by a letter which Lord John received meanwhile from Palmerston, in which he talked with his usual confidence and levity of 'the certainty of success,' the 'hopeless condition of the Pasha,' and the facility with which the Treaty would be carried into effect.[17]

[17] Everything turned out according to his anticipations.

[Page Head: LORD PALMERSTON'S RESOLUTION.]

In the morning, after I had been with Guizot (and after Palmerston's interview with Lord John), he went to Palmerston and communicated fully the offer of France, saying he would not enter into the details of the question, but he could not help reminding him of the failure of so many of his confident expectations. Palmerston said that there would be no sort of difficulty in enforcing the Treaty, and that then France might join if she pleased. Guizot replied that this was out of the question, that France was now ready to join in a transaction fair and honourable to both parties, but she would not stand by, see the question settled without her, and then come in to bolster up an arrangement made by others, and with which she had no concern. In the evening he went to Holland House, where he told Melbourne what he had communicated to Palmerston; found him in a satisfactory disposition, but Melbourne said that there was a danger greatly to be feared, and that was, that our ambassador at Constantinople, who was very violent against Mehemet Ali, and not afraid of war, might and probably would urge the immediate rejection of the Pacha's proposal and every sort of violent measure.[18] Guizot, naturally enough, expressed (to me) his astonishment that the Prime Minister should hold such language, and that, if he had an ambassador who was likely to act in such a manner so much at variance with his political views, he did not recall him or supersede him by a special mission. This, however, was very characteristic of Melbourne; and I told Clarendon, urging him to insist that some positive understanding should be come to, upon the conduct to be adopted by Ponsonby. There can be no doubt that Palmerston and Ponsonby between them will do all they can to embroil matters, and to make a transaction impossible, and Palmerston writes just what he pleases without any of his colleagues having the least idea what he says. The result of the whole then is, that the Cabinet meet at three to-day, and that Lord John will have to stand forth in opposition to Palmerston's policy, and to propose the adoption of measures leading to an amicable arrangement. A few hours will show how the rest are disposed to take it.

[18] As he did.



CHAPTER IX.

The Cabinet meets—The Government on the verge of Dissolution— The Second Cabinet—Palmerston lowers his Tone in the Cabinet— But continues to bully in the Press—Taking of Beyrout— Deposition of Mehemet Ali—Lord John acquiesces—Total Defeat of Peace Party—Lord John Russell's False Position—His Views— Lord Granville's Dissatisfaction—Further Attempts at Conciliation—Prevarication of Lord Ponsonby—Newspaper Hostilities—Discussion of the French Note of the 8th October— Guizot's Opinion of the Note of the 8th October—Louis Philippe's Influence on the Crisis—Summary of Events—Death of Lord Holland—Lord Clarendon's Regret for Lord Holland—M. Guizot's Intentions as to France—Effects of the Queen's Partiality for Melbourne—Resignation to Thiers—Bickerings in the Ministry—Lord John Russell's Dissatisfaction with Lord Palmerston—Lord John resigns—Lord John demands the Recall of Lord Ponsonby—Lord Palmerston defends Lord Ponsonby—M. Guizot's Policy—Conciliatory Propositions fail—Attitude of Austria—Asperity of Lord Palmerston—Operations in Syria— Success of Lord Palmerston and his Policy—Baron Mounier's Mission to London—Birth of the Princess Royal—Results of the Success of Lord Palmerston's Measures—The Tories divided in Opinion as to the Treaty—Retrospect of the Year—Lord Holland.

September 29th, 1840: Wednesday {p.320}

[Page Head: A CABINET ON THE EASTERN QUESTION.]

The Cabinet met on Monday evening and sat till seven o'clock. The account of the proceedings which has reached me is to the last degree amusing, but at the same time pitoyable. It must have been a payer les places to see. They met, and as if all were conscious of something unpleasant in prospect, and all shy, there was for some time a dead silence. At length Melbourne, trying to shuffle off the discussion, but aware that he must say something, began: 'We must consider about the time to which Parliament should be prorogued.' Upon this Lord John took it up and said, 'I presume we must consider whether Parliament should be called together or not, because, as matters are now going on, it seems to me that we may at any moment find ourselves at war, and it is high time to consider the very serious state of affairs. I should like,' he added, turning to Melbourne, 'to know what is your opinion upon the subject.' Nothing, however, could be got from Melbourne, and there was another long pause, which was not broken till somebody asked Palmerston, 'What are your last accounts?' On this Palmerston pulled out of his pocket a whole parcel of letters and reports from Ponsonby, Hodges, and others, and began reading them through, in the middle of which operation someone happened to look up, and perceived Melbourne fast asleep in his armchair. At length Palmerston got through his papers, when there was another pause; and at last Lord John, finding that Melbourne would not take the lead or say a word, went at once into the whole subject. He stated both sides of the case with great precision, and in an admirable, though very artful speech, a statement which, if elaborated into a Parliamentary speech and completed as it would be in the House of Commons, was calculated to produce the greatest effect. He delivered this, speaking for about a quarter of an hour, and then threw himself back in his chair, waiting for what anybody else would say. After some little talk, Palmerston delivered his sentiments the other way, made a violent philippic against France, talked of her weakness and want of preparation, of the union of all the Powers of Europe against her, said that Prussia had 200,000 men on the Rhine, and (as Lord Holland said) exhibited all the violence of '93. Lord John was then asked, since such were his opinions, what course he would advise? He said he had formed his opinion as to what it would be advisable to do, and he produced a slip of paper on which he had written two or three things. The first was, that we should immediately make a communication to the French Government, expressing our thanks for the efforts France had made to induce the Pasha to make concessions for the purpose of bringing about a settlement; and next, to call together the Ministers of the other Powers, and express to them our opinion that it would be desirable to re-open negotiations for a settlement of the dispute in consequence of the effects produced by the mediation of France. There then ensued a good deal of talk (in which, however, the Prime Minister took no part), Lord Minto espousing Palmerston's side, and saying (which was true enough), that though Lord Holland and Clarendon, who had all along opposed the Treaty, might very consistently take this course, he did not see how any of those could do so who had originally supported and approved of it; to which Lord John quietly and briefly said, 'The events at Alexandria have made all the difference.' This was in fact no answer; and Minto was quite right, especially as Lord John had taken his line before the events at Alexandria were known. Of the Ministers present besides Minto, Macaulay seemed rather disposed to go with Palmerston, and talked blusteringly about France, as he probably thought a Secretary of War should. Labouchere was first one way and then the other, and neither the Chancellor nor the Chancellor of the Exchequer said one word. The result was an agreement, that it would be disrespectful to Lord Lansdowne, considering his position, to come to any resolution in his absence; and as he could not arrive before this day, that the discussion should be adjourned till Thursday (to-morrow) by which time he and Morpeth would be here. They were all to dine with Palmerston, and a queer dinner it must have been.