[11] See chapter on Colored Officers.

[12] Young is now captain in the Ninth Cavalry.—T.G.S.

[13] The colored regulars were embarked on the following named ships: The 9th Cavalry on the Miami, in company with the 6th Infantry; the 10th Cavalry on the Leona, in company with the 1st Cavalry; the 24th Infantry on the City of Washington, in company with one battalion of the 21st Infantry; the 25th infantry on board the Concho, in company with the 4th Infantry.

[14] See Note, at the close of this chapter.



CHAPTER IV.

BRIEF SKETCH OF SPANISH HISTORY.

The following brief sketch of Spain, its era of greatness, the causes leading thereto, and the reasons for its rapid decline, will be of interest to the reader at this point in the narrative, as it will bring into view the other side of the impending conflict:

Spain, the first in rank among the second-rate powers of Europe, by reason of her possessions in the West Indies, especially Cuba, may be regarded as quite a near neighbor, and because of her connection with the discovery and settlement of the continent, as well as the commanding part she at one time played in the world's politics, her history cannot but awaken within the breasts of Americans a most lively interest.

As a geographical and political fact, Spain dates from the earliest times, and the Spanish people gather within themselves the blood and the traditions of the three great continents of the Old World—Europe, Asia and Africa—united to produce the mighty Spaniard of the 15th and 16th centuries. It would be an interesting subject for the anthropologist to trace the construction of that people who are so often spoken of as possessing the pure blood of Castile, and as the facts should be brought to view, another proud fiction would dissipate in thin air, as we should see the Spaniard arising to take his place among the most mixed of mankind.

The Spain that we are considering now is the Spain that gradually emerged from a chaos of conflicting elements into the unity of a Christian nation. The dismal war between creeds gave way to the greater conflict between religions, when Cross and Crescent contended for supremacy, and this too had passed. The four stalwart Christian provinces of Leon, Castile, Aragon and Navarre had become the four pillars of support to a national throne and Ferdinand and Isabella were reigning. Spain has now apparently passed the narrows and is crossing the bar with prow set toward the open sea. She ends her war with the Moors at the same time that England ends her wars of the Roses, and the battle of Bosworth's field may be classed with the capitulation of Granada. Both nations confront a future of about equal promise and may be rated as on equal footing, as this new era of the world opens to view.

What was this new era? Printing had been invented, commerce had arisen, gunpowder had come into use, the feudal system was passing, royal authority had become paramount, and Spain was giving to the world its first lessons in what was early stigmatized as the "knavish calling of diplomacy."

Now began the halcyon days of Spain, and what a breed of men she produced! Read the story of their conquests in Mexico and Peru, as told with so much skill and taste by our own Prescott; or read of the grandeur of her national character, and the wonderful valor of her troops, and the almost marvelous skill of her Alexander of Parma, and her Spinola, as described by our great Motley, and you will see something of the moral and national glory of that Spain which under Charles V and Philip II awed the world into respectful silence.

Who but men of iron, under a commander of steel, could have conducted to a successful issue the awful siege of Antwerp, and by a discipline more dreadful than death, kept for so many years, armed control of the country of the brave Netherlanders? A Farnese was there, who could support and command an army, carry Philip and his puerile idiosyncrasies upon his back and meet the fury of an outraged people who were fighting on their own soil for all that man holds dear. Never was wretched cause so ably led, never were such splendid talents so unworthily employed.

Alexander of Parma, Cortez, the Pizarros, were representatives of that form of human character that Spain especially developed. Skill and daring were brought out in dazzling splendor, and success followed their movements. Take a brief survey of the Empire under Charles V: Himself Emperor of Germany; his son married to the Queen of England; Turkey repulsed; France humbled, and all Europe practically within his grasp. And what was Spain outside of Europe? In America she possessed territory covering sixty degrees of latitude, owning Mexico, Central America, Venezuela, New Granada, Peru and Chili, with vast parts of North America, and the islands of Cuba, Jamaica and St. Domingo. In Africa and Asia she had large possessions—in a word, the energies of the world were at her feet. The silver and gold of America, the manufactures and commerce of the Netherlands, combined to make her the richest of nations.

The limits of the present purpose do not permit an exhaustive presentation of her material strength in detail, nor are the means at hand for making such an exhibit. We must be content with a general picture, quoted directly from Motley. He says:

"Look at the broad magnificent Spanish Peninsula, stretching across eight degrees of latitude and ten of longtitude, commanding the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with a genial climate, warmed in winter by the vast furnace of Africa, and protected from the scorching heats of summer by shady mountain and forest, and temperate breezes from either ocean. A generous southern territory, flowing with oil and wine, and all the richest gifts of a bountiful nature—splendid cities—the new and daily expanding Madrid, rich in the trophies of the most artistic period of the modern world; Cadiz, as populous at that day as London, seated by the straits where the ancient and modern systems of traffic were blending like the mingling of the two oceans; Granada, the ancient, wealthy seat of the fallen Moors; Toledo, Valladolid, and Lisbon, chief city of the recently conquered kingdom of Portugal, counting with its suburbs a larger population than any city excepting Paris, in Europe, the mother of distant colonies, and the capital of the rapidly-developing traffic with both the Indies—these were some of the treasures of Spain herself. But she possessed Sicily also, the better portion of Italy, and important dependencies in Africa, while the famous maritime discoveries of the age had all enured to her aggrandizement. The world seemed suddenly to have expanded its wings from East to West, only to bear the fortunate Spanish Empire to the most dizzy heights of wealth and power. The most accomplished generals, the most disciplined and daring infantry the world has ever known, the best equipped and most extensive navy, royal and mercantile, of the age, were at the absolute command of the sovereign. Such was Spain."

Such is not Spain to-day. A quite recent writer, speaking of Spain before the war, said, that although Spain in extent holds the sixth place in the European states, "it really now subsists merely by the sufferance of stronger nations." Thus has that nation, which three centuries ago dominated the world, lost both its position and its energy.

Without attempting to sketch chronologically, either this rise or this decline, let us rather direct our efforts to an inquiry into the causes of both the one and the other.

In attempting to explain the greatness of Spain we must give first place to the vigor of the Spanish race. The great Spaniard was a mighty compound. He had the blood of Rome mingled with the awful torrent that gave birth to the soulless Goths and Vandals. In him also flowed the hot blood of the Moors. He was both sturdy and fiery; he had the fervor of the South with the tenacity of the North; the pride of the Roman with the passion of the Moor. The Spanish race was emphatically a rich race.

And then we must remember that this race had been forged in war. Century after century, from the earliest times, they had lived with their arms in their hands. First came the long war between the Arian Vandals, and the Trinitarian natives; then the seven-hundred-year war with the followers of Mahomed. The whole mission of life to them was to fight.

Naturally there was developed in the people at large the most complete unification and subjection. Individualism gave place almost entirely to the common weal, and the spectacle was presented of a nation with no political questions. Maccaulay maintains that human nature is such that aggregations of men will always show the two principles of radicalism and conservatism, and that two parties will exist in consequence, one composed of those who are ever looking to a brighter future, the other of those who are ever seeking to restore a delightful past; but no such phenomena appear in the ascending period of Spain's history. The whole nation moved as an organized army, steadily forward, until its zenith was reached. This solidity was a marked element of its strength.

Mr. Buckle recognizes this, and accounts for the harmonious movements of the nation by the influence of two leading principles, which he is pleased to call superstition and loyalty. The Arab invasion had pressed upon the Christians with such force that it was only by the strictest discipline that the latter had managed to survive. To secure such discipline, and at the same time supply the people with the steady enthusiasm necessary to support a war from century to century, all the terrors and all the glories that could be derived from religion were employed. The church and the state, the prince and the priest, became as one, and loyalty and religion, devotion to the standard and to the cross, were but different names for the same principles and actions. Hence Spain emerged to greatness without the least dream of liberty of either person, conscience or thought. Her rallying cry was: For the Prince and the Church; not, For God and Liberty. She went up to greatness the most loyal and the most religious of nations; but Liberty, Justice and Truth were not upon her banners.

Look over the territory settled and conquered by her, and what do we see? Columbus, sailing under Spain, names the first land he discovers San Salvador; the first settlement made in this country is St. Augustine; the second, Sante Fe. Look down over the southern half of our continent and such names as Espirito Santo, Corpus Christi, San Diego, San Juan, San Jose, San Domingo attest the religious zeal of the conquerors. They were missionaries of the Cross, robbing the people of their gold and paying them off with religion.

Steadfast in the faith and sturdy in her loyalty, Spain resisted all innovations with respect to her religious beliefs, and all insurrections against her government. Her Alva and her Torquemada but illustrated how strong was her conservatism, while her Isabella and her Philip II show how grand and comprehensive and how persistent was her aggressiveness, under the idea of spreading and upholding the true faith. She not only meant to hold all she had of wealth and power, but she aspired to universal dominion; already chief, she desired to be sole, and this in the interest and name of the Holy Church.

The Reformation did not disturb Spain; it was crushed out within twenty years. The spirit of liberty that had been growing in England since Bosworth's Field, and that was manifesting itself in Germany and the Netherlands, and that had begun to quiver even in France, did not dare stir itself in Spain. Spain was united, or rather, was solidity itself, and this solidity was both its strength and its death. England was not so united, and England went steadily onward and upward; but Spain's unity destroyed her, because it practically destroyed individualism and presented the strange paradox of a strong nation of weak men.

As a machine Spain in the sixteenth century was a marvel of power; as an aggregation of thinking men, it was even then contemptible. Ferdinand, Charles V and Philip II were able and illustrious rulers, and they appeared at a time when their several characters could tell on the immediate fortunes of Spain. They were warriors, and the nation was entirely warlike. During this period the Spaniard overran the earth, not that he might till the soil, but that he might rob the man who did. With one hand he was raking in the gold and silver of Mexico and Peru; with the other confiscating the profits of the trade and manufactures of the Low Countries—and all in the name of the Great God and Saints!

How was Spain overthrown? The answer is a short one. Spain, under Philip II staked her all upon a religious war against the awakening age. She met the Reformation within her own borders and extinguished it; but thought had broken loose from its chains and was abroad in the earth. England had turned Protestant, and Elizabeth was on the throne; Denmark, Norway and Sweden, indeed all countries except Spain and Italy had heard the echoes from Luther's trumpet blast. Italy furnished the religion, and Spain the powder, in this unequal fight between the Old and the New. Spain was not merely the representative of the old, she WAS the old, and she armed her whole strength in its behalf.

Here was a religion separated from all moral principle and devoid of all softening sentiment—its most appropriate formula being, death to all heretics. Death—not to tyrants, not to oppressors, not to robbers and men-stealers—but death to heretics. It was this that equipped her Armada.

The people were too loyal and too pious to THINK, and so were hurled in a solid mass against the armed thought of the coming age, and a mighty nation crumbled as in a day. With the destruction of her Armada her warlike ascendancy passed and she had nothing to put in its place. She had not tillers of the soil, mechanics or skilled merchants. Business was taking the place of war all over the world, but Spain knew only religion and war, hence worsted in her only field, she was doomed.

From the days of Philip II her decline was rapid. Her territory slipped from her as rapidly as it had been acquired. Her great domains on our soil are now the seat of thriving communities of English-speaking people. The whole continent of South America has thrown off her yoke, though still retaining her language, and our troops now embarked from Port Tampa are destined to wrest from her the two only remaining colonies subject to her sway in the Western World,—Cuba and Porto Rico. With all her losses hitherto, Spain has not learned wisdom. Antagonistic to truth and liberty, she seems to sit in the shadow of death, hugging the delusions that have betrayed her, while all other people of earth are pressing onward toward light and liberty.

The struggle in Cuba had been going on for years, and in that colony of less than two millions of inhabitants, many of whom were Spaniards, there was now an army four times as large as the standing army of the United States. Against this army and against the Government of Spain a revolt had been carried on previous to the present outbreak for a period of ten years, and which had been settled by concessions on the part of the home government. The present revolt was of two years' standing when our government decided to interfere. The Cubans had maintained disorder, if they had not carried on war; and they had declined to be pacified. In their army they experienced no color difficulties. Gomez, Maceo and Quintin Banderas were generals honored and loved, Maceo especially coming to be the hero and idol of the insurgents of all classes. And it can truthfully be said that no man in either the Cuban or Spanish army, in all the Cuban struggle previous to our intervention, has earned a loftier fame as patriot, soldier and man of noble mould than ANTONIO MACEO.

Cuba, by far the most advanced of all the West Indian colonies; Cuba, essentially Spanish, was destined to be the battle ground between our troops and the veterans of Spain. The question to be settled was that of Spain's sovereignty. Spain's right to rule over the colonies of Cuba and Porto Rico was disputed by the United States, and this question, and this alone, is to be settled by force of arms. Further than this, the issue does not go. The dictum of America is: Spain shall not rule. The questions of Annexation, Expansion and Imperialism were not before us as we launched our forces to drive Spain out of the West Indies. The Cuban flag was closely associated with our own standard popularly, and "Cuba Libre" was a wide-spread sentiment in June, 1898. "We are ready to help the Cubans gain their liberty" was the honest expression of thousands who felt they were going forward in a war for others.



CHAPTER V.

PASSAGE, LANDING, AND FIRST BATTLE IN CUBA.

The Tenth Cavalry at Guasimas—The "Rescue of the Rough Riders"—Was There an Ambush?—Notes.

"The passage to Santiago was generally smooth and uneventful," says General Shafter in his official report. But when the fact is called to mind that the men had been on board a week before sailing, and were a week more on the passage, and that "the conveniences on many of the transports in the nature of sleeping accommodations, space for exercise, closet accommodations, etc., were not all that could have been desired," and that the opinion was general throughout the army that the travel ration was faulty, it cannot be doubted that the trip was a sore trial to the enlisted men at least. The monotonous days passed in the harbor at Port Tampa, while waiting for orders to sail, were unusually trying to the men. They were relieved somewhat by bathing, swimming, gaming and chatting on the coming events. A soldier who was in one of the colored regiments describes the inside life of one of the transports as follows: "After some miles of railroad travel and much hustling we were put on board the transport. I say on board, but it is simply because we cannot use the terms under board. We were huddled together below two other regiments and under the water line, in the dirtiest, closest, most sickening place imaginable. For about fifteen days we were on the water in this dirty hole, but being soldiers we were compelled to accept this without a murmur. We ate corn beef and canned tomatoes with our hard bread until we were anything but half way pleased. In the fifth or sixth day out to sea the water furnished us became muddy or dirty and well flavored with salt, and remained so during the rest of the journey. Then, the ship's cooks, knowing well our condition made it convenient to themselves to sell us a glass of clean ice water and a small piece of bread and tainted meat for the sum of seventy-five cents, or one dollar, as the case might be."

A passage from Port Tampa, around the eastern end of Cuba, through the Windward Passage, even in June, is ordinarily pleasant. On the deck of a clean steamer, protected from the sun's rays by a friendly awning, it may be put down as nearly an ideal pleasure trip; but crowded into freight ships as these men were, many of them clad in thick and uncomfortable clothing, reduced to the uninviting travel ration, compelled to spend most of the time below decks, occupied with thoughts of home and friends, and beset with forebodings of coming events, it was very far from being to them a pastime. Of the thousands who are going to Cuba to magnify the American flag, not all will return. Occasionally the gay music of the bands would relieve the dull routine and cause the spirits to rise under the effects of some enlivening waltz or stirring patriotic air; or entering a school of flying fish the men would be entertained to see these broad-finned creatures dart from the waves like arrows from the bow, and after a graceful flight of perhaps near two hundred yards drop again into the sea; but taken altogether it was a voyage that furnishes little for the historian.

The transports were so arranged as to present an interesting and picturesque spectacle as they departed from our shores on their ocean march. Forming in three columns, with a distance of about 1,000 yards between the columns, and the vessels in the columns being distanced from one another about 400 yards, the fleet was convoyed from Port Tampa by small naval vessels until it reached a point between the Dry Tortugas and Key West. Here it was met by the noble battleship Indiana and nine other war vessels, thus making a convoy altogether of fifteen fighting craft. Transports and convoy now made an armada of more than forty ships, armed and manned by the audacious modern republic whose flag waved from every masthead. Thus spreading out over miles of smooth sea, moving quietly along by steam, carrying in its arms the flower of the American army, every man of which was an athlete, this fleet announced to the world the grim purpose of a nation aroused.

The weather from the time of leaving Port Tampa continued fine until the fleet entered the passage between the western coast of Hayti and the eastern end of Cuba, known as the Windward Passage, when the breeze freshened and a rough sea began, continuing more or less up to the time of landing. Rounding this eastern coast of Cuba the fleet headed its course westerly and on the morning of the 20th was able to determine its position as being off Guantanamo Bay, about fifty miles east of Santiago. Here, eight days before, the first battle on Cuban soil, in which four American marines were killed, had been fought. About noon on the same day, the fleet came to a halt off Santiago harbor, or a little to the west of the entrance to it, and Admiral Sampson came on board. He and General Shafter soon after went ashore to consult the Cuban General, Garcia, who was known to be in that vicinity with about 4,000 well armed troops.

The voyage over, and the men having been crowded together on shipboard for nearly two weeks, it was now expedient to get them on shore as soon as possible. But it was necessary to find out beforehand what defences were along the coast, and what forces of the enemy were likely to be encountered in landing. The fleet lay off from the shore about a mile, and it was no small undertaking to convey the 17,000 men on board with all their arms and equipments to the shore in small boats over a rough sea, especially should the landing be disputed. It was to arrange for the landing and also to map out a general plan of campaign that the three great leaders, Shafter, Sampson and Garcia met at Aserradores on the afternoon of June 20th as the American fleet stood guard over the harbor of Santiago.

General Garcia was already aware of the coming of the fleet, having received a message from Major-General Miles two weeks previous. The letter of General Miles ran as follows:

Headquarters of the Army, In the Field, Tampa, Fla., June 2, 1898.

Dear General:—I am very glad to have received your officers, General Enrique Collazo and Lieut.-Col. Carlos Hernandez, the latter of whom returns to-night with our best wishes for your success.

It would be a very great assistance if you could have as large a force as possible in the vicinity of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, and communicate any information by signals which Colonel Hernandez will explain to you either to our navy or to our army on its arrival, which we hope will be before many days.

It would also assist us very much if you could drive in and harass any Spanish troops near or in Santiago de Cuba, threatening or attacking them at all points, and preventing, by every means, any possible re-enforcement coming to that garrison. While this is being done, and before the arrival of our army, if you can seize and hold any commanding position to the east or west of Santiago de Cuba, or both, that would be advantageous for the use of our artillery, it will be exceedingly gratifying to us."

To this General Garcia replied that he would "take measures at once to carry out your (Miles') recommendation, but concentration of forces will require some time. Roads bad and Cubans scattered. Will march without delay." Admiral Sampson also cabled the Secretary of the Navy that Garcia "regards his (Miles') wishes and suggestions as orders, and immediately will take measures to concentrate forces at the points indicated, but he is unable to do so as early as desired on account of his expedition at Banes Port, Cuba, but will march without delay. All of his subordinates are ordered to assist to disembark the United States troops and to place themselves under orders." It was in compliance with these requests that General Garcia had the five thousand troops so near Santiago at the time he welcomed Shafter and Sampson to his camp, as mentioned above, and there is every necessary evidence that these Cuban troops took part in the fight about Santiago. Says General Miles of Garcia: "He had troops in the rear as well as on both sides of the garrison at Santiago before the arrival of our troops."

It was agreed that the force of five hundred men under General Castillo, posted near Daiquiri, should be increased to 1,000, and should be prepared to make an attack upon the rear of the Spanish garrison at Daiquiri on the morning of the 22nd, at which time the debarkation would begin. General Rabi with about 500 men was also to attack Cabanas at the same time, in the same manner, the transports and war vessels so manoeuvring as to give the impression that a landing was to be made at that place. While these attacks in the rear were distracting the garrisons, the navy, by order of Admiral Sampson, was to start up a vigorous bombardment of all the villages along the coast, thus clearing the shore for the landing of the army. Thus did the conference unite the hands of Americans and Cubans in the fight against Spain on Cuban soil, and each was pledged to the other by the expressions of good will. Having accomplished its work the important conference closed, Admiral Sampson and General Shafter to return to their ships, and General Garcia to carry out the part of the work assigned to him, which he did with fidelity and success.[15]

According to orders published on the 20th, General Lawton's Division, known as the Second Division, Fifth Army Corps, was to disembark first. This Division contained the three following Brigades: The First, General Ludlow's, composed of the Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry (regulars) and the Second Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry; the Second Brigade, General Miles', composed of the Fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry (regulars); the Third Brigade, General Chaffee's, containing the Seventh, Twelfth and Seventeenth Infantry (regulars). Next to follow was General Bates' Brigade, which was to act as reserve to Lawton's Division. This Brigade consisted of the Third and Twentieth Infantry (regulars) and one squadron of the Second Cavalry, the only mounted troops in Shafter's army. The cavalry, however, were not to disembark with the Brigade, but were to be the last troops to leave the transports. After Bates' Brigade, was to follow Wheeler's Dismounted Cavalry Division, containing the two following Brigades: The First, composed of the Third, Sixth and Ninth Cavalry (regulars); the Second, composed of the First and Tenth Cavalry (regulars) and the First Volunteer Cavalry (Rough Riders). To follow the Cavalry Division was to come the First Division, General Kent's, containing the following troops: The First Brigade, General Hawkins', consisting of the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry (regulars) and the Seventy-first New York Volunteer Infantry; the Second Brigade, General Pearson's, consisting of the Second, Tenth and Twenty-first Infantry (regulars); the Third Brigade, Colonel Wikoffs, made up of the Ninth, Thirteenth and Twenty-fourth Infantry (regulars). Then, lastly, was to depart the squadron of mounted cavalry.

Thus prepared, both on board the ships and on shore, the morning of the 22nd dawned to witness the beginning of mighty operations. The war vessels, drawn up in proper order, early began to hurl shot and shell upon the towns, forts, blockhouses and clumps of trees that could be discovered along the shore. The cannonading lasted between two and three hours and was furious throughout. Meanwhile General Lawton's Division began the work of going ashore. The sea was rough and the passage to the shore was made in small boats furnished from the transports and from the naval vessels, towed by steam launches belonging to the navy. The larger of the boats were capable of carrying ten or twelve men each, while the smaller ones could carry but six or seven. During the passage to the shore several of the men who had escaped thus far, were taken with seasickness, greatly to the amusement of their more hardy companions. The landing was made at a pier which had been used formerly as a railroad pier, but was now abandoned and somewhat dilapidated. To get from the boats to the pier in this rough sea was the most perilous part of the whole trip from Tampa to Cuba. As the boats would rise on the waves almost level with the landing place it was necessary to leap quickly from the boat to the shore. In this way two cavalrymen of the Tenth lost their lives, falling into the sea with their equipments on and sinking before help could reach them. Some of the boats were rowed ashore and made a landing on the beach some distance from the pier. By this method some men of the Twenty-fifth tried to be the first to land, but failed, that regiment landing, however, in the first body of troops to go ashore, and being the second in order, in the invasion of the island. By night of the 22nd more than one-third of the troops were on shore, and by the evening of the 24th the whole army was disembarked according to the program announced at the beginning, the squadron of cavalry coming in at the close of the march to the shore.

The only national movement on our part deserving to be brought into comparison with the expedition against the Spanish power in Cuba, is that of fifty years earlier, when General Scott sailed at the head of the army of invasion against Mexico. Some of the occurrences of that expedition, especially connected with its landing, should be carefully studied, and if the reports which have reached the public concerning it are truthful, we would do well to consider how far the methods then in use could be applied now. Scribner's recent history, published just before the outbreak of the Spanish War, tells the story of that expedition, so far as it tells it at all, in the following sentence: "On the 7th of March, the fleet with Scott's army came to anchor a few miles south of Vera Cruz, and two days later he landed his whole force—nearly twelve thousand men—by means of surf-boats." A writer in a recent number of The Army and Navy Journal says General Worth's Division of 4,500 men were landed in one hour, and the whole force was landed in six hours, without accident or confusion. In the prosecution of that unholy war, which lasted about a year, nearly three thousand men were lost in battle and about as many more by disease, peace being finally made by the cession of territory on the part of Mexico, the United States paying in return much more than the territory was worth. The twenty millions paid to Texas probably in great part went into the coffers of the patriots who occupied that region, some of whom had not been known as desirable citizens in the parts from which they came, and had manifested their patriotism by leaving their country for their country's good. The fifteen millions handed over to Mexico looks like a contribution to a conscience fund, and an atonement offered for an assault without provocation. The country gained Arizona, New Mexico, California and finally Texas, but it lost six thousand good men, the cost of the war, and all told, in negotiations, about thirty million dollars, besides. However, it is not always profitable to look up the harvests of war. There are always two—the harvest of gain, and the harvest of loss. Death and debt are reapers, as well as are honor and extent of territory.

The feelings of the six thousand American troops who landed on Cuban soil on June 22nd, 1898, may well be imagined. Although they felt the effects of the confinement to which they had been subjected while on shipboard, there was very little sickness among them. Again possessed of the free use of their limbs they swarmed the beach and open space near the landing, making themselves at home, and confronting the difficulties and perils that lay before them with a courage born of national pride. Before them were the mountains with their almost impassable roads, the jungles filled with poisonous plants and the terrible prickly underbrush and pointed grass, in which skulked the land crab and various reptiles whose bite or sting was dangerous; twenty miles of this inhospitable country lay between them and Santiago, their true objective. And somewhere on the road to that city they knew they were destined to meet a well-trained foe, skilled in all the arts of modern warfare, who would contest their advance. The prospect, however, did not unnerve them, although they could well conjecture that all who landed would not re-embark. Some in that six thousand were destined never again to set foot on shipboard. Out of the Twenty-fifth Infantry and the Tenth Cavalry men were to fall both before Spanish bullets and disease ere these organizations should assemble to return to their native shores. These thoughts did not prevent the men from taking advantage of what nature had to offer them.

"We landed in rowboats, amid, and after the cessation of the bombardment of the little hamlet and coast by the men-of-war and battle-ships," writes a brave soldier of the Twenty-fifth Infantry, and adds immediately: "We then helped ourselves to cocoanuts which we found in abundance near the landing." Ordinarily this statement, so trivial and apparently unimportant, would not merit repetition, but in its connection here it is significant as showing the immediate tendency of the men to resort to the fruits of the country, despite all warnings to the contrary. The two weeks' experience on board the transports had made the finding of cocoanuts an event to be noted, and the dry pulp and strongly flavored milk of this tropical fruit became extremely grateful to the palate, even if not altogether safe for the stomach. If ripe, however, the cocoanut could scarcely be more ungenial to many, than the raw, canned tomatoes upon which they had in part subsisted during the voyage. It is to be added that this report of the finding of the cocoanuts is not the report of an old soldier, but of a young and intelligent, first enlistment man.

Lawton's Division soon after landing, was ordered to move forward in the direction of Santiago, on the road leading past Siboney. A staff officer, writing of that movement, says: "General Lawton, with his Division, in obedience to this order, pushed forward from Daiquiri about five miles, when night overtook him and he bivouacked on the road." An old soldier of the Twenty-fifth, writing me from the hospital in Tampa, Florida, July 22nd, says of the same event: "After the regiment landed we marched about four and a half miles through the mountains; then we made camp." The old soldier says nothing of cocoanuts, but makes his statement with as much accuracy as possible, and with no waste of words. The novice describing the same thing says: "A short distance ahead (from the shore) we bivouacked for the night. We were soon lying in dreamland, so far from friends and home, indeed, on a distant, distant shore." These two extracts show at once the difference between the soldier produced by years of trial and training on our plains, and the soldier who but yesterday was a civilian. With the one the march is a short distance; with the other it is about four and a half miles; one reports that they "made camp," the other talks of dreamland, friend, home and distant shore; one expresses his feelings, the other shows control of feeling and reserve in expression.

That first night on Cuban soil, the night following June 22nd, was one without events, but one of great concern to the commanders on shore and on the fleet. The work of disembarking had gone on successfully, and already about six thousand men were on shore. Nearly the whole of Lawton's Division, with Bates' independent brigade, were bivouacked, as we have seen, about five miles from Daiquiri, exactly where the railroad crosses the wagon road leading to Siboney. General Wheeler's troops—one brigade—were encamped on the open ground near the landing, the remainder of his division being still on the transports. The Twenty-fifth Infantry was with Lawton; the Tenth Cavalry was ashore with Wheeler's troops. A detachment of the Twenty-fifth was put on outpost duty on that night of their landing, and five miles within Cuban territory they tramped their solitary beats, establishing and guarding the majestic authority of the United States.

Lawton's orders were to seize and hold the town of Siboney at which place Kent's Division, containing the Twenty-fourth, was to land. It was then intended that the whole army should advance as rapidly as would be consistent with supplying the men with rations toward Santiago. Siboney was to be the base of supplies, and from this point ammunition and food were to be conveyed to the front by wagons and pack trains. General Shafter also intended that Lawton with his division should lead the advance upon Santiago, but circumstances beyond his control brought about a different result. On the morning of the 23rd Lawton's division was in motion early, and before half-past ten o'clock he was able to report that the Spaniards had evacuated Siboney and were in full retreat, pursued by a body of Cubans under direction of General Castillo; that the town was in his hands, and he had also captured one locomotive and nearly one hundred cars loaded with coal.

General Young's brigade of General Wheeler's cavalry division, got on shore on the afternoon of the 23rd and after landing received verbal orders to move out with three days' rations "to a good camping place between Juraguacito and Siboney, on the road leading to Santiago de Cuba." In obedience to these orders, at 4.30 in the afternoon Young with the Rough Riders and a squadron from each of the First and Tenth Regular Cavalry moved from the bivouack near the landing and arrived at Siboney at about 7 o'clock. When General Young arrived at Siboney he had with him the Rough Riders, the other troops having been delayed by the crowded condition of the trail and the difficulty of following after nightfall. Although these troops are always spoken of as cavalry, the reader must not forget that they were dismounted and in marching and fighting were the same as infantry.

General Young on arriving at Siboney reported to General Wheeler, who had preceded him to the same place. The statements of the several commanders here appear somewhat conflicting, although not inexplicable. General Lawton says: "Yesterday afternoon, late, General Wheeler and staff arrived and established his headquarters within the limits of my command. Saw him after dark. Late last night Colonel Wood's regiment of dismounted cavalry (Rough Riders) passed through my camp at Division Headquarters, and later General Young, with some of the dismounted Cavalry, and early this morning others of the dismounted cavalry." Wheeler says that "in obedience to instructions from the Major-General Commanding," given to him in person, he proceeded, on June 23rd, to Siboney, but does not say at what hour. He says he "rode out to the front and found that the enemy had halted and established themselves at a point about three miles from Siboney." He then informs us that "at 8 o'clock on that evening of the 23rd General Young reached Siboney with eight troops of Colonel Wood's regiment (A, B, D, E, F, G, K and L), 500 strong; Troops A, B, G and K, of the First Cavalry, in all 244, and Troops A, B, E and I, of the Tenth Cavalry, in all 220 men, making a total force of 964 men, which included nearly all of my command which had disembarked. These troops had marched from Daiquiri, 11 miles. With the assistance of General Castillo a rough map of the country was prepared and the position of the enemy fully explained, and I determined to make an attack." Lieutenant Miley says that the whole brigade of Wheeler's troops arrived in Siboney about dark and were occupying the same ground as General Lawton ("In Cuba With Shafter," p. 76.) General Young says that after reporting to General Wheeler he "asked and obtained from General Wheeler authority to make a reconnoisance in force" for the purpose of obtaining "positive information * * * as to the position and movements of the enemy in front."

The distance from Daiquiri to Siboney was but eleven miles, and as the troops left the former place at 4.30 it is probable that they were all bivouacked near Siboney before 9 o'clock, as they were all together, according to General Wheeler's report, at 5.45 on the morning of the 24th. General Young having discovered that there were two roads or trails leading from Siboney northward toward the town of Sevilla determined to make his reconnoisance by both these trails. He directed Colonel Wood to move by the western trail and to keep a careful lookout and to attack any Spaniards he might encounter, being careful to join his right in the event of an engagement, with the left of the column advancing by the eastern trail. Colonel Wood's column was the left column and was composed of the Rough Riders only. The column marching by the eastern trail was composed of the First and Tenth Cavalry (regulars) and was under the command of General Young. It was the intention of General Young by this column to gain the enemy's left, and thus attack in front and left. As early as 7.20 a.m. Captain Mills discovered the enemy exactly as had been described by General Castillo. When this was done word was sent to Colonel Wood, who was making his way to the front over a more difficult route than the one by which General Young's column had marched. A delay was therefore made on the part of General Young in order that the attack should begin on both flanks at the same time. During this delay General Wheeler arrived and was informed of the plans and dispositions for the attack, and after examining the position gave his approval of what had been done, whereupon General Young ordered the attack. General Wheeler in speaking of the same event says: "General Young and myself examined the position of the enemy. The lines were deployed and I directed him to open fire with the Hotchkiss gun. The enemy replied and the firing immediately became general." There can be no question as to the planning of this fight nor as to the direction of the American force in the fight so far as any general direction was possible. Colonel Wood directed one column and General Young another, while the plan of the attack undoubtedly originated with General Young. General Wheeler conveys as much when he says: "General Young deserves special commendation for his cool deliberate and skillful management." General Young, if only the commander of the right column consisting of two squadrons of regular cavalry, had not as large a command, nor as difficult and important a one as had Colonel Wood, and hence is not deserving of special commendation except upon the general ground that he had supervision over the whole battle. This position is taken by General Shafter in his report, who though admitting the presence of the Division Commander, credits the battle to General Young, the commander of the brigade. The reconnoissance in force for which Young had obtained authority from General Wheeler on the night of the 23rd had developed into a battle, and the plan had evolved itself from the facts discovered. This plan General Wheeler approved, but in no such way as to take the credit from its originator; and it is doubtless with reference both to the plan and the execution that he bestows on General Young the mead of praise. This statement of fact does not in the least detract from either the importance or the praiseworthiness of the part played by Colonel Wood. Both he and the officers and men commanded by him received both from General Young and from the division commander the most generous praise. The advance of Wood's column was made with great difficulty owing to the nature of the ground, and according to General Young's belief, he was in the rear when at 7.20 in the morning Captain Mills discovered the enemy, and a Cuban guide was dispatched to warn Wood, and a delay made to allow time for him to come up. Colonel Wood, on the other hand, claims to have discovered the enemy at 7.10 and to have begun action almost immediately, so that it turned out as Young had planned, and "the attack of both wings was simultaneous." The Spaniards were posted on a range of high hills in the form of a "V," the opening being toward Siboney, from which direction the attack came.

From Colonel Wood's report it appears that soon after the firing began he found it necessary to deploy five troops to the right, and left, leaving three troops in reserve. The enemy's lines being still beyond his, both on the right and on the left, he hastily deployed two more troops, which made the lines now about equal in length. The firing was now "exceedingly heavy," and much of it at short range, but on account of the thick underbrush it was not very effective; "comparatively few of our men were injured." Captain Capron at this time received his mortal wound and the firing became so terrific that the last remaining troop of the reserve was absorbed by the firing line, and the whole regiment ordered to advance very slowly. The Spanish line yielded and the advance soon showed that in falling back the enemy had taken a new position, about three hundred yards in front of the advancing regiment. Their lines extended from 800 to 1,000 yards, and the firing from their front was "exceedingly heavy" and effective. A "good many men" were wounded, "and several officers," says Colonel Wood's report. Still the advance was kept up, and the Spanish line was steadily forced back. "We now began," says Colonel Wood, "to get a heavy fire from a ridge on our right, which enfiladed our line." The reader can at once see that although the Rough Riders were advancing heroically, they were now in a very serious situation, with an exceedingly heavy and effective fire striking them in front, and a heavy, enfilading fire raking them from the right. Their whole strength was on the line, and these two fires must have reduced their effectiveness with great rapidity had it kept up, the Spaniards having their range and firing by well-directed volleys. It was for the regiment a moment of the utmost peril. Had they been alone they must have perished.

It was from this perilous situation of Colonel Wood's command that one of the most popular stories of the war originated, a story that contained some truth, but which was often told in such a way as to cause irritation, and in some instances it was so exaggerated or mutilated in the telling as to be simply ridiculous. On the day after the battle the story was told in Lawton's camp according to the testimony of an intelligent soldier of the Twenty-fifth Infantry. His words are: "The next day about noon we heard that the Tenth Cavalry had met the enemy and that the Tenth Cavalry had rescued the Rough Riders. We congratulated ourselves that although not of the same branch of service, we were of the same color, and that to the eye of the enemy we, troopers and footmen, all looked alike." According to artists and cheap newspaper stories this rescuing occurred again and again. A picture is extensively advertized as "an actual and authoritative presentation of this regiment (the Tenth Cavalry) as it participated in that great struggle, and their heroic rescue of the Rough Riders on that memorable July day." This especial rescuing took place on San Juan Hill. The editor of a religious paper declares that it was the Twenty-fifth Infantry that rescued the Rough Riders and that it was done at El Caney![16]

Before we go any farther let us see just what the Tenth Cavalry did do in this fight. That their action was highly meritorious admits of no doubt, and the laurels they won were never allowed to fade during the whole campaign. General Wheeler speaks of them with the First Cavalry. He says: "I was immediately with the troops of the First and Tenth Regular Cavalry, dismounted, and personally noticed their brave and good conduct." There were four troops of the Tenth engaged, composing the First Squadron of that regiment, under command of Major Norval. Troop A was commanded by Captain W.H. Beck, who was specially commended by General Wheeler for good conduct. Second Lieutenant F.R. McCoy was Captain Beck's assistant. This troop moved over to the left, receiving the fire of the enemy, but making no response, the distance being too great for effective carbine firing. This troop reached Colonel Wood's right and made the line continuous so that there was now a force in front of that ridge where the Spaniards were securely entrenched and from which they were pouring their enfilading fire upon Colonel Wood's line. Troop A, although coming into the line, did not fire. Their presence, however, gave the Rough Riders the assurance that their flank was saved. Troop E was commanded by Captain C.G. Ayres with Second Lieutenant George Vidmar. This troop was placed by General Young in support of Captain Watson's two Hotchkiss guns, and also of the troops in their front. The troop was under fire one hour and a quarter, during which they were in plain view of the Spaniards, who also had their exact range. One man was killed and one wounded. Their courage, coolness and discipline in this trying hour and a quarter were of the very highest order. The troop commander says: "Their coolness and fine discipline were superb." This troop did not fire a shot. Thus one-half of the squadron moved to its positions and held them without being able to do any damage to the enemy, as they were carrying out to the letter their instructions, which were to fire only when they could see the enemy. Troop B was commanded by Captain J.W. Watson with H.O. Willard as Second Lieutenant. A detachment of this troop was placed in charge of four Hotchkiss mountain guns. This detachment opened fire upon the enemy, using the ammunition sparingly, as they had but fifty rounds with them. Twenty-two shots were fired, apparently with effect. The remainder of the troop under Lieutenant Williard was ordered to move out to the extreme right, which would place it beyond the line of the First Cavalry, thus bringing that regiment between Troop A of the Tenth, which connected it with the Rough Riders and Troop B, which was to be on its extreme right. Lieutenant Williard's report of this movement is as follows:

"I ordered the troop forward at once, telling them to take advantage of all cover available. In the meantime the volleys from the Spanish were coming in quite frequently and striking the ground on all sides near where we were. I found it very difficult to move the men forward after having found cover, and ran back to a portion of the troop near an old brick wall, and ordered them forward at once. They then made a dash forward, and in doing so three or four men were wounded, Private Russell severely. Who the others were I do not know. We encountered a severe fire directly after this move forward; and Private Wheeler was wounded in the left leg. There was a wire fence on our right, and such thick underbrush that we were unable to get through right there, so had to follow along the fence for some distance before being able to penetrate. Finally, was able to get the greater proportion of my men through, and about this time I met Lieutenants Fleming and Miller, Tenth Cavalry, moving through the thicket at my left. I there heard the order passed on 'not to fire ahead,' as there was danger of firing into our own forces. In the meantime there was shouting from the First Cavalry in our front, 'Don't fire on us in rear.' My troop had not fired a shot to my knowledge, nor the knowledge of any non-commissioned officers in the troop. About this time I found I was unable to keep the troop deployed, as they would huddle up behind one rock or tree, so I gave all sergeants orders to move out on the extreme right and to keep in touch with those on their left. Then, with a squad of about five men, I moved to the right front, and was unfortunate enough to lose the troop, i.e., I could see nothing of them except the men with me.

"But as I had given explicit instructions to my sergeant, in case I was lost from them, to continue to advance until halted by some one in authority, I moved ahead myself, hoping to find them later on. In making a rush forward three men of my squad were lost from me in some way. I still had two men with me, Privates Combs and Jackson, and in the next advance made I picked up a First Cavalry sergeant who had fallen out from exhaustion. After a terrific climb up the ridge in front of me, and a very regular though ineffective fire from the enemy kept up until we were about sixty yards from the summit of hill, we reached the advance line of the First United States Cavalry, under command of Captain Wainwright. I then reported to him for orders, and moved forward when he next advanced. The firing had ceased, and no more shots were fired, to my knowledge, after this time. With the First Cavalry, Troop G, we followed along the right of the ridge and came down to the right front, encountering no opposition or fire from the enemy, but finding the enemy's breastworks in confusion, ammunition and articles of clothing scattered around; also one dead Spaniard and two Mauser rifles. At the foot of the ridge we met some of the First Volunteer Cavalry, and being utterly exhausted, I was obliged to lie down. Soon after, Captain Mills, adjutant-general of Second Brigade, Cavalry Division, came up to where I was and placed me in command of Troop K, First United States Cavalry, whose officers were wounded. I then marched them forward on the road to where General Wheeler was sitting, and received orders from Colonel Wood, First Volunteer Cavalry, to remain until further orders and make no further advance. Directly afterwards, learning the action was over, I reported back to General Young, and received orders to remain camped with the First Cavalry Squadron, where the action had closed. In the meantime, I should have stated that I found the principal part of my troop and collected them and left them under the first sergeant, when I went back to receive orders. So far as I know, and to the best of my knowledge, the men of my troop acted with the greatest bravery, advancing on an enemy who could not be seen, and subjected to a severe and heavy fire at each step, which was only rendered ineffective to a great degree by the poor marksmanship of the enemy, as many times we were in sight of them (I discovered this by observation after the engagement) while we could see nothing. We were also subjected to a severe reverse fire from the hills in our right rear, several men being wounded by this fire. Throughout the fight the men acted with exceptional coolness, in my judgment. The casualties were: Privates Russell, Braxton and Morris, severely wounded; Privates F.A. Miller, Grice, Wheeler and Gaines, slightly wounded, i.e., less severely. None killed.

Very respectfully,

HENRY O. WILLIARD. June 24, 1898. Troop B, Tenth Cavalry, during action near La Guasima, Second Lieutenant, Tenth United States Cavalry, Commanding.

Troop I of the Tenth Cavalry was commanded by First Lieutenant R.J. Fleming with Second Lieutenant A.M. Miller. This troop moved to the right and wedged in between B Troop and the right of the First Cavalry. Lieutenant Fleming discovered the enemy posted on the high ridge immediately in front of his troop, and also extending to his right, in front of B Troop. Moving his troop a little to the right so as to secure room to advance without coming in contact with the First Cavalry, he then directed his course straight toward the hill on which he had located the enemy. The advance was made with great caution, the men seeking cover wherever possible, and dashing across the open spaces at full run. Thus they moved until the base of the steep part of the hill was reached. This was found very difficult of ascent, not only because of the rugged steepness, but also on account of the underbrush, and the sharp-leaved grass, the cacti and Spanish bayonet, that grow on all these hillsides. Paths had to be cut through these prickly obstructions with knives and sabres. Consequently the advance up that hill, though free from peril, was very slow and trying. Twice during the advance the men obtained a view of their enemies and were permitted to fire. The instructions were rigidly adhered to: No firing only at the visible foe. Lieutenant Fleming says: "Owing to the underbrush it was impossible for me to see but a very few men at a time, but as they all arrived on the crest about the time I did, or shortly after, they certainly advanced steadily." He says: "The entire troop behaved with great coolness and obeyed every order." Farrier Sherman Harris, Wagoner John Boland and Private Elsie Jones especially distinguished themselves for coolness and gallantry. The aggressive work of the Tenth Cavalry, therefore, appears to have been done by Troops B and I, a detachment of the former troop serving the Hotchkiss gun battery. Troop I was commanded by Lieutenant Fleming and by him conducted to the front, although he admits that in their advance up the slope of the hill he could see but very few of the men at a time, and declares that their advance was certainly steady, because all arrived at the crest of the hill simultaneously or nearly so.

Lieutenant Fleming does not show that his troop of excellent men were in any sense peculiarly dependent upon their white officers as some have asserted. They advanced steadily, just as the regulars always do, advanced noiselessly and without any reckless firing, and reached the crest of the hill in order, although he could not see them as they were making their advance. They kept their line despite all the obstructions. Lieutenant Fleming also says that in moving to his position he passed Troop B, which then "inclined to the right, and during the remainder of the action was on my right." Troop B, therefore, went through about the same experience as Troop I, and being on the extreme right of the line may have been more directly in front of that foe which Fleming says was in his front and to the right. Why did not the officer who directed or led B Troop in its advance upon the enemy report the action of his troop as vividly and generously as did Lieutenant Fleming the men of Troop I? With not the slightest reflection upon the gallant officer, he himself has the manliness to say he was so unfortunate as to lose the troop. The troop, however, did not become demoralized, but went into action under command of its First Sergeant, John Buck,[17] and remained on Lieutenant Fleming's right during the action. It has been proven more than once that should the commissioned officers of a company or troop of colored regulars be killed or incapacitated, the non-commissioned officers can carry on the fight. Speaking of this same regiment it is equally true that at San Juan the officers of Troops D and G were all shot and the commands of these troops fell to their First Sergeants, the first to Sergeant William H. Given, the second to Sergeant Saint Foster, and it is generally understood that these two men were appointed Lieutenants of Volunteers because of their success in handling their troops in battle.

The entire attacking force at this end of the line, if we count only those engaged in actual firing, consisted of two troops of the Tenth Cavalry and two of the First Cavalry—four troops—while to the left the entire eight troops were on the firing line. The action of the troops of the First Cavalry was quite similar to that of the troops of the Tenth Cavalry, and equally deserving of commendation. Of them all General Young says:

"The ground over which the right column advanced was a mass of jungle growth, with wire fences, not to be seen until encountered, and precipitous heights as the ridge was approached. It was impossible for the troops to keep in touch along the front, and they could only judge of the enemy from the sound and direction of his fire. However, had it not been for this dense jungle, the attack would not have been made against an overwhelming force in such a position. Headway was so difficult that advance and support became merged and moved forward under a continuous volley firing, supplemented by that of two rapid-fire guns. Return firing by my force was only made as here and there a small clear spot gave a sight of the enemy. The fire discipline of these particular troops was almost perfect. The ammunition expended by the two squadrons engaged in an incessant advance for one hour and fifteen minutes averaged less than ten rounds per man. The fine quality of these troops is also shown by the fact that there was not a single straggler, and in not one instance was an attempt made by any soldier to fall out in the advance to assist the wounded or carry back the dead. The fighting on the left flank was equally creditable and was remarkable, and I believe unprecedented, in volunter troops so quickly raised, armed and equipped."

The five hundred men of Colonel Wood's regiment were stretched over a space of 800 to 1,000 yards, and were entirely without support or reserve, and appear to have advanced to a point where this very strong force on the right swept a good part of their line both with rifle fire and the fire of their two machine guns. Men and officers were falling under both the front and flank fire of the enemy, and had not the squadrons of the First and Tenth made their successful assault upon that ridge, which, according to General Wood's report, was "very strongly held," the situation of the Rough Riders would have been extreme. Because this successful assault was participated in by the Tenth Cavalry the story arose that the Rough Riders were rescued by that regiment. The fair statement would be: That the Regular Cavalry, consisting of a squadron of the First and a squadron of the Tenth, made their advance on the right at the precise moment to deliver the Rough Riders from a fire that threatened their annihilation. The marksmanship and coolness of the men of the Tenth have been specially commented upon and their fire was described as very effective, but the same remarks could be made of the men of the First, who fought side by side with them. It is probable that the volunteers advanced more rapidly than did the regulars, using more ammunition, and manifesting a very high degree of courage and enthusiasm as well as deliberation; but the regulars reached their objective at the proper time to turn the battle's tide. Each advancing column was worthy to be companion to the other.

General Wheeler said the fire was very hot for about an hour, and "at 8.30 sent a courier to General Lawton informing him that he was engaged with a larger force of the enemy than was anticipated, and asked that his force be sent forward on the Sevilla road as quickly as possible." ("In Cuba With Shafter," p. 83.) General Lawton, however, with the true instinct of a soldier had already sent orders to General Chaffee to move forward with the First Brigade. The Second Brigade was also in readiness to move and the men of the Twenty-fifth were expecting to go forward to take a position on the right and if possible a little to the rear of the Spanish entrenchments in order to cut off their retreat. The rapid movements of the cavalry division, however, rendered this unnecessary, and the routing of the foe gave to the Americans an open country and cleared the field for the advance on Santiago. The first battle had been fought, and the Americans had been victorious, but not without cost. Sixteen men had been killed and fifty-two wounded. In Colonel Wood's regiment eight had been killed and thirty-four wounded; in the First Cavalry, seven killed and eight wounded; in the Tenth Cavalry, one killed and ten wounded. The percentage of losses to the whole strength of the several organizations engaged was as follows: Rough Riders, over 8 per cent.; First Cavalry, over 6 per cent.; Tenth Cavalry, 5 per cent. But if we take those on the firing line as the base the rate per cent. of losses among the regulars would be doubled, while that of the volunteers would remain the same.

The strength of the enemy in this battle is given in the Spanish official reports, according to Lieutenant Miley, at about five hundred, and their losses are put at nine killed and twenty-seven wounded. At the time of the fight it was supposed to be much larger. General Young's report places the estimates at 2,000, and adds "that it has since been learned from Spanish sources to have been 2,500. The Cuban military authorities claim the Spanish strength was 4,000." These figures are doubtless too high. The force overtaken at Las Guasimas was the same force that evacuated Siboney at the approach of Lawton and the force with which the Cubans had fought on the morning of the 23rd. It may have consisted solely of the garrison from Siboney, although it is more probable that it included also those from Daiquiri and Jutici, as it is quite certain that all these troops proceeded toward Santiago over the same road. The force at Siboney had been given by the Cubans at 600, at Daiquiri at 300, and at Jutici at 150. If these had concentrated and the figures were correct, the Spanish force at Guasimas was upwards of 1,000. If, however, it was the force from Siboney alone, it was about as the Spanish official report gives it. On this latter basis, however, the losses are out of proportion, for while the attacking party lost a little less than 7 per cent. of its entire strength in killed and wounded, the losses of the entrenched, defending party, were even a little greater, or over 7 per cent. of its strength. It is, therefore, probable that the Spanish force was greater than officially reported and included the troops from the other posts as well as those from Siboney. The engagement was classed by General Shafter as unimportant, although its effect upon our army was inspiring. It did not cut off the retreat of the Spanish force, and the men who faced our army at Guasimas met them again in the trenches before Santiago. General Shafter desired to advance with his whole force, and cautioned strongly against any further forward movement until the troops were well in hand. The two battles between the Cubans and Spaniards, fought on the 23rd, in which the Cubans had sixteen men wounded and two killed, were engagements of some consequence, although we have no reports of them. There is no evidence that the Cubans took part in the battle of Guasimas, although they arrived on the grounds immediately after the firing ceased.

The story thus far told is, as the reader cannot fail to see, directly from official records, and the conclusions arrived at are those which result naturally from the facts as therein detailed. Not one word is quoted from any but military men—actors in the affair. We may now go briefly over the same ground, giving the views and conclusions of able civilian correspondents who followed the army to see what was done, and who were trained observers and skilled writers. How have these able war journalists told the story of Las Guasimas?

To quote from Stephen Bonsal in substance, not in words, is to contradict what General Shafter says officially in one particular, but in no such way as to discredit the General, or to weaken Bonsal. It is not a case of bringing two universal, antagonistic propositions face to face, but a case where two men of different training look upon an action from different standpoints and through different field-glasses. General Shafter says of the collision of the Rough Riders with the Spanish force: "There was no ambush as reported." As a military man, he says there was no more concealment on the part of the Spanish force than what an attacking party should expect, no more than what is usual in modern warfare, hence he does not regard it as an ambush, and does not officially take notice of any surprise or unexpected encounter on the part of his force. To do so would be to reflect, however slightly, upon the professional skill of the commander of the left column. General Shafter thus says officially in a manly way: "There was no ambush." Beyond this his duty does not call him to go, and he halts his expressions exactly at this line, maintaining in his attitude all the attributes of the true soldier, placing himself beyond criticism by thus securing from attack the character of his subordinate.

Mr. Bonsal is a writer and author, accustomed to view actions in the broader light of popular judgment, entirely free from professional bias, and having no class-feeling or obligations to serve. His pen is not official; his statements are not from the military standpoint; not influenced in any way by considerations of personal weal or woe with respect to others or himself. He says that one troop of the Rough Riders, Troop L, commanded by Captain Capron, was leading the advance of the regiment, and was in solid formation and within twenty-five yards of its scouting line when it received the enemy's fire. This troop was so far in the advance that it took the other troops of the regiment more than a half hour to get up to it. The writer speaks of the advance of that troop as having been made "in the fool-hardy formation of a solid column along a narrow trail, which brought them, in the way I have described, within point-blank range of the Spanish rifles, and within the unobstructed sweep of their machine guns." He sums up as follows: "And if it is to be ambushed when you receive the enemy's fire perhaps a quarter of an hour before it was expected, and when the troop was in a formation, and the only one in which, in view of the nature of the ground it was possible to advance quickly, then most certainly L Troop of the Rough Riders was ambushed by the Spaniards on the morning of June 24th."

Mr. Bonsal also brings into clear view the part taken in this battle by Lawton's Infantry. He shows by means of a simple map the trail by which Miles' brigade, in which was the Twenty-fifth Infantry, moved in order to flank the Spanish position, while Chaffee's brigade was hurrying forward on the Royal Road to reinforce the line in front. A letter from a soldier of the Twenty-fifth written soon after these events fully confirms Mr. Bonsal in what he says concerning the movement of Miles' brigade. The soldier says: "On the morning of the 24th the Rough Riders, Tenth and First Cavalry were to make an attack on a little place where the Spanish were fortified. The Second Brigade was to come on the right flank of these troops and a little in rear of the fortifications; but by some misunderstanding, the former troops, led by the Rough Riders, made an attack before we got our position, and the result was a great many lives lost in the First Cavalry and Rough Riders—only one in Tenth Cavalry, but many wounded. They captured the fortification." This letter by a humble soldier, written with no thought of its importance, shows how gallantly Lawton had sprung to the rescue of Wheeler's division. According to Bonsal, who says he obtained his information from Spanish officers who were present in this fight, it was the information of the approach of this brigade and of Chaffee's up the main road that caused the Spaniards to withdraw rapidly from the position. The whole force was in imminent danger of being captured. Another soldier of the Twenty-fifth wrote: "The report came that the Twenty-fifth Infantry was to cut off the Spanish retreat from a stronghold, toward Santiago." These glimpses from soldiers' letters illustrate how clearly they comprehended the work upon which they were sent, and show also how hearty and cordial was the support which the infantry at that time was hurrying forward to the advancing cavalry.

The official reports show that the strength of the Spanish position was before the right of our line. Mr. Bonsal says: "Directly in front of the Tenth Cavalry rose undoubtedly the strongest point in the Spanish position—two lines of shallow trenches, strengthened by heavy stone parapets." We must remember that so far as we can get the disposition of these troops from official records, Troop A connected the Rough Riders with the First Cavalry, and Troops I and B were on the right of the First Cavalry. Troop A did not fire a shot; the fighting, therefore, was done by Troops I and B on the extreme right of the line, and it was on their front that "undoubtedly the strongest point in the Spanish position" lay—nor should the reader forget that at this very important moment Troop B was commanded by its First Sergeant, Buck, Lieutenant Williard having by his own report been "unfortunate enough to lose the troop." This is said with no disparagement to Lieutenant Williard. It was merely one of the accidents of battle.

Says Mr. Bonsal: "The moment the advance was ordered the black troopers of the Tenth Cavalry forged ahead. They were no braver certainly than any other men in the line, but their better training enabled them to render more valuable services than the other troops engaged. They had with them and ready for action their machine guns, and shoved them right up to the front on the firing line, from where they poured very effective fire into the Spanish trenches, which not only did considerable execution, but was particularly effective in keeping down the return fire of the Spaniards. The machine guns of the Rough Riders were mislaid, or the mules upon which they had been loaded could not be found at this juncture. It was said they had bolted. It is certain, however, that the guns were not brought into action, and consequently the Spaniards suffered less, and the Rough Riders more, in the gallant charge they made up the hill in front of them, after the Tenth Cavalry had advanced and driven the Spaniards from their position on the right."

Corporal W.F. Johnson, B Troop, was the non-commissioned officer in charge of the machine guns during the brief fight at Las Guasimas, and his action was such as to call forth from the troop commander special mention "for his efficiency and perfect coolness under fire." Here I may be pardoned for calling attention to a notion too prevalent concerning the Negro soldier in time of battle. He is too often represented as going into action singing like a zany or yelling like a demon, rather than as a man calculating the chances for life and victory. The official reports from the Black Regulars in Cuba ought to correct this notion. Every troop and company commander, who has reported upon colored soldiers in that war, speaks of the coolness of the men of his command. Captain Beck, of Troop A, Tenth Cavalry, in the Guasimas fight, says: "I will add that the enlisted men of Troop A, Tenth Cavalry, behaved well, silently and alertly obeying orders, and without becoming excited when the fire of the enemy reached them." The yell, in the charge of the regulars, is a part of the action, and is no more peculiar to Negro troops than to the whites, only as they may differ in the general timbre of voice. Black American soldiers when not on duty may sing more than white troops, but in quite a long experience among them I have not found the difference so very noticeable. In all garrisons one will find some men more musically inclined than others; some who love to sing and some who do not; some who have voices adapted to the production of musical tones, and some who have not, and it is doubtless owing to these constitutional differences that we find differences in habits and expressions.

Lieutenant Miley, of General Shafter's staff, in his description of the departure of General Shatter from General Garcia's tent, gives us a glimpse of the character of the men that composed the Cuban army in that vicinity.

"While the interview was going on, the troops were being assembled to do honor to the General on his departure. Several companies were drawn up in front of the tent to present arms as he came out, and a regiment escorted him to the beach down the winding path, which was now lined on both sides by Cuban soldiers standing about a yard apart and presenting arms. The scene made a strong impression on all in the party, there seemed to be such an earnestness and fixedness of purpose displayed that all felt these soldiers to be a power. About fifty per cent. were blacks, and the rest mulattoes, with a small number of whites. They were very poorly clad, many without shirts or shoes, but every man had his gun and a belt full of ammunition."

B.

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM A SOLDIER OF THE 10TH CAVALRY, TROOP B, CONCERNING THE BATTLE OF LAS GUASIMAS:

"... The platoon which escaped this ditch got on the right of the 1st Cavalry on the firing line, and pushed steadily forward under First Sergeant Buck, being then in two squads—one under Sergeant Thompson. On account of the nature of the ground and other natural obstacles, there were men not connected with any squads, but who advanced with the line.

Both squads fired by volley and at will, at the command of the sergeants named; and their shots reached the enemy and were effective, as it is generally believed.

Private W.M. Bunn, of Sergeant Thompson's squad, is reported to have shot a sharpshooter from a tree just in front of the enemy's work. Private Wheeler was shot twice in the advance. Sergeant Thompson's squad was once stopped from firing by General Wheeler's adjutant-general for fear of hitting the Rough Riders.

It seems that two distinct battles were fought that day. Colonel Wood's command struck the enemy at about the tame time, or probably a Little before, ours did, and all unknown to the men in our ranks; and got themselves into a pretty tight squeeze. About the same time our force engaged the enemy and drew part of the attention they were giving the Rough Riders. This, the latter claimed, enabled them to continue the movement on the enemy's works.

But as our command had an equal number of 1st and 10th Cavalrymen, I am of the opinion that the story of our saving the Rough Riders arose from the fact that as soon as the fight was over, the 1st Regular Cavalry was opening its arms to us, declaring that we, especially B Troop, had saved them; for the 1st Regular Cavalry was first in the attack in General Young's command; and when the enemy began to make it pretty warm, he ordered B and I Troops of the 10th forward on the right. Troop B was in the lead; and the alacrity with which these two troops moved to the front has always been praised by the 1st Cavalry; and they declare that that movement helped them wonderfully. In making this movement my troop had three or four men wounded; and later, when Sergeant Thompson's squad was fighting far to the front, it had in it several members of the 1st Cavalry, who are always glad to praise him.

So, I think that by the Rough Riders first attributing their success, or their rescue from inevitable defeat, to the attack made by our command; and by the 1st Regular Cavalry's very generously, in the heat of success, bestowing upon us the honors of the day, it finally became a settled thing that we saved the whole battle.

That evening, after the battle, I was met by Lieutenant Shipp, later killed at San Juan Hill, who, on inquiring and being told that I belonged to Troop B, congratulated me on its conduct, and said it had made a name for the regiment. Lieutenant Shipp was not in that fight, but had come up after it was over and had heard of us through the 1st Cavalry."

C.

Sergeant John Buck was born September 10th, 1861, at Chapel Hill, Texas; enlisted in 10th Cavalry, November 6, 1880, and passed over ten years in active Indian service. He is a man of strong character, an experienced horseman and packer, and so commanded a portion of the firing line in the battle of June 24 as to elicit remarks of praise from officers of other troops "for his gallantry, coolness and good judgment under fire." Sergeant Thompson's good conduct in the same battle was noticeable also. Sergeant Buck was made second lieutenant in the 7th U.S. Volunteer Infantry and subsequently captain in the 48th United States Volunteers.

FOOTNOTES:

[15] See Note A at the end of this chapter.

[16] THE TWENTY-FIFTH AT EL-CANEY.

American valor never shone with greater luster than when the Twenty-fifth Infantry swept up the sizzling hill of El-Caney to the rescue of the rough riders. Two other regiments came into view of the rough riders. But the bullets were flying like driving hail; the enemy were in trees and ambushes with smokeless powder, and the rough riders were biting the dust and were threatened with annihilation.

A rough rider described the feelings of his brigade when they saw the other regiments appear and retreat. Finally this rough rider, a Southerner, heard a well-known yell. And out of the distance moved a regiment as if on dress parade, faces set like steel, keeping step like a machine, their comrades falling here, there, everywhere, moving into the storm of invisible death without one faltering step, passing the rough riders, conquering up the hill, and never stopping until with the rough riders El-Caney was won. This was the Twenty-fifth Regiment (colored), United States Infantry, now quartered at Fort Logan, Denver. We have asked the chaplain, T.G. Steward, to recite the events at El-Caney. His modesty confines him to the barest recital of "semi-official" records. But the charge of the Twenty-fifth is deserving of comparison with that of "the Light Brigade" in the Crimean War, or of Custer at the massacre of the Big Horn.

(Editorial in religious paper.)

[17] See Note C at the end of this chapter.



CHAPTER VI.

THE BATTLE OF EL CANEY.

The Capture of the Stone Fort by the Twenty-fifth Infantry.

While the battle of Guasimas was going on, in which the Tenth Cavalry took so conspicuous a part, the Twenty-fourth Infantry still remained on board the City of Washington awaiting orders to land. During the night of the 24th such orders were received by the authorities of the transport, and they were directed to land their troops, but the General Commanding, Brigadier-General Kent, did not hear of the matter until some time the next morning. He relates the following circumstances in his official report of the debarkation:

"At 9 a.m. of the 25th Lieutenant Cardin, of the Revenue Marine, came aboard with orders for me to proceed to and disembark at Altares (Siboney). This officer also handed me a letter from the corps commander expressing his astonishment that I had remained away three days."

General Kent also states in his report that his travel rations had been exhausted seven days before and that but one meal of field rations remained, and that the ship's supply both of water and provisions was running low, and that in consequence of these facts as well as for higher considerations he was very anxious to get on shore. The debarkation followed as rapidly as possible, and that afternoon General Kent reported in person to Major-General Wheeler, the troops bivouacking for the night near the landing. The next day Colonel Pearson, who commanded the Second Brigade of Kent's division, took the Second Infantry and reconnoitred along the railroad toward the Morro, going a distance of about six miles and returning in the evening, having found no enemy in that vicinity, although evidences were found that a force had recently retreated from a blockhouse situated on the railroad about two miles from Aguadores.

On the day following, June 27th, the entire division moved out on the road toward Santiago and encamped on the same ground that Lawton had occupied the night previous. The Second Brigade took its place near Savilla, while the Third Brigade, which included the Twenty-fourth Infantry, went into camp at Las Guasimas, where the affair of the 24th had occurred. The order of march had now partially fallen back to the original plan: Lawton in advance, with whom was the Twenty-Fifth Infantry; Wheeler next, with whom was the Ninth and Tenth Cavalry, and Kent in the rear, who had, as we have just related, the Twenty-fourth Infantry in his Third Brigade. In this order the army moved, so far as it moved at all, until the morning of the 30th, when dispositions for the general attack began.

The story of the great battle, or as it turned out, of the two great battles, begins on this day, and the careers of the four colored regiments are to be followed through the divisions of Lawton, Kent and Wheeler. Let us begin, however, with General Shafter's official report and his "Story of Santiago," as told in the "Century" of February, 1899.

From these sources it is learned that on June 30th General Shafter reconnoitered the country about Santiago and determined upon a plan of attack. Ascending a hill from which he could obtain a good view of the city, and could also see San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney, he observed afresh what had impressed itself upon all immediately upon landing, to wit: That in all this country there were no good roads along which to move troops or transport supplies. The General says: "I had never seen a good road in a Spanish country, and Santiago did not disappoint my expectations." The roads as he saw them from the summit of the hill on June 30th were very poor, and indeed, little better than bridle paths, except between El Caney and San Juan River and the city. Within this region, a distance of from four to four and a half miles, the roads were passable. El Caney lay about four miles northeast of Santiago, and was strongly fortified, and, as events proved, strongly garrisoned. This position was of great importance to the enemy, because from it a force might come to attack the right flank and rear of the American Army as it should make its attempt on San Juan Hill. El Caney held the road from Guantanamo, at which point an important Spanish force was posted. While General Shafter was surveying the country from the hill at El Pozo and making what special examination he could of the country toward San Juan Hills, Generals Lawton and Chaffee were making a reconnoisance around El Caney. From General Lawton's report it would appear that the work of reconnoitering around El Caney was done chiefly by General Chaffee. He says: "To General Adna R. Chaffee I am indebted for a thorough and intelligent reconnoissance of the town of El Caney and vicinity prior to the battle and the submission of a plan of attack which was adopted. I consider General Chaffee one of the best practical soldiers in the army and recommend him for special distinction for successfully charging the stone fort mentioned in this report, the capture of which practically closed the battle."

The general plan of attack as explained by General Shafter himself in his "Century" article was "to put a brigade on the road between Santiago and El Caney, to keep the Spaniards at the latter place from retreating on the city, and then with the rest of Lawton's division and the divisions of Wheeler and Kent, and Bates' brigade to attack the Spanish position in front of Santiago." Before that he had said that he wished to put a division in on the right of El Caney and assault the town on that road. To Admiral Sampson on June 26th he said: "I shall, if I can, put a large force in Caney, and one perhaps still farther west, near the pipe-line conveying water to the city, making my main attack from the northeast and east." His desire at this time was to "get the enemy in my front and the city at my back." On June 30th he had modified this plan so as to decide to place one brigade on the road between El Caney and Santiago, with a view merely to keeping the El Caney garrison from retreating into Santiago.

As he was explaining his plan to the division officers and others on the afternoon of the 30th at his own headquarters, Lawton and Chaffee were of the opinion that they could dispose of the Spaniards at El Caney in two hours time. "Therefore," says the General, "I modified my plan, assigning Lawton's whole division for the attack of El Caney and directed Bates' independent brigade to his support." This last modification of General Shafter's plan was made in deference to the opinion of subordinates, and was based upon observations made especially by General Chaffee.

The force assigned for the reduction of El Caney was to begin its work early in the morning, and by ten or eleven o'clock at the outside it was expected that the task would be accomplished and Lawton would join Kent and Sumner in the assault upon San Juan. Early on the morning of July 1st Capron's battery was got into position on a line running directly north from Marianage on a hill about five hundred yards east of Las Guasimas Creek. Lawton's division began its move on the afternoon of the 30th, as did in fact the whole army, and bivouacked that night near El Pozo. The Twenty-fifth Infantry, which belonged to the Second Brigade, commanded by Colonel Miles, a former Major of the Twenty-fifth, left El Pozo at daylight by way of the road leading almost due north, and marched about one mile to the little town of Marianage. Here a halt was made for an hour, from 6.30 to 7.30, during which time reconnoitering parties were sent out to examine the ground toward the Ducoureau House, which lay about one mile to the northward of Marianage, and which had been designated by General Lawton as a general rendezvous after the engagement should terminate. Reconnoissance was made also to the front for the purpose of discovering the enemy, and to ascertain the left of Ludlow's brigade. This was the first brigade of Lawton's division and consisted of the Eighth and Twenty-second Infantry and the Second Massachusetts, the last named regiment being on the right. The Second Brigade was to connect with this on its right and succeeded in finding the position of the Second Massachusetts during this halt. At 11.30 Miles' brigade was ordered to take position on the right of Ludlow's brigade, which it did in the following order: The Fourth Infantry on the left, joining with the Second Massachusetts on Ludlow's right; the Twenty-fifth on the right, with its left joining on the Fourth Infantry.

We must now review the progress of the battle so far as it is possible to do so, from the firing of the first shot by Capron's battery up to 11.30, an hour long after the time at which it had been supposed that El Caney would fall. Capron's reports are very brief. He says: "July 1—Fired shell and shrappnel into El Caney (ranged 2,400) 6.15 a.m. to 11.30 a.m." In another report he says: "Opened fire July 1, with shell and shrappnel at 6.15 on Caney; range, 2,400 yards; continued until 11.30 a.m." He says that the battery "continued its fire against specified objectives intermittently throughout the day under the personal direction of the division commander." The forces we have so far considered, consisting of Ludlow's and Miles' brigades, and of Capron's battery, lay to the south of Caney, between it and Santiago, Ludlow's brigade having been placed there to "cut off the retreat of the garrison should it attempt to escape." Up to 11.30 there had been no call for employing it for that purpose. The garrison had made no attempt to escape. We must now go around to the east and north of Caney. Here the Third Brigade, consisting of the Seventh, Twelfth and Seventeenth Infantry, was posted, and early in the morning joined in the attack, the brigade getting under fire before eight o'clock. Colonel Carpenter, of the Seventh Regiment, says that one company of his regiment, by General Chaffee's direction, was detached and sent forward to reduce a blockhouse, well up on the hill, which commanded the approach of his regiment to the field of action. After several ineffectual attempts by the company, the Captain (Van Orsdale) was directed to abandon the undertaking and rejoin the regiment, which then took up a position on the crest of a hill running nearly parallel with the Spanish lines. From this position the men crawled forward about fifty yards and opened a deliberate fire upon the enemy, keeping it up for about an hour, but as the losses of the regiment at this time were considerable and the fire seemed to be without material effect, the command was withdrawn to its position on the hill where it found protection in a sunken road. In this condition this regiment lay when Capron's battery made its lull at 11.30. The fearful fire this regiment met can be estimated by the losses it sustained, which during the day were as follows: Killed, 1 officer and 33 enlisted men; wounded, 4 officers and 95 enlisted men; missing, 3 enlisted men. The Seventeenth Regiment went into action on the right of the Seventh, doing but little firing, as their orders were not to open fire unless they could make the fire effective. Companies C and G fired a few volleys; the remainder of the regiment did not fire at all. Four enlisted men were killed and two officers severely wounded, one, Lieutenant Dickinson, dying from his wounds within a few hours. Several enlisted men were also wounded. At 11.30 this regiment was lying on the right of the Seventh. The Twelfth Regiment began firing between 6 and 7 in the morning and advanced to take its position on the left of the Seventh Infantry. This regiment early reached a position within 350 yards of the enemy, in which it found shelter in the sunken road, "free from the enemy's fire." The regiment remained in this position until about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and, hence, was there at 11.30 a.m. The losses of this regiment during the day were, killed, 7 enlisted men; wounded, 2 officers and 31 enlisted men. From these brief sketches the reader will now be able to grasp the position of Lawton's entire division. Beginning on the south, from the west, with Ludlow's brigade, consisting of the Twenty-second, Eighth and Second Massachusetts, the line was continued by Miles' brigade of the Fourth and Twenty-fifth Infantry; then passing over a considerable space, we strike Chaffee's brigade, posted as has just been described. General Bates' brigade probably arrived upon the field about noon. This brigade consisted of the Third and Twentieth Infantry, and is known as "Bates' Independent Brigade." The brigade is reported as going into action about 1 o'clock and continuing in action until 4 o'clock. It took a position on the right, partially filling up the gap between Miles and Chaffee. The first battalion of the Twentieth Infantry went into action on the left of the Twenty-fifth Infantry's firing line, and one company, A, took part in the latter part of the charge by which the stone house was taken. Between 11.30, when Capron's firing stopped, and when Miles' brigade was moved forward to join the right of Ludlow's, and 12.20, when the battery recommenced, the troops, including Bates' brigade, were either in the positions described above or were moving to them. Noon had arrived and El Caney is not taken; the garrison has not attempted to escape, but is sending out upon its assailants a continuous and deadly fire. "Throughout the heaviest din of our fire," says Colonel Carpenter, "could be heard the peculiar high-keyed ring of the defiant enemy's shots."