7. Melancthon says, "Grammatica est certa loquendi ac scribendi ratio, Latinis Latine." Vossius, "Ars bene loquendi eoque et scribendi, atque id Latinis Latine." Dr. Prat, "Grammatica est recte loquendi atque scribendi ars." Ruddiman also, in his Institutes of Latin Grammar, reversed the terms writing and speaking, and defined grammar, "ars rece loquendi scribendique;" and, either from mere imitation, or from the general observation that speech precedes writing, this arrangement of the words has been followed by most modern grammarians. Dr. Lowth embraces both terms in a more general one, and says, "Grammar is the art of rightly expressing our thoughts by words." It is, however, the province of grammar, to guide us not merely in the expression of our own thoughts, but also in our apprehension of the thoughts, and our interpretation of the words, of others. Hence, Perizonius, in commenting upon Sanctius's imperfect definition, "Grammatica est ars recte loquendi," not improperly asks, "et quidni intelligendi et explicandi?" "and why not also of understanding and explaining?" Hence, too, the art of reading is virtually a part of grammar; for it is but the art of understanding and speaking correctly that which we have before us on paper. And Nugent has accordingly given us the following definition: "Grammar is the art of reading, speaking, and writing a language by rules."—Introduction to Dict., p. xii.[1]

8. The word recte, rightly, truly, correctly, which occurs in most of the foregoing Latin definitions, is censured by the learned Richard Johnson, in his Grammatical Commentaries, on account of the vagueness of its meaning. He says, it is not only ambiguous by reason of its different uses in the Latin classics, but destitute of any signification proper to grammar. But even if this be true as regards its earlier application, it may well be questioned, whether by frequency of use it has not acquired a signification which makes it proper at the present time. The English word correctly seems to be less liable to such an objection; and either this brief term, or some other of like import, (as, "with correctness"—"with propriety,") is still usually employed to tell what grammar is. But can a boy learn by such means what it is, to speak and write grammatically? In one sense, he can; and in an other, he cannot. He may derive, from any of these terms, some idea of grammar as distinguished from other arts; but no simple definition of this, or of any other art, can communicate to him that learns it, the skill of an artist.

9. R. Johnson speaks at large of the relation of words to each other in sentences, as constituting in his view the most essential part of grammar; and as being a point very much overlooked, or very badly explained, by grammarians in general. His censure is just. And it seems to be as applicable to nearly all the grammars now in use, as to those which he criticised a hundred and thirty years ago. But perhaps he gives to the relation of words, (which is merely their dependence on other words according to the sense,) an earlier introduction and a more prominent place, than it ought to have in a general system of grammar. To the right use of language, he makes four things to be necessary. In citing these, I vary the language, but not the substance or the order of his positions. First, That we should speak and write words according to the significations which belong to them: the teaching of which now pertains to lexicography, and not to grammar, except incidentally. "Secondly, That we should observe the relations that words have one to another in sentences, and represent those relations by such variations, and particles, as are usual with authors in that language." Thirdly, That we should acquire a knowledge of the proper sounds of the letters, and pay a due regard to accent in pronunciation. Fourthly, That we should learn to write words with their proper letters, spelling them as literary men generally do.

10. From these positions, (though he sets aside the first, as pertaining to lexicography, and not now to grammar, as it formerly did,) the learned critic deduces first his four parts of the subject, and then his definition of grammar. "Hence," says he, "there arise Four Parts of Grammar; Analogy, which treats of the several parts of speech, their definitions, accidents, and formations; Syntax, which treats of the use of those things in construction, according to their relations; Orthography, which treats of spelling; and Prosody, which treats of accenting in pronunciation. So, then, the true definition of Grammar is this: Grammar is the art of expressing the relations of things in construction, with due accent in speaking, and orthography in writing, according to the custom of those whose language we learn." Again he adds: "The word relation has other senses, taken by itself; but yet the relation of words one to another in a sentence, has no other signification than what I intend by it, namely, of cause, effect, means, end, manner, instrument, object, adjunct, and the like; which are names given by logicians to those relations under which the mind comprehends things, and therefore the most proper words to explain them to others. And if such things are too hard for children, then grammar is too hard; for there neither is, nor can be, any grammar without them. And a little experience will satisfy any man, that the young will as easily apprehend them, as gender, number, declension, and other grammar-terms." See R. Johnson's Grammatical Commentaries, p. 4.

11. It is true, that the relation of words—by which I mean that connexion between them, which the train of thought forms and suggests—or that dependence which one word has on an other according to the sense—lies at the foundation of all syntax. No rule or principle of construction can ever have any applicability beyond the limits, or contrary to the order, of this relation. To see what it is in any given case, is but to understand the meaning of the phrase or sentence. And it is plain, that no word ever necessarily agrees with an other, with which it is not thus connected in the mind of him who uses it. No word ever governs an other, to which the sense does not direct it. No word is ever required to stand immediately before or after an other, to which it has not some relation according to the meaning of the passage. Here then are the relation, agreement, government, and arrangement, of words in sentences; and these make up the whole of syntax—but not the whole of grammar. To this one part of grammar, therefore, the relation of words is central and fundamental; and in the other parts also, there are some things to which the consideration of it is incidental; but there are many more, like spelling, pronunciation, derivation, and whatsoever belongs merely to letters, syllables, and the forms of words, with which it has, in fact, no connexion. The relation of words, therefore, should be clearly and fully explained in its proper place, under the head of syntax; but the general idea of grammar will not be brought nearer to truth, by making it to be "the art of expressing the relations of things in construction," &c., according to the foregoing definition.

12. The term grammar is derived from the Greek word [Greek: gramma], a letter. The art or science to which this term is applied, had its origin, not in cursory speech, but in the practice of writing; and speech, which is first in the order of nature, is last with reference to grammar. The matter or common subject of grammar, is language in general; which, being of two kinds, spoken and written, consists of certain combinations either of sounds or of visible signs, employed for the expression of thought. Letters and sounds, though often heedlessly confounded in the definitions given of vowels, consonants, &c., are, in their own nature, very different things. They address themselves to different senses; the former, to the sight; the latter, to the hearing. Yet, by a peculiar relation arbitrarily established between them, and in consequence of an almost endless variety in the combinations of either, they coincide in a most admirable manner, to effect the great object for which language was bestowed or invented; namely, to furnish a sure medium for the communication of thought, and the preservation of knowledge.

13. All languages, however different, have many things in common. There are points of a philosophical character, which result alike from the analysis of any language, and are founded on the very nature of human thought, and that of the sounds or other signs which are used to express it. When such principles alone are taken as the subject of inquiry, and are treated, as they sometimes have been, without regard to any of the idioms of particular languages, they constitute what is called General, Philosophical, or Universal Grammar. But to teach, with Lindley Murray and some others, that "Grammar may be considered as consisting of two species, Universal and Particular," and that the latter merely "applies those general principles to a particular language," is to adopt a twofold absurdity at the outset.[2] For every cultivated language has its particular grammar, in which whatsoever is universal, is necessarily included; but of which, universal or general principles form only a part, and that comparatively small. We find therefore in grammar no "two species" of the same genus; nor is the science or art, as commonly defined and understood, susceptible of division into any proper and distinct sorts, except with reference to different languages—as when we speak of Greek, Latin, French, or English grammar.

14. There is, however, as I have suggested, a certain science or philosophy of language, which has been denominated Universal Grammar; being made up of those points only, in which many or all of the different languages preserved in books, are found to coincide. All speculative minds are fond of generalization; and, in the vastness of the views which may thus be taken of grammar, such may find an entertainment which they never felt in merely learning to speak and write grammatically. But the pleasure of such contemplations is not the earliest or the most important fruit of the study. The first thing is, to know and understand the grammatical construction of our own language. Many may profit by this acquisition, who extend not their inquiries to the analogies or the idioms of other tongues. It is true, that every item of grammatical doctrine is the more worthy to be known and regarded, in proportion as it approaches to universality. But the principles of all practical grammar, whether universal or particular, common or peculiar, must first be learned in their application to some one language, before they can be distinguished into such classes; and it is manifest, both from reason and from experience, that the youth of any nation not destitute of a good book for the purpose, may best acquire a knowledge of those principles, from the grammatical study of their native tongue.

15. Universal or Philosophical Grammar is a large field for speculation and inquiry, and embraces many things which, though true enough in themselves, are unfit to be incorporated with any system of practical grammar, however comprehensive its plan. Many authors have erred here. With what is merely theoretical, such a system should have little to do. Philosophy, dealing in generalities, resolves speech not only as a whole into its constituent parts and separable elements, as anatomy shows the use and adaptation of the parts and joints of the human body; but also as a composite into its matter and form, as one may contemplate that same body in its entireness, yet as consisting of materials, some solid and some fluid, and these curiously modelled to a particular figure. Grammar, properly so called, requires only the former of these analyses; and in conducting the same, it descends to the thousand minute particulars which are necessary to be known in practice. Nor are such things to be despised as trivial and low: ignorance of what is common and elementary, is but the more disgraceful for being ignorance of mere rudiments. "Wherefore," says Quintilian, "they are little to be respected, who represent this art as mean and barren; in which, unless you faithfully lay the foundation for the future orator, whatever superstructure you raise will tumble into ruins. It is an art, necessary to the young, pleasant to the old, the sweet companion of the retired, and one which in reference to every kind of study has in itself more of utility than of show. Let no one therefore despise as inconsiderable the elements of grammar. Not because it is a great thing, to distinguish consonants from vowels, and afterwards divide them into semivowels and mutes; but because, to those who enter the interior parts of this temple of science, there will appear in many things a great subtilty, which is fit not only to sharpen the wits of youth, but also to exercise the loftiest erudition and science."—De Institutione Oratoria, Lib. i, Cap. iv.

16. Again, of the arts which spring from the composition of language. Here the art of logic, aiming solely at conviction, addresses the understanding with cool deductions of unvarnished truth; rhetoric, designing to move, in some particular direction, both the judgement and the sympathies of men, applies itself to the affections in order to persuade; and poetry, various in its character and tendency, solicits the imagination, with a view to delight, and in general also to instruct. But grammar, though intimately connected with all these, and essential to them in practice, is still too distinct from each to be identified with any of them. In regard to dignity and interest, these higher studies seem to have greatly the advantage over particular grammar; but who is willing to be an ungrammatical poet, orator, or logician? For him I do not write. But I would persuade my readers, that an acquaintance with that grammar which respects the genius of their vernacular tongue, is of primary importance to all who would cultivate a literary taste, and is a necessary introduction to the study of other languages. And it may here be observed, for the encouragement of the student, that as grammar is essentially the same thing in all languages, he who has well mastered that of his own, has overcome more than half the difficulty of learning another; and he whose knowledge of words is the most extensive, has the fewest obstacles to encounter in proceeding further.

17. It was the "original design" of grammar, says Dr. Adam, to facilitate "the acquisition of languages;" and, of all practical treatises on the subject, this is still the main purpose. In those books which are to prepare the learner to translate from one tongue into another, seldom is any thing else attempted. In those also which profess to explain the right use of vernacular speech, must the same purpose be ever paramount, and the "original design" be kept in view. But the grammarian may teach many things incidentally. One cannot learn a language, without learning at the same time a great many opinions, facts, and principles, of some kind or other, which are necessarily embodied in it. For all language proceeds from, and is addressed to, the understanding; and he that perceives not the meaning of what he reads, makes no acquisition even of the language itself. To the science of grammar, the nature of the ideas conveyed by casual examples, is not very essential: to the learner, it is highly important. The best thoughts in the best diction should furnish the models for youthful study and imitation; because such language is not only the most worthy to be remembered, but the most easy to be understood. A distinction is also to be made between use and abuse. In nonsense, absurdity, or falsehood, there can never be any grammatical authority; because, however language may be abused, the usage which gives law to speech, is still that usage which is founded upon the common sense of mankind.

18. Grammar appeals to reason, as well as to authority, but to what extent it should do so, has been matter of dispute. "The knowledge of useful arts," says Sanctius, "is not an invention of human ingenuity, but an emanation from the Deity, descending from above for the use of man, as Minerva sprung from the brain of Jupiter. Wherefore, unless thou give thyself wholly to laborious research into the nature of things, and diligently examine the causes and reasons of the art thou teachest, believe me, thou shalt but see with other men's eyes, and hear with other men's ears. But the minds of many are preoccupied with a certain perverse opinion, or rather ignorant conceit, that in grammar, or the art of speaking, there are no causes, and that reason is scarcely to be appealed to for any thing;—than which idle notion, I know of nothing more foolish;—nothing can be thought of which is more offensive. Shall man, endowed with reason, do, say, or contrive any thing, without design, and without understanding? Hear the philosophers; who positively declare that nothing comes to pass without a cause. Hear Plato himself; who affirms that names and words subsist by nature, and contends that language is derived from nature, and not from art."

19. "I know," says he, "that the Aristotelians think otherwise; but no one will doubt that names are the signs, and as it were the instruments, of things. But the instrument of any art is so adapted to that art, that for any other purpose it must seem unfit; thus with an auger we bore, and with a saw we cut wood; but we split stones with wedges, and wedges are driven with heavy mauls. We cannot therefore but believe that those who first gave names to things, did it with design; and this, I imagine, Aristotle himself understood when he said, ad placitum nomina significare. For those who contend that names were made by chance, are no less audacious than if they would endeavour to persuade us, that the whole order of the universe was framed together fortuitously."

20. "You will see," continues he, "that in the first language, whatever it was, the names of things were taken from Nature herself; but, though I cannot affirm this to have been the case in other tongues, yet I can easily persuade myself that in every tongue a reason can be rendered for the application of every name; and that this reason, though it is in many cases obscure, is nevertheless worthy of investigation. Many things which were not known to the earlier philosophers, were brought to light by Plato; after the death of Plato, many were discovered by Aristotle; and Aristotle was ignorant of many which are now everywhere known. For truth lies hid, but nothing is more precious than truth. But you will say, 'How can there be any certain origin to names, when one and the same thing is called by different names, in the several parts of the world?' I answer, of the same thing there may be different causes, of which some people may regard one, and others, an other. * * * There is therefore no doubt, that of all things, even of words, a reason is to be rendered: and if we know not what that reason is, when we are asked; we ought rather to confess that we do not know, than to affirm that none can be given. I know that Scaliger thinks otherwise; but this is the true account of the matter."

21. "These several observations," he remarks further, "I have unwillingly brought together against those stubborn critics who, while they explode reason from grammar, insist so much on the testimonies of the learned. But have they never read Quintilian, who says, (Lib. i, Cap. 6,) that, 'Language is established by reason, antiquity, authority, and custom?' He therefore does not exclude reason, but makes it the principal thing. Nay, in a manner, Laurentius, and other grammatists, even of their fooleries, are forward to offer reasons, such as they are. Moreover, use does not take place without reason; otherwise, it ought to be called abuse, and not use. But from use authority derives all its force; for when it recedes from use, authority becomes nothing: whence Cicero reproves Coelius and Marcus Antonius for speaking according to their own fancy, and not according to use. But, 'Nothing can be lasting,' says Curtius, (Lib. iv,) 'which is not based upon reason.' It remains, therefore, that of all things the reason be first assigned; and then, if it can be done, we may bring forward testimonies; that the thing, having every advantage, may be made the more clear."—Sanctii Minerva, Lib. i, Cap. 2.

22. Julius Caesar Scaliger, from whose opinion Sanctius dissents above, seems to limit the science of grammar to bounds considerably too narrow, though he found within them room for the exercise of much ingenuity and learning. He says, "Grammatica est scientia loquendi ex usu; neque enim constituit regulas scientibus usus modum, sed ex eorum statis frequentibusque usurpatiombus colligit communem rationem loquendi, quam discentibus traderet."—De Causis L. Latinae, Lib. iv, Cap. 76. "Grammar is the science of speaking according to use; for it does not establish rules for those who know the manner of use, but from the settled and frequent usages of these, gathers the common fashion of speaking, which it should deliver to learners." This limited view seems not only to exclude from the science the use of the pen, but to exempt the learned from any obligation to respect the rules prescribed for the initiation of the young. But I have said, and with abundant authority, that the acquisition of a good style of writing is the main purpose of the study; and, surely, the proficients and adepts in the art can desire for themselves no such exemption. Men of genius, indeed, sometimes affect to despise the pettiness of all grammatical instructions; but this can be nothing else than affectation, since the usage of the learned is confessedly the basis of all such instructions, and several of the loftiest of their own rank appear on the list of grammarians.

23. Quintilian, whose authority is appealed to above, belonged to that age in which the exegesis of histories, poems, and other writings, was considered an essential part of grammar. He therefore, as well as Diomedes, and other ancient writers, divided the grammarian's duties into two parts; the one including what is now called grammar, and the other the explanation of authors, and the stigmatizing of the unworthy. Of the opinion referred to by Sanctius, it seems proper to make here an ampler citation. It shall be attempted in English, though the paragraph is not an easy one to translate. I understand the author to say, "Speakers, too, have their rules to observe; and writers, theirs. Language is established by reason, antiquity, authority, and custom. Of reason the chief ground is analogy, but sometimes etymology. Ancient things have a certain majesty, and, as I might say, religion, to commend them. Authority is wont to be sought from orators and historians; the necessity of metre mostly excuses the poets. When the judgement of the chief masters of eloquence passes for reason, even error seems right to those who follow great leaders. But, of the art of speaking, custom is the surest mistress; for speech is evidently to be used as money, which has upon it a public stamp. Yet all these things require a penetrating judgement, especially analogy; the force of which is, that one may refer what is doubtful, to something similar that is clearly established, and thus prove uncertain things by those which are sure."—QUINT, de Inst. Orat., Lib. i, Cap. 6, p. 48.

24. The science of grammar, whatever we may suppose to be its just limits, does not appear to have been better cultivated in proportion as its scope was narrowed. Nor has its application to our tongue, in particular, ever been made in such a manner, as to do great honour to the learning or the talents of him that attempted it. What is new to a nation, may be old to the world. The development of the intellectual powers of youth by instruction in the classics, as well as the improvement of their taste by the exhibition of what is elegant in literature, is continually engaging the attention of new masters, some of whom may seem to effect great improvements; but we must remember that the concern itself is of no recent origin. Plato and Aristotle, who were great masters both of grammar and of philosophy, taught these things ably at Athens, in the fourth century before Christ. Varro, the grammarian, usually styled the most learned of the Romans, was contemporary with the Saviour and his apostles. Quintilian lived in the first century of our era, and before he wrote his most celebrated book, taught a school twenty years in Rome, and received from the state a salary which made him rich. This "consummate guide of wayward youth," as the poet Martial called him, being neither ignorant of what had been done by others, nor disposed to think it a light task to prescribe the right use of his own language, was at first slow to undertake the work upon which his fame now reposes; and, after it was begun, diligent to execute it worthily, that it might turn both to his own honour, and to the real advancement of learning.

25. He says, at the commencement of his book: "After I had obtained a quiet release from those labours which for twenty years had devolved upon me as an instructor of youth, certain persons familiarly demanded of me, that I should compose something concerning the proper manner of speaking; but for a long time I withstood their solicitations, because I knew there were already illustrious authors in each language, by whom many things which might pertain to such a work, had been very diligently written, and left to posterity. But the reason which I thought would obtain for me an easier excuse, did but excite more earnest entreaty; because, amidst the various opinions of earlier writers, some of whom were not even consistent with themselves, the choice had become difficult; so that my friends seemed to have a right to enjoin upon me, if not the labour of producing new instructions, at least that of judging concerning the old. But although I was persuaded not so much by the hope of supplying what was required, as by the shame of refusing, yet, as the matter opened itself before me, I undertook of my own accord a much greater task than had been imposed; that while I should thus oblige my very good friends by a fuller compliance, I might not enter a common path and tread only in the footsteps of others. For most other writers who have treated of the art of speaking, have proceeded in such a manner as if upon adepts in every other kind of doctrine they would lay the last touch in eloquence; either despising as little things the studies which we first learn, or thinking them not to fall to their share in the division which should be made of the professions; or, what indeed is next to this, hoping no praise or thanks for their ingenuity about things which, although necessary, lie far from ostentation: the tops of buildings make a show, their foundations are unseen."—Quintiliani de Inst. Orat., Prooemium.

26. But the reader may ask, "What have all these things to do with English Grammar?" I answer, they help to show us whence and what it is. Some acquaintance with the history of grammar as a science, as well as some knowledge of the structure of other languages than our own, is necessary to him who professes to write for the advancement of this branch of learning—and for him also who would be a competent judge of what is thus professed. Grammar must not forget her origin. Criticism must not resign the protection of letters. The national literature of a country is in the keeping, not of the people at large, but of authors and teachers. But a grammarian presumes to be a judge of authorship, and a teacher of teachers; and is it to the honour of England or America, that in both countries so many are countenanced in this assumption of place, who can read no language but their mother tongue? English Grammar is not properly an indigenous production, either of this country or of Britain; because it is but a branch of the general science of philology—a new variety, or species, sprung up from the old stock long ago transplanted from the soil of Greece and Rome.

27. It is true, indeed, that neither any ancient system of grammatical instruction nor any grammar of an other language, however contrived, can be entirely applicable to the present state of our tongue; for languages must needs differ greatly one from an other, and even that which is called the same, may come in time to differ greatly from what it once was. But the general analogies of speech, which are the central principles of grammar, are but imperfectly seen by the man of one language. On the other hand, it is possible to know much of those general principles, and yet be very deficient in what is peculiar to our own tongue. Real improvement in the grammar of our language, must result from a view that is neither partial nor superficial. "Time, sorry artist," as was said of old, "makes all he handles worse." And Lord Bacon, seeming to have this adage in view, suggests: "If Time of course alter all things to the worse, and Wisdom and Counsel shall not alter them to the better, what shall be the end?"—Bacon's Essays, p. 64.

28. Hence the need that an able and discreet grammarian should now and then appear, who with skillful hand can effect those corrections which a change of fashion or the ignorance of authors may have made necessary; but if he is properly qualified for his task, he will do all this without a departure from any of the great principles of Universal Grammar. He will surely be very far from thinking, with a certain modern author, whom I shall notice in an other chapter, that, "He is bound to take words and explain them as he finds them in his day, without any regard to their ancient construction and application."—Kirkham's Gram., p. 28. The whole history of every word, so far as he can ascertain it, will be the view under which he will judge of what is right or wrong in the language which he teaches. Etymology is neither the whole of this view, nor yet to be excluded from it. I concur not therefore with Dr. Campbell, who, to make out a strong case, extravagantly says, "It is never from an attention to etymology, which would frequently mislead us, but from custom, the only infallible guide in this matter, that the meanings of words in present use must be learnt."—Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 188. Jamieson too, with an implicitness little to be commended, takes this passage from Campbell; and, with no other change than that of "learnt" to "learned" publishes it as a corollary of his own.—Grammar of Rhetoric, p. 42. It is folly to state for truth what is so obviously wrong. Etymology and custom are seldom at odds; and where they are so, the latter can hardly be deemed infallible.



CHAPTER II.

OF GRAMMATICAL AUTHORSHIP.

"Respondeo, dupliciter aliquem dici grammaticum, arte et professione. Grammatici vera arte paucissimi sunt: et hi magna laude digni sunt, ut patuit: hos non vituperant summi viri; quia ipse Plinius ejusmodi grammaticus fuit, et de arte grammatica libelos edidit. Et Grellius verae grammaticae fuit diligentissimus doctor; sic et ipse Datus. Alii sunt grammatici professione, et ii plerumque sunt inceptissimi; quia scribimus indocti doctique, et indignissimus quisque hanc sibi artem vindicat:——hos mastigias multis probris docti summo jure insectantur."—DESPAUTER. Syntaxis, fol. 1.

1. It is of primary importance in all discussions and expositions of doctrines, of any sort, to ascertain well the principles upon which our reasonings are to be founded, and to see that they be such as are immovably established in the nature of things; for error in first principles is fundamental, and he who builds upon an uncertain foundation, incurs at least a hazard of seeing his edifice overthrown. The lover of truth will be, at all times, diligent to seek it, firm to adhere to it, willing to submit to it, and ready to promote it; but even the truth may be urged unseasonably, and important facts are things liable to be misjoined. It is proper, therefore, for every grammarian gravely to consider, whether and how far the principles of his philosophy, his politics, his morals, or his religion, ought to influence, or actually do influence, his theory of language, and his practical instructions respecting the right use of words. In practice, grammar is so interwoven with all else that is known, believed, learned, or spoken of among men, that to determine its own peculiar principles with due distinctness, seems to be one of the most difficult points of a grammarian's duty.

2. From misapprehension, narrowness of conception, or improper bias, in relation to this point, many authors have started wrong; denounced others with intemperate zeal; departed themselves from sound doctrine; and produced books which are disgraced not merely by occasional oversights, but by central and radical errors. Hence, too, have sprung up, in the name of grammar, many unprofitable discussions, and whimsical systems of teaching, calculated rather to embarrass than to inform the student. Mere collisions of opinion, conducted without any acknowledged standard to guide the judgement, never tend to real improvement. Grammar is unquestionably a branch of that universal philosophy by which the thoroughly educated mind is enlightened to see all things aright; for philosophy, in this sense of the term, is found in everything. Yet, properly speaking, the true grammarian is not a philosopher, nor can any man strengthen his title to the former character by claiming the latter; and it is certain, that a most disheartening proportion of what in our language has been published under the name of Philosophic Grammar, is equally remote from philosophy, from grammar, and from common sense.

3. True grammar is founded on the authority of reputable custom; and that custom, on the use which men make of their reason. The proofs of what is right are accumulative, and on many points there can be no dispute, because our proofs from the best usage, are both obvious and innumerable. On the other hand, the evidence of what is wrong is rather demonstrative; for when we would expose a particular error, we exhibit it in contrast with the established principle which it violates. He who formed the erroneous sentence, has in this case no alternative, but either to acknowledge the solecism, or to deny the authority of the rule. There are disputable principles in grammar, as there are moot points in law; but this circumstance affects no settled usage in either; and every person of sense and taste will choose to express himself in the way least liable to censure. All are free indeed from positive constraint on their phraseology; for we do not speak or write by statutes. But the ground of instruction assumed in grammar, is similar to that upon which are established the maxims of common law, in jurisprudence. The ultimate principle, then, to which we appeal, as the only true standard of grammatical propriety, is that species of custom which critics denominate GOOD USE; that is, present, reputable, general use.

4. Yet a slight acquaintance with the history of grammar will suffice to show us, that it is much easier to acknowledge this principle, and to commend it in words, than to ascertain what it is, and abide by it in practice. Good use is that which is neither ancient nor recent, neither local nor foreign, neither vulgar nor pedantic; and it will be found that no few have in some way or other departed from it, even while they were pretending to record its dictates. But it is not to be concealed, that in every living language, it is a matter of much inherent difficulty, to reach the standard of propriety, where usage is various; and to ascertain with clearness the decisions of custom, when we descend to minute details. Here is a field in which whatsoever is achieved by the pioneers of literature, can be appreciated only by thorough scholars; for the progress of improvement in any art or science, can be known only to those who can clearly compare its ruder with its more refined stages; and it often happens that what is effected with much labour, may be presented in a very small compass.

5. But the knowledge of grammar may retrograde; for whatever loses the vital principle of renovation and growth, tends to decay. And if mere copyists, compilers, abridgers, and modifiers, be encouraged as they now are, it surely will not advance. Style is liable to be antiquated by time, corrupted by innovation, debased by ignorance, perverted by conceit, impaired by negligence, and vitiated by caprice. And nothing but the living spirit of true authorship, and the application of just criticism, can counteract the natural tendency of these causes. English grammar is still in its infancy; and even bears, to the imagination of some, the appearance of a deformed and ugly dwarf among the liberal arts. Treatises are multiplied almost innumerably, but still the old errors survive. Names are rapidly added to our list of authors, while little or nothing is done for the science. Nay, while new blunders have been committed in every new book, old ones have been allowed to stand as by prescriptive right;. and positions that were never true, and sentences that were never good English, have been published and republished under different names, till in our language grammar has become the most ungrammatical of all studies! "Imitators generally copy their originals in an inverse ratio of their merits; that is, by adding as much to their faults, as they lose of their merits."—KNIGHT, on the Greek Alphabet, p. 117.

"Who to the life an exact piece would make, Must not from others' work a copy take."—Cowley.

6. All science is laid in the nature of things; and he only who seeks it there, can rightly guide others in the paths of knowledge. He alone can know whether his predecessors went right or wrong, who is capable of a judgement independent of theirs. But with what shameful servility have many false or faulty definitions and rules been copied and copied from one grammar to another, as if authority had canonized their errors, or none had eyes to see them! Whatsoever is dignified and fair, is also modest and reasonable; but modesty does not consist in having no opinion of one's own, nor reason in following with blind partiality the footsteps of others. Grammar unsupported by authority, is indeed mere fiction. But what apology is this, for that authorship which has produced so many grammars without originality? Shall he who cannot write for himself, improve upon him who can? Shall he who cannot paint, retouch the canvass of Guido? Shall modest ingenuity be allowed only to imitators and to thieves? How many a prefatory argument issues virtually in this! It is not deference to merit, but impudent pretence, practising on the credulity of ignorance! Commonness alone exempts it from scrutiny, and the success it has, is but the wages of its own worthlessness! To read and be informed, is to make a proper use of books for the advancement of learning; but to assume to be an author by editing mere commonplaces and stolen criticisms, is equally beneath the ambition of a scholar and the honesty of a man.

"'T is true, the ancients we may rob with ease; But who with that mean shift himself can please?" Sheffield, Duke of Buckingham.

7. Grammar being a practical art, with the principles of which every intelligent person is more or less acquainted, it might be expected that a book written professedly on the subject, should exhibit some evidence of its author's skill. But it would seem that a multitude of bad or indifferent writers have judged themselves qualified to teach the art of speaking and writing well; so that correctness of language and neatness of style are as rarely to be found in grammars as in other books. Nay, I have before suggested that in no other science are the principles of good writing so frequently and so shamefully violated. The code of false grammar embraced in the following work, will go far to sustain this opinion. There have been, however, several excellent scholars, who have thought it an object not unworthy of their talents, to prescribe and elucidate the principles of English Grammar. But these, with scarcely any exception, have executed their inadequate designs, not as men engaged in their proper calling, but as mere literary almoners, descending for a day from their loftier purposes, to perform a service, needful indeed, and therefore approved, but very far from supplying all the aid that is requisite to a thorough knowledge of the subject. Even the most meritorious have left ample room for improvement, though some have evinced an ability which does honour to themselves, while it gives cause to regret their lack of an inducement to greater labour. The mere grammarian can neither aspire to praise, nor stipulate for a reward; and to those who were best qualified to write, the subject could offer no adequate motive for diligence.

8. Unlearned men, who neither make, nor can make, any pretensions to a knowledge of grammar as a study, if they show themselves modest in what they profess, are by no means to be despised or undervalued for the want of such knowledge. They are subject to no criticism, till they turn authors and write for the public. And even then they are to be treated gently, if they have any thing to communicate, which is worthy to be accepted in a homely dress. Grammatical inaccuracies are to be kindly excused, in all those from whom nothing better can be expected; for people are often under a necessity of appearing as speakers or writers, before they can have learned to write or speak grammatically. The body is more to be regarded than raiment; and the substance of an interesting message, may make the manner of it a little thing. Men of high purposes naturally spurn all that is comparatively low; or all that may seem nice, overwrought, ostentatious, or finical. Hence St. Paul, in writing to the Corinthians, suggests that the design of his preaching might have been defeated, had he affected the orator, and turned his attention to mere "excellency of speech," or "wisdom of words." But this view of things presents no more ground for neglecting grammar, and making coarse and vulgar example our model of speech, than for neglecting dress, and making baize and rags the fashionable costume. The same apostle exhorts Timothy to "hold fast the form of sound words," which he himself had taught him. Nor can it be denied that there is an obligation resting upon all men, to use speech fairly and understandingly. But let it be remembered, that all those upon whose opinions or practices I am disposed to animadvert, are either professed grammarians and philosophers, or authors who, by extraordinary pretensions, have laid themselves under special obligations to be accurate in the use of language. "The wise in heart shall be called prudent; and the sweetness of the lips increaseth learning."—Prov., xvi, 21. "The words of a man's mouth are as deep waters, and the well-spring of wisdom [is] as a flowing brook."—Ib., xviii, 4. "A fool's mouth is his destruction, and his lips are the snare of his soul."—Ib., xviii, 7.

9. The old maxim recorded by Bacon, "Loquendum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes,"—"We should speak as the vulgar, but think as the wise," is not to be taken without some limitation. For whoever literally speaks as the vulgar, shall offend vastly too much with his tongue, to have either the understanding of the wise or the purity of the good. In all untrained and vulgar minds, the ambition of speaking well is but a dormant or very weak principle. Hence the great mass of uneducated people are lamentably careless of what they utter, both as to the matter and the manner; and no few seem naturally prone to the constant imitation of low example, and some, to the practice of every abuse of which language is susceptible. Hence, as every scholar knows, the least scrupulous of our lexicographers notice many terms but to censure them as "low," and omit many more as being beneath their notice. Vulgarity of language, then, ever has been, and ever must be, repudiated by grammarians. Yet we have had pretenders to grammar, who could court the favour of the vulgar, though at the expense of all the daughters of Mnemosyne.

10. Hence the enormous insult to learning and the learned, conveyed in the following scornful quotations: "Grammarians, go to your tailors and shoemakers, and learn from them the rational art of constructing your grammars!"—Neef's Method of Education, p. 62. "From a labyrinth without a clew, in which the most enlightened scholars of Europe have mazed themselves and misguided others, the author ventures to turn aside."—Cardell's Gram., 12mo, p. 15. Again: "The nations of unlettered men so adapted their language to philosophic truth, that all physical and intellectual research can find no essential rule to reject or change."—Ibid., p. 91. I have shown that "the nations of unlettered men" are among that portion of the earth's population, upon whose language the genius of grammar has never yet condescended to look down! That people who make no pretensions to learning, can furnish better models or instructions than "the most enlightened scholars," is an opinion which ought not to be disturbed by argument.

11. I regret to say, that even Dr. Webster, with all his obligations and pretensions to literature, has well-nigh taken ground with Neef and Cardell, as above cited; and has not forborne to throw contempt, even on grammar as such, and on men of letters indiscriminately, by supposing the true principles of every language to be best observed and kept by the illiterate. What marvel then, that all his multifarious grammars of the English language are despised? Having suggested that the learned must follow the practice of the populace, because they cannot control it, he adds: "Men of letters may revolt at this suggestion, but if they will attend to the history of our language, they will find the fact to be as here stated. It is commonly supposed that the tendency of this practice of unlettered men is to corrupt the language. But the fact is directly the reverse. I am prepared to prove, were it consistent with the nature of this work, that nineteen-twentieths of all the corruptions of our language, for five hundred years past, have been introduced by authors—men who have made alterations in particular idioms which they did not understand. The same remark is applicable to the orthography and pronunciation. The tendency of unlettered men is to uniformity—to analogy; and so strong is this disposition, that the common people have actually converted some of our irregular verbs into regular ones. It is to unlettered people that we owe the disuse of holpen, bounden, sitten, and the use of the regular participles, swelled, helped, worked, in place of the ancient ones. This popular tendency is not to be contemned and disregarded, as some of the learned affect to do;[3] for it is governed by the natural, primary principles of all languages, to which we owe all their regularity and all their melody; viz., a love of uniformity in words of a like character, and a preference of an easy natural pronunciation, and a desire to express the most ideas with the smallest number of words and syllables. It is a fortunate thing for language, that these natural principles generally prevail over arbitrary and artificial rules."—Webster's Philosophical Gram., p. 119; Improved Gram., p. 78. So much for unlettered erudition!

12. If every thing that has been taught under the name of grammar, is to be considered as belonging to the science, it will be impossible ever to determine in what estimation the study of it ought to be held; for all that has ever been urged either for or against it, may, upon such a principle, be proved by reference to different authorities and irreconcilable opinions. But all who are studious to know, and content to follow, the fashion established by the concurrent authority of the learned,[4] may at least have some standard to refer to; and if a grammarian's rules be based upon this authority, it must be considered the exclusive privilege of the unlearned to despise them—as it is of the unbred, to contemn the rules of civility. But who shall determine whether the doctrines contained in any given treatise are, or are not, based upon such authority? Who shall decide whether the contributions which any individual may make to our grammatical code, are, or are not, consonant with the best usage? For this, there is no tribunal but the mass of readers, of whom few perhaps are very competent judges. And here an author's reputation for erudition and judgement, may be available to him: it is the public voice in his favour. Yet every man is at liberty to form his own opinion, and to alter it whenever better knowledge leads him to think differently.

13. But the great misfortune is, that they who need instruction, are not qualified to choose their instructor; and many who must make this choice for their children, have no adequate means of ascertaining either the qualifications of such as offer themselves, or the comparative merits of the different methods by which they profess to teach. Hence this great branch of learning, in itself too comprehensive for the genius or the life of any one man, has ever been open to as various and worthless a set of quacks and plagiaries as have ever figured in any other. There always have been some who knew this, and there may be many who know it now; but the credulity and ignorance which expose so great a majority of mankind to deception and error, are not likely to be soon obviated. With every individual who is so fortunate as to receive any of the benefits of intellectual culture, the whole process of education must begin anew; and, by all that sober minds can credit, the vision of human perfectibility is far enough from any national consummation.

14. Whatever any may think of their own ability, or however some might flout to find their errors censured or their pretensions disallowed; whatever improvement may actually have been made, or however fondly we may listen to boasts and felicitations on that topic; it is presumed, that the general ignorance on the subject of grammar, as above stated, is too obvious to be denied. What then is the remedy? and to whom must our appeal be made? Knowledge cannot be imposed by power, nor is there any domination in the republic of letters. The remedy lies solely in that zeal which can provoke to a generous emulation in the cause of literature; and the appeal, which has recourse to the learning of the learned, and to the common sense of all, must be pressed home to conviction, till every false doctrine stand refuted, and every weak pretender exposed or neglected. Then shall Science honour them that honour her; and all her triumphs be told, all her instructions be delivered, in "sound speech that cannot be condemned."

15. A generous man is not unwilling to be corrected, and a just one cannot but desire to be set right in all things. Even over noisy gainsayers, a calm and dignified exhibition of true docrine [sic—KTH], has often more influence than ever openly appears. I have even seen the author of a faulty grammar heap upon his corrector more scorn and personal abuse than would fill a large newspaper, and immediately afterwards, in a new edition of his book, renounce the errors which had been pointed out to him, stealing the very language of his amendments from the man whom he had so grossly vilified! It is true that grammarians have ever disputed, and often with more acrimony than discretion. Those who, in elementary treatises, have meddled much with philological controversy, have well illustrated the couplet of Denham: "The tree of knowledge, blasted by disputes, Produces sapless leaves in stead of fruits."

16. Thus, then, as I have before suggested, we find among writers on grammar two numerous classes of authors, who have fallen into opposite errors, perhaps equally reprehensible; the visionaries, and the copyists. The former have ventured upon too much originality, the latter have attempted too little. "The science of philology," says Dr. Alexander Murray, "is not a frivolous study, fit to be conducted by ignorant pedants or visionary enthusiasts. It requires more qualifications to succeed in it, than are usually united in those who pursue it:—a sound penetrating judgement; habits of calm philosophical induction; an erudition various, extensive, and accurate; and a mind likewise, that can direct the knowledge expressed in words, to illustrate the nature of the signs which convey it."—Murray's History of European Languages, Vol. ii, p. 333.

17. They who set aside the authority of custom, and judge every thing to be ungrammatical which appears to them to be unphilosophical, render the whole ground forever disputable, and weary themselves in beating the air. So various have been the notions of this sort of critics, that it would be difficult to mention an opinion not found in some of their books. Amidst this rage for speculation on a subject purely practical, various attempts have been made, to overthrow that system of instruction, which long use has rendered venerable, and long experience proved to be useful. But it is manifestly much easier to raise even plausible objections against this system, than to invent an other less objectionable. Such attempts have generally met the reception they deserved. Their history will give no encouragement to future innovators.

18. Again: While some have thus wasted their energies in eccentric flights, vainly supposing that the learning of ages would give place to their whimsical theories; others, with more success, not better deserved, have multiplied grammars almost innumerably, by abridging or modifying the books they had used in childhood. So that they who are at all acquainted with the origin and character of the various compends thus introduced into our schools, cannot but desire to see them all displaced by some abler and better work, more honourable to its author and more useful to the public, more intelligible to students and more helpful to teachers. Books professedly published for the advancement of knowledge, are very frequently to be reckoned, among its greatest impediments; for the interests of learning are no less injured by whimsical doctrines, than the rights of authorship by plagiarism. Too many of our grammars, profitable only to their makers and venders, are like weights attached to the heels of Hermes. It is discouraging to know the history of this science. But the multiplicity of treatises already in use, is a reason, not for silence, but for offering more. For, as Lord Bacon observes, the number of ill-written books is not to be diminished by ceasing to write, but by writing others which, like Aaron's serpent, shall swallow up the spurious.[5]

19. I have said that some grammars have too much originality, and others too little. It may be added, that not a few are chargeable with both these faults at once. They are original, or at least anonymous, where there should have been given other authority than that of the compiler's name; and they are copies, or, at best, poor imitations, where the author should have shown himself capable of writing in a good style of his own. What then is the middle ground for the true grammarian? What is the kind, and what the degree, of originality, which are to be commended in works of this sort? In the first place, a grammarian must be a writer, an author, a man who observes and thinks for himself; and not a mere compiler, abridger, modifier, copyist, or plagiarist. Grammar is not the only subject upon which we allow no man to innovate in doctrine; why, then, should it be the only one upon which a man may make it a merit, to work up silently into a book of his own, the best materials found among the instructions of his predecessors and rivals? Some definitions and rules, which in the lapse of time and by frequency of use have become a sort of public property, the grammarian may perhaps be allowed to use at his pleasure; yet even upon these a man of any genius will be apt to set some impress peculiar to himself. But the doctrines of his work ought, in general, to be expressed in his own language, and illustrated by that of others. With respect to quotation, he has all the liberty of other writers, and no more; for, if a grammarian makes "use of his predecessors' labours," why should any one think with Murray, "it is scarcely necessary to apologize for" this, "or for omitting to insert their names?"—Introd. to L. Murray's Gram., 8vo, p. 7.

20. The author of this volume would here take the liberty briefly to refer to his own procedure. His knowledge of what is technical in grammar, was of course chiefly derived from the writings of other grammarians; and to their concurrent opinions and practices, he has always had great respect; yet, in truth, not a line has he ever copied from any of them with a design to save the labour of composition. For, not to compile an English grammar from others already extant, but to compose one more directly from the sources of the art, was the task which he at first proposed to himself. Nor is there in all the present volume a single sentence, not regularly quoted, the authorship of which he supposes may now be ascribed to an other more properly than to himself. Where either authority or acknowledgement was requisite, names have been inserted. In the doctrinal parts of the volume, not only quotations from others, but most examples made for the occasion, are marked with guillemets, to distinguish them from the main text; while, to almost every thing which is really taken from any other known writer, a name or reference is added. For those citations, however, which there was occasion to repeat in different parts of the work, a single reference has sometimes been thought sufficient. This remark refers chiefly to the corrections in the Key, the references being given in the Exercises.

21. Though the theme is not one on which a man may hope to write well with little reflection, it is true that the parts of this treatise which have cost the author the most labour, are those which "consist chiefly of materials selected from the writings of others." These, however, are not the didactical portions of the book, but the proofs and examples; which, according to the custom of the ancient grammarians, ought to be taken from other authors. But so much have the makers of our modern grammars been allowed to presume upon the respect and acquiescence of their readers, that the ancient exactness on this point would often appear pedantic. Many phrases and sentences, either original with the writer, or common to everybody, will therefore be found among the illustrations of the following work; for it was not supposed that any reader would demand for every thing of this kind the authority of some great name. Anonymous examples are sufficient to elucidate principles, if not to establish them; and elucidation is often the sole purpose for which an example is needed.

22. It is obvious enough, that no writer on grammar has any right to propose himself as authority for what he teaches; for every language, being the common property of all who use it, ought to be carefully guarded against the caprices of individuals; and especially against that presumption which might attempt to impose erroneous or arbitrary definitions and rules. "Since the matter of which we are treating," says the philologist of Salamanca, "is to be verified, first by reason, and then by testimony and usage, none ought to wonder if we sometimes deviate from the track of great men; for, with whatever authority any grammarian may weigh with me, unless he shall have confirmed his assertions by reason, and also by examples, he shall win no confidence in respect to grammar. For, as Seneca says, Epistle 95, 'Grammarians are the guardians, not the authors, of language.'"—Sanctii Minerva, Lib. ii, Cap. 2. Yet, as what is intuitively seen to be true or false, is already sufficiently proved or detected, many points in grammar need nothing more than to be clearly stated and illustrated; nay, it would seem an injurious reflection on the understanding of the reader, to accumulate proofs of what cannot but be evident to all who speak the language.

23. Among men of the same profession, there is an unavoidable rivalry, so far as they become competitors for the same prize; but in competition there is nothing dishonourable, while excellence alone obtains distinction, and no advantage is sought by unfair means. It is evident that we ought to account him the best grammarian, who has the most completely executed the worthiest design. But no worthy design can need a false apology; and it is worse than idle to prevaricate. That is but a spurious modesty, which prompts a man to disclaim in one way what he assumes in an other—or to underrate the duties of his office, that he may boast of having "done all that could reasonably be expected." Whoever professes to have improved the science of English grammar, must claim to know more of the matter than the generality of English grammarians; and he who begins with saying, that "little can be expected" from the office he assumes, must be wrongfully contradicted, when he is held to have done much. Neither the ordinary power of speech, nor even the ability to write respectably on common topics, makes a man a critic among critics, or enables him to judge of literary merit. And if, by virtue of these qualifications alone, a man will become a grammarian or a connoisseur, he can hold the rank only by courtesy—a courtesy which is content to degrade the character, that his inferior pretensions may be accepted and honoured under the name.

24. By the force of a late popular example, still too widely influential, grammatical authorship has been reduced, in the view of many, to little or nothing more than a mere serving-up of materials anonymously borrowed; and, what is most remarkable, even for an indifferent performance of this low office, not only unnamed reviewers, but several writers of note, have not scrupled to bestow the highest praise of grammatical excellence! And thus the palm of superior skill in grammar, has been borne away by a professed compiler; who had so mean an opinion of what his theme required, as to deny it even the common courtesies of compilation! What marvel is it, that, under the wing of such authority, many writers have since sprung up, to improve upon this most happy design; while all who were competent to the task, have been discouraged from attempting any thing like a complete grammar of our language? What motive shall excite a man to long-continued diligence, where such notions prevail as give mastership no hope of preference, and where the praise of his ingenuity and the reward of his labour must needs be inconsiderable, till some honoured compiler usurp them both, and bring his "most useful matter" before the world under better auspices? If the love of learning supply such a motive, who that has generously yielded to the impulse, will not now, like Johnson, feel himself reduced to an "humble drudge"—or, like Perizonius, apologize for the apparent folly of devoting his time to such a subject as grammar?

25. The first edition of the "Institutes of English Grammar," the doctrinal parts of which are embraced in the present more copious work, was published in the year 1823; since which time, (within the space of twelve years,) about forty new compends, mostly professing to be abstracts of Murray, with improvements, have been added to our list of English grammars. The author has examined as many as thirty of them, and seen advertisements of perhaps a dozen more. Being various in character, they will of course be variously estimated; but, so far as he can judge, they are, without exception, works of little or no real merit, and not likely to be much patronized or long preserved from oblivion. For which reason, he would have been inclined entirely to disregard the petty depredations which the writers of several of them have committed upon his earlier text, were it not possible, that by such a frittering-away of his work, he himself might one day seem to some to have copied that from others which was first taken from him. Trusting to make it manifest to men of learning, that in the production of the books which bear his name, far more has been done for the grammar of our language than any single hand had before achieved within the scope of practical philology, and that with perfect fairness towards other writers; he cannot but feel a wish that the integrity of his text should be preserved, whatever else may befall; and that the multitude of scribblers who judge it so needful to remodel Murray's defective compilation, would forbear to publish under his name or their own what they find only in the following pages.

26. The mere rivalry of their authorship is no subject of concern; but it is enough for any ingenuous man to have toiled for years in solitude to complete a work of public utility, without entering a warfare for life to defend and preserve it. Accidental coincidences in books are unfrequent, and not often such as to excite the suspicion of the most sensitive. But, though the criteria of plagiarism are neither obscure nor disputable, it is not easy, in this beaten track of literature, for persons of little reading to know what is, or is not, original. Dates must be accurately observed; and a multitude of minute things must be minutely compared. And who will undertake such a task but he that is personally interested? Of the thousands who are forced into the paths of learning, few ever care to know, by what pioneer, or with what labour, their way was cast up for them. And even of those who are honestly engaged in teaching, not many are adequate judges of the comparative merits of the great number of books on this subject. The common notions of mankind conform more easily to fashion than to truth; and even of some things within their reach, the majority seem contend to take their opinions upon trust. Hence, it is vain to expect that that which is intrinsically best, will be everywhere preferred; or that which is meritoriously elaborate, adequately appreciated. But common sense might dictate, that learning is not encouraged or respected by those who, for the making of books, prefer a pair of scissors to the pen.

27. The fortune of a grammar is not always an accurate test of its merits. The goddess of the plenteous horn stands blindfold yet upon the floating prow; and, under her capricious favour, any pirate-craft, ill stowed with plunder, may sometimes speed as well, as barges richly laden from the golden mines of science. Far more are now afloat, and more are stranded on dry shelves, than can be here reported. But what this work contains, is candidly designed to qualify the reader to be himself a judge of what it should contain; and I will hope, so ample a report as this, being thought sufficient, will also meet his approbation. The favour of one discerning mind that comprehends my subject, is worth intrinsically more than that of half the nation: I mean, of course, the half of whom my gentle reader is not one.

"They praise and they admire they know not what, And know not whom, but as one leads the other."—Milton.



CHAPTER III.

OF GRAMMATICAL SUCCESS AND FAME.

"Non is ego sum, cui aut jucundum, aut adeo opus sit, de aliis detrahere, et hac via ad famara contendere. Melioribus artibus laudem parare didici. Itaque non libenter dico, quod praesens institutum dicere cogit."—Jo. AUGUSTI ERNESTI Praef. ad Graecum Lexicon, p. vii.

1. The real history of grammar is little known; and many erroneous impressions are entertained concerning it: because the story of the systems most generally received has never been fully told; and that of a multitude now gone to oblivion was never worth telling. In the distribution of grammatical fame, which has chiefly been made by the hand of interest, we have had a strange illustration of the saying: "Unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not, shall be taken away even that which he hath." Some whom fortune has made popular, have been greatly overrated, if learning and talent are to be taken into the account; since it is manifest, that with no extraordinary claims to either, they have taken the very foremost rank among grammarians, and thrown the learning and talents of others into the shade, or made them tributary to their own success and popularity.

2. It is an ungrateful task to correct public opinion by showing the injustice of praise. Fame, though it may have been both unexpected and undeserved, is apt to be claimed and valued as part and parcel of a man's good name; and the dissenting critic, though ever-so candid, is liable to be thought an envious detractor. It would seem in general most prudent to leave mankind to find out for themselves how far any commendation bestowed on individuals is inconsistent with truth. But, be it remembered, that celebrity is not a virtue; nor, on the other hand, is experience the cheapest of teachers. A good man may not have done all things ably and well; and it is certainly no small mistake to estimate his character by the current value of his copy-rights. Criticism may destroy the reputation of a book, and not be inconsistent with a cordial respect for the private worth of its author. The reader will not be likely to be displeased with what is to be stated in this chapter, if he can believe, that no man's merit as a writer, may well be enhanced by ascribing to him that which he himself, for the protection of his own honour, has been constrained to disclaim. He cannot suppose that too much is alleged, if he will admit that a grammarian's fame should be thought safe enough in his own keeping. Are authors apt to undervalue their own performances? Or because proprietors and publishers may profit by the credit of a book, shall it be thought illiberal to criticise it? Is the author himself to be disbelieved, that the extravagant praises bestowed upon him may be justified? "Superlative commendation," says Dillwyn, "is near akin to detraction." (See his Reflections, p. 22.) Let him, therefore, who will charge detraction upon me, first understand wherein it consists. I shall criticise, freely, both the works of the living, and the doctrines of those who, to us, live only in their works; and if any man dislike this freedom, let him rebuke it, showing wherein it is wrong or unfair. The amiable author just quoted, says again: "Praise has so often proved an impostor, that it would be well, wherever we meet with it, to treat it as a vagrant."—Ib., p. 100. I go not so far as this; but that eulogy which one knows to be false, he cannot but reckon impertinent.

3. Few writers on grammar have been more noted than WILLIAM LILY and LINDLEY MURRAY. Others have left better monuments of their learning and talents, but none perhaps have had greater success and fame. The Latin grammar which was for a long time most popular in England, has commonly been ascribed to the one; and what the Imperial Review, in 1805, pronounced "the best English grammar, beyond all comparison, that has yet appeared," was compiled by the other. And doubtless they have both been rightly judged to excel the generality of those which they were intended to supersede; and both, in their day, may have been highly serviceable to the cause of learning. For all excellence is but comparative; and to grant them this superiority, is neither to prefer them now, nor to justify the praise which has been bestowed upon their authorship. As the science of grammar can never be taught without a book, or properly taught by any book which is not itself grammatical, it is of some importance both to teachers and to students, to make choice of the best. Knowledge will not advance where grammars hold rank by prescription. Yet it is possible that many, in learning to write and speak, may have derived no inconsiderable benefit from a book that is neither accurate nor complete.

4. With respect to time, these two grammarians were three centuries apart; during which period, the English language received its most classical refinement, and the relative estimation of the two studies, Latin and English grammar, became in a great measure reversed. Lily was an Englishman, born at Odiham,[6] in Hampshire, in 1466. When he had arrived at manhood, he went on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem; and while abroad studied some time at Rome, and also at Paris. On his return he was thought one of the most accomplished scholars in England. In 1510, Dr. John Colet, dean of St. Paul's church, in London, appointed him the first high master of St. Paul's School, then recently founded by this gentleman's munificence. In this situation, Lily appears to have taught with great credit to himself till 1522, when he died of the plague, at the age of 56. For the use of this school, he wrote and published certain parts of the grammar which has since borne his name. Of the authorship of this work many curious particulars are stated in the preface by John Ward, which may be seen in the edition of 1793. Lily had able rivals, as well as learned coadjutors and friends. By the aid of the latter, he took precedence of the former; and his publications, though not voluminous, soon gained a general popularity. So that when an arbitrary king saw fit to silence competition among the philologists, by becoming himself, as Sir Thomas Elliott says, "the chiefe authour and setter-forth of an introduction into grammar, for the childrene of his lovynge subjects," Lily's Grammar was preferred for the basis of the standard. Hence, after the publishing of it became a privilege patented by the crown, the book appears to have been honoured with a royal title, and to have been familiarly called King Henry's Grammar.

5. Prefixed to this book, there appears a very ancient epistle to the reader, which while it shows the reasons for this royal interference with grammar, shows also, what is worthy of remembrance, that guarded and maintained as it was, even royal interference was here ineffectual to its purpose. It neither produced uniformity in the methods of teaching, nor, even for instruction in a dead language, entirely prevented the old manual from becoming diverse in its different editions. The style also may serve to illustrate what I have elsewhere said about the duties of a modern grammarian. "As for the diversitie of grammars, it is well and profitably taken awaie by the King's Majesties wisdome; who, foreseeing the inconvenience, and favorably providing the remedie, caused one kind of grammar by sundry learned men to be diligently drawn, and so to be set out, only every where to be taught, for the use of learners, and for the hurt in changing of schoolemaisters." That is, to prevent the injury which schoolmasters were doing by a whimsical choice, or frequent changing, of grammars. But, says the letter, "The varietie of teaching is divers yet, and alwaies will be; for that every schoolemaister liketh that he knoweth, and seeth not the use of that he knoweth not; and therefore judgeth that the most sufficient waie, which he seeth to be the readiest meane, and perfectest kinde, to bring a learner to have a thorough knowledge therein." The only remedy for such an evil then is, to teach those who are to be teachers, and to desert all who, for any whim of their own, desert sound doctrine.

6. But, to return. A law was made in England by Henry the Eighth, commanding Lily's Grammar only, (or that which has commonly been quoted as Lily's,) to be everywhere adopted and taught, as the common standard of grammatical instruction.[7] Being long kept in force by means of a special inquiry, directed to be made by the bishops at their stated visitations, this law, for three hundred years, imposed the book on all the established schools of the realm. Yet it is certain, that about one half of what has thus gone under the name of Lily, ("because," says one of the patentees, "he had so considerable a hand in the composition,") was written by Dr. Colet, by Erasmus, or by others who improved the work after Lily's death. And of the other half, it has been incidentally asserted in history, that neither the scheme nor the text was original. The Printer's Grammar, London, 1787, speaking of the art of type-foundery, says: "The Italians in a short time brought it to that perfection, that in the beginning of the year 1474, they cast a letter not much inferior to the best types of the present age; as may be seen in a Latin Grammar, written by Omnibonus Leonicenus, and printed at Padua on the 14th of January, 1474; from whom our grammarian, Lily, has taken the entire scheme of his Grammar, and transcribed the greatest part thereof, without paying any regard to the memory of this author." The historian then proceeds to speak about types. See also the same thing in the History of Printing, 8vo, London, 1770. This is the grammar which bears upon its title page: "Quam solam Regia Majestas in omnibus scholis docendam prcaecipit."

7. Murray was an intelligent and very worthy man, to whose various labours in the compilation of books our schools are under many obligations. But in original thought and critical skill he fell far below most of "the authors to whom," he confesses, "the grammatical part of his compilation is principally indebted for its materials; namely, Harris, Johnson, Lowth, Priestley, Beattie, Sheridan, Walker, Coote, Blair, and Campbell."—Introd. to Lindley Murray's Gram., p. 7. It is certain and evident that he entered upon his task with a very insufficient preparation. His biography, which was commenced by himself and completed by one of his most partial friends, informs us, that, "Grammar did not particularly engage his attention, until a short time previous to the publication of his first work on that subject;" that, "His Grammar, as it appeared in the first edition, was completed in rather less than a year;" that, "It was begun in the spring of 1794, and published in the spring of 1795—though he had an intervening illness, which, for several weeks, stopped the progress of the work;" and that, "The Exercises and Key were also composed in about a year."—Life of L. Murray, p. 188. From the very first sentence of his book, it appears that he entertained but a low and most erroneous idea of the duties of that sort of character in which he was about to come before the public.[8] He improperly imagined, as many others have done, that "little can be expected" from a modern grammarian, or (as he chose to express it) "from a new compilation, besides a careful selection of the most useful matter, and some degree of improvement in the mode of adapting it to the understanding, and the gradual progress of learners."—Introd. to L. Murray's Gram.; 8vo, p. 5; 12mo, p. 3. As if, to be master of his own art—to think and write well himself, were no part of a grammarian's business! And again, as if the jewels of scholarship, thus carefully selected, could need a burnish or a foil from other hands than those which fashioned them!

8. Murray's general idea of the doctrines of grammar was judicious. He attempted no broad innovation on what had been previously taught; for he had neither the vanity to suppose he could give currency to novelties, nor the folly to waste his time in labours utterly nugatory. By turning his own abilities to their best account, he seems to have done much to promote and facilitate the study of our language. But his notion of grammatical authorship, cuts off from it all pretence to literary merit, for the sake of doing good; and, taken in any other sense than as a forced apology for his own assumptions, his language on this point is highly injurious towards the very authors whom he copied. To justify himself, he ungenerously places them, in common with others, under a degrading necessity which no able grammarian ever felt, and which every man of genius or learning must repudiate. If none of our older grammars disprove his assertion, it is time to have a new one that will; for, to expect the perfection of grammar from him who cannot treat the subject in a style at once original and pure, is absurd. He says, "The greater part of an English grammar must necessarily be a compilation ;" and adds, with reference to his own, "originality belongs to but a small portion of it. This I have acknowledged; and I trust this acknowledgement will protect me from all attacks, grounded on any supposed unjust and irregular assumptions." This quotation is from a letter addressed by Murray to his American publishers, in 1811, after they had informed him of certain complaints respecting the liberties which he had taken in his work. See "The Friend," Vol. iii, p. 34.

9. The acknowledgement on which he thus relies, does not appear to have been made, till his grammar had gone through several editions. It was, however, at some period, introduced into his short preface, or "Introduction," in the following well-meant but singularly sophistical terms: "In a work which professes itself to be a compilation, and which, from the nature and design of it, must consist chiefly of materials selected from the writings of others, it is scarcely necessary to apologise for the use which the Compiler has made of his predecessors' labours, or for omitting to insert their names. From the alterations which have been frequently made in the sentiments and the language, to suit the connexion, and to adapt them to the particular purposes for which they are introduced; and, in many instances, from the uncertainty to whom the passages originally belonged, the insertion of names could seldom be made with propriety. But if this could have been generally done, a work of this nature would derive no advantage from it, equal to the inconvenience of crowding the pages with a repetition of names and references. It is. however, proper to acknowledge, in general terms, that the authors to whom the grammatical part of this compilation is principally indebted for its materials, are Harris, Johnson, Lowth, Priestley, Beattie, Sheridan, Walker, and Coote."—Introd.; Duodecimo Gram., p. 4; Octavo, p. 7.

10. The fallacy, or absurdity, of this language sprung from necessity. An impossible case was to be made out. For compilation, though ever so fair, is not grammatical authorship. But some of the commenders of Murray have not only professed themselves satisfied with this general acknowledgement, but have found in it a candour and a liberality, a modesty and a diffidence, which, as they allege, ought to protect him from all animadversion. Are they friends to learning? Let them calmly consider what I reluctantly offer for its defence and promotion. In one of the recommendations appended to Murray's grammars, it is said, "They have nearly superseded every thing else of the kind, by concentrating the remarks of the best authors on the subject." But, in truth, with several of the best English grammars published previously to his own, Murray appears to have been totally unacquainted. The chief, if not the only school grammars which were largely copied by him, were Lowth's and Priestley's, though others perhaps may have shared the fate of these in being "superseded" by his. It may be seen by inspection, that in copying these two authors, the compiler, agreeably to what he says above, omitted all names and references—even such as they had scrupulously inserted: and, at the outset, assumed to be himself the sole authority for all his doctrines and illustrations; satisfying his own mind with making, some years afterwards, that general apology which we are now criticising. For if he so mutilated and altered the passages which he adopted, as to make it improper to add the names of their authors, upon what other authority than his own do they rest? But if, on the other hand, he generally copied without alteration; his examples are still anonymous, while his first reason for leaving them so, is plainly destroyed: because his position is thus far contradicted by the fact.

11. In his later editions, however, there are two opinions which the compiler thought proper to support by regular quotations; and, now and then, in other instances, the name of an author appears. The two positions thus distinguished, are these: First, That the noun means is necessarily singular as well as plural, so that one cannot with propriety use the singular form, mean, to signify that by which an end is attained; Second, That the subjective mood, to which he himself had previously given all the tenses without inflection, is not different in form from the indicative, except in the present tense. With regard to the later point, I have shown, in its proper place, that he taught erroneously, both before and after he changed his opinion; and concerning the former, the most that can be proved by quotation, is, that both mean and means for the singular number, long have been, and still are, in good use, or sanctioned by many elegant writers; so that either form may yet be considered grammatical, though the irregular can claim to be so, only when it is used in this particular sense. As to his second reason for the suppression of names, to wit, "the uncertainty to whom the passages originally belonged,"—to make the most of it, it is but partial and relative; and, surely, no other grammar ever before so multiplied the difficulty in the eyes of teachers, and so widened the field for commonplace authorship, as has the compilation in question. The origin of a sentiment or passage may be uncertain to one man, and perfectly well known to an other. The embarrassment which a compiler may happen to find from this source, is worthy of little sympathy. For he cannot but know from what work he is taking any particular sentence or paragraph, and those parts of a grammar, which are new to the eye of a great grammarian, may very well be credited to him who claims to have written the book. I have thus disposed of his second reason for the omission of names and references, in compilations of grammar.

12. There remains one more: "A work of this nature would derive no advantage from it, equal to the inconvenience of crowding the pages with a repetition of names and references." With regard to a small work, in which the matter is to be very closely condensed, this argument has considerable force. But Murray has in general allowed himself very ample room, especially in his two octavoes. In these, and for the most part also in his duodecimoes, all needful references might easily have been added without increasing the size of his volumes, or injuring their appearance. In nine cases out of ten, the names would only have been occupied what is now blank space. It is to be remembered, that these books do not differ much, except in quantity of paper. His octavo Grammar is but little more than a reprint, in a larger type, of the duodecimo Grammar, together with his Exercises and Key. The demand for this expensive publication has been comparatively small; and it is chiefly to the others, that the author owes his popularity as a grammarian. As to the advantage which Murray or his work might have derived from an adherence on his part to the usual custom of compilers, that may be variously estimated. The remarks of the best grammarians or the sentiments of the best authors, are hardly to be thought the more worthy of acceptance, for being concentrated in such a manner as to merge their authenticity in the fame of the copyist. Let me not be understood to suggest that this good man sought popularity at the expense of others; for I do not believe that either fame or interest was his motive. But the right of authors to the credit of their writings, is a delicate point; and, surely, his example would have been worthier of imitation, had he left no ground for the foregoing objections, and carefully barred the way to any such interference.

13. But let the first sentence of this apology be now considered. It is here suggested, that because this work is a compilation, even such an acknowledgement as the author makes, is "scarcely necessary." This is too much to say. Yet one may readily admit, that a compilation, "from the nature and design of it, must consist chiefly"—nay, wholly—"of materials selected from the writings of others." But what able grammarian would ever willingly throw himself upon the horns of such a dilemma! The nature and design of a book, whatever they may be, are matters for which the author alone is answerable; but the nature and design of grammar, are no less repugnant to the strain of this apology, than to the vast number of errors and defects which were overlooked by Murray in his work of compilation. It is the express purpose of this practical science, to enable a man to write well himself. He that cannot do this, exhibits no excess of modesty when he claims to have "done all that could reasonably be expected in a work of this nature."—L. Murray's Gram., Introd., p. 9. He that sees with other men's eyes, is peculiarly liable to errors and inconsistencies: uniformity is seldom found in patchwork, or accuracy in secondhand literature. Correctness of language is in the mind, rather than in the hand or the tongue; and, in order to secure it, some originality of thought is necessary. A delineation from new surveys is not the less original because the same region has been sketched before; and how can he be the ablest of surveyors, who, through lack of skill or industry, does little more than transcribe the field-notes and copy the projections of his predecessors?

14. This author's oversights are numerous. There is no part of the volume more accurate than that which he literally copied from Lowth. To the Short Introduction alone, he was indebted for more than a hundred and twenty paragraphs; and even in these there are many things obviously erroneous. Many of the best practical notes were taken from Priestley; yet it was he, at whose doctrines were pointed most of those "positions and discussions," which alone the author claims as original. To some of these reasonings, however, his own alterations may have given rise; for, where he "persuades himself he is not destitute of originality," he is often arguing against the text of his own earlier editions. Webster's well-known complaints of Murray's unfairness, had a far better cause than requital; for there was no generosity in ascribing them to peevishness, though the passages in question were not worth copying. On perspicuity and accuracy, about sixty pages were extracted from Blair; and it requires no great critical acumen to discover, that they are miserably deficient in both. On the law of language, there are fifteen pages from Campbell; which, with a few exceptions, are well written. The rules for spelling are the same as Walker's: the third one, however, is a gross blunder; and the fourth, a, needless repetition.

15. Were this a place for minute criticism, blemishes almost innumerable might be pointed out. It might easily be shown that almost every rule laid down in the book for the observance of the learner, was repeatedly violated by the hand of the master. Nor is there among all those who have since abridged or modified the work, an abler grammarian than he who compiled it. Who will pretend that Flint, Alden, Comly, Jaudon, Russell, Bacon, Lyon, Miller, Alger, Maltby, Ingersoll, Fisk, Greenleaf, Merchant, Kirkham, Cooper, R. G. Greene, Woodworth, Smith, or Frost, has exhibited greater skill? It is curious to observe, how frequently a grammatical blunder committed by Murray, or some one of his predecessors, has escaped the notice of all these, as well as of many others who have found it easier to copy him than to write for themselves. No man professing to have copied and improved Murray, can rationally be supposed to have greatly excelled him; for to pretend to have produced an improved copy of a compilation, is to claim a sort of authorship, even inferior to his, and utterly unworthy of any man who is able to prescribe and elucidate the principles of English grammar.

16. But Murray's grammatical works, being extolled in the reviews, and made common stock in trade,—being published, both in England and in America, by booksellers of the most extensive correspondence, and highly commended even by those who were most interested in the sale of them,—have been eminently successful with the public; and in the opinion of the world, success is the strongest proof of merit. Nor has the force of this argument been overlooked by those who have written in aid of his popularity. It is the strong point in most of the commendations which have been bestowed upon Murray as a grammarian. A recent eulogist computes, that, "at least five millions of copies of his various school-books have been printed;" particularly commends him for his "candour and liberality towards rival authors;" avers that, "he went on, examining and correcting his Grammar, through all its forty editions, till he brought it to a degree of perfection which will render it as permanent as the English language itself;" censures (and not without reason) the "presumption" of those "superficial critics" who have attempted to amend the work, and usurp his honours; and, regarding the compiler's confession of his indebtedness to others, but as a mark of "his exemplary diffidence of his own merits," adds, (in very bad English,) "Perhaps there never was an author whose success and fame were more unexpected by himself than Lindley Murray."—The Friend, Vol. iii, p. 33.