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(6) Salvage Value.—It is not constitutional error to disregard theoretical reproduction cost for a plant which "no responsible person would think of reproducing." Accordingly, where, due to adverse conditions, a street-surface railroad has lost all value except for scrap or salvage, it was permissible for a commission, as the Court held in Market St. R. Co. v. Comm'n., 324 U.S. 548, 562, 564 (1945), to use as a rate base the price at which the utility offered to sell its property to a citizen. Moreover, the Commission's order was not invalid even though under the prescribed rate the utility would operate at a loss; for the due process cannot be invoked to protect a public utility against business hazards, such as the loss of, or failure to obtain, patronage. On the other hand, in the case of a water company whose franchise has expired (Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178 (1918)), but where there is no other source of supply, its plant should be valued as actually in use rather than at what the property would bring for some other use in case the city should build its own plant.
(7) Past Losses And Gains.—"The Constitution [does not] require that the losses of * * * [a] business in one year shall be restored from future earnings by the device of capitalizing the losses and adding them to the rate base on which a fair return and depreciation allowance is to be earned." Power Comm'n. v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 590 (1942). Nor can past losses be used to enhance the value of the property to support a claim that rates for the future are confiscatory (Galveston Electric Co. v. Galveston, 258 U.S. 388 (1922)), any more than profits of the past can be used to sustain confiscatory rates for the future (Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U.S. 165, 175 (1922); Public Utility Commissioners v. New York Teleg. Co., 271 U.S. 23, 31-32 (1926)).
[223] Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Commission, 206 U.S. 1, 19 (1907), citing Chicago, B.& Q.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1877). See also Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908); Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919).
[224] Chicago & G.T.R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 344 (1892); Mississippi R. Commission v. Mobile & O.R. Co., 244 U.S. 388, 391 (1917). See also Missouri P.R. Co. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196 (1910); Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405, 415 (1935).
[225] Cleveland Electric Ry. Co. v. Cleveland, 204 U.S. 116 (1907).
[226] Detroit United Railway Co. v. Detroit, 255 U.S. 171 (1921). See also Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229 U.S. 123 (1913).
[227] Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Electric Corp., 251 U.S. 32 (1919).
[228] Newburyport Water Co. v. Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561 (1904). See also Skaneateles Waterworks Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 354 (1902); Helena Waterworks Co. v. Helena, 195 U.S. 383 (1904); Madera Waterworks v. Madera, 228 U.S. 454 (1913).
[229] Western Union Teleg. Co. v. Richmond, 224 U.S. 160 (1912).
[230] Pierce Oil Corp. v. Phoenix Ref Co., 259 U.S. 125 (1922).
[231] Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914). See also Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 255 (1897); Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Grimwood, 200 U.S. 561, 591-592 (1906); New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682 (1930).
[232] Consumers' Co. v. Hatch, 224 U.S. 148 (1912).
[233] Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Commission, 294 U.S. 613 (1935).
[234] New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Commission, 197 U.S. 453 (1905).
[235] Norfolk & S. Turnpike Co. v. Virginia, 225 U.S. 264 (1912).
[236] International Bridge Co. v. New York, 254 U.S. 126 (1920).
[237] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57 (1898).
[238] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Illinois ex rel. Grimwood, 200 U.S. 561 (1906); Chicago & A.R. Co. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915); Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Clough, 242 U.S. 375 (1917).
[239] Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Police Ct., 251 U.S. 22 (1919).
[240] Chicago, St. P., M. & O.R. Co. v. Holmberg, 282 U.S. 162 (1930).
[241] Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935). See also Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Public Utility Comrs., 278 U.S. 24 (1928).
[242] United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 278 U.S. 300, 308-309 (1929). See also New York ex rel. Woodhaven Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Commission, 269 U.S. 244 (1925); New York ex rel. New York & O. Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U.S. 345 (1917).
[243] Missouri P.R. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Taylor, 216 U.S. 262 (1910); Chesapeake & O.R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 242 U.S. 603 (1917); Ft. Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland, 267 U.S. 330 (1925).
[244] Chesapeake & O.R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 242 U.S. 603, 607 (1917); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251 U.S. 396 (1920); Railroad Commission v. Eastern Texas R. Co., 264 U.S. 79 (1924); Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537 (1930).
[245] Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 283 U.S. 380, 394-395 (1931).
[246] Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. Railroad & W. Commission, 193 U.S. 53 (1904).
[247] Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U.S. 427 (1897).
[248] Missouri P.R. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Taylor, 216 U.S. 262 (1910).
[249] Chesapeake & O.R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 242 U.S. 603 (1917).
[250] Lake Erie & W.R. Co. v. State Public Utilities Commission ex rel. Cameron, 249 U.S. 422 (1919); Western & A.R. Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission, 267 U.S. 493 (1925).
[251] Alton R. Co. v. Illinois Comm'n, 305 U.S. 548 (1939).
[252] Missouri P.R. Co. v. Nebraska, 217 U.S. 196 (1910).
[253] Chesapeake & O.R. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 242 U.S. 603, 607 (1917).
[254] Great Northern R. Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. Railroad & Warehouse Commission, 238 U.S. 340 (1915); Great Northern R. Co. v. Cahill, 253 U.S. 71 (1920).
[255] Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491 (1915).
[256] Washington ex rel. Oregon R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 528-529 (1912). See also Michigan C.R. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, 236 U.S. 615 (1915); Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 240 U.S. 324, 327 (1916).
[257] Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Central Stockyards Co., 212 U.S. 132 (1909).
[258] Michigan C.R. Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, 236 U.S. 615 (1915).
[259] Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. v. Iowa, 233 U.S. 334 (1914).
[260] Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. v. Minneapolis C. & C. Asso., 247 U.S. 490 (1918). Nor are railroads denied due process when they are forbidden to exact a greater charge for a shorter distance than for a longer distance. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U.S. 503, 512 (1902); Missouri P.R. Co. v. McGrew Coal Co., 244 U.S. 191 (1917).
[261] Wadley Southern R. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651 (1915).
[262] Richmond, F. & P.R. Co. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521 (1878).
[263] Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914).
[264] Great Northern R. Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. Clara City, 246 U.S. 434 (1918).
[265] Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919).
[266] Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. White, 278 U.S. 456 (1929).
[267] Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96 (1888).
[268] Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911); St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518 (1916); Missouri P.R. Co. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931).
[269] Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914).
[270] Erie R. Co. v. Solomon, 237 U.S. 427 (1915).
[271] New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628 (1897).
[272] Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35 (1922). See also Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); Cf. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491 (1913).
[273] Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Glenn, 239 U.S. 388 (1915).
[274] St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1 (1897).
[275] Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35 (1922).
[276] Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Anderson, 233 U.S. 325 (1914).
[277] St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354 (1912).
[278] Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165 (1914).
[279] Missouri P.R. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340 (1913).
[280] St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919).
[281] Missouri P.R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (1885); Minneapolis & St. L.R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889).
[282] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Cram, 228 U.S. 70 (1913).
[283] Southwestern Teleg. & Teleph. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915).
[284] New Orleans Debenture Redemption Co. v. Louisiana, 180 U.S. 320 (1901).
[285] Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 698 (1899).
[286] National Council v. State Council, 203 U.S. 151 (1906).
[287] Munday v. Wisconsin Trust Co., 252 U.S. 499 (1920).
[288] State Farm Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154 (1945).
[289] Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945).
[290] Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 527-528 (1934).
[291] Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447 (1905). See Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86 (1909); National Cotton Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115 (1905), also upholding antitrust laws.
[292] International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199 (1914). See also American Seeding Machine Co. v. Kentucky, 236 U.S. 660 (1915).
[293] Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217 U.S. 433 (1910).
[294] Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194 (1904).
[295] Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157 (1912).
[296] Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927).
[297] Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183 (1936); The Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U.S. 198 (1936).
[298] Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578, 588 (1913), citing McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 550 (1909).
[299] Merchants Exch. v. Missouri ex rel. Barker, 248 U.S. 365 (1919).
[300] Hauge v. Chicago, 299 U.S. 387 (1937).
[301] Lemieux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489 (1909); Kidd, D. & P. Co. v. Musselman Grocer Co., 217 U.S. 461 (1910).
[302] Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
[303] Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U.S. 578 (1913).
[304] Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924).
[305] Petersen Baking Co. v. Bryan, 290 U.S. 570 (1934).
[306] Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510 (1916).
[307] Heath & M. Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U.S. 338 (1907); Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919); National Fertilizer Asso. v. Bradley, 301 U.S. 178 (1937).
[308] Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jackson, 287 U.S. 283 (1932).
[309] Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
[310] Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425 (1902).
[311] Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903).
[312] Brodnax v. Missouri, 219 U.S. 285 (1911).
[313] House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270 (1911).
[314] Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co., 240 U.S. 342 (1916); Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369 (1916); Pitney v. Washington, 240 U.S. 387 (1916).
[315] Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911); Shallenberger v. First State Bank, 219 U.S. 114 (1911); Assaria State Bank v. Dolley, 219 U.S. 121 (1911); Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765 (1931).
[316] Provident Inst. for Savings v. Malone, 221 U.S. 660 (1911); Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
When a bank conservator appointed pursuant to a new statute has all the functions of a receiver under the old law, one of which is the enforcement on behalf of depositors of stockholders' liability, which liability the conservator can enforce as cheaply as could a receiver appointed under the pre-existing statute, it cannot be said that the new statute, in suspending the right of a depositor to have a receiver appointed, arbitrarily deprives a depositor of his remedy or destroys his property without due process of law. The depositor has no property right in any particularly form of remedy.—Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933).
[317] Doty v. Love, 295 U.S. 64 (1935).
[318] Farmers & M. Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649 (1923).
[319] Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563 (1910).
[320] Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225 (1911).
[321] La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919); Stipcich v. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 320 (1928).
[322] German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914).
[323] O'Gorman and Young v. Hartford Insur. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931).
[324] Nutting v. Massachusetts, 185 U.S. 553, 556 (1902), distinguishing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). See also Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895).
[325] Daniel v. Family Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949).
[326] Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 68-69 (1940). Dissenting from the conclusion, Justice Roberts declared that the plain effect of the Virginia law is to compel a nonresident to pay a Virginia resident for services which the latter does not in fact render.
[327] California Auto. Assn. v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951).
[328] Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
[329] New York L. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
[330] National Union F. Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922).
[331] Hartford Acci. & Indem. Co. v. Nelson (N.O.) Mfg. Co., 291 U.S. 352 (1934).
[332] Merchants Mut. Auto Liability Ins. Co. v. Smart, 267 U.S. 126 (1925).
[333] Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557 (1899).
[334] Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
[335] German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307 (1911). See also Carroll v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 199 U.S. 401 (1905).
[336] Life & C. Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934).
[337] Northwestern Nat. L. Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243 (1906).
[338] Whitfield ex rel. Hadley v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., 205 U.S. 489 (1907).
[339] Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, 207 U.S. 310 (1907).
[340] Neblett v. Carpenter, 305 U.S. 297 (1938).
[341] Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (1916).—With four Justices dissenting, the Court, in Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), "struck down a State law absolutely prohibiting maintenance of private employment agencies." Commenting on the "constitutional philosophy" thereof in Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949), Justice Black stated that Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), (see p. 997) "clearly undermined Adams v. Tanner."
[342] Liggett (Louis K.) Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
[343] McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344, 349 (1917). See also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903); Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910).
[344] Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288 (1912); Hayman v. Galveston, 273 U.S. 414 (1927).
[345] Semler v. Oregon State Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935). See also Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923); Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 427 (1926).
[346] Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332 (1904).
[347] Nashville, C. &. St. L.R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U.S. 96 (1888).
[348] Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
[349] Western Turf Asso. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 (1907).
[350] Cargill (W.W.) Co. v. Minnesota ex rel. Railroad & W. Commission, 180 U.S. 452 (1901).
[351] Lehon v. Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53 (1916).
[352] Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 185 (1900).
[353] Bourjois, Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183 (1937).
[354] Weller v. New York, 268 U.S. 319 (1925).
[355] Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932).
[356] Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907).
[357] McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920).
[358] Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891).
[359] Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912).
[360] Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260 (1912).
[361] Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 76-77 (1937), citing Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana (No. 1), 177 U.S. 100 (1900); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
[362] Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
[363] Railroad Commission v. Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940). See also R.R. Commission v. Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941); R.R. Commission v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 311 U.S. 578 (1941).
[364] Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
[365] Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Oklahoma, ibid., 190 (1950).
[366] Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920). See also Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258 (1937).
[367] Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Ct., 284 U.S. 8 (1931).
[368] Gant v. Oklahoma City, 289 U.S. 98 (1933).
[369] Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
[370] Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356-357 (1908).
[371] Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277, 279 (1928).
[372] Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915).
[373] Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422, 426 (1936).
[374] Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
[375] Miller v. McLaughlin, 281 U.S. 261, 264 (1930).
[376] Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936).
[377] Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
[378] Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908).
[379] Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
[380] Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
[381] Fischer v. St. Louis, 194 U.S. 361 (1904).
[382] Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
[383] Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907).
[384] Northwestern Laundry Co. v. Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486 (1916). For a case embracing a rather special set of facts, see Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904).
[385] Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
[386] Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Nectaw v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Cusack (Thomas) Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919).
[387] Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberage, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
[388] Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
[389] Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
[390] Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
[391] Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919).
[392] Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929).
[393] Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
[394] Maguire v. Reardon, 255 U.S. 271 (1921).
[395] Queenside Hills Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).
[396] Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902).
[397] Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905).
[398] Perley v. North Carolina, 249 U.S. 510 (1919).
[399] California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905).
[400] Hutchinson v. Valdosta, 227 U.S. 303 (1913).
[401] Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59-60 (1915).
[402] Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888); Magnano (A.) Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934).
[403] North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
[404] Adams v. Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572 (1913).
[405] Baccus v. Louisiana, 232 U.S. 334 (1914).
[406] Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337 (1929).
[407] Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921).
[408] Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242 U.S. 153 (1916).
[409] Hebe Co. v. Shaw, 248 U.S. 297 (1919).
[410] Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446 (1915).
[411] Sage Stores v. Kansas, 323 U.S. 32 (1944).
[412] Weaver v. Palmer Bros Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
[413] Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905).
[414] Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212 (1905).
[415] Stone v. Mississippi ex rel. Harris, 101 U.S. 814 (1880); Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1897).
[416] L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900).
[417] Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164 (1900).
[418] Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 33 (1878); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888); Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192 (1912); James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917); Barbour v. Georgia, 249 U.S. 454 (1919).
[419] Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 671 (1887).
[420] Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922); Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
[421] Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
[422] Stanley v. Public Utilities Commission, 295 U.S. 76 (1935).
[423] Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932).
[424] Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925).
[425] Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
[426] Bradley v. Pub. Util. Comm'n., 289 U.S. 92 (1933).
[427] Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374 (1932).
[428] Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
[429] Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
[430] Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
[431] Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 (1933). See also Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140 (1924); Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163 (1928); Hodge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335 (1932); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932).
[432] Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 564 (1942).
[433] Demorest v. City Bank Co., 321 U.S. 36, 47-48 (1944).
[434] Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1948). Justice Jackson and Douglas dissented on the ground that New York is attempting to escheat unclaimed funds not located either actually or constructively in New York and which are the property of beneficiaries who may never have been citizens or residents of New York.
[435] 341 U.S. 428 (1951).
[436] Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944).
[437] Angle v. Chicago, St. P.M. & O.R. Co., 151 U.S. 1 (1894).
[438] Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 442, 448 (1932).
[439] Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933).
[440] Shriver v. Woodbine Sav. Bank, 285 U.S. 467 (1932).
[441] Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 315-316 (1945).
[442] Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698 (1897).
[443] Soliah v. Heskin, 222 U.S. 522 (1912).
[444] Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923).
[445] Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313 (1911).
[446] Louisiana ex rel. Folsom Bros. v. New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 289 (1883).
[447] Attorney General ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905).
[448] Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
[449] Stewart v. Kansas City, 239 U.S. 14 (1915).
[450] Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U.S. 389 (1901); Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 181 U.S. 396 (1901).
[451] Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U.S. 114, 119 (1910).
[452] Citizens' Sav. & L. Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1875); Jones v. Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917); Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 300 U.S. 644 (1937).
[453] Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improv. Dist., 262 U.S. 710 (1923).
[454] Jones v. Portland, 245 U.S. 217 (1917).
[455] Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 (1920).
[456] Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228 (1920).
[457] Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improv. Dist, 262 U.S. 710 (1923).
[458] Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Ed., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
[459] Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 300 U.S. 644 (1937).
[460] Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 99 (1935).
[461] Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935). See also Chapman v. Zobelein, 237 U.S. 135 (1915); Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881).
[462] Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 300 U.S. 644 (1937). A taxpayer therefore cannot contest the imposition of an income tax on the ground that, in operation, it returns to his town less income tax than he and its other inhabitants pay.—Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589 (1921).
[463] Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 140, 141 (1925).
[464] Cahen v. Brewster, 203 U.S. 543 (1906).
[465] Keeney v. New York, 222 U.S. 525 (1912).
[466] Salomon v. State Tax Commission, 278 U.S. 484 (1929).
[467] Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278 (1902); Chanler v. Kelsey, 205 U.S. 466 (1907).
[468] Nickel v. Cole, 256 U.S. 222, 226 (1921).
[469] Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582 (1931).
[470] Binney v. Long, 299 U.S. 280 (1936).
[471] Whitney v. State Tax Com., 309 U.S. 530, 540(1940).
[472] Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147 (1938).
[473] Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206 (1931).
[474] Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147-150 (1938).
[475] Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934).
[476] New York, P. & N. Teleg. Co. v. Dolan, 265 U.S. 96 (1924).
[477] Barwise v. Sheppard, 299 U.S. 33 (1936).
[478] Nashville, O. & St. L. Ky. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
[479] Paddell v. New York, 211 U.S. 446 (1908).
[480] Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U.S. 701 (1884).
[481] Butters v. Oakland, 263 U.S. 162 (1923).
[482] Missouri P.R. Co. v. Western Crawford Road Improv. Dist., 266 U.S. 187 (1924). See also Roberts v. Richland Irrig. Co., 289 U.S. 71 (1933) in which it was also stated that an assessment to pay the general indebtedness of an irrigation district is valid, even though in excess of the benefits received.
[483] Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist, 239 U.S. 254 (1915).
[484] Road Improv. Dist. v. Missouri P.R. Co., 274 U.S. 188 (1927).
[485] Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Road Improv. Dist., 266 U.S. 379 (1924).
[486] Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Barber Asphalt Pav. Co., 197 U.S. 430 (1905).
[487] Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia & St. M. Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 478 (1916).
[488] Wagner v. Leser, 239 U.S. 207 (1915).
[489] Charlotte Harbor & N.R. Co. v. Welles, 260 U.S. 8 (1922).
[490] Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 204 (1905). See also Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903).
[491] Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904); Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285 (1910); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928).
[492] New York ex rel. New York, C. & H.R.R. Co. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906).
[493] Wheeling Steel Corp v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 209-210 (1936); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 207 (1905); Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158 (1933).
[494] Robert L. Howard, State Jurisdiction to Tax Intangibles: A Twelve Year Cycle, 8 Missouri Law Review 155, 160-162 (1943); Ralph T. Rawlins, State Jurisdiction to Tax Intangibles: Some Modern Aspects, 18 Texas Law Review 296, 314-315 (1940).
[495] Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 498 (1879).
[496] Savings & L. Soc. v. Multnomah County, 169 U.S. 421 (1898).
[497] Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U.S. 133, 141 (1900).
[498] Fidelity & C. Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U.S. 54 (1917).
[499] Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U.S. 184 (1916).
[500] Citizens Nat. Bank v. Durr, 257 U.S. 99, 109 (1921).
[501] Hawley v. Maiden, 232 U.S. 1, 12 (1914).
[502] First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234, 241 (1937).
[503] Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U.S. 506 (1938).
[504] Harvester Co. v. Dept. of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435 (1944).
[505] Wisconsin Gas Co. v. United States, 322 U.S. 526 (1944).
[506] New York ex rel. Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152 (1907).
[507] Graniteville Mfg. Co. v. Query, 283 U.S. 376 (1931).
[508] Buck v. Beach, 206 U.S. 392 (1907).
[509] Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27 (1928).
[510] Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486, 496-497 (1947).
[511] 277 U.S. 27 (1928).
[512] 280 U.S. 83 (1929).
[513] Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422 (1985).
[514] Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U.S. 137, 140-141 (1925).
[515] 199 U.S. 194 (1905).—In dissenting in State Tax Commission v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 185 (1942), Justice Jackson asserted that a reconsideration of this principle had become timely.
[516] 268 U.S. 473 (1925). See also Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U.S. 112 (1934).
[517] 240 U.S. 625, 631 (1916).—A decision rendered in 1920 which is seemingly in conflict was Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U.S. 567, in which North Carolina was prevented from taxing the exercise of a power of appointment through a will executed therein by a resident, when the property was a trust fund in Massachusetts created by the will of a resident of the latter State. One of the reasons assigned for this result was that by the law of Massachusetts the property involved was treated as passing from the original donor to the appointee. However, this holding was overruled in Graves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657 (1942).
[518] 233 U.S. 434 (1914).
[519] Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U.S. 69 (1926).
[520] 277 U.S. 1 (1928).
[521] First National Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 330-331 (1932).
[522] 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
[523] 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
[524] 281 U.S. 586 (1930).—In dissenting, Justice Holmes observed that Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U.S. 434 (1914), previously mentioned, apparently joined Blackstone v. Miller on the "Index Expurgatorius."
[525] 282 U.S. 1 (1930).
[526] 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
[527] 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
[528] 307 U.S. 357, 363, 366-368, 372 (1939).
[529] 308 U.S. 313 (1939).
[530] 307 U.S. 383 (1939).
[531] Ibid. 386.
[532] 315 U.S. 657, 660, 661 (1942).
[533] 4 Wheat. 316, 429 (1819).
[534] 319 U.S. 94 (1943).
[535] 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
[536] Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936). See also Memphis Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649, 652 (1942).
[537] Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897).
[538] Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203 (1925).
[539] Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, 253 U.S. 325 (1920).
[540] Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. State Board, 307 U.S. 313, 318, 324 (1939). Although the eight judges affirming this tax were not in agreement as to the reasons to be assigned in justification of this result, the holding appears to be in line with the dictum uttered by the late Chief Justice Stone in Curry v. McCanless (307 U.S. at 368) to the effect that the taxation of a corporation by a State where it does business, measured by the value of the intangibles used in its business there, does not preclude the State of incorporation from imposing a tax measured by all its intangibles.
[541] Delaware L. & W.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341 (1905).
[542] Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903).
[543] Kansas City Ry. v. Kansas, 240 U.S. 227 (1916); Kansas City, M. & B.R. Co. v. Stiles, 242 U.S. 111 (1916).
[544] Schwab v. Richardson, 263 U.S. 88 (1923).
[545] Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Pullman Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 56 (1910); Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178 (1917); International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135 (1918).
[546] Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460 (1929).
[547] St. Louis S.W.R. Co. v. Arkansas ex rel. Norwood, 235 U.S. 350 (1914).
[548] Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937).
[549] American Mfg Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459 (1919). Nor does a State license tax on the production of electricity violate the due process clause because it may be necessary, to ascertain, as an element in its computation, the amounts delivered in another jurisdiction.—Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
[550] James v. Dravo Contracting Co. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
[551] Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
[552] Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
[553] Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905).
[554] 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
[555] Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
[556] Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 294-297, 307 (1944).—The case was said to be governed by New York Central Railroad v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584, 596 (1906). As to the problem of multiple taxation of such airplanes, which had in fact been taxed proportionately by other States, the Court declared that the "taxability of any part of this fleet by any other State than Minnesota, in view of the taxability of the entire fleet by that State, is not now before us." Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion, would treat Minnesota's right [to tax as] exclusive of any similar right elsewhere.
[557] Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v. Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158 (1933).
[558] Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894).
[559] Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66 (1920).—For example, the ratio of track mileage within the taxing State to total track mileage cannot be employed in evaluating that portion of total railway property found in said State when the cost of the lines in the taxing State was much less than in other States and the most valuable terminals of the railroad were located in other States. See also Fargo v. Hart, 193 U.S. 490 (1904); Union Tank Line v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275 (1919).
[560] Great Northern R. Co. v. Minnesota, 278 U.S. 503 (1929).
[561] Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Minnesota, 309 U.S. 157 (1940).
[562] Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
[563] Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920); Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
[564] New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
[565] Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920).
[566] Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 23 (1938).
[567] Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937).
[568] Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920); Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
[569] Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
[570] Matson Nav. Co. v. State Board, 297 U.S. 441 (1936).
[571] Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 448-449 (1940). Dissenting, Justice Roberts, along with Chief Justice Hughes and Justices McReynolds and Reed, stressed the fact that the use and disbursement by the corporation at its home office of income derived from operations in many States does not depend on, and cannot be controlled by, any law of Wisconsin. The act of disbursing such income as dividends, he contended, is "one wholly beyond the reach of Wisconsin's sovereign power, one which it cannot effectively command, or prohibit or condition." The assumption that a proportion of the dividends distributed is paid out of earnings in Wisconsin for the year immediately preceding payment is arbitrary and not borne out by the facts. Accordingly, "if the exaction is an income tax in any sense it is such upon the stockholders [many of whom are nonresidents] and is obviously bad."—See also Wisconsin v. Minnesota Mining Co., 311 U.S. 452 (1940).
[572] Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
[573] Equitable L. Assur. Soc. v. Pennsylvania, 238 U.S. 143 (1915).
[574] Provident Sav. Life Assur. Soc. v. Kentucky, 239 U.S. 103 (1915).
[575] Continental Co. v. Tennessee, 311 U.S. 5, 6 (1940), (Emphasis supplied).
[576] Palmetto F. Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 272 U.S. 295 (1926).
[577] St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
[578] Connecticut General Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
[579] Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U.S. 395 (1907).
[580] Board of Assessors v. New York L. Ins. Co., 216 U.S. 517 (1910).
[581] Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U.S. 346 (1911).
[582] Orient Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 221 U.S. 358 (1911).
[583] Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U.S. 51, 58 (1902); Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U.S. 255 (1903).
[584] McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 42 (1877).
[585] Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 239 (1890).
[586] Hodge v. Muscatine County, 196 U.S. 276 (1905).
[587] Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 709-710 (1884).
[588] Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 710 (1884).
[589] McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 42 (1877).
[590] Taylor v. Secor, (State Railroad Tax Cases), 92 U.S. 575, 610 (1876).
[591] Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934). See also Clement Nat. Bank v. Vermont, 231 U.S. 120 (1914).
[592] Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 421 (1894).
[593] Michigan C.R. Co. v. Powers, 201 U.S. 245, 302 (1906).
[594] Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Board of Public Works, 172 U.S. 32, 45 (1898).
[595] St. Louis & K.C. Land Co. v. Kansas City, 241 U.S. 419, 430 (1916); Paulson v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 41 (1893); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 590 (1897).
[596] Tonawanda v. Lyon, 161 U.S. 389, 391 (1901).
[597] Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
[598] Withnell v. Ruecking Constr. Co., 249 U.S. 63, 68 (1919); Browning v. Hooper, 269 U.S. 396, 405 (1926). Likewise, the committing to a board of county supervisors of authority to determine, without notice or hearing, when repairs to an existing drainage system are necessary cannot be said to deny due process of law to landowners in the district, who, by statutory requirement, are assessed for the cost thereof in proportion to the original assessments.—Breiholz v. Pocahontas County, 257 U.S. 118 (1921).
[599] Fallbrook Irrig. District v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 168, 175 (1896); Browning v. Hooper, 269 U S. 396, 405 (1926).
[600] Utley v. St. Petersburg, 292 U.S. 106, 109 (1934); French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324, 341 (1901). See also Soliah v. Heskin, 222 U.S. 522 (1912).
[601] Hibben v. Smith, 191 U.S. 310, 321 (1903).
[602] Hancock v. Muskogee, 250 U.S. 454, 488 (1919).—Likewise, a taxpayer does not have a right to a hearing before a State board of equalization preliminary to issuance by it of an order increasing the valuation of all property in a city by 40%.—Bi-Metallic Invest. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
[603] Detroit v. Parker, 181 U.S. 399 (1901).
[604] Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30, 38 (1893).
[605] Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). See also Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.R. Co. v. Kentucky (Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases), 115 U.S. 321, 331 (1885); Winona & St. P. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U.S. 526, 537 (1895); Merchants' & Mfgrs. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U.S. 461, 466 (1897); Glidden v. Harrington, 189 U.S. 255 (1903).
[606] Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U.S. 466, 478 (1905).
[607] Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1904).
[608] Ontario Land Co. v. Yordy, 212 U.S. 152 (1909). See also Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U.S. 414 (1908).
[609] Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
[610] Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907).
[611] Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930). See also Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
[612] Farncomb v. Denver, 252 U.S. 7 (1920).
[613] Pullman Co. v. Knott, 235 U.S. 23 (1914).
[614] Bankers Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 260 U.S. 647 (1923).
[615] National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58 (1914).
[616] Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137 (1924).
[617] Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904); Hannis Distilling Co. v. Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285 (1910).
[618] Travis v. Yale & T. Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 75-76 (1920).
[619] League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156 (1902).
[620] Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 669 (1890).
[621] Scottish Union & Nat. Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U.S. 611 (1905).
[622] King v. Mullins, 171 U.S. 404 (1898); Chapman v. Zobelein, 237 U.S. 135 (1915).
[623] Leigh v. Green, 193 U.S. 79 (1904).
[624] Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 107 (1878).
[625] Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193 (1899).
[626] League v. Texas, 184 U.S. 156, 158 (1902). See also Straus v. Foxworth, 231 U.S. 162 (1913).
[627] Exercisable as to every description of property, tangibles and intangibles including choses in action, contracts, and charters, but only for a public purpose, the power of eminent domain may also be conferred by the State upon municipal corporations, public utilities, and even upon individuals. Like every other governmental power, the power of eminent domain cannot be surrendered by the State or its subdivisions either by contract or by any other means.—Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897); Offield v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 203 U.S. 372 (1906); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380 (1895); Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905); Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917); Galveston Wharf Co. v. Galveston, 260 U.S. 473 (1923).
[628] Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 238 (1920).
[629] 7 Pet. 243.
[630] 96 U.S. 97, 105.
[631] 166 U.S. 226, 233, 236-237 (1897); see also Sweet v: Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 398 (1895).
[632] Hairston v. Danville & W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 606 (1908).
[633] Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233, 240 (1920); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 446 (1930).
[634] Hairston v. Danville & W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908).
[635] United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 551-552, 556-558 (1946), citing Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946), and New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946)—Concurring in the result, Justice Frankfurter insisted that "the fact that the nature of the subject matter gives the legislative determination nearly immunity from judicial review does not mean that the power to review is wanting." Also concurring in the result, Justice Reed, for himself and Chief Justice Stone, dissented from that portion of the opinion which suggested that "there is no judicial review" of the question whether a "taking is for a public purpose."
[636] Justice Reed concurring in United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 557 (1946).
[637] Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57-59 (1919).—It is no longer open to question that the State legislature may confer upon a municipality the authority to determine such necessity for itself.—Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 678 (1923).
[638] Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
[639] Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 166, 177-178 (1872); Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See also comparable cases involving the Federal Government and discussed under the Fifth Amendment, United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); Portsmouth Harbor L. & H. Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). See also the cases hereinafter discussed on the limitations on "uncompensated takings."
[640] Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897)
[641] Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905).
[642] Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906).
[643] Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v.. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916).
[644] Hendersonville Light & Power Co. v.. Blue Ridge Interurban R. Co., 243 U.S. 563 (1917).
[645] Roe v. Kansas ex rel. Smith, 278 U.S. 191, 193 (1929).
[646] Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930).
[647] Hairston v. Danville & W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598 (1908).
[648] Delaware, L. & W.R. Co. v. Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928).
[649] Otis Co. v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 201 U.S. 140, 151, 153 (1906). See also Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 20-21 (1885).
[650] Missouri P.R. Co. v. Nebraska ex rel. Board of Transportation, 164 U.S. 403, 416 (1896). The State court in this case was declared to have acknowledged that the taking was not for a public use. Hence, its reversal by the Supreme Court did not conflict with the later observation by the Court that "no case is recalled where this Court has condemned * * * a taking upheld by the State court as a taking for public uses in conformity with its laws."—See Hairston v. Danville & W.R. Co., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908).
[651] Backus (A.) Jr. and Sons v. Port Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 573, 575 (1898).
[652] McGovern v. New York, 229 U.S. 363, 370-371 (1913).
[653] Ibid. 371.
[654] Provo Bench Canal and Irrig. Co. v. Tanner, 239 U.S. 323 (1915); Appleby v. Buffalo, 221 U.S. 524 (1911).
[655] Backus (A.) Jr. and Sons v. Port Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 569 (1898).
[656] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 250 (1897); McGovern v. New York, 229 U.S. 363, 372 (1913).
[657] Roberts v. New York, 295 U.S. 264 (1935).
[658] Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930).
[659] Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 677 (1923).
[660] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 255 (1897).
[661] Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 484-485 (1905).
[662] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 252 (1897).
[663] Darling v. Newport News, 249 U.S. 540 (1919).
[664] Northern Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879). See also Marchant v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 153 U.S. 380 (1894).
[665] Meyer v. Richmond, 172 U.S. 82 (1898). For cases illustrative of the types of impairment or flooding consequent upon erection of dams or aids to navigation which have been deemed to amount to a taking for which compensation must be paid, see Pumpelly v. Green Bay Company, 13 Wall. 166 (1872); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
[666] Sauer v. New York, 206 U.S. 536 (1907).
[667] Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
[668] Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413-414 (1922). For comparable cases involving the Federal Government see Portsmouth Harbor L. & H. Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922) and United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
[669] Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 483 (1924).
[670] North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925). See also Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919).
[671] Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57 (1919); Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 678 (1923).
[672] Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 59 (1919); North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276 (1925).
[673] Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 59 (1919).
[674] Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 695 (1897).
[675] Hays v. Seattle, 251 U.S. 233, 238 (1920); Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203, 205 (1945).
[676] The requirements of due process in tax and eminent domain proceedings are discussed in conjunction with the coverage of these topics. See pp. 1056-1062, 1069.
[677] Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884).
[678] Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908); Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 244 (1944).
[679] Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 U.S. 380, 386 (1894).
[680] Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 255 (1907); Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U.S. 660, 668 (1890).
[681] McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 41 (1877).
[682] R.R. Commission v. Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570 (1941). See also Railroad Commission v. Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940).
[683] Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83-84 (1902).
[684] New York ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 562 (1905).
[685] Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park Dist, 281 U.S. 74, 79 (1930).
[686] Carfer v. Caldwell, 200 U.S. 293, 297 (1906).
[687] Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34, 46 (1894); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1878).
[688] National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 270 (1904); Iron Cliffs Co. v. Negaunee Iron Co., 197 U.S. 463, 471 (1905).
[689] Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 321 (1890); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914); Pennington v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917).
[690] Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909).
[691] Pennington v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917).
[692] The jurisdictional requirements for rendering a valid decree in divorce proceedings are considered under the full faith and credit clause, supra, pp. 662-670.
[693] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 122 (1915); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 392, 394 (1914).
[694] Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230 (1900); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91, (1917). See also Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
[695] Rees v. Watertown, 19 Wall. 107 (1874); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 423 (1915); Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
[696] Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U.S. 524 (1889).
[697] Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 193 (1915); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 355 (1927). See also Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U.S. 476 (1879); Wilson v. Seligman, 144 U.S. 41 (1892).
[698] Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462-464 (1940).
[699] McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917).
[700] Thus, in an older decision rendered in 1919, the Court held that whereas "States could exclude foreign corporations * * *, and therefore establish * * * [appointment of such an agent] as a condition to letting them in," they had no power to exclude individuals; and as a consequence, a statute was ineffective which treated nonresident partners, by virtue of their having done business therein, as having consented to be bound by service of process on a person who was their employee when the transaction sued on arose but was not their agent at the time of service.—Flexner v. Farson, 248. U.S. 289, 293 (1919).
Because it might be construed to negative extension to nonresidents, other than motorists, of the statutory device upheld in Hess v. Pawloski, the doctrine of Flexner v. Farson, "that the mere transaction of business in a State by a nonresident natural person does not imply consent to be bound by the process of its courts," was recently condemned as inadequate "to cope with the increasing problem of practical responsibility of hazardous business conducted in absentia * * *"—Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F. (2d) 740, 742 (1944).
[701] Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 20, 24 (1928).
[702] 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
[703] 326 U.S. 310.
[704] Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
[705] In a very few cases, "continuous operations within a State were thought to be so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suits against [a foreign corporation] on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those" operations.—See St. Louis S.W.R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913); Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921).
[706] Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 21 (1907).
[707] Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 129-130 (1915).—In neither this case, nor the preceding decision were the defendant corporations notified of the pendency of the action, service having been made only on the Insurance Commissioner or the Secretary of State.
[708] Green v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1907). See also Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co., 262 U.S. 312, 317 (1923).
[709] Pennsylvania F. Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Min. & M. Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95-96 (1917).
[710] Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516, 517 (1923).
[711] Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895).
[712] Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406 (1903).
[713] Riverside Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S. 189, 195 (1915).
[714] Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602 (1899).
[715] St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882). See St. Louis S.W.R. Co. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218 (1913).
[716] Mutual Reserve &c. Assn. v. Phelps, 190 U.S. 147, 156 (1903).
[717] Washington v. Superior Court, 289 U.S. 361, 365 (1933).
[718] 326 U.S. 310, 317-320 (1945).
[719] This departure was recognized by Justice Rutledge in a subsequent opinion in Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416, 422 (1946).
The principle that solicitation of business alone is inadequate to confer jurisdiction for purposes of subjecting a foreign corporation to a suit in personam was established in Green v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 205 U.S. 530 (1907); but was somewhat qualified by the later holding in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) to the effect that when solicitation was connected with other activities (in the latter case, the local agents collected from the customers), a foreign corporation was then doing business within the forum State. Inasmuch as the International Shoe Company, in addition to having its agents solicit orders, also permitted them to rent quarters for the display of merchandise, the observation has been made that the Court, by applying the qualification of the International Harvester Case, could have decided International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) as it did without abandoning the "presence" doctrine.
[720] 326 U.S. 310, 316-317.
[721] Ibid. 319.
[722] 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
[723] Ibid. 647-649.—Concerning the holding in Minnesota Ass'n. v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923), that a similar Minnesota mail order insurance company could not be viewed as doing business in Montana where the claimant-plaintiff lived, and that the circumstances under which its Montana contracts, executed and to be performed in Minnesota, were consummated could not support in implication that the foreign insurer had consented to be sued in Montana, the majority asserted that the "narrow grounds relied on by the Court in the Benn Case cannot be deemed controlling."
Declaring that what is necessary to sustain a suit by a policyholder in Virginia against a foreign insurer is not determinative when the State seeks to regulate solicitation within its borders, Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that it is the nature of the State's action that determines the degree of activity in a State necessary for satisfying the requirements of due process, and that solicitation by existing members operates as though the insurer "had formally designated Virginia members as its agents."
Insisting that "an in personam judgment cannot be based upon service by registered letter on a nonresident corporation or a natural person, neither of whom has ever been" in Virginia, Justice Minton, with whom Justice Jackson was associated in a dissenting opinion, would have dismissed the appeal on the ground that "Virginia has not claimed the power to require [the insurer] * * * to appoint the Secretary of State as their agent for service of process, nor have [its] courts rendered judgment in a suit where service was made in that manner." He would therefore let Virginia "go through this shadow-boxing performance in order to publicize the activities of" the insurer.—Justices Reed and Frankfurter joined this dissent on the merits.—Ibid. 655-656, 658, 659.
In Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) it was held, that the State of Ohio was free either to open its courts, or to refuse to do so, to a foreign corporation owning gold and silver mines in the Philippine Islands, but temporarily (during Japanese occupation) carrying on a part of its general business in Ohio, including directors meetings, business correspondence, banking, etc. Two members of the Court dissented, contending that what it was doing was "giving gratuitously an advisory opinion to the Ohio Supreme Court. [They] would dismiss the writ [of certiorari] as improvidently granted." The case is obviously too atypical to offer much promise of importance as a precedent.
[724] Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 321 (1890).
[725] Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 254 (1907); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
[726] Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193, 203 (1899); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
[727] American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U.S. 47 (1911).
[728] Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); citing Boswell v. Otis, 9 How. 336 (1850); Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308 (1870). Such remedy, by way of example, is also available to a wife who is enabled thereby to impound local bank deposits of her absent husband for purposes of collecting unpaid instalments by him. Moreover, because of the antiquity of the procedure authorized, a statute permitting the impounding of property of an absconding father for the maintenance of his children is not in conflict with due process because it fails to provide for notice, actual or constructive, to the absconder.—Pennington v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917); Corn Exch. Bank v. Coler, 280 U.S. 218, 222 (1930). Likewise, proceedings to attach wages in execution of a judgment for debt may be instituted without any notice or service on the judgment debtor. The latter, having had his day in court when the judgment was rendered, is not entitled to be apprized of what action the judgment creditor may elect to take to enforce collection.—Endicott Co. v. Encyclopedia Press, 266 U.S. 285, 288 (1924).
[729] Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909).
[730] McCaughey v. Lyall, 224 U.S. 558 (1912).
[731] RoBards v. Lamb, 127 U.S. 58, 61 (1888). Inasmuch as it is within the power of a State to provide that one who has undertaken administration of an estate shall remain subject to the order of its courts until said administration is closed, it follows that there can be no question as to the validity of a judgment for unadministered assets obtained on service of publication plus service personally upon an executor in the State in which he had taken refuge and in which he had been adjudged incompetent.—Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913). Also, when a mother petitions for her appointment as guardian, and no one but the mother and her infant son of tender years, are concerned, failure to serve notice of the petition upon the infant does not invalidate the proceedings resulting in her appointment.—Jones v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 273 U.S. 195 (1927). Also a Pennsylvania statute which establishes a special procedure for appointment of one to administer the estate of absentees, which procedure is distinct from that contained in the general law governing settlement of decedents' estates and provides special safeguards to protect the rights of absentees is not repugnant to the due process clause because it authorizes notice by publication after an absence of seven years.—Cunnius v. Reading School Dist., 198 U.S. 458 (1905).
[732] Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U.S. 256, 275 (1896).
[733] Security Sav. Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923).
[734] Anderson Nat. Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944).
[735] Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
[736] Voeller v. Neilston Co., 311 U.S. 531 (1941).
[737] Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 395-396 (1914).
[738] Miedreich v. Lauenstein, 232 U.S. 236 (1914).
[739] Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110 (1908); Jacob v. Roberts, 223 U.S. 261, 265 (1912).
[740] Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 58 (1919). For the procedural requirements that must be observed in the passage of legislation levying special assessments or establishing assessment districts, see pp. 1058-1059.
[741] Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Industrial Com'n., 24 F. Supp. 370 (1938); Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Making, 52 Harvard Law Review, 259 (1938).
Whether action of an administrative agency, which voluntarily affords notice and hearing in proceedings in which due process would require the same, is voided by the fact that the statute in pursuance of which it operates does not expressly provide such protection, is a question as to which the Supreme Court has developed no definitive answer. It appears to favor the doctrine enunciated by State courts to the effect that such statutes are to be construed as impliedly requiring notice and hearing, although, in a few instances, it has uttered comments rejecting this notice-by-implication theory.—See Toombs v. Citizens Bank, 281 U.S. 643 (1930); Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U.S. 30 (1893); Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110 (1922); Cincinnati, N.O. & T.R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 U.S. 321 (1885). Contra: Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
[742] Bratton v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110 (1922); Missouri ex rel. Hurwitz v. North, 271 U.S. 40 (1926).
[743] North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306, 315-316 (1908). For an exposition of the doctrine applicable for determining the tort liability of administrative officers, see Miller v. Horton, 152 Mass. 540 (1891).
[744] Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925).
[745] 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
[746] Ibid. 140-141.
[747] Anderson National Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246-247 (1944).
[748] Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928).
[749] Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918); Baker v. Baker, E. & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 403 (1917); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).
[750] American Surety Co v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932).
[751] Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917).
[752] See footnote 1, p. 1085. [Transcriber's Note: Reference is to Footnote 741, above.]
[753] Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
[754] Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 407, 409 (1900).
[755] Goodrich v. Ferris, 214 U.S. 71, 80 (1909). One may, of course, waive a right to notice and hearing, as in the case of a debtor or surety who consents to the entry of a confessed judgment on the happening of certain conditions.—Johnson v. Chicago & P. Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388 (1886); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932).
[756] See pp. 1084-1088.
[757] Holmes v. Conway, 241 U.S. 624, 631 (1916); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).
[758] Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 263 (1904); Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912). The power of a State to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversies which shall be heard in them and to deny access to its courts, in the exercise of its right to regulate practice and procedure; is also subject to the restrictions imposed by the contract, full faith and credit, and privileges and immunities clauses of the Federal Constitution. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
[759] Hardware Dealers Mut. F. Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931); Iowa C.R. Co. v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 389, 393 (1896); Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U.S. 375 (1937).
[760] Cincinnati Street R. Co. v. Snell, 193 U.S. 30, 36 (1904).
[761] Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 112 (1921). Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment does not constrain the States to accept modern doctrines of equity, or adopt a combined system of law and equity procedure, or dispense with all necessity for form and method in pleading, or give untrammeled liberty to make amendments.
[762] Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
[763] Young Co. v. McNeal-Edwards Co., 283 U.S. 398 (1931); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938).
[764] Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171 (1924).
[765] York v. Texas, 137 U.S. 15 (1890); Kauffman v. Wooters, 138 U.S. 285, 287 (1891).
[766] Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133 (1915).
[767] Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111 (1921).—Consistently, with due process, a State may provide that the doctrines of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and fellow servant shall not bar recovery in actions brought against an employer for death or injury resulting from dangerous machinery improperly safeguarded. A person having no vested right to the defense of contributory negligence, a State may take it away altogether, or may provide that said defense, as well as that of assumption of risk, are questions of fact to be left to the jury.—Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U.S. 29, 34 (1917); Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 55 (1919); Herron v. Southern P. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931).
[768] Sawyer v. Piper, 189 U.S. 154 (1903).
[769] Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 259 (1907).
[770] Missouri K. & T.R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 650 (1914).
[771] Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U.S. 81 (1896).
[772] Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35, 43-44 (1922); Hartford L. Ins. Co. v. Blincoe, 255 U.S. 129, 139 (1921); Life & C. Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934).
[773] Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 114 (1927).
[774] Coffey v. Harlan County, 204 U.S. 659, 663, 665 (1907).
[775] Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U.S. 245, 258 (1890); Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 156 (1911).
[776] Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1 (1911).
[777] Turner v. New York, 168 U.S. 90, 94 (1897).
[778] Soper v. Lawrence Bros. Co., 201 U.S. 359 (1906). Nor is a former owner who had not been in possession for five years after and fifteen years before said enactment thereby deprived of any property without due process.
[779] Mattson v. Department of Labor, 293 U.S. 151, 154 (1934).
[780] Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 623, 628 (1885).
[781] Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
[782] Gange Lumber Co. v. Rowley, 326 U.S. 295 (1945).
[783] Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 623 (1885). See also Stewart v. Keyes, 295 U.S. 403, 417 (1935).
[784] Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 398 (1930).
[785] Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 214 (1917); James-Dickinson Farm Mortg. Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 124 (1927). An omission in a criminal trial of any reference to the presumption of innocence effects no denial of due process of law where the State appellate court ruled that such omission did not invalidate the proceedings. Howard v. Fleming, 191 U.S. 126, 136 (1903).
[786] Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 5 (1929); Western & A.R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 642 (1929); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 233 (1911); Mobile, J. & K.C.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35, 42 (1910).
[787] Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 233 (1911).
[788] Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 7 (1929).
[789] Western & A.R. Co. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929).
[790] Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ford, 287 U.S. 502 (1933). See also Mobile, J. & K.C.R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910).
[791] Hawes v. Georgia, 258 U.S. 1 (1922).
[792] Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Ct., 284 U.S. 8, 19 (1931).
[793] Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
[794] Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258, 261 (1925).
[795] Morrison v. California, 288 U.S. 591 (1933).
[796] Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
[797] "The limits are in substance these, that the State shall have proved enough to make it just for the defendant to be required to repeal what has been proved * * *, or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression."—Ibid. 88-89.
[798] Ibid. 87-91, 96-97.
[799] Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
[800] Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876); New York C.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208 (1917); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
[801] Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 226 (1905).
[802] Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101, 108 (1898); Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36, 39 (1890).
[803] Delgado v. Chavez, 140 U.S. 586, 588 (1891).
[804] Wilson v. North Carolina ex rel. Caldwell, 169 U.S. 586 (1898); Foster v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 112 U.S. 201, 206 (1884).
[805] Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685, 694 (1897).
[806] Montana Company v. St. Louis Min. & Mill Co., 152 U.S. 160, 171 (1894); Church v. Kelsey, 121 U.S. 282 (1887).
[807] Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).
[808] Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602 (1900).
[809] Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-510, 515 (1948). See also Cline v. Frink Dairy, 274 U.S. 445 (1927); Cole v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 345, 354 (1949).
[810] Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 455 (1939).
[811] Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
[812] Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 520, 538 (1884); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 (1890); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 602 (1900); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 627 (1912); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912).
[813] Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913).
[814] Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81, 86 (1928).
[815] Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). See also Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951).
[816] Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66, 71 (1932).
[817] Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-325 (1937).
[818] 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
[819] Ibid. 71.
[820] 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932).—The Court presently seems to be holding that in capital cases, notwithstanding the absence even of other circumstances prejudicial to the defendant, the right to counsel is unqualified. See the later cases discussed herein, especially Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); and the Court's summary of its rulings in Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948), supra, p. 1108.
[821] 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
[822] Ibid. 446-447.
[823] 312 U.S. 329 (1941).—In a post mortem comment on this case appearing in the later decision of Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 464 (1942), there is contained the intimation that the mere failure to appoint counsel, alone, in the absence of the proof of other facts tending to show that the whole trial was "a mere sham and a pretense," would not have sufficed to support a finding of a denial of due process.
[824] 316 U.S. 455, 462-463 (1942).
[825] Ibid. 462, 473.
[826] In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940); and Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329 (1941), a State law required the appointment of counsel.
[827] 316 U.S. 455, 461-462, 474-476 (1942).—Dissenting, Justice Black, with whom Justices Douglas and Murphy were in agreement, acknowledged regretfully that the view that the "Fourteenth Amendment made the Sixth applicable to the States * * * has never been accepted by a majority of this Court," and submitted a list of citations showing that by judicial decision, as well as by constitutional and statutory provision, a majority of States require that indigent defendants, in noncapital as well as capital cases, be provided with counsel on request. This evidence, he contended, supports the conclusion that "denial to the poor of a request for counsel in proceedings based on serious charges of crime," has "long been regarded throughout this country as shocking to the 'universal sense of justice.'"
[828] 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
[829] 323 U.S. 485 (1945).
[830] 287 U.S. 45, 69, 71 (1932).
[831] 323 U.S. 471, 476 (1945).
[832] 324 U.S. 42 (1945). See also White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945).
[833] 326 U.S. 271 (1945).
[834] 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1945).
[835] 324 U.S. 786 (1945).
[836] 327 U.S. 82 (1946). Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented, the former contending that "the right to counsel means nothing unless it means the right to counsel at each and every step in a criminal proceeding."—Ibid. 89.
[837] 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
[838] Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 (1945), was distinguished on the ground that the record in the older case contained specific allegations bearing on the disabilities of the accused to stand prosecution without the aid of counsel and the complete absence of any uncontested finding, as in the instant case, of an intelligent waiver of counsel.
Dissenting for himself and Justices Black and Rutledge, Justice Douglas declared that, under the authority of Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 476 (1945), "if * * * [the] defendant is not capable of making his own defense, it is the duty of the Court, at least in capital cases, to appoint counsel, whether requested so to do or not."—329 U.S. 173, 181 (1946). In a separate dissent, Justice Murphy observed that while "legal technicalities doubtless afford justification for our pretense of ignoring plain facts before us," facts which emphasize the absence of any intelligent waiver of counsel, "the result certainly does not enhance the high traditions of the judicial process."—Ibid. 183.
[839] 329 U.S. 663, 665 (1947).
[840] 332 U.S. 134 (1947).
[841] 332 U.S. 145 (1947).
[842] 332 U.S. 134, 136 (1947).—Acknowledging that the decision is in line with the precedent of Betts v. Brady, Justice Black, who was joined by Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge, lamented that the latter was a "kind of precedent [which he] had hoped that the Court would not perpetuate." Complaining of the loss of certainty occasioned by the Court's refusal to read into the Fourteenth Amendment the absolute right to counsel set out in the Sixth Amendment, Justice Black contends that the fair trial doctrine as enunciated in this and in the Adamson v. California case (see p. 1115) decided on the same day is "another example of the consequences which can be produced by the substitution of this Court's day-to-day opinion of what kind of trial is fair and decent for the kind of trial which the Bill of Rights guarantees."—Ibid. 139, 140.—In a second dissenting opinion meriting the concurrence of Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, Justice Rutledge, who also is of the opinion that the absolute right to counsel granted by the Sixth Amendment should be enjoyed in State criminal trials, insisted that even under the fair trial doctrine, the accused had not been accorded due process.
[843] 332 U.S. 145 (1947).
[844] 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
[845] 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
[846] See p. 1103.
[847] 333 U.S. 640, 678, 680-682 (1948).—As against the assertion of the majority that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not of its own force require appointment of counsel for one simply because he would have a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in a comparable federal case, the minority, consisting of Justices Black, Murphy, and Rutledge speaking through Justice Douglas, declared that "the Bill of Rights is applicable to all courts at all times"; for, otherwise, "of what value is the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial if an accused does not have counsel to advise and defend him." Noting that all members of the Court were in accord on the requirement of counsel in capital offenses, the minority contended that the considerations inducing such unanimity were "equally germane [in noncapital cases] where liberty rather than life hangs in the balance." Conceding that "it might not be nonsense to draw the Betts v. Brady line somewhere between that case and the case of one charged with violation of a parking ordinance, and to say the accused is entitled to counsel in the former but not in the latter," the minority concluded as follows: "* * * to draw the line between this case and cases where the maximum penalty is death is to make a distinction which makes no sense in terms of the absence or presence of need for counsel. Yet it is the need for counsel that establishes the real standard for determining whether the lack of counsel rendered the trial unfair. And the need for counsel, even by Betts v. Brady standards, is not determined by the complexities of the individual case or the ability of the particular person who stands as an accused before the Court. That need is measured by the nature of the charge and the ability of the average man to face it alone, unaided by an expert in the law."
[848] 334 U.S. 672, 683 (1948).
[849] 334 U.S. 728, 730, 731 (1948).
[850] 334 U.S. 736 (1948).
[851] Ibid. 740.—The majority also observed that "trial court's facetiousness casts a somewhat somber reflection on the fairness of the proceeding * * *"
Although Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Burton dissented without an opinion in Townsend v. Burke, four Justices, Black, Douglas, and Murphy speaking through Justice Rutledge filed a vigorous dissent in Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 733, 736 (1948). Justice Rutledge declared his inability to "square * * * [this] decision in this case with that made in Townsend v. Burke. I find it difficult to comprehend that the [trial] court's misreading or misinformation concerning the facts of [the] record [Townsend v. Burke] vital to the proper exercise of the sentencing function is prejudicial * * *, but its misreading or misconception of the controlling statute, [Gryger v. Burke] in a matter so vital as imposing mandatory sentence or exercising discretion concerning it, has no such effect. Perhaps the difference serves only to illustrate how capricious are the results when the right to counsel is made to depend not upon the mandate of the Constitution, but upon the vagaries of whether judges, * * * will regard this incident or that in the course of particular criminal proceedings as prejudicial."
[852] 335 U.S. 437, 438-442 (1948).
[853] 337 U.S. 773, 780 (1949).
[854] 342 U.S. 184 (1951); See also Per Curiam opinion granting certiorari in Foulke v. Burke, 342 U.S. 881 (1951).
[855] 339 U.S. 660, 665 (1950).
[856] 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
[857] Ibid. 64.
[858] 335 U.S. 437, 440-441 (1948).
[859] Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788-789 (1945).
[860] Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 683-684 (1948); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, 664-665 (1947); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 472 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 51-52, 71 (1932).
[861] Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739-741 (1948); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, 665 (1947); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 332-333 (1941).
[862] Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789-791 (1945).
[863] Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773, 780-781 (1949). Devotion to the Fair Trial doctrine has also created another problem for the Court, that of a burdensome increase in the volume of its business. Inasmuch as accurate appraisal of the effect of absence of counsel on the validity of a State criminal proceeding has been rendered more difficult by the vagueness of that doctrine as well as by the Court's acknowledged variation in the application thereof, innumerable State prisoners have been tempted to seek judicial reconsideration of their convictions. To reduce the number of such cases which it is obliged to examine on their merits, the Court had been compelled to have recourse to certain protective rules. Thus, when a State prisoner seeks to attack the validity of his conviction by way of habeas corpus proceedings begun in a lower federal court, application for that writ will be entertained only after all State remedies available, including all appellate remedies in State courts and in the Supreme Court by appeal or writ of certiorari, have been exhausted. This rule, however, will not be applied when no adequate State remedy is in fact available. Also when a prisoner's petition for release on the grounds of the unconstitutionally of his conviction has been rejected by a State court, a petition for certiorari addressed to the United States Supreme Court will be denied whenever it appears that the prisoner had not invoked the appropriate State remedy. Or stated otherwise, where the State court's conviction or refusal to grant writs of habeas corpus to those under State sentences may fairly be attributed to a rule of local procedure and is not exclusively founded on the denial of a federal claim, such as, right to counsel, the Supreme Court will refuse to intervene. As in the case of other legal rules, Justices of the Supreme Court have often found themselves in disagreement as to the manner of applying these aforementioned principles; and vigorous dissents arising out of this very issue were recorded in the cases of Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); and Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948). Justice Frankfurter has frequently, albeit unsuccessfully contended, that "intervention by * * * [the Supreme Court] in the criminal process of States * * * should not be indulged in unless no reasonable doubt is left that a State denies, or has refused to exercise, means of correcting a claimed infraction of the United States Constitution. * * * After all, [it should be borne in mind that] this is the Nation's ultimate judicial tribunal, not a super-legal-aid bureau."
[864] 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
[865] 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
[866] Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176. (1912).
[867] Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
[868] Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314 (1892).
[869] Ibid. 318-320.
[870] Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1880); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 603 (1900); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
[871] Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175, 176 (1899).
[872] Ashe v. United States ex rel. Valotta, 270 U.S. 424, 425 (1926).
[873] Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947); Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 585 (1948).—Both cases reject the proposition that the commandment of the Sixth Amendment, which requires a jury trial in criminal cases in the federal courts is picked up by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to become a limitation upon the States.
[874] Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 283-284 (1947).—Since Congress, by way of enforcing the guarantees contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, has, by statute [18 Stat. 336, 377 (1875); 8 U.S.C. 44], made it a crime to exclude a citizen from jury service only on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, the Supreme Court "never has interfered with the composition of State court juries except in cases where this guidance of Congress was applicable." Without suggesting that "no case of discrimination in jury drawing except those involving race or color can carry such unjust consequences as to amount to a denial of * * * due process," the Court has nevertheless required that a defendant, alleging grounds not covered by that statute, "must comply with the exacting requirements of proving clearly" that the procedure in his case was destructive of due process.
These statements reflect the views of only five Justices. Speaking for the minority (Justices Black, Douglas, and Rutledge), Justice Murphy declared that "the vice lies in the very concept of 'blue ribbon' panels—the systematic and intentional exclusion of all but the 'best' or the most learned or intelligent of the general jurors. Such panels are completely at war with the democratic theory of our jury system, a theory formulated out of the experience of generations. One is constitutionally entitled to be judged by a fair sampling of all one's neighbors who are qualified, not merely those with superior intelligence or learning. Jury panels are supposed to be representative of all qualified classes. Within those classes, of course, are persons with varying degrees of intelligence, wealth, education, ability and experience. But it is from that welter of qualified individuals, who meet specified minimum standards, that juries are to be chosen. Any method that permits only the 'best' of these to be selected opens the way to grave abuses. The jury is then in danger of losing its democratic flavor and becoming the instrument of the select few." A "blue ribbon jury" is neither "a jury of the * * * [defendant's] peers," nor "a jury chosen from a fair cross-section of the community, * * *"—Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565, 569-570 (1948).
[875] Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U.S. 638 (1906). The Supreme Court "has never entertained a defendant's objections to exclusions from the jury except when he was a member of the excluded class."—Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947).
[876] 211 U.S. 78, 93, 106-107, 113; citing Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22 (1880); and Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 387, 389 (1898).
[877] In several decisions the Court, assuming, but without deciding, that a State law requiring a witness to answer incriminating questions would violate the due process clause, has then proceeded to conclude, nevertheless, that a State antitrust law which grants immunity from local prosecution to a witness compelled to testify thereunder is valid even though testimony thus extracted may later serve as the basis of a federal prosecution for violation of federal antitrust laws.—Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372, 380 (1905).
[878] Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
[879] Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-326 (1937).
[880] 297 U.S. 278, 285-286 (1936). For the significance of this decision as a precedent in favor of a more careful scrutiny by the Supreme Court of State trials in which a denial of constitutional rights allegedly occurred, see p. 1138.
[881] Ibid, 285-286.
[882] 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
[883] Ibid. 228-229, 237-241.
[884] 310 U.S. 530 (1940).
[885] 314 U.S. 219, 237 (1941). This dictum represents the closest approach which the Court thus far has made toward inclusion of the privilege against self-incrimination within the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In all but a few of the forced confession cases, however, the results achieved by application of the Fair Trial doctrine differ scarcely at all from those attainable by incorporation of the privilege within that clause.
[886] 316 U.S. 547 (1942).
[887] 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
[888] See Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930).
[889] 322 U.S. 143, 160-162 (1944).—All members of the Court were in accord, however, in condemning, as no less a denial of due process, the admission at the second trial of Ashcraft [Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946)] of evidence uncovered in consequence of the written confession, acceptance of which at the first trial had led to the reversal of his prior conviction.
[890] 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
[891] Ibid. 602.—Of three Justices who dissented, Justice Murphy, with whom Justice Black was associated, declared that it was "inconceivable * * * that the second confession was free from the coercive atmosphere that admittedly impregnated the first one"; and added that previous decisions of this Court "in effect have held that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the prohibition [of the Fifth pertaining to self-incrimination] applicable to the States."—Ibid. 605-606.
[892] 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
[893] Chief Justice Stone, together with Justices Roberts, Reed, and Jackson, all of whom dissented, would have sustained the conviction.
[894] Justices Rutledge and Murphy dissented in part, assigning among their reasons therefor their belief that the "subsequent confessions, * * *, were vitiated with all the coercion which destroys admissibility of the first one." According to Justice Rutledge, "a stricter standard is necessary where the confession tendered follows a prior coerced one than in the case of a single confession * * *. Once a coerced confession has been obtained all later ones should be excluded from evidence, wherever there is evidence that the coerced one has been used to secure the later ones."—324 U.S. 401, 420, 428-429 (1945).
[895] In Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 601 (1944), the Court stated that "when the State-approved instruction (to the jury) fairly raises the question of whether or not the challenged confession was voluntary, * * *, the requirements of due process, * * *, are satisfied and this Court will not require a modification of local practice to meet views that it might have as to * * * how specific an instruction * * * must be." In Malinski v. New York, the four dissenting Justices declared that "the trial court, * * *, instructed the jury that the evidence with respect to the first confession was adduced only to show that the second was coerced. And * * * that it could consider the second confession, only if it found it voluntary, and that it could convict in that case. In view of these instructions, we cannot say that the first confession was submitted to the jury, or that in the absence of any exception or request to charge more particularly, there was any error, of which the * * * [accused] can complain."—324 U.S. 401, 437 (1945).
[896] The coercive nature of the first oral confession was apparently acknowledged by the prosecuting attorney in his summation to the jury; for he declared that the accused "was not hard to break," and that the purpose of holding him incommunicado and unclothed in a hotel room from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m., when the confession was made, was to "let him think that he is going to get a shellacking (beating)."—324 U.S. 401, 407 (1945).
[897] 332 U.S. 46, 56 (1947).
[898] 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
[899] 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
[900] Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50, 53, 56, 58 (1947).
[901] Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59-60, 63-64, 66 (1947). See also Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414, 415, 417 (1945).
[902] Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69, 74-75, 89 (1947).—Dissenting separately, Justice Murphy, together with Justice Rutledge, announced their agreement with Justice Black, subject to one reservation. While agreeing "that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried over intact into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment," they were "not prepared to say that the latter is entirely and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights. Occasions may arise where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming to fundamental standards of procedure as to warrant * * * condemnation in terms of a lack of due process despite the absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights."—Ibid. 124.
In a lengthy article based upon a painstaking examination of original data pertaining to the "understanding of the import of the * * * clauses of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment at the time the Amendment was adopted"; that is, during the period 1866-1868, Professor Charles Fairman has marshalled a "mountain of evidence" calculated to prove conclusively the inaccuracy of Justice Black's reading of history.—Charles Fairman. Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding.—2 Stanford Law Review, 5-139 (1949).
[903] 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
[904] Ibid. 600-601.—In a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Jackson and Reed concurred, Justice Burton remarked that inasmuch as the issue of the voluntariness of the confession was one of fact, turning largely on the credibility of witnesses, the determination thereof by the trial judge and jury should not be overturned upon mere conjecture.—Ibid. 607, 615. |
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