Twelve o'clock on July 1st, 1898, was a most anxious hour for our army in Cuba. The battle at El Caney was at a standstill and the divisions of Kent and Sumner were in a most perilous situation. Bonsal's description of the state of the battle at that time is pathetic. Speaking of the artillery at El Caney—Capron's battery—he says it was now apparent that this artillery, firing from its position of twenty-four hundred yards, could do very little damage to the great stone fort and earthworks north of the village. The shots were too few and the metal used too light to be effectual. Three hours of the morning had worn away and the advance of our men had been slowly made and at great cost; all the approaches were commanded by Spanish entrenchments and the fighting was very unequal. A soldier of the Twenty-fifth says that when he came in sight of the battle at El Caney, "the Americans were gaining no ground, and the flashes of the Spanish mausers told us that the forces engaged were unequally matched, the difference of position favoring the Spaniards." This view was had about noon, or soon after. At that time "a succession of aides and staff officers came galloping from headquarters with messages which plainly showed that confusion, if not disaster, had befallen the two divisions which, by the heavy firing, we had learned to our great surprise, had become warmly engaged in the centre. The orders to General Lawton from headquarters were at first peremptory in character—he was to pull out of his fight and to move his division to the support of the centre" (Bonsal). This call for Lawton arose from the fact that about noon General Shafter received several dispatches from Sumner, of the Cavalry Division, requiring assistance. General Sumner felt the need of the assistance of every available man in the centre of the line where he was carrying on his fight with the Spaniards on Blue House Hill. This situation so impressed the General, Shafter, that he finally wrote to Lawton, "You must proceed with the remainder of your force and join on immediately upon Sumner's right. If you do not the battle is lost." Shafter's idea then was to fall back to his original plan of just leaving enough troops at El Caney to prevent the garrison from going to the assistance of any other part of the line. Shafter himself says: "As the fight progressed I was impressed with the fact that we were meeting with a very stubborn resistance at El Caney and I began to fear that I had made a mistake in making two fights in one day, and sent Major Noble with orders to Lawton to hasten with his troops along the Caney road, placing himself on the right of Wheeler" (Sumner). Lawton now made a general advance, and it is important to see just what troops did advance. The Seventh Infantry did not move, for Lieutenant-Colonel Carpenter says that after withdrawing "to the partial cover furnished by the road, the regiment occupied this position from 8 o'clock a.m. until about 4.30 p.m." The Seventeenth did not move, for Captain O'Brien, commanding, says the regiment took a position joining "its left with the right of the Seventh Infantry" and that the regiment "remained in this position until the battle was over." The Twelfth Infantry remained in its shelter within 350 yards of the stone fort until about 4 p.m. Then we have Chaffee's brigade on the north of the fort remaining stationary and by their own reports doing but little firing. The Seventeenth fired "for about fifty minutes" about noon, with remarkable precision, but "it seemingly had no effect upon reducing the Spanish fire delivered in our (their) front." The Seventh did not fire to any extent. The Twelfth Infantry lay in its refuge "free from the enemy's fire" and may have kept up an irregular fire.

About this time Bates' brigade entered the field and one battalion of the Twentieth Infantry is reported to have joined the left of the firing line of the Twenty-fifth. General Ludlow says there was a lull from 12 to 1 p.m., "when the action again became violent, and at 3 p.m. the Third Brigade captured the stone fort with a rush and hoisted the American flag." From Ludlow's brigade, Captain Van Horne, commanding the Twenty-second Infantry, after the wounding of Lieutenant-Colonel Patterson, says that the First Battalion of his regiment took a position about 800 yards from the town and kept up firing until the place surrendered. He does not say positively that the firing was upon the town, but he had said just before that the Second Battalion slowly moved forward, firing into the town from the left, so that we may readily conclude from the context as well as from the position that the First Battalion fired into the town also. Hence it seems fair to exclude from the fort all of Ludlow's brigade, and it is observable that Ludlow himself claims no part in the capture of that stronghold.

General Bates says his brigade took position to the right of Colonel Miles' brigade and pushed rapidly to the front. He then says that after remaining sometime in the crossroad to the right of Miles' brigade, under a heavy fire from the enemy, the brigade moved farther "to the right to the assault of a small hill, occupied upon the top by a stone fort and well protected by rifle pits. General Chaffee's brigade charged them from the right, and the two brigades joining upon the crest, opened fire from this point of vantage, lately occupied by the Spanish, upon the village of El Caney." General Chaffee says it was in consequence of the fire of General Bates' troops upon the fort that the assault by the Twelfth Infantry was postponed.

In General Chaffee's report this statement occurs: "The action lasted nearly throughout the day, terminating at about 4.30 p.m., at which time the stone blockhouse was assaulted by Captain Haskell's battalion of the Twelfth Infantry, under the personal direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Comba, commanding the regiment. The resistance at this point had been greatly affected by the fire of Capron's battery. A few moments after the seizure of this point—the key to the situation—my left was joined by General Bates with a portion of his command." It is to be noted in connection with all of the above statements that Major McCaskey, who commanded the Twentieth Infantry (Bates brigade), says: "The First Battalion was moved to the right and put into action on the left of the Twenty-fifth Infantry's firing line, and one company, A, took part in the latter part of the charge by which the stone house was taken." The two points to be noted here are (1) that this battalion was on the left of the Twenty-fifth's firing line, and (2) that one company took part in the charge upon the stone house. When Chaffee's brigade charged the stone house from the right some of Bates' troops, at least this Company A, from the battalion near the firing line of the Twenty-fifth Infantry, took part in the latter part of the charge. The two brigades, Bates' and Chaffee's, joined immediately after the capture of the stone fort and opened fire upon the town.

We have now traced the actions and the fortunes of the three following brigades: Ludlow's Chaffee's and Bates'. But what has become of Miles' brigade? Unfortunately, the Second Brigade has not been so well reported as were the others engaged in the action at El Caney. We have seen that it was ordered to take position on the right of Ludlow's brigade at 11.30, when Capron's battery ceased its firing for the fifty minutes. "We were detained in reaching our position by troops in our front blocking the road," says the brigade commander. "We came into action directly in front of the stone blockhouse at 12.30, and from that hour until about 4.30, when the command 'cease firing' was given, the blockhouse having been captured, my command was continuously under fire." The reader will note in this report that the brigade went into action at 12.30, several hours before the charge was ordered by General Chaffee, and at least an hour and a half before, according to the report of the commander of the Third Brigade, "this fort was practically in the possession of the Twelfth Infantry." Major Baker, who commanded the Fourth Infantry, says: "About 12 m. we received orders directing us to take our place in the line of battle, and arriving at the proper point the regiment was placed in line in the following order: The First Battalion in the fighting line; the Second Battalion in support and regimental reserve. In this order the First Battalion, under my command, took up the advance toward the blockhouse, to our right, south east of Caney." This battalion advanced until it reached a position about 200 yards from the village, where it remained, assisted by the Second Battalion until the capture of the fort. Two companies of this First Battalion "fired into the town and also into the blockhouse until its fall." A good part of the fire of this regiment was directed upon the fort.

Colonel Miles says: "The brigade advanced steadily, with such scanty cover as the ground afforded, maintaining a heavy fire on the stone fort from the time the fight began until it ended." The reader is asked to note particularly that this fire was continuous throughout the fight; that it was characterized by the brigade commander as "heavy," and that it was "on the stone fort". He says: "As the brigade advanced across a plowed field in front of the enemy's position the latter's sharpshooters in the houses in Caney enfiladed the left of our line with a murderous fire. To silence it Major Baker, Fourth Infantry, in command of the battalion of that regiment on the left of our line of battle, directed it to turn its fire upon the town. In so doing this battalion lost heavily, but its steady front and accurate volleys greatly assisted the advance of the remainder of the brigade upon the stone fort."

We have now these facts clearly brought out or suggested: That the brigade took its place in line of battle soon after 12 o'clock; that the Fourth Infantry was on the left; that the advance of the First Battalion of the Fourth Infantry was "toward the blockhouse;" that aside from the companies of the Fourth Infantry that fired into town, "the remainder of the brigade advanced upon the stone fort." The Fourth Infantry, holding the left of the line, however, reached a position from which it could not advance, its commander having "quickly perceived that an advance meant annihilation, as it would involve not only a frontal, but also a flank fire from the town." Here the Fourth Infantry remained, but continued to maintain a fire upon both the blockhouse and the town.

There is but one more regiment in all of Lawton's division to be accounted for, and that is the Twenty-fifth Infantry, holding the right of Miles' brigade in this advance. This regiment was in place in the line under its gallant and experienced commander, Lieutenant-Colonel A.S. Daggett, and contributed its full share of that "heavy fire on the stone fort from the time the fight began until it ended." Major McCaskey says the First Battalion of his regiment took a position on the left of the Twenty-fifth's firing line. The statement seems erroneous, and one is inclined to believe that it was originally written "on the right," instead of "on the left"; but it is enough for our purpose now, that the firing line of the Twenty-fifth is recognized well in advance. Major Baker, who commanded on the left of the brigade line, and whose advance was stopped by the flank fire from the village and a frontal fire from the fort, says: "as a matter of fact the village of El Caney was not charged by any troops. Those of Bates' brigade and the Twenty-fifth Infantry, after having carried the stone fort (on a hill some 75 feet higher, and to the east of the town,) fired into the village, and the Fourth Infantry continued its fire. Nor was it charged by any of the troops to our left. Such a charge would necessarily have been seen by us." Major Baker, who was on the field and had the blockhouse in clear view, declares that some of Bates' brigade and the Twenty-fifth Infantry carried the stone fort. Major McCaskey says that one battalion of the Twentieth Infantry (Bates' brigade) was on the left of the Twenty-fifth's firing line, and that one company (A) took part in the latter part of the charge by which the fort was taken. This battalion may be referred to by Major Baker when he says: "Those of Bates' brigade and the Twenty-fifth Infantry, after having carried, etc."

As there are some matters of dispute concerning the events which I am now going to relate, I will present a soldier's statement before I go to the official records. The soldier in writing to me after the battle says: "I was left-guide of Company G (25th Infantry), and I received orders from Lieutenant McCorkle to guide on Fourth Infantry, which held the left flank. 'Forward, march! Guide left. Don't fire until you see somebody; then fire to hit!' came the orders. Tramp! tramp! Crash! crash! On we walked and stopped. We fired into the underbrush for safety; then in another moment we were under Spanish fire. Balls flew like bees, humming as they went. Soon we found ourselves up against a network of Spanish trickery. Barbed-wire fences, ditches and creeks, too numerous to think of. The only thing left was to go ahead or die; or else retreat like cowards. We preferred to go ahead. At this first fence Lieutenant McCorkle was taken to earth by a Spanish bullet. Lieutenant Moss spoke out, 'Come ahead! Let's get at these Spaniards!' A few moments more and he, too, was almost dead with exertion, loud speaking, running and jumping, as onward we swept toward the Spanish stronghold. The sun was exceedingly hot, as on the slope of a little mound we rested for a few moments. We lay here about five minutes, looking into the Spanish fort or blockhouse; we measured the distance by our eyesight, then with our rifles; we began to cheer and storm, and in a moment more, up the hill like a bevy of blue birds did the Twenty-fifth fly. G and H Companies were the first to reach the summit and to make the Spaniards fly into the city of El Caney, which lay just behind the hill. When we reached the summit others soon began to mount our ladder. We fired down into the city until nearly dusk."

The brigade made its advance under fire almost from the beginning. The commander says it was continuously under fire from 12.30 to 4.30 p.m. "The attack was begun by two companies in each regiment on the firing line, strengthened by supports and reserves from the remaining companies until the brigade had but two companies in reserve. At one time in this hotly engaged contest the commanding officer of the Twenty-Fifth Infantry sent me word that he needed troops on his right. I then sent forward 40 Cubans, under command of Captains Jose' Varges and Avelens Bravo, with Lieutenants Nicholas Franco and Tomas Repelao, to form on the right of the Twenty-fifth, which was also the right of the brigade. With these Cubans I ordered Private Henry Downey, Company H, First Infantry, on duty as interpreter at the headquarters. These men advanced on the stone fort with our line, fighting gallantly, during which Lieutenant Nicholas Franco was mortally wounded and died soon afterwards." (Col. Miles' report.)

From the soldier's story, as well as from the official report of the brigade commander, it is conclusive that the real objective of the Second Brigade was the stone fort, and that the Twenty-fifth Infantry, which occupied the right of the line, had no other objective whatever.* [Transcriber's Note: No footnote text present for this footnote anchor.] It also appears that Bates' brigade, although somewhere on the right, was not so near but that the commanding officer of the Twenty-fifth could see the need of troops at his right; and to meet this need the brigade commander "sent forward 40 Cubans, who advanced on the stone fort with our lines." The fire from this fort continued severe during the whole of the advance, and until the last halt made by the Twenty-fifth. At the first fence met by the Twenty-fifth Lieutenant McCorkle was killed; and, to use the words of a soldier, "as the regiment swept toward the Spanish stronghold" to reach the slope of a little mound for cover, many more fell. Behind this little mound, after resting about five minutes, they began their last fire upon the enemy. This must have been as late as 3 o'clock, and perhaps considerably later, and the fire from the stone fort was vigorous up until their last halt, as their casualties prove. The battery had begun to fire on the fort again at 12.30 and continued from the same position until 2.10, the range being as has been already stated, 2,400 yards. Hence the artillery firing at long range had ceased, and it is generally conceded that this long range firing had been ineffective. Captain Capron says he moved his battery at 2.10 p.m. to 1,000 yards from Caney and opened fire on two blockhouses. He does not say at what hour he opened fire on these two blockhouses, or how long he continued to fire, or what was the effect of his fire upon the two block houses. Lieutenant-Colonel Bisbee, who was acting as support of Capron's battery, says of himself that he "moved with the battery at 3.30 p.m. by the Dubroix (Ducureaux) road." General Lawton says the battery was moved to a new position about 2.30, "about 1,000 yards from certain blockhouses in the town, where a few shots, all taking effect, were fired." From these reports it would appear that after moving to the second station the battery fired upon two blockhouses in the town, and not upon the stone fort. General Ludlow, speaking of the battle, says: "In the present case, the artillery fire was too distant to reduce the blockhouses or destroy the entrenchments, so that the attack was practically by infantry alone." On the other hand, General Chaffee says: "The resistance at this point," meaning the stone fort at the time of assault, "had been greatly affected by the fire of Capron's battery." Colonel Comba, of the Twelfth Infantry, says: "The artillery made the breach through which our men entered the stone work." Bonsal says that Captain Capron, "under the concentrated fire of his four guns at a point blank range of a thousand yards, had converted the fort into a shapeless ruin," when the infantry charged it.

It is probable that in this case, as in most cases of similar nature, the truth divides equally between the apparently opposing views. Of General Ludlow, who is the authority for this statement, that the stone fort at El Caney was taken by infantry alone, General Lawton says: "General Ludlow's professional accomplishments are well known and his assignment to command a brigade in my division I consider a high compliment to myself." "The fighting was all done with small arms" were the words written me by an infantryman soon after the battle. The question, whether Capron fired upon the stone fort after taking his new position, or fired on two blockhouses, entirely distinct from the fort, remains undetermined. The author of this work inclines to the conclusion that the fire of Capron after moving to his new position was directed for a brief period, at least, upon the stone fort.

Inasmuch as we are now to trace the career of the Twenty-fifth Infantry through an unfortunate dispute, on both sides of which are officers of high rank and unimpeachable honor, it is important to note, first, to what extent the several statements, both unofficial and official, can be harmonized and made to corroborate one another. Major Baker says: "Those of Bates' brigade and the Twenty-fifth Infantry, after having carried the stone fort," which he explains was some 75 feet higher than the town, then fired down into the village. The soldier who acted as left-guide of Company G, Twenty-fifth Infantry, says, after getting up on the hill, "we fired down into the city until near dusk." The experience of the soldier agrees exactly with the report of the officer. The fact that the Twenty-fifth went up the hill cannot be questioned, and that up to their last halt, they went under fire, no one will deny. Bonsal, in speaking of Chaffee's brigade, which was "more immediately charged with the reduction of Caney" (Ludlow's report), says: "And it was nearly five o'clock when his most advanced regiment, the gallant Twelfth Infantry, deployed into the valley and charged up the steep hillside, which was lined with Spanish trenches, rising in irregular tiers and crowned with a great stone fort." The stone fort at this time, however, was, as he says, "a shapeless ruin." Where was the Twenty-fifth Infantry at this time? Mr. Bonsal continues: "Almost at the same moment the Twenty-fifth Colored Infantry, the leading regiment of Miles' brigade, which had been advancing in the centre, started up the hill also." General Lawton says that after moving the battery to its new position, 1,000 yards from certain blockhouses in the town, Capron fired a few shots, all of which took effect, and he adds: "This firing terminated the action, as the Spanish garrison were attempting to escape." Colonel Comba says there was a breach in the stonework large enough for his men to enter, and that this had been made by the artillery; General Chaffee says resistance had been greatly affected by the artillery, and Bonsal adds, the garrison resisted the last advance made by the infantry but for a moment.

General Chaffee declares: "The troops arriving at the fort were there in the following order: Twelfth Infantry, which took the place; the command of General Bates some moments later; the Twenty-fifth Infantry."

The facts therefore stand, that the Twenty-fifth Infantry was on the ground with the first troops that reached the fort and that there was a captain of that regiment who then and there claimed the capture of the place, even against the claims of a Major-General. He was told that his proposition was absurd, and so it may have been from one standpoint; and yet there may be a ground upon which the captain's claim was fair and just.

That the Twelfth Infantry arrived on the ground first is not disputed; but it is questioned whether the fort was belligerent at that time. General Chaffee says the resistance had been greatly reduced by the artillery; General Lawton says the action had been finished by Capron's shots and the garrison was trying to escape; a soldier from the Twenty-fifth says the Spaniards flew out of the fort to the town; Bonsal says, they stoutly resisted "for a moment and then fled precipitately down the ravine and up the other side, and into the town." If first occupancy is the only ground upon which the capture of a place can be claimed, then the title to the honor of capturing the stone fort lies, according to official report as so far presented, with the Twelfth Infantry. But even upon this ground it will be shown that the Twenty-fifth's action will relieve the claim of its captain from absurdity. We are now prepared to read the official report of the commanding officer of the Twenty-fifth Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Daggett, who was with the regiment all through the fight, and who bore himself so well that the division commander said: "Lieutenant-Colonel Daggett deserves special mention for skillful handling of his regiment, and would have received it before had the fact been reported by his brigade commander."

July 5, 1898.

Intrenchments Twenty-fifth United States Infantry, Adjutant-General, Second Brigade, Second Division, Fifth Corps.

Sir:—I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Twenty-fifth Infantry in the battle of the 1st instant. The regiment formed firing line on the right of the Fourth Infantry, facing a Spanish fort or blockhouse about half a mile distant. On moving forward, the battalion, composed of Companies C, D, E, G and H, and commanded by Capt. W.S. Scott, received the fire of the enemy, and after advancing about 400 yards was subjected to a galling fire on their left. Finding cover, the battalion prepared for an advance up the hill to the fort. This advance was made rapidly and conducted with great skill by company officers.

"On arriving within a short distance of the fort the white flag was waved to our companies, but a cross fire prevented the enemy from advancing with it or our officers from receiving it. About twenty minutes later a battalion of some other regiment advanced to the rear of the fort, completely covered from fire, and received the flag; but the men of the Twenty-fifth Infantry entered the fort at the same time. All officers and men behaved gallantly. One officer was killed and three wounded; eight men were killed and twenty wounded.

"About 200 men and ten officers were in the firing line. I attribute the comparatively small losses to the skill and bravery of the company officers, viz.: First Lieutenant Caldwell and Second Lieutenants Moss and Hunt. Second Lieutenant French, adjutant of the battalion, was among those who gallantly entered the fort.

"The battle lasted about two hours and was a hotly contested combat. Very respectfully,

"A.S. DAGGETT, "Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-fifth Infantry, Commanding."

Here it is shown by the testimony of the regimental commander, that a battalion of the Twenty-fifth ascended the hill and arrived at a short distance from the fort about twenty minutes before any other troops are mentioned as coming in sight; and that a white flag was waved to the companies of the Twenty-fifth. It was doubtless upon this ground that a captain of the Twenty-fifth had the temerity to claim the capture of the place, even from a Major-General. I do not know who the captain was, but it is evident that he had what he believed ample grounds for his claim. Colonel Daggett says, also, that when the men of the other regiment advanced to this fort after it had waved the white flag to the companies of the Twenty-fifth, the men of the Twenty-fifth advanced and entered the fort at the same time. Bonsal says: "Almost at the same moment that the Twelfth started up the hill the Twenty-fifth started up the hill also;" while according to Colonel Daggett's testimony the Twenty-fifth was well up the hill already and the fort had waved to it the white flag.

Colonel Daggett makes this further report:

Headquarters Twenty-fifth Infantry, Near Santiago, Cuba, July 16, 1898.

The Adjutant-General, Second Division, Fifth Corps, near Santiago, Cuba.

Sir:—Feeling that the Twenty-fifth Infantry has not received credit for the part it took in the battle of El Caney on the first instant, I have the honor to submit the following facts:

I was ordered by the brigade commander to put two companies (H, Lieutenant Caldwell, and G, Lieutenant McCorkle) on the firing line in extended order. The right being uncovered and exposed to the enemy, I ordered D Company (Captain Edwards) to deploy as flankers. The battalion was commanded by Capt. W.S. Scott. The battalion advanced about 300 yards under fire, the Fourth Infantry on its left, where the line found cover, halted, and opened fire on the blockhouse and intrenchments in front of it. After the line had been steadied and had delivered an effective fire, I ordered a further advance, which was promptly made. As the Fourth Infantry did not advance, my left was exposed to a very severe fire from the village on the left. I immediately ordered Company C (Lieutenant Murdock), which was in support, to the front, and E. Company (Lieutenant Kinnison) from regimental reserve to take its place. Thus strengthened, the four companies moved up the hill rapidly, being skilfully handled by company officers. On arriving near the fort the white flag was waved toward our men, but the fire from the village on our left was so severe that neither our officers nor Spanish could pass over the intervening ground. After about twenty minutes some of the Twelfth Infantry arrived in rear of the fort, completely sheltered from the fire from the village, and received the white flag; but Privates J.H. Jones, of Company D, and T.C. Butler, H. Company, Twenty-fifth Infantry, entered the fort at the same time and took possession of the Spanish flag. They were ordered to give it up by an officer of the Twelfth United States Infantry, but before doing so they each tore a piece from it, which they now have. So much for the facts.

I attribute the success attained by our line largely to the bravery and skill of the company officers who conducted the line to the fort. These officers are: First Lieutenants V.A. Caldwell and J.A. Moss, and Second Lieutenant J.E. Hunt. It is my opinion that the two companies first deployed could not have reached the fort alone, and that it was the two companies I ordered to their support that gave them the power to reach it. I further believe that had we failed to move beyond the Fourth Infantry the fort would not have been taken that night.

The Twenty-fifth Infantry lost one officer killed[18] and three wounded, and seven men killed and twenty-eight wounded.

Second Lieutenant H.W. French, adjutant of Captain Scott's battalion, arrived at the fort near the same time as the other officers.

I request that this report be forwarded to corps headquarters.

Very respectfully,

A.S. DAGGETT, Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-fifth Infantry, Commanding.

General Chaffee's statement is not to be questioned for a moment. There is not the least doubt that the troops, as organizations arrived at the fort in the order he describes. General Lawton says: "General Chaffee's brigade was especially charged with the duty of assaulting the stone fort, and successfully executed that duty, after which a portion of the Twenty-fifth, and a portion of Bates' brigade, assisted in the work, all of which is commendable." He says also, that the "Twenty-fifth Infantry did excellent service, as reported, though not better than the others engaged.' This seems to confirm Lieutenant-Colonel Daggett's report, for he says he is sure the regiment did excellent work, "as reported;" and at that time he is commenting on Lieutenant-Colonel Daggett's report, the report printed above. The broad statements of General Lawton do not touch the exact question at issue between the reports of the subordinate commanders; nor do they throw any light on the circumstances of the final charge. Miles' brigade had been advancing on the stone fort for some hours, and the Twenty-fifth was so near when the charge of the Twelfth was made that portions of it were on the hill and near the fort at the same time. The commander of the Third Brigade saw the fight from one side and reported events as he learned them. His official statement requires no support. The commanding officer of the Twenty-fifth Infantry saw the fight from another standpoint, and his official reports are entitled to equal respect. Both the General's and the Lieutenant-Colonel's must be accepted as recitals of facts, made with all the accuracy that high personal integrity armed with thorough military training can command. Happily the statements, which at first appear so widely at variance, are entirely reconcilable. The following supplementary report of the regimental commander, when taken in connection with the final complimentary orders published in the regiment before leaving Cuba, will place the whole subject before the reader and put the question at rest, and at the same time leave undisturbed all the reports of superior officers.

Headquarters Twenty-fifth Infantry, Montauk Point, Long Island, August 22, 1898.

The Adjutant-General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

Sir:—I have the honor to submit a supplementary report to the original one made on the 19th (16th) of July, 1898, of the battle of El Caney de Cuba, so far as relates to the part taken therein by the Twenty-fifth Infantry:

1. I stated in the original report that the Twenty-fifth Infantry, in advancing, broke away from and left the Fourth Infantry behind. This may inferentially reflect on the latter regiment. It was not so intended, and a subsequent visit to the battle-field convinces me that it would have been impossible for the regiment to advance to the fort, and, although it might have advanced a short distance farther, it would have resulted in a useless slaughter, and that the battalion commander exercised excellent judgment in remaining where he did and by his fire aiding the Twenty-fifth Infantry in its advance.

2. Colonel Miles, the then brigade commander, informed me that his first report of the battle would be brief and that a later and full report would be made. In his former report I think he failed to give credit to myself and regiment. As he was soon after relieved of the command of the brigade I assume that no further report will be made.

I have reported what the regiment did, but said nothing about my own action. I must, therefore, report it myself or let it go unrecorded. Distasteful as it is to me, I deem it duty to my children to state the facts and my claims based thereon, as follows:

1. I was ordered to put two companies in the firing line. Before this line advanced the brigade commander informed me, and personal examination verified, that my right was in the air and exposed. On my own judgment I ordered a company, as flankers, to that part of the line.

2. As soon as the line had rested and become steadied at its first halt I ordered it to advance, and it continued to advance, although it broke away from the rest of the brigade.

3. As this exposed the left to a galling and dangerous fire, I ordered, on my own judgment, a company to re-enforce that part of the line and a company from the regimental reserve also to the fighting line.

These are the facts, and as my orders were to keep my left joined to the right of the Fourth Infantry, and received no further orders, my claims are as follows:

1. That it was necessary to place a company on the right as flankers.

2. That the conditions offered an opportunity to advance after the first halt, and I took advantage of it.

3. That the left being exposed by this advance of the line beyond the rest of the brigade, it was proper and necessary to re-enforce it by two companies.

4. That the two companies first deployed could not have reached the stone fort.

5. That the three companies added to the firing line gave it the power to reach the fort.

6. That the advance beyond the rest of the brigade was a bold and, without support, dangerous movement, but that the result justified the act. Had it failed I would have been held responsible.

7. That I saw at each stage of the battle what ought to be done, and did it. Results show that it was done at the right moment.

8. That the Twenty-fifth Infantry caused the surrender of the stone fort.

I desire to repeat that it is with great reluctance that I make so much of this report as relates to myself, and nothing but a sense of duty would impel me to do it.

Very respectfully,

A.S. DAGGETT, Lieutenant-Colonel, Twenty-fifth Infantry, Commanding.

LOSSES OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH INFANTRY.

Killed.—Lieutenant H.L. McCorkle, Company G; Private Albert Strother, H; Private John W. Steele, D; Corporal Benj. Cousins, H; Private John B. Phelps, D; Private French Payne, B; Private Aaron Leftwich, G; Private Tom Howe, D.

Wounded.—Company A: Private William H. Clarke, Sergeant Stephen A. Browne. Company B: Private Tom Brown. Company C: Lieutenant John S. Murdock, Private Joseph L. Johnson, Private Samuel W. Harley, Private John A. Boyd. Company D; Captain Eaton A. Edwards, Sergeant Hayden Richards, Private Robert Goodwin. Company E: Lieutenant H.L. Kinnison, Private James Howard, Private John Saddler, Private David C. Gillam, Private Hugh Swann. Company F: First Sergeant Frank Coleman. Company G: Corporal James O. Hunter, Private Henry Brightwell, Private David Buckner, Private Alvin Daniels, Private Boney Douglas, Private George P. Cooper, Private John Thomas, Corporal Gov. Staton, Private Eugene Jones. Company H: Private James Bevill, Private Henry Gilbert.

Wounded July 2.—Private Elwood A. Forman, H; Private Smith, D; Private William Lafayette, F.

COMPLIMENTARY ORDER.

Headquarters 25th Infantry,

Near Santiago de Cuba, August 11, 1898. General Orders No. 19.

The regimental commander congratulates the regiment on the prospect of its speedy return to the United States.

Gathered from three different stations, many of you strangers to each other, you assembled as a regiment for the first time in more than twenty-eight years on May 7, 1898, at Tampa, Florida. There you endeavored to solidify and prepare yourselves, as far as the oppressive weather would permit, for the work that appeared to be before you; but, who could have fortold the severity of that work?

You endured the severe hardships of a long sea voyage, which no one who has not experienced it can appreciate. You then disembarked, amidst dangerous surroundings; and on landing were for the first time on hostile ground. You marched, under a tropical sun, carrying blanket-roll, three days' rations, and one hundred rounds of ammunition, through rain and mud, part of the time at night, sleeping on the wet ground without shelter, living part of the time on scant rations, even, of bacon, hard bread and coffee, until on July 1 you arrived at El Caney. Here you took the battle formation and advanced to the stone fort, more like veterans than troops who had never been under fire. You again marched, day and night, halting only to dig four lines of intrenchments, the last being the nearest point to the enemy reached by any organization, when, still holding your rifles, within these intrenchments, notice was received that Santiago and the Spanish army had surrendered.

But commendable as the record cited may be, the brightest hours of your lives were on the afternoon of July 1. Formed in battle array, you advanced to the stone fort against volleys therefrom, and rifle-pits in front, and against a galling fire from blockhouses, the church tower and the village on your left. You continued to advance, skilfully and bravely directed by the officers in immediate command, halting and delivering such a cool and well-directed fire that the enemy was compelled to wave the white flag in token of surrender.

Seldom have troops been called upon to face a severer fire, and never have they acquitted themselves better.

The regimental reserve was called upon to try its nerve, by lying quiet under a galling fire, without the privilege of returning it, where men were killed and wounded. This is a test of nerve which the firing line cannot realize, and requires the highest qualities of bravery and endurance.

You may well return to the United States proud of your accomplishments; and if any one asks you what you have done, point him to El Caney.

But in the midst of the joy of going home, we mourn the loss of those we leave behind. The genial, generous-hearted McCorkle fell at his post of duty, bravely directing his men in the advance on the stone fort. He died as the soldier dies, and received a soldier's burial. He was beloved by all who knew him, and his name will always be fondly remembered by his regiment—especially by those who participated in the Santiago campaign. The officers of the regiment will wear the prescribed badge of mourning for Lieutenant McCorkle for thirty days. And Corporal Benjamin Cousins, Privates Payne, Lewis, Strother, Taliaferro, Phelps, Howell, Steel and Leftwitch, sacrificed their lives on their country's altar. Being of a race which only thirty-five years ago emerged through a long and bloody war, from a condition of servitude, they in turn engaged in a war which was officially announced to be in the interest of humanity and gave all they had—their lives—that the oppressed might be free, and enjoy the blessings of liberty guaranteed by a stable government. They also died like true soldiers and received a soldier's burial.

By order of Lieutenant-Colonel Daggett.

M.D. CRONIN, First Lieutenant and Adjutant, 25th Infantry.

MAJOR GENERAL AARON S. DAGGETT.

General Aaron S. Daggett is a native of Maine, born at Greene Corner, in that State, June 14, 1837. He is descended from a paternal ancestry which can be traced, with an honorable record, as far back as 1100 A.D. His mother was Dorcas C., daughter of Simon Dearborn, a collateral descendant of General Henry Dearborn. His more immediate ancestors came from Old to New England about 1630, and both his grandparents served in the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War. He was educated in his native town, at Monmouth Academy, Maine Wesleyan Seminary and Bates College. At the outbreak of the Civil War he enlisted as a private, April 27th, 1861, in the 5th Maine Infantry; was appointed second lieutenant May 1, and promoted first lieutenant May 24, 1861. He commanded his company at the first Bull Run battle, and was promoted captain August 14, 1861.



From the first engagement of the regiment to the end of its three years' memorable service, Captain Daggett proved a faithful and gallant soldier. He was promoted major, January 8th, 1863; on January 18th, 1865, was commissioned lieutenant-colonel of the 5th Regiment, United States Veteran Volunteers, Hancock Corps, and was brevetted colonel and brigadier-general of volunteers, March 13, 1865, for "gallant and meritorious services during the war." He also received the brevets of major in the United States Army for "gallant and meritorious services at the battle of Rappahannock Station, Va.," November 7, 1863, and lieutenant-colonel for "gallant and meritorious services in the battle of the Wilderness, Va." Immediately after the battle of Rappahannock Station, the captured trophies, flags, cannons, etc., were escorted, by those who had been most conspicuous in the action, to General Meade's headquarters, Colonel Daggett being in command of the battalion of his brigade. General Upton to whom he owed this distinction, wrote of him as follows:

"In the assault at Rappahannock Station, Colonel Daggett's regiment captured over five hundred prisoners. In the assault at Spottsylvania Court House, May 10, his regiment lost six out of seven captains, the seventh being killed on the 12th of May, at the "angle," or the point where the tree was shot down by musketry, on which ground the regiment fought from 9.30 A.M. to 5.30 P.M., when it was relieved. On all these occasions Colonel Daggett was under my immediate command, and fought with distinguished bravery.

"Throughout his military career in the Army of the Potomac, he maintained the character of a good soldier and an upright man, and his promotion would be commended by all those who desire to see courage rewarded."

General Upton also wrote to the Governor of Maine as follows:

"I would respectfully recommend to Your Excellency, Major A.S. Daggett, formerly 5th Maine Volunteers, as an officer highly qualified to command a regiment. Major Daggett served his full term in this brigade with honor both to himself and State, and won for himself the reputation of being a brave, reliable and efficient officer. His promotion to a colonelcy would be a great benefit to the service, while the honor of his State could scarcely be entrusted to safer hands."

He was subsequently recommended for promotion by Generals Meade, Hancock, Wright and D.A. Russell. He was in every battle and campaign in which the Sixth Corps, Army of the Potomac, was engaged, from the first Bull Run to Petersburg, and was twice slightly wounded. On July 28, 1866, without his knowledge or solicitation, he was appointed a captain in the U.S. Regular Army, on recommendation of General Grant, and has since been promoted colonel in this service. During his subsequent career he has won the reputation of being a fine tactician and of being thoroughly versed in military law, as is indicated by Major Hancock's commendatory words in 1878:

"I look upon him as by far the best tactician in the regiment, and as for a thorough, clear knowledge of tactics his superior is not in the army. As regards military and civil law, I know of no one so well informed."

His ability and soldierly qualities have also been highly commended by General Crook, Colonel Hughes—Inspector-General in 1891—and Colonel ——, Inspector-General in 1892.

Not only as a soldier, but in many other ways, has General Daggett distinguished himself. As a public speaker the following was said of him by the Rev. S.S. Cummings, of Boston:

"It was my privilege and pleasure to listen to an address delivered by General A.S. Daggett on Memorial Day of 1891. I had anticipated something able and instructive, but it far exceeded my fondest expectations. The address was dignified, yet affable, delivered in choice language without manuscript, instructive and impressive, and highly appreciated by an intelligent audience."

General Daggett is noted for his courteous and genial manner, and his sterling integrity of character. He is a member of the Presbyterian church.

War Department, Inspector-General's Office, Washington, Jan. 6th, 1899.

To the Adjutant-General, U.S.A., Washington, D.C.

Sir:—I desire to recommend to your favorable consideration and for advancement in case of the reorganization of the Regular Army, Lieutenant-Colonel A.S. Daggett, 25th U.S. Infantry.

I have known Colonel Daggett for a long time; he served in the War of the Rebellion with the 5th Maine Volunteers and acquitted himself with much honor; he served in Cuba in the war with Spain, commanding the 25th U.S. Infantry, and was conspicuous for gallantry at the battle of El Caney. He is an officer of the highest character, intelligent, courageous and energetic.

I sincerely trust that he may receive all the consideration he deserves.

Very respectfully,

(Sd) H.W. LAWTON, Major-General, U.S.V.

A true copy:

M.D. CRONIN, First Lieutenant and Adjutant 25th Infantry. Headquarters Department of the East, Governor's Island, New York City, December 29, 1898.

Honorable R.A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D.C.

Sir:—I recommend to the favorable consideration of the Secretary of War for promotion to Brigadier-General, Colonel A.S. Daggett, 25th Infantry. This officer has an excellent war record; his service has been faithful since then, and in the recent Spanish-American war he distinguished himself by his good judgment and faithful attention to duty, as well as for gallant service in action. An appointment of this character will be very highly appreciated throughout the army as a recognition of faithful, meritorious and gallant service. From my observation of Colonel Daggett he is well qualified for the position.

Very respectfully,

(Sd) WM. R. SHAFTER, Major-General, U.S. Volunteers.

M.D. CRONIN,

A true copy:

First Lieutenant and Adjutant 25th Infantry.

To this very brilliant official record it is necessary to add but a word personal. Colonel Daggett is a typical New Englander; tall, well-formed, nervous and sinewy, a centre of energy, making himself felt wherever he may be. Precise and forceful of speech, correct and sincere in manners, a safe counsellor and a loyal friend, his character approaches the ideal. Stern and commanding as an officer he is nevertheless tender and sympathetic. His very sensitiveness concerning the feelings of others embarrasses him in giving expression to his own feelings on seeing suffering, unless it should be urgent, but those who know him best know him to be just, humane and tender. No man could have taken more care than he did for his regiment in Cuba. Hating oppression and wrong with a vehemency suited to his intense nature, he nevertheless deplores war and bloodshed. The President of the United States never did a more worthy act than when he gave to Lieutenant-Colonel A.S. Daggett of the Twenty-fifth Infantry his commission as Brigadier-General of Volunteers in recognition of his valor and skill at El Caney and of his general efficiency as an officer in our army.

TESTIMONIES CONCERNING THE WORK OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH INFANTRY BEFORE EL CANEY.

Headquarters First District, Southern Luzon, El Deposito, P.I., April 20, 1900.

My Dear General Daggett:—Some time ago I received a letter from you asking me to make an official statement as to where and at what objective the energies and fire of the 25th Infantry were directed during the battle of El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

In reply I have the honor to officially state that about noon July 1, 1898, the regiment moved from the mango grove, near the Ducro House, toward a stone fort located on a hill, near the town of El Caney.

It arrived at about one of the afternoon at a point about eight hundred yards to the south and east of the fort; immediately deployed, and the First Battalion, under command of Captain Walter S. Scott, and of which I was adjutant, designated as the attacking line. Presently, after advancing a few yards, we were subjected to a galling fire from the stone fort, the trenches in its front and from a blockhouse on its right. The line steadily moved forward, directing its fire at the stone fort and the trenches surrounding it. When within about one hundred and fifty yards from the fort the line was halted, and several sharpshooters, directed by their company officers to fire at the loopholes. Finally, when the men had regained their wind, a rush was made, part of the line going through a cornfield. At the foot the line was again halted, and after a few moments' rest charged up the hill, and the fort surrendered.

I went to the fort and found a Spanish lieutenant and seven enlisted men whom I passed out and were taken charge of by an officer of the 12th Infantry. This was about 3.50 P.M.

* * * * *

Note.—Since the above was written, General Daggett served with great distinction in the Philippines and in China, and was retired as a brigadier-general—a hero of four wars. A bill is now before Congress to make him a major-general, an honor to which he is most justly entitled.

* * * * *

As soon as the line reached the top of the hill it was fired on from the town, which had before been masked by the hill; the fire was of course returned, and this was the first fire from the battalion directed at the town. About five o'clock firing had ceased, the battalion was assembled and marched away.

(Sd) H.W. FRENCH, First Lieutenant, 17th Infantry (late Second Lieutenant 25th Infantry).

A true copy:

H.G. LEARNARD, Capt. and Adj. 14th Infantry. Manila, P.I., March 30, 1900.

I certify that in the action of El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898, the company I commanded, i.e., H, 25th Infantry, directed its fire almost exclusively on the stone fort and the trench a few yards from its base. That very little of this company's fire was directed on the town and none before the fort was carried.

(Sd) VERNON A. CALDWELL, First Lieutenant, 25th Infantry.

A true copy:

H.G. LEARNARD, Capt. and Adj. 14th Infantry. Tayug, Luzon, Philippine Islands, April 17th, 1900.

To Those in Military Authority.

Regarding the battle of El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898, I hereby certify:

1. From about 1.20 o'clock P.M. to the time of the capture of the town of El Caney, I was in command of two companies—C and G—forming part of the 25th U.S. Infantry firing line.

2. From about 2.55 o'clock P.M. to the time of the capture of the town, very nearly the entire 25th Infantry firing line was under my observation.

3. From about 2.55 o'clock P. M. to about 3.20, the time of the surrender of the stone fort to the east of the town, the fire of the entire 25th Infantry firing line within my sight was directed against the fort.

4. During this period of the battle the 25th Infantry firing line was about 150 yards from the stone fort.

5. From the time the firing line began firing—about 1 o'clock P.M.—to the time of the surrender of the stone fort—about 3.20 P.M.—the companies under my command and all others under my observation concentrated their fire on the fort.

6. About 3.20 P.M., I was standing about 150 yards from the stone fort, and I plainly and distinctly saw a Spaniard appear in the door of the fort, and, for two or three seconds, wave a white flag at the 25th Infantry firing line, and upon being shot down, another Spaniard picked up the flag and likewise waved it at the 25th Infantry firing line.

7. After the white flag had twice been presented to the 25th Infantry firing line, and after all fire from the stone fort had ceased, the firing line rushed forward, took up a position facing to their left—that is, facing the town—and began a vigorous fire on a small blockhouse and on the town.

Respectfully,

JAMES A. MOSS, First Lieutenant, 24th U.S. Infantry.



RECOLLECTIONS OF THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN, BY CAPTAIN R.H.R. LOUGHBOROUGH, 25TH U.S. INFANTRY.

The 25th U.S. Infantry left its stations in Montana on the 10th of April, 1898; six companies (B, C, D, E, F and H) went in camp at Chickamauga National Park; the other two companies (A and G) went to Key West, Fla.

On May 6th the six companies at the Chickamauga National Park moved by rail to Tampa, Fla., arriving the night of the 7th, where they were joined by the two companies from Key West. With the exception of three days in 1870, the regiment had never been together since its organization in 1869. It necessarily followed that many of the officers, as well as men, were strangers to each other.

Our camp at Tampa was fair; the ground is sandy and flat, but as the rainy season had not set in, it was dry and the health was good. Drills and parades were held daily (Sundays excepted), but on account of the intense heat the hours for it were limited to the early mornings and after sunset. The clothing of the men was the same they had worn in Montana, and did not add to their comfort. Supplies of all kinds (except rations) came by piecemeal, and we finally sailed for the tropics with the same clothing used in the Northwest.

At 6 o'clock P.M. June 6th the regiment received orders to strike tents and be ready to move within an hour; the order was immediately complied with, though the necessary transportation to move the baggage did not report until the forenoon of the following day; it was not far from noon when the last of it left the camp for the railroad station, en route to Port Tampa, where we were to embark on transports for the seat of war.

As soon as the camp equipage was started, the regiment was formed and marched to West Tampa (about three miles), where we took a train for Port Tampa, distant nine miles. On arrival, the regiment boarded the steamer "Concho," one of the vessels to carry the expedition to its destination. The 4th U.S. Infantry had preceded us, and the next day a battalion of the 2d Massachusetts Volunteers was put on, but owing to the crowded condition of the ship, a few days later they were transferred to another vessel.

The "Concho" is a large ship, but without the comforts I have seen since then on the U.S. Army transports plying between San Francisco and Manila. The ships used were hastily fitted up for the occasion, and it could not be expected that they would be all that was required, but some of the appointments could and should have been better. After a tedious wait until June 14th, we sailed down Tampa Bay and out on the Gulf of Mexico, still in ignorance of our destination. The evening of the 15th the light at Dry Tortugas was seen to our right. June 16th, 17th and 18th our course was a little south of east, and part of the time the north coast of Cuba was visible. The weather (except the intense heat) was fine. On Sunday morning, June 18th, we entered the Windward Passage, and it seemed certain, from our course, that Santiago was our objective. Early the next morning the high mountains of Santiago de Cuba were in plain sight to our north. June 20th and 21st, remained off the coast; the sea was rough and the vessel rolled considerably, adding to the discomfort of every one, especially those subject to seasickness. During the evening of the 21st, orders were received to be ready to disembark the following morning. About 8 A.M. on the 22d our warships began shelling the coast, and two hours later the troops started in small boats from the transports to the shore. By evening most of the Second Division and part of the Cavalry Division were on Cuban soil. There was no opposition to our landing; I believe that a small force well handled could have made it very difficult, if, indeed, it could not have prevented it.

As soon as the regiment had landed it was marched out about four miles and bivouacked for the night. The country is rugged and covered with a dense tropical vegetation. A few "Cuban Patriots" had joined us and formed the extreme advance, saving us some disagreeable outpost duty. This was the only service that I know of them doing throughout the campaign, though they were always on hand ration day. Later developments showed that the service rendered was not so important, as any Spanish force had retired to a safe place, something our friends looked out for whenever there was any danger.

June 23d, the regiment started shortly after daylight towards the city of Santiago. About 9 o'clock there was a report that the enemy were in our front. The regiment was immediately formed for battle, and reconnoitering parties sent forward; after about thirty minutes' delay the supposed enemy proved to be the large leaves of some tropical trees being moved by the wind, giving them the appearance of persons in motion. Our route was over a narrow trail, through a dense wilderness; water was scarce and the heat was intense. About noon we arrived at Siboney, where we bivouacked for the night. Before daylight next morning the troops in our rear were heard passing on the trail by our camp. Shortly after daylight Captain Capron's battery of four guns passed, and the men lined up along the road and cheered lustily. About an hour later, musketry fire and the occasional discharge of a Hotchkiss gun could be plainly heard towards Santiago. About three-quarters of an hour later we received orders to march. By mistake, the wrong trail was taken, and after marching fourteen hours we returned to our camp of the previous night, all fagged out. A great many men of the brigade were overcome with heat during this long, tiresome and fruitless ramble. I cannot say how many of these were of the 25th Infantry, but in my own company (B) there was not a man out of the ranks when the camp was reached. (I have called the above-mentioned place "Siboney." There is probably some other name for it, as the Cubans have one for every hamlet. It is not far from Siboney, and not knowing the name, have called it Siboney.)

On the morning of the 25th we got rations from the transport and all enjoyed a hearty breakfast. At 1 P.M. we broke camp and marched to Sevilla, about six miles. Here we remained until the morning of the 27th, part of the regiment being out on picket duty. June 27th, the regiment marched three miles towards Santiago and bivouacked on the banks of a small creek. Bathing was forbidden, as the creek was the only water supply for the army. The troops remained at this place until the afternoon of June 30th. The camp was in the valley of the creek, the ground is low and flat, and with the heavy rainfall every one was uncomfortable. Rations had to be brought from Siboney over a trail and did not arrive regularly.

About 1 o'clock in the afternoon on the 30th, the officers of the regiment were assembled at headquarters and were notified that there would be an attack on the Spanish position the next morning. About 4 o'clock the regiment started for its position, arriving after 10 o'clock, having covered a distance of less than three miles. The route was over an excuse for a road, but was crowded with some of the troops of almost every organization of the army, causing numberless halts, but worse than all, breaking the much-needed rest of the troops. On one part of this route I heard men asking, "What regiment is this?" and heard various responses, as follows: "The W.W.W.'s, the 1st Cavalry, the 4th Infantry, the 10th Cavalry," etc. Some one asked, "What are the W.W.W.'s?" and some one replied, "Wood's Weary Walkers." I do not know who is responsible for that condition of affairs. Had we had an enterprising enemy in our front, disaster certainly would have followed. Here were a number of organizations scattered along a narrow, muddy trail, at the mercy of an active foe. All this was only three or four miles from the Spanish works. The men were cheerful, and few if any realized that there might be danger.

Most of the men were up and moving about before daylight the next morning. Shortly after, the regiment started in the direction of El Caney. At 9 A.M. we halted in a mango grove near the Ducureau mansion. Shortly before noon a mounted orderly appeared with a message for the brigade commander. A few minutes later the march towards El Caney was taken up. Heavy musketry fire had been heard in that direction since shortly before 7 o'clock. A march of little more than a mile and the regiment was formed for battle, Companies G and H in the firing line, C and D in support, the remaining four companies in reserve.

For two hours or perhaps more the firing was very heavy, especially during the second hour. Attention is called to report of Colonel A.S. Daggett, pages 387 and 388, "Report of the War Department, 1898, Vol. I," and endorsement on same by Major-General A.R. Chaffee. He says: "This stone fort was practically in the possession of the 12th Infantry at about 2 P.M. July 1." I cannot reconcile this statement with the fact that between the hours named some of the heaviest firing was going on, which does not indicate that its defenders were ready to give up. Lord Wellington once said, "At the end of every campaign truth lies at the bottom of a deep well, and it often takes twenty years to get her out." This may not be an exception. About half-past 4 o'clock the firing ceased and El Caney was ours.

The dead were collected near a hedge and the regiment was formed in column of masses to pay a silent tribute of respect to our departed comrades.

The regiment then started for the mango grove where we had left our blanket rolls and haversacks. Just as we were starting, some men with canteens started for water (about a mile away), when orders were received to be ready to march in twenty minutes. A few rods took us back to the road leading to Santiago. We moved down the road about three-quarters of a mile and halted. Two hours later, the pack train arrived with ammunition and then another with rations. Before the latter were issued orders were issued to move at once to the rear. The regiment marched over the trail it had come on the day before, arriving at El Poso about 8 o'clock A.M. Here we took the road leading to Santiago. About 9 A.M. we passed under San Juan Hill and moved to our right. Our forces held the crest of the hill. In passing along the hill we were sheltered from the fire except a short space, where one or two men were slightly wounded. Arriving at the La Cruz house near the road leading from El Caney to Santiago about 3.30 P.M. and bivouacked for the night. About 10 o'clock the troops on our left were attacked by the Spanish. The firing was very heavy for an hour, when it suddenly ceased, and we retired for the night. During this time we were under the hill and protected from the fire.

Next morning (Sunday, July 3d) desultory firing began at daylight. About 7 A.M. the regiment left the La Cruz house and moved across the Caney-Santiago road and formed line to the left and moved forward to a ridge overlooking the city. A number of shots fell about us, but no one was struck. Shortly after, we were in possession of the ridge and began intrenching. The firing was kept up and two men were wounded. About noon we were informed that a truce had been established and all work was stopped. This gave all a much-needed rest, though it proved to be of short duration, caused by a false alarm by Major Webb, the inspector of the division staff.

During the afternoon the regiment was moved to the foot of the ridge, leaving only the pickets on the crest. About 8.30 P.M. we were ordered to the picket line and began intrenching. The tall grass was wet from a drenching rain a few hours before. The ground, though wet, was hard, and slow progress was made, having only their bayonets for picks and their bare hands for shovels. All night this work went on. The men were tired, and hungry (as rations had not come up that day), but worked faithfully. During this, and I will add, throughout the campaign, I never heard a murmur nor a complaint; even when almost all the men of the regiment were down with fever and bowel trouble they were cheerful and ready to do any duty they were called on for.

The morning of July 3d Cervera's fleet sailed down the bay. An officer rode by our part of the line about half-past 9 and informed us of it. A few minutes later we heard the roar of the big guns, though at the time I little thought of what was going on. In the afternoon we heard cheering on our line way to the left, and as the good news came along it was taken up, and soon the whole line was shouting.

On the morning of July 5th the non-combatants left Santiago by two roads, one passing through our line. It was a pitiful sight. During the forenoon of the 5th we moved about a mile to the right and began intrenching. This position was very near the Spanish line, and quite elaborate works were constructed. We remained in this position until the morning of the 11th, when the regiment was ordered to the right of the line, about three miles. Here we intrenched. About 1 P.M. a truce was announced.

At 9.15 P.M. a staff officer came to the regimental commander's tent and informed him that the regiment was to be on the line at 12 o'clock midnight, and as soon as the moon rose to advance through the jungle until fired on, when the line was to halt and intrench. The night was stormy and any moon there might have been was obscured by the clouds. We were up, however, standing until daylight in a drenching rain, for it was so dark that any movement was impossible. Our rest was broken, without accomplishing anything that I know or heard of.

However, the rain and storm were providential, for I will always believe if the movement had been started we should have met with disaster. The ground was broken, deep ravines and underbrush with wire fences running through it. I have never learned who was "the father" of this order, and possibly never will. He must be ashamed of it.

The afternoon of the 12th the regiment advanced several hundred yards to the front and dug more intrenchments. They were still on this work the afternoon of the 14th when it was announced that the Spanish army had agreed to surrender. This came none too soon, for our men were coming down with malarial fever. A few days later nearly half the regiment were on the sick list, and the balance could not have done much.

The regiment was moved the same afternoon to higher ground in rear of the trenches. Strong guards were kept to look out for our prisoners and to prevent "our allies," the Cubans, from going into the city.

On the morning of the 17th the formal surrender of the city and Spanish army took place. We were some distance away and did not see anything of the ceremony.

On July 25th the regiment was moved about a mile further back in the hills and made camp, our tents, etc., having been brought up from the transport. Medicines appeared very scarce, resulting in much suffering. The food supplied was totally unfit for our new surroundings, and I believe not a little of the sickness can be traced to this. Our last camp was as good as any to be found in that vicinity.

The regiment remained in camp until August 13th, when it embarked on the transport "Camanche" for Montauk Point, arriving on the 18th, and landed on the 23d.

B.H.R. LOUGHBOROUGH, Captain, 25th Infantry.

FOOTNOTES:

[18] First Lieutenant McCorkle killed; Captain Edwards and First Lieutenants Kinnison and Murdock wounded.



CHAPTER VII.

SAN JUAN.

Cavalry Division: The Ninth and Tenth Regiments.

When Lawton's division swung off to the right to engage the enemy at El Caney, with the results described in the preceeding chapter, the divisions of Wheeler and Kent were ordered to proceed directly along the Santiago road toward San Juan. Within a mile from El Pozo, the point where they had bivouacked for the night of the 30th, the troops arrived at the Aguadores River, which crosses the road here within less than a mile from San Juan Heights. Wheeler's division headed the column, although that general was not commanding. He had been relieved on the afternoon of the 30th and did not resume command until about 4 o'clock on July 1,[19] long after the heights had been carried, although he was on the field shortly after 1 o'clock of that day.

The Dismounted Cavalry Division on the morning of July 1 presented 2,663 fighting men, including officers. The First Brigade, commanded by Colonel Carrol, had 50 officers and 1,054 men, in regiments as follows: Third Cavalry, 22 officers, 420 men; Sixth Cavalry, 16 officers, 427 men; Ninth Cavalry, 12 officers, 207 men, the Ninth having hardly one-half the strength of either of the other regiments of the brigade. The Second Brigade, commanded by General Wood, contained 1,559 persons, distributed as follows: Brigade staff, 9 officers, 14 men; First Cavalry, 21 officers, 501 men: Tenth Cavalry, 22 officers, 507 men; First Volunteer Cavalry (Rough Riders), 25 officers, 517 men.

Before the troops left El Poso, Grimes' battery had been put in position and had fired a few shots at a blockhouse on San Juan Hill, distance 2,600 yards. Using black powder, which created a cloud of smoke with every shot, the battery was readily located by the foe, and the shrapnel from their guns was soon bursting among our forces. The second shot from the Spaniards wounded four of the Rough Riders and two or three of the regulars, while a third killed and wounded several Cubans. As a matter of course there was a rapid movements of the troops from that immediate vicinity. The firing soon ceased, and the troops took up that general advance movement already noted.

It is no easy task to follow the movements of the Cavalry Division from the time it left El Poso that July morning until it finally entrenched itself for the night on San Juan Hills. As heretofore we will take the official reports first, and from them make up the itinerary and the movements of the battle that followed, as far as they will enable us to do so. General Sumner says the division proceeded toward Santiago, and when about three-fourths of a mile from El Poso was halted in a narrow road to await orders and remained there for nearly an hour, subject to the effects of heavy artillery fire from the enemy's battery. Major Wessells, of the Third Cavalry, says, while following the road toward Santiago that morn, "much delay ensued from some reason unknown to the undersigned," and that the First Brigade of the division arrived at San Juan ford about 10 o'clock. This creek was about five hundred yards farther toward Santiago than Aguadores River, and ran about parallel with San Juan Heights, from which it was about three-fourths of a mile distant.

The orders for which General Sumner had waited nearly an hour under fire had come and were "verbal instructions to move to the San Juan Creek and hold it." Reaching this creek his advance guard was met by the Spaniards who fired one volley and retreated to a position on a hill on Sumner's right front, about 1,200 yards distant. Crossing this creek with sufficient strength to hold it, Sumner was now ordered to move by the right flank and connect with Lawton's left. While his troops were in this massed condition prior to deploying to the right through a thick jungle, the balloon that was in use for purposes of reconnoitering, came up the road and exposed itself to the full view of the Spaniards upon the heights. They needed no further invitation to direct toward our forces their artillery, for which the balloon became a flying target. Many officers and men were wounded here by exploding shells and small arms' fire of the enemy (Sumner). Under this fire, however, the troops were deployed as ordered.

Colonel Wood, who had charge of the Second Brigade, of which the Rough Riders were the leading regiment, says this "regiment was directed to change direction to the right, and by moving up the creek to effect a junction with General Lawton's division, which was engaged at Caney, about one and a-half miles toward the right, but was supposed to be working toward our right flank. After proceeding in this direction about half a mile the effort to connect with General Lawton was given up." This movement to the right took place between ten and eleven o'clock, at which time Lawton's forces had made no impression upon El Caney, and he was far from making any movement which might be described as working toward the right flank of the Cavalry Division. Lawton was not found by that half-hour's search to the right; and it was evident that something must be done by these troops in front, and done quickly. The whole division was under fire, and the battle on the Spanish side was in actual progress. True our men were hidden away in the jungle that bordered the creek, but their position was known to the Spaniards, and leaves and boughs are no cover from shot and shell. They were receiving the fire of the enemy and making no reply whatever, save by the few ineffective shots from the far away battery on El Poso Hill.

Directly in front of the cavalry division was a little hill occupied by a Spanish force. This hill is called in General Wood's report East Hill, but in the literature of the battle it is usually mentioned as Kettle Hill. The fire in part was coming from here. Colonel Wood gives another report of the morning's experience in which he says: "The brigade moved down the road toward Santiago in rear of the First Brigade, with instructions to deploy to the right after crossing the San Juan, and continue to extend to the right, reaching out toward General Lawton's left and holding ourselves in rear of the First Brigade as a support. On reaching the stream the First Volunteer Cavalry, which was in the lead, crossed the stream with comparatively slight loss and deployed to the right in good order, but at this time a captive balloon was led down the road in which the troops were massed, and finally anchored at the crossing of the stream. The approach and anchoring of this balloon served to indicate the line of approach of the troops and to locate the ford, and the result was a terrific converging of artillery and rifle fire on the ford, which resulted in severe loss of men. Under this fire the First United States Cavalry and the Tenth United States Cavalry crossed the stream and deployed to the right where they were placed in position in rear of the First Brigade. Two regiments of the Second Brigade, to wit., the First and the Tenth Regular Cavalry, were located in the rear of the First Brigade. The First Regular Cavalry had begun its day's work as support of Grimes' battery, but had later come forward and taken its place in the brigade time enough to join in the action that followed.

"After completing the deployment," says Sumner, "the command was so much committed to battle that it became necessary either to advance or else retreat under fire." The troops were already in battle, but were not fighting, and could not do so in their present position, simply because they could not see the enemy. "Lieutenant Miley, representing General Shafter, authorized an advance, which was ordered, Carroll's brigade taking the advance, reinforced on the right by Roosevelt's regiment, and supported by the First and Tenth Cavalry." (Sumner.) Colonel Wood says: "After remaining in this position for about an hour (meaning the position held by his brigade previous to the coming of the order to advance) the order to advance was given, and the brigade advanced in good order as possible, but more or less broken up by the masses of brush and heavy grass and cactus; passing through the line of the First Brigade, mingling with them and charging the hill in conjunction with these troops, as well as some few infantry who had extended to the right." It must be remembered that the First Brigade consisted wholly of regulars, the Third, Sixth and Ninth Cavalry, while the Second Brigade had that remarkable regiment, the Rough Riders. This fact may account for their breaking through the lines of the First Brigade. Major Wessells, who commanded the Third Cavalry in that fight, and was himself wounded at the close of the first charge, says his regiment became entangled with other regiments, but, nevertheless, was to the crest as soon as any. Of the advance of the whole division, General Sumner says: "The advance was made under heavy infantry fire, through open flat ground, cut up by wire fences, to the creek, distant about 600 yards. The advance was made in good order, the enemy's fire being returned only under favorable opportunities. In crossing the flat one officer and several men were killed and several officers and men wounded. Both sides of the creek were heavily wooded for about 200 yards. The creek was swollen, and the crossing through this space and the creek was made with great difficulty.

"After passing through the thick woods the ground was entirely open and fenced by wire. From this line it was necessary to storm the hill, upon the top of which is a house, loop-holed for defense. The slope of the hill is very difficult, but the assault was made with great gallantry and with much loss to the enemy. In this assault Colonel Hamilton, Lieutenants Smith and Shipp were killed; Colonel Carroll, Lieutenants Thayer and Myer were wounded. A number of casualties occurred among the enlisted men." The heights were carried by the whole division.

Lieutenant-Colonel Baldwin's account of the part his regiment took in the assault upon San Juan is told about as follows: After the search for Lawton had been given up, the First and Tenth Cavalry were formed for attack on East Hill. "I was directed," he says, "to take a position to the right, behind the river bank, for protection. While moving to this position, and while there, the regiment suffered considerable loss. After an interval of twenty or thirty minutes I was directed to form line of battle in a partially open field facing toward the blockhouses and strong intrenchments to the north occupied by the enemy. Much difficulty was found on account of the dense undergrowth, crossed in several directions by wire fences. As a part of the cavalry division under General Sumner, the regiment was formed in two lines, the First Squadron under Major S.T. Norvell, consisting of Troops A, B, E and I, leading; the second line, under Major T.J. Wint, consisting of Troops C, F and G. Troop D having crossed farther down the river, attached itself to a command of infantry and moved with that command on the second blockhouse. The regiment advanced in this formation in a heavy converging fire from the enemy's position, proceeding but a short distance when the two lines were united into one. The advance was rapidly continued in an irregular line toward the blockhouses and intrenchments to the right front. During this advance the line passed some troops of the First Cavalry, which I think had previously been formed on our right. Several losses occurred before reaching the top of the hill, First Lieutenant William H. Smith being killed as he arrived on its crest. The enemy having retreated toward the northwest to the second and third blockhouses, new lines were formed and a rapid advance was made upon these new positions. The regiment assisted in capturing these works from the enemy, and with the exception of Troops C and I, which in the meantime had joined the First Volunteer Cavalry, then took up a position to the north of the second blockhouse, remaining there all night."

Major Norvell, who commanded the First Squadron of the Tenth Cavalry, which consisted of Troops A, B, E and I, gives the following account of the experiences of July 1st:

"The regiment took position in a wood, and here suffered considerable loss, due to the fact that the whole of the enemy's fire appeared to be directed to this point. In a short time we moved out of the wood by the right flank and then deployed to the left, being then directly in front of the enemy and one mile distant from his works, marked by three houses about half a mile from one another. The enemy was strongly entrenched in front of these houses. The line, consisting of the cavalry division, under direction of Brigadier-General Sumner, moved forward in double time, under a terrific fire of the enemy. We had a very heavy jungle to march through, beside the river (San Juan) to cross, and during our progress many men were killed and wounded. The troops became separated from one another, though the general line was pretty well preserved. The works of the enemy were carried in succession by the troops; and the Spaniards were steadily driven back toward the town to their last ditches. We now found ourselves about half a mile from the city, but the troops being by this time nearly exhausted, here intrenched themselves for the night under a heavy fire. By dark this line was occupied by all the troops engaged during the day."

The official reports of the troop commanders of the Tenth Cavalry bring out a few more particulars which serve to give us a more vivid conception of this moving line. The entire cavalry division advanced together, and notwithstanding the roughness of the ground, Major Norvell assures us the line was pretty well preserved. Troops A, B, E and I were in the First Squadron, which was in the lead; Troops C, F and G were in the second line; Troop D made its advance with the infantry off to the left. We have now a fair knowledge of the general movement of the whole regiment. Let us follow the fortunes of some of the Troops, and by that means get nearer to the work done by the individual soldier.

Troop A was on the right of the leading squadron as the regiment took its place in line on the left of the First Cavalry and moved against the Spanish blockhouses in the face of a heavy fire, making a rush forward without intermission. A portion of the right platoon, under Lieutenant Livermore, became separated in one of the thickets, and under instructions received personally from the brigade commander, who seems to have been everywhere where he was needed, continued up the slope toward his right and toward the first blockhouse. The remainder of the troop, commanded by Captain Beck and Lieutenant McCoy, moved in the same direction at first, but observing that on account of the shorter distance to the slope from that end of the line, a large number of troops were arriving there, Captain Beck swung his troop to the left and reached the summit of the hill between the second and third blockhouses, and on arriving received a message by an aid of the brigade commander to hold the ridge. Just then Lieut. Livermore arrived, having come by way of Blockhouse No. 1. The troop now being together, held the crest for an hour. At times the fire of the enemy was so severe and Captain Beck's force so small that there was great danger that he would be compelled to abandon the position, but fortunately at the most critical juncture Lieutenant Lyon of the Twenty-fourth Infantry came up with a few reinforcements, and Lieutenant Hughes of the Tenth Cavalry with a Hotchkiss gun. Lieutenant Lyon formed his troops to the left of the gun, Troop A of the Tenth Cavalry being on the right. With this force the position was held until other troops arrived. Soon after, the squadron was reformed and the men entrenched themselves under fire. Troop B was next to Troop A and advanced as skirmishers by rushes and double time, but soon found its front blocked by other troops. Troop I advanced in two sections, the left being commanded by Lieutenant Miller, joined in the attack on the right of the enemy's position; the right commanded by Lieutenant Fleming, advanced on trenches between two blockhouses, and in so doing caught up with the rest of the troop. The first half of the troop, after attacking the blockhouse on right of the enemy's position then crossed the valley and attacked the blockhouse on the left of enemy's position, and then moved forward with the First Regular Cavalry and First Volunteer Cavalry, until the troop assembled as a whole. When it reached the place of intrenchment there were altogether about one hundred men at that point of the ridge, consisting of men from the Tenth Cavalry and of the Rough Riders. It is claimed by Lieutenant Anderson, who commanded Troop C, and who made his way to the front on the right of the line, that after coming up on the second hill and joining his troop to the left of Troop I, Colonel Roosevelt and part of his regiment joined on the right of the Tenth, and that he reported to him, placing C Troop in his command. Before this time Lieutenant Anderson had reported to Captain Jones, of Troop F, while they were on Kettle Hill, and the Two troops, F and C, had been formed in skirmish line and moved against the second blockhouse. In this movement Troop C got separated from Captain Jones, and Anderson, with 18 men of his own troop and several from other organizations, moved forward until he connected with Troop I, as previously narrated. These troops, C and I, were reported by their Colonel as having joined the First Volunteer Cavalry. All of the troop commanders who were immediately with the men bear hearty testimony to their good conduct. Captain Jones, commanding Troop F, says: "I could only do justice to the troop by mentioning by name all who were engaged, not only for their bravery, but for their splendid discipline under the most demoralizing fire." Lieutenant Fleming, commanding Troop I, says: "The entire troop behaved with great gallantry. Private Elsie Jones particularly distinguished himself." Captain Beck, commanding Troop A, says: "The behaviour of the enlisted men was magnificent, paying studious attention to orders while on the firing line, and generally exhibiting an intrepidity which marks the first-class soldier." Lieutenant Hughes, who commanded the Hotchkiss gun detachment, mentions four men for conspicuous bravery and commends his entire detachment for "spirit, enterprise and good behavior."

The official story is that the entire cavalry division advanced under orders from General Sumner and that the heft of its first blow fell upon Kettle Hill, which was soon captured, and on the crest of this hill the troops which had ascended it made a temporary halt, reformed their lines somewhat and immediately advanced upon the second hill to the help of that part of the cavalry division which had swung to the left in the advance, and also to the help of the infantry who were coming against Fort San Juan at the same time. Meanwhile there was left upon Kettle Hill a sufficient garrison or force to prevent its being recaptured by the enemy. In the assault on Kettle Hill the brigade commander, Colonel Carroll, had been wounded, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton of the Ninth Cavalry killed. Many troop officers also had been either killed or wounded and also in the rush forward through the jungle and high grass some troops had been separated from their officers, and yet it is remarkable that all were ready to move forward to the next assault.

The words of praise to the whole cavalry division contained in the following order, published at Camp Wikoff immediately after the arrival there of the troops, are claimed by both black and white cavalrymen alike:

Headquarters, Cavalry Division, Camp Wikoff, L.I., September 7th, 1898.

To the Officers and Soldiers of the Cavalry Division, Army of Santiago.

The duties for which the troops comprising the Cavalry Division were brought together have been accomplished.

On June 14th we sailed from Tampa, Fla., to encounter in the sickly season the diseases of the tropical island of Cuba, and to face and attack the historic legions of Spain in positions chosen by them and which for years they had been strengthening by every contrivance and art known to the skillful military engineers of Europe.

On the 23d, one squadron each of the 1st and 10th Regular Cavalry and two squadrons of the 1st Volunteer Cavalry, in all 964 officers and men, landed on Cuban soil. These troops marched on foot fourteen miles, and, early on the morning of the 24th, attacked and defeated double their number of regular Spanish soldiers under the command of Lieutenant-General Linares. Eagerly and cheerfully you pushed onward, and on July 1st forded San Juan River and gallantly swept over San Juan Hill, driving the enemy from its crest. Without a moment's halt you formed, aligning the division upon the 1st Infantry Division under General Kent, and, together with these troops, you bravely charged and carried the formidable intrenchments of Fort San Juan. The entire force which fought and won this great victory was less than seven thousand men.

The astonished enemy, though still protected by the strong works to which he had made his retreat, was so stunned by your determined valor that his only thought was to devise the quickest means of saving himself from further battle. The great Spanish fleet hastily sought escape from the harbor and was destroyed by our matchless navy.

After seizing the fortifications of San Juan Ridge, you, in the darkness of night, strongly intrenched the position your valor had won. Reinforced by Bates' Brigade on your left and Lawton's Division on your right, you continued the combat until the Spanish army of Santiago Province succumbed to the superb prowess and courage of American arms. Peace promptly followed, and you return to receive the plaudits of seventy millions of people.

The valor displayed by you was not without sacrifice. Eighteen per cent., or nearly one in five, of the Cavalry Division fell on the field either killed or wounded. We mourn the loss of these heroic dead, and a grateful country will always revere their memory.

Whatever may be my fate, wherever my steps may lead, my heart will always burn with increasing admiration for your courage in action, your fortitude under privation and your constant devotion to duty in its highest sense, whether in battle, in bivouac or upon the march.

JOSEPH WHEELER, Major-General U.S.V., Commanding.

Aside from that part of the Tenth Cavalry who fought under General Wheeler and who are consequently included among those congratulated by the General Order just quoted, Troop M of that regiment, under command of Lieutenant C.P. Johnson, performed an important part in the war. The troop consisted of 50 men and left Port Tampa June 21 on board the steamship Florida, the steamship Fanita also making a part of the expedition. The troop was mounted and was accompanied by a pack train of 65 animals. Both ships were heavily loaded with clothing, ammunition and provision, and had on board besides Lieutenant Johnson's command, General Nunez and staff and 375 armed Cubans. The expedition sailed around the west end of the island and attempted a landing at a point chosen by General Nunez on June 29, but failed owing to the fact that the place chosen was well guarded by Spaniards, who fired upon the landing party. The expedition had with it a small gunboat, the Peoria, commanded by Captain Ryan, and on the afternoon of June 30th an attack was made upon a blockhouse on the shore by the gunboat, and a small force of Cuban and American volunteers landed, but were repulsed with the loss of one killed, General Nunez's brother, and seven wounded. Two days later Lieutenant Johnson was able to land and immediately made connection with General Gomez, unloading his stores for the Cuban Army.

Lieutenant G.P. Ahearn, of the Twenty-fifth Infantry, who went on this expedition as a volunteer, rendered important service on the night after the attack on the blockhouse at Tayabacoa. As the attacking party met with repulse and escaped to the ship in the darkness, several of their wounded were left on shore. Several boats sent out to recover them had returned without the men, their crews fearing to go on shore after them. Lieutenant Ahearn volunteered to attempt the rescue of the men, and taking a water-logged boat, approached the shore noiselessly and succeeded in his undertaking. The crew accompanying Lieutenant Ahearn was made up of men from Troop M, Tenth Cavalry, and behaved so well that the four were given Medals of Honor for their marked gallantry. The action of Lieutenant Ahearn in this case was in keeping with his whole military career. He has ever manifested a fondness for exceptional service, and has never failed when opportunity occurred to display a noble gallantry on the side of humanity. Nothing appeals to him so commandingly as an individual needing rescue, and in such a cause he immediately rises to the hero's plane. The noble colored soldiers who won medals on that occasion were all privates and became heroes for humanity's sake. Their names deserve a place in this history outside the mere official table. They were Dennis Bell, George H. Wanton, Fitz Lee and William H. Tompkins, and were the only colored soldiers who, at the time of this writing, have won Medals of Honor in the Spanish War. Others, however, may yet be given, as doubtless others are deserved. The heroic service performed by whole regiments, as in the case of the Twenty-fourth Infantry, should entitle every man in it to a medal of some form as a souvenir for his posterity.

Losses of the Ninth Cavalry in the battles of San Juan:

OFFICERS—Killed, Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Hamilton.

MEN—Killed, Trumpeter Lewis Fort, Private James Johnson.

OFFICERS—Wounded, Adjutant Winthrop S. Wood, Captain Charles W. Taylor.

MEN—Wounded. First Sergeant Charles W. Jefferson, Sergeant Adam Moore, Sergeant Henry F. Wall, Sergeant Thomas B. Craig, Corporal James W. Ervine, Corporal Horace T. Henry, Corporal John Mason, Burwell Bullock, Elijah Crippen, Edward Davis, Hoyle Ervin, James Gandy, Edward D. Nelson, Noah Prince, Thomas Sinclair, James R. Spear, Jr., Jacob Tull, William H. Turner, George Warren, Alfred Wilson.

Losses of the Tenth Cavalry during the battle of San Juan:

OFFICERS—Killed, First Lieutenant W.E. Shipp, First Lieutenant W.H. Smith.

MEN—Killed, John H. Smoot, Corporal W.F. Johnson, John H. Dodson, George Stroal, William H. Slaughter.

OFFICERS—Wounded, Major T.J. Wint Captain John Bigelow, Jr., Adjutant and First Lieutenant M.H. Barnum, First Lieutenant R.L. Livermore, First Lieutenant E.D. Anderson, Second Lieutenant F.R. McCoy, Second Lieutenant H.C. Whitehead, Second Lieutenant T.A. Roberts, Second Lieutenant H.O. Willard.

MEN—Wounded, First Sergeant A. Houston, First Sergeant Robert Milbrown, Q.M. Sergeant William Payne, Sergeant Smith Johnson, Sergeant Ed. Lane, Sergeant Walker Johnson, Sergeant George Dyers, Sergeant Willis Hatcher, Sergeant John L. Taylor, Sergeant Amos Elliston, Sergeant Frank Rankin, Sergeant E.S. Washington, Sergeant U.G. Gunter, Corporal J.G. Mitchell, Corporal Allen Jones, Corporal Marcellus Wright, Privates Lewis L. Anderson, John Arnold, Charles Arthur, John Brown, Frank D. Bennett, Wade Bledsoe, Hillary Brown, Thornton Burkley, John Brooks, W.H. Brown, Wm. A. Cooper, John Chinn, J.H. Campbell, Henry Fearn, Benjamin Franklin, Gilmore Givens, B.F. Gaskins, William Gregory, Luther D. Gould, Wiley, Hipsher, Thomas Hardy, Charles Hopkins, Richard James, Wesley Jones, Robert E. Lee, Sprague Lewis, Henry McCormack, Samuel T. Minor, Lewis Marshall, William Matthews, Houston Riddill, Charles Robinson, Frank Ridgeley, Fred. Shackley, Harry D. Sturgis, Peter Saunderson, John T. Taylor, William Tyler, Isom Taylor, John Watson, Benjamin West, Joseph Williams, Allen E. White, Nathan Wyatt.