The last-named provision for admission into the Union, being in the nature of a promise for the future, was not included in the body of the document providing for the government, but was contained in certain "articles of compact, between the original States and the people and States in the said territory, [which should] forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent." These articles of compact were in general similar to the bills of rights in State Constitutions; but one of them found no parallel in any State Constitution. Article VI reads: "There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." This has been hailed as a farsighted, humanitarian measure, and it is quite true that many of the leading men, in the South as well as in the North, were looking forward to the time when slavery would be abolished. But the motives predominating at the time were probably more nearly represented by Grayson, who wrote to James Monroe, three weeks after the ordinance was passed: "The clause respecting slavery was agreed to by the southern members for the purpose of preventing tobacco and indigo from being made on the northwest side of the Ohio, as well as for several other political reasons."

It is over one hundred and forty years since the Ordinance of 1787 was adopted, during which period more than thirty territories of the United States have been organized, and there has never been a time when one or more territories were not under Congressional supervision, so that the process of legislative control has been continuous. Changes have been made from time to time in order to adapt the territorial government to changed conditions, but for fifty years the Ordinance of 1787 actually remained in operation, and even twenty years later it was specifically referred to by statute. The principles of territorial government today are identical with those of 1787, and those principles comprise the largest measure of local self-government compatible with national control, a gradual extension of self-government to the people of a territory, and finally complete statehood and admission into the Union on a footing of equality with the other States.

In 1825, when the military occupation of Oregon was suggested in Congress, Senator Dickerson of New Jersey objected, saying, "We have not adopted a system of colonization and it is to be hoped we never shall." Yet that is just what America has always had. Not only were the first settlers on the Atlantic coast colonists from Europe; but the men who went to the frontier were also colonists from the Atlantic seaboard. And the men who settled the States in the West were colonists from the older communities. The Americans had so recently asserted their independence that they regarded the name of colony as not merely indicating dependence but as implying something of inferiority and even of reproach. And when the American colonial system was being formulated in 1783-87 the word "Colony" was not used. The country under consideration was the region west of the Alleghany Mountains and in particular the territory north and west of the Ohio River and, being so referred to in the documents, the word "Territory" became the term applied to all the colonies.

The Northwest Territory increased so rapidly in population that in 1800 it was divided into two districts, and in 1802 the eastern part was admitted into the Union as the State of Ohio. The rest of the territory was divided in 1805 and again in 1809; Indiana was admitted as a State in 1816 and Illinois in 1818. So the process has gone on. There were thirteen original States and six more have become members of the Union without having been through the status of territories, making nineteen in all; while twenty-nine States have developed from the colonial stage. The incorporation of the colonies into the Union is not merely a political fact; the inhabitants of the colonies become an integral part of the parent nation and in turn become the progenitors of new colonies. If such a process be long continued, the colonies will eventually outnumber the parent States, and the colonists will outnumber the citizens of the original States and will themselves become the nation. Such has been the history of the United States and its people. By 1850, indeed, one-half of the population of the United States was living west of the Alleghany Mountains, and at the present time approximately seventy per cent are to be found in the West.

The importance of the Ordinance of 1787 was hardly overstated by Webster in his famous debate with Hayne when he said: "We are accustomed to praise the lawgivers of antiquity; we help to perpetuate the fame of Solon and Lycurgus; but I doubt whether one single law of any lawgiver, ancient or modern, has produced effects of more distinct, marked and lasting character than the Ordinance of 1787." While improved means of communication and many other material ties have served to hold the States of the Union together, the political bond was supplied by the Ordinance of 1787, which inaugurated the American colonial system.



CHAPTER V. DARKNESS BEFORE DAWN

John Fiske summed up the prevailing impression of the government of the Confederation in the title to his volume, "The Critical Period of American History." "The period of five years," says Fiske, "following the peace of 1783 was the most critical moment in all the history of the American people. The dangers from which we were saved in 1788 were even greater than were the dangers from which we were saved in 1865." Perhaps the plight of the Confederation was not so desperate as he would have us believe, but it was desperate enough. Two incidents occurring between the signing of the preliminary terms of peace and the definitive treaty reveal the danger in which the country stood. The main body of continental troops made up of militiamen and short-term volunteers—always prone to mutinous conduct—was collected at Newburg on the Hudson, watching the British in New York. Word might come at any day that the treaty had been signed, and the army did not wish to be disbanded until certain matters had been settled primarily the question of their pay. The officers had been promised half-pay for life, but nothing definite had been done toward carrying out the promise. The soldiers had no such hope to encourage them, and their pay was sadly in arrears. In December, 1782, the officers at Newburg drew up an address in behalf of themselves and their men and sent it to Congress. Therein they made the threat, thinly veiled, of taking matters into their own hands unless their grievances were redressed.

There is reason to suppose that back of this movement—or at least in sympathy with it—were some of the strongest men in civil as in military life, who, while not fomenting insurrection, were willing to bring pressure to bear on Congress and the States. Congress was unable or unwilling to act, and in March, 1783, a second paper, this time anonymous, was circulated urging the men not to disband until the question of pay had been settled and recommending a meeting of officers on the following day. If Washington's influence was not counted upon, it was at least hoped that he would not interfere; but as soon as he learned of what had been done he issued general orders calling for a meeting of officers on a later day, thus superseding the irregular meeting that had been suggested. On the day appointed the Commander-in-Chief appeared and spoke with so much warmth and feeling that his "little address... drew tears from many of the officers." He inveighed against the unsigned paper and against the methods that were talked of, for they would mean the disgrace of the army, and he appealed to the patriotism of the officers, promising his best efforts in their behalf. The effect was so strong that, when Washington withdrew, resolutions were adopted unanimously expressing their loyalty and their faith in the justice of Congress and denouncing the anonymous circular.

The general apprehension was not diminished by another incident in June. Some eighty troops of the Pennsylvania line in camp at Lancaster marched to Philadelphia and drew up before the State House, where Congress was sitting. Their purpose was to demand better treatment and the payment of what was owed to them. So far it was an orderly demonstration, although not in keeping with military regulations; in fact the men had broken away from camp under the lead of noncommissioned officers. But when they had been stimulated by drink the disorder became serious. The humiliating feature of the situation was that Congress could do nothing, even in self-protection. They appealed, to the Pennsylvania authorities and, when assistance was refused, the members of Congress in alarm fled in the night and three days later gathered in the college building in Princeton.

Congress became the butt of many jokes, but men could not hide the chagrin they felt that their Government was so weak. The feeling deepened into shame when the helplessness of Congress was displayed before the world. Weeks and even months passed before a quorum could be obtained to ratify the treaty recognizing the independence of the United States and establishing peace. Even after the treaty was supposed to be in force the States disregarded its provisions and Congress could do nothing more than utter ineffective protests. But, most humiliating of all, the British maintained their military posts within the northwestern territory ceded to the United States, and Congress could only request them to retire. The Americans' pride was hurt and their pockets were touched as well, for an important issue at stake was the control of the lucrative fur trade. So resentment grew into anger; but the British held on, and the United States was powerless to make them withdraw. To make matters worse, the Confederation, for want of power to levy taxes, was facing bankruptcy, and Congress was unable to devise ways and means to avert a crisis.

The Second Continental Congress had come into existence in 1775. It was made up of delegations from the various colonies, appointed in more or less irregular ways, and had no more authority than it might assume and the various colonies were willing to concede; yet it was the central body under which the Revolution had been inaugurated and carried through to a successful conclusion. Had this Congress grappled firmly with the financial problem and forced through a system of direct taxation, the subsequent woes of the Confederation might have been mitigated and perhaps averted. In their enthusiasm over the Declaration of Independence the people—by whom is meant the articulate class consisting largely of the governing and commercial elements—would probably have accepted such a usurpation of authority. But with their lack of experience it is not surprising that the delegates to Congress did not appreciate the necessity of such radical action and so were unwilling to take the responsibility for it. They counted upon the goodwill and support of their constituents, which simmered down to a reliance upon voluntary grants from the States in response to appeals from Congress. These desultory grants proved to be so unsatisfactory that, in 1781, even before the Articles of Confederation had been ratified, Congress asked for a grant of additional power to levy a duty of five per cent ad valorem upon all goods imported into the United States, the revenue from which was to be applied to the discharge of the principal and interest on debts "contracted... for supporting the present war." Twelve States agreed, but Rhode Island, after some hesitation, finally rejected the measure in November, 1782.

The Articles of Confederation authorized a system of requisitions apportioned among the "several States in proportion to the value of all land within each State." But, as there was no power vested in Congress to force the States to comply, the situation was in no way improved when the Articles were ratified and put into operation. In fact, matters grew worse as Congress itself steadily lost ground in popular estimation, until it had become little better than a laughing-stock, and with the ending of the war its requests were more honored in the breach than in the observance. In 1782 Congress asked for $8,000,000 and the following year for $2,000,000 more, but by the end of 1783 less than $1,500,000 had been paid in.

In the same year, 1783, Congress made another attempt to remedy the financial situation by proposing the so-called Revenue Amendment, according to which a specific duty was to be laid upon certain articles and a general duty of five per cent ad valorem upon all other goods, to be in operation for twenty-five years. In addition to this it was proposed that for the same period of time $1,500,000 annually should be raised by requisitions, and the definite amount for each State was specified until "the rule of the Confederation" could be carried into practice: It was then proposed that the article providing for the proportion of requisitions should be changed so as to be based not upon land values but upon population, in estimating which slaves should be counted at three-fifths of their number. In the course of three years thereafter only two States accepted the proposals in full, seven agreed to them in part, and four failed to act at all. Congress in despair then made a further representation to the States upon the critical condition of the finances and accompanied this with an urgent appeal, which resulted in all the States except New York agreeing to the proposed impost. But the refusal of one State was sufficient to block the whole measure, and there was no further hope for a treasury that was practically bankrupt. In five years Congress had received less than two and one-half million dollars from requisitions, and for the fourteen months ending January 1, 1786, the income was at the rate of less than $375,000 a year, which was not enough, as a committee of Congress reported, "for the bare maintenance of the Federal Government on the most economical establishment and in time of profound peace." In fact, the income was not sufficient even to meet the interest on the foreign debt.

In the absence of other means of obtaining funds Congress had resorted early to the unfortunate expedient of issuing paper money based solely on the good faith of the States to redeem it. This fiat money held its value for some little time; then it began to shrink and, once started on the downward path, its fall was rapid. Congress tried to meet the emergency by issuing paper in increasing quantities until the inevitable happened: the paper money ceased to have any value and practically disappeared from circulation. Jefferson said that by the end of 1781 one thousand dollars of Continental scrip was worth about one dollar in specie.

The States had already issued paper money of their own, and their experience ought to have taught them a lesson, but with the coming of hard times after the war, they once more proposed by issuing paper to relieve the "scarcity of money" which was commonly supposed to be one of the principal evils of the day. In 1785 and 1786 paper money parties appeared in almost all the States. In some of these the conservative element was strong enough to prevent action, but in others the movement had to run its fatal course. The futility of what they were doing should have been revealed to all concerned by proposals seriously made that the paper money which was issued should depreciate at a regular rate each year until it should finally disappear.

The experience of Rhode Island is not to be regarded as typical of what was happening throughout the country but is, indeed, rather to be considered as exceptional. Yet it attracted widespread attention and revealed to anxious observers the dangers to which the country was subject if the existing condition of affairs were allowed to continue. The machinery of the State Government was captured by the paper-money party in the spring election of 1786. The results were disappointing to the adherents of the paper-money cause, for when the money was issued depreciation began at once, and those who tried to pay their bills discovered that a heavy discount was demanded. In response to indignant demands the legislature of Rhode Island passed an act to force the acceptance of paper money under penalty and thereupon tradesmen refused to make any sales at all some closed their shops, and others tried to carry on business by exchange of wares. The farmers then retaliated by refusing to sell their produce to the shopkeepers, and general confusion and acute distress followed. It was mainly a quarrel between the farmers and the merchants, but it easily grew into a division between town and country, and there followed a whole series of town meetings and county conventions. The old line of cleavage was fairly well represented by the excommunication of a member of St. John's Episcopal Church of Providence for tendering bank notes, and the expulsion of a member of the Society of the Cincinnati for a similar cause.

The contest culminated in the case of Trevett vs. Weeden, 1786, which is memorable in the judicial annals of the United States. The legislature, not being satisfied with ordinary methods of enforcement, had provided for the summary trial of offenders without a jury before a court whose judges were removable by the Assembly and were therefore supposedly subservient to its wishes. In the case in question the Superior Court boldly declared the enforcing act to be unconstitutional, and for their contumacious behavior the judges were summoned before the legislature. They escaped punishment, but only one of them was reelected to office.

Meanwhile disorders of a more serious sort, which startled the whole country, occurred in Massachusetts. It is doubtful if a satisfactory explanation ever will be found, at least one which will be universally accepted, as to the causes and origin of Shays' Rebellion in 1786. Some historians maintain that the uprising resulted primarily from a scarcity of money, from a shortage in the circulating medium; that, while the eastern counties were keeping up their foreign trade sufficiently at least to bring in enough metallic currency to relieve the stringency and could also use various forms of credit, the western counties had no such remedy. Others are inclined to think that the difficulties of the farmers in western Massachusetts were caused largely by the return to normal conditions after the extraordinarily good times between 1776 and 1780, and that it was the discomfort attending the process that drove them to revolt. Another explanation reminds one of present-day charges against undue influence of high financial circles, when it is insinuated and even directly charged that the rebellion was fostered by conservative interests who were trying to create a public opinion in favor of a more strongly organized government.

Whatever other causes there may have been, the immediate source of trouble was the enforced payment of indebtedness, which to a large extent had been allowed to remain in abeyance during the war. This postponement of settlement had not been merely for humanitarian reasons; it would have been the height of folly to collect when the currency was greatly depreciated. But conditions were supposed to have been restored to normal with the cessation of hostilities, and creditors were generally inclined to demand payment. These demands, coinciding with the heavy taxes, drove the people of western Massachusetts into revolt. Feeling ran high against lawyers who prosecuted suits for creditors, and this antagonism was easily transferred to the courts in which the suits were brought. The rebellion in Massachusetts accordingly took the form of a demonstration against the courts. A paper was carried from town to town in the County of Worcester, in which the signers promised to do their utmost "to prevent the sitting of the Inferior Court of Common Pleas for the county, or of any other court that should attempt to take property by distress."

The Massachusetts Legislature adjourned in July, 1786, without remedying the trouble and also without authorizing an issue of paper money which the hardpressed debtors were demanding. In the months following mobs prevented the courts from sitting in various towns. A special session of the legislature was then called by the Governor but, when that special session had adjourned on the 18th of November, it might just as well have never met. It had attempted to remedy various grievances and had made concessions to the malcontents, but it had also passed measures to strengthen the hands of the Governor. This only seemed to inflame the rioters, and the disorders increased. After the lower courts a move was made against the State Supreme Court, and plans were laid for a concerted movement against the cities in the eastern part of the State. Civil war seemed imminent. The insurgents were led by Daniel Shays, an officer in the army of the Revolution, and the party of law and order was represented by Governor James Bowdoin, who raised some four thousand troops and placed them under the command of General Benjamin Lincoln.

The time of year was unfortunate for the insurgents, especially as December was unusually cold and there was a heavy snowfall. Shays could not provide stores and equipment and was unable to maintain discipline. A threatened attack on Cambridge came to naught for, when preparations were made to protect the city, the rebels began a disorderly retreat, and in the intense cold and deep snow they suffered severely, and many died from exposure. The center of interest then shifted to Springfield, where the insurgents were attempting to seize the United States arsenal. The local militia had already repelled the first attacks, and the appearance of General Lincoln with his troops completed the demoralization of Shays' army. The insurgents retreated, but Lincoln pursued relentlessly and broke them up into small bands, which then wandered about the country preying upon the unfortunate inhabitants. When spring came, most of them had been subdued or had taken refuge in the neighboring States.

Shays' Rebellion was fairly easily suppressed, even though it required the shedding of some blood. But it was the possibility of further outbreaks that destroyed men's peace of mind. There were similar disturbances in other States; and there the Massachusetts insurgents found sympathy, support, and finally a refuge. When the worst was over, and Governor Bowdoin applied to the neighboring States for help in capturing the last of the refugees, Rhode Island and Vermont failed to respond to the extent that might have been expected of them. The danger, therefore, of the insurrection spreading was a cause of deep concern. This feeling was increased by the impotence of Congress. The Government had sufficient excuse for intervention after the attack upon the national arsenal in Springfield. Congress, indeed, began to raise troops but did not dare to admit its purpose and offered as a pretext an expedition against the Northwestern Indians. The rebellion was over before any assistance could be given. The inefficiency of Congress and its lack of influence were evident. Like the disorders in Rhode Island, Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts helped to bring about a reaction and strengthened the conservative movement for reform.

These untoward happenings, however, were only symptoms: the causes of the trouble lay far deeper. This fact was recognized even in Rhode Island, for at least one of the conventions had passed resolutions declaring that, in considering the condition of the whole country, what particularly concerned them was the condition of trade. Paradoxical as it may seem, the trade and commerce of the country were already on the upward grade and prosperity was actually returning. But prosperity is usually a process of slow growth and is seldom recognized by the community at large until it is well established. Farsighted men forecast the coming of good times in advance of the rest of the community, and prosper accordingly. The majority of the people know that prosperity has come only when it is unmistakably present, and some are not aware of it until it has begun to go. If that be true in our day, much more was it true in the eighteenth century, when means of communication were so poor that it took days for a message to go from Boston to New York and weeks for news to get from Boston to Charleston. It was a period of adjustment, and as we look back after the event we can see that the American people were adapting themselves with remarkable skill to the new conditions. But that was not so evident to the men who were feeling the pinch of hard times, and when all the attendant circumstances, some of which have been described, are taken into account, it is not surprising that commercial depression should be one of the strongest influences in, and the immediate occasion of, bringing men to the point of willingness to attempt some radical changes.

The fact needs to be reiterated that the people of the United States were largely dependent upon agriculture and other forms of extractive industry, and that markets for the disposal of their goods were an absolute necessity. Some of the States, especially New England and the Middle States, were interested in the carrying trade, but all were concerned in obtaining markets. On account of jealousy interstate trade continued a precarious existence and by no means sufficed to dispose of the surplus products, so that foreign markets were necessary. The people were especially concerned for the establishment of the old trade with the West India Islands, which had been the mainstay of their prosperity in colonial times; and after the British Government, in 1783, restricted that trade to British vessels, many people in the United States were attributing hard times to British malignancy. The only action which seemed possible was to force Great Britain in particular, but other foreign countries as well, to make such trade agreements as the prosperity of the United States demanded. The only hope seemed to lie in a commercial policy of reprisal which would force other countries to open their markets to American goods. Retaliation was the dominating idea in the foreign policy of the time. So in 1784 Congress made a new recommendation to the States, prefacing it with an assertion of the importance of commerce, saying: "The fortune of every Citizen is interested in the success thereof; for it is the constant source of wealth and incentive to industry; and the value of our produce and our land must ever rise or fall in proportion to the prosperous or adverse state of trade."

And after declaring that Great Britain had "adopted regulations destructive of our commerce with her West India Islands," it was further asserted: "Unless the United States in Congress assembled shall be vested with powers competent to the protection of commerce, they can never command reciprocal advantages in trade." It was therefore proposed to give to Congress for fifteen years the power to prohibit the importation or exportation of goods at American ports except in vessels owned by the people of the United States or by the subjects of foreign governments having treaties of commerce with the United States. This was simply a request for authorization to adopt navigation acts. But the individual States were too much concerned with their own interests and did not or would not appreciate the rights of the other States or the interests of the Union as a whole. And so the commercial amendment of 1784 suffered the fate of all other amendments proposed to the Articles of Confederation. In fact only two States accepted it.

It usually happens that some minor occurrence, almost unnoticed at the time, leads directly to the most important consequences. And an incident in domestic affairs started the chain of events in the United States that ended in the reform of the Federal Government. The rivalry and jealousy among the States had brought matters to such a pass that either Congress must be vested with adequate powers or the Confederation must collapse. But the Articles of Confederation provided no remedy, and it had been found that amendments to that instrument could not be obtained. It was necessary, therefore, to proceed in some extra-legal fashion. The Articles of Confederation specifically forbade treaties or alliances between the States unless approved by Congress. Yet Virginia and Maryland, in 1785, had come to a working agreement regarding the use of the Potomac River, which was the boundary line between them. Commissioners representing both parties had met at Alexandria and soon adjourned to Mount Vernon, where they not only reached an amicable settlement of the immediate questions before them but also discussed the larger subjects of duties and commercial matters in general. When the Maryland legislature came to act on the report, it proposed that Pennsylvania and Delaware should be invited to join with them in formulating a common commercial policy. Virginia then went one step farther and invited all the other States to send commissioners to a general trade convention and later announced Annapolis as the place of meeting and set the time for September, 1786.

This action was unconstitutional and was so recognized, for James Madison notes that "from the Legislative Journals of Virginia it appears, that a vote to apply for a sanction of Congress was followed by a vote against a communication of the Compact to Congress," and he mentions other similar violations of the central authority. That this did not attract more attention was probably due to the public interest being absorbed just at that time by the paper money agitation. Then, too, the men concerned seem to have been willing to avoid publicity. Their purposes are well brought out in a letter of Monsieur Louis Otto, French Charge d'Affaires, written on October 10, 1786, to the Comte de Vergennes, Minister for Foreign Affairs, though their motives may be somewhat misinterpreted.

"Although there are no nobles in America, there is a class of men denominated "gentlemen," who, by reason of their wealth, their talents, their education, their families, or the offices they hold, aspire to a preeminence which the people refuse to grant them; and, although many of these men have betrayed the interests of their order to gain popularity, there reigns among them a connection so much the more intimate as they almost all of them dread the efforts of the people to despoil them of their possessions, and, moreover, they are creditors, and therefore interested in strengthening the government, and watching over the execution of the laws.

"These men generally pay very heavy taxes, while the small proprietors escape the vigilance of the collectors. The majority of them being merchants, it is for their interest to establish the credit of the United States in Europe on a solid foundation by the exact payment of debts, and to grant to congress powers extensive enough to compel the people to contribute for this purpose. The attempt, my lord, has been vain, by pamphlets and other publications, to spread notions of justice and integrity, and to deprive the people of a freedom which they have so misused. By proposing a new organization of the federal government all minds would have been revolted; circumstances ruinous to the commerce of America have happily arisen to furnish the reformers with a pretext for introducing innovations.

"They represented to the people that the American name had become opprobrious among all the nations of Europe; that the flag of the United States was everywhere exposed to insults and annoyance; the husbandman, no longer able to export his produce freely, would soon be reduced to want; it was high time to retaliate, and to convince foreign powers that the United States would not with impunity suffer such a violation of the freedom of trade, but that strong measures could be taken only with the consent of the thirteen states, and that congress, not having the necessary powers, it was essential to form a general assembly instructed to present to congress the plan for its adoption, and to point out the means of carrying it into execution.

"The people, generally discontented with the obstacles in the way of commerce, and scarcely suspecting the secret motives of their opponents, ardently embraced this measure, and appointed commissioners, who were to assemble at Annapolis in the beginning of September.

"The authors of this proposition had no hope, nor even desire, to see the success of this assembly of commissioners, which was only intended to prepare a question much more important than that of commerce. The measures were so well taken that at the end of September no more than five states were represented at Annapolis, and the commissioners from the northern states tarried several days at New York in order to retard their arrival.

"The states which assembled, after having waited nearly three weeks, separated under the pretext that they were not in sufficient numbers to enter on business, and, to justify this dissolution, they addressed to the different legislatures and to congress a report, the translation of which I have the honor to enclose to you."*

* Quoted by Bancroft, "History of the Formation of the Constitution," vol. ii, Appendix, pp. 399-400.

Among these "men denominated 'gentlemen'" to whom the French Charge d'Affaires alludes, was James Madison of Virginia. He was one of the younger men, unfitted by temperament and physique to be a soldier, who yet had found his opportunity in the Revolution. Graduating in 1771 from Princeton, where tradition tells of the part he took in patriotic demonstrations on the campus—characteristic of students then as now—he had thrown himself heart and soul into the American cause. He was a member of the convention to frame the first State Constitution for Virginia in 1776, and from that time on, because of his ability, he was an important figure in the political history of his State and of his country. He was largely responsible for bringing about the conference between Virginia and Maryland and for the subsequent steps resulting in the trade convention at Annapolis. And yet Madison seldom took a conspicuous part, preferring to remain in the background and to allow others to appear as the leaders. When the Annapolis Convention assembled, for example, he suffered Alexander Hamilton of New York to play the leading role.

Hamilton was then approaching thirty years of age and was one of the ablest men in the United States. Though his best work was done in later years, when he proved himself to be perhaps the most brilliant of American statesmen, with an extraordinary genius for administrative organization, the part that he took in the affairs of this period was important. He was small and slight in person but with an expressive face, fair complexion, and cheeks of "almost feminine rosiness." The usual aspect of his countenance was thoughtful and even severe, but in conversation his face lighted up with a remarkably attractive smile. He carried himself erectly and with dignity, so that in spite of his small figure, when he entered a room "it was apparent, from the respectful attention of the company, that he was a distinguished person." A contemporary, speaking of the opposite and almost irreconcilable traits of Hamilton's character, pronounced a bust of him as giving a complete exposition of his character: "Draw a handkerchief around the mouth of the bust, and the remnant of the countenance represents fortitude and intrepidity such as we have often seen in the plates of Roman heroes. Veil in the same manner the face and leave the mouth and chin only discernible, and all this fortitude melts and vanishes into almost feminine softness."

Hamilton was a leading spirit in the Annapolis Trade Convention and wrote the report that it adopted. Whether or not there is any truth in the assertion of the French charge that Hamilton and others thought it advisable to disguise their purposes, there is no doubt that the Annapolis Convention was an all-important step in the progress of reform, and its recommendation was the direct occasion of the calling of the great convention that framed the Constitution of the United States.

The recommendation of the Annapolis delegates was in the form of a report to the legislatures of their respective States, in which they referred to the defects in the Federal Government and called for "a convention of deputies from the different states for the special purpose of entering into this investigation and digesting a Plan for supplying such defects." Philadelphia was suggested as the place of meeting, and the time was fixed for the second Monday in May of the next year.

Several of the States acted promptly upon this recommendation and in February, 1787, Congress adopted a resolution accepting the proposal and calling the convention "for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting. .. such alterations... as shall... render the Federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union." Before the time fixed for the meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, or shortly after that date, all the States had appointed deputies with the exception of New Hampshire and Rhode Island. New Hampshire was favorably disposed toward the meeting but, owing to local conditions, failed to act before the Convention was well under way. Delegates, however, arrived in time to share in some of the most important proceedings. Rhode Island alone refused to take part, although a letter signed by some of the prominent men was sent to the Convention pledging their support.



CHAPTER VI. THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

The body of delegates which met in Philadelphia in 1787 was the most important convention that ever sat in the United States. The Confederation was a failure, and if the new nation was to be justified in the eyes of the world, it must show itself capable of effective union. The members of the Convention realized the significance of the task before them, which was, as Madison said, "now to decide forever the fate of Republican government." Gouverneur Morris, with unwonted seriousness, declared: "The whole human race will be affected by the proceedings of this Convention." James Wilson spoke with equal gravity: "After the lapse of six thousand years since the creation of the world America now presents the first instance of a people assembled to weigh deliberately and calmly and to decide leisurely and peaceably upon the form of government by which they will bind themselves and their posterity."

Not all the men to whom this undertaking was entrusted, and who were taking themselves and their work so seriously, could pretend to social distinction, but practically all belonged to the upper ruling class. At the Indian Queen, a tavern on Fourth Street between Market and Chestnut, some of the delegates had a hall in which they lived by themselves. The meetings of the Convention were held in an upper room of the State House. The sessions were secret; sentries were placed at the door to keep away all intruders; and the pavement of the street in front of the building was covered with loose earth so that the noises of passing traffic should not disturb this august assembly. It is not surprising that a tradition grew up about the Federal Convention which hedged it round with a sort of awe and reverence. Even Thomas Jefferson referred to it as "an assembly of demigods." If we can get away from the glamour which has been spread over the work of the Fathers of the Constitution and understand that they were human beings, even as we are, and influenced by the same motives as other men, it may be possible to obtain a more faithful impression of what actually took place.

Since representation in the Convention was to be by States, just as it had been in the Continental Congress, the presence of delegations from a majority of the States was necessary for organization. It is a commentary upon the times, upon the difficulties of travel, and upon the leisurely habits of the people, that the meeting which had been called for the 14th of May could not begin its work for over ten days. The 25th of May was stormy, and only twenty-nine delegates were on hand when the Convention organized. The slender attendance can only partially be attributed to the weather, for in the following three months and a half of the Convention, at which fifty-five members were present at one time or another, the average attendance was only slightly larger than that of the first day. In such a small body personality counted for much, in ways that the historian can only surmise. Many compromises of conflicting interests were reached by informal discussion outside of the formal sessions. In these small gatherings individual character was often as decisive as weighty argument.

George Washington was unanimously chosen as the presiding officer of the Convention. He sat on a raised platform; in a large, carved, high-backed chair, from which his commanding figure and dignified bearing exerted a potent influence on the assembly; an influence enhanced by the formal courtesy and stately intercourse of the times. Washington was the great man of his day and the members not only respected and admired him; some of them were actually afraid of him. When he rose to his feet he was almost the Commander-in-Chief again. There is evidence to show that his support or disapproval was at times a decisive factor in the deliberations of the Convention.

Virginia, which had taken a conspicuous part in the calling of the Convention, was looked to for leadership in the work that was to be done. James Madison, next to Washington the most important member of the Virginia delegation, was the very opposite of Washington in many respects—small and slight in stature, inconspicuous in dress as in figure, modest and retiring, but with a quick, active mind and wide knowledge obtained both from experience in public affairs and from extensive reading. Washington was the man of action; Madison, the scholar in politics. Madison was the younger by nearly twenty years, but Washington admired him greatly and gave him the support of his influence—a matter of no little consequence, for Madison was the leading expert worker of the Convention in the business of framing the Constitution. Governor Edmund Randolph, with his tall figure, handsome face, and dignified manner, made an excellent impression in the position accorded to him of nominal leader of the Virginia delegation. Among others from the same State who should be noticed were the famous lawyers, George Wythe and George Mason.

Among the deputies from Pennsylvania the foremost was James Wilson, the "Caledonian," who probably stood next in importance in the convention to Madison and Washington. He had come to America as a young man just when the troubles with England were beginning and by sheer ability had attained a position of prominence. Several times a member of Congress, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, he was now regarded as one of the ablest lawyers in the United States. A more brilliant member of the Pennsylvania delegation, and one of the most brilliant of the Convention, was Gouverneur Morris, who shone by his cleverness and quick wit as well as by his wonderful command of language. But Morris was admired more than he was trusted; and, while he supported the efforts for a strong government, his support was not always as great a help as might have been expected. A crippled arm and a wooden leg might detract from his personal appearance, but they could not subdue his spirit and audacity.*

* There is a story which illustrates admirably the audacity of Morris and the austere dignity of Washington. The story runs that Morris and several members of the Cabinet were spending an evening at the President's house in Philadelphia, where they were discussing the absorbing question of the hour, whatever it may have been. "The President," Morris is said to have related on the following day, "was standing with his arms behind him—his usual position—his back to the fire. I started up and spoke, stamping, as I walked up and down, with my wooden leg; and, as I was certain I had the best of the argument, as I finished I stalked up to the President, slapped him on the back, and said. "Ain't I right, General?" The President did not speak, but the majesty of the American people was before me. Oh, his look! How I wished the floor would open and I could descend to the cellar! You know me," continued Mr. Morris, "and you know my eye would never quail before any other mortal."—W. T. Read, Life and Correspondence of George Read (1870) p.441.

There were other prominent members of the Pennsylvania delegation, but none of them took an important part in the Convention, not even the aged Benjamin Franklin, President of the State. At the age of eighty-one his powers were failing, and he was so feeble that his colleague Wilson read his speeches for him. His opinions were respected, but they do not seem to have carried much weight.

Other noteworthy members of the Convention, though hardly in the first class, were the handsome and charming Rufus King of Massachusetts, one of the coming men of the country, and Nathaniel Gorham of the same State, who was President of Congress—a man of good sense rather than of great ability, but one whose reputation was high and whose presence was a distinct asset to the Convention. Then, too, there were the delegates from South Carolina: John Rutledge, the orator, General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of Revolutionary fame, and his cousin, Charles Pinckney. The last named took a conspicuous part in the proceedings in Philadelphia but, so far as the outcome was concerned, left his mark on the Constitution mainly in minor matters and details.

The men who have been named were nearly all supporters of the plan for a centralized government. On the other side were William Paterson of New Jersey, who had been Attorney-General of his State for eleven years and who was respected for his knowledge and ability; John Dickinson of Delaware, the author of the "Farmer's Letters" and chairman of the committee of Congress that had framed the Articles of Confederation—able, scholarly, and sincere, but nervous, sensitive, and conscientious to the verge of timidity—whose refusal to sign the Declaration of Independence had cost him his popularity, though he was afterward returned to Congress and became president successively of Delaware and of Pennsylvania; Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, a successful merchant, prominent in politics, and greatly interested in questions of commerce and finance; and the Connecticut delegates, forming an unusual trio, Dr. William Samuel Johnson, Roger Sherman, and Oliver Ellsworth. These men were fearful of establishing too strong a government and were at one time or another to be found in opposition to Madison and his supporters. They were not mere obstructionists, however, and while not constructive in the same way that Madison and Wilson were, they must be given some credit for the form which the Constitution finally assumed. Their greatest service was in restraining the tendency of the majority to overrule the rights of States and in modifying the desires of individuals for a government that would have been too strong to work well in practice.

Alexander Hamilton of New York, as one of the ablest members of the Convention, was expected to take an important part, but he was out of touch with the views of the majority. He was aristocratic rather than democratic and, however excellent his ideas may have been, they were too radical for his fellow delegates and found but little support. He threw his strength in favor of a strong government and was ready to aid the movement in whatever way he could. But within his own delegation he was outvoted by Robert Yates and John Lansing, and before the sessions were half over he was deprived of a vote by the withdrawal of his colleagues. Thereupon, finding himself of little service, he went to New York and returned to Philadelphia only once or twice for a few days at a time, and finally to sign the completed document. Luther Martin of Maryland was an able lawyer and the Attorney-General of his State; but he was supposed to be allied with undesirable interests, and it was said that he had been sent to the Convention for the purpose of opposing a strong government. He proved to be a tiresome speaker and his prosiness, when added to the suspicion attaching to his motives, cost him much of the influence which he might otherwise have had.

All in all, the delegates to the Federal Convention were a remarkable body of men. Most of them had played important parts in the drama of the Revolution; three-fourths of them had served in Congress, and practically all were persons of note in their respective States and had held important public positions. They may not have been the "assembly of demigods" which Jefferson called them, for another contemporary insisted "that twenty assemblies of equal number might be collected equally respectable both in point of ability, integrity, and patriotism." Perhaps it would be safer to regard the Convention as a fairly representative body, which was of a somewhat higher order than would be gathered together today, because the social conditions of those days tended to bring forward men of a better class, and because the seriousness of the crisis had called out leaders of the highest type.

Two or three days were consumed in organizing the Convention—electing officers, considering the delegates' credentials, and adopting rules of procedure; and when these necessary preliminaries had been accomplished the main business was opened with the presentation by the Virginia delegation of a series of resolutions providing for radical changes in the machinery of the Confederation. The principal features were the organization of a legislature of two houses proportional to population and with increased powers, the establishment of a separate executive, and the creation of an independent judiciary. This was in reality providing for a new government and was probably quite beyond the ideas of most of the members of the Convention, who had come there under instructions and with the expectation of revising the Articles of Confederation. But after the Virginia Plan had been the subject of discussion for two weeks so that the members had become a little more accustomed to its proposals, and after minor modifications had been made in the wording of the resolutions, the Convention was won over to its support. To check this drift toward radical change the opposition headed by New Jersey and Connecticut presented the so-called New Jersey Plan, which was in sharp contrast to the Virginia Resolutions, for it contemplated only a revision of the Articles of Confederation, but after a relatively short discussion, the Virginia Plan was adopted by a vote of seven States against four, with one State divided.

The dividing line between the two parties or groups in the Convention had quickly manifested itself. It proved to be the same line that had divided the Congress of the Confederation, the cleavage between the large States and the small States. The large States were in favor of representation in both houses of the legislature according to population, while the small States were opposed to any change which would deprive them of their equal vote in Congress, and though outvoted, they were not ready to yield. The Virginia Plan, and subsequently the New Jersey Plan, had first been considered in committee of the whole, and the question of "proportional representation," as it was then called, would accordingly come up again in formal session. Several weeks had been occupied by the proceedings, so that it was now near the end of June, and in general the discussions had been conducted with remarkably good temper. But it was evidently the calm before the storm. And the issue was finally joined when the question of representation in the two houses again came before the Convention. The majority of the States on the 29th of June once more voted in favor of proportional representation in the lower house. But on the question of the upper house, owing to a peculiar combination of circumstances—the absence of one delegate and another's change of vote causing the position of their respective States to be reversed or nullified—the vote on the 2d of July resulted in a tie. This brought the proceedings of the Convention to a standstill. A committee of one member from each State was appointed to consider the question, and, "that time might be given to the Committee, and to such as chose to attend to the celebration on the anniversary of Independence, the Convention adjourned" over the Fourth. The committee was chosen by ballot, and its composition was a clear indication that the small-State men had won their fight, and that a compromise would be effected.

It was during the debate upon this subject, when feeling was running high and when at times it seemed as if the Convention in default of any satisfactory solution would permanently adjourn, that Franklin proposed that "prayers imploring the assistance of Heaven... be held in this Assembly every morning." Tradition relates that Hamilton opposed the motion. The members were evidently afraid of the impression which would be created outside, if it were suspected that there were dissensions in the Convention, and the motion was not put to a vote.

How far physical conditions may influence men in adopting any particular course of action it is impossible to say. But just when the discussion in the Convention reached a critical stage, just when the compromise presented by the committee was ready for adoption or rejection, the weather turned from unpleasantly hot to being comfortably cool. And, after some little time spent in the consideration Of details, on the 16th of July, the great compromise of the Constitution was adopted. There was no other that compared with it in importance. Its most significant features were that in the upper house each State should have an equal vote and that in the lower house representation should be apportioned on the basis of population, while direct taxation should follow the same proportion. The further proviso that money bills should originate in the lower house and should not be amended in the upper house was regarded by some delegates as of considerable importance, though others did not think so, and eventually the restriction upon amendment by the upper house was dropped.

There has long been a prevailing belief that an essential feature of the great compromise was the counting of only three-fifths of the slaves in enumerating the population. This impression is quite erroneous. It was one of the details of the compromise, but it had been a feature of the revenue amendment of 1783, and it was generally accepted as a happy solution of the difficulty that slaves possessed the attributes both of persons and of property. It had been included both in the amended Virginia Plan and in the New Jersey Plan; and when it was embodied in the compromise it was described as "the ratio recommended by Congress in their resolutions of April 18, 1783." A few months later, in explaining the matter to the Massachusetts convention, Rufus King said that, "This rule... was adopted because it was the language of all America." In reality the three-fifths rule was a mere incident in that part of the great compromise which declared that "representation should be proportioned according to direct taxation." As a further indication of the attitude of the Convention upon this point, an amendment to have the blacks counted equally with the whites was voted down by eight States against two.

With the adoption of the great compromise a marked difference was noticeable in the attitude of the delegates. Those from the large States were deeply disappointed at the result and they asked for an adjournment to give them time to consider what they should do. The next morning, before the Convention met, they held a meeting to determine upon their course of action. They were apparently afraid of taking the responsibility for breaking up the Convention, so they finally decided to let the proceedings go on and to see what might be the ultimate outcome. Rumors of these dissensions had reached the ears of the public, and it may have been to quiet any misgivings that the following inspired item appeared in several local papers: "So great is the unanimity, we hear, that prevails in the Convention, upon all great federal subjects, that it has been proposed to call the room in which they assemble Unanimity Hall."

On the other hand the effect of this great compromise upon the delegates from the small States was distinctly favorable. Having obtained equal representation in one branch of the legislature, they now proceeded with much greater willingness to consider the strengthening of the central government. Many details were yet to be arranged, and sharp differences of opinion existed in connection with the executive as well as with the judiciary. But these difficulties were slight in comparison with those which they had already surmounted in the matter of representation. By the end of July the fifteen resolutions of the original Virginia Plan had been increased to twenty-three, with many enlargements and amendments, and the Convention had gone as far as it could effectively in determining the general principles upon which the government should be formed. There were too many members to work efficiently when it came to the actual framing of a constitution with all the inevitable details that were necessary in setting up a machinery of government. Accordingly this task was turned over to a committee of five members who had already given evidence of their ability in this direction. Rutledge was made the chairman, and the others were Randolph, Gorham, Ellsworth, and Wilson. To give them time to perfect their work, on the 26th of July the Convention adjourned for ten days.



CHAPTER VII. FINISHING THE WORK

Rutledge and his associates on the committee of detail accomplished so much in such a short time that it seems as if they must have worked day and night. Their efforts marked a distinct stage in the development of the Constitution. The committee left no records, but some of the members retained among their private papers drafts of the different stages of the report they were framing, and we are therefore able to surmise the way in which the committee proceeded. Of course the members were bound by the resolutions which had been adopted by the Convention and they held themselves closely to the general principles that had been laid down. But in the elaboration of details they seem to have begun with the Articles of Confederation and to have used all of that document that was consistent with the new plan of government. Then they made use of the New Jersey Plan, which had been put forward by the smaller States, and of a third plan which had been presented by Charles Pinckney; for the rest they drew largely upon the State Constitutions. By a combination of these different sources the committee prepared a document bearing a close resemblance to the present Constitution, although subjects were in a different order and in somewhat different proportions, which, at the end of ten days, by working on Sunday, they were able to present to the Convention. This draft of a constitution was printed on seven folio pages with wide margins for notes and emendations.

The Convention resumed its sessions on Monday, the 6th of August, and for five weeks the report of the committee of detail was the subject of discussion. For five hours each day, and sometimes for six hours, the delegates kept persistently at their task. It was midsummer, and we read in the diary of one of the members that in all that period only five days were "cool." Item by item, line by line, the printed draft of the Constitution was considered. It is not possible, nor is it necessary, to follow that work minutely; much of it was purely formal, and yet any one who has had experience with committee reports knows how much importance attaches to matters of phrasing. Just as the Virginia Plan was made more acceptable to the majority by changes in wording that seem to us insignificant, so modifications in phrasing slowly won support for the draft of the Constitution.

The adoption of the great compromise, as we have seen, changed the whole spirit of the Convention. There was now an expectation on the part of the members that something definite was going to be accomplished, and all were concerned in making the result as good and as acceptable as possible. In other words, the spirit of compromise pervaded every action, and it is essential to remember this in considering what was accomplished.

One of the greatest weaknesses of the Confederation was the inefficiency of Congress. More than four pages, or three-fifths of the whole printed draft, were devoted to Congress and its powers. It is more significant, however, that in the new Constitution the legislative powers of the Confederation were transferred bodily to the Congress of the United States, and that the powers added were few in number, although of course of the first importance. The Virginia Plan declared that, in addition to the powers under the Confederation, Congress should have the right "to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent." This statement was elaborated in the printed draft which granted specific powers of taxation, of regulating commerce, of establishing a uniform rule of naturalization, and at the end of the enumeration of powers two clauses were added giving to Congress authority:

"To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;

"And to make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers."

On the other hand, it was necessary to place some limitations upon the power of Congress. A general restriction was laid by giving to the executive a right of veto, which might be overruled, however, by a two-thirds vote of both houses. Following British tradition yielding as it were to an inherited fear—these delegates in America were led to place the first restraint upon the exercise of congressional authority in connection with treason. The legislature of the United States was given the power to declare the punishment of treason; but treason itself was defined in the Constitution, and it was further asserted that a person could be convicted of treason only on the testimony of two witnesses, and that attainder of treason should not "work corruption of blood nor forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted." Arising more nearly out of their own experience was the prohibition of export taxes, of capitation taxes, and of the granting of titles of nobility.

While the committee of detail was preparing its report, the Southern members of that committee had succeeded in getting a provision inserted that navigation acts could be passed only by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature. New England and the Middle States were strongly in favor of navigation acts for, if they could require all American products to be carried in American-built and American-owned vessels, they would give a great stimulus to the ship-building and commerce of the United States. They therefore wished to give Congress power in this matter on exactly the same terms that other powers were granted. The South, however, was opposed to this policy, for it wanted to encourage the cheapest method of shipping its raw materials. The South also wanted a larger number of slaves to meet its labor demands. To this need New England was not favorably disposed. To reconcile the conflicting interests of the two sections a compromise was finally reached. The requirement of a two-thirds vote of both houses for the passing of navigation acts which the Southern members had obtained was abandoned, and on the other hand it was determined that Congress should not be allowed to interfere with the importation of slaves for twenty years. This, again, was one of the important and conspicuous compromises of the Constitution. It is liable, however, to be misunderstood, for one should not read into the sentiment of the members of the Convention any of the later strong prejudice against slavery. There were some who objected on moral grounds to the recognition of slavery in the Constitution, and that word was carefully avoided by referring to "such Persons as any States now existing shall think proper to admit." And there were some who were especially opposed to the encouragement of that institution by permitting the slave trade, but the majority of the delegates regarded slavery as an accepted institution, as a part of the established order, and public sentiment on the slave trade was not much more emphatic and positive than it is now on cruelty to animals. As Ellsworth said, "The morality or wisdom of slavery are considerations belonging to the States themselves," and the compromise was nothing more or less than a bargain between the sections.

The fundamental weakness of the Confederation was the inability of the Government to enforce its decrees, and in spite of the increased powers of Congress, even including the use of the militia "to execute the laws of the Union," it was not felt that this defect had been entirely remedied. Experience under the Confederation had taught men that something more was necessary in the direction of restricting the States in matters which might interfere with the working of the central Government. As in the case of the powers of Congress, the Articles of Confederation were again resorted to and the restrictions which had been placed upon the States in that document were now embodied in the Constitution with modifications and additions. But the final touch was given in connection with the judiciary.

There was little in the printed draft and there is comparatively little in the Constitution on the subject of the judiciary. A Federal Supreme Court was provided for, and Congress was permitted, but not required, to establish inferior courts; while the jurisdiction of these tribunals was determined upon the general principles that it should extend to cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, to treaties and cases in which foreigners and foreign countries were involved, and to controversies between States and citizens of different States. Nowhere in the document itself is there any word as to that great power which has been exercised by the Federal courts of declaring null and void laws or parts of laws that are regarded as in contravention to the Constitution. There is little doubt that the more important men in the Convention, such as Wilson, Madison, Gouverneur Morris, King, Gerry, Mason, and Luther Martin, believed that the judiciary would exercise this power, even though it should not be specifically granted. The nearest approach to a declaration of this power is to be found in a paragraph that was inserted toward the end of the Constitution. Oddly enough, this was a modification of a clause introduced by Luther Martin with quite another intent. As adopted it reads: "That this Constitution and the Laws of the United States... and all Treaties... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." This paragraph may well be regarded as the keystone of the constitutional arch of national power. Its significance lies in the fact that the Constitution is regarded not as a treaty nor as an agreement between States, but as a law; and while its enforcement is backed by armed power, it is a law enforceable in the courts.

One whole division of the Constitution has been as yet barely referred to, and it not only presented one of the most perplexing problems which the Convention faced but one of the last to be settled—that providing for an executive. There was a general agreement in the Convention that there should be a separate executive. The opinion also developed quite early that a single executive was better than a plural body, but that was as far as the members could go with any degree of unanimity. At the outset they seemed to have thought that the executive would be dependent upon the legislature, appointed by that body, and therefore more or less subject to its control. But in the course of the proceedings the tendency was to grant greater and greater powers to the executive; in other words, he was becoming a figure of importance. No such office as that of President of the United States was then in existence. It was a new position which they were creating. We have become so accustomed to it that it is difficult for us to hark back to the time when there was no such officer and to realize the difficulties and the fears of the men who were responsible for creating that office.

The presidency was obviously modeled after the governorship of the individual States, and yet the incumbent was to be at the head of the Thirteen States. Rufus King is frequently quoted to the effect that the men of that time had been accustomed to considering themselves subjects of the British king. Even at the time of the Convention there is good evidence to show that some of the members were still agitating the desirability of establishing a monarchy in the United States. It was a common rumor that a son of George III was to be invited to come over, and there is reason to believe that only a few months before the Convention met Prince Henry of Prussia was approached by prominent people in this country to see if he could be induced to accept the headship of the States, that is, to become the king of the United States. The members of the Convention evidently thought that they were establishing something like a monarchy. As Randolph said, the people would see "the form at least of a little monarch," and they did not want him to have despotic powers. When the sessions were over, a lady asked Franklin: "Well, Doctor, what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?" "A republic," replied the doctor, "if you can keep it."

The increase of powers accruing to the executive office necessitated placing a corresponding check upon the exercise of those powers. The obvious method was to render the executive subject to impeachment, and it was also readily agreed that his veto might be overruled by a two-thirds vote of Congress; but some further safeguards were necessary, and the whole question accordingly turned upon the method of his election and the length of his term. In the course of the proceedings of the Convention, at several different times, the members voted in favor of an appointment by the national legislature, but they also voted against it. Once they voted for a system of electors chosen by the State legislatures and twice they voted against such a system. Three times they voted to reconsider the whole question. It is no wonder that Gerry should say: "We seem to be entirely at a loss."

So it came to the end of August, with most of the other matters disposed of and with the patience of the delegates worn out by the long strain of four weeks' close application. During the discussions it had become apparent to every one that an election of the President by the people would give a decided advantage to the large States, so that again there was arising the divergence between the large and small States. In order to hasten matters to a conclusion, this and all other vexing details upon which the Convention could not agree were turned over to a committee made up of a member from each State. It was this committee which pointed the way to a compromise by which the choice of the executive was to be entrusted to electors chosen in each State as its legislature might direct. The electors were to be equal in number to the State's representation in Congress, including both senators and representatives, and in each State they were to meet and to vote for two persons, one of whom should not be an inhabitant of that State. The votes were to be listed and sent to Congress, and the person who had received the greatest number of votes was to be President, provided such a number was a majority of all the electors. In case of a tie the Senate was to choose between the candidates and, if no one had a majority, the Senate was to elect "from the five highest on the list."

This method of voting would have given the large States a decided advantage, of course, in that they would appoint the greater number of electors, but it was not believed that this system would ordinarily result in a majority of votes being cast for one man. Apparently no one anticipated the formation of political parties which would concentrate the votes upon one or another candidate. It was rather expected that in the great majority of cases—"nineteen times in twenty," one of the delegates said—there would be several candidates and that the selection from those candidates would fall to the Senate, in which all the States were equally represented and the small States were in the majority. But since the Senate shared so many powers with the executive, it seemed better to transfer the right of "eventual election" to the House of Representatives, where each State was still to have but one vote. Had this scheme worked as the designers expected, the interests of large States and small States would have been reconciled, since in effect the large States would name the candidates and, "nineteen times in twenty," the small States would choose from among them.

Apparently the question of a third term was never considered by the delegates in the Convention. The chief problem before them was the method of election. If the President was to be chosen by the legislature, he should not be eligible to reelection. On the other hand, if there was to be some form of popular election, an opportunity for reelection was thought to be a desirable incentive to good behavior. Six or seven years was taken as an acceptable length for a single term and four years a convenient tenure if reelection was permitted. It was upon these considerations that the term of four years was eventually agreed upon, with no restriction placed upon reelection.

When it was believed that a satisfactory method of choosing the President had been discovered—and it is interesting to notice the members of the Convention later congratulated themselves that at least this feature of their government was above criticism—it was decided to give still further powers to the President, such as the making of treaties and the appointing of ambassadors and judges, although the advice and consent of the Senate was required, and in the case of treaties two-thirds of the members present must consent.

The presidency was frankly an experiment, the success of which would depend largely upon the first election; yet no one seems to have been anxious about the first choice of chief magistrate, and the reason is not far to seek. From the moment the members agreed that there should be a single executive they also agreed upon the man for the position. Just as Washington had been chosen unanimously to preside over the Convention, so it was generally accepted that he would be the first head of the new state. Such at least was the trend of conversation and even of debate on the floor of the Convention. It indicates something of the conception of the office prevailing at the time that Washington, when he became President, is said to have preferred the title, "His High Mightiness, the President of the United States and Protector of their Liberties."

The members of the Convention were plainly growing tired and there are evidences of haste in the work of the last few days. There was a tendency to ride rough-shod over those whose temperaments forced them to demand modifications in petty matters. This precipitancy gave rise to considerable dissatisfaction and led several delegates to declare that they would not sign the completed document. But on the whole the sentiment of the Convention was overwhelmingly favorable. Accordingly on Saturday, the 8th of September, a new committee was appointed, to consist of five members, whose duty it was "to revise the stile of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the House." The committee was chosen by ballot and was made up exclusively of friends of the new Constitution: Doctor Johnson of Connecticut, Alexander Hamilton, who had returned to Philadelphia to help in finishing the work, Gouverneur Morris, James Madison, and Rufus King. On Wednesday the twelfth, the Committee made its report, the greatest credit for which is probably to be given to Morris, whose powers of expression were so greatly admired. Another day was spent in waiting for the report to be printed. But on Thursday this was ready, and three days were devoted to going over carefully each article and section and giving the finishing touches. By Saturday the work of the Convention was brought to a close, and the Constitution was then ordered to be engrossed. On Monday, the 17th of September, the Convention met for the last time. A few of those present being unwilling to sign, Gouverneur Morris again cleverly devised a form which would make the action appear to be unanimous: "Done in Convention by the unanimous consent of the states present... in witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names." Thirty-nine delegates, representing twelve States, then signed the Constitution.

When Charles Biddle of Philadelphia, who was acquainted with most of the members of the Convention, wrote his "Autobiography," which was published in 1802, he declared that for his part he considered the government established by the Constitution to be "the best in the world, and as perfect as any human form of government can be." But he prefaced that declaration with a statement that some of the best informed members of the Federal Convention had told him "they did not believe a single member was perfectly satisfied with the Constitution, but they believed it was the best they could ever agree upon, and that it was infinitely better to have such a one than break up without fixing on some form of government, which I believe at one time it was expected they would have done."

One of the outstanding characteristics of the members of the Federal Convention was their practical sagacity. They had a very definite object before them. No matter how much the members might talk about democracy in theory or about ancient confederacies, when it came to action they did not go outside of their own experience. The Constitution was devised to correct well-known defects and it contained few provisions which had not been tested by practical political experience. Before the Convention met, some of the leading men in the country had prepared lists of the defects which existed in the Articles of Confederation, and in the Constitution practically every one of these defects was corrected and by means which had already been tested in the States and under the Articles of Confederation.



CHAPTER VIII. THE UNION ESTABLISHED

The course of English history shops that Anglo-Saxon tradition is strongly in favor of observing precedents and of trying to maintain at least the form of law, even in revolutions. When the English people found it impossible to bear with James II and made it so uncomfortable for him that he fled the country, they shifted the responsibility from their own shoulders by charging him with "breaking the original Contract between King and People." When the Thirteen Colonies had reached the point where they felt that they must separate from England, their spokesman, Thomas Jefferson, found the necessary justification in the fundamental compact of the first settlers "in the wilds of America" where "the emigrants thought proper to adopt that system of laws under which they had hitherto lived in the mother country"; and in the Declaration of Independence he charged the King of Great Britain with "repeated injuries and usurpations all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States."

And so it was with the change to the new form of government in the United States, which was accomplished only by disregarding the forms prescribed in the Articles of Confederation and has been called, therefore, "the Revolution of 1789." From the outset the new constitution was placed under the sanction of the old. The movement began with an attempt, outwardly at least, to revise the Articles of Confederation and in that form was authorized by Congress. The first breach with the past was made when the proposal in the Virginia Resolutions was accepted that amendments made by the Convention in the Articles of Confederation should be submitted to assemblies chosen by the people instead of to the legislatures of the separate States. This was the more readily accepted because it was believed that ratification by the legislatures would result in the formation of a treaty rather than in a working instrument of government. The next step was to prevent the work of the Convention from meeting the fate of all previous amendments to the Articles of Confederation, which had required the consent of every State in the Union. At the time the committee of detail made its report, the Convention was ready to agree that the consent of all the States was not necessary, and it eventually decided that, when ratified by the conventions of nine States, the Constitution should go into effect between the States so ratifying.

It was not within the province of the Convention to determine what the course of procedure should be in the individual States; so it simply transmitted the Constitution to Congress and in an accompanying document, which significantly omitted any request for the approval of Congress, strongly expressed the opinion that the Constitution should "be submitted to a convention of delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof." This was nothing less than indirect ratification by the people; and, since it was impossible to foretell in advance which of the States would or would not ratify, the original draft of "We, the People of the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,..." was changed to the phrase "We, the People of the United States." No man of that day could imagine how significant this change would appear in the light of later history.

Congress did not receive the new Constitution enthusiastically, yet after a few days' discussion it unanimously voted, eleven States being present, that the recommendations of the Convention should be followed, and accordingly sent the document to the States, but without a word of approval or disapproval. On the whole the document was well received, especially as it was favored by the upper class, who had the ability and the opportunity for expression and were in a position to make themselves heard. For a time it looked as if the Constitution would be readily adopted.