Morals.—Prostitutes have disappeared from sight, the economic reasons for their career having ceased to exist. Family life has been absolutely unchanged by the revolution. I have never heard more genuinely mirthful laughter than when I told Lenin, Tchitcherin, and Litvinov that much of the world believed that women had been "nationalized." This lie is so wildly fantastic that they will not even take the trouble to deny it. Respect for womanhood was never greater than in Russia to-day. Indeed, the day I reached Petrograd was a holiday in honor of wives and mothers.

Education.—The achievements of the department of education under Lunacharsky have been very great. Not only have all the Russian classics been reprinted in editions of three and five million copies and sold at a low price to the people, but thousands of new schools for men, women, and children have been opened in all parts of Russia. Furthermore, workingmen's and soldiers' clubs have been organized in many of the palaces of yesteryear, where the people are instructed by means of moving pictures and lectures. In the art galleries one meets classes of working men and women being instructed in the beauties of the pictures. The children's schools have been entirely reorganized, and an attempt is being made to give every child a good dinner at school every day. Furthermore, very remarkable schools have been opened for defective and over-nervous children. On the theory that genius and insanity are closely allied, these children are taught from the first to compose music, paint pictures, sculpt and write poetry, and it is asserted that some very valuable results have been achieved, not only in the way of productions but also in the way of restoring the nervous systems of the children.

Morale.—The belief of the convinced communists in their cause is almost religious. Never in any religious service have I seen higher emotional unity than prevailed at the meeting of the Petrograd Soviet in celebration of the foundation of the Third Socialist Internationale. The remark of one young man to me when I questioned him in regard to his starved appearance is characteristic. He replied very simply: "I am ready to give another year of starvation to our revolution."



STATEMENTS OF LEADERS OF OPPOSITION PARTIES

The following statement was made to me by Volsky, leader of the right social revolutionaries, the largest opposition party:

"Intervention of any kind will prolong the regime of the Bolsheviki by compelling us, like all honorable Russians, to drop opposition and rally round the Soviet Government in defense of the revolution. With regard to help to individual groups or governments fighting against soviet Russia, we see no difference between such intervention and the sending of troops. If the allies come to an agreement with the Soviet Government, sooner or later the peasant masses will make their will felt and they are alike against the bourgeoisie and the Bolsheviki.

"If by any chance Kolchak and Denikin were to win, they would have to kill in tens of thousands where the Bolsheviki have had to kill in hundreds and the result would be the complete ruin and collapse of Russia into anarchy. Has not the Ukraine been enough to teach the allies that occupation by non-Bolshevik troops merely turns into Bolsheviki those of the population who were not Bolsheviki before? It is clear to us that the Bolshiviki are really fighting against bourgeois dictatorship, We are, therefore, prepared to help them in every possible way.

"Grandmother Ekaterina Constantinovna Breshkovskaya has no sort of authority, either from the assembly of members of the all Russian constituent assembly or from the party of social revolutionaries. Her utterances in America, if she is preaching intervention, represent her personal opinions which are categorically repudiated by the party of social revolutionaries, which has decisively expressed itself against the permissibility of intervention, direct or indirect."

Volsky signed this latter statement: "V. Volsky, late president of the assembly of members of the all Russian constituent assembly."

Martov, leader of the Menshiviki, stated: "The Menshiviki are against every form of intervention, direct or indirect, because by providing the incentive to militarization it is bound to emphasize the least desirable qualities of the revolution. Further, the needs of the army overwhelm all efforts at meeting the needs of social and economic reconstruction. Agreement with the Soviet Government would lessen the tension of defense and would unmuzzle the opposition, who, while the Soviet Government is attacked, are prepared to help in its defense, while reserving until peace their efforts to alter the Bolshevik regime.

"The forces that would support intervention must be dominated by those of extreme reaction because all but the reactionaries are prepared temporarily to sink their differences with the Bolsheviki in order to defend the revolution as a whole."

Martov finally expressed himself as convinced that, given peace, life itself and the needs of the country will bring about the changes he desires.



ARMY

The soviet army now numbers between 1,000,000 and 1,200,000 troops of the line. Nearly all these soldiers are young men between the ages of 17 and 27. The morale of regiments varies greatly. The convinced communists, who compose the bulk of the army, fight with crusading enthusiasm. Other regiments, composed of patriots but noncommunists, are less spirited; other regiments composed of men who have entered the army for the slightly higher bread ration are distinctly untrustworthy. Great numbers of officers of the old army are occupying important executive posts in the administration of the new army, but are under control of convinced communist supervisors. Nearly all the lower grade officers of the army are workmen who have displayed courage in the ranks and have been trained in special officer schools. Discipline has been restored and on the whole the spirit of the army appears to be very high, particularly since its recent successes. The soldiers no longer have the beaten dog-like look which distinguished them under the Czar but carry themselves like freemen and curiously like Americans. They are popular with the people.

I witnessed a review of 15,000 troops in Petrograd. The men marched well and their equipment of shoes, uniforms, rifles, and machine guns and light artillery was excellent. On the other hand they have no big guns, no aeroplanes, no gas shells, no liquid fire, nor indeed, any of the more refined instruments of destruction.

The testimony was universal that recruiting for the army is easiest in the districts which having once lived under the soviet were over run by anti-soviet forces and then reoccupied by the Red Army.

Trotski is enormously proud of the army he has created, but it is noteworthy that even he is ready to disband the army at once if peace can be obtained in order that all the brains and energy it contains may be turned to restoring the normal life of the country.



LENIN'S PRESTIGE

The hold which Lenin has gained on the imagination of the Russian people makes his position almost that of a dictator. There is already a Lenin legend. He is regarded as almost a prophet. His picture, usually accompanied by that of Karl Marx, hangs everywhere. In Russia one never hears Lenin and Trotski spoken of in the same breath as is usual in the western world. Lenin is regarded as in a class by himself. Trotski is but one of the lower order of mortals.

When I called on Lenin at the Kremlin I had to wait a few minutes until a delegation of peasants left his room. They had heard in their village that Comrade Lenin was hungry. And they had come hundreds of miles carrying 800 poods of bread as the gift of the village to Lenin. Just before them was another delegation of peasants to whom the report had come that Comrade Lenin was working in an unheated room. They came bearing a stove and enough firewood to heat it for three months. Lenin is the only leader who receives such gifts. And he turns them into the common fund.

Face to face Lenin is a very striking man—straightforward and direct, but also genial and with a large humor and serenity.



CONCESSIONS

The Soviet Government recognizes very clearly the undesirability of granting concessions to foreigners and is ready to do so only because of necessity. The members of the Government realize that the lifting of the blockade will be illusory unless the Soviet Government is able to establish credits in foreign countries, particularly the United States and England, so that goods may be bought in those countries. For Russia to-day is in a position to export only a little gold, a little platinum, a little hemp, flax, and wood. These exports will be utterly inadequate to pay for the vast quantity of imports which Russia needs. Russia must, therefore, obtain credit at any price. The members of the Soviet Government realize fully that as a preliminary step to the obtaining of credit the payment of foreign debts must be resumed and, therefore, are ready to pay such debts. But even though these debts are paid the members of the Soviet Government believe that they will not be able to borrow money in foreign countries on any mere promise to pay. They believe, therefore, that they will have to grant concessions in Russia to foreigners in order to obtain immediate credit. They desire to avoid this expedient if in any way it shall be possible, but if absolutely necessary they are ready to adopt it in order to begin the restoration of the normal life of the country.

Senator KNOX. To whom did you hand that report?

Mr. BULLITT. I handed copies of this personally to Secretary Lansing, Col. House, Gen. Bliss and Mr. Henry White, and I handed a second copy, for the President, to Mr. Lansing. Secretary Lansing wrote on it, "Urgent and immediate"; put it in an envelope, and I took it up to the President's house.

Senator KNOX. At the same time that you handed in this report, did you hand them the proposal of the Soviet Government?

Mr. BULLITT. The proposal of the Soviet Government is appended to this report.

Senator KNOX. It is a part of the report?

Mr. BULLITT. It is a part of the report which I have already read. There comes first an appendix explaining the statements which I have just read, and giving the evidence I have for them.

Senator KNOX. Was there any formal meeting of the peace conference, or of representatives of the great powers, to act upon this suggestion and upon your report?

Mr. BULLITT. It was acted upon in a very lengthy, long-drawn-out manner.

Immediately on my return I was first asked to appear before the American Commission. First, the night I got back I had a couple of hours with Col. House, in which I went over the whole matter. Col. House was entirely and quite decidedly in favor of making peace, if possible, on the basis of this proposal.

The next morning I was called before the other Commissioners, and I talked with Mr. Lansing, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. Henry White all the morning and most of the afternoon. We had a long discussion, at the end of which it was the sense of the commissioners' meeting that it was highly desirable to attempt to bring about peace on that basis.



BREAKFAST WITH LLOYD GEORGE

The next morning I had breakfast with Mr. Lloyd George at his apartment. Gen. Smuts and Sir Maurice Hankey and Mr. Philip Kerr were also present, and we discussed the matter at considerable length, I brought Mr. Lloyd George the official text of the proposal, the same official one, in that same envelop, which I have just shown to you. He had previously read it, it having been telegraphed from Helsingfors. As he had previously read it, he merely glanced over it and said, "That is the same one I have already read," and he handed it to Gen. Smuts, who was across the table, and said, "General, this is of the utmost importance and interest, and you ought to read it right away." Gen. Smuts read it immediately, and said he thought it should not be allowed to lapse; that it was of the utmost importance. Mr. Lloyd George, however, said that he did not know what he could do with British public opinion. He had a copy of the Daily Mail in his hand, and he said, "As long as the British press is doing this kind of thing how can you expect me to be sensible about Russia?" The Daily Mail was roaring and screaming about the whole Russian situation. Then Mr. Lloyd George said, "Of course all the reports we get from people we send in there are in this same general direction, but we have got to send in somebody who is known to the whole world as a complete conservative, in order to have the whole world believe that the report he brings out is not simply the utterance of a radical." He then said, "I wonder if we could get Lansdowne to go?" Then he immediately corrected himself and said, "No; it would probably kill him." Then he said, "I wish I could send Bob Cecil, but we have got to keep him for the league of nations." And he said to Smuts, "It would be splendid if you could go, but, of course, you have got the other job," which was going down to Hungary. Afterwards he said he thought the most desirable man to send was the Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Robert Cecil's brother; that he would be respectable enough and well known enough so that when he came back and made the same report it would go down with British public opinion. Mr. Lloyd George then urged me to make public my report. He said it was absolutely necessary to have publicity given to the actual conditions in Russia, which he recognized were as presented.

I saw Mr. Balfour that afternoon with Sir Eric Drummond, who at that time was acting as his secretary. He is now secretary of the league of nations. We discussed the entire matter. Sir William Wiseman told me afterward that Mr. Balfour was thoroughly in favor of the proposition.

Well, to cut the story short, first the President referred the matter to Col. House. He left his decision on the matter with Col. House, as was his usual course of procedure in most such matters. Mr. Lloyd George also agreed in advance to leave the preparation of the proposal to Col. House; that is, he said he would be disposed to go at least as far as we would and would follow the lead of the President and Col. House. Col. House thereupon asked me to prepare a reply to this proposal, which I did.

Col. House in the meantime had seen Mr. Orlando, and Mr. Orlando had expressed himself as entirely in favor of making peace on this basis, at least so Col. House informed me at the time. The French, I believe, had not yet been approached formally on the matter.

Senator KNOX. By the way, right here, you say Mr. Lloyd George advised you to make your report public. Did you make it public?

Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. Mr. Lloyd George desired me to make it public for the enlightenment that he thought it might give to public opinion.

Senator KNOX. But you did not do it?



BULLITT REPORT SUPPRESSED

Mr. BULLITT. I attempted to. I prepared a statement for the press based on my report, giving the facts, which I submitted to the commission to be given out. No member of the commission was ready to take the responsibility for publicity in the matter and it was referred to the President. The President received it and decided that he did not want it given out. He thought he would rather keep it secret, and in spite of the urgings of the other commissioners he continued to adhere to that point of view, and my report has never been made public until this moment.

Col. House asked me to prepare a declaration of policy, a statement based on this proposal of the Soviet Government. It was to be an ironclad declaration which we knew in advance would be accepted by the Soviet Government if we made it, and he thought that the President and Mr. Lloyd George would put it through.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you attend that meeting of the commission when that report was considered by the American Commission?

Mr. BULLITT. I first handed each member of the commission my report. I had appeared before them and discussed my mission for an entire day. They sat in the morning and in the afternoon.

Senator BRANDEGEE. I wondered whether you were present when the President thought it would be better not to give it out, not to make it public.

Mr. BULLITT. No, sir; I was not. Then upon order of Col. House, to whom the matter had been referred, I prepared this declaration of policy. I prepared it in conjunction with Mr. Whitney Shepherdson, who was Col. House's assistant secretary, and also versed in international law. I do not know that this is of any importance, aside from the fact that it is almost the only direct proposition to accept their proposal which was prepared. Col. House took this and held it under advisement and discussed it, I believe, with the President and other persons.

The CHAIRMAN. It had better be printed.

The document referred to is as follows:

A PROPOSED DECLARATION OF POLICY TO BE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE ASSOCIATED GOVERNMENTS AND AN OFFER OF AN ARMISTICE

The representatives of the States assembled in conference at Paris recently extended an invitation to the organized groups in Russia to lay down their arms and to send delegates to Prince's Island. These delegates were asked to "confer with the representatives of the associated powers in the freest and frankest way, with a view to ascertaining the wishes of all sections of the Russian people and bringing about, if possible, some understanding and agreement by which Russia may work out her own purposes and happy cooperative relations may be established between her people and the other peoples of the world." The truce of arms was not declared, and the meeting did not take place.

The people of Russia are laboring to-day to establish the system of government under which they shall live. Their task is one of unparalleled difficulty, and should not be further complicated by the existence of misapprehensions among the Russian people or throughout the world. Therefore, the representatives of the associated powers, now sitting in the conference of Paris, have determined to state publicly what they had in mind to say through their delegates to Prince's Island concerning the policies which govern their relations with the Russian people.

They wish to make it plain that they do not intend to interfere in any way with the solution of the political, social, or economic problems of Russia. They believe that the peace of the world will largely depend upon a right settlement of these matters; but they equally recognize that any right settlement must proceed from the Russian people themselves, unembarrassed by influence or direction from without. On the other hand, the associated powers desired to have it clearly understood that they can have no dealings with any Russian Government which shall invade the territory of its neighbors or seek to impose its will upon other peoples by force. The full authority and military power of the associated governments will stand in the way of any such attempt.

The task of creating a stable government demands all the great strength of Russia, healed of the famine, misery, and disease which attend and delay the reconstruction. The associated powers have solemnly pledged their resources to relieve the stricken regions of Europe. Their efforts, begun in Belgium and in northern France during the course of the war, now extend to exhausted peoples from Finland to the Dalmatian coast. Ports long idle are busy again. Trainloads of food are moved into the interior and there are distributed with an impartial hand. Industry is awakened, and life is resumed at the point where it was broken off by war. These measures of relief will be continued until peace is signed and until nations are once more able to provide for their needs through the normal channels of commerce.

It is the earnest desire of the associated peoples similarly to assuage the distress of millions of men and women in Russia and to provide them with such physical conditions as will make life possible and desirable. Relief can not be effectively rendered, however, except by the employment of all available transportation facilities and the active cooperation of those exercising authority within the country.

These requisites can not be assured while Russia is still at war.

The allied and associated governments, therefore, propose an agreement between themselves and all governments now exercising political authority within the territory of the former Russian Empire, including Finland, together with Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and Afghanistan, that hostilities against one another shall cease on all fronts within these territories on April —— at noon; that fresh hostilities shall not be begun during the period of this armistice, and that no troops or war material of any kind whatever shall be transferred to or within these territories so long as the armistice shall continue. The duration of the armistice shall be for two weeks, unless extended by mutual consent. The allied and associated Governments propose that such of these Governments as are willing to accept the terms of this armistice shall send not more than three representatives each, together with necessary technical experts, to —— where they shall meet on April —— with representatives of the allied and associated Governments in conference to discuss peace, upon the basis of the following principles:

(1) All signatory Governments shall remain, as against each other, in full control of the territories which they occupy at the moment when the armistice becomes effective; subject only to such rectifications as may be agreed upon by the conference, or until the peoples inhabiting these territories shall themselves voluntarily determine to change their Government.

(2) The right of free entry, sojourn, circulation, and full security shall be accorded by the several signatories to the citizens of each other; provided, however, that such persons comply with the laws of the country to which they seek admittance, and provided also that they do not interfere or attempt to interfere in any way with the domestic politics of that country.

(3) The right to send official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity shall be accorded by the several signatories to each other.

(4) A general amnesty shall be granted by the various signatories to all political or military opponents, offenders, and prisoners who are so regarded because of their association or affiliation with another signatory, provided that they have not otherwise violated the laws of the land.

(5) Nationals of one signatory residing or detained in the country of another shall be given all possible facilities for repatriation.

(6) The allied and associated Governments shall immediately withdraw their armed forces and further military support from the territory of the former Russian Empire, including Finland, and the various Governments within that territory shall effect a simultaneous reduction of armed forces according to a scheme of demobilization and control to be agreed upon by the conference.

(7) Any economic blockade imposed by one signatory as against another shall be lifted and trade relations shall be established, subject to a program of equitable distribution of supplies and utilization of transport facilities to be agreed upon by the conference.

(8) Provision shall be made by the conference for a mutual exchange of transit and port privileges among the several signatories.

(9) The conference shall be competent to discuss and determine any other matter which bears upon the problem of establishing peace within the territory of the former Russian Empire, including Finland, and the reestablishment of international relations among the signatories.

NOTE.—If it is desirable to include a specific reference to Russia's financial obligations, the following clause (8 bis) would be acceptable to the Soviet Government at least: "The governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland shall recognize their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire to foreign States parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such States. Detailed arrangements for discharging these obligations shall be agreed upon by the conference, regard being had to the present financial situation of Russia."

Senator BRANDEGEE. Was this brought to the attention of the President?

Mr. BULLITT. The first night after I got in Col. House went to the telephone and called up the President right away and told him that I was in, and that he thought this was a matter of the utmost importance, and that it would seem to be an opportunity to make peace in a section of the world where there was no peace; in fact, where there were 23 wars. The President said he would see me the next evening down at Col. House's office, as I remember it. The next evening, however, the President had a headache and he did not come. The following afternoon Col. House said to me that he had seen the President and the President had said he had a one-track mind and was occupied with Germany at present, and he could not think about Russia, and that he had left the Russian matter all to him, Col. House. Therefore I continued to deal with Col. House directly on it inasmuch as he was the delegate of the President, and Lloyd George, in the matter. I used to see Col. House every day, indeed two or three times a day, on the subject, urging him to obtain action before April 10, which, as you will recall, was the date when this proposal was to expire.



NANSEN PLAN TO FEED RUSSIA

Meanwhile Mr. Hoover and Mr. Auchincloss had the idea of approaching peace with Russia by a feeding proposition, and they had approached Mr. Fridjof Nansen, the Arctic explorer, and got him to write and send the following letter to the President. You doubtless have seen his letter to the President.

PARIS, April 3, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The present food situation in Russia, where hundreds of thousands of people are dying monthly from sheer starvation and disease, is one of the problems now uppermost in all men's minds. As it appears that no solution of this food and disease question has so far been reached in any direction, I would like to make a suggestion from a neutral point of view for the alleviation of this gigantic misery on purely humanitarian grounds.

It would appear to me possible to organize a purely humanitarian commission for the provisioning of Russia, the foodstuffs and medical supplies to be paid for, perhaps, to some considerable extent by Russia itself, the justice of distribution to be guaranteed by such a commission, the membership of the commission to be comprised of Norwegian, Swedish, and possibly Dutch, Danish, and Swiss nationalities. It does not appear that the existing authorities in Russia would refuse the intervention of such a commission of wholly nonpolitical order, devoted solely to the humanitarian purpose of saving life. If thus organized upon the lines of the Belgian Relief Commission, it would raise no question of political recognition or negotiations between the Allies with the existing authorities in Russia.

I recognize keenly the large political issues involved, and I would be glad to know under what conditions you would approve such an enterprise and whether such commission could look for actual support in finance, shipping, and food and medical supplies from the United States Government.

I am addressing a similar note to Messrs. Orlando, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George. Believe me, my dear Mr. President,

Yours, most respectfully,

FRIDJOF NANSEN.

His Excellency the PRESIDENT, II Place des Etats-Unis, Paris.

Senator KNOX, I think that was published in nearly all the papers.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. In it he proposed that a commission should be formed at once for the feeding of Russia, because of the frightful conditions of starvation and so on. Col. House decided that it would be an easier way to peace if we could get there via the feeding plan, under the guise of a purely humanitarian plan, if we could slide in that way instead of by a direct, outright statement inviting these people to sit down and make peace. Therefore he asked me to prepare a reply to the Nansen letter, which I have here.

PARIS, FRANCE, April 4, 1919. Suggested reply to Dr. Nansen by the President of the United States and the premiers of France, Great Britain, and Italy:

DEAR MR. NANSEN: It is the earnest desire of the allied and associated Governments, and of the peoples for whom they speak, to assuage the distress of the millions of men, women, and children who are suffering in Russia. The associated powers have solemnly pledged their resources to relieve the stricken regions of Europe. Their efforts, begun in Belgium and in Northern France during the course of the war, now extend to exhausted peoples from Finland to the Dalmatian coast. Ports long idle are busy again. Trainloads of food are moved into the interior and there are distributed with an impartial hand. Industry is awakened, and life is resumed at the point where it was broken off by war. These measures of relief will be continued until nations are once more able to provide for their needs through the normal channels of commerce.

The associated peoples desire and deem it their duty similarly to assist in relieving the people of Russia from the misery, famine, and disease which oppress them. In view of the responsibilities which have already been undertaken by the associated Governments they welcome the suggestion that the neutral States should take the initiative in the matter of Russian relief and, therefore, are prepared to state in accordance with your request, the conditions under which they will approve and assist a neutral commission for the provisioning of Russia.

The allied and associated Governments and all Governments now exercising political authority within the territory of the former Russian Empire, including Finland, together with Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and Afghanistan, shall agree that hostilities against one another shall cease on all fronts within these territories on April 20 at noon; that fresh hostilities shall not be begun during the period of this armistice, and that no troops or war material of any kind whatever shall be transferred to or within these territories so long as the armistice shall continue. The duration of the armistice shall be for two weeks unless extended by mutual consent.

The allied and associated Governments propose that such of these Governments as are willing to accept the terms of this armistice, shall send not more than three representatives each, together with necessary technical experts, to Christiania, where they shall meet on April 25 with representatives of the allied and associated Governments in conference to discuss peace 'and the provisioning of Russia, upon the basis of the following principles:

1. All signatory Governments shall remain, as against each other, in full control of the territories which they occupy at the moment when the armistice becomes effective, subject to such rectifications as may be agreed upon by the conference, or until the peoples inhabiting these territories shall themselves voluntarily determine to change their government.

2. The right of free entry, sojourn, circulation, and full security shall be accorded by the several signatories to the citizens of each other; provided, however, that such persons comply with the laws of the country to which they seek admittance, and provided also-that they do not interfere or attempt to interfere in any way with the domestic politics of that country.

3. The right to send official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity shall be accorded by the several signatories to one another.

4. A general amnesty shall be granted by the various signatories to all political or military opponents, offenders, and prisoners who are so treated because of their association or affiliation with another signatory, provided that they have not otherwise violated the laws of the land.

5. Nationals of one signatory residing or detained in the country of another shall be given all possible facilities for repatriation.

6. The allied and associated Governments will immediately withdraw their armed forces and further military support from the territory of the former Russian Empire, including Finland and the various Governments within that territory shall effect a simultaneous reduction of armed forces according to a scheme of demobilization and control to be agreed upon by the conference.

7. Any economic blockade imposed by one signatory as against another shall be lifted and trade relations shall be established, subject to a program of equitable distribution of supplies and utilization of transport facilities to be agreed upon by the conference in consultation with representatives of those neutral States which are prepared to assume the responsibility for the provisioning of Russia.

8. Provision shall be made by the conference for a mutual exchange of transit and port privileges among the several signatories.

9. The Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland shall recognize their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire to foreign States parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such States. Detailed arrangements for discharging these obligations shall be agreed upon by the conference, regard being had to the present financial situation of Russia.

10. The conference shall be competent to discuss and determine any other matter which bears upon the provisioning of Russia, the problem of establishing peace within the territory of the former Russian Empire, including Finland, and the reestablishment of international relations among the signatories.

Mr. BULLITT. I also prepared at the orders of Col. House———

Senator KNOX. What attitude did you take toward the Nansen proposal?

Mr. BULLITT. At first I opposed it. I was in favor of the original plan.

Senator KNOX. You were in favor of the original plan?

Mr. BULLITT. I was in favor of direct, straightforward action in the matter. However, I found that there was no use in kicking against the pricks, that I was unable to persuade the commission that my point of view was the correct one. Therefore at the request of Col. House I wrote out a reply to Dr. Nansen, in which I embodied a peace proposal so that it would have meant a peace conference via Nansen, which was what was desired.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Was that letter delivered to Nansen?

Mr. BULLITT. No. I gave this reply of mine to Col. House. Col. House read it and said he would approve it, but that before he gave it to the President and to Lloyd George as his solution of the way to deal with this Russian matter, he wished it considered by his international law experts, Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller, and it was thereupon turned over that afternoon to Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller. Does the Senator desire this document?

Senator KNOX. I do not regard it as material. It was not accepted?

Mr. BULLITT. It was not accepted. What happened in regard to this was that Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller, to correct its legal language, produced a proposition which was entirely different, which left out all possibility of the matter coming to a peace conference, and was largely an offer to feed Russia provided Russia put all her railroads in the hands of the allied and associated Governments. I have that as well.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you object to having that put in the record, Senator Knox?

Senator KNOX. No.

Senator BRANDEGEE. I would like to have that put in.

(The document referred to is here printed in full, as follows:)

(AUCHINCLOSS-MILLER PROPOSAL)

Draft of proposed letter to be signed by President Wilson and the prime ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy in reply to Mr. Nansen's letter:

DEAR SIR: The situation of misery and suffering in Russia which is described in your letter of April 3 is one which appeals to the sympathies of all peoples of the world. Regardless of political differences or shades of thought, the knowledge that thousands and perhaps millions of men, and above all of women and children lack the food and the necessities which make life endurable is one which is shocking to humanity.

The Governments and the peoples whom we represent, without thought of political, military or financial advantage, would be glad to cooperate in any proposal which would relieve the existing situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a commission as you propose, purely humanitarian in its purpose, would offer a practical means of carrying out the beneficent results which you have in view and could not either in its conception or its operation be considered as having in view any other aim than "the humanitarian purpose of saving life."

It is true that there are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties owing to the existing situation in Russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. But if the existing de facto governments of Russia are all willing as the Governments and peoples whom we represent to see succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no political difficulties will remain as obstacles thereto.

There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply and transport which we have mentioned and also the problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of supply we can ourselves safely hope to solve in connection with the advice and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. The problem of transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the assistance of your own and other neutral Governments.

The difficulties of transport in Russia can in large degree only be overcome in Russia itself. So far as possible, we would endeavor to provide increased means of transportation; but we would consider it essential in any such scheme of relief that control of transportation in Russia, so far as was necessary in the distribution of relief supplies, should be placed wholly under such a commission as is described in your letter and should to the necessary extent be freed from any governmental or private control whatsoever.

The real human element in the situation, even supposing all these difficulties to be surmounted, is the problem of distribution, the problem of seeing that the food reaches the starving, the medicines the sick, the clothing the naked. Subject to the supervision of such a commission, this is a problem which should be solely under the control of the people of Russia themselves so far as it is humanly possible to put it under their control. It is not a question of class or of race or of politics but a question of human beings in need, and these human beings in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the Belgian relief commission, the fullest opportunity to advise the commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community is to be relieved. Under no other circumstances could it be believed that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian and not political, and still more important, under no other conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed. That such a course would involve cessation of hostilities by Russian troops would of course mean a cessation of all hostilities on the Russian fronts. Indeed, relief to Russia which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile, and would be impossible to consider.

Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that your plan could be successfully carried into effect and we should be prepared to give it our full support.

Senator KNOX. What I am anxious to get at is to find out what became of your report.

Senator FALL. I should like to know whether Col. House approved Mr. Auchincloss's and Mr. Miller's report, or the report of the witness.

Mr. BULLITT. I should like to have this clear, and if I can read just this one page I shall be greatly obliged. On this proposition I wrote the following memorandum to Mr. Auchincloss [reading]:

APRIL 4, 1919.

Memorandum for Mr. Auchincloss:

DEAR GORDON: I have studied carefully the draft of the reply to Dr. Nansen which you have prepared. In spirit and substance your letter differs so radically from the reply which I consider essential that I find it difficult to make any constructive criticism. And I shall refrain from criticizing your rhetoric.

There are two proposals in your letter, however, which are obviously unfair and will not, I am certain, be accepted by the Soviet Government.

1. The life of Russia depends upon its railroads; and your demand for control of transportation by the commission can hardly be accepted by the Soviet Government which knows that plots for the destruction of railroad bridges were hatched in the American consulate in Moscow. You are asking the Soviet Government to put its head in the lion's mouth. It will not accept. You must moderate your phrases.

2. When you speak of the "cessation of hostilities by Russian troops," you fail to speak of hostilities by troops of the allied and associated Governments, a number of whom, you may recall, have invaded Russia. Furthermore, your phrase does not cover Finns, Esthonians, Letts, Poles, etc. In addition, you say absolutely nothing about the withdrawal of the troops of the allied and associated Governments from Russian territory. And, most important, you fail to say that troops and military supplies will cease to be sent into the territory of the former Russian Empire. You thereby go a long way toward proving Trotsky's thesis: That any armistice will simply be used by the Allies as a period in which to supply tanks, aeroplanes, gas shells, liquid fire, etc., to the various antisoviet governments. As it stands, your armistice proposal is absolutely unfair, and I am sure that it will not be accepted by the Soviet Government.

Very respectfully, yours,

WILLIAM C. BULLITT.

Senator NEW. Otherwise you had no fault to find with it?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes. The morning after Col. House had told me he wished to submit this proposition to his international law experts, I came as usual to his office about 9.40, and Mr. Auchincloss was on his way to the President with his proposal, the Auchincloss-Miller proposal, as Col. House's proposal. But I got that stopped. I went in to Col. House, and Col. House told Mr. Auchincloss not to take it up to the President, and asked me if I could doctor up the reply of Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller to the Nansen letter so that it might possibly be acceptable to the Soviet Government. I thereupon rewrote the Auchincloss-Miller letter, but I was forced to stick very closely to the text. I was told that I could cut things out if I wished to, but to stick very closely to the text, which I did. I drew this redraft of their letter, under protest at the whole business. My redraft of their letter was finally the basis of the reply of the four to Nansen. I have both these documents here, my reply—and the four took that reply—and with the changes——

The CHAIRMAN. What four—the successors of the ten?

Mr. BULLITT. The successors of the 10, sir, took the reply———

The CHAIRMAN. Who were the four at that moment?

Mr. BULLITT. M. Orlando, Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and the President. This extremely mild proposition, which really had almost no chance of life, was, you will see, in no sense a reply to these proposals of the Soviet Government. This is my attempt to doctor up the Auchincloss-Miller proposition. In spite of every effort I could make to obtain definite action on it, the reply was made to me that this reply to the Nansen proposal would be a sufficient reply to that proposal of the Soviet Government. [Reading:]

DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in your letter of April 3 appeals to the sympathies of all peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men, women, and children lack the food and the necessities, which make life endurable.

The Governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve this situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a commission as you propose would offer a practical means of achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could not, either in its conception or its operation, be considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian purpose of saving life."

There are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties, owing to the existing situation in Russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. But if the existing local governments of Russia are as willing as the Governments and the peoples whom we represent to see succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no political obstacle will remain. There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply and transport, which we have mentioned, and also the problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with the advice and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. The problem of transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the assistance of your own and other neutral Governments. The problem of transport in Russia and of distribution can be solved only by the people of Russia themselves, with the assistance, advice, and supervision of your commission.

Subject to such supervision, the problem of distribution should be solely under the control of the people of Russia themselves. The people in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the Belgian Relief Commission, the fullest opportunity to advise your commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community is to be relieved. In no other circumstances could it be believed that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not political, under no other conditions could it be certain that the hungry would be fed.

That such a course would involve cessation of all hostilities within the territory of the former Russian Empire is obvious. And the cessation of hostilities would, necessarily, involve a complete suspension of the transfer of troops and military material of all sorts to and within these territories. Indeed, relief to Russia which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile, and would be impossible to consider.

Under such conditions as we have outlined we believe that your plan could be successfully carried into effect, and we should be prepared to give it our full support.



REPLY OF PRESIDENT WILSON, PREMIERS CLEMENCEAU, LLOYD GEORGE, AND ORLANDO, TO DR. NANSEN, APRIL 17, 1919

DEAR SIR: The misery and suffering in Russia described in your letter of April 3 appeals to the sympathies of all peoples. It is shocking to humanity that millions of men, women, and children lack the food and the necessities which make life endurable.

The Governments and peoples whom we represent would be glad to cooperate, without thought of political, military, or financial advantage, in any proposal which would relieve this situation in Russia. It seems to us that such a commission as you propose would offer a practical means of achieving the beneficent results you have in view, and could not, either in its conception or its operation, be considered as having any other aim than the "humanitarian purpose of saving life."

There are great difficulties to be overcome, political difficulties, owing to the existing situation in Russia, and difficulties of supply and transport. But if the existing local governments of Russia are as willing as the Governments and people whom we represent to see succor and relief given to the stricken peoples of Russia, no political obstacle will remain.

There will remain, however, the difficulties of supply, finance, and transport which we have mentioned? and also the problem of distribution in Russia itself. The problem of supply we can ourselves hope to solve, in connection with the advice and cooperation of such a commission as you propose. The problem of finance would seem to us to fall upon the Russian authorities. The problem of transport of supplies to Russia we can hope to meet with the assistance of your own and other neutral governments whose interests should be as great as our own and whose losses have been far less. The problems of transport in Russia and of distribution can be solved only by the people of Russia themselves, with the assistance, advice, and supervision of your commission.

Subject to your supervision, the problem of distribution should be solely under the control of the people of Russia themselves. The people in each locality should be given, as under the regime of the Belgian Relief Commission, the fullest opportunity to advise your commission upon the methods and the personnel by which their community is to be relieved. In no other circumstances could it be believed that the purpose of this relief was humanitarian, and not political; under no other condition could it be certain that the hungry would be fed.

That such a course would involve cessation of all hostilities within definitive lines in the territory of Russia is obvious. And the cessation of hostilities would, necessarily, involve a complete suspension of the transfer of troops and military material of all sorts to and within Russian territory. Indeed, relief to Russia which did not mean a return to a state of peace would be futile and would be impossible to consider.

Under such conditions as we have outlined, we believe that your plan could be successfully carried into effect, and we should be prepared to give it our full support.

V.E. ORLANDO. D. LLOYD GEORGE. WOODROW WILSON. G. CLEMENCEAU.

Senator KNOX. I want the reply of Auchincloss to Nansen to go into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Let all that correspondence be printed in the record.

Senator KNOX. Dr. Nansen's proposition, and then the reply,

(The letters referred to are inserted above.)

Mr. BULLITT. The Nansen letter was written in Mr. Hoover's office. Nansen made the proposition. I wrote the original of a reply to Dr. Nansen, which I believe would have led to peace. Col. House indicated his approval of it, but wished to have it considered from the international legal standpoint, which was then done by Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller, who proposed a reply that had no resemblance to my proposal. I then objected to that as it was on its way to the President. It was not sent to the President, and I was ordered to try to doctor it up. I attempted to doctor it up and produced a doctored version which was finally made the basis of the reply, with the change of two or three words which made it even worse and even more indefinite, so that the Soviet Government could not possibly conceive it as a genuine peace proposition. It left the whole thing in the air.

Senator KNOX. We would like to have you see that these documents to which you have just now referred are inserted in the record in the sequence in which you have named them.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, I shall be at the service of the committee in that regard.

Senator HARDING. Lest I missed something while I was out of the room I am exceedingly curious to know why the Soviet proposal was not given favorable consideration.

Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt has stated that.



KOLCHAK'S ADVANCE CAUSES REJECTION OF PEACE PROPOSAL

Mr. BULLITT. The principal reason was entirely different. The fact was that just at this moment, when this proposal was under consideration, Kolchak made a 100-mile advance. There was a revolt of peasants in a district of Russia which entirely cut off supplies from the Bolshevik army operating against Kolchak. Kolchak made a 100-mile advance, and immediately the entire press of Paris was roaring and screaming on the subject, announcing that Kolchak would be in Moscow within two weeks; and therefore everyone in Paris, including, I regret to say members of the American commission, began to grow very lukewarm about peace in Russia, because they thought Kolchak would arrive in Moscow and wipe out the Soviet Government.

Senator KNOX. And the proposal which you brought back from Russia, that is the Soviet proposal, was abandoned and dropped, after this last document to which you have just referred.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes; it was. May I say this, that April 10 was the final date when their proposition was open. I had attempted every day and almost every night to obtain a reply to it. I finally requested the commission to send the following telegram to Tchitcherin.

I proposed to send this telegram to the American consul at Helsingfors [reading]:

APRIL 10, 1919. AMERICAN CONSUL, Helsingfors:

Please send Kock or other reliable person immediately to Petrograd to Schklovsky, minister of foreign affairs, with following message for Tchitcherin:

"Action leading to food relief via neutrals likely within week.—Bullitt."



AMMISSION.

The commission considered that matter, and this is the official minute of their meeting [reading]:

AMERICAN MISSION TO NEGOTIATE PEACE, [No. 211.] April 10, 1919.

To: The Commissioners, for action. Subject: Telegram to Tchitcherin.

Statement.—Action by the council of four on the reply to Mr. Nansen was prevented yesterday by French objection to a minor clause in the President's letter. It is hoped that agreement in this matter may be reached to-day or to-morrow, but it is quite possible that agreement may not be reached for several days.

To-day, April 10, the pledge of the Soviet Government to accept a proposal of the sort outlined in its statement of March 14 expires. No indication has been given the Soviet Government that its statement was ever placed before the conference of Paris or that any change of policy in regard to Russia is contemplated. In view of the importance which the Soviet Government placed upon its statement, I fear that this silence and the passing of April 10 will be interpreted as a definite rejection of the peace effort of the Soviet Government and that the Soviet Government will at once issue belligerent political statements and orders for attacks on all fronts, including Bessarabia and Archangel. It is certain that if the soviet troops should enter Bessarabia or should overcome the allied forces at Archangel, the difficulty of putting through the policy which is likely to be adopted within the next few days would be greatly increased. I feel that if the appended telegram should be sent at once to Tchitcherin, no large offensive movements by the soviet armies would be undertaken for another week, and no provocative political statements would be issued.

I therefore respectfully suggest that the appended telegram should be sent at once.

Respectfully submitted.

WILLIAM C. BULLITT.

APRIL 10, 1919.

At the meeting of the commissioners this morning the above memorandum was read in which Mr. Bullitt requested that a telegram be sent to the American consul at Helsingfors, instructing the latter to send a message through reliable sources to Tchitcherin respecting Mr. Lansing's contemplated scheme for relief in Russia. After some discussion the commissioners redrafted the telegram in question to read as follows:

"Please send Kock or other reliable person immediately to Petrograd to Schklovsky, minister of foreign affairs, with following message for Tchitcherin, sent on my personal responsibility: 'Individuals of neutral States are considering organization for feeding Russia. Will perhaps decide something definite within a week.'—Bullitt."

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, Assistant to Mr. White.

I believe that telegram was dispatched. I do not know.

Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, I want to ask you a question. You have told us that you went to Russia with instructions from the Secretary of State, Mr. Lansing, with a definition of the American policy by Mr. House, with the approval of Lloyd George, who approved of your mission, of the purposes for which you were being sent. Now, tell us whether or not to your knowledge your report and the proposal of the Soviet Government was ever formally taken up by the peace conference and acted on?

Mr. BULLITT. It was never formally laid before the peace conference, which I believe met only six times during the course of the entire proceedings of what is called the peace conference.



LLOYD GEORGE DECEIVES PARLIAMENT

Senator KNOX. Did not Mr. Lloyd George in a speech to Parliament assert that he had never received the proposal with which you returned from Russia? Have you a copy of his speech?

Mr. BULLITT. About a week after I had handed to Mr. Lloyd George the official proposal, with my own hands, in the presence of three other persons, he made a speech before the British Parliament, and gave the British people to understand that he knew nothing whatever about any such proposition. It was a most egregious case of misleading the public, perhaps the boldest that I have ever known in my life. On the occasion of that statement of Mr. Lloyd George, I wrote the President. I clipped his statement from a newspaper and sent it to the President, and I asked the President to inform me whether the statement of Mr. Lloyd George was true or untrue. He was unable to answer, inasmuch as he would have had to reply on paper that Mr. Lloyd George had made an untrue statement. So flagrant was this that various members of the British mission called on me at the Crillon, a day or so later, and apologized for the Prime Minister's action in the case.

Senator KNOX. Have you a copy of Lloyd George's remarks in the Parliament?

Mr. BULLITT. I have a copy.

Senator KNOX. Suppose you read it?

Mr. BULLITT. It is as follows:

Mr. CLYNES. Before the right honorable gentleman comes to the next subject, can he make any statement on the approaches or representations alleged to have been made to his Government by persons acting on behalf of such government as there is in Central Russia?

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE. We have had no approaches at all except what have appeared in the papers.

Mr. CLYNES. I ask the question because it has been repeatedly alleged.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE. We have had no approaches at all. Constantly there are men coming and going to Russia of all nationalities, and they always come back with their tales of Russia. But we have made no approach of any sort.

I have only heard reports of others having proposals which they assume have come from authentic quarters, but these have never been put before the peace conference by any member, and therefore we have not considered them.

I think I know what my right honorable friend refers to. There was some suggestion that a young American had come back from Russia with a communication. It is not for me to judge the value of this communication, but if the President of the United States had attached any value to it he would have brought it before the conference, and he certainly did not.

It was explained to me by the members of the British delegation who called on me, that the reason for this deception was that although when Lloyd George got back to London he intended to make a statement very favorable to peace with Russia, he found that Lord Northcliffe, acting through Mr. Wickham Steed, the editor of The Times, and Mr. Winston Churchill, British secretary for war, had rigged the conservative majority of the House of Commons against him, and that they were ready to slay him then and there if he attempted to speak what was his own opinion at the moment on Russian policies.



MR. BULLITT RESIGNS

Senator KNOX. Mr. Bullitt, you resigned your relations with the State Department and the public service, did you not?

Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir.

Senator KNOX. When?

Mr. BULLITT. I resigned on May 17.

Senator KNOX. For what reason?

Mr. BULLITT. Well, I can explain that perhaps more briefly than in any other way by reading my letter of resignation to the President, which is brief.

Senator KNOX. Very well, we would like to hear it.

The CHAIRMAN. Before that letter is read, you did not see the President and had no knowledge of his attitude in regard to your report?

Mr. BULLITT. None whatever, except as it was reported to me by Col. House. Col. House, as I said before, reported to me that he thought in the first place that the President favored the peace proposal; in the second place, that the President could not turn his mind to it, because he was too occupied with Germany, and finally—well, really, I have no idea what was in the President's mind.

Senator KNOX. There never was another effort to secure an audience with the President for you after those first two that you say Col. House made?

Mr. BULLITT. No; not at all. Meetings with the President were always arranged through Col. House.

In my letter of resignation to the President, which was dated May 17, 1919, I said:

MAY 17, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have submitted to-day to the Secretary of State my resignation as an assistant in the Department of State, attache to the American commission to negotiate peace. I was one of the millions who trusted confidently and implicitly in your leadership and believed that you would take nothing less than "a permanent peace" based upon "unselfish and unbiased justice." But our Government has consented now to deliver the suffering peoples of the world to new oppressions, subjections, and dismemberments—a new century of war. And I can convince myself no longer that effective labor for "a new world order" is possible as a servant of this Government.

Russia, "the acid test of good will," for me as for you, has not even been understood. Unjust decisions of the conference in regard to Shantung, the Tyrol, Thrace, Hungary, East Prussia, Danzig, the Saar Valley, and the abandonment of the principle of the freedom of the seas make new international conflicts certain. It is my conviction that the present league of nations will be powerless-to prevent these wars, and that the United States will be involved in them by the obligations undertaken in the covenant of the league and in the special understanding with France. Therefore the duty of the Government of the United States to its own people and to mankind is to refuse to sign or ratify this unjust treaty, to refuse to guarantee its settlements by entering the league of nations, to refuse to entangle the United States further by the understanding with France.

That you personally opposed most of the unjust settlements, and that you accepted them only under great pressure, is well known. Nevertheless, it is my conviction that if you had made your fight in the open, instead of behind closed doors, you would have carried with you the public opinion of the world, which was yours; you would have been able to resist the pressure and might have established the "new international order based upon broad and universal principles of right and justice" of which you used to speak. I am sorry that you did not fight our fight to the finish and that you had so little faith in the millions of men, like myself, in every nation who had faith in you.

Very sincerely, yours,

WILLIAM C. BULLITT.

To the honorable WOODROW WILSON, President of the United States.

Senator KNOX. Did you ever get a reply to that letter?

Mr. BULLITT. I did not, sir. The only intimation I had in regard to it was that Mr. Close, secretary of the President, with whom I was lunching, said to me that the President had read my letter and had said that he would not reply. In connection with that I wrote Col. House a letter at the same time as follows:

MAY 17, 1919.

MY DEAR COL. HOUSE: Since you kindly lent me the text of the proposed treaty of peace, I have tried to convince myself that some good might come of it and that I ought to remain in the service of the Department of State to labor for its establishment.

It is with sincere regret that I have come to the conviction that no good ever will issue from a thing so evil and that those who care about a permanent peace should oppose the signature and ratification of it, and of the special understanding with France.

I have therefore submitted my resignation to the Secretary of State and have written the appended note to the President. I hope you will bring it to his attention; not because he will care what I may think, but because I have expressed the thoughts which are in the minds of many young and old men in the commission—thoughts which the President will have to reckon with when the world begins to reap the crop of wars the seeds of which have here been sown.

I feel sure that you will agree that I am right in acting on my conviction and I hope that this action will in no way affect the relationship between us which has always been so delightful and stimulating to me.

With my sincerest personal regards, I am, Very respectfully, yours,

WILLIAM C. BULLITT.

To the honorable EDWARD M. HOUSE, Hotel Crillon, Paris.

Senator KNOX. Did you get a reply to that?

Mr. BULLITT. Col. House sent for me, and after that we had a conversation. That was the only reply that I had. I had a conversation with Col. House on the whole matter, and we thrashed it all out.

Senator KNOX. Was anything said during this conversation which you feel willing or disposed to tell us, which will be important?

Mr. BULLITT. I made a record of the conversation. Inasmuch as the conversations which I had with various members of the commission on the occasion of my resignation touched on a number of important issues, I kept a record of those conversations, that is, those I had at the time when I resigned. They are the only conversations of which I made records, and I made them simply because we did deal more or less with the entire question of the peace treaty. On the other hand, they are personal conversations, and I hesitate to repeat them, unless the committee considers it particularly important.

Senator KNOX. I would not press you on the personal conversations which you had with Col. House after you resigned. I leave the matter to your own judgment. I wondered whether there might have been something which transpired which you would care to tell us; but I withdraw that suggestion. I should like to ask you this one question: I suppose your letter of resignation to Mr. Lansing was merely formal?

Mr. BULLITT. My letter of resignation to Mr. Lansing was a formal letter.

Senator KNOX. You certainly got a reply to that.

Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir. I wrote a formal letter and I got a formal reply, and the Secretary sent for me the same afternoon and explained that he only sent me a formal reply because it was necessary, because of the form in which I had put my resignation, and particularly because I had appended to my note my letter to the President. We then discussed various other matters in connection with the treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Senator KNOX. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, you put into the record or read here, I think, some extracts from the minutes of the Council of Ten?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you present at any of these meetings?

Mr. BULLITT. I was not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Council of Ten was the first body that was dealing with the treaty generally, the important body? It was not a special commission?

Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. It was the main body of the conference.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it was the main body, and was the one that subsequently became the Council of Five, and then the Council of Four, and I think at one time a Council of Three?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, there were records of these meetings, were there not?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what disposition was made of those records?

Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Chairman, there were a number of copies for each delegation, and I presume that there must be a number of copies in this country at the present time; perhaps not.

The CHAIRMAN. You say each delegate had a copy?

Mr. BULLITT. Each plenipotentiary had a copy, and the Secretary of the American Commission had a copy, I believe, and the assistant secretaries had copies; certainly one of the assistant secretaries, Mr. Leland Harrison; and Mr. Grew had a copy.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Mr. Lansing have copies while he served on the Council of Ten?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir; well, I am quite sure that he did. I am sure that I have seen copies on the desk of the Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they were furnished regularly to every member of the conference?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We have found some difficulty in getting them; that is the reason I asked.

Senator KNOX. I am informed—perhaps Mr. Bullitt can tell us—that there is a complete set of minutes in the hands of some individual in this country. Do you know anything about that—perhaps Auchincloss & Miller?

Mr. BULLITT. I could not be certain in regard to the matter, but I should certainly be under the impression that Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller have copies of the minutes; perhaps not. Perhaps Mr. Auchincloss has left his with Col. House. He would have Col. House's copies. Perhaps they are in this country, perhaps not. But Mr. Auchincloss and Mr. Miller perhaps have those minutes in their files.

The CHAIRMAN. Undoubtedly there are a number, at least, of those records in existence.

Mr. BULLITT. Certainly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That must be the case.

Mr. BULLITT. Certainly, sir. Also records of the meetings of the American Commission.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know whether or not they are in the State Department—any of these minutes or records in our State Department?

Mr. BULLITT. I should presume that in the normal course of events they would be certainly among Mr. Lansing's papers, which were very carefully kept. He had an excellent secretariat.

The CHAIRMAN. Did any member of our delegation, any member of the council of 10, express to you any opinions about the general character of this treaty?

Mr. BULLITT. Well, Mr. Lansing, Col. House, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. White had all expressed to me very vigorously their opinions on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they enthusiastically in favor of it?

Mr. BULLITT. I regret to say, not.

As I say, the only documents of the sort that I have are the memoranda of the discussions that I had after I resigned, when we thrashed over the whole ground.

The CHAIRMAN. Those memoranda of consultations that you had after you resigned you prefer not to publish? I am not asking you to do so.

Mr. BULLITT. I think it would be out of the way.

The CHAIRMAN. I quite understand your position. I only wanted to know—I thought it might be proper for you to say whether or not their opinions which you heard them express were favorable to the series of arrangements, I would call them, that were made for the consideration of this treaty.

Mr. BULLITT. It is no secret that Mr. Lansing, Gen. Bliss, and Mr. Henry White objected very vigorously to the numerous provisions of the treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. It is known that they objected to Shantung. That, I think, is public information. I do not know that it is public information that they objected to anything else.

Mr. BULLITT. I do not think that Secretary Lansing is at all enthusiastic about the league of nations as it stands at present. I have a note of a conversation with him on the subject, which, if I may, I will just read, without going into the rest of that conversation, because it bears directly on the issue involved.

This was a conversation with the Secretary of State at 2.30 on May 19. The Secretary sent for me. It was a long conversation, and Mr. Lansing in the course of it said:

Mr. Lansing then said that he personally would have strengthened greatly the judicial clauses of the league of nations covenant, making arbitration compulsory. He also said that he was absolutely opposed to the United States taking a mandate in either Armenia or Constantinople; that he thought that Constantinople should be placed under a local government, the chief members of which were appointed by an international committee.

This is a matter, it seems to me, of some importance in regard to the whole discussion, and therefore I feel at liberty to read it, as it is not a personal matter.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a note of the conversation made at the time?

Mr. BULLITT. This is a note which I immediately dictated after the conversation. [Reading:]

Mr. Lansing then said that he, too, considered many parts of the treaty thoroughly bad, particularly those dealing with Shantung and the league of nations. He said: "I consider that the league of nations at present is entirely useless. The great powers have simply gone ahead and arranged the world to suit themselves. England and France in particular have gotten out of the treaty everything that they wanted, and the league of nations can do nothing to alter any of the unjust clauses of the treaty except by unanimous consent of the members of the league, and the great powers will never give their consent to changes in the interests of weaker peoples."

We then talked about the possibility of ratification by the Senate. Mr. Lansing said: "I believe that if the Senate could only understand what this treaty means, and if the American people could really understand, it would unquestionably be defeated, but I wonder if they will ever understand what it lets them in for." He expressed the opinion that Mr. Knox would probably really understand the treaty— [Laughter.] May I reread it?

He expressed the opinion that Mr. Knox would probably really understand the treaty, and that Mr. Lodge would; but that Mr. Lodge's position would become purely political, and therefore ineffective.

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I do not mind.

Mr. BULLITT (reading):

He thought, however, that Mr. Knox might instruct America in the real meaning of it.

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. He has made some very valuable efforts in the direction.

Mr. BULLITT. I beg to be excused from reading any more of these conversations.

Senator BRANDEGEE. We get the drift.

[Laughter.]

I want to ask one or two questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you read any of these minutes of the meetings of the American commission?

Mr. BULLITT. Of the American commission itself?

Senator BRANDEGEE. Yes.

Mr. BULLITT. No, sir. I have on one or two occasions glanced at them but I never have read them carefully.

Senator BRANDEGEE. They were accessible to you at the time, were they?

Mr. BULLITT. They were, sir.

Senator BRANDEGEE. You stated, if I recall your testimony correctly, that when the proposition was made that the legislative bodies of the contracting parties should have representation in the assembly, the President objected to that?

Mr. BULLITT. The President—if I may explain again—approved in principle, but said that he did not see how the thing could be worked out, and he felt that the assembly of delegates, or whatever it is called in the present draft, gave sufficient representation to the peoples of the various countries.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know what his objection was to the legislative bodies of the contracting parties having representation on the assembly?

Mr. BULLITT. The President believed, I think—in fact, it was so stated to me by Col. House, who discussed the matter with me—that it would make too unwieldy a central organ for the league.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you understand why it would be any more unwieldy if Congress should appoint the delegates than if the President should?

Mr. BULLITT. It would necessitate a larger central body if representation was to be given to the important political parties of the various countries. It would have necessitated a body of, say, 10 representatives from the United States—5 from the Republican party and 5 from the; Democratic Party, in the assembly of the league, which would become a large body.

Senator BRANDEGEE. The idea was that the political parties of the country should be represented?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, the political viewpoints should be represented so that you would get some connection between the central assembly of the league and the true opinion of the countries.

Senator BRANDEGEE. When you went across to Paris on the George Washington with the President do you know whether he had with him at that time any draft for a league of nations or any memorandum that he showed to you of discussed with you?

Mr. BULLITT. The President outlined to several of us one evening, or rather one afternoon, the conception he had at the time of the league of nations. I did not see any formal draft that he had, but the President made a statement before the council of 10, in one of these minutes from which I have been reading, stating that he had first—and in fact I think I know it from other sources—that he had first received the Phillimore report, that then it had been rewritten by Col. House and that he had rewritten Col. House's report, and after he had discussed his rewriting with Robert Cecil and Gen. Smuts, he had rewritten it again.

Senator BRANDEGEE. You stated substantially that the only part of the league draft which was laid before the Peace Conference which the President had his way about, was Article 10. Did you make some such statement as that?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir.

Senator BRANDEGEE. The President stated to us that that was practically what he had submitted to the Niagara conference here when the ABC powers from South America were discussing the Mexican question. He had then considered it as an article for American use on this continent.

Do you know what the attitude of Gen Smuts was as to article 10 as proposed by the President?

Mr. BULLITT. I do not, sir. Again, full minutes of the discussions and conclusions reached of all these meetings of the committee on the league of nations were kept.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Did you read the various other plans that were proposed or suggested over there for a league of nations?

Mr. BULLITT. I have read some of them, sir.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Did the others have anything similar to what is now article 10 in the treaty pending in the Senate?

Mr. BULLITT. I really can not say. I am sorry, but I have forgotten. I should not care to testify on that.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Do you know from what you heard while you were there in your official capacity whether the other nations were anxious to have article 10 in the covenant for the league?

Mr. BULLITT. The French were not only anxious for it, but I believe were anxious greatly to strengthen it. They desired immediately a league army to be established, and I believe also to be stationed in Alsace-Lorraine and along the Rhine, in addition to article 10. I can not say for certain about the others.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bullitt, we had before us at one of our hearings a representative of the Egyptian people. Do you know anything about that, when it was done, or any discussions about it? I mean the clauses that appear in regard to the British protectorate.

Mr. BULLITT. You mean our agreement to recognize the British protectorate in Egypt?

The CHAIRMAN. It was recognized by this treaty in those clauses.

Mr. BULLITT. Yes; but we gave a sort of assent before the treaty formally came out, did we not? I recall the morning it was done. It was handled by Sir William Wiseman, who was the confidential representative that Lloyd George and Balfour had constantly with Col. House and the President. He was a sort of extra confidential foreign office. It was all done, if I recall his statement correctly, in the course of one morning. The President was informed that the Egyptian nationalists were using his 14 points as meaning that the President thought that Egypt should have the right to control her own destinies, and therefore have independence, and that they were using this to foment revolution; that since the President had provoked this trouble by the 14 points, they thought that he should allay it by the statement that we would recognize the British protectorate, and as I remember Sir William Wiseman's statement to me that morning, he said that he had only brought up the matter that morning and that he had got our recognition of the British protectorate before luncheon.

The CHAIRMAN. The President made some public statement?

Mr. BULLITT. I am not certain in regard to the further developments of it. I recall that incident, that it was arranged through Sir William Wiseman, and that it took only a few minutes.

Senator KNOX. That was a good deal of time to devote to a little country like Egypt.

Mr. BULLITT. I do not know. You should know, sir, you have been Secretary of State.

Senator KNOX. We never chewed them up that fast.

Senator NEW. Mr. Bullitt, what, if anything, was said with reference to the Irish question, with which you are familiar?

Mr. BULLITT. At the conference? I do not believe the Irish question was ever brought up before the conference or discussed. There was considerable said on the side, attempts to let down the Walsh mission easily without antagonizing the Irish vote in this country. [Laughter.] I think that is the only consideration that Ireland received.

Senator NEW. There was a cheerful willingness to do that, was there not?

Mr. BULLITT. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further that anybody desires to ask Mr. Bullitt? We are very much obliged to you indeed, Mr. Bullitt.

Mr. BULLITT. Mr. Chairman, if I may just say—I do not know whether it is a matter of first interest to the Senators or not—but on this trip with me to Russia there was Capt. Pettit, and at the same time the journalist, Lincoln Steffens, and I have documents which they prepared and which might be of interest to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will hand those to the stenographer, we will print them with your testimony.

Senator KNOX. What are your plans, Mr. Bullitt? What are you going to do in this country now?

Mr. BULLITT. I expect to return to Maine and fish for trout, where I was when I was summoned by the committee.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Did Mr. Steffens go to Russia with you?

Mr. BULLITT. He did.

The CHAIRMAN. He held no official position?

Mr. BULLITT. No.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Who advised him to go?

Mr. BULLITT. I did.

Senator BRANDEGEE. Is he in the country now?

Mr. BULLITT. I do not believe so. I believe he is still in Europe.



REPORT OF LINCOLN STEFFENS

(By order of the committee the report of Lincoln Steffens referred to is here printed in full in the record, as follows:)

REPORT OF LINCOLN STEFFENS

APRIL 2, 1919.

Politically, Russia has reached a state of equilibrium; internally; for the present at least.

I think the revolution there is ended; that it has run its course. There will be changes. There may be advances; there will surely be reactions, but these will be regular, I think; political and economic, but parliamentary, A new center of gravity seems to have been found.

Certainly, the destructive phase of the revolution in Russia is over. Constructive work has begun.

We saw this everywhere. And we saw order, and though we inquired for them, we heard of no disorders. Prohibition is universal and absolute. Robberies have been reduced in Petrograd below normal of large cities. Warned against danger before we went in, we felt safe. Prostitution has disappeared with its clientele, who have been driven out by the "no-work-no-food law," enforced by the general want and the labor-card system. Loafing on the job by workers and sabotage by upper-class directors, managers, experts and clerks have been overcome. Russia has settled down to work.

The soviet form of government, which sprang up so spontaneously all over Russia, is established.

This is not a paper thing; not an invention. Never planned, it has not yet been written into the forms of law. It is not even uniform. It is full of faults and difficulties; clumsy, and in its final development it is not democratic. The present Russian Government is the most autocratic government I have ever seen. Lenin, head of the Soviet Government, is farther removed from the people than the Tsar was, or than any actual ruler in Europe is.

The people in a shop or an industry are a soviet. These little informal Soviets elect a local soviet; which elects delegates to the city or country (community) soviet; which elects delegates to the government (State) soviet. The government Soviets together elect delegates to the All-Russian Soviet, which elects commissionaires (who correspond to our Cabinet, or to a European minority). And these commissionaires finally elect Lenin. He is thus five or six removes from the people. To form an idea of his stability, independence, and power, think of the process that would have to be gone through with by the people to remove him and elect a successor. A majority of all the Soviets in all Russia would have to be changed in personnel or opinion, recalled, or brought somehow to recognize and represent the altered will of the people.

No student of government likes the soviet as it has developed. Lenin himself doesn't. He calls it a dictatorship, and he opposed it at first. When I was in Russia in the days of Milyoukov and Kerensky, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were demanding the general election of the constituent assembly. But the Soviets existed then; they had the power, and I saw foreign ambassadors blunder, and the world saw Milyoukov and Kerensky fall, partly because they would not, or could not, comprehend the nature of the soviet; as Lenin did finally, when, against his theory, he joined in and expressed the popular repudiation of the constituent assembly and went over to work with the soviet, the actual power in Russia. The constituent assembly, elected by the people, represented the upper class and the old system. The soviet was the lower class.

The soviet, at bottom, is a natural gathering of the working people, of peasants, in their working and accustomed groupings, instead of, as with us, by artificial geographical sections.

Labor unions and soldiers' messes made up the Soviets in the cities; poorer peasants and soldiers at the village inn were the first Soviets in the country; and in the beginning, two years ago, these lower class delegates used to explain to me that the "rich peasants" and the "rich people" had their own meetings and meeting places. The popular intention then was not to exclude the upper classes from the government, but only from the Soviets, which were not yet the same. But the Soviets, once in existence, absorbed in their own class tasks and their own problems, which the upper class had either not understood or solved, ignored—no; they simply forgot the council of empire and the Duma. And so they discovered (or, to be more exact, their leaders discovered) that they had actually all the power. All that Lenin and the other Socialist leaders had to do to carry through their class-struggle theory was to recognize this fact of power and teach the Soviets to continue to ignore the assemblies and the institutions of the upper classes, which, with their "governments," ministries, and local assemblies, fell, powerless from neglect.

The Soviet Government sprouted and grew out of the habits, the psychology, and the condition of the Russian people. It fitted them. They understand it. They find they can work it and they like it. Every effort to put something else in its place (including Lenin's) has failed. It will have to be modified, I think, but not in essentials, and it can not be utterly set aside. The Tsar himself, if he should come back, would have to keep the Russian Soviet, and somehow rule over and through it.

The Communist Party (dubbed "Bolshevik") is in power now in the Soviet Government.

I think it will stay there a long time. What I have shown of the machinery of change is one guaranty of communist dominance. There are others. All opposition to the communist government has practically ceased inside of Russia.

There are three organized opposition parties: Mencheviks, Social Revolutionary Right, and Social Revolutionary Left. The anarchists are not organized. The Social Revolutionary Left is a small group of very anarchistic leaders, who have hardly any following. The Mencheviks and the Social Revolutionaries Right are said to be strong, but there is no way of measuring their strength, for a very significant reason.

These parties have stopped fighting. They are critical, but they are not revolutionary. They also think the revolution is over. They proposed, and they still propose eventually, to challenge and oust the Communist Party by parliamentary and political methods, not by force. But when intervention came upon distracted Russia, and the people realized they were fighting many enemies on many fronts, the two strong opposing parties expressed their own and the public will to stand by the party in power until the menace of foreign invasion was beaten off. These parties announced this in formal statements, uttered by their regular conventions; you have confirmation of it in the memoranda written for you by Martov and Volsky, and you will remember how one of them put it to us personally:

"There is a fight to be made against the Bolsheviks, but so long as you foreigners are making it, we Russians won't. When you quit and leave us alone, we will take up our burden again, and we shall deal with the Bolsheviks. And we will finish them. But we will do it with our people, by political methods, in the Soviets, and not by force, not by war or by revolution, and not with any outside foreign help."

This is the nationalistic spirit, which we call patriotism, and understand perfectly; it is much stronger in the new than it was in the old, the Tsar's, Russia. But there is another force back of this remarkable statement of a remarkable state of mind.

All Russia has turned to the labor of reconstruction; sees the idea in the plans proposed for the future; and is interested—imaginatively.

Destruction was fun for a while and a satisfaction to a suppressed, betrayed, to an almost destroyed people. Violence was not in their character, however. The Russian people, sober, are said to be a gentle people. One of their poets speaks of them as "that gentle beast, the Russian people," and I noticed and described in my reports of the first revolution how patient, peaceable, and "safe" the mobs of Petrograd were. The violence came later, with Bolshevism, after the many attempts at counterrevolution, and with vodka. The Bolshevik leaders regret and are ashamed of their red terror. They do not excuse it. It was others, you remember, who traced the worst of the Russian atrocities and the terror itself to the adoption by the counter-revolutionists of the method of assassination (of Lenin and others), and most of all to the discovery by the mobs of wine cellars and vodka stills. That the Russian drunk and the Russian sober are two utterly different animals, is well known to the Jews, to the Reactionaries, and to the Russians themselves. And that is why this people lately have not only obeyed; they have themselves ruthlessly enforced the revolutionary prohibition decrees in every part of Russia that we would inquire about and hear from.

The destructive spirit, sated, exhausted, or suppressed, has done its work. The leaders say so—the leaders of all parties.

There is a close relationship between the Russian people and the new Russian leaders, in power and out. New men in politics are commonly fresh, progressive, representative; it's the later statesmen that damp the enthusiasm and sober the idealism of legislators. In Russia all legislators, all, are young or new. It is as if we should elect in the United States a brand-new set of men to all offices, from the lowest county to the highest Federal position, and as if the election should occur in a great crisis, when all men are full of hope and faith. The new leaders of the local Soviets of Russia were, and they still are, of the people, really. That is one reason why their autocratic dictatorship is acceptable. They have felt, they shared the passion of the mob to destroy, but they had something in mind to destroy.

The soviet leaders used the revolution to destroy the system of organized Russian life.

While the mobs broke windows, smashed wine cellars, and pillaged buildings to express their rage, their leaders directed their efforts to the annihilation of the system itself. They pulled down the Tsar and his officers; they abolished the courts, which had been used to oppress them; they closed shops, stopped business generally, and especially all competitive and speculative business; and they took over all the great industries, monopolies, concessions, and natural resources. This was their purpose. This is their religion. This is what the lower-class culture has been slowly teaching the people of the world for 50 years: that it is not some particular evil, but the whole system of running business and railroads, shops, banks, and exchanges, for speculation and profit that must be changed. This is what causes poverty and riches, they teach, misery, corruption, vice, and war. The people, the workers, or their State, must own and run these things "for service."

Not political democracy, as with us; economic democracy is the idea; democracy in the shop, factory, business. Bolshevism is a literal interpretation, the actual application of this theory, policy, or program. And so, in the destructive period of the Russian revolution, the Bolshevik leaders led the people to destroy the old system, root and branch, fruit and blossom, too. And apparently this was done. The blocks we saw in Petrograd and Moscow of retail shops nailed up were but one sign of it. When we looked back of these dismal fronts and inquired more deeply into the work of the revolution we were convinced that the Russians have literally and completely done their job. And it was this that shocked us. It is this that has startled the world; not the atrocities of the revolution, but the revolution itself.

The organization of life as we know it in America, in the rest of Europe, in the rest of the world, is wrecked and abolished in Russia.

The revolution didn't do it. The Tsar's Government had rotted it. The war broke down the worn-out machinery of it; the revolution has merely scrapped it finally.

The effect is hunger, cold, misery, anguish, disease—death to millions. But worse than these—I mean this—was the confusion of mind among the well and the strong. We do not realize, any of us—even those of us who have imagination—how fixed our minds and habits are by the ways of living that we know. So with the Russians. They understood how to work and live under their old system; it was not a pretty one; it was dark, crooked, and dangerous, but they had groped around in it all their lives from childhood up. They could find their way in it. And now they can remember how it was, and they sigh for the old ways. The rich emigres knew whom to see to bribe for a verdict, a safe-conduct, or a concession; and the poor, in their hunger, think now how it would be to go down to the market and haggle, and bargain, from one booth to another, making their daily purchases, reckoning up their defeats and victories over the traders. And they did get food then. And now—it is all gone. They have destroyed all this, and having destroyed it they were lost, strangers in their own land.

This tragedy of transition was anticipated by the leaders of the revolution, and the present needs were prepared for in the plans laid for reconstruction.

Lenin has imagination. He is an idealist, but he is a scholar, too, and a very grim realist. Lenin was a statistician by profession. He had long been trying to foresee the future of society under socialism, and he had marked down definitely the resources, the machinery, and the institutions existing under the old order, which could be used in the new. There was the old Russian communal land system, passing, but standing in spots with its peasants accustomed to it. That was to be revived; it is his solution of the problem of the great estates. They are not to be broken up, but worked by the peasants in common. Then there was the great Russian Cooperative (trading) Society, with its 11,000,000 families before the war; now with 17,000,000 members. He kept that. There was a conflict; it was in bourgeoise hands but it was an essential part of the projected system of distribution, so Lenin compromised and communist Russia has it. He had the railroads, telegraph, telephone already; the workers seized the factories, the local Soviets the mines; the All-Russian Soviet, the banks. The new government set up shops—one in each neighborhood—to dole out not for money, but on work tickets, whatever food, fuel, and clothing this complete government monopoly had to distribute. No bargaining, no display, no advertising, and no speculation. Everything one has earned by labor the right to buy at the cooperative and soviet shops is at a fixed, low price, at the established (too small.) profit—to the government or to the members of the cooperative.