[Footnote 214: Statement of his son, General James Watson Webb, of New York.]

This affair on Chatterton's Hill is known as the Battle of White Plains. On the side of the Americans, not more than sixteen hundred troops were engaged, but the action was an important one, as it had the effect of changing the direction of future operations.[215]

[Footnote 215: The details of the various movements in Westchester County would fill a long and interesting chapter; but in the present connection not more than an outline can be attempted.]

On the following day, the 29th, Howe waited for reinforcements. On the 30th, the rain postponed an intended attack. On the 31st the weather proved fine about noon, but the British General "did not think proper to put his former intentions in execution." The next morning, November 1st, there was a further excuse for not attacking: Washington during the night had fallen back to the almost unassailable heights of North Castle, in his rear. Howe was thus again baffled in his attempt to bring the Americans to a decisive engagement, or to surround them, and he now turned his attention to another line of campaign. Stedman, the British historian, probably gives the correct reason why Washington was not followed. The American position, he says, was now "so advantageous that any attack on them must have proved unsuccessful, for the river Croton stretched along their front, and their rear was defended by woods and heights. Convinced that it was part of the enemy's system studiously to avoid an action, and that their knowledge of the country enabled them to execute this system with advantage, General Howe resolved to cease an ineffectual pursuit, and employ himself in the reduction of King's Bridge and Fort Washington." This accomplished, he could then push on to Philadelphia and close the year's operations with the occupation of that place. The capture of two cities, the successive defeats inflicted upon the Americans, and the good prospect of ending the rebellion in the next campaign, would be a brilliant military record with which to gratify the home government.

FORT WASHINGTON.

Howe broke up his camp near White Plains on November 5th, and marched west to the Hudson at Dobb's Ferry. Knyphausen, who had lately arrived with a second division of "foreigners," had already been despatched to King's Bridge. After various movements and delays, the entire British force also moved on the 12th to the immediate vicinity of the bridge, and dispositions were made to attack and capture Fort Washington. On the 15th, Howe sent a summons for the surrender of the fort, in which he intimated that a refusal to comply would justify the putting of the garrison to the sword.

The commander of Fort Washington was Colonel Robert Magaw, of Pennsylvania. In addition to his own regiment and Colonel Shee's, now under Lieutenant-Colonel Cadwallader, he had with him several detachments of troops from the Pennsylvania Flying Camp, under Colonels Baxter, Swoope, and others, together with a Maryland rifle battalion, under Colonel Rawlings, whose major was Otho Holland Williams, an officer distinguished later in the war. The artillery numbered about one hundred men, under Captain Pierce, and there were also the "Rangers," parts of Miles's and Atlee's old regiments, such as escaped the Long Island defeat, and about two hundred and fifty from Bradley's Connecticut levies, many of whom were to die in captivity. The whole force under Magaw numbered about twenty-eight hundred officers and men. The ground they were expected to hold was that part of Harlem Heights from the first of the three lines already described, northward to the end of Laurel Hill on the Harlem, and the hill west on the Hudson, a distance of two miles and a half.

At the lower lines at One Hundred and Forty-sixth Street, Cadwallader's men, the Rangers, and some others were posted; at Laurel Hill, Colonel Baxter, and west of him, at the northern termination of the level summit of the ridge where Fort Washington stood, was Colonel Rawlings. Magaw remained at the fort to direct movements during the attack. The outer defences where the troops were stationed were to be held as long as possible, while the fort and the intrenchments immediately surrounding it were to be the point of retreat. Magaw believed he could hold the post against almost any force until December, and when the summons for a surrender reached him he returned the following spirited reply:

"15 NOVEMBER, 1776.

"SIR: If I rightly understand the purport of your message from General Howe communicated to Colonel Swoope, this post is to be immediately surrendered or the garrison put to the sword. I rather think it a mistake than a settled resolution in General Howe to act a part so unworthy of himself and the British Nation. But give me leave to assure his Excellency that actuated by the most glorious cause that mankind ever fought in, I am determined to defend this post to the last extremity.

"ROB'T MAGAW, Colonel Commanding.

"To the Adjutant-General of the British Army."

On the morning of the 16th, the enemy opened the attack from three directions.[216] The Hessians moved forward from King's Bridge against Rawlings' position, Rall on the right nearest to the Hudson, Knyphausen a short distance to his left nearer the King's Bridge road. Brigadier-General Matthews, supported by Cornwallis, came down the Harlem from the bridge in boats, and landed at the foot of Laurel Hill (One Hundred and Ninety-sixth Street), where Baxter was posted. These formed the attacking columns from the north side. On the south side Percy marched up from Harlem Plains and engaged Cadwallader at the lower lines.

[Footnote 216: Consult "Map of New York," etc., Part II.]

At about the moment the cannonade began, Washington, Putnam, Greene, and Mercer were putting off from the Jersey shore at Fort Lee to make a final visit to Fort Washington, and determine whether to defend or evacuate the post. When they reached the island they found the threatened attack in actual progress, and evacuation then was out of the question. They saw Percy making his dispositions, and could see nothing to modify on their own side. All they could do was to await the result. "There," says Greene, "we all stood in a very awkward situation." Had they remained much longer it would have been more than awkward. Putnam, Greene, and Mercer felt that Washington at least ought not to be exposed in a position which might become dangerous, and they all urged him to return to Fort Lee, while each in turn offered to stay and conduct the defence. But the chief, who never wished to hold the fort as an isolated post, foresaw the possible, if not the probable, result of the British attack as clearly as his generals, and he advised the return of the entire party. Entering their boat they were rowed back to the Jersey side.[217]

[Footnote 217: Read the letter Greene wrote to Knox on the following day.—Document 36.]

The fighting began under a heavy fire from the enemy's artillery posted at advantageous points, both on the island and on the east side of the Harlem River. The several columns pushed forward nearly at the same time. Rall and Knyphausen encountered the most serious obstacles, and met with the most obstinate resistance. Their course lay through woods and underbrush and heavy abattis, felled by the Americans. As they approached Rawlings, his men received them with a destructive and determined fire, which lasted a long time. Rall's force, including the newly arrived Waldeckers, fought desperately, and, as Cornwallis afterwards declared, "to the admiration of the entire British army."[218] Knyphausen led his men and tore down obstructions with his own hands. Matthews and Cornwallis climbed up the steep hill, and drove back Baxter's men; but not before Baxter had fallen while fighting manfully. Percy, with whose column Lord Howe had taken his station, held Cadwallader's attention and made some progress in that direction, when Howe ordered a fourth column, consisting of the Forty-second Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel Sterling, and two supporting regiments, to cross Harlem River, and attempt to land between Cadwallader and Fort Washington. This movement was successfully conducted under difficulties. The Highlanders rushed up the steep side of Harlem Heights just below the Morris Mansion, and captured over one hundred and fifty of the Americans whom Cadwallader and Magaw had detached to oppose them. Sterling's force, however, suffered considerably in making the landing. By this attack in flank, Cadwallader could maintain his position no longer, and his entire party retreated rapidly towards the fort.

[Footnote 218: Testimony of Cornwallis before Parliamentary Committee on Howe's case in 1779.]

Knyphausen and Rall, meanwhile, succeeded in driving back Rawlings, who had made the best resistance during the day, and the former soon reached Fort Washington, where all the Americans had now retreated. The German general at once sent in a summons for surrender, and Magaw finding that the fort was so crowded with his beaten troops, and that it was impossible to attempt further resistance without great sacrifice of life, agreed to a capitulation on favorable terms, officers and men to be guaranteed personal safety and allowed to retain private baggage.[219]

[Footnote 219: Washington, who with his officers watched the fighting from Fort Lee, sent over Captain Gooch to tell Magaw to maintain himself until night, when an effort would be made to withdraw the garrison to New Jersey. The captain reached the fort, delivered his message, and, running through the fire of the enemy, got to his boat again and recrossed in safety.]

By this surrender the Americans lost in prisoners two thousand six hundred and thirty-seven enlisted men and two hundred and twenty-one officers,[220] the greater part from Pennsylvania, and nearly half of them well-drilled troops. These were the men, with those taken on Long Island and at Kip's Bay, for whose accommodation the Presbyterian and Reformed churches in New York were turned into prisons, and who were to perish by hundreds by slow starvation and loathsome disease, which brutal keepers took little trouble to alleviate. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was something over four hundred and fifty, about two thirds of which fell upon the Hessians. The American casualties were four officers and fifty privates killed, and not over one hundred wounded.

[Footnote 220: Henshaw's copy of return of prisoners.—Document No. 59.]

* * * * *

Upon whom the responsibility for the loss of this post should rest is a question on which divided opinions have been expressed.[221] Greene had urged the retention of the fort as necessary, both to command the passage of the river, and because it would be a threatening obstacle to the enemy's future operations. For them to advance into the country with such a fortification in their rear would be a hazardous move. These reasons were sound, and, as already stated, when the main army evacuated Harlem Heights, Washington's council voted to retain Fort Washington. But on the 7th of November, some British men-of-war again passed the obstructions without difficulty, and Washington wrote to Greene on the 8th from White Plains as follows:

"SIR: The late passage of the three vessels up the North River (which we have just received advice of) is so plain a proof of the inefficacy of all the obstructions we have thrown into it, that I cannot but think it will fully justify a change in the disposition which has been made. If we cannot prevent vessels passing up, and the enemy are possessed of the surrounding country, what valuable purpose can it answer to attempt to hold a post from which the expected benefit cannot be had? I am therefore inclined to think it will not be prudent to hazard the men and stores at Mount Washington; but as you are on the spot, leave it to you to give such orders as to evacuating Mount Washington as you judge best, and so far revoking the order given to Col. Magaw to defend it to the last."

[Footnote 221: Two weeks before the attack on the fort, Magaw's adjutant, William Demont, deserted to the enemy. This fact has lately been established by the recovery, by Mr. Edward F. de Lancey, of the New York Historical Society, of Demont's own letter confessing the desertion. It is dated London, January 16th, 1792, and is in part as follows:

"On the 2d of Nov'r 1776 I Sacrificed all I was Worth in the World to the Service of my King & Country and joined the then Lord Percy, brought in with me the Plans of Fort Washington, by which Plans that Fortress was taken by his Majesty's Troops the 16 instant, Together with 2700 Prisoners and Stores & Ammunition to the amount of 1800 Pound. At the same time, I may with Justice affirm, from my Knowledge of the Works, I saved the Lives of many of His Majesty's Subjects—these Sir are facts well-known to every General Officer which was there."

Mr. De Lancey makes this letter the text of a detailed and highly interesting account of the fall of Fort Washington (published in the Magazine of American History, February, 1877), in which the new theory is advanced that the disaster was due in the first instance to Demont's treason. It is quite probable, as the deserter claimed, that his information was of some use to the British general in making his dispositions for the attack, but beyond this the incident could hardly have affected the situation on either side. Up to the night preceding the assault, Howe did not know whether the Americans would remain in the fort or not. Indeed, he gave them the opportunity to evacuate it by allowing a whole night to intervene between the summons to surrender and the attack. He could not, therefore, have changed his plans, as alleged, in the confident expectation of taking a large garrison prisoners and sending home word of another great victory. Fort Washington was simply in his way, and he would have moved against it under any circumstances, regardless of Demont and his treachery.]

General Greene on the following day replied that he did not think the garrison in any danger, and that it could be drawn off at any time. He believed, too, that the stores could be removed at the last moment, in spite of an attack; and again he called attention to the advantage of holding the post as an annoyance to the enemy. No further communications passed on the subject, but Washington rode to the Highlands, and, returning on the Jersey side of the Hudson, reached Greene's headquarters at Fort Lee on the 14th, to find no steps taken to withdraw men or stores from Mount Washington. Had the enemy in the mean time invested and captured the fort, it is pertinent to inquire whether Greene, having been acquainted with the distinct wishes of the commander-in-chief not to hazard the post, could not have been justly and properly charged with its loss. Washington's instructions were discretionary only so far as related to the details or perhaps the time of the evacuation; and to leave Greene free, he revoked the order already given to Magaw to defend the fort to the last. Upon the arrival of Washington at Fort Lee, however, one phase of the question changed. By not renewing his instructions to evacuate the mount when he found that nothing had been done in the case, or not making the instructions peremptory, he entirely relieved Greene of the charge of non-compliance, which could have been brought against him before. The commander-in-chief was now present, and Greene was no longer under instructions, discretionary or otherwise. Washington accepted the situation as he now found it, and was reconsidering the propriety of a total evacuation. Finding Greene, of whose military judgment he had "a good opinion," strong in favor of holding the post, and others agreeing with him, among whom evidently were Putnam, Mercer, and Magaw, and knowing that Congress and the country would not easily be reconciled to its abandonment, Washington hesitated for the moment to enforce his own views and opinions. On the 14th and 15th, he still delayed a final decision. So says Greene. "His Excellency General Washington," he writes, "has been with me several days. The evacuation or reinforcement of Fort Washington was under consideration, but finally nothing concluded on;" and it was not until the morning of the 16th, just at the time of the attack, that they all went over to the fort "to determine what was best to be done." This clearly settles the fact that Greene was not under instructions at the time of the surrender of the post.

But at the same time, upon a review of all the circumstances, it is difficult to escape the conviction that but for General Greene's earnest opposition to an abandonment of the fort, the disaster would not have occurred. It was an error of judgment, an over-confidence in the sufficiency of the preparations made for the defence, and a belief that if matters came to the worst the garrison could be withdrawn in spite of the enemy. That Greene himself felt that he would be held largely accountable for the loss of the post, is evident from his own expressions in the letter he wrote to Knox on the next day. "I feel mad, vexed, sick, and sorry," are his words. "Never did I need the consoling voice of a friend more than now. Happy should I be to see you. This is a most terrible event; its consequences are justly to be dreaded. Pray, what is said upon the occasion?"[222]

[Footnote 222: This is what Tilghman said upon the occasion: "The loss of the post is nothing compared to the loss of men and arms, and the damp it will strike upon the minds of many. We were in a fair way of finishing the campaign with credit to ourselves and I think to the disgrace of Mr. Howe, and had the General followed his own opinion the garrison would have been withdrawn immediately upon the enemy's falling down from Dobb's Ferry; but Gen'l Greene was positive that our forces might at any time be drawn off under the guns of Fort Lee. Fatal experience has evinced the contrary."—Correspondence in Proceedings of the N.Y. Provincial Congress, vol. ii.]

There were those who censured Washington for not overruling Greene, but the chief kept his counsels to himself, and it was not until nearly three years later, in August, 1779, that he gave his version of the affair in a private letter to Colonel Reed. In that he frankly admits that Greene's representations and other reasons caused a "warfare" and "hesitation" in his mind, by which the evacuation was delayed until too late. But he indulged in no censures on Greene. His confidence in the latter remained steadfast. The disaster was one of those misfortunes which occur in the career of every great general, and become, indeed, a step by which he rises to greatness. Greene, more than any general of the Revolution, learned by experience. Every battle, whether a defeat or victory, was for him a training-school; and at the close of the war we find him ranking hardly second to the commander-in-chief, in military talents, and enjoying nearly an equal reputation for his achievements.

* * * * *

This disaster at Fort Washington, the heaviest suffered by the Americans during the entire war, closed the campaign in the vicinity of New York. All the western part of Long Island, New York City, and all Manhattan Island, had fallen into the possession of the British, and their fleet came into undisturbed control of the Hudson, the East River, and the waters of the Sound. Every thing that Washington and his soldiers had sought to secure and defend was wrested from their hands. Their losses too, in men and material, were almost irreparable. Much the greater part of their artillery had been captured—two hundred and eighteen pieces of all calibres, according to the enemy's report. Three hundred and twenty-nine officers and four thousand one hundred men had been taken prisoners; nearly six hundred had been killed or wounded; and numbers had been swept off by disease. The enemy suffered more heavily, except in prisoners and cannon, in which their loss was nothing; but they had recovered territory, won victories, and they were now to find before them only a flying and dissolving body of rebels.

The situation at this point presented a gloomy prospect for America. But had the cause been then surrendered, we could still contemplate this struggle around New York and Brooklyn with respect, as a noble effort to gain an end worth fighting for. As success, however, was finally achieved, and achieved through the experience of these events, they challenge our deepest interest.



CHAPTER VIII.

TRENTON—PRINCETON—CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN.

To appreciate the full significance of what has been described in the preceding pages, follow the campaign in outline to its closing scenes.

Thus far the American army had met with nothing but defeat, retreat, sacrifice, hardship, and discouragement. First came the months of preparation, with England straining every nerve to conquer the colonies; then the first and disastrous collision on Long Island, on which so much depended; then the retreat, the loss of New York, the withdrawal to White Plains, and a battle which was not a victory for the Americans; and, finally, the heavy blow struck in the fall of Fort Washington. Much had been endured and learned alike by general and private soldier during these gloomy months, and both were now destined to profit by the trial. All this faith and patience had its legitimate reward, as we shall find if we now place ourselves in the last days of the year upon the banks of the Delaware.

What had occurred in the mean time was the evacuation of Fort Lee, a hasty retreat through New Jersey, the dwindling away of the army, the advance of the British towards Philadelphia, the removal of Congress to Baltimore, and an increase of despondency throughout the country.[223] Washington with the remnants of his army had taken post on the right bank of the Delaware, and, still strong in hope, was calling for militia to come to his assistance. At the same time he watched the opportunity to inflict upon the enemy some happy counter-stroke that might temporarily raise the spirits of his soldiers and the people. The opportunity came. The British delayed crossing the Delaware, and divided their force among different posts throughout New Jersey. At Trenton they stationed Colonel Rall with a body twelve hundred strong, composed chiefly of Hessians. This was the Rall who marched up with De Heister on Long Island, and figured in the capture of prisoners, who afterwards turned our right on Chatterton's Hill, at White Plains, and whose attack on Rawlings at Fort Washington was the brilliant feature of that day. He was every inch a soldier, except in possessing that reserve of caution which every commander is bound to exercise in the presence of an enemy, however remote the probability of an attack. Rall despised Washington's troops, and would throw up no intrenchments around Trenton.

[Footnote 223: After the battle of White Plains, Howe, we have seen, moved against Fort Washington. On the other hand, Washington, supposing that Howe would aim next for Philadelphia, prepared to cross part of his force into Jersey and endeavor to protect that city. He proposed to continue the policy of "wasting" the campaign. Heath was left to look after the Highlands; Lee with another force remained at Northcastle, and Connecticut troops were posted at Saw Pits and the borders of that State. Washington took with him Putnam, Greene, Stirling, and Mercer, with less than four thousand men, and fell back before the British through Brunswick, Princeton, and Trenton. He wrote several times to Lee to join him, but Lee was full of excuses and utterly failed Washington at this crisis. While marching in no haste by a westerly route through Jersey, Lee was surprised at his quarters at Baskingridge on the morning of December 13th, and made prisoner by Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt and a party of dragoons. (The account of the capture by Captain Bradford, Lee's aid, not heretofore published, is given in Document 46. In Wilkinson's Memoirs there is another account.) Sullivan then took command of Lee's troops and joined Washington, who at Trenton had crossed to the Pennsylvania side of the Delaware, removing all boats to delay the enemy, and had halted in camp a few miles above.]

Washington resolved to make a sudden dash upon this Hessian. A surprise, an irresistible attack, the capture of a post with a thousand men, might work wonders in their moral effect. The soldiers with him were trusty men, twenty-four hundred of whom he proposed to lead himself on this enterprise. Many of the regiments we have already become familiar with, and their leaders are men who have led them from the first. Here are Greene, Sullivan, Stirling, Mercer, Glover, and Sargent, for division and brigade commanders; and with them we meet new officers—Brigadier-Generals Adam Stephen, of Virginia; Arthur St. Clair, of Pennsylvania, and De Fermoy, a French officer, lately commissioned by Congress. Here also are Hand's battalion, parts of Smallwood's and Haslet's, Knox and his artillerymen, Durkee's, Charles Webb's, Ward's, and parts of Chester's and Bradley's, from Connecticut; Sargent's, Glover's, Hutchinson's, Baldwin's, Shepherd's, Bailey's, and Paterson's, of Massachusetts; Stark's, Poor's, and Reed's, from New Hampshire, who, with Paterson's, have just arrived in camp from Ticonderoga; the remnants of McDougall's and Ritzema's New York Continentals, and Weedon's, Scott's, Elliot's, Buckner's, and Reed's Virginians. How depleted are these battalions, many of them less than a hundred strong!

Washington's plan included a simultaneous move from several points. The body he was to lead was concentrated, on the night of December 24th, at McConkey's Ferry, nine miles above Trenton. The troops were to cross at night, reach the town at dawn, and take its garrison by surprise. Lower down were two other bodies of troops. About opposite Trenton, General Ewing was posted with Pennsylvania militia and Nixon's Continental brigade, now commanded by Colonel Daniel Hitchcock, of Rhode Island. At Bristol, General Cadwallader commanded still another corps of Pennsylvanians, including many young men from the best families in Philadelphia. Ewing and Cadwallader were to cross and intercept the retreat of the Hessians from Trenton, or prevent Donop at Burlington from affording relief. Putnam was to make a demonstration from Philadelphia.

To his own force Washington issued minute and stringent orders. The troops he divided into two divisions, giving Sullivan the first, and Greene the second. Sullivan's brigades were Glover's, Sargent's, and St. Clair's; Greene's were Stephen's, Mercer's, and Stirling's. De Fermoy was to follow in Greene's rear with Hand's riflemen and Hausegger's German battalion from Pennsylvania. To each brigade were attached from two to four pieces of artillery, eighteen guns in all, under Knox. Greene's division was to cross first, Stephen's in advance, provided with spikes and hammers to spike the enemy's guns, and with ropes to drag them off if that proved feasible. After the crossing, Captain Washington, of the Third Virginia, was to proceed with a guard on the road towards Trenton, and halt and detain any one who might be passing in either direction. Three miles from the ferry the road branched, making two lines of approach to the town. Greene's division was to take the upper road; Sullivan's the lower one near the river. Stirling's and St. Clair's brigades were to act as reserves for their respective columns, and in case of necessity were to form separately or join forces, as the emergency required. The officers set their watches by Washington's. Profound silence was enjoined. Not a man to leave the ranks, read the orders, under penalty of death.[224]

[Footnote 224: Order of march to Trenton.—Drake's Life of Knox.]

The night of the 24th brought storm, snow, and sleet. Ewing and Cadwallader could do nothing on account of the ice in the river. But Washington was determined on the attempt. He called upon Glover's men to man the boats; and these amphibious soldiers, who had transported the army on the retreat from Long Island, were ready again to strain every nerve for the plans of their chief. It was a long, tedious night as they pushed across the Delaware, through ice and chilling spray, and it was not until four o'clock in the morning that the force was ready to take up the march on the Jersey side. They could not surprise the Hessians before daylight, but a return was not to be thought of. The troops then marched on in the worst weather that could be encountered. "As violent a storm ensued of Hail & Snow as I ever felt," wrote Captain William Hull, of Webb's Continentals. The river was crossed, says Knox, "with almost infinite difficulty," the floating ice making the labor incredible. Fortunately the storm was against our backs, "and consequently in the faces of our enemy." The march was kept up swiftly and quietly. In Sullivan's column some of the soldiers could not cover their muskets from the wet, and word was sent to Washington of the unfitness of their arms. Washington promptly sent word back by his aid, Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel B. Webb, that if the men could not discharge their pieces they must use the bayonet, for the town must be taken.

At eight o'clock the two columns neared the enemy's outposts—Sullivan striking them on the lower road but three minutes after Greene on the upper one. Greene's van was led by Captain Washington and Lieutenant James Monroe, the future President; Sullivan's by Stark's New Hampshire men. Surprising the Hessian outguards, our troops dashed after them "pell-mell" into Trenton, gave the enemy no time to form, cleared the streets with cannon and howitzers "in the twinkling of an eye," under Washington's own direction, dislodged them from the houses, drove them beyond into a plain, surrounded and forced them to surrender, with the loss of their commander Rall, who fell mortally wounded. A fine and remarkable exploit! The turning-point of the campaign—if not, indeed, the decisive stroke of the war! Gathering up their nine hundred and fifty prisoners, six brass field-pieces, standards, horses, and "a vast quantity of Plunder," the Americans marched back again, having lost not a man killed, and hardly more than two or three wounded.

In General Orders next day, Washington congratulated his soldiers in the warmest terms. He had been in many actions, in all of which he had seen misbehavior on the part of some; but at Trenton, he told them their conduct was admirable, without exception. Among others he thanked Knox for his services in terms "strong and polite." "Providence seemed to have smiled upon every part of this enterprise." "What can't men do," said Hull, "when engaged in so noble a cause!" "That victory," writes Bancroft, "turned the shadow of death into the morning."

* * * * *

One more encounter with the enemy, one more success, and the campaign closes with final victory assured for America.

Convinced that inaction would be as demoralizing as defeat, Washington once more determined to try his fortunes in New Jersey, and at once prepared again "to beat up" the enemy's quarters. Crossing the Delaware as before, he marched on the 30th to Trenton, which the British had not reoccupied since Christmas. Hearing of this move, Cornwallis at Princeton gathered a force of seven thousand veterans, and on the 2d of January started for Trenton. Washington sent out detachments, and delayed his entry into the town until evening. At nightfall he took up position on the east bank of the Assanpink Creek, which ran along the east edge of the town and emptied into the Delaware. The British pursued our troops to the bridge, but were there repulsed by Knox's artillery. Cornwallis rested at Trenton, sent off for reinforcements, and expected the next morning to cross the Assanpink at the bridge or the fords above, and bring Washington to an engagement. Obviously the Americans were in a hazardous position. Should the British drive them back, there was no escape, for the Delaware flowed in their rear. They must save themselves that night. A council of war was called, and the situation discussed. From Trenton to Princeton ran a second roundabout road east of the main highway, along which Cornwallis had marched, and which it was possible for the Americans to take, and put themselves in the rear of Cornwallis, with lines of retreat open beyond to Morristown and the back country. Washington proposed escape by this route, and the council seconded him. Orders for a secret night march were given to the officers, and the regiments were silently withdrawn from their posts along the Assanpink, and set in motion along this back road towards Princeton. The camp-fires on the banks of the creek were kept up by guards left behind for the purpose. Nothing occurred to excite suspicion of the movement in the minds of the British sentinels, nearly within musket-shot on the opposite bank.

Washington's troops reached a point within two miles of Princeton about sunrise. The main column pushed on for the village, while Mercer's brigade, consisting of the remnants of Haslet's Delawares, Smallwood's Marylanders, and the First Virginia regiment under Captain Fleming, turned to the left to break down a bridge on the main road over Stony Creek, which the enemy would have to cross on returning from Trenton, in pursuit of Washington.

Three British regiments had been left at Princeton by Cornwallis, but were now, on the morning of the 3d, proceeding under orders to join him. These were the Fifty-fifth, the Fortieth, and Seventeenth, the latter commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Mawhood. Mawhood was a mile in advance of the others, and had just crossed the Stony Creek bridge, when, looking across the country to his left and rear, he discovered Mercer's party on its march. Surprised at the appearance of a force of rebels where he least expected to see one, Mawhood, nevertheless, with a soldier's instinct, promptly wheeled about and proceeded to attack Mercer. They met on a hill and exchanged fire, when Mawhood ordered a bayonet charge, and put the Americans to rout. Mercer, on horseback, attempted in vain to rally his men, and was mortally wounded with bayonet thrusts. Haslet, gallantly fighting on foot, and also trying to form the broken brigade, fell dead with a bullet wound in his forehead. Captain Fleming, of Virginia, suffered a like fate, as well as Captain Neal of the artillery. This sudden and serious reverse required instant attention, for Washington could not afford to be detained long in this position. Cadwallader's brigade, which had followed Mercer's, was accordingly brought up into line, while Washington attempted to rally the latter's force; but Mawhood was making a surprising fight, and he threw Cadwallader's militiamen into confusion as he had Mercer's. Matters now were worse, and the commander-in-chief made strenuous exertions, at great personal hazard, to bring the troops into some order. Meanwhile, he sent word for Hitchcock's brigade to advance upon the enemy, while Hand's riflemen endeavored to turn their left. The "gallant Hitchcock" promptly took his command into action—all that remained of it, five regiments together hardly five hundred strong—and formed in line. On the right was Lieutenant-Colonel Nixon, next Varnum's battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Crary, in the centre Colonel Lippett, with the largest number, one hundred and twenty-eight men, next Hitchcock's, under Major Angell, and on the left Little's battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Henshaw.[225] They opened fire at one hundred yards, and then, in conjunction with Cadwallader's men, whom Washington had rallied in part, they rushed upon Mawhood's force, recaptured the two guns we had lost, and joined in putting the enemy completely to rout.

[Footnote 225: Stiles' MS. Diary. Statement of Rhode Island officers engaged at Princeton.]

No doubt these old troops experienced a glow of satisfaction over this brief and final work of the campaign, for they had endured hard service from the outset. Here was Greene's old brigade, which crossed with him to Long Island on the 1st of May—Varnum's, Hitchcock's, Little's, and, by a happy accident, Hand's, on the left—to assist in reversing the record of the year. These men had built the lines around Brooklyn; Hitchcock's and Little's at the Flatbush Pass had been caught and all but captured in the surprise of August 27th; they fought manfully, and suffered the most at Harlem Heights; many of them responded to Washington's appeal to remain six weeks beyond their term of service, and now they had shared in the successful manoeuvre at Princeton, which changed the whole aspect of affairs.

Hitchcock, who had temporarily succeeded Nixon in command of the brigade, received the thanks of Washington for himself and for his men in front of Princeton College for their aid and conduct in the action. But the colonel, a brilliant, promising officer, whose regiment built and guarded Fort Putnam in Brooklyn, was destined to only a brief career henceforth. Overcome by the fatigue and hardships of the campaign, he died in camp at Morristown, on the 13th of January, and was buried by the Philadelphia and Delaware Light Infantry companies, under Rodney, with all the honors of war. It was a fitting escort to the remains of the brave soldier, for Rodney and most of his men had behaved well at Princeton.

Sullivan's troops drove the other two British regiments out of Princeton towards Brunswick, and Washington's tired army then pushed on, and on the 6th went into camp at Morristown.[226]

[Footnote 226: In connection with the battles of Trenton and Princeton, read the interesting letters from Knox, Haslet, Rodney, and Hull in Part II. They have all appeared since our general accounts were written.]

* * * * *

The effect of these two unexpected strokes at Trenton and Princeton was to baffle Howe, and utterly disconcert his plans. Expecting to march upon Philadelphia at his leisure, he suddenly finds Washington turning about and literally cutting his way through the British posts, back to a point where he threatened Howe's flank and rear. The enemy were at once compelled to retire from all their positions below Brunswick, give up the thought of wintering in Philadelphia, and fall back to the vicinity of New York. When Horace Walpole heard of these movements, he wrote to Sir Horace Mann: "Washington has shown himself both a Fabius and a Camillus. His march through our lines is allowed to have been a prodigy of generalship. In one word, I look upon a great part of America as lost to this country."[227]

[Footnote 227: In another letter Walpole says:

"It is now the fashion to cry up the manoeuvre of General Washington in this action [Princeton] who has beaten two English regiments, too, and obliged General Howe to contract his quarters—in short, the campaign has by no means been wound up to content.... It has lost a great deal of its florid complexion, and General Washington is allowed by both sides not to be the worst General in the field."

Again, in a humorous vein:

"Caius Manlius Washingtonius Americanus, the dictator, has got together a large army, larger than our ally, the Duke of Wirtemberg was to have sold us; and General Howe, who has nothing but salt provisions in our metropolis, New York, has not twenty thousand pounds' worth of pickles, as he had at Boston."—Walpole's Letters and Correspondence. Cunningham.]

Here the campaign closed. Washington could not be dislodged from his strong mountain position, and Howe was satisfied to rest his troops and postpone further operations until the next season. Meantime the country took heart, Congress voted troops and supplies, and the army was recruited and organized on a better basis. "The business of war is the result of Experience," wrote Wolcott from Congress, with faith unshaken during the darkest hours of the campaign; and experience was now put to good profit.

The crisis was passed. Events proved decisive. Hardship and anxiety were yet to come during succeeding years of the war; but it was the result of this year's struggle that cleared away misgivings and confirmed the popular faith in final success. England could do no more than she had done to conquer America; while America was now more ready than ever to meet the issue. Independence was established in the present campaign—in the year of its declaration; and more than to any others we owe this political privilege to the men who fought from Long Island to Princeton.

NOTES.

OBSTRUCTIONS IN THE HUDSON.—The following letter from Mr. Duer to the Secret Committee of the New York Provincial Congress refers to the defence of the Hudson at Fort Washington:

"WHITE PLAINS, Sunday 21st July, 1776.

"DEAR GENTL:—I have just arrived at this place from New York where I have conversed with Genl. Washington on the Purport of the Letter from the Secret Committee.

"Gens. Putnam and Mifflen have made an exact Survey of the River opposite Mount Washington and find that the Depth in no Part exceeds seven Fathoms; the Width, however, of the Channel (which is from three to seven Fathoms) is not much less than 1800 Yards, the shallow Part of the River running in an oblique Direction. Genl. Washington expresses himself extremely anxious about the Obstruction of that Channel, and Measures are daily used for executing that Purpose. It is impossible to procure Vessels enough at New York, so that the Measure must be delayed till such Time as more Vessels can be brought through the Sound from Connecticut; however, I am not without Apprehensions that this Resource will be cut off, as I understand that some of the Enemy's Vessels have sailed out of the Hook with an Intention (probably) of cutting off our Communication with the Sound.

"It is, however an Object of so much Importance that no Difficulties, however great, ought to deter us from our Attempts to carry it into Execution; if we succeed, the Designs of the Enemy in this Campaign are effectually baffled—if we fail, we cannot be in a more lamentable Situation than we are now.

"Exclusive of the great Advantage we should reap in obstructing the Channel so far to the Southward, it is, I fear, the only Place we can depend upon shallowing to the Southward of the Highlands, whilst the Men-of-War are in the River, for if proper Batteries are erected near the Water at Mount Washington, and on the opposite Side, mounted with Guns of 18, 24 and 32 Pounders, it will not be practicable for any Vessels to be so near as to prevent our working under the Cover of these Works. I have strongly urged Genl. Washington to send Gen. Mifflen some heavier Metal, and he seems half inclined. This necessary operation has not yet taken place.

"The Genl. is anxious to have either of you (as Members of the Secret Committee) to be with him in Town, and has authorized me to make the Offer to you of his House during your Residence. Let me entreat One of you immediately to come Down, and not to quit Genl. Washington till such Time as this Measure on which our Safety depends is effected....

"I am very sincerely, yours, etc., "WM. DUER.

"P.S.—For God's sake exert yourself to secure the Sea Vessels which are in the River."[228]

[Footnote 228: From the Clinton papers as published in E.M. Ruttenber's Obstructions to the Navigation of Hudson's River, etc. Munsell, Albany.]

To hasten the completion of the obstructions General Putnam proposed the following plan of sinking ships, as appears in a letter from him to General Gates, dated July 26, 1776 (in Sparks'):

"We are preparing Chevaux-de-Frize, at which we make great Despatch by the Help of Ships, which are to be Sunk; a Scheme of mine, which you may be assured is very simple, a Plan of which I send you. The two Ships' Sterns lie towards each other, about Seventy Feet apart. Three large Logs, which reach from Ship to Ship, are fastened to them. The two Ships and Logs stop the River two hundred and eighty Feet. The Ships are to be sunk, and, when hauled down on one side, the Picks will be raised to a proper Height, and they must inevitably stop the River, if the Enemy will let us sink them."

On the 21st of September, the New York Convention resolved:

"That the Secret Committee for obstructing the Navigation of Hudson's River be empowered and directed to purchase or impress for the Service of the State any Number of Vessels not exceeding six, which they shall think best calculated for the Purpose of completing the Obstructions in the Hudson's River opposite to Mount Washington....

"That the said Committee be directed to send all the Oak Plank which they may have in their Possession, to Mount Washington with the utmost Dispatch."

GOVERNOR'S ISLAND.—The obstructions in the East River between Governor's Island and the Battery consisted of hulks sunk in the Channel. This was not done until a few days before the battle on Long Island. Colonel Douglas, as he states, sounded the river. The present Buttermilk Channel, between the island and Brooklyn, was not obstructed. Governor's Island was evacuated on the morning of the retreat from Long Island, but the enemy failed to take possession for two days. The interval was improved by the Americans in carrying off all except the heavy pieces to New York in the night-time.

BATTLE OF LONG ISLAND.—The prisoners named in Document 58 as having been captured by us at the battle of Long Island were a small party of marines, who mistook the Delaware regiment in Stirling's force for Hessians. They came too near and were taken by Lieut. Wm. Popham, who was ordered to march them into camp. He made them cross Gowanus Creek on Stirling's retreat, and brought all but one in safe. Popham afterwards became major and aid to General James Clinton, and settled in New York, where he lived to be over ninety years old. Was a member of the New York Cincinnati. During the battle the marines landed from the fleet, which could not make its way up above Gowanus Bay, and, according to one letter, Admiral Howe furnished Grant with ammunition while fighting Stirling. The Roebuck alone, as already stated, could work its way along far enough to send some harmless long-range shot at the Red Hook fort.



PART II.

DOCUMENTS.



[No. 1.]

GENERAL GREENE'S ORDERS

CAMP ON LONG ISLAND

[Colonel Little's Order Book]

GENERAL ORDERS.[229]

[Footnote 229: These orders are from the Order Book kept by Colonel Moses Little, of Greene's brigade, while encamped on Long Island during the months of May, June, July, and August, 1776, the original being in the possession of Benjamin Hale, Esq., of Newburyport, Mass. They cover the whole period of active operations there after the arrival of the main army at New York. The book also contains Washington's general orders from headquarters, New York, General Sullivan's orders while in command on Long Island, Colonel Little's regimental orders, and scattering orders from Generals Lee, Spencer, Greene, and Nixon, in September and October, 1776. As all Washington's orders are to be found in Force's Archives, a few only are inserted here to preserve the connection. They are distinguished as "General Orders." Sullivan's and the others are given separately.]

HEAD QUARTERS, April 30, 1776.

(Parole, SAWBRIDGE.) (Countersign, OLIVER.)

... Genl Greene's Brigade is to encamp tomorrow at 10 A.M. on the ground marked out on Long Island....

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

[NEW YORK] April 30, 1776.

The Qr. Mrs. of the 9th, 11th, 12th regts. are to apply to the Q. M. Genl. for tents & camp utensils this evening to be in readiness to encamp agreeably to general orders to morrow morning—at 4 o'clock this P.M. Col. Varnum & Col. Hitchcock & Col. Little are desired to attend at the General's quarters to go over to Long Island & view the encampment marked out. A sergt. & 20 men are to parade at White Hall to morrow at 7 o'clock, to be under the direction of Engineer Smith.

[LONG ISLAND] May 4th, 1776.

Captain Spurs is to draw out a party of carpenters to make Bell tents, they are to apply to Col. Miflin for tools, boards & nails to make them of. 300 men for fatigue to morrow. The Quarter Master is to make an estimate of the necessary quantity of boards to floor the tents & apply to the Quarter Master general for them. The Cols. or commanding officers of each regiment is to give an order for the boards, certifying the quantity wanted. A return is to be made of the state of the cartridges now in possession of the troops & the number wanted to make up each man's twenty rounds.

REGIMENTAL ORDERS.

[Col. Little's.]

Officers for fatigue to-morrow, Cap. Gerrish, Lt. Kent, & Lt. Atkinson.

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

May 5th, 1776.

A fatigue party of 200 men to morrow morning properly officered. No non-commissioned Officer or Soldier is to pass the ferries to New York without permission from some of ye Field Officers. Any of the troops attempting to pass over without permission will be confined & tried for disobedience of orders. Any of the fatigue parties that leave their work without liberty, shall do constant fatigue duty for a whole week. As the security of New York greatly dependeth on this pass, when these works are constructing the General hopes the troops will carefully forward the same as fast as possible.

The inhabitants having entered a complaint that their meadow ground was injured by the troops going upon it to gather greens, they are for the future strictly prohibited going on the ground of any inhabitants, unless in the proper passes to & from the encampments & the forts, without orders from some commissioned officer. The General desires the troops not to sully their reputation by any undue liberty in speech or conduct but behave themselves towards the inhabitants with that decency & respect that becomes the character of troops fighting for the preservation of the rights & liberties of America.

The General would have the troops consider that we came here to protect the inhabitants & their property from the ravages of the enemy, but if instead of support & protection, they meet with nothing but insult & outrage, we shall be considered as banditti & treated as oppressors & enemies.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS May 7, 1776.

(Parole, DEVONSHIRE.) (Countersign, CAVENDISH.)

Every regiment encamped in the lines & every regt. in the brigade on Long Island, exclusive of their quarter & rear guards, are to mount a picket every evening at retreat beating at sun set, consisting of one Capt. 2 Subs, 1 drum & 1 fife & 50 rank & file—they are to lay upon their arms, & be ready to turn out at a moments notice.

One Col. one Lt. Col. & one major are to mount every evening at sunset as Field Officers of the picket.

Immediately upon any alarm or order from the Brig. Genl. of the day, the pickets are to form in the front of their respective encampments, & there wait the orders of the Field Officer commanding the pickets, who is instantly to obey the orders of the Brigr. Genl. of the Day.

A Brig. Genl. is to mount every morning at ten o'clock who will receive all reports, visit all the outguards in the day time & report all extraordinary occurrences to the Commander in Chief & the Brigde Major of the day is constantly to attend head quarters to receive all orders, & distribute them immediately.

The Col. is to go the grand rounds, & the Lt. Col. & the major the visiting rounds of the Camp.

Brig. Genl. Greene will order the same picket to be mounted by the regiments in his brigade as are mounted in the grand Camp. He will also direct one field officer to mount daily to command them. Gen. Greene will report all extraordinaries to the Commander in Chief.

Col. Prescott or the officer commanding on Nutten's or Governor's Island & the officer commanding at Red Hook, are to report all extraordinaries to the Commander in Chief on any appearance of the enemy. The commanding officer at Red Hook will also dispatch a messenger to Genl. Greene.

The officer commanding the riflemen upon Long Island will constantly report all extraordinaries to Genl. Greene, & the officer commanding upon Staten Island will do the same to the Commander in Chief.

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

May 8, 1776.

Field officers for the picket, Major Angell, Adjt. for the day from Col. Hitchcock's regiment.

REGIMENTAL ORDERS.

Officers for picket tonight, Cap. Parker, Lt. Jenkins, Lt. Burnham, Ensign Story. Officers for fatigue to-morrow, Cap. Dodge, Lt. Jared Smith & Ensign Proctor.

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

LONG ISLAND, May 10th 1776.

The Brigde Major is to regulate the duty of the regiments, both officers & soldiers, by their number & not by regiments, some being much larger than others, & to establish a regular roster for the regulation of the same. A subaltern & 11 men are to guard the stores & ferries.

The officer commanding the guard is to receive his orders from Deputy Commissary Brown for the number of sentries necessary for securing the stores, to be relieved daily.

The Cols. or commanding officers of the ninth, eleventh, twelfth Regts are to draw as many cartridges from the laboratory as will furnish each man 20 rounds; as many to be delivered out as the cartridge boxes will contain, the remainder to be tied up by the capt of companies, & every man's name written on his cartridges, that they may be delivered without confusion: All the bad cartridges now in the regiments are to be returned to the Laboratory. The Brigde Major will send a party to the Qr Mr Genl to draw tents for the establishment of the main guard, to consist of a subaltern and 21 men. An orderly sergeant from each regiment will attend at the general's quarters daily; they are to bring their provisions with them.

The commanding officers of the 9th 11th & 12th Regts are to make returns of the guns out of repair & the number wanted to furnish every non commissioned officer & soldier with a gun.

May 10th 1776.

A subaltern & 30 men are to parade immediately to fetch over 300 spears from the Qr Mr Genl's store. The officer must pick those that are fit for use. He is also to bring over a grindstone to sharpen the spears on. Col. Hitchcock will send over the arms of his regiment that are out of order, to Mr. John Hillyard, foreman of a shop at the King's Works (so called) where they will be immediately repaired. Any soldier that has his gun damaged by negligence or carelessly injured, shall pay the cost of repairing, the caps & subs are desired to report all such.

May 11th 1776.

Field officer for picket tomorrow night Lt. Col. Henshaw, Adjt from Col. Hitchcock's regt.

DETAIL.

C. S. S. C. D. F. P. Picket 1 2 2 2 1 1 50 Fatigue 1 2 2 2 1 1 80 Main Guard 1 8

REGIMENTAL ORDERS FOR THE 12th REGt OF FOOT.

Those non commissioned officers & soldiers who have occasion to go over the ferry to New York will apply to Lt. Col. Henshaw for their permits.

A regimental Court Martial will sit today at 12 o'clock at Capt Wade's tent to try such prisoners as are contained in the Quarter Guard of the regiment. Cap. Wade, Pres. Lt. Hodgkins, Lt. Parsons, Lt. Knot & Ensn Pearson, members.

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

May 12th, 1776.

The 12th regiment exempt from fatigue tomorrow having to be mustered.

May 14, 1776.

Field officer for picket tomorrow night, Major Collins, adjt. for the day from Col. Hitchcock's Regt.

REGl. ORDERS FOR THE 12th REGt. OF FOOT.

IN CAMP LONG ISLAND May 15, 1776.

The Col. desires hereby to remind the officers & soldiers of this regiment of the Rules & Regulations of the army, & of the general orders issued by the Commander in Chief agreable to them, especially that the Rules & Regulations be often read to the men that no one plead ignorance if he is called to account for the breach of any of them.

The Col. desires & orders that the officers pay particular attention that the Rules & Regulations be read to the men agreable to the resolves of Congress, likewise that the officers of each company, off duty, attend morning & evening to the calling of the roll & if possible that a report be made every day of such as be absent. The Col. is sorry to see so much inattention, of the officers & men to the duties of religious worship, & he desires as we are all engaged in the cause of God & our country, & are dependent on the Divine assistance for protection & success, & as it is a duty incumbent on all as far as possible in a social way to wait upon God in the way of his appointment, to implore pardon & forgiveness of all our sins, & to ask his guidance & direction in the prosecution of our affairs, that neither officers nor soldiers will unnecessarily absent themselves from the stated worship of God at the house of Prayer—or on the Sabbath day.

Commissioned officers for picket tonight Cap. Baker, Lt. Knot & Ensign Woodman. Commissioned officers for fatigue tomorrow, Capt. Parker, Lt. Silvanus Smith & Lt. Lamborn; for main guard Ensign Mitchell.

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

BROOKLIN May 16, 1776.

Col. Varnum's regiment to be off duty tomorrow morning in the forenoon, to parade on the regimental parade at 8 oclock, to be reviewed, & their arms examined. Every man in the regiment, that is well, is to be on parade with arms & accoutrements. No soldier is to borrow either arms or accoutrements from a soldier of either of the other regiments, as the true state of the regiment with respect to arms is wanted. Col. Hitchcock's regt. will be reviewed next day after tomorrow. Col. Little's the day after that will be reviewed in the same manner.

No soldier is to mount the picket guard without shoes.

May 16, 1776.

Tomorrow being the day appointed by the Continental Congress to be observed as a day of fasting & prayer & his Excellency Genl. Washington having ordered all duties to be discontinued except the necessary guard until next day after tomorrow, there are no fatigue parties to turn out tomorrow morning & the reviewing of Col. Varnum's regiment is put off until next day after tomorrow, the other regiments are to follow in order as in the morning orders. The general desires that the troops of the 9, 11 & 12 regiments (except those on duty) may be strict to attend the duties of the day in a devout & cleanly manner. Field officers for picket tomorrow night—Adjt. from Col. Varnum's regiment. Detail for Guard & fatigue as usual.

REGIMENTAL ORDERS FOR THE 12TH REGT. OF FOOT.

James Holland, a fifer in Cap. Dodge's Company is appointed fife major to this regiment, & is to be obeyed as such.

Comd officers for picket tonight Lt. Atkinson & Lt. Fiske.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, 17 May 1776.

(Parole, NEW CASTLE.) (Countersign, WILMINGTON.)

Cap. Wolverton's Company of New Jersey is to join General Greene's Brigade. The Cap. is to take his orders from the General respecting his post....

GEN. GREENE'S MORNING ORDERS.

May 17, 1776.

A corporal & 6 men to be sent for a guard to fort Sterling to mount at 9 O'clock. This guard is to be sent every other day. The corporal to receive his orders from Lt. Randall of the train.

Field officer for picket tomorrow night Lt. Col. Henshaw, Adjt. from Col. Varnum's regiment. Fatigue as usual.

May 19, 1776.

Field officer for picket tomorrow night Major Collins, Adjt. from Col. Varnum's regiment. Detail as yesterday.

May 20, 1776.

Field officer for picket, Major Angell, Adjt. from Col. Hitchcock's regiment.

May 21, 1776.

Field officer for picket tomorrow night, Lt. Col. Crary, Adjt. from Col. Little's regiment.

May 23, 1776.

Field officer for picket to morrow night, Lt. Col. Henshaw, adjutant from Col. Hitchcock's regiment.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, May 25, 1776.

(Parole, MUGFORD.) (Countersign, LEONARD.)

A working party consisting of nine hundred men to be ordered tomorrow morning from the different brigades, & the regiments.

Genl. Heath's. { Colos. Leonard's & Bailey's } { Colos. Read's & Baldwin's } To go to Powles Hook.

{ Colos. Parson's & Wylly's—To go to Bayard's Genl. Spencer's. { Hill. Colos. Huntington's to Red Hook. Arnold's { to Fort Sterling. Col. Ward's—50 men with 4 { days provisions to cut pickets.... The remainder { of this regiment's working party—at Fort George.

Lord Stirlings. { Nixon's & Webb's } On Governor's Island { McDougall's & Ritzema's. } every day till further orders.

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

May 25, 1776.

Cap. Silas Talbut of Col. Hitchcock's regiment, Capn. Frazier of Capn. (Col.) Wayne's regiment, Lt. Noel Allen of Col. Varnum's regiment & [Lt.] Samuel Huse of Col. Little's regiment are a Committee to inspect the provisions for the troops of this brigade. The commissaries & quartermasters are to apply to them to determine, which is merchantable and which is not. Such as they say are good the quarter masters are to receive and such as they condemn are to be refused.

No non commissioned officer or soldier is to be out of camp after retreat beating, & any that are discovered going out after that time are to be taken up & confined in the main guard, & any that are coming in, that have been out without leave from their officers are to be confined; any sentry that permits them to pass without examination will be punished for disobedience of orders.

Lt. Col. Cornell having reported great negligence among the guards, for the future they will be visited by day & night, by the field officer of the day. Every commissioned & non-commissioned officer that commands guards is to be reported, that has not his guard in good order. No soldier is to be absent from the guard without leave, & not more than 2 commissioned officers nor more than one non commissioned officer at a time. All guards except the picket are to mount at —— o'Clock in the morning. The retreat is to beat half an hour after sunset. At guard mounting in the morning, the field officer of the day is to attend the parade & give to each respective officer a proper detail of his guard.

One man from each detached guard is to be sent to the grand parade to pilot the new guard to the relief of the old ones.

No person is to be admitted to any of the forts where there are cannon or ammunition except a General officer by day, without the leave of the officer commanding the guard, & a general officer after dark is not to be admitted without leave first obtained of the commanding (officer).

The officer commanding guards where there are cannon or ammunition, is to be very watchful & not to suffer by day or night any person to enter the forts unless they have business there, or are known to belong to the army, or are with some officer belonging to the army.

Adjt. from Col. Varnum's.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, May 26, 1776.

(Parole, HANCOCK.) (Countersign, TRUMBULL.)

... The working party of Col. Nixon's regiment are to be ordered every day to Long Island, instead of Governor's Island as mentioned in yesterday's orders....

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

May 26, 1776.

Field officer for picket tomorrow night, Major Collins, Adjt. from Col. Hitchcock's regiment.

May 29, 1776.

A garrison court martial to sit for the trial of prisoners now in the main Guard.

The commanding officer of the Ferry Guard is to permit the Ferry boats to pass until ten O'clock with common passengers, but no soldier is to pass after retreat beating, unless the Col. or commanding officer of the regiment, to which he belongs, certify the necessity. The troops are to be under arms at roll calling, morning & evening. Every soldier detected snapping his lock without orders from his officer, is to be immediately sent prisoner to the main guard, there to be confined two days & nights, & allowed nothing to eat or drink but bread & water.

All officers are desired to be more careful of discovering the countersign to persons that have no right to know it.

Any soldier on guard that discovers the countersign to any of his fellow soldiers, that are not on guard, is to be immediately confined. Every one that gives the countersign, is to give it as softly as possible so that if any person is listening, he may not hear it.

The sentries are not to suffer any person to stand near them, while they are on their posts after retreat beating.

The General wishes that every part of camp duty may be done with as much exactness, as if the enemy was encamped in the neighborhood, for bad habits once contracted are difficult to get over, & doing duty in a slovenly manner, is both disgraceful & dangerous to officers & men.

Field officer for picket tomorrow night, Major Smith, Adjt. from Col. Hitchcock's regiment.

C. S. S. C. D. F. P. Fatigue 1 2 1 3 1 1 80 Guard 1 1 0 0 20 Picket 1 2 2 2 1 1 49

GENERAL ORDERS.

AFTER ORDERS, May 31, 1776.

Gen. Washington has written to Genl. Putnam[230] desiring him, in the most pressing form, to give positive orders to all the Cols. to have colors immediately completed for their respective regiments.

[Footnote 230: General Washington was absent at Philadelphia from May 21st to June 6th, leaving General Putnam in command at New York.]

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

June 1st, 1776.

A sergeant & 20 men to parade immediately to clear out Mr. Livingston's Dock filled up by the Picket pealings. No pealings to be thrown into the dock for the future.

Six o'clock this evening the troops to be all under arms to man the works.

Five Cos. of Col. Varnum's Regiment upon the right in fort Box. The other three upon the right of fort Green.

Col. Hitchcock's regt. to man fort Putnam & the redoubt upon the left of it. 5 Cos. in the first & 3 in the Last.

Five Cos. of Col. Little's regiment in Fort Green & 3 in the oblong square.

The independent Co. to be reserved in the rear of fort Green.

June 3d, 1776.

150 men & officers wanted from Cols Varnum's Hitchcock's & Little's regts with arms blankets & 2 days provisions cooked & 1/2 a pint of rum a man. To be ready to march at 3 o'clock to morrow morning every man to take his blanket & none to go but such as are decently dressed.

CAMP LONG ISLAND, June 7, 1776.

Cols. of 9, 11, & 12 regiments to have all the arms in their regiments that need repairing sent to the armorers.

The pikes to be placed in the works in the following order—100 in fort Green, 30 in the works on the right of it, 20 in the oblong redoubt, 50 in fort Putnam & 20 in the works on the left of it. Every regt. to clean the spears once a week at their alarm Post.

The officers at the Ferry guard to stop all arms coming over the Ferry to the island, & report immediately to the Genl. who has them & where they say they are going. 2 sentries to be posted at the church to stop all arms going eastward from the city, the names and place of abode of any person stopped with arms to be taken & reported immediately.

June 9th 1776.

Field officer for picket, Lt. Col. Henshaw.

The 9, 11, 12 Regts to parade tomorrow morning at 6 o'clock on the right of the encampment, every officer & soldier not on duty or unwell to join their respective regiments.

The Fatigue party not to turn out till after ye regiments are paraded.

The officers of the 9th, 11th, 12th are desired to exercise together by regts 4 days, & the whole of the officers of the three regiments to exercise together once a week to be exercised by the Col. of the Regt. in turn or by some person appointed by the Col. whose turn it is. The Cols. of the 9, 11, 12, Regts are desired to make returns of the state of the arms &c, agreably to yesterdays order tomorrow.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS June 10, 1776.

(Parole, BEDFORD.) (Countersign, CUMBERLAND.)

The Brig. Gens. are requested to make their different Brigades perfectly acquainted with their several alarm posts & to pay particular attention to the men's arms....

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

June 12, 1776.

A garrison court martial to sit to-day....

The Col. or Commg: officers of the 9, 11, 12 Regts to certify to the Deputy Commissary from day to day the necessary supplies for the sick. The Surgeons to report every day the state and wants of the sick. Centries posted at Hospitals & armory not to demand the countersign of passengers unless they attempt to enter those places.

June 13, 1776.

The Camp Cullimen (?) of the 9. 11. 12 regts. to keep the streets clean, remove the filth, cover the vaults every day & dig new ones once a week; they must attend the Hospitals, & give directions for having them kept in good clean order. Cols. are requested to appoint nurses. No soldier to purchase clothing of another without leave, many soldiers stealing and selling clothing.

June 14, 1776.

The 5 Cos. of Col. Waynes regt. on Long Island are to be mustered to-morrow afternoon. A subaltern sergeant & 20 men to be detached from the picket guard every evening to mount guard at Red Hook Barbette battery to rejoin the picket in the morning.

IN CAMP LONG ISLAND, June 17, 1776.

The rank of the Captains in Col. Little's regt. being unsettled, a Court to day is to establish their rank. The members to be from Col. Varnum's & Hitchcock's Regts.

Col. Varnum's Regt. is to take fort Box & the Oblong redoubt for their alarm posts, fort Box 6 cos., oblong redoubt 2 cos. Cap. Woolverton's Independent Co. to join those in the redoubt, & to receive orders from Col. Varnum.

Col. Hitchcock's Regt. to take fort Putnam & the fort or redoubt on the left of it for their alarm posts.

Col. Little's Regt. to take fort Greene for their alarm post.

In case of an attack all these posts are to be defended to the last extremity.

The lines to be manned every morning between day & sunrise & the troops to be exercised at parapet firing.

CAMP LONG ISLAND June 18, 1776.

The picket to be discontinued till further orders, except guard at Red Hook.

300 men with their officers to parade at 8 O'clock tomorrow morning to receive orders from Engineer Smith.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS June 19, 1776.

(Parole, LONDON.) (Countersign, MONTGOMERY.)

A working party of 900 men properly officered to parade tomorrow morning near the artillery park.... Brig. Gen. Greene & Col. Prescott will furnish 150 men each as a working party on Governor's Island. On the present emergency all working parties to work till 6 o'clock P.M. Those who go by water will leave work sooner if wind & tide make it necessary.

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

June 20, 1776.

Field officer, Lt. Col. Cornell, Adjt. from Col. Little's Regt.

Col. Hitchcock's & Col. Little's regts. to furnish the fatigue party to Governor's Island tomorrow. The remainder furnished by those regts. to be upon the "Abatee" between fort Putnam & the redoubt on the left of it, & the Cap. from fort Putnam to the half moon. Lt. Col. Johnson's 5 Cos. of the 4th battalion of Pennsylvania Regt. (Wayne's) to furnish the fatigue party for Cobble Hill. Col. Varnum's Regt. to be employed on his alarm post. The Gen. disapproves of the report for the establishment of the rank of the 12th regt. & directs the same court to sit again day after tomorrow to examine the rank of the Caps. & to report how the court conceives they ought to rank, & how it may be most equitably established.

REGIMENTAL ORDERS.

June 21, 1776.

For guard Lt. Burnham, for Red Hook tomorrow night Lt. Collins.

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

June 21, 1776.

Lt. Huse is requested to oversee the well-digging in fort Greene. 110 men for Governor's Island & 40 for Red Hook. Those that are to go on the Island to be at St. George's Ferry by 8 o'clock. The others to march to Red Hook as soon as they have had their breakfasts.

June 28, 1776.

Picket guard to mount from the 9, 11, 12, Regts. The 9 & 11 Regts to lie in their alarm posts—the 12th to lie in the oblong redoubt.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, June 29.

... The Commissary Gen. to lodge a fortnights provision on Governor's Island, Powles Hook & in all ye detached posts, Gen. Putnam furnishing him a list of the men.

All soldiers intrusted with the defence of any work will behave with coolness & bravery, & will be careful not to throw away their fire. The Gen. recommends them to load for their first fire with one musket ball & 4 or 8 buckshot according to the size and strength of their pieces. If the enemy are received with such a fire at not more than 20 or 30 yards distance, he has no doubt of their being repulsed.

Brig. Genls. to order Chevaux de Freze & Fascines to close the sally ports of their respective works. 26000 musket cartridges to be sent Col. Prescott on Govr. Isld.

HEAD QUARTERS, June 30.

... Upon the signal of the enemy's approach or on any alarm all fatigue parties are to repair to their respective corps ready for instant action. Working parties are not otherwise to be interrupted in finishing the defences....

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

IN CAMP LONG ISLAND, July 1, 1776.

Cols. or commd. officers of 9th, 11th, 12th, Regts. are desired to make a line round each of the forts & fortifications for the troops to begin a fire on the enemy if they attempt to storm the works & the troops are to be told not to fire sooner than the enemy's arrival at these lines, unless commanded. The line should be about 80 yards from the parapet.

Comg. officers of the guards at Forts Green & Putnam to send a patrolling party to patrol about the 1/4 of a mile to prevent a surprise by a partisan party.

The general thanks both officers & soldiers who turned out voluntarily to work upon the Little Cobble hill; such public spirit is laudable & shall not go unrewarded, if the genl. ever has it in his power to make a more suitable acknowledgement.

No officer below the rank of a field officer to lodge out of camp from their Cos. on any pretence, sickness excepted. The General recommends the strictest discipline & daily attention to arms & ammunition. Brigade being sickly the Gen. recommends the strictest attention to the cookery & that broiling & frying meat so destructive to health be prohibited.

A picket of one hundred to go to Red Hook to night by order of a private message from his Excellency.

TUESDAY July 2d, 1776.

A picket of 50 men in fort Putnam, 25 in fort Box, a sergt. & 12 men at the milldam from the 9th, 11th, 12th Regts. A picket of 20 men at fort Sterling & 25 at Smith's redoubt on Cobble Hill. Upon an alarm Col. Ward's regt. of Jersey militia to form in the rear of Fort Green, the sentries to be placed at the front of the redoubts. Major of Brigade to see to them. Patrols to be kept up from fort Putnam every hour.

July 4, 1776.

Officers of the guards at ye different posts to be accountable for everything in the forts but particularly for the rum lodged there for the people in time of action. Any one destroying the tools or taking the liquor without leave will be punished.

Every Regt. to furnish pickets for their alarm posts & to be credited therefor in the detail for duty. The 9th, 11th, 12th, Regts. & the N.J. battalions under Col. Cadmus & Col. Ward to furnish a fatigue party of 250 men tomorrow morning. Garrison Court martial to sit tomorrow, Col. Little president. Caps. earnestly requested to examine the arms and ammunition of their Cos. & have them ready for action at all times.

CAMP AT BROOKLIN, July 6, 1776.

The Ferry guard upon a night alarm are to repair to fort Sterling. The ground to be levelled from which Col. Hitchcock's Regt. moved. 233 men for picket from Col. Varnum's, Hitchcock's & Little's Regts. 66 men from the same for guard.

July 8, 1776.

Col. Varnum's Regt. to remove their encampment to Red Hook, & do the duty of that post. Col. Forman's N.J. regt. to camp on the ground lately occupied by Col. Hitchcock's regt.

July 8, 1776.

Col. Forman's Regt. to occupy Col. Varnum's old alarm posts, namely, Fort Box and the Oblong redoubt. Brigade Major to lead the troops to the alarm Post at 7 A.M. The guard for the several works to be continued the same as before from the 11th & 12th of the old establishment & the Jersey new levies, that the new levies may have the benefit of the knowledge of the standing troops.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, July 9, 1776.

... The Continental Congress impelled by the dictates of duty, policy and necessity have been pleased to dissolve the connection which subsisted between this country & Gt. Britain, & to declare the colonies of North America, Free & Independent States—the several Brigades are to be drawn up this evening on their respective parades at 6 o'clock when the declaration of Congress, showing the grounds and reasons of the measure is to be read with an audible voice. The Gen. hopes that this important Point will serve as a fresh incitement to every officer & soldier to act with courage & fidelity, as knowing that now the Peace & safety of this country depend (under God) solely on the success of our arms, & that he is now in the service of a state possessed of sufficient power to reward his merit & advance him to the highest honor of a free country.

The Brigade Majors are to receive copies of the declaration to be delivered to the Brigrs. & Cols.

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

July 9, 1776.

Adjt. for the day to carry the Parole & countersign to the guards at Red Hook, Smith's Barbette, Fort Box, Fort Green & forts Putnam & Sterling, & the ferry guard.

A fatigue tomorrow of 100 men for Smith's Barbette.

July 10, 1776.

Deputy Commissary, Mr. Brown, to issue provisions 3 times a week, Tu. Th. & Saturdays.

Putrid fevers prevailing among the troops, the troops are forbid going into the water only in the mornings and evenings, being dangerous in the heat of the day.

A fatigue party of 150 to be furnished from the 11th & 12th & Col. Forman's Regt. for Smith's Barbette to be continued till it is completed.

July 11, 1776.

Fatigue parties to be turned out to be at work on the Hill by five in the morning.

CAMP LONG ISLAND, July 16, 1776.

Prisoners sent to the main Guard by the Field officer of the day with or without arms, unless sooner released by him or the Gen. are only to be kept till the mounting of the new guard, unless a crime be delivered to the Cap. of the guard in writing against (the prisoners) by the person that committed them, with his name to it.

Lt. Col. Cornell & Cap. Warner are appointed to oversee the works at Smith's Barbette & complete them. They are to be excused from all other duty. Fatigue parties for the future are to work as long as the Cols. think advisable every cool day. The general wishes the troops to be as industrious as possible, lest the enemy attack (the works) before they are done.

A subaltern's Guard to mount at Rapalyea's mill upon the point every night, to continue till sunrise.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, July 18 1776.

2 guns from fort Cobble Hill on Long Island to be a signal that the enemy have landed on that Island.

GEN. GREENE'S ORDERS.

July 18, 1776.

Field officer of the day tomorrow, Lt. Col. Henderson, Adjt. from Col. Little's....

Patrolling parties to be sent out every hour to advance as silently as possible & to stop & listen every few rods, to discover spies lurking around the works.

CAMP ON LONG ISLAND, July 19 1776.

The works on Cobble Hill being greatly retarded for want of men to lay turf, few being acquainted with that service, all those in Col. Hitchcock's & Col. Little's Regts. that understand that business, are desired to voluntarily turn out every day, & they shall be excused from all other duty, & allowed 1/2 a pint of rum a day.

Half the fatigue party to work tomorrow at fort Sterling in widening the ditch. Lt. Col. Cornell will detach the party & give the necessary instructions. Cap. Newell of the Train to mount an artillery guard on Smith's Barbette, on Cobble Hill, of a Sergeant & 6 men.

F. Officer of the day tomorrow Major Parker, Adjt. from Col. Forman's Regt. (New Jersey).

July 22, 1776.

F. Offr. tomorrow, Col. Forman, Adjt. from his regt.

The Cols. or Cg. Offrs. of the 1st, 9th, 11th, 12th Regiments are requested to send in a return of vacancies, with a list of names to fill them, by tomorrow at 9 A.M. The 11th, 12th & Col. Forman's Regts. are to parade on the regimental parade tomorrow A.M. instead of going to their alarm posts. Comg. off. of each regt. will receive orders on the spot when & where to march.

The duties being exceedingly heavy on the men, the Genl. thinks proper to lessen the fatigue party 1/2 & reduce the guard in forts Green & Putnam 1/3, & a Serjt. & 12 men to mount in fort Box, instead of the present guard.

July 24, 1776.

A fatigue party of 40 men & 1 sub. to cut fascines to parade this P.M. 4 days provisions to be provided. Passengers going into the city not to be stopped at the ferry unless there is reason to suspect them. No one to come out without a proper pass. Fatigue for home duty to be lessened as much as the number detached.

IN CAMP LONG ISLAND, July 28, 1776.

The success of the campaign must depend on the health of the troops; nothing should be neglected that contributes to it. Good Policy as well as humanity claims the attention of every officer to this object; our honor as well as our success depends on it.

The good officer discharges his duty not only in one but in every respect. It is a mistaken notion that the minutiae of military matters is only an employment for little minds. Such an officer betrays a want of understanding and showeth a person ignorant of the necessary dependence and connection of one thing upon another. What signifies knowledge without power to execute? He who studies the Branches of military knowledge relating to Dispositions, & neglects to preserve the health of his troops will find himself in that disagreeable situation.

The general is pained to discover inattention to the digging and filling vaults for the regts. & to the burial of filth and putrid matter. The general directs camp Columen(?) of the several regts. to dig new vaults, and fill up old ones every 3 days, & that fresh dirt be thrown in every day to the vaults, & that all filth in and about the camp be daily buried. The sickly season coming on, & Putrid fevers prevailing, the Gen. recommends a free use of vegetables & desires the men may keep themselves & clothes clean, & cook their provisions properly; & little injury is to be dreaded. A neglect of these matters at this critical season may be attended with dreadful consequences.

Complaints are made of the troops stealing water mellons. Such practices must be punished. A few unprincipled rascals may ruin the reputation of a whole corps of virtuous men. The General desires the virtuous to complain of every offender that may be detected in invading people's property in an unlawful manner, whatever his station or from whatever part of the country he may come.

Aug. 1, 1776.

All the straw bunks & —— in ye different regts. occupied by the well to be collected for the sick of Col. Forman's regt. A sergeant & 8 men to be employed cutting wood for a coal pit for the armorers shop—apply to master armorers for orders.

IN CAMP LONG ISLAND, Aug. 4, 1776.

4 Cos. of Col. Gay's regt. to take fort Sterling for their alarm post & 4—Cobble Hill.

The countersign having spread too generally in the camp, & amongst many that don't belong to the army, the Genl. orders every person to be punished who is base enough to discover it to those who have no right to it.

No person allowed to pass after 10 o'clock with or without the countersign within the limits of the camp or circle of the sentries, except Genl. & Field Officers, Brigade Majors & expresses. This order extends to inhabitants as well as the army.

A fatigue party from Col. Little's, Col. Forman's & Col. Gay's regts. of 200 men, properly officered, to work at Fort Sterling tomorrow. Col. Gay or the comg. officer of his regt. is directed to lead his troops into their alarm posts at 5 o'clock this afternoon. Officers are directed to acquaint themselves with the ground for miles about their camps.

MORNING ORDERS, Aug. 6, 1776.

Commanding Officers of fortifications are requested to pay particular attention to ye provisions lodged at each alarm post for the support of the troops in case of seige, and also that ye water casks & cisterns are filled & when the water is bad to have it pumped out & fresh water put in.

Aug. 6, 1776.

By a deserter from Sir Peter Parker's fleet we learn that the Hessians, from England, & Clinton's troops from S. Carolina are arrived & that the enemy meditate an attack on this Island & the city of New York. The Genl. wishes to have the troops provided with every thing necessary to give them a proper reception. Caps. are directed to examine the arms of their cos. immediately.

Aug. 8, 1776.

A sub. & 20 men to parade immediately to march to Jamaica. Let the men be decently dressed, & the officers keep them from offering insolence or abuse to any person. They are to escort & assist Lt. Skinner & wait there for his directions.

Aug. 9, 1776.

A report from Col. Hand mentions a large number of regulars drawn up at Staten Island Ferry, & boats to embark in. No officer or soldier to stir from his quarters that we may be ready to march at a moment's warning if necessary.

Aug. 16, 1776.

Col. Smith (L.I. militia) to appt an Adjt., Q.M. & Serjt Maj. & Q. Mr. Serjt to his regt., & to have the troops in his regt not on duty exercised daily in learning the necessary manoeuvres and evolutions.

Genls. Nixon and Heard are to furnish a fatigue party from their brigades and to form the necessary lines from fort Box to fort Putnam. The gin shops and houses selling liquor, strictly forbidden to sell to soldiers, excepting near the two ferries.

The inhabitants of houses near the lines are immediately to move out of them, and they are to be appropriated to the use of the troops. The General is determined to have any soldiers punished that may be found disguised with liquor, as no soldier in such a situation can be fit for defense or attack.

The General orders that no sutler in the army shall sell to any soldier more than 1 gill of spirits per day. If the above orders are not adhered to, there shall no more be retailed out at all.

The Colonels of regts. lately come in are immediately to make returns to the Genl. of their number of men & where they are quartered. Col. Hitchcock's and Smith's Regts are to do duty in Genl. Nixon's brigade—Cols. Van Brunt's and Gay's Regts. to do duty in Genl. Heard's brigade. Capts in the brigades are to be particularly careful that the Rolls are called 3 times a day & that the troops do not stray from quarters.

GENERAL ORDERS.

HEAD QUARTERS, Aug. 20, 1776.

... General Sullivan is to take command on Long Island till Gen. Greene's state of health will permit him to resume it. Brig. Ld Sterling is to take charge of Genl Sullivan's division.

[No. 2.]

MAJOR GENERAL SULLIVAN'S ORDERS

CAMP ON LONG ISLAND

[Colonel Little's Order Book]

[LONG ISLAND,] August 20, 1776.

Field Offr of the Day tomorrow, Col. Phipps, (?) Adjt from Col. Little's regt.

August 21st, 1776.

Five hundred men to be on fatigue to-morrow to be on the works by 8 o'clock, to leave at 12, & begin at 2 o'clock, & work till half past 6. Nothing can be more disagreeable to the Genl. than to call upon the men to be so constantly on fatigue, but their own salvation, and the safety of the country requires it. He hopes that in 2 or 3 days more the encampment will be so secure that he can release the men from fatigue and give them an opportunity to rest from their labors. Adjt. of the day to attend at the Genls. quarters every morning at 8, and an orderly from each brigade daily. Four men are to be drafted to row the Genls boat and do no other duty. The Brigade majors, upon receiving orders from Head Quarters are to call at Gen. Sullivan's quarters for his orders, or send adjts to take them off.

Col. Johnson's and Newcomb's regts are to consider the woods on the west side of the creek as their alarm post, and repair there in case of an alarm. Gen. Nixon will show the ground this evening at 6 o'clock to the commg officers of the Regts.

Aug. 23, 1776.

The men not to turn out to their alarm posts this afternoon, (but) to get 2 days' provisions ready, & to be at their alarm posts to-morrow morning by 3 o'clock in order for action.

Cols. Miles & Ransom's (Remsen's of L.I.) regts. to take possession of the Bedford road this night—Col. Ransom's regt. to march at 5 o'clock. Col. Miles' regt. is on the spot. Cols. Little's & Hitchcock's Regts to possess the Flatbush road & Cols. Johnson's & Martin's to take possession of the road near the river. All these regts. to be at their posts by 6 o'clock. Upon their arrival the troops now there are to retire to their encampments & get 2 days provisions dressed, & be ready for action. The Gen. will never make a 3rd. requisition to the majors of brigade, to attend for orders.

LONG ISLAND Aug. 24 1776.

A return to be made to the Gen. this afternoon at 5 o'clock of all ye Light Horse & companies of troop within the lines. The adjt. of Col. Little's regiment is to attend at Genls. quarters at 7 o'clock A.M. to-morrow.

The Genl. returns his thanks to the brave officers & soldiers who with so much spirit & intrepidity repulsed the enemy & defeated their designs of taking possession of the woods near our lines. He is now convinced that the troops he has the honor to command, will not, in point of bravery, yield to any troops in the universe. The cheerfulness with which they do their duty, & the patience with which they undergo fatigue evince exalted sentiments of freedom, & love of country gives him most satisfactory evidence that when called upon they will prove themselves worthy of that freedom for which they are now contending.

Col. Ramsons (Remsen's) Regt. to mount no guard except quarter guard of 12, but be considered a fatigue party, to which they are to attend from day to day. The Genl. is sorry to find that Regt. flying from their posts, when timid women would have blushed to have betrayed any signs of fear at any thing this regt. discovered at the time of their flight.

Officers are requested to see that their men always keep at least 2 days provisions, ready dressed by them. The Commissary is to deal out one gill of rum per man each day on this Island until further orders. Soldiers are not to be out of their encampment but upon urgent business. Gen. Nixon to take command of the lines next the enemy until further orders, to post his men in the edge of the woods next the enemy. Brigde Majors to attend punctually at the Genl's. quarters at 10 A.M.

LONG ISLAND Aug. 25 1776.

The following arrangement to take place on Long Island until further orders—Viz: Col. Mile's 2 battalions, Col. Atlee's, Col. Lutzs, Major Hayes, Col. Lashers and Drake's to be formed into one brigade under the command of Gen. Ld. Stirling. Col. Hand's, Prescott's, (Late) Nixon's, Varnum's, Hitchcock's, Little's, Smith's, & Ramson's to be under Gen. Nixon. Wylly's, Huntington's, Taylor's, (Tyler's) Silliman's, Chester's, & Gay's under Gen. Parsons; Johnson's, Courtlandt's, Martins, Newcombs & Freeman's (Forman's), under the command of Brig. Gen Hurd.

The General orders that the Brigrs. attend at Head Quarters at 8 A.M. to-morrow for directions. Brigde Major Box is appointed to act as Adjt. Genl. for this department until further orders.

A Brigr. Genl. of the Day to attend the Grand Parade at Guard mounting at 10 A.M., every day afterwards at 8, whose duty it shall be to see that the guards are regularly made up, & properly posted & duly relieved. No firing at the outposts to be allowed on any pretense, except by permission of the Comg Gen. of the day, & none within the lines except by permission. This order not to extend to sentries on guard.

Brigr. for the day Gen. Ld. Stirling.

The Gen. is surprised to find the soldiers strolling about, notwithstanding repeated orders, miles distant from the lines, at a time when the enemy are hourly expected to make an attack. The officers are enjoined to cause the arrest of any soldier who shall be found strolling without the lines unless they can show a written permit from their Cap. or Comg. officer of the regt. or company. All the officers and soldiers are to keep within their quarters, unless ordered on duty.

All troops in this department are desired to wear a green bough or branch of a tree in their hats, till further orders.