[Footnote 74: Todd, Parliamentary Government in England, I., 81.]

*58. Appointment of Ministers.*—In the naming of a new premier, following the retirement of a ministry, the king is legally unhampered; but here again in practice he is bound to designate the recognized leader of the dominant party, and so to pursue a course in which there is left no room for the exercise of discretion. Only when there is no clearly recognized leader, or when circumstances compel the formation of a coalition ministry, is there a real opportunity for the sovereign to choose a premier from a number of more or less available men.[75] In the appointment of the remaining ministers, and of all persons whose offices are regarded as political, the crown yields uniformly to the judgment of the premier. The King's Speech, on the opening of Parliament, is written by the ministers; all public communications of the crown pass through their hands; peers are created and honors bestowed in accord with their advice; measures are framed and executive acts are undertaken by them, sometimes without the sovereign's knowledge and occasionally even contrary to his wishes.

[Footnote 75: This sort of situation presented itself several times during the reign of Queen Victoria, but in general it is exceptional.]

III. THE IMPORTANCE AND STRENGTH OF THE MONARCH (p. 058)

*59. The Real Authority and Service of the Crown.*—It would be an error, however, to conclude that kingship in England is unimportant, or even that the power wielded in person by the crown is negligible. On the contrary, the uses served by the crown are indisputable and the influence exerted upon the course of public affairs may be decisive. The sovereign, in the words of Bagehot, has three rights—the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn. "A king of great sense and sagacity," it is added, "would want no others."[76] Despite the fact that during upwards of two hundred years the sovereign has not attended the meetings of the cabinet, and so is deprived of the opportunity of wielding influence directly upon the deliberations of the ministers as a body, the king keeps in close touch with the premier, and cabinet councils at which important lines of policy are to be formulated are preceded not infrequently by a conference in which the subject in hand is threshed out more or less completely by king and chief minister. Merely because the ancient relation has been reversed, so that now it is the king who advises and the ministry that arrives at decisions, it does not follow that the advisory function is an unimportant thing. Queen Victoria many times wielded influence of a decisive nature upon the public measures of her reign, especially in respect to the conduct of foreign relations. The extent of such influence cannot be made a matter of record, because the ministers are in effect bound not to publish the fact that a decision upon a matter of state has been taken at the sovereign's instance. It is familiarly known, however—to cite a recent illustration—that Edward VII. approved and encouraged the Haldane army reforms, that he sought to dissuade the House of Lords from the rejection of the Lloyd-George budget of 1909, and that he discouraged the raising, in any form, of the issue of the reconstitution of the upper chamber. In other words while, as a constitutional monarch content to remain in the background of political controversy, the late king not only had opinions but did not hesitate to make them known; and in the shaping and execution of the Liberal programme his advice was at times a factor of importance.[77]

[Footnote 76: The English Constitution (rev. ed.), 143.]

[Footnote 77: The most satisfactory estimate of the political and governmental activities of Edward VII. is contained in Mr. Sidney Lee's memoir of the king, printed in the Dictionary of National Biography, Second Supplement (London and New York, 1912), I., 546-610.]

*60. Why Monarchy Survives.*—Monarchy in Great Britain is a solid (p. 059) and, so far as can be foreseen, a lasting reality. Throughout the tempestuous years 1909-1911, when the nation was aroused as it had not been in generations upon the issue of constitutional reform, and when every sort of project was being warmly advocated and as warmly opposed, without exception every suggested programme took for granted the perpetuation of the monarchy as an integral part of the governmental system. In the general bombardment to which the hereditary House of Lords was subjected hereditary kingship wholly escaped. The reasons are numerous and complex. They arise in part, though by no means so largely as is sometimes imagined, from the fact that monarchy in England is a venerable institution and the innate conservatism of the Englishman, while permitting him from time to time to regulate and modify it, restrains him from doing anything so revolutionary as to abolish it. That upon certain conspicuous occasions, as in the Cromwellian period, and again in 1688, kingship has owed its very life to the conservative instinct of the English people is well enough known to every student of history. But to-day, as ever, the institution rests upon a basis very much more substantial than a mere national predilection. Monarchy remains impregnably entrenched because the crown, in addition to comprising an accustomed feature of the governmental economy, fulfills specific ends which are recognized universally to be eminently worth while, if not indispensable. As a social, moral, and ceremonial agency, and as a visible symbol of the unity of the nation; king and court occupy an immeasurable place in the life and thought of the people; and even within the domain of government, to employ the figure of Lowell, if the crown is no longer the motive power of the ship of state, it is the spar on which the sail is bent, and as such it is not only a useful but an essential part of the vessel.[78] The entire governmental order of Great Britain hinges upon the parliamentary system, and nowhere has that system been reduced to satisfactory operation without the presence of some central, but essentially detached, figure, whether a king or, as in France, a president with the attributes of kingship. It is fundamentally because the English people have discerned that kingship is not necessarily incompatible with popular government that the monarchy has persisted. If royalty had been felt to stand inevitably in the path of democratic progress, it is inconceivable that all the forces of tradition could have pulled it through the past seventy-five or eighty years. As it is, while half a century ago there was in the country a small republican group which was fond of urging that the monarchy was but a source of needless (p. 060) expense, to-day there is hardly a vestige, in any grade of society, of anti-monarchical sentiment.[79]

[Footnote 78: Government of England, I., 49.]

[Footnote 79: The best brief discussions of the position of the crown in the governmental system are Lowell, Government of England, I., Chap, 1; Moran, English Government, Chaps. 2-3; Marriott, English Political Institutions, Chap. 3; Macy, English Constitution, Chap. 5; and Low, Governance of England, Chaps. 14-15. More extended treatment of the subject will be found in Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, II., Pt. 1, Chaps 1 and 4; Todd, Parliamentary Government in England, I, Pt. 2; Bagehot, English Constitution, Chaps. 2-3; H. D. Traill, Central Government, Chap. 1. Mention may be made of N. Caudel, Le souverain anglais, in Annales des Sciences Politiques, July, 1910, and J. Bardoux, Le pouvoir politique de la couronne anglaise, in Revue des Deux Mondes, May 15, 1911.]

IV. PRIVY COUNCIL, MINISTRY, AND CABINET

*61. The Privy Council.*—One who would understand the modes by which the powers of the crown are in practice exercised must begin by fixing firmly in mind the nature and relations of three distinct but closely interrelated institutions, the Privy Council, the ministry, and the cabinet. As has appeared, the Privy Council through a long period of English history comprised the body of men who advised the crown and assisted to some extent in the supervision of administration. The number of councillors from time to time varied widely, but it tended constantly to be too large to admit of the requisite despatch and secrecy, and by reason principally of this consideration the crown fell into the custom of selecting as advisers a group of persons less numerous, and perhaps more trustworthy, than the whole body of public functionaries collectively designated as the Privy Council. Thus arose the cabinet, which throughout its entire history has been only an inner circle, unknown to the law, of the older and larger body. The Privy Council survives to-day, and in both law and theory it still is the advisory body of the crown. A cabinet member possesses authority and is known to the law only as a privy councillor. In point of fact, however, the Privy Council, once highly influential in affairs of state, is now, as such, all but powerless. Such portions of the dignity of its ancient place in the constitution as remain to it are of a purely formal and ceremonial nature. It holds no meetings of a deliberative character, and although legally its action is still essential to many public measures, as the preparation of proclamations and of orders in council, this action may be taken by as few as three persons.[80] All cabinet members are members of the Council, so that even one-fifth or one-sixth of the cabinet group is competent to meet every legal requirement imposed upon the Council as a whole.[81] (p. 061) All councillors are appointed by the crown and continue in office for life or until dismissed. Their number is unlimited, and the only qualification necessary for appointment is British nativity. Members fall into three groups: (1) members of the cabinet; (2) holders of certain important non-political offices who by custom are entitled to appointment; (3) persons eminent in politics, literature, law, or science, or by reason of service rendered the crown, upon whom the dignity is conferred as an honorary distinction. Members bear regularly the title of Right Honorable. The President of the Council, designated by the crown, takes rank in the House of Lords next after the Chancellor and Treasurer.[82]

[Footnote 80: On the nature of orders in council see Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, II., Pt. 1, 147-149.]

[Footnote 81: It is to be observed, however, that despite the transfer of the business devolving formerly upon the Council into the hands of the specially constituted departments of government, the Council does still, through the agency of its committees, perform a modicum of actual service. Of principal importance among the committees is the Judicial Committee, which hears appeals in ecclesiastical cases and renders final verdict in all appeals coming from tribunals outside the United Kingdom. See p. 175.]

[Footnote 82: Traill, Central Government, Chap. 12.]

*62. Ministry and Cabinet.*—Another governmental group which, like the Privy Council, differs from the cabinet while containing it, is the ministry. The ministry comprises a large and variable body of functionaries, some of whom occupy the principal offices of state and divide their efforts between advising the crown, i.e., formulating governmental policy, and administering the affairs of their respective departments, and others of whom, occupying less important executive positions, do not possess, save indirectly, the advisory function. The first group comprises, approximately at least, the cabinet. Most heads of departments are regularly and necessarily in the cabinet. A few are in it as a rule, though not invariably. A few, still less important, may be, but are not likely to be, admitted to it. And, finally, a large number of parliamentary under-secretaries, party "whips," and officers of the royal household are certain not to be admitted.[83]

[Footnote 83: On the relations of cabinet and ministry see Lowell, Government of England, I., Chap. 3.]

V. THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS

In respect to both origin and legal status the executive departments of the central government of Great Britain exhibit little of the conformity to type which characterizes their counterparts in the logical and self-consistent governmental systems of the majority of continental countries. Under the pressure, however, of custom and (p. 062) of parliamentary control, they have been reduced to essentially a common style of organization and a common mode of administrative procedure. In virtually every instance the department is presided over by a single responsible minister, assisted as a rule by one or more parliamentary under-secretaries and, more remotely, by a greater or lesser body of non-political officials who carry on the actual work of the department and whose tenure is not affected by the political fortunes of their chiefs.

*63. The Treasury.*—Among the numerous departments, some represent survivals of great offices of state of an earlier period, some are offshoots of the ancient secretariat, and some comprise boards and commissions established in days comparatively recent. In the first group fall the offices of the Lord High Treasurer, the Lord High Chancellor, and the Lord High Admiral. From the early sixteenth century to the death of Queen Anne the principal official of the Treasury was the Lord High Treasurer. Since 1714, however, the office has been regularly in commission. The duties connected with it have been intrusted to a board composed of certain Lords of the Treasury, and no individual to-day bears the Lord High Treasurer's title. When a ministry is made up the group of Treasury Lords is renewed, and as a rule the post of First Lord is assumed by the premier. In point of fact, however, the board is never called together, some of its members have no actual connection whatsoever with the Treasury, and the functions of this most important of all departments are in practice exercised by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, assisted by the Junior Lords and the under-secretaries. The Exchequer, i.e., the department concerned principally with the collection of the taxes, is in fact, though not in name, a branch of the Treasury Board. Within the Treasury, and immediately under the direction of the Chancellor, is drawn up the annual budget, embodying a statement of the contemplated expenditures of the year and a programme of taxation calculated to produce the requisite revenue. The Treasury exercises general control over all other departments of the public service, e.g., the Post-office and the Board of Customs, in which public money is collected or expended.[84]

[Footnote 84: On the organization and workings of the Treasury see Lowell, Government of England, I, Chap. 5; Dicey, Law of the Constitution, Chap. 10; Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, II., Pt. 1, 173-190; Traill, Central Government, Chap. 3.]

*64. The Admiralty Board and the Lord High Chancellorship.*—A second of the ancient offices of state which survives only in commission is (p. 063) that of the Lord High Admiral. The functions of this important post devolve to-day upon an Admiralty Board, consisting strictly of a First Lord, four Naval Lords (naval experts, usually of high rank), and a Civil Lord, with whom, however, sit a number of parliamentary and permanent secretaries. The First Lord is invariably a member of the cabinet, and while legally the status of the six Lords is identical, in practice the position of the First Lord approximates closely that of the minister of marine in continental countries. Unlike the Treasury Lords, the Lords of the Admiralty actually meet, and transact business.

The third of the executive offices which comprise survivals from early times is that of the Lord High Chancellor. There is in Great Britain no single official who fills even approximately the position occupied elsewhere by a minister of justice or an attorney-general, but the most important of several officers who supply the lack is the Lord Chancellor. "The greatest dignitary," says Lowell, "in the British government, the one endowed by law with the most exalted and most diverse functions, the only great officer of state who has retained his ancient rights, the man who defies the doctrine of the separation of powers more than any other personage on earth, is the Lord Chancellor."[85] The Lord Chancellor is invariably a member of the Cabinet. He is the chief judge in the High Court of Justice and in the Court of Appeal. He appoints and removes the justices of the peace and the judges of the county courts and wields large influence in appointments to higher judicial posts. He affixes the Great Seal where it is required to give validity to the acts of the crown and he performs a wide variety of other more or less formal services. Finally, it is the Lord High Chancellor who presides in the House of Lords.

[Footnote 85: Government of England, I., 131.]

*65. The Five Secretaries of State.*—Five of the great departments to-day represent the product of a curious evolution of the ancient secretariat of state. Originally there was but a single official who bore the designation of secretary of state. In the earlier eighteenth century a second official was added, although no new office was created. At the close of the century a third was added, after the Crimean War a fourth, and after the Indian Mutiny of 1857 a fifth. There are now, accordingly, five "principal secretaries of state," all in theory occupying the same office and each, save for a few statutory restrictions, competent legally to exercise the functions of any or all of the others. In practice each of the five holds strictly to his own domain. The group comprises: (1) the Secretary of State for the Home Department, assisted by a parliamentary under-secretary and a large staff of permanent officials, and possessing functions of a highly miscellaneous sort—those, in general, belonging to the (p. 064) ancient secretariat which have not been assigned to the care of other departments; (2) the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, at the head of a department which not only conducts foreign relations but administers the affairs of such protectorates as are not closely connected with any of the colonies; (3) the Secretary of State for the Colonies; (4) the Secretary of State for War; and (5) the Secretary of State for India, assisted by a special India Council of ten to fourteen members.

*66. The Administrative Boards.*—The third general group of departments comprises those which have arisen through the establishment in comparatively recent years of a variety of administrative boards or commissions. Two—the Board of Trade and the Board of Education—originated as committees of the Privy Council. Three others—the Board of Agriculture, the Board of Works, and the Local Government Board—represent the development of administrative commissions not conceived of originally as vested with political character. All are in effect independent and co-ordinate governmental departments. The composition and functions of the Board of Trade are regulated by order in council at the opening of each reign, but the character of the other four is determined wholly by statute. At the head of each is a president (save that the chief of the Board of Works is known as First Commissioner), and the membership embraces the five secretaries of state and a variable number of other important dignitaries. This membership, however, is but nominal. No one of the Boards actually meets, and the work of each is performed entirely by its president, with, in some instances, the assistance of a parliamentary under-secretary. "In practice, therefore, these boards are legal phantoms that provide imaginary colleagues for a single responsible minister."[86] Very commonly the presidents are admitted to the cabinet, but sometimes they are not.[87]

[Footnote 86: Lowell, Government of England, I., 84.]

[Footnote 87: On the organization and workings of the executive departments see Lowell, op. cit., I., Chaps. 4-6; Marriott, English Political Institutions, Chap. 5; Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, II., Pt. 1, Chap. 3; Traill, Central Government, Chaps. 3-11.]

VI. THE CABINET: COMPOSITION AND CHARACTER

*67. Regular and Occasional Members.*—The cabinet comprises a variable group of the principal ministers of state upon whom devolves singly the task of administering the affairs of their respective departments and, collectively, that of shaping the policy and directing the conduct of the government as a whole. The position occupied by the cabinet (p. 065) in the constitutional system is anomalous, but transcendently important. As has been pointed out, the cabinet as such is unknown to English law. Legally, the cabinet member derives his administrative function from the fact of his appointment to a ministerial post, and his advisory function from his membership in the Privy Council. The cabinet exists as an informal, extra-legal ministerial group into whose hands, through prolonged historical development, has fallen the supreme direction of both the executive and the legislative activities of the state. The composition of the body is determined largely by custom, but in part by passing circumstance. Certain ministerial heads are invariably included: the First Lord of the Treasury, the Lord Chancellor, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the five Secretaries of State, and the First Lord of the Admiralty. Two dignitaries who possess no administrative function, i.e., the Lord President of the Privy Council and the Lord Privy Seal,[88] are likewise always included. Beyond this, the make-up of the cabinet group is left to the discretion of the premier. The importance of a given office at the moment and the wishes of the appointee, together with general considerations of party expediency, may well enter into a decision relative to the seating of individual departmental heads. In recent years the presidents of the Board of Trade, the Board of Education, and the Local Government Board have regularly been included, together with the Lord Lieutenant or the Chief Secretary for Ireland.[89] The Secretary for Scotland and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster are usually included; the Postmaster-General and the President of the Board of Agriculture frequently, and the First Commissioner of Works and the Lord Chancellor for Ireland occasionally.

[Footnote 88: The functions of this official are but nominal. In 1870 Sir Charles Dilke moved to abolish the office as useless, but Gladstone urged the desirability of having in the cabinet at least one man who should not be burdened with the management of a department, and the motion was lost. The presidency of the Council is a post likewise of dignity but of meager governmental power or responsibility.]

[Footnote 89: In theory the powers of the executive are exercised in Ireland by the Lord Lieutenant, but in practice they devolve almost entirely upon the nominally inferior official, the Chief Secretary.]

*68. Increasing Size.*—The trend is distinctly in the direction of an increase in the size of the body. The more notable cabinets of the eighteenth century contained, as a rule, not above seven to ten members. In the first half of the nineteenth century the number ran up to thirteen or fourteen, and throughout the Gladstone-Disraeli period it seldom fell below this level. The second Salisbury cabinet, at its fall in 1892, numbered seventeen, and when, following the elections of 1900, the third Salisbury government was reconstructed, the cabinet attained a membership of twenty.[90] The Balfour cabinet of 1905 (p. 066) and the succeeding Campbell-Bannerman cabinet likewise numbered twenty. The increase is attributable to several causes, especially the pressure which comes from ambitious statesmen for admission to the influential circle, the growing necessity of according representation to varied elements and interests within the dominant party, the multiplication of state activities which call for direction under new and important departments, and the disposition to accord to every considerable branch of the administrative system at least one representative. The effect is to produce a certain unwieldiness, to avoid which, it will be recalled, the cabinet was originally instituted. Only through the domination of the cabinet by a few of its most influential members can expeditiousness be preserved, and during recent years there has been a tendency toward the differentiation of an inner circle which shall bear to the whole cabinet a relation somewhat analogous to that which the cabinet now bears to the ministry. Development in this direction is viewed apprehensively by many people who regard that the concentration of power in the hands of an "inner cabinet" might well fail to be accompanied by a corresponding concentration of recognized responsibility. During more than a decade criticism of the inordinate size of the cabinet group has been voiced freely upon numerous occasions and by many observers.[91]

[Footnote 90: Lord Salisbury at this point retired from the Foreign Office, which was assigned to Lord Lansdowne, and assumed in conjunction with the premiership the less exacting post of Lord Privy Seal.]

[Footnote 91: Lowell, Government of England, I., 59; Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, II., Pt. 1, 211.]

*69. Appointment of the Premier.*—When a new cabinet is to be made up the first step is the designation of the prime minister. Legally the choice rests with the crown, but considerations of practical politics leave, as a rule, no room whatsoever for the exercise of discretion. The crown sends as a matter of course for the statesman who is able to command the support of the majority in the House of Commons. If the retiring ministry has "fallen," i.e., has lost its parliamentary majority, the new premier is certain to be the recognized leader of the party which formerly has played the role of opposition. If there has not occurred a shift in party status, the premiership will be bestowed upon some one of the colleagues, at least upon one of the fellow-partisans, of the retiring premier, nominated, if need be, by the chiefs of the party. Thus, when in 1894 Gladstone retired from office by reason of physical infirmity, the Liberal leaders in the two houses conferred upon the question as to whether he should be succeeded by Sir William Vernon-Harcourt or by Lord Rosebery. They (p. 067) recommended Lord Rosebery, who was forthwith appointed by the Queen. If, by any circumstance, the premiership should fall to the Opposition at a moment when the leadership of this element is in doubt, the crown would be guided, similarly, by the informally expressed will of the more influential party members. While, therefore, the appointment of the prime minister remains the sole important governmental act which is performed directly by the sovereign, even here the substance of power has been lost and only the form survives.

*70. Selection of Other Members.*—The remaining members of the cabinet are selected by the premier, in consultation, as a rule, with leading members of the party. Technically, what happens is that the first minister places in the hands of the sovereign a list of the men whom he recommends for appointment to the principal offices of state. The crown accepts the list and there appears forthwith in the London Gazette an announcement to the effect that the persons named have been chosen by the crown to preside over the several departments. Officially, there is no mention of the "cabinet." In the selection of his colleagues the premier theoretically has a free hand. Practically he is bound by the necessity of complying with numerous principles and of observing various precedents and practical conditions. Two principles, in particular, must be adhered to in determining the structure of every cabinet. All of the members must have seats in one or the other of the two houses of Parliament, and all must be identified with the party in power, or, at the least, with an allied political group. There was a time, when the personal government of the king was yet a reality, when the House of Commons refused to admit to its membership persons who held office under the crown, and this disqualification found legal expression as late as the Act of Settlement of 1701.[92] With the ripening of parliamentary government in the eighteenth century, however, the thing that once had been regarded properly enough as objectionable became a matter of unquestionable expediency, if not a necessity. When once the ministers comprised the real executive of the nation it was but logical that they should be authorized to appear on the floor of the two houses to introduce and advocate measures and to explain the acts of the government. Ministers had occupied regularly seats in the upper chamber, and not only was all objection to their occupying seats in the lower chamber removed, but by custom it came to be an inflexible rule that cabinet officers, and indeed the ministers generally, should be drawn exclusively from the membership of the two houses.[93] (p. 068) Under provision of an act of 1707 it is still obligatory upon commoners who are tendered a cabinet appointment, with a few exceptions, to vacate their seats and to offer themselves to their constituents for re-election. But re-election almost invariably follows as a matter of course and without opposition.[94] It is to be observed that there are two expedients by which it is possible to bring into the cabinet a desirable member who at the time of his appointment does not possess a seat in Parliament. The appointee may be created a peer; or he may stand for election to the Commons and, winning, qualify himself for a cabinet post.

[Footnote 92: The clause of this measure which bore upon the point in hand was repealed, however, before it went into operation.]

[Footnote 93: The one notable instance in which this rule has been departed from within the past seventy-five years was Gladstone's tenure of the post of Secretary of State for the Colonies during the last six months of the Peel administration in 1846.]

[Footnote 94: On the reasons for the requirement of re-election and the movement for the abolition of the requirement see Moran, The English Government, 108-109.]

*71. Distribution Between the Houses of Parliament.*—Since the middle of the eighteenth century the tenure of the premiership has been divided approximately equally between peers and commoners, but the apportionment of cabinet seats between the two houses has been extremely variable. The first cabinet of the reign of George III. contained fourteen members, thirteen of whom had seats in the House of Lords, and, in general, throughout the eighteenth century the peers were apt greatly to preponderate. With the growth in importance of the House of Commons, however, and especially after the Reform Act of 1832, the tendency was to draw an ever increasing proportion of the cabinet officers from the chamber in which lies the storm center of English politics. By legal stipulation one of the secretaries of state must sit in the upper house; and the Lord Privy Seal, the Lord Chancellor, and the Lord President of the Council are all but invariably peers. Beyond this, there is no positive requirement, in either law or custom. In the ministries of recent times the number of peers and of commoners has generally been not far from equal. To fill the various posts the premier must bring together the best men he can secure—not necessarily the ablest, but those who will work together most effectively—with but secondary regard to the question of whether they sit in the one or the other of the legislative houses. A department whose chief sits in the Commons is certain to be represented in the Lords by an under-secretary or other spokesman, and vice versa.[95]

[Footnote 95: In France and other continental countries in which the parliamentary system obtains an executive department is represented in Parliament by its presiding official only. But this official is privileged, as the English minister is not, to appear and to speak and otherwise participate in proceedings on the floor of either chamber.]

*72. Political Solidarity.*—A second fundamental principle which (p. 069) dominates the structure of the cabinet is that which requires that the members be men of one political faith. William III. sought to govern with a cabinet in which there were both Whigs and Tories, but the result was confusion and the experiment was abandoned. Except during the ascendancy of Walpole, the cabinets of the eighteenth century very generally embraced men of more or less diverse political affiliations, but gradually the conviction took root that in the interest of unity and efficiency the political solidarity of the cabinet group is indispensable. The last occasion upon which it was proposed to make up a cabinet from utterly diverse political elements was in 1812. The scheme was rejected, and from that day to this cabinets have been composed regularly, not necessarily of men identified with a common political party, but at least of men who are in substantial agreement upon the larger questions of policy and who have expressed their willingness to co-operate in the carrying out of a given programme of action. The fundamental requisite is unity. A Liberal Unionist may occupy a post in a Conservative cabinet and a Laborite in a Liberal administration, but he may not oppose the Government upon any important question and expect to continue a member of it, save by the express permission of the premier. It is the obligation of every cabinet member to agree, or to appear to agree, with his colleagues. If he is unable to do this, no course is open to him save resignation.

*73. Other Considerations Determining Appointment.*—In the selection of his colleagues the premier works under still other practical restrictions. One of them is the well-established rule that surviving members of the last cabinet of the party, in so far as they are in active public life and desirous of appointment, shall be given prior consideration. Members of the party, furthermore, who have come into special prominence and influence in Parliament must usually be included. In truth, as Bagehot points out, the premier's independent choice is apt to find scope not so much in the determination of the cabinet's personnel as in the distribution of offices among the members selected; and even here he will often be obliged to subordinate his wishes to the inclinations, susceptibilities, and capacities of his prospective colleagues. In the expressive simile of Lowell, the premier's task is "like that of constructing a figure out of blocks which are too numerous for the purpose, and which are not of shapes to fit perfectly together."[96]

[Footnote 96: Government of England, I., 57. See MacDonaugh, The Book of Parliament, 148-183.]

VII. THE CABINET IN ACTION (p. 070)

*74. Ministerial Responsibility.*—In its actual operation the English cabinet system involves the unvarying application of three principles: (1) the responsibility of cabinet ministers to Parliament; (2) the non-publicity of cabinet proceedings; and (3) the close co-ordination of the cabinet group under the leadership of the premier. Every minister whether or not in the cabinet, is responsible individually to Parliament, which in effect means to the House of Commons, for all of his public acts. If he is accorded a vote of censure he must retire. In the earlier eighteenth century the resignation of a cabinet officer did not affect the tenure of his colleagues, the first of cabinets to retire as a unit being that of Lord North in 1782. Subsequently, however, the ministerial body so developed in compactness that in relation to the outside world, and even to Parliament, the individual officer came to be effectually subordinated to the group. Not since 1866 has a cabinet member retired singly in consequence of an adverse parliamentary vote. If an individual minister falls into serious disfavor one of two things almost certainly happens. Either the offending member is persuaded by his colleagues to modify his course or to resign before formal parliamentary censure shall have been passed, or the cabinet as a whole rallies to the support of the minister in question and stands or falls with him. This is but another way of saying that, in practice, the responsibility of the cabinet is collective rather than individual, a condition by which the seriousness and effectiveness of it are vastly increased. This responsibility covers the entire range of acts of the executive department of the government, whether regarded as acts of the crown or of the ministers themselves, and it constitutes the most distinctive feature of the English parliamentary system. Formerly the only means by which ministers could be held to account by Parliament was that of impeachment. With the development, however, of the principle of ministerial responsibility as a necessary adjunct to parliamentary government, the occasional and violent process of impeachment was superseded by continuous, inescapable, and pacific legislative supervision. The impeachment of cabinet ministers may be regarded, indeed, as obsolete.

*75. How a Ministry may Be Overthrown.*—A fundamental maxim of the constitution to-day is that a cabinet shall continue in office only so long as it enjoys the confidence and support of a majority in the House of Commons. There are at least four ways in which a parliamentary majority may manifest its dissatisfaction with a cabinet, and so compel its resignation. It may pass a simple vote (p. 071) of "want of confidence," assigning therefor no definite reason. It may pass a vote of censure, criticising the cabinet for some specific act. It may defeat a measure which the cabinet advocates and declares to be of vital importance. Or it may pass a bill in opposition to the advice of the ministers. The cabinet is not obliged to give heed to an adverse vote in the Lords; but when any of the four votes indicated is carried in the lower chamber the premier and his colleagues must do one of two things—resign or appeal to the country. If it is clear that the cabinet has lost the support, not only of Parliament, but also of the electorate, the only honorable course for the ministry is that of resignation. If, on the other hand, there is doubt as to whether the parliamentary majority really represents the country upon the matters at issue, the ministers are warranted in requesting the sovereign to dissolve Parliament and to order a general election. In such a situation the ministry continues tentatively in office. If at the elections there is returned a majority disposed to support the ministers, the cabinet is given a new lease of life. If, on the other hand, the new parliamentary majority is adverse, no course is open to the ministry save to retire. The new parliament will be convoked at the earliest practicable date; but in advance of its assembling the defeated cabinet will generally have resigned and a new government, presided over by the leader of the late Opposition, will have assumed the reins. During the interval required for the transfer of power none save routine business is likely to be undertaken.

*76. Secrecy of Proceedings.*—Perpetually responsible to the House of Commons and imperatively obligated to resign collectively when no longer able to command a working majority in that body, the cabinet must at all times employ every device by which it may be enabled to present a solid and imposing front. Two such devices are those of secrecy and the leadership of the premier. It is a sufficiently familiar principle that a group of men brought together to agree upon and execute a common policy in behalf of a widespread and diverse constituency will be more likely to succeed if the differences that must inevitably appear within their ranks are not published to the world. It is in deference to this principle that the German Bundesrath transacts its business to this day behind closed doors, and it was for an analogous reason that the public was excluded from the sittings of the convention by which the present constitution of the United States was framed. Notices of meetings of the English cabinet and the names of members present appear regularly in the press, but respecting the subjects discussed, the opinions expressed, and the conclusions arrived at not a word is given out, officially or unofficially. (p. 072) The oath of secrecy, required of all privy councillors, is binding in a special degree upon the cabinet officer. Not even the sovereign is favored with more than a statement of the topics considered, together with occasionally a formal draft of such decisions as require his assent. In the earlier part of the nineteenth century meager minutes of the proceedings were preserved, but nowadays no clerical employee is allowed to be present and no record whatsoever is kept.[97] For knowledge of past transactions members rely upon their own or their colleagues' memories, supplemented at times by privately kept notes. The meetings, which are held only as occasion requires (usually as often as once a week when Parliament is in session) are notably informal. There is not even a fixed place where meetings are held, the members being gathered sometimes at the Foreign Office, sometimes at the premier's house, and, as circumstance may arise, at almost any convenient place.

[Footnote 97: The same thing is true of the President's cabinet in the United States. The reasons for the policy are obvious and ample; but the preservation of cabinet records, whether in Great Britain or the United States, would, if such records were to be made accessible, facilitate enormously the task of the historian and of the student of practical government.]

*77. Leadership of the Premier.*—The unity of the cabinet is further safeguarded and emphasized by the leadership of the prime minister. Long after the rise of the cabinet to controlling influence in the state the members of the ministerial body continued supposedly upon a common footing in respect both to rank and authority. The habitual abstention of the early Hanoverians from attendance at cabinet meetings, however, left the group essentially leaderless, and by a natural process of development the members came gradually to recognize a virtual presidency on the part of one of their own number. In time what was a mere presidency was converted into a thoroughgoing leadership, in short, into the premier's office of to-day. It is commonly regarded that the first person who fulfilled the functions of prime minister in the modern sense was Sir Robert Walpole, First Lord of the Treasury from 1715 to 1717 and from 1721 to 1742. The phrase "prime minister" was not at that time in use, but that the realities of the office existed is indicated by a motion made in the Commons attacking Walpole on the ground that he had "grasped in his own hands every branch of government; had attained the sole direction of affairs; had monopolized all the powers of the crown; had compassed the disposal of all places, pensions, titles, and rewards"—almost precisely, as one writer puts it, what the present premier is doing and is expected to do.[98] By the time of the establishment of (p. 073) the ministry of the younger Pitt, in 1783, the ascendancy of the premier among his colleagues was an accomplished fact and was recognized as altogether legitimate. The enormous power of the premier, arising immediately upon the ruins of the royal prerogative, was brought virtually to completion when, during the later years of George III., the rule became fixed that in constituting a ministry the king should but ratify the choice of officials made by the premier.

[Footnote 98: Moran, The English Government, 99.]

Not until 1906 was the premier's office recognized by law,[99] but through more than a century no other public position in the nation has been comparable with it in volume of actual ruling power. Within the ministry, more particularly the cabinet, the premier is the guiding force. He presides, as a rule, at cabinet meetings; he advises with colleagues upon all matters of consequence to the administration's welfare; and, although he will shrink from doing it, he may require of his colleagues that they acquiesce in his views, with the alternative of his resignation.[100] He occupies one of the high offices of state, usually that of First Lord of the Treasury; and, although ordinarily his own portfolio will not require much of his time or energy, he must maintain as close a watch as may be over the affairs of every one of the departments in which his appointees have been placed. The prime minister, is, furthermore, the link between the cabinet and, on the one hand, the crown, and, on the other, Parliament. On behalf of the cabinet he advises with the sovereign, communicating information respecting ministerial acts and synopses of the daily debates in Parliament. In the house of which he is a member he represents (p. 074) the cabinet as a whole, makes such statements as are necessary relative to general aspects of the government's policy, and speaks, as a rule, upon every general or important projected piece of legislation. As a matter of both theory and historical fact, the premier who belongs to the House of Commons is more advantageously situated than one who sits in the Lords.[101]

[Footnote 99: In a statute fixing the order of precedence of public dignitaries. The premier's position, however, was defined by a royal warrant of December, 1905.]

[Footnote 100: The resignation of the premier terminates ipso facto the life of the ministry. An excellent illustration of the accustomed subordination of individual differences of opinion to the interests of cabinet solidarity is afforded by some remarks made by Mr. Asquith, December 4, 1911, to a deputation of the National League for Opposing Woman Suffrage. The deputation had called to protest against the Government's announced purpose to attach a suffrage amendment (if carried in the House of Commons) to a forthcoming measure of franchise reform. The Premier explained that he was, and always had been, of the opinion that "the grant of the parliamentary franchise to women in this country would be a political mistake of a very grievous kind." "So far," he continued, "we are in complete harmony with one another. On the other hand, I am, as you know, for the time being the head of the Government, in which a majority of my colleagues, a considerable majority of my colleagues—I may say that without violating the obligation of cabinet secrecy...—are of a different opinion; and the Government in those circumstances has announced a policy which is the result of their combined deliberations, and by which it is the duty of all their members, and myself not least, to abide loyally. That is the position, so far as I am personally concerned."]

[Footnote 101: Low, The Governance of England, Chap. 9; M. Sibert, Etude sur le premier ministre en Angleterre depuis ses origines jusqu'a l'epoque contemporaine (Paris, 1909).]

*78. The Cabinet's Central Position.*—In the English governmental system the cabinet is in every sense the keystone of the arch. Its functions are both executive and legislative, and indeed, to employ the figure of Bagehot, it comprises the hyphen that joins, the buckle that fastens, the executive and the legislative departments together.[102] As has been pointed out, the uses of the crown are by no means wholly ornamental. None the less, the actual executive of the nation is the cabinet. It is within the cabinet circle that administrative policies are decided upon, and it is by the cabinet ministers and their subordinates in the several departments that these policies, and the laws of the land generally, are carried into effect. On the other side, the cabinet members not only occupy seats in one or the other of the houses of Parliament; collectively they direct the processes of legislation. They—primarily the prime minister—prepare the Speech from the Throne, in which at the opening of a parliamentary session the state of the country is reviewed and a programme of legislation is outlined. They formulate, introduce, explain, and advocate needful legislative measures upon all manner of subjects; and although bills may be submitted in either house by private members it is a recognized principle that all measures of large importance shall emanate directly or indirectly from the cabinet. Statistics demonstrate that measures introduced by private members have but an infinitesimal chance of enactment.

[Footnote 102: The English Constitution (new ed.), 79.]

In effect, the cabinet comprises a parliamentary committee chosen, as Bagehot bluntly puts it, to rule the nation. If a cabinet group does not represent the ideas and purposes of Parliament as a whole, it at least represents those of the majority of the preponderating chamber; and that is ample to give it, during the space of its tenure of office, a thoroughgoing command of the situation. The basal fact of the political system is the control of party, and within the party the power that governs is the cabinet. "The machinery," says Lowell, "is one of wheels within wheels; the outside ring consisting of the (p. 075) party that has a majority in the House of Commons; the next ring being the ministry, which contains the men who are most active within that party; and the smallest of all being the cabinet, containing the real leaders or chiefs. By this means is secured that unity of party action which depends upon placing the directing power in the hands of a body small enough to agree, and influential enough to control."[103]

[Footnote 103: Government of England, I., 56. The best discussion of the organization, functions, and relationships of the cabinet is contained in Lowell, op. cit., I., Chaps. 2-3, 17-18, 22-23. Other good general accounts are Low, Governance of England, Chaps. 2-4, 8-9; Moran, English Government, Chaps. 4-9; Macy, English Constitution, Chap. 6; Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, II., Pt. 1, Chap. 2; and Maitland, Constitutional History of England, 387-430. A detailed and still valuable survey is in Todd, Parliamentary Government, Parts 3-4. A brilliant study is Bagehot, English Constitution, especially Chaps. 1, 6-9. The growth of the cabinet is well described in Blauvelt, The Development of Cabinet Government in England; and a monograph of value is P. le Vasseur, Le cabinet britannique sous la reine Victoria (Paris, 1902). For an extended bibliography see Select List of Books on the Cabinets of England and America (Washington, 1903), compiled in the Library of Congress under the direction of A. P. C. Griffin.]



CHAPTER IV (p. 076)

PARLIAMENT: THE HOUSE OF COMMONS

*79. Antiquity and Importance.*—The British Parliament is at once the oldest, the most comprehensive in jurisdiction, and the most powerful among modern legislative assemblages. In structure, and to some extent in function, it is a product, as has appeared, of the Middle Ages. The term "parliament," employed originally to denote a discussion or conference, was applied officially to the Great Council in 1275;[104] and by the opening of the fourteenth century the institution which the English know to-day by that name had come clearly into existence, being then, indeed, what technically it still is—the king and the three estates of the realm, i.e., the lords spiritual, the lords temporal, and the commons. During upwards of a hundred years the three estates sat and deliberated separately. By the close of the reign of Edward III. (1327-1377), however, the bicameral principle had become fixed, and throughout the whole of its subsequent history (save during the Cromwellian era of experimentation) Parliament has comprised uninterruptedly, aside from the king, the two branches which exist at the present time, the House of Lords and the House of Commons, or, strictly, the Lords of Parliament and the Representatives of the Commons.

[Footnote 104: In the First Statute of Westminster.]

The range of jurisdiction which, step by step, these chambers, both separately and conjointly, have acquired has been broadened until, so far as the dominions of the British crown extend, it covers all but the whole of the domain of human government. And within this enormous expanse of political control the competence of the chambers knows, in neither theory nor fact, any restriction. "The British Parliament, ..." writes Mr. Bryce, "can make and unmake any and every law, change the form of government or the succession to the crown, interfere with the course of justice, extinguish the most sacred private rights of the citizen. Between it and the people at large there is no legal distinction, because the whole plenitude of the people's rights and powers resides in it, just as if the whole nation were present within the chamber where it sits. In point of legal theory it is the nation, being the historical successor of the Folk Moot of our Teutonic forefathers. Both practically and legally, it is to-day the only (p. 077) and the sufficient depository of the authority of the nation; and it is therefore, within the sphere of law, irresponsible and omnipotent."[105] Whether the business in hand be constituent or legislative, whether ecclesiastical or temporal, the right of Parliament—or, more accurately "the King in Parliament"—to discuss and to dispose is indisputable.

[Footnote 105: The American Commonwealth (3d ed.), I., 35-36.]

I. THE HOUSE OF COMMONS PRIOR TO 1832

*80. Present Ascendancy.*—Legally, as has been explained, Parliament consists of the king, the lords spiritual, the lords temporal, and the commons. For practical purposes, however, it is the House of Commons alone. "When," as Spencer Walpole wrote a quarter of a century ago, "a minister consults Parliament he consults the House of Commons; when the Queen dissolves Parliament she dissolves the House of Commons. A new Parliament is simply a new House of Commons."[106] The gathering of the "representatives of the commons" at Westminster is, and has long been, without question the most important agency of government in the kingdom. The House of Commons consists at the present day of 670 members, of whom 465 sit for English constituencies, 30 for Welsh, 72 for Scottish, and 103 for Irish. Nine of the members are chosen, under somewhat special conditions, by the universities, but the remaining 661 are elected in county or borough constituencies under franchise arrangements, which, while based upon residence and property qualifications, fall not far short of manhood suffrage. The chamber is at the same time the preponderating repository of power in the national government and the prime organ of the popular will. It is in consequence of its prolonged and arduous development that Great Britain has attained democracy in national government; and the influence of English democracy as actualized in the House of Commons upon the political ideas and the governmental agencies of the outlying world, both English-speaking and non-English-speaking, is simply incalculable.

[Footnote 106: The Electorate and the Legislature (London, 1892), 48.]

*81. Undemocratic Character at the Opening of the Nineteenth Century.*—"The virtue, the spirit, the essence of the House of Commons," once declared Edmund Burke, "consists in its being the express image of the nation." In the eighteenth century, however, when this assertion was made, the House of Commons was, in point of fact, far from constituting such an "image." Until, indeed, the nineteenth century was well advanced the nominally popular parliamentary branch was in reality representative, not of the mass of the nation, but (p. 078) of the aristocratic and governing elements, at best of the well-to-do middle classes; and a correct appreciation of the composition and character of the chamber as it to-day exists requires some allusion to the process by which its democratization was accomplished. In 1832—the year of the first great Reform Act—the House of Commons consisted of 658 members, of whom 186 represented the forty counties and 472 sat for two hundred three boroughs. The apportionment of both county and borough members was haphazard and grossly inequitable. In the Unites States, and in many European countries, it is required by constitutional provision that following a decennial census there shall be a reapportionment of seats in the popular legislative chamber, the purpose being, of course, to preserve substantial equality among the electoral constituencies and, ultimately, an essential parity of political power among the voters. At no time, however, has there been in Great Britain either legislation or the semblance of a tradition in respect to this matter. Reapportionment has taken place only partially and at irregular intervals, and at but a few times in the history of the nation have constituencies represented at Westminster been even approximately equal. Save that, in 1707, forty-five members were added to represent Scotland and, in 1801, one hundred to sit for Ireland, the identity of the constituencies represented in the Commons continued all but unchanged from the reign of Charles II. to the reform of 1832.

*82. Need of a Redistribution of Seats.*—The population changes, in respect to both growth and distribution, falling within this extended period were, however, enormous. In 1689 the population of England and Wales was not in excess of 5,500,000. The census of 1831 revealed in these countries a population of 14,000,000. In the seventeenth and earlier eighteenth centuries the great mass of the English people lived in the south and east. Liverpool was but an insignificant town, Manchester a village, and Birmingham a sand-hill. But the industrial revolution had the effect of bringing coal, iron, and water-power into enormous demand, and after 1775 the industrial center, and likewise the population center, of the country was shifted rapidly toward the north. In the hitherto almost uninhabited valleys of Lancashire and Yorkshire sprang up a multitude of factory towns and cities. In Parliament these fast-growing populations were either glaringly under-represented or not represented at all. In 1831 the ten southernmost counties of England contained a population of 3,260,000 and returned to Parliament 235 members.[107] At the same time the six northernmost counties contained a population of 3,594,000, but (p. 079) returned only 68 members. Cornwall, with 300,000 inhabitants, had 42 representatives; Lancashire, with 1,330,000, had 14. Among towns, Birmingham and Manchester, each with upwards of 100,000 people, and Leeds and Sheffield, each with 50,000, had no representation whatever. On the other hand, boroughs were entitled to representation which contained ridiculously scant populations, or even no population at all. Gatto, in Surrey, was a park; Old Sarum, in Wiltshire, was a deserted hill; the remains of what once was Dunwich were under the waves of the North Sea. Bosseney, in Cornwall, was a hamlet of three cottages, eight of whose nine electors belonged to a single family. But Bosseney sent two members to the House of Commons.

[Footnote 107: That is to say, the quota of members mentioned was returned by the counties and by the boroughs contained geographically within them.]

*83. County and Borough Franchise in 1831.*—Not only was there, thus, the most glaring lack of adjustment of parliamentary representation to the distribution of population; where the right of representation existed, the franchise arrangements under which members were elected were hopelessly heterogeneous and illiberal. Originally, as has been pointed out,[108] the representatives of the counties were chosen in the county court by all persons who were entitled to attend and to take part in the proceedings of that body. In 1429, during the reign of Henry VI., an act was passed ostensibly to prevent riotous and disorderly elections, wherein it was stipulated that county electors should thereafter comprise only such male residents of the county as possessed free land or tenement which would rent for as much as forty shillings a year above all charges.[109] Leaseholders, copyholders, small freeholders, and all non-landholders were denied the suffrage altogether. Even in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the number of forty-shilling freeholders was small. With the concentration of land in fewer hands, incident to the agrarian revolution of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it bore an increasingly diminutive ratio to the aggregate county population, and by 1832 the county electors comprised, as a rule, only a handful of large landed proprietors. Within the boroughs the franchise arrangements existing at the date mentioned were complicated and diverse beyond the possibility of general characterization. Many of the boroughs had been accorded parliamentary representation by the most arbitrary and haphazard methods, and at no time prior to 1830 was there legislation which so much as attempted to regulate the conditions of voting within them. There were "scot and lot" boroughs, "potwalloper" boroughs, burgage boroughs, corporation or "close" boroughs, and "freemen" boroughs, to mention only the more important of the types that (p. 080) can be distinguished.[110] In some of these the franchise was, at least in theory, fairly democratic; but in most of them it was restricted by custom or local regulation to petty groups of property-holders or taxpayers, to members of the municipal corporations, or even to members of a favored guild. With few exceptions, the borough franchise was illogical, exclusive, and non-expansive.

[Footnote 108: See p. 23.]

[Footnote 109: Equivalent in present values to L30 or L40.]

[Footnote 110: See p. 23.]

*84. Political Corruption.*—A third fact respecting electoral conditions in the earlier nineteenth century is the astounding prevalence of illegitimate political influence and of sheer corruption. Borough members were very commonly not true representatives at all, but nominees of peers, of influential commoners, or of the government. It has been estimated that of the 472 borough members not more than 137 may be regarded as having been in any proper sense elected. The remainder sat for "rotten" boroughs, or for "pocket" boroughs whose populations were so meager or so docile that the borough might, as it were, be carried about in a magnate's pocket. In the whole of Cornwall there were only one thousand voters. Of the forty-two seats possessed by that section of the country twenty were controlled by seven peers, twenty-one were similarly controlled by eleven commoners, and but one was filled by free election. In 1780 it was asserted by the Duke of Richmond that a clear majority of the House of Commons was returned by six thousand persons. Bribery and other forms of corruption were so common that only the most shameless instances attracted public attention. Not merely votes, but seats, were bought and sold openly, and it was a matter of general understanding that L5,000 to L7,000 was the amount which a political aspirant might expect to be obliged to pay a borough-monger for bringing about his election. Seats were not infrequently advertised for sale in the public prints, and even for hire for a term of years.[111]

[Footnote 111: The monumental treatise on the House of Commons prior to 1832 is E. Porritt, The Unreformed House of Commons: Parliamentary Representation before 1832, 2 vols. (2d ed., Cambridge, 1909). On the prevalence of corruption see May and Holland, Constitutional History of England, I., 224-238, 254-262.]

II. PARLIAMENTARY REFORM, 1832-1885

*85. Demand for Reform Prior to 1832.*—Active demand for a reformation of the conditions that have been described antedated the nineteenth century. As early as 1690, indeed, John Locke denounced the absurdities of the prevailing electoral system,[112] although at the time they were inconsiderable in comparison with what they became by 1832; and during the second half of the eighteenth century a (p. 081) number of interesting reform proposals—notably that of the elder Pitt in 1766, that of Wilkes in 1776, and that of the younger Pitt in 1785—were widely though fruitlessly discussed. In 1780 a group of public-spirited men established a Society for Constitutional Information which during the ensuing decade carried on actively a propaganda in behalf of parliamentary regeneration, and at a meeting under the auspices of this organization and presided over by Charles James Fox a programme was drawn up insisting upon innovations no less sweeping than the establishment of manhood suffrage, the creation of equal electoral districts, the payment of members, the abolition of property qualifications for members, and adoption of the secret ballot.[113] The revolution in France and the prolonged contest with Napoleon stayed the reform movement, but after 1815 agitation was actively renewed. The economic and social ills of the nation in the decade following the restoration of peace were many, and the idea took hold widely that only through a reconstitution of Parliament could adequate measures of amelioration be attained. The disposition of the Tory governments of the period was to resist the popular demand, or, at the most, to concede changes which would not affect the aristocratic character of the parliamentary chambers. But the reformers refused to be diverted from their fundamental object, and in the end the forces of tradition, conservatism, and vested interest were obliged to give way.[114]

[Footnote 112: Treatises of Government, II., Chap. 13, Sec. 157.]

[Footnote 113: It is of interest to observe that every one of the demands enumerated found a place half a century later among the "six points" of the Chartists. See pp. 82-83. A bill embodying the proposed reforms was introduced by the Duke of Richmond in 1780, but met with small favor. A second society—The Friends of the People—was formed in 1792 to promote the cause.]

[Footnote 114: The reform movement prior to 1832 is admirably sketched in May and Holland, Constitutional History of England, I., 264-280. See also G. L. Dickinson, The Development of Parliament during the Nineteenth Century (London, 1895), Chap. 1; J. H. Rose, The Rise and Growth of Democracy in Great Britain (London, 1897), Chap. 1; C. B. R. Kent, The English Radicals (London, 1899), Chaps. 1-2; and W. P. Hall, British Radicalism, 1791-1797 (New York, 1912).]

*86. The Reform Act of 1832.*—The first notable triumph was the enactment of the Reform Bill of 1832. The changes wrought by this memorable piece of legislation were two-fold, the first relating to the distribution of seats in Parliament, the second to the extension of the franchise. The number of Scottish members was increased from 45 to 54; that of Irish, from 100 to 105; that of English and Welsh was reduced from 513 to 499. There was no general reapportionment of seats, no effort to bring the parliamentary constituencies into precise and uniform relation to the census returns. But the most glaringly inequitable of former conditions were remedied. Fifty-six (p. 082) boroughs, of populations under 2,000, were deprived entirely of representation,[115] thirty-one, of populations between 2,000 and 4,000, were reduced from two members to one, and one was reduced from four members to two. The 143 seats thus made available were redistributed, and the aggregate number (658) continued as before. Twenty-two large boroughs hitherto unrepresented were given two members each; twenty-one others were given one additional member each; and a total of sixty-five seats were allotted to twenty-seven of the English counties, the remaining thirteen being given to Scotland and Ireland. The redistribution had the effect of increasing markedly the political power of the northern and north-central portions of the country. The alterations introduced in the franchise were numerous and important. In the counties the forty-shilling freehold franchise, with some limitations, was retained; but the voting privilege was extended to all leaseholders and copyholders of land renting for as much as L10 a year, and to tenants-at-will holding an estate worth L50 a year. In the boroughs the right to vote was conferred upon all "occupiers" of houses worth L10 a year. The total number of persons enfranchised was approximately 455,000. By basing the franchise exclusively upon the ownership or occupancy of property of considerable value the reform fell short of admitting to political power the great mass of factory employees and of agricultural laborers, and for this reason it was roundly opposed by the more advanced liberal elements. If, however, the voting privilege had not been extended to the masses it had been brought appreciably nearer them; and—what was almost equally important—it had been made substantially uniform, for the first time, throughout the realm.[116]

[Footnote 115: Of the fifty-six all save one had returned two members.]

[Footnote 116: The more important parts of the text of the Reform Bill of 1832 are printed in Robertson, Statutes, Cases and Documents, 197-212.]

*87. The Chartist Movement.*—The act of 1832 possessed none of the elements of finality. Its authors were in general content, but with the lapse of time it was made increasingly manifest that the nation was not. Political power was still confined to the magnates of the kingdom, the townsfolk who were able to pay a L10 annual rental, and the well-to-do copyholders and leaseholders of rural districts. Whigs and Tories of influence alike insisted that further innovation could not be contemplated, but the radicals and the laboring masses insisted no less resolutely that the reformation which had been begun should be carried to its logical conclusion. The demands upon which emphasis was especially placed were gathered up in the "six points" of the People's Charter, promulgated in final form May 8, 1838. The six points were: (1) universal suffrage for males over twenty-one years of age, (p. 083) (2) equal electoral districts, (3) voting by secret ballot, (4) annual sessions of Parliament, (5) the abolition of property qualifications for members of the House of Commons, and (6) payment of members. The barest enumeration of these demands is sufficient to reveal the political backwardness of the England of three-quarters of a century ago. Not only was the suffrage still severely restricted and the basis of representation antiquated and unfair; voting was oral and public, and only men who were qualified by the possession of property were eligible for election.[117]

[Footnote 117: Rose, Rise and Growth of Democracy, Chaps. 6-8; Kent, The English Radicals, Chap. 3; and R. G. Gammage, History of the Chartist Movement, 1837-1854 (Newcastle-on-Tyne, 1894).]

*88. The Representation of the People Act of 1867.*—After a decade of spectacular propaganda Chartism collapsed, without having attained tangible results. None the less, the day was not long postponed when the forces of reform, sobered and led by practical statesmen, were enabled to realize one after another of their fundamental purposes. In 1858 the second Derby government acquiesced in the enactment of a measure by which all property qualifications hitherto required of English, Welsh, and Irish members were abolished,[118] and after 1860 projects for franchise extension were considered with increasing seriousness. In 1867 the third Derby government, whose guiding spirit was Disraeli, carried a bill providing for an electoral reform of a more thoroughgoing character than any persons save the most uncompromising of the radicals had ever asked or desired. This Representation of the People Act modified but slightly the distribution of parliamentary seats. The total number of seats remained unchanged, as did Ireland's quota of 105; Scotland's apportionment was increased from 54 to 60, while that of England and Wales was decreased from 499 to 493; and in the course of the re-allotment that was made eleven boroughs lost the right of representation and thirty-five others were reduced from two members to one. The fifty-two seats thus vacated were utilized to enfranchise twelve new borough and three university constituencies and to increase the representation of a number of the more populous towns and counties.

[Footnote 118: By law of 1710 it had been required that county members should possess landed property worth L600, and borough members worth L300, a year. These qualifications were very commonly evaded, but they were not abolished until 1858.]

The most important provisions of the Act were, however, those relating to the franchise. In England and Wales the county franchise was guaranteed to men whose freehold was of the value of forty shillings a year, to copyholders and leaseholders of the annual value of L5, and to householders whose rent amounted to not less than L12 a year. (p. 084) The twelve pound occupation franchise was new,[119] and the qualification for copyholders and leaseholders was reduced from L10 to L5; otherwise the county franchise was unchanged. The borough franchise was modified profoundly. Heretofore persons were qualified to vote as householders only in the event that their house was worth as much as L10 a year. Now the right was conferred upon every man who occupied, as owner or as tenant, for twelve months, a dwelling-house, or any portion thereof utilized as a separate dwelling, without regard to its value. Another newly established franchise admitted to the voting privilege all lodgers occupying for as much as a year rooms of the clear value, unfurnished, of L10 a year. The effect of these provisions was to enfranchise the urban working population, even as the act of 1832 had enfranchised principally the urban middle class. So broad, indeed, did the urban franchise at this point become that little room was left for its modification subsequently. As originally planned, Disraeli's measure would have enlarged the electorate by not more than 100,000; as amended and carried, it practically doubled the voting population, raising it from 1,370,793 immediately prior to 1867 to 2,526,423 in 1871.[120] By the act of 1832 the middle classes had been enfranchised; by that of 1867 political power was thrown in no small degree into the hands of the masses. Only two large groups of people remained now outside the pale of political influence, i.e., the agricultural laborers and the miners.

[Footnote 119: It may be regarded, however, as taking the place of the L50 rental franchise.]

[Footnote 120: It is to be observed that these figures are for the United Kingdom as a whole, embracing the results not merely of the act of 1867 applying to England and Wales but of the two acts of 1868 introducing similar, though not identical, changes in Scotland and Ireland.]

*89. The Representation of the People Act of 1884.*—That the qualifications for voting in one class of constituencies should be conspicuously more liberal than in another class was an anomaly, and in a period when anomalies were at last being eliminated from the English electoral system remedy could not be long delayed. February 5, 1884, the second Gladstone ministry redeemed a campaign pledge by introducing a bill extending to the counties the same electoral regulations that had been established in 1867 in the towns. The measure passed the Commons, but was rejected by the Lords by reason of the fact that it was not accompanied by a bill for the redistribution of seats. By an agreement between the two houses a threatened deadlock was averted, and the upshot was that before the end of the year the Lords accepted the Government's bill, on the understanding that its enactment was to be followed immediately by the introduction of a redistribution measure. The Representation of the People Act of (p. 085) 1884 is in form disjointed and difficult to understand, but the effect of it is easy to state. By it there was established a uniform household franchise and a uniform lodger franchise in all counties and boroughs of the United Kingdom. The occupation of any land or tenement of a clear annual value of L10 was made a qualification in boroughs and counties alike; and persons occupying a house by virtue of office or employment were to be deemed "occupiers" for the purpose of the act. The measure doubled the county electorate and increased the total electorate by some 2,000,000, or approximately forty per cent. Its most important effect was to enfranchise the workingman in the country, as the act of 1867 had enfranchised the workingman in the town.

*90. The Redistribution of Seats Act, 1885.*—In 1885, the two great parties co-operating, there was passed the Redistribution of Seats Act which had been promised. Now for the first time in English history attempt was made to apportion representation in the House of Commons in something like strict accordance with population densities. In the first place, the total number of members was increased from 658[121] to 670, and of the number 103 were allotted to Ireland, 72 to Scotland, and 495 to England and Wales. In the next place, the method by which former redistributions had been accomplished, i.e., transferring seats more or less arbitrarily from flagrantly over-represented boroughs to more populous boroughs and counties, was replaced by a method based upon the principle of equal electoral constituencies, each returning one member. In theory a constituency was made to comprise 50,000 people. Boroughs containing fewer than 15,000 inhabitants were disfranchised as boroughs, becoming for electorial purposes portions of the counties in which they were situated. Boroughs of between 15,000 and 50,000 inhabitants were allowed to retain, or if previously unrepresented were given, one member each. Those of between 50,000 and 165,000 were given two members, and those of more than 165,000 three, with one in addition for every additional 50,000 people. The same general principle was followed in the counties. Thus the city of Liverpool, which prior to 1885 sent three members to Parliament, fell into nine distinct constituencies, each returning one member, and the great northern county of Lancashire, which since 1867 had been divided into four portions each returning two members, was now split into twenty-three divisions with one member each. The boroughs which prior to 1885 elected two members, and at the redistribution retained that number, remained single constituencies for the election of those two members. Of these boroughs there are to-day twenty-three. They, together (p. 086) with the city of London and the three universities of Oxford, Cambridge, and Dublin, comprise the existing twenty-seven two-member constituencies. By partition of the counties, of the old boroughs having more than two members, and of the new boroughs with only two members, all save these twenty-seven constituencies have been erected into separate, single-member electoral divisions, each with its own name and identity.[122]

[Footnote 121: Strictly 652, since after 1867 four boroughs, returning six members, were disfranchised.]

[Footnote 122: On the reforms of the period 1832-1885 see Cambridge Modern History, X., Chap. 18, and XI., Chap. 12; Dickinson, Development of Parliament, Chap. 2; Rose, Rise and Growth of Democracy, Chaps. 2, 10-13; Marriott, English Political Institutions, Chap. 10. An excellent survey is May and Holland, Constitutional History of England, I., Chap. 6, and III., Chap. 1. Mention may be made of H. Cox, A History of the Reform Bills of 1866 and 1867 (London, 1868); J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (London, 1861); and T. Hare, The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal (3d ed., London, 1865). An excellent survey by a Swiss scholar is contained in C. Borgeaud, The Rise of Modern Democracy in Old and New England, trans. by B. Hill (London, 1894), and a useful volume is J. Murdock, A History of Constitutional Reform in Great Britain and Ireland (Glasgow, 1885). The various phases of the subject are covered, of course, in the general histories of the period, notably S. Walpole, History of England from the Conclusion of the Great War in 1815, 6 vols. (new ed., London, 1902); W. N. Molesworth, History of England from the year 1830-1874, 3 vols. (London, 1874); J. F. Bright, History of England, 5 vols. (London, 1875-1894); H. Paul, History of Modern England, 5 vols. (London, 1904-1906); and S. Low and L. C. Sanders, History of England during the Reign of Victoria (London, 1907). Three biographical works are of special service: S. Walpole, Life of Lord John Russell, 2 vols. (London, 1889); J. Morley, Life of William E. Gladstone, 3 vols. (London, 1903); and W. F. Monypenny, Life of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, vols. 1-2 (London and New York, 1910-1912).]

III. THE FRANCHISE AND THE ELECTORAL QUESTIONS OF TO-DAY

*91. The Franchise as It Is.*—By the measures of 1884 and 1885 the House of Commons was placed upon a broadly democratic basis. Both measures stand to-day upon the statute-books, and neither has been amended in any important particular. With respect to the existing franchises there are two preponderating facts. One of them is that individuals, as such, do not possess the privilege of voting; on the contrary, the possession of the privilege is determined all but invariably in relation to the ownership or occupation of property. The other is that the franchise system, while substantially uniform throughout the kingdom, is none the less the most complicated in Europe. There are three important franchises which are universal and two which are not. In the first group are included: (1) occupancy, as owner or tenant, of land or tenement of a clear yearly value of L10; (2) occupancy, as owner or tenant, of a dwelling-house, or part of a house used as a separate dwelling, without regard to its value; (p. 087) and (3) occupancy of lodgings of the value, unfurnished, of L10 a year. The two franchises which are not universal are (1) ownership of land of forty shillings yearly value or occupation of land under certain other specified conditions—this being applicable only to counties and, to a small extent, to boroughs which are counties in themselves; and (2) residence of freemen in those towns in which they had a right to vote prior to 1832. The conditions and exceptions by which these various franchises are attended are so numerous that few people in England save lawyers make a pretense of knowing them all, and the volume of litigation which arises from the attempted distinction between "householder" and "lodger," and from other technicalities of the subject, is enormous. Voters must be twenty-one years of age, and there are several complicated requirements in respect to the period of occupation of land and of residence, and likewise in respect to the fulfillment of the formalities of registration.[123] There are also various incidental disqualifications. No peer, other than a peer of Ireland who is in possession of a seat in the House of Commons, may vote; persons employed as election agents, canvassers, clerks, or messengers may not vote, nor may the returning officers of the constituencies, save when necessary to break a tie between two candidates; and aliens, felons, and, under stipulated conditions, persons in receipt of public charity, are similarly debarred. In the aggregate, however, the existing franchises approach measurably near manhood suffrage. It has been computed that the ratio of electors to population is approximately one in six, whereas, the normal proportion of males above the age of twenty-one, making no allowance for paupers, criminals, and other persons commonly disqualified by law, is somewhat less than one in four. The only classes of adult males at present excluded regularly from the voting privilege are domestic servants, bachelors living with their parents and occupying no premises on their own account, and persons whose change of abode periodically deprives them of a vote.

[Footnote 123: On the process of registration see Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, I., 134-137, and M. Caudel, L'enregistrement des electeurs en Angleterre, in Annales des Sciences Politiques, Sept., 1906.]

"The present condition of the franchise," asserts Lowell, "is, indeed, historical rather than rational. It is complicated, uncertain, expensive in the machinery required, and excludes a certain number of people whom there is no reason for excluding, while it admits many people who ought not to be admitted if any one is to be debarred."[124] During the past generation there has been demand from a variety (p. 088) of quarters that the conditions of the franchise, and, indeed, the electoral system as a whole, be overhauled, co-ordinated, and liberalized; and at the date of writing (1912) there is pending in Parliament a measure of fundamental importance looking in this direction. The electoral changes which have been most widely advocated, at least in recent years, are four in number: (1) a fresh apportionment of seats in the Commons in accordance with the distribution of population; (2) the extension of the franchise to classes of men at present debarred; (3) the abolition of the plural vote; and (4) the enfranchisement of women.

[Footnote 124: Government of England, I., 213. On the franchise system see Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, I., Chap. 4 and Lowell, op. cit., I., Chap. 9.]

*92. The Question of Redistribution of Seats.*—As has been pointed out, the Redistribution of Seats Act of 1885 established constituencies in which there was some approach to equality. The principle was far from completely carried out. For example, the newly created borough of Chelsea contained upwards of 90,000 people, while the old borough of Windsor had fewer than 20,000. But the inequalities left untouched by the act were slight in comparison with those which have arisen during a quarter of a century in which there has been no reapportionment whatsoever. In 1901 the least populous constituency of the United Kingdom, the borough of Newry in Ireland, contained but 13,137 people, while the southern division of the county of Essex contained 217,030; yet each was represented by a single member. This means, of course, a gross disparity in the weight of popular votes, and, in effect, the over-representation of certain sets of opinions and interests. In January, 1902, an amendment to a parliamentary address urging the desirability of redistribution was warmly debated in the Commons, and, on the eve of its fall, in the summer of 1905, the Balfour government submitted a Redistribution Resolution designed to meet the demands of the "one vote, one value" propagandists. At this time it was pointed out that whereas immediately after the reform of 1885 the greatest ratio of disparity among the constituencies was 5.8 to 1, in twenty years it had risen to 16.5 to 1. The plan proposed provided for the fixing of the average population to be represented by a member at from 50,000 to 65,000, the giving of eighteen additional seats to England and Wales and of four to Scotland, the reduction of Ireland's quota by twenty-two, and such further readjustments as would bring down the ratio of greatest disparity to 6.8 to 1. Under a ruling of the Speaker to the effect that the resolution required to be divided into eight or nine parts, to be debated separately, the proposal was withdrawn. It was announced that a bill upon the subject would be brought in, but the early retirement of the ministry rendered this impossible, (p. 089) and throughout succeeding years this aspect of electoral reform yielded precedence to other matters.[125]

[Footnote 125: Annual Register (1905), 193.]

A special difficulty inherent in the subject is imposed by the peculiar situation of Ireland. By reason of the decline of Ireland's population during the past half century that portion of the United Kingdom has come to be markedly over-represented at Westminster. The average Irish commoner sits for but 44,147 people, while the average English member represents 66,971. If a new distribution were to be made in strict proportion to members Ireland would lose 30 seats and Wales three, while Scotland would gain one and England about 30. It is contended by the Irish people, however, that the Act of Union of 1800, whereby Ireland was guaranteed as many as one hundred parliamentary seats, is in the nature of a treaty, whose stipulations cannot be violated save by the consent of both contracting parties; and so long as the Irish are not allowed a separate parliament they may be depended upon to resist, as they did resist in 1905, any proposal contemplating the reduction of their voting strength in the parliament of the United Kingdom.