But, Gentlemen, is this view something new and entirely unheard-of in the realm of science? Let us see what Fichte himself, in his Addresses to the German People, has to say to the cultured classes, to whom he addresses these words: "It is particularly to the cultured classes of Germany that I wish to direct my remarks in the present address, for it is to these classes I hope in the first place to make myself intelligible. And I implore these classes, then, as the first step to be taken, to take the initiative in the work of reconstruction, and so, on the one hand, atone for their past deeds, and, on the other hand, earn the right to continued life in the future.



It will appear in the course of this address that hitherto all the advance in the German nation has originated with the common people, and that hitherto all the great national interests have, in the first instance, been the affair of the people, have been taken in hand and pushed forward by the body of the people; so that today for the first time does it happen that the initiative in the cultural advance of the nation is committed to the hands of the cultured classes, and if they will but accept the commission it will be the first time when such has been the case. It will presently appear that it is quite impossible for these classes to determine how long the matter will yet rest in their discretion, how long the choice will yet be open to them whether to take the initiative in this matter or not, for the whole matter is nearly ripe to be taken in hand by the people, and it will be carried out by men sprung from the body of the people, who will presently be able to help themselves without assistance from us."

Fichte, then, knew and proclaimed this fact, that the realization of all the great national interests in the past has been the work of the common people and has never been carried out at the hands of the cultured classes. That, in spite of this knowledge, he turned to the cultured classes is due, as he himself says, to the hope he had of first and most readily making himself understood by them. It is because, in his apprehension, for the presentment of the matter to the people, the whole was, so he says, "only approaching readiness and maturity," but not yet ready and mature.

That it is possible today to do what in Fichte's time was recognized as the only fruitful thing to do, but, at the same time, as not then ready to be done, and therefore too serious to be undertaken,—this expresses the whole short step in advance that has been accomplished in Germany during the past fifty years; for you will seek in vain for the slightest progress on the part of the German government.

Fichte himself, in the passage cited, says that this advance is coming in the near future. This "near future" proves to have been fifty years removed, and I trust, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court, that you will all consider a fifty-years' interval long enough to satisfy the requirements of the "near future."

But the men who, undeterred by all the difficulties of the task, put all their energies into this stupendous undertaking of carrying scientific knowledge and scientific habits of thought among the body of the people,—are they fairly open to the accusation of having sought to incite the indigent classes to hatred of the well-to-do? Do they not thereby really deserve the thanks and the affection of the propertied classes, and of the bourgeoisie above all?

Whence arises the bourgeoisie's dread of the people in political matters?

Look back, in memory, to the months of March, April, and May, 1848. Have you forgotten how things looked here at that time? The power of the police was broken; the people filled all the streets and public places. And all streets, all public places and all the people in the hands of Karbe, Lindenmueller, and other reckless agitators like them,—men without knowledge, without intelligence, without culture, thrown into prominence by the storm which stirred our political life to its depths. The bourgeoisie, scared and faint hearted, hiding in their cellars, trembling every instant for fear of their property and their lives, which lay in the hands of these coarse agitators, and saved only by the fact that these agitators were too good-natured to make such use of their power as the bourgeoisie feared they would. The bourgeoisie, secretly praying for the reestablishment of the police power and quaking with a fright which they have not yet forgotten, the recollection of which still leaves them incapable of taking up the political struggle.

How came it that in a city which proudly calls itself the metropolis of intelligence, in so great a city, in the home of the most brilliant intellects,—how came it that the people here for months together could be at the disposal of Karbe and Lindenmueller and could tremble before them in fear for their life and property. Where was the intelligence of Berlin? Where were the men of science and of insight? Where were you, Gentlemen?

A whole city is never cowardly.

But these men reflected and told one another: The people do not understand our ways of thinking; they do not even understand our speech. There is a great gulf between our scientific views and the ways of the multitude, between the speech of scientific discussion and the habits of thought of the people. They would not understand us. Therefore the floor belongs to the coarsest.

So they reflected and held their peace. Now, Gentlemen, are you quite sure that a political upheaval will never recur? Are you ready to swear that you have reached the end of historical development? Or are you willing to see your lives and property again at the mercy of a Karbe and a Lindenmueller?

If not, then your thanks are due to the men who have devoted themselves to the work of filling up that gulf which separates scientific thought and scientific speech from the people, and so to raze the barriers that divide the bourgeoisie and the people. Your thanks are due these men, who, at the expense of their utmost intellectual efforts, have undertaken a work whose results will redound to the profit of each and all of you. These men you should entertain at the prytaneum, not put under indictment.

The place in which this address was held, therefore, can also not afford ground for exception as to its scientific character.

I have now shown you conclusively that the production is a scientific work.

But if, contrary to all expectation, this should still be questioned, although I do not for a moment consider it possible that it should be questioned by men as enlightened as you are, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court; now, in such a case, I seek refuge in the privilege which is accorded every cobbler and which you can all the less deny me, viz., to submit a question of workmanship in my trade to the award of men expert in the trade.

In the last resort, the question as to the scientific character of a given work is a question for the men of the trade, and therefore a question which may not be decided on a basis of common education and common culture alone, and therefore also not by a court of law. The question at issue does not concern jurisprudence, with which you are necessarily familiar, but it concerns other sciences with which you may well be unfamiliar, although, as a matter of chance, you may, in your private capacity, not your capacity as jurists, also be acquainted with these matters.

It is true, you may answer this question in the affirmative, your competence extends that far. For in very many cases is the scientific character of a given work manifest, even to the commonly instructed intelligence.

But to pass a negative opinion in the face of the expert testimony to which I provisionally appeal as a subsidiary recourse;[55] to that your competence does not extend, for the nicer question, whether in a given case the most profound researches of science may not, with a view to their readier apprehension, be presented in a facile and popular form, whether this fact of a facile presentation may not itself mark a peculiarly high achievement of scientific endeavor, in which all traces of the struggle, all difficulties and all the refractoriness of the materials handled have been successfully eliminated and the whole has in the outcome been reduced to the simplest and clearest terms; where the result presented is a scientific work of art, which, in the words of Schiller, has risen above the limitations of human infirmity and moves with such ease and freedom as to give the impression that it offers but the free play of the auditor's own unfolding thought; to decide with confidence whether you have to deal with a scientific work of this class, and to decide it with that certainty and security that is required in order to pass a sentence, that is something of which none but men trained in the science are capable.

This question, therefore, I beg that the following gentlemen: Privy Councillor August Boeckh, Efficient Privy Councillor Johannes Schultze, formerly Director of the Ministry of Public Worship, Professor Adolf Trendelenburg, Privy Councillor and Chief Librarian Dr. Pertz, Professor Leopold Ranke, Professor Theodor Mommsen, Privy Councillor Professor Hanssen, all members of the Royal Academy of Science, and as specialists capable of judging in the matter, be constituted a subsidiary tribunal to pass on the question, whether the address in question is not in the strict sense a scientific production.

But, if such is found to be the case, then, as I have already explained, it has nothing to do with the penal code.

I have permitted myself to go exhaustively into an exposition of this, my first ground of defense, because, for the sake of the country itself and the dignity and liberty of science, and for the sake of establishing once for all a precedent which shall bar out all similar endeavors of the public prosecutor in the future, it is incumbent on me to adjure you to acquit me under Article 20 of the Constitution.

But it is not that recourse to this article is necessary to protect my person from the penalty of the law.

For, even were it held that the present case comes within the competence of the penal code, the law appealed to has in no wise been violated, and the paragraph cited by the public prosecutor has no application.

Even this one exception, alone would suffice to set the indictment aside; viz., that no objection is taken to any given passage in which the specified offense is alleged to occur; so that the prosecution proceeds wholely on an allegation of bias, and in the baldest manner. The indictment runs against a bias; that is all. But a bias is not actionable.

But I am not to be permitted to dispose of my defense in so easy a manner. The accusation of having endeavored to incite the poor to hatred of the rich is an accusation of such a kind that, apart from all question of punishment, it is likely to injure any citizen's name and fame. This accusation is of such character that, even if it is formally disproven on legal ground, it may still leave the accused an object of suspicion. You will, accordingly, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court, take it simply as evidence of the respect I bear you when I now go on to clear my honor in your sight, with the same solicitude as that with which I have defended my freedom. To this end it is necessary for me to present the grounds of fact, as painstakingly as I have presented the grounds of law, on which this accusation is to be quashed, and you will, therefore, I am sure, hear me with the same forbearance if this second part of my defense turns out to be but little briefer than the first.

I am accused of having violated Section 100 of the penal code. This section reads as follows: "Any person who endangers or jeopardizes the public peace by publicly inciting the subjects of the State to hatred or to contempt of one another, is liable to punishment by a fine of not less than 20 and not more than 200 thalers, or by imprisonment of not less than one month and not more than two years."

This section of the law specifies three different conditions, which must be found to concur if it is to be applicable.

I. There must be incitement to hatred or to contempt;

II. This incitement must be directed to the detriment of given classes of the subjects of the State, and I am accordingly accused by the public prosecutor of having incited the class of the unpropertied against the class of the propertied;

III. This incitement must be of such a nature as to endanger the public peace.

These three conditions must concur, must combine, if the section of the law is to apply,—and not one of these conditions occurs.

As to I. There must be incitement to hatred and contempt; there can in the case before you be no question of this point, and for several reasons.

1. The offense specified in Section 100 cannot be committed except there be an intention to incite to hatred and contempt. A contingent incitement to hatred and contempt, an incitement by inadvertence, is in this case not conceivable. If such a contingent incitement, an unintended incitement to hatred and contempt, were conceivable, what would not the consequences be? We have, all of us, for instance, recently read certain speeches delivered in the upper house, which have, we will say, filled me,—and not me alone, Gentlemen, but along with me a very large part of the nation—with hatred and contempt to the point of distraction. Does it follow that the public prosecutor could take action against the speakers in question? He is not competent to do so, even aside from the political prerogative of the speakers, for, although such has been the effect of these speeches, the purpose of these gentlemen was assuredly not to stir up hatred and contempt. But it is equally true that no one can deny that the purpose of my address was to impart knowledge. The most that the public prosecutor can allege is that it was a matter of indifference to me if the knowledge imparted stirred up hatred and contempt,—an allegation without significance, since there is no such thing as an incitement to hatred and contempt by inadvertence.

But, in point of fact, a deliberate incitement of this kind is in the present case absolutely excluded for another reason, which at the same time establishes that the address in question could not even have had the effect of stirring up hatred and contempt. I, therefore, in order to prevent repetition, beg to present this reason in connection with the second, viz.: that my address could not have the effect of causing hatred and contempt.

I have, therefore, to say, as the second count under this head, that this address cannot possibly have had the effect of stirring up hatred and contempt, and a fortiori cannot have had that intention.

On what grounds alone can hatred and contempt be deserved?

On the ground of viciousness, which in turn is an attribute of voluntary human actions alone. But in this address of mine, I show that the dominance of this principle of the bourgeoisie, against which I am by the public prosecutor accused of inciting to hatred and contempt, is but a stage of economic and ethical development, which is the outcome of historical necessity, and that its nonexistence is an utter impossibility and that it therefore has all the character of natural necessity that belongs to the developmental progress of the earth.

Do we hate Nature because we have to struggle with her? Because we have to strive to guide her processes and improve her products?

But there is the further question: How has the public prosecutor understood my pamphlet?

The fundamental idea of my address is that the dominance of the bourgeoisie has in no wise been produced, consciously and by their own motion, intentionally and in a responsible manner, by the propertied class as persons or individuals. On the contrary, the bourgeois are but the unconscious, choiceless, and therefore irresponsible products, not the producers of the situation as it stands and as it has developed under the guidance of quite other laws than the direction of personal choice. Even their reluctance to surrender this their mastery I refer back to the laws of human nature, whose character it is to hold fast to whatever is and to account it necessary. But a doctrine which goes the length of denying the propertied class all responsibility for the existing state of things, which makes them a product instead of the producers of this state of things—this doctrine the public prosecutor construes to have incited to hatred and contempt of these persons.

For, be it noted, we have here to do with persons and classes of persons, under section 100, not with institutions established by the State, as under section 101.

No workingman has got so faulty an understanding of my address as the public prosecutor, and I leave it to him to say whether this is due to his lack of understanding or to his lack of will to understand.

But, more than all this, I go on to show that the dominance of the idea of the bourgeoisie is a great historic move in the liberation of humanity; that it was a most potent moral cultural advance; that in fact it was the historically indispensable prerequisite and transitional stage through development out of which the idea of the working class was to emerge.

I therefore must be said to reconcile the working class to the dominance of the bourgeoisie as an historical fact by showing the logical necessity of this dominance. I reconcile them to it, for a comprehension of the rationality of what restricts us is the fullest possible reconciliation to it.

And if I proceed, further, to show that the idea of the bourgeoisie is not the highest stage of the historical development, not the perfect flower of advancing improvement, but that beyond it lies yet a higher manifestation of the human spirit, and that this ulterior phase rests on the former as its base—does this mean that I incite to hatred and contempt of the former?

The working class might as well hate and despise themselves and all human nature, whether in their own or in their neighbors' persons, because it is the law of human nature to unfold step by step and to proceed to each succeeding stage of development from the indispensable vantage ground of the phase preceding.

If I had any predilection for homiletical discourse, Gentlemen, I should be quite justified in saying that I have exhorted the working classes to a filial piety toward the bourgeoisie, in that I have shown that the dominance of the bourgeoisie was the indispensable prerequisite and condition by transition out of which alone the idea of the working class could come forth. For even if the son, by grace of a freer and fuller education and a larger endowment of personal force, strives to place himself above the level on which his father stood, still he never forgets the source of his own blood and the author of his own being. How deep in the mud is it the intention to thrust the noblest of all the sciences in bringing this charge of criminal instigation against the doctrine that history is an unfolding evolution of reason and human liberty?

It was for long incomprehensible to me how the public prosecutor could use such words as instigation to hatred and contempt in this connection. In the end I have been able to explain this fact to myself only on this one supposition. The public prosecutor must have endeavored in reading this address, to put himself in the place of a working man and has then come to feel that he would in such a case be moved to hatred.

The public prosecutor, then, is sensible that he would hate.

Now, Gentlemen, I might say that this would be attributable to the peculiarity of his temperament, and that he had no call to generalize and go beyond that. But I will lend a hand to the public prosecutor in this perplexity. I will bring the charge against myself in a more telling form than he has been able to do. I will formulate it as the facts of the case require that it must be formulated if it is to be preferred at all. And in so doing, the more pointedly I may be able to bring to light the essential nature of the charge, the more utterly shall I annihilate it.

This is what the public prosecutor should have said:

It is true this address held by Lassalle appeals to the intellect of the auditors, not to their practical impulses or their emotions. It is accordingly true also that this address does not come within the sphere of competence of the penal code.

But in a person endowed with the normal complement of human sensibility, cognition, will and emotion are not so many insulated pigeonholes which stand in no relation to one another. Whenever the one compartment is full it flows over into the next. Will and emotion are servants of the intellect and are controlled by it.

Lassalle, it is true, has not a word to say of hatred and contempt; he is simply occupied with a theoretical exposition of how certain arrangements, for instance, the three-class suffrage, is pernicious. I am unable to confute this teaching. But I have this to say with respect to the organic unity of human nature, that if the doctrine is true then it follows that every normally constituted working man must come to hate and distrust not only these arrangements and institutions but also those who profit by them.

Such is the logical framework on which this indictment must proceed. This is the line of argument which avowedly or not, by logical necessity comes to expression in this indictment.

It is not I, but the public prosecutor speaking from the eminence of his curule chair, who proclaims to the working classes the awful doctrine: You must hate and distrust.

It is not for me, it is for the public prosecutor to square himself with the bourgeoisie.

But what is my answer to the public prosecutor and his indictment which charges me with his own offense?

My answer is a four-fold one:

In the first place a full recognition of the inadequacy or the viciousness of a given institution must arouse in any person of normal sensibility an enduring purpose to change such an institution, if possible, and the arousing of such an undying purpose in my hearers has necessarily been the aim of my scientific investigation, as it necessarily is the end of all scientific work. But such a purpose, so long as it does not utter itself in an illegal manner, is absolutely unconstrained by law. The like is true of all effort to arouse such a purpose, so long as it does not resort to illegal means. But such a purpose to amend the shortcomings of any established arrangement, is by no means the same thing as hatred and contempt of the arrangement in question; since these shortcomings are a matter of historical growth, of historical necessity; since, indeed, they may even be, in effect, a factor in the work of liberation, and a factor of the gravest consequence and of the most beneficial effect for cultural growth. Further reasons to the like effect have already been recited and I will not take up your time with their repetition and further development. Here, then, is the first hiatus in the public prosecutor's argument.

In the second place, if it actually follows in any given case that hatred and contempt is, for a normally constituted human being, the necessary consequence of a scientific knowledge of the facts, such hatred and contempt could by no means be laid under penalties by the legislator.

Whatever institution is so vicious that knowledge of it necessarily excites hatred and contempt, that institution should be hated and despised.

The legislator lays penalties upon such hatred and contempt as are but the effects produced by blind emotions and passions. But he has not imposed penalties upon human reason and the moral constitution of man. He consequently does not impose penalties upon hatred and contempt which are the necessary outcome of these two features of human nature. The public prosecutor construes section 100 to the effect that the legislator has therein intended to prohibit the use of reason and proscribe the moral nature of man. But such a purpose has not entered the thoughts of the law-giver. No court will put such a construction upon the law as to make the legislator the avowed enemy of intelligence and science,—and here come into bearing again all the arguments of my defense directed to Article 20 of the Constitution. The only meaning of these arguments in this connection is that even if science and its teaching were not by Article 20 of the Constitution exempt from the application of the criminal code, still section 100, except it be construed to intend the utter destruction of human nature, cannot be leveled against such hatred and contempt as is the necessary outcome of scientific knowledge.

In the third place, hatred and contempt of a given institutional arrangement or expedient is by no means the same thing as hatred and contempt of those persons who profit by the arrangement in question; whereas section 100 deals only with hatred of persons,—so that we have here the third break in the public prosecutor's argument, and it is a veritable saltomortale.

In the fourth place I have to present an argument of fact. The prosecutor's argument presents the most remarkable quid pro quo[56] that has ever come to light in a legal discussion. The point which I here touch upon constitutes the transition to the second part of my argument, showing that all proof touching the second condition to be fulfilled by the indictment is wanting; viz.: that even if there were ground for speaking of hatred and contempt in this connection, it is still quite plain that there has been no instigation to hatred or contempt of those against whom I am charged with having incited to hatred and contempt.

As to this second part of the indictment: I am accused of instigating the unpropertied classes to hatred and contempt of the propertied classes.

"By this presentation," says the indictment, "working men will plainly be incited to hatred and contempt of the bourgeoisie, that is to say, the unpropertied classes will be inflamed against the propertied classes." And after having in this way, quietly and by subreption, introduced this its definition of the term "bourgeoisie," the indictment goes on to formulate its final charge as follows:

"It is accordingly charged that the above named citizen, F.L., (1), by his lecture etc., and (2) by publishing the pamphlet containing this same lecture, has publicly instigated the unpropertied classes of the State's subjects to hatred and contempt of the propertied classes."

It is true, in my address I speak of the "bourgeoisie." But what is my definition of this term? It will be sufficient to cite a single passage which contains the definition of "bourgeoisie" as used by me in this pamphlet. This will show what an incomprehensible, unheard-of, uncharacterisable quid pro quo the public prosecutor has attempted to impute to me in charging me with instigating the unpropertied classes to hatred and contempt of the propertied classes.

On page 20 of this pamphlet is the following passage, quoted literally:

"I have now reached the point, Gentlemen, where it becomes necessary that, in order to avoid a possible gross misapprehension of what I have to say, I explain what I mean by the term 'bourgeoisie' or 'great bourgeoisie,' as the designation of a political party—that I define what the word 'bourgeoisie' means in my use of it.

"The word 'bourgeoisie' might be translated into German by the term Buergertum (citizenship, or the body of citizens). But that is not the meaning actually attached to the word. We are all citizens—workingmen, petty burghers, commercial aristocracy and all the rest alike. On the other hand the word 'bourgeoisie' has, in the course of historical development, come to designate a particular political bias and movement which I will now go on to characterize.

"At the time of the French Revolution, and, indeed, even yet, that entire body of subjects which is not of noble birth, was roughly divided into two sub-classes: First the class comprising those persons who, wholly or chiefly, get their income from their own labor and are without capital, or are, at the most, possessed of but a moderate capital which affords them the means of carrying on some employment from which they and their families derive their subsistence. This class comprises the workingmen, the lower middle classes (Kleinbuerger), the citizen class and also the body of the peasants. The second class is made up of those persons who have the disposal of a large property, of a large capital, and who are producers or receivers of income on the basis of their possession of capital. These latter might be called the great burghers or commoners, or the capitalist gentry. But such a great burgher or capitalist gentleman, is not by reason of that fact a bourgeois. No commoner has any objection to raise because a nobleman in the bosom of his family finds comfort in his pedigree and in his lands. But when, on the other hand, this nobleman insists on making such pedigree or such landed property the basis of a peculiar importance and prerogative in the State, when he insists on making them a ground for controlling public policy, then the commoner takes offense at the nobleman and calls him a feudalist.

"The case is entirely similar as regards the distinctions in respect of property within the body of commoners.

"That the capitalist gentleman in his chamber takes pleasure in the high degree of comfort and the great advantage which large wealth confers upon its possessor,—nothing can be more natural, simpler or more legitimate than that he should do so."

Incidentally, then, Gentlemen, so far am I in this pamphlet from instigating the unpropertied classes to hatred and contempt of the wealthy, that, on the contrary, I expressly declare myself for the legitimacy of such property. I explicitly declare that the satisfaction taken in the advantages and amenities which flow from such wealth are the most natural and legitimate things in the world.

Let me now go on with the definition referred to:

"The workingmen and the lower middle class, that is to say the class without capital, may be wholly justified in demanding that those by whose hands all that wealth which is the pride of our civilization is produced, whose hands have brought forth all these products without which society could not live for a single day—it may well be demanded that these should be secured an ample and unfailing income, and thereby be given an opportunity for some intellectual development, and that they be by this means put in the way of a truly human manner of life. But, while I am free to say that the working classes are fairly within their rights in making these demands of the State, and to stand out stiffly for their demands as being the essential purpose for which the State exists, yet the workingman must never allow himself to forget that all property that has once been acquired and is legally held must be considered lawful and inviolable."

Such, then, is the manner and degree of my instigation of the unpropertied class to hatred and distrust that I incontinently preach to them the inviolability and sacredness of all property acquired by the wealthy classes, and exhort them to respect it.

But I go on to say:

"In case the man of means is not content with the material amenities of large wealth, but insists that possession of wealth, of capital, be made the basis of a control to be exercised over the State, a condition of participation in the direction of public policy and of the direction of public affairs, then and only then does the man of means become a bourgeois; then does he make the fact of property a legal ground of political power; then does he stand forth as representative of a privileged class aiming to put the imprint of its prerogative upon all social features and institutions, just as truly as the nobility of the Middle Ages did with respect to the basis of their privilege, landed property."

Accordingly, in my use of the term, as I have explicitly and painstakingly defined it, the man of means, the man of the upper-middle class, is a bourgeois in case he proceeds to set up the essentially harmless and inoffensive fact of his large property as a legal condition of participation in the direction of public affairs; in short, when he proceeds to set up the ownership of capital as a legal and political prerogative, and so abolishes the equality of the propertied and the unpropertied classes before the law, and thereby infringes upon the liberty and further growth of the people, in the interest of accumulated wealth and continued upper-class mastery. Only under these circumstances, as I particularly point out, does the bourgeoisie become a privileged class, which it otherwise, in spite of all inequality of wealth, is not.

In my pamphlet I point out how all this has its effect through the census rating whereby admission to a share in the direction of public policy, through eligibility to any legislative body, is so limited by property qualifications as to make the possession of capital a prerequisite. I point out further that this effect follows equally whether the property qualification is open and above-board or under-hand, and finally that the existing three-class system of elections, dating back to 1849, amounts to such an under-hand, disguised property rating.

The point at which the pamphlet strikes, therefore, albeit in a purely theoretical way, is the three-class system of elections. It makes no attack upon the propertied classes, whose accumulated wealth, on the contrary, I am repeatedly at pains to define as wholly incontestable, inoffensive, inviolable and perfectly lawful.

This three-class system of elections is one of our political institutions.

Now, this being the case, why has not the public prosecutor indicted me under section 101 of the criminal code, "for having exposed the measures of the State to hatred and to contempt?" To be sure, if the prosecutor had chosen to make this charge, I should have known how to answer him. To go into this matter today would be superfluous, for I am not accused of this offense, and my defense would be drawn out endlessly if I were to defend myself against charges that have never been brought against me.

But why, among all impossible charges, does the public prosecutor choose to bring precisely the most impossible? Why does he make this substitution as to the point of my attack? I point out that the three-class system of elections is an injustice because it makes an essentially innocent difference in wealth a legal qualification for participation in the direction of public affairs; whereupon this envenomed accusation is brought against me that I have instigated the unpropertied classes to hatred and contempt of the propertied.

Is there, then, no remedy, Gentlemen, against such a public defamation of one's name and fame?

Can we say that among us the introduction, of the three-class system of elections is to be laid at the door of the propertied classes or the commonalty? Something of that kind might be said of the French bourgeoisie. In France the property qualification and rating was introduced as long ago as the revolutionary Assemblee Constituante. But the like has not been done by the German.

When the Prussian bourgeoisie came into power through the March revolution of 1848 it introduced universal and equal suffrage by the law of the 8th of April, 1848. The German bourgeoisie at St. Paul's Church, Frankfort, enacted universal equal suffrage.

The three-class system of elections which we now have, was arbitrarily imposed, imposed by the government.

Now, why does the public prosecutor shelter the government behind the backs of the Prussian bourgeoisie? A tout seigneur tout honneur![57]

It is the Prussian government, not the propertied classes, that must for all time and in the eyes of all people bear the responsibility of this arbitrarily imposed three-class system of elections.

But, whatever may have been the reasons which decided the public prosecutor to make this very singular substitution of grievances in his indictment—and we may perhaps presently come to find out what his reasons were—at any rate, this second ground of the indictment also fails. There has been no incitement against the propertied classes of the community; there has been no instigation against those against whom I am accused of instigating to hatred and contempt.

The third ground on which the indictment is brought, the charge of having endangered the public peace, fails likewise.

As to this third count:

Section 100 says: "Any person who endangers the public peace by publicly inciting the subjects of the State to hatred or to contempt of one another is to be punished."

Now, when the State speaks of the public peace it cannot be taken to mean peace of mind, for the State is not a pietistic overseer concerned about the subjects' peace of mind and the general sphere of spiritual edification. What it looks to is the peace of the streets. This is made quite plain by the phrase, "public peace."

The like is plain from all principles of law. Subjective states of mind do not concern the State; it is concerned with overt actions alone. It has, accordingly, no concern with hatred and contempt or with instigation thereto in so far as they are a matter of subjective sensibility only; but such instigation is subject to penalties only in case it is of such a nature as to lead to overt action. This is very patently indicated by the legislator in making use of the expression, "Any person who endangers public peace." The legislator says not any one who "disturbs," but any one who "endangers." If, in the contemplation of the law, any incitement whatever to hatred and contempt were punishable; if, in the contemplation of the law, the public peace were to be "endangered" through the mere incitement to such subjective sentiments; then the law would necessarily have said: any person who disturbs the public peace by inciting. If such had been the phrasing of the law, then it might perhaps be held that such disturbance always follows when instigation to hatred and contempt is made.

"Endanger" means to bring about the possibility of a disturbance, and by his choice of this term, therefore, the legislator has shown us that in speaking of the public peace he has not in mind a harmony of sentiments—which in the case contemplated must already have been disturbed, not simply endangered—but the peace of the streets. He has shown that he does not consider that a disturbance of the public peace necessarily has arisen in case of incitement to subjective sentiments of hatred and contempt. Consequently not every case of such incitement is held to be punishable, but only those cases in which the peace of the streets is in danger of being disturbed. In other words the penalty follows only when the incitement to hatred and contempt attains such a pitch as to become dangerous, that is to say, liable to result in overt unlawful acts. Section 100 is accordingly not to be taken to say that any person who incites to hatred and contempt endangers the public peace and is therefore subject to punishment. Such an interpretation would be wholly fallacious, on juridical as well as on grammatical grounds. Its meaning is that any person who puts the public peace in jeopardy through inciting to hatred and contempt—that is to say in case the incitement is of such a nature that it necessarily carries danger to the public peace—such a person is subject to the penalties of this law. In making use of the term "endanger," therefore, the law defines the crime of incitement to this effect, that it must be incitement of such a kind that it at least may lead to overt action—to the endangering of the peace of the streets—otherwise it is not punishable.

To show how far my action falls short of this third criterion, how little the alleged instigation is of the kind which might, even conceivably, lead to tangible action in the way of endangering the political peace, the peace of the public highways—to this end let me simply point out that in this address I am occupied with a discussion of periods of historical development of secular duration, and at the close I make the explicit statement that in the advance of a historical dawning one or two decades count but as a single hour in the revolution of a natural day.

So that we have here to do with an indictment which meets the requirements of the law at not a single point; whereas in order to an adequate charge, the several counts should concur, should combine and bear one another out.

It has frequently happened that indictments have been made in which some one count has not been well taken. But an indictment of which not even a single count proves to come within the contemplation of the law,—such an indictment deserves a special, and in every sense of the word a peculiar, place on honor in the temple of jurisprudence.

However, audiatur et altera pars.[58] Let us take one last look at the motivation which the indictment offers. In so doing it is possible that we shall find that in what I have been saying I have, by some highly ingenious artifice of exposition, succeeded in concealing the legally offensive features of my action; or on the other hand it may turn out that the totally nugatory character of this indictment will by this means be brought out in even more startling fashion than has yet appeared.

There is one sentence in this indictment which serves as underpinning to the whole structure. This sentence may, therefore, be expected to be of selected timber. The preamble of the document says: "The leading ideas of this address are as follows:—" and then, having given an ostensible resume of these ideas, it goes on to the following effect: "By these expositions, and by the frequently recurring allusions to an imminent social revolution, the workingmen will manifestly be provoked to hatred and contempt of the bourgeoisie; that is to say, the unpropertied classes will be stirred up against the propertied, whereby the public peace will be endangered, particularly since the address contains a direct appeal to make the mastery of the working class over the other classes of society the end of their endeavors, to be pursued with the most ardent and consuming passion."

This is the only passage in the document that is of the nature of a legal motivation. Let us look more closely into this sentence. This is a sentence which might give the asthma to a person with weak lungs, and it is so constructed as to hide its total lack of substance from any superficial view under a shimmering verbiage and a confusion of ideas. If you will look more closely into this passage, Gentlemen, you will be astonished at the quantity of juristic monstrosities, absurdities, misstatements and misconstructions of fact which it contains.

Now, whereby, according to this passage, have I accomplished my alleged incitement to hatred and contempt? "By these expositions," says the document. That is to say by a purely theoretical, purely objective exposition of historical events; by what the indictment itself designates as the exposition of my leading ideas; by nothing else, therefore, than the scientific doctrine simply. It is by this means that I am alleged to have incited to hatred and contempt. The indictment may shift and turn as it likes; it cannot escape the avowal that its accusation runs against nothing else than purely scientific arguments,—against science and its teaching.

But the passage goes on to add an "and." By these expositions and by the frequently recurring allusions to an imminent social revolution is the instigation alleged to have been effected.

What are these allusions to an imminent social revolution? Where are they to be found? Why does not the public prosecutor cite them? I call upon him to do so. But he cannot cite them. There is no passage in this pamphlet which will bear out his insinuations on this point.

It is true, throughout this pamphlet I make frequent use of the words "revolutionary" and "revolution;" although I do not speak of an "imminent social revolution," as the public prosecutor alleges. What I speak of is a social revolution which supervened in February, 1848. But with this word, "revolution," the public prosecutor hopes to crush me. For he, taking the word in its narrower legal sense alone, cannot read this word, "revolution," without conjuring up before his fancy the brandishing of pitchforks. But such is not the meaning of the word in its scientific use, and the consistent use of the term in my pamphlet might have apprised the public prosecutor of the fact that the term is there employed in its alternative, scientific signification. So, for instance, I speak of the development of the territorial principality as a "revolutionary" phenomenon.

And so again, on the other hand, I expressly declare that the peasant wars, which, assuredly, were sufficiently garnished with violence and bloodshed,—I declare these wars to have been a movement which was revolutionary only in the imagination of those who participated in them, whereas they were in reality not a revolutionary, but a reactionary movement.

The progress of industry which took place in the sixteenth century, on the contrary, I repeatedly and constantly characterize as a "really and veritably revolutionary fact" (page 7), although no sword was drawn on its account. Likewise I characterize (page 7) the invention of the spinning jenny in 1775 as a radical and effectual revolution.

Is this an abuse of language, or am I hereby introducing a novel use of words in making use of the term "revolution" in this sense,—in that I apply it to peaceful developments and deny it to sanguinary disturbances!

The elder Schelling says (Untersuchungen ueber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, Vol. VII, p. 351): "The happy thought of making freedom the all in all of Philosophy has not only made the human intellect free as regards its own motives and effected a greater change in this science in all directions than any earlier revolution," etc. The elder Schelling, at least, does not, like the public prosecutor's fancy, see pitchforks flashing before his eyes at the sound of the word "revolution." Applying the word, as he does, to the effects wrought by a philosophical principle, he takes it, as I do, in a sense which has no relation whatever to physical violence.

What, then, is the scientific meaning of this word "revolution," and how does revolution differ from reform? Revolution means transmutation, and a revolution is, accordingly, accomplished whenever, by whatever means, with or without shock or violence, an entirely new principle is substituted for what is already in effect. A reform, on the other hand, is effected in case the existing situation is maintained in point of principle, but with a more humane, more consequent or juster working out of this principle. Here, again, it is not a question of the means. A reform may be effected by means of insurrection and bloodshed, and a revolution may be carried out in piping times of peace. The peasant wars were an attempt at compelling a reform by force of arms. The development of industry was a full-blown revolution, accomplished in the most peaceable manner; for in this latter case an entirely new and novel principle was put in the place of the previously existing state of affairs. Both these ideas are developed at length and with great pains in the pamphlet under consideration.

How comes it that the public prosecutor alone has failed to understand me? Why is all this unintelligible to him alone, when every workingman understands it?

Now, even suppose that I had spoken of an "imminent social revolution," as in point of fact I did not; would I, therefore, necessarily have been talking of pitchforks and bayonets?

Professor Huber is a thoroughly conservative man, a strenuous royalist, a man who, on the adoption of the constitution of 1850, voluntarily resigned the professor's chair which he held in the University of Berlin, because, if I am rightly informed, he had scruples about subscribing to it; but at the same time he is a man who is with the deepest affection devoted to the welfare of the working classes, who has given the most painstaking study to their development and has written most excellent works upon that subject, particularly upon the history of industrial corporations or labor organizations. After having shown that the labor organizations of England, France, and Germany already have in hand a capital of fifty million thalers, Professor Huber says in this latest work (Concordia, p. 24):

"Under these circumstances and under the influences herein at work, and in view of the historical facts above indicated in outline, it is to be hoped that I need enter no disclaimer against Utopian daydreams of a universal millenium when I say that not only is a very substantial reform of the existing political conditions of the factory population practicable in such a measure as to bring about an elevation of their entire social and economic situation, but such a reform is to be looked for as in the natural course of things the assured outcome of the growth of labor organizations."

Here we have a prediction of a thoroughgoing social transmutation spoken of as the assured outcome of the labor-organization movement working out its effects simply within the lines of the peaceable and conventional course of things. But how if I, with all the stronger reason, had spoken of a prospective social change that might be expected to result from the combined force of the two factors, organized labor and universal suffrage?

But how can I be held accountable for the public prosecutor's literary limitations? for his lack of acquaintance with what is going on all around us in modern times and what science has already accepted and made a matter of record? Am I the scientific whipping-boy of the public prosecutor? If that were the case, the punishment which it would be for you, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court, to mete out to me would be something stupendous. But all that apart, how can an allusion to an imminent social revolution, even to a pitchfork revolution, constitute an instigation to hatred and contempt of the bourgeoisie? And this is, after all, what the public prosecutor must be held to allege in the passage cited, and this in fact is what he does allege. Hatred and contempt can be aroused against any man only by his own acts and their publicity. But how can anything done by Peter excite the hatred and contempt of Paul? If any one were to tell us: "The workingmen are going to get up a social revolution," how could that remark arouse hatred and contempt of the bourgeoisie? The passage in question, then, shows itself to have been one that makes no sense, either in point of grammar or in point of logic. It is not only untrue with a threefold untruth, but it is contradictory and meaningless. At least it is quite unintelligible to me.

I have as great difficulty in understanding the public prosecutor's language as he has in understanding mine. The Greeks were in the habit of calling any one barbaros (a barbarian) who did not understand the current speech. So the public prosecutor and I are both barbarians, the one to the other.

But this passage in the indictment which I have been analyzing brings up a third point at which I am alleged to have been guilty of inciting to hatred and contempt of the bourgeoisie. This is introduced with the word "particularly." The exposition and the allusions above spoken of are alleged to have incited to hatred and contempt, "particularly because the address contains a direct appeal to make the mastery of the working classes over the other classes of society the end of their endeavors, to be pursued with the most ardent and consuming passion." Suppose that such were the case; an exhortation addressed to a given class of society to pursue the vain ambition of a mastery over the other classes would be worthy of all reprobation, but it would still be legally permissible unless it urged to criminal acts. Every class in society is at liberty to strive for the control of the State, so long as it does not seek to realize its end by unlawful means. No political purpose is punishable, the means employed alone are. Now, the character of this prosecution, as a prosecution directed against a political bias, appears plainly and should be manifest to every one in every line of the indictment, in that it constantly charges incitement to the seeking of certain ends; it never attempts to show that criminal means have been employed, or that I have, in my address, urged the employment of such means. But even if I had been guilty of urging the working classes to resort to criminal means for gaining control over the other classes of society, then I could only have been indicted under Article 61,[59] or some other article of the criminal code, but never under Article 100, or as having offended against that article by an instigation of the workingmen to hatred and contempt; for such an exhortation addressed to the working classes to make themselves masters of the other classes of society must have incited the workingmen to political ambition, but by no means to hatred and contempt of any third party. This ambition on the part of the workingmen could, of course, not have been fathered upon the bourgeoisie; and since responsibility for it could not have been put upon them, hatred and contempt of them could not have been aroused by the fact of such an ambition. It therefore appears again that this passage is quite devoid of grammatical and logical content. But upon what ground has the public prosecutor read into my address an exhortation urging to the pursuit of "mastery on the part of the workingmen over the other classes of society?"

All that I have to say in my pamphlet bearing on this head is that it is the destiny of the historical epoch beginning with February, 1848, to install the ethical principle of the working classes as the dominant principle of society, to make it the guiding principle of the State; the nature of this principle is expounded in my pamphlet, and I have already restated it in outline in the introductory part of my speech.

I repeatedly and explicitly express myself to the same effect. So I say (page 31) that, as in 1789 the revolution was a revolution of the third estate, so in this later case it was a revolution of the fourth estate, "which now seeks to erect its principle into the dominant principle of society and to permeate all institutions with it." Or again

(page 32): "Whoever, therefore, appeals to the principle of the working class as the dominant principle of society;" and, further, on the same page: "We have now to examine, in three several hearings, this principle of the working class as the dominant principle of society." And (page 33): "Perhaps the idea of making the principle of the lowest class of society the dominant principle of the State and of society may seem to be a dangerous idea." I, then, proceed to develop, from page 39 onward, the difference between the ethical and political principle of the bourgeoisie and the ethical and political principle of the working class, and conclude on page 42 with the words: "This, then, is it, Gentlemen, that is to be characterized as the political principle of the working class," etc.

And because I present an exalted ethical principle, the noblest ethical principle which my intelligence is capable of grasping, the noblest ethical principle yet achieved by political philosophy, because I proclaim this as destined to become the guiding principle of the present period of history; because of this and because I bring evidence to show that this principle, as being the expression of the natural instinct due to the economic situation of the working classes, is properly to be designated as the principle of the working classes,—this is what the public prosecutor has construed into an atrocious crime, and has accused me of urging the working classes to aim at making their own class the masters of the other classes of society.

The public prosecutor appears to believe that I aspire to see the propertied classes reduced to servitude under the working classes, that I would invert history and make the landed gentry and the manufacturers the servants of the workingmen.

But however widely we may differ in the use of language, however much we may mutually be barbarians to one another, could such a misapprehension, or anything approaching it, be at all possible?

I develop (page 32) my view, explicitly and in detail, to the effect that this is precisely the characteristic mark of the fourth estate, that its principle contains no ground of discrimination, whether in point of fact or in point of law, such as could be erected into a domineering prerogative and applied to reconstruct the institutions of society to that end. The words I use are as follows (page 32): "Laborers we all are, in so far as we are willing to make ourselves useful to human society in any way whatever. This fourth estate, in the recesses of whose heart there lies no germ of a new and further development of privilege, is therefore a term coincident with the human race. Its concerns are, therefore, in truth the concerns of mankind as a whole; its freedom is the freedom of mankind itself; its sovereignty is the sovereignty of all men." And I thereupon go on to say: "Therefore, whoever appeals to the principle of the working class as the dominant principle of society, in the sense in which I have presented this idea,—his cry is not a cry designed to divide the classes of society," etc. And while I, with all my heart and soul, am making an appeal for the termination of all class rule and all class antagonism, the public prosecutor charges me with inciting the laborers to establish class rule over the propertied classes. I ask again: How is such an astonishing misunderstanding to be explained? Permit me once again, to quote the father against the son:

"The medium," says Schelling (Vol. I, p. 243, Abhandlungen zur Erlaeuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre)—"The medium whereby intellects understand one another is not the circumambient atmosphere, but the joint and common freedom whose movements penetrate to the innermost recesses of the soul. A human spirit not consciously replete with freedom is excluded from all spiritual communion, not only with others but even with himself. No wonder, therefore, that he remains incomprehensible to himself as well as to others, and wearies himself in his pitiable solitude with empty words which stir no friendly response whether in his own or in another's breast. To be unintelligible to such an unfortunate is a credit and an honor before God and man."

So says Schelling, the father.

Gentlemen, I have now reached the close of my argument. It were bootless to ask whether this charge could possibly have any weight with you, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court. But there was probably another design at the root of the prosecution. The political struggle between the bourgeoisie and the government has lately shown some slight signs of life. It has, not improbably, been thought that under these circumstances a prosecution for incitement of the unpropertied classes to hatred and contempt of the propertied classes would create an effective diversion; it was probably hoped that even if such an accusation were dismissed by you, still—you remember the ancient adage: calumniare audacter, semper aliquit haeret[60]—it would serve as a wet towel to bind about the slightly-inflamed countenance of our bourgeoisie,—and so, with this in view, Gentlemen, I was selected as the scapegoat to be driven out into the wilderness. But even this design, Gentlemen, will fail.

It will fail shamefully through the mere reading of my pamphlet, which I most particularly commend to the bourgeoisie. It will fail before the force of my own voice; and precisely with this in view I felt called on to go so extensively into the facts of the case in my defense. We are all, bourgeoisie and laborers, members of one people, and we stand firmly together against our oppressors.

Let me now close. Upon a man who, as I have presented the matter to you, has devoted his life under the motto, "Science and the Workingmen," even a sentence which may meet him on the way will make no other impression beyond that made upon a chemist by the breaking of a retort used by him in his scientific experiments. With a momentary knitting of the brow and a reflection on the physical properties of matter, as soon as the accident is remedied he goes on with his experiments and his investigation as before.

But I appeal to you that for the sake of the nation and its honor, for the sake of science and its dignity, for the sake of the country and its liberty under the law, for the sake of your own memory as history shall preserve it, Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Court, acquit me.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 49: The criteria which are here appealed to as working the differences of spiritual constitution between the so-called Germanic peoples and the peoples of antiquity are today questioned at more than one point. And quite legitimately so. Considered as peoples simply, the Greeks or Romans were scarcely less capable of development than the Germanic peoples. That their States, their political organizations, collapsed because of the decay of certain institutional arrangements peculiar to the social life of the times, that is a fortune in which the states of antiquity quite impartially have shared with the various States of the Germanic world. Political structures in general are capable of but a moderate degree of development. If the development proceeds beyond this critical point the result, sooner or later, is a historical cataclysm, whereby the old State is supplanted by a new form of social organization resting on a new foundation. As elements in this new foundation there may be comprised new religious or new ethical notions, but, in a general way, it is to be said that, except in the theocratic States, the role played by religion is only of secondary importance even in antiquity.

Socrates was not the first nor the only one in Greece who had taught "new gods." That he in particular was called on to drink the hemlock was due to reasons of State policy, which had but a very slight and unessential relation to the acts of sacrilege of which he was accused. It may be added that this Greek promulgator of new gods is among the German peoples fairly matched by John Huss and thousands of other victims of religious persecution.

Lassalle's mistake lies in this, that he seeks the motor force of development in the "spirit" of the nations, instead of looking for an explanation of their spiritual life in the peculiar circumstances which condition their development. But, in spite of this, it must be said that his conclusions as bearing upon the modern situation are for the most part substantially sound.—TRANSLATOR.]

[Footnote 50: According to this doctrine, the motions of the "Monads"—animistically conceived units of which the entire universe, organic or inorganic, was held to be constituted—were (by the fiat of God at the creation of the world) bound in a preordained sequence, in such a manner that all these motions constitute a comprehensive, harmonious series. Wherefore, all events whatever that may take place, take place as the necessary outcome of the constitution of these monads moving independently of one another.—TRANSLATOR.]

[Footnote 51: Permission to teach.]

[Footnote 52: I have fought not without glory.]

[Footnote 53: Don't disturb my circles.]

[Footnote 54: A new and unheard-of-crime.]

[Footnote 55: In case it becomes necessary.]

[Footnote 56: Confusion of one thing with another.]

[Footnote 57: Honor to whom honor belongs!]

[Footnote 58: Hear also the other side.]

[Footnote 59: That is, for high treason.]

[Footnote 60: Calumniate boldly, some of it will always stick.]

* * * * *



OPEN LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (1863)

FOR THE SUMMONING OF A GENERAL GERMAN WORKINGMEN'S CONGRESS AT LEIPZIG

BY FERDINAND LASSALLE

TRANSLATED BY E.H. BABBITT, A.B.

Assistant Professor of German, Tufts College

Gentlemen:—You have asked me in your letter to express my opinion, in any way that seems suitable to me, on the workingmen's movement and the means which it should use to attain an improvement of the condition of the working class in political, material, and intellectual matters—especially on the value of associations for the class of people who have no property.

I have no hesitation in following your wishes, and I choose the form which is simplest and most suitable to the nature of the matter—the form of a public letter of reply to your communication.

Last October in Berlin, at a time when I was absent from here, during your first preliminary discussion concerning the German Workingmen's Congress—a discussion which I followed in the newspapers with interest—two opposing views were brought forward in the meeting.

One was to the effect that you have no concern whatever with political agitation and that it has no interest for you.

The other, in distinction from this, was that you were to consider yourselves an appendix to the Prussian Progressive party, and to furnish a sort of characterless chorus or sounding-board for it.

If I had attended that meeting, I should have expressed myself against both views. It is utterly narrow-minded to believe that political agitation and political progress do not concern the workingman. On the contrary, the workingman can expect the realization of his legitimate ambitions only from political liberty.

Even the question to what extent you are allowed to meet, discuss your interests, form general and local unions for their consideration, etc., is a question which depends upon the political situation and upon political legislation, and therefore it is not worth the trouble even to refute such a narrow view by further consideration.

No less false and misleading was the other view which was placed before you, namely, to consider yourselves politically a mere annex of the Progressive party.

It would certainly be unjust not to recognize that the Progressive party, in its struggle with the Prussian Government, performed at that time a certain service, though a moderate one, in behalf of political liberty, by its insistence upon the right of granting appropriations and its opposition to the reorganization of the army in Prussia.

Nevertheless the realization of that suggestion is completely out of the question, for the following reasons:

In the first place, such a position was in no way fitting for a powerful independent party with much more important political purposes, such as the German Workingmen's party should be, with reference to a party which, like the Prussian Progressive party, has set up as its standard, in the matter of principle, only the maintenance of the Prussian constitution, and, as the basis of its activity, only the prevention of the one-sided organization of the army—which is not even attempted in other German countries; or the insistence upon the right of granting appropriations—which is not even disputed in other German countries.

In the second place, it was in no way certain that the Prussian Progressive party would carry on its conflict with the Prussian Government with that dignity and energy which alone are appropriate for the working class, and which alone can count upon its warm sympathy.

In the third place, it was also not certain that the Prussian Progressive party, even if it had won a victory over the Prussian administration, would use this victory in the interest of the whole people, or merely for the maintenance of the privileged position of the bourgeoisie; in other words, that it would apply this victory toward the establishment of the universal equal and direct franchise, which is demanded by democratic principles and by the legitimate interests of the working class. In the latter case it evidently could not make the slightest claim to any interest on the part of the German working class.

That is what I should have said to you at that time with reference to that suggestion.

Today I can add furthermore that in the meantime it has been shown by facts—a thing which at that time would not have been very difficult to foresee—that the Progressive party is completely lacking in the energy which would have been required to carry to a conclusion, in a dignified and victorious manner, even such a limited conflict between itself and the Prussian administration.

And since it continues, in spite of the denial by the Government of the right of granting appropriations, to meet and to carry on parliamentary affairs with the ministry, which has been declared by the party itself criminally liable, it humiliates, by this contradiction, itself and the people through a lack of force and dignity without parallel.

Since it continues to meet, to debate, and to arrange parliamentary affairs with the administration itself—in spite of the violation of the constitution which it has declared to exist—it is a support to the administration and aids it in maintaining the appearance of a constitutional situation.

Instead of declaring the sessions of the Chamber closed until the administration has declared that it will no longer continue the expenditures refused by the Chamber, instead of thus placing upon the administration the unavoidable alternative either of respecting the constitutional right of the Chamber or of renouncing every appearance of a constitutional procedure, of ruling openly and without prevarication as an absolute government, of taking upon itself the tremendous responsibility of absolutism, and thus of precipitating the crisis which must necessarily come, in time, as the result of open absolutism, this party by its own action enables the administration to unite all the advantages of absolute power with all the advantages of an apparently constitutional procedure.

And since, instead of forcing the administration into open and unconcealed absolutism and by that action enlightening the people as to the non-existence of constitutional procedure, it consents to continue to play its part in this comedy of mock constitutionalism, it helps maintain an appearance which, like every system of government based on appearances, must have a confusing and debasing effect upon the intelligence of the people.

Such a party has in this way shown that it is, and always will be, utterly impotent against a determined administration.

Such a party has shown that it is for this very reason entirely incapable of accomplishing even the slightest genuine development of the interests of liberty.

Such a party has shown that it has no claim to the sympathies of the democratic classes of the population, and that it has no realization and no understanding of the feeling of political honor which must permeate the working class.

Such a party has, in a word, shown by its action that it is nothing else than the resurrection of the unsavory Gotha idea, decked out with a different name.

I can add today also the following facts: Today, as at that time, I should have been obliged to say to you that a party which compels itself through its dogma of Prussian leadership to see in the Prussian administration the chosen Messiah for the German renaissance—while there is not a single German administration (even including Hesse), which is more backward than the Prussian in political development, and while there is hardly a single German government (and this includes Austria) which is not far ahead of Prussia—for this reason alone loses all claim to representing the German working class; for such a party shows by this alone a depth of illusion, self-conceit, and incompetence drunken with the sound of its own words, which must dash all hope of expecting from it a real development of the liberty of the German people.

From what has been said we can now understand definitely what position the working class must take in political matters and what attitude toward the Progressive party it must maintain.

The working class must establish, itself as an independent political party, and must make the universal, equal, and direct franchise the banner and watchword of this party. Representation of the working class in the legislative bodies of Germany—nothing else can satisfy its legitimate interests from a political point of view. To begin a peaceful and law-abiding agitation for this by all lawful means is and must be, from a political point of view, the programme of the workingmen's party.

It is self-evident what attitude this workingmen's party is to take toward the German Progressive party.

It must feel and organize itself everywhere as an independent party completely separate from the latter, although the Progressive party is to be supported on points and questions in which the interest of the two parties is a common one; it must turn its back decidedly upon the Progressive party and oppose it whenever it departs from that interest, and thus force the Progressive party either to develop progressively and to rise above its own level or to sink deeper and deeper into the mire of insignificance and weakness in which it already stands knee deep; these must be the straightforward tactics of the German workingmen's party with reference to the Progressive party.

So much as to what you must do from a political point of view.

Now for the social question which you raise, a question which rightly interests you to a still greater extent.

I have read in the papers, not without a sad smile, that part of the program for your Congress consists in debates concerning freedom of choosing places of residence and of employment for the workingman.

What, Gentlemen, are you going to debate about the right of choosing places of residence, the right of settling down anywhere without being specially taxed!

I can answer you on this point with nothing better than Schiller's epigram:

Jahre lang schon bedien' ich mich meiner Nase zum Riechen: Aber hab' ich an sie auch ein erweisliches Recht?

(Year after year I have used the nose God gave me to smell with: But can I legally prove any such right to its use?)

And is not the situation the same as to freedom of employment?

All these debates have at least one mistake—they come more than fifty years too late. Freedom of moving about and freedom of employment are things which nowadays are decreed in a legislative body in silence, but no longer debated.

Should the German working class repeat again the spectacle of assemblies whose enjoyment consists in giving themselves over to long purposeless speeches and applauding them? The seriousness and the energy of the German working class will know how to protect it from such a pitiable spectacle.

But you propose to establish institutions for savings, funds for retiring pensions, insurance against accidents and sickness? I am willing to recognize the relative usefulness of these institutions, although it is a subordinate one and hardly worth notice.

But let us make a complete distinction between two questions which have absolutely nothing to do with each other.

Is it your object to make the misery of individual workingmen more endurable; to counteract the effects of thoughtlessness, sickness, old age, accidents of all kinds, through which by chance or necessity individual workingmen are forced even below the normal condition of the working class? For such objects all these institutions are entirely appropriate means. Only it would not be worth while in that case to begin a movement for such a purpose throughout all Germany, to stir up a general agitation in the whole working class of the nation. You must not bring mountains into labor in order that a ridiculous mouse appear. This so extremely limited and subordinate purpose can better be left to local unions and local organizations, which can always handle it far better.

Or is this your object: To improve the normal condition of the whole working class and elevate it above its present level? In truth this is and must be your purpose, but this sharp line of distinction is necessary, which I have drawn between these two objects, which must not be confused with each other, in order to show you, better than I could through a long exposition, how utterly powerless these institutions are to attain this second object, and therefore how utterly outside the scope of the present workingmen's movement.

Permit me to adduce the testimony of a single authority—the admission of a strict conservative, a strict royalist, Professor Huber—a man who has likewise devoted his studies to the social question and the development of the workingmen's movement.

I like to call on the testimony of this man (in the course of this letter I shall do it now and then again) because he is politically entirely opposed to me, and in regard to economic questions differs radically from me, and must accordingly be the best person to remove, through his testimony, the suspicion that the slight advantage which I attach to those institutions is only the consequence of previously formed political tendencies; furthermore because Professor Huber, who stands as far from liberalism as from my political views, has for this very reason the necessary impartiality to make in the field of political economy admissions which are in accordance with the truth; whereas all adherents of the liberal school of political economy are forced to deceive the workingmen, or, in order to deceive them better, first to deceive themselves, in order to bring the facts into harmony with their tendencies.

"Without underestimating," says Professor Huber, "the relative usefulness of savings banks, accident and sickness insurance, etc., as far as it really goes, these good things may nevertheless carry great negative disadvantages with them, in that they stand in the way of improvement."

And surely never would these negative disadvantages persist and stand in the way of improvement more than if they took up the attention of the great German workingmen's movement, or divided its forces.

It was stated in various newspapers, and your letter itself states, that you have been recommended from almost all sides to take into consideration the Schulze-Delitzsch organizations—credit associations, raw material associations, and consumers' associations—for the improvement of the situation of the working class. Allow me to ask you for still closer attention.

Schulze-Delitzsch may be considered from three points of view: First, from the political point of view, he belongs to the Progressive party, which has already been discussed. Second, he claims to be a political economist. In this respect—as a theoretical economist—he stands entirely on the ground of the Liberal school: he shares all its mistakes, fallacies, and self-deceptions. The addresses which he has made so far to the Berlin workingmen are a striking proof of this—misrepresentations of fact and conclusions which in no way follow from his premises. However, it will not help your purpose, and it is not my intention, to go into a criticism here of the economic views and the speeches of Schulze-Delitzsch and to point out these self-deceptions and fallacies which, in matters of theoretical economics, he has in common with the whole Liberal school to which he belongs. I shall be compelled later, in any case, to come back to the essential content of these doctrines.

But Schulze-Delitzsch has, in the third place, a practical nature, which is of more importance than his theoretical economic viewpoint. He is the only member of his party, the Progressive party—and all the more credit is due him just for this reason—who has done anything for the people. Through his tireless activity, even though he stands alone at a most unfavorable time, he has become the father and founder of the German associations, and so has given an impulse, of the most far-reaching importance, to the cause of associations in general, a service for which, however I may be opposed to him in theory, I shake his hand warmly in spirit as I write this. Truth and justice even toward an adversary (and for the working class above all it is befitting to take this deeply to heart)—this is the first duty of man.

That the question whether associations are to be understood according to his or my interpretation is under discussion today is in large part due to him, and that is a real service which cannot be too highly esteemed.

But the warmth with which I recognize this service must not prevent us from stating the question with critical clearness: "Are the Schulze-Delitzsch associations for credit and for raw materials, and are the consumers' leagues able to accomplish the improvement of the situation of the working class?"

The answer to this question must be a most decided "no." It will be easy to show this briefly. As to the credit and raw material associations, these both agree in that they exist only for those who are carrying on business on their own account—that is, only for artisan production. For the working class in the narrower sense—the hands employed in factory production, who have no business of their own for which they can use credit and raw materials—neither kind of association exists. Their help can therefore reach only the artisan producers.

But, even in this respect, please notice and impress upon your minds two essential circumstances:

In the first place the inevitable tendency of our industrialism is to put factory production more and more from day to day in place of artisan production, and, in consequence, to drive the workmen of a constantly increasing number of trades into the laboring class proper, which finds work in the factories. England and France, which are ahead of us in economic development, show this in a still greater degree than Germany, which is, however, taking tremendous strides in the same direction. Your own experience will confirm this sufficiently.

It follows from this that the Schulze-Delitzsch credit and raw material associations, even if they could help the artisans, could be of advantage only to a very small number of people, a number which is constantly decreasing and tends to disappear, through the inevitable development of our manufacturing system—people who through the progress of our culture are, in constantly increasing numbers, forced into the class of workingmen who are not affected by this aid. That is, nevertheless, only the first conclusion. A second, of still greater importance, is the following: In competition with factory production, which is in constantly increasing scope taking the place of small artisan production, even the artisans who remain in the latter are in no way certain of being protected by the credit and raw material associations. I will again cite Professor Huber as a witness on this point. "Unfortunately," says he, after speaking in praise, as I have done, of the Schulze-Delitzsch credit and raw material associations, "unfortunately, however, the assumption that the competition of production on a small scale with factory production would be made possible seems by no means sufficiently established." But, better than any testimony, the easily explained internal reasons of what I say will convince you.

How far can the credit associations accomplish the procuring of cheap and good raw materials? It can place the artisan without capital in a position to compete with the artisan who has sufficient small capital for his small artisan production. It can, therefore, at most put the artisan without capital on an equality and in the same situation with the master workman who has sufficient capital of his own for his production. But now the fact is just here—even the master workman with sufficient capital of his own cannot stand the competition of large capitalists and of factory production, both on account of the smaller cost of production of all kinds made possible by the factory system, and on account of the smaller rate of the profit which in wholesale production is to be reckoned on each single piece, and, finally, on account of other advantages connected with it. Since, now, the credit and raw material associations can at most bring the small producer without capital into the same general position as the one who has sufficient capital for his small production, and since the latter cannot stand the competition of the wholesale production of the factories, this result is still more certain for the small producer who carries on his business with the help of these associations.

These associations can, therefore, with reference to the artisan, only prolong the death struggle in which artisan production is destined to succumb and give place to factory production; can only increase thereby the agony of this death struggle and hold back in vain the development of our culture—that is the whole result which they have with reference to the artisan class, while they do not touch at all the real laboring class occupied, in constantly increasing numbers, in factory production.

There remain for consideration the consumers' associations. The effect of these would reach the whole working class. They are, however, utterly incapable of accomplishing the improvement of the situation of the working class. This can be shown by three reasons which essentially, however, form a single one.

(1) The disadvantage under which the working class labors affects it, as the economic law which I shall adduce under the second head shows, as producer, not as consumer. It is therefore an entirely false kind of aid to try to help the workingman as a consumer instead of helping him in the place where the shoe really pinches him—as producer.

As consumers, we are, in general, all on the same footing; as before the law, so before the salesman, all men are equal—provided only they pay.

Just for this reason it is true that for the working class, in consequence of its limited ability to pay, a special additional evil has developed which has nothing to do with the general cancer which is eating into it—the disadvantage of having to supply needs on the smallest scale, and so of being exposed to the extortion of the retailer. Against this the consumers' associations give protection; but, aside from the facts that you will see under No. 3 as to how long this help can last and when it must cease, this limited help, which can for the time being make the sad condition of the workingman a little more endurable, must by no means be mistaken for a means for that improvement in the situation of the working class at which the workingmen are aiming.

(2) The relentless economic law which, under present conditions, fixes the wages by the law of demand and supply of labor is this: The average wage always remains at the lowest point which will maintain existence and propagate the race at the standard of living accepted by the people. This is the point about which the actual wage always oscillates like a pendulum, without ever rising above or falling below it for any length of time. It cannot permanently rise above this average, for then, through the easier situation of the workingman, an increase of the working population and therefore of the supply of hands would ensue, which would bring the wage again to a point below its former scale.

Neither can the wage fall permanently far below what is necessary to support life, for then arise emigration, celibacy, and avoidance of child-bearing, and, finally, a reduction of the number of laborers, which then diminishes still more the supply of hands, and therefore brings the wage back to its former position again.

The real average wage, therefore, is fixed by a constant movement about this point of equilibrium, to which it must constantly return, sometimes rising a little above it (period of prosperity in some or all industries), sometimes falling a little below it (period of more or less general distress and industrial crises).

The limitation of the average wage to the amount necessary to exist and propagate the race under the accepted standard of living in a community—that, I repeat, is the inexorable and cruel law which determines the wage under present conditions.

This law can be denied by no one. I could cite as many authorities for it as there are great and famous names in economic science, and even from the Liberal school itself, for it is just the Liberal school of political economy which has discovered this law and proved it. This inexorable and cruel law, Gentlemen, you must above all things fix deeply in your minds and base upon it all your thinking.