"Meanwhile Barteau was not idle. He had moved his regiment, as we have stated, across to get in the enemy's rear, and in his own language says: 'I took my regiment across the country westward, to reach the Ripley road, on which the enemy was moving, and being delayed somewhat in passing through a swampy bottom, I did not reach that road, at Lyon's gin, three miles from Brice's Cross Roads, until probably 1 o'clock. I then learned that the last of the Federal regiments, with all their train, had passed by rapid march, and as there was now a lull in the engagement (for I had been hearing sharp firing in front), I greatly feared that Forrest was defeated and that the Federals were pushing him back, so I moved rapidly down the road till I reached the open field near the bridge.'

"This could not have been the Ripley Guntown road, as that road was filled with Federal troops, wagons and artillery from Dr. Agnew's house to the cross roads, a distance of two miles. 'Having placed some sharpshooters, whose sole attention was to be directed to the bridge,' he continues, 'I extended my line nearly half a mile, and began an attack by scattering shots at the same time. Sounding my bugle from various points along the line, almost immediately a reconnoitering force of the enemy appeared at the bridge, and being fired upon returned. This was followed, perhaps, by a regiment, and then a whole brigade came down to the creek. My men, taking good aim, fired upon them coolly and steady. Soon I saw wagons, artillery, etc., pushing for the bridge. These were shot at by my sharpshooters. I now began to contract my line and collect my regiment, for the Federals came pouring in immense numbers across the creek. Your artillery was doing good work. Even the bullets from the small arms of the Confederates reached my men. I operated upon the flank of the enemy until after dark.'

"The wagons blockading the bridge were soon removed by being thrown into the stream and a section from each battery was worked across by hand, supported by the escort, and brought to bear upon a negro brigade with fearful loss; the other two sections were quickly to the front, ahead of any support for the moment, and drove the enemy from the ridge back of Holland's house across Dry creek. The cavalry in the meantime had halted, reorganized and soon joined in the pursuit. The road was narrow, with dense woods on each side, so that it was impossible to use more than four pieces at a time, but that number were kept close upon the heels of the retreating enemy and a murderous fire prevented them from forming to make a stand.

"The ridge extending southward from the Hadden house offered a strong natural position for defensive operations. Upon this ridge the Federals had established a line of battle, but a few well directed shots from the artillery stationed near the Holland house and a charge by our cavalry across Dry creek readily put them to flight. A section of each battery was ordered at a gallop to this ridge, which was reached in time to open with a few rounds of double-shotted cannister upon their demoralized ranks as they hastily retreated through the open fields on either side of Phillips branch. Our cannoneers were greatly blown and well nigh exhausted from excessive heat and continuous labor at their guns for full five hours. We noticed a number drink with apparant relish the black powder water from the sponge buckets."

The enemy followed the fleeing column, capturing and wounding many at the town of Ripley. Next morning the Federals made a stand. Again the Phalanx bore the brunt of the battle, and when finally the troops stampeded, held the confederates in check until the white troops were beyond capture. But this was all they could do, and this was indeed an heroic act.

The confederate says:

"Long before daylight found us moving rapidly to overtake the flying foe. We had changed positions. The cavalry now being in advance, overtook the enemy at Stubb's farm; a sharp skirmish ensued, when they broke, leaving the remainder of their wagon train. Fourteen pieces of artillery and some twenty-five ambulances, with a number of wounded, were left in Little Hatchie bottom, further on. The discomfited Federals were badly scattered throughout the country. Forrest, therefore, threw out his regiment on either side of the roads to sweep the vicinity. A number were killed and many prisoners captured before reaching Ripley, twenty-five miles from Brice's Cross Roads. At this point two strong lines were formed across the road. After a spirited onset the Federals broke, leaving one piece of artillery, two caissons, two ambulances. Twenty-one killed and seventy wounded were also left on the field. Colonel G. M. McCraig, of the One Hundred and Twentieth Illinois Infantry, was among the killed; also Captain W. J. Tate, Seventh Tennessee Cavalry. This was accomplished just as the artillery reached the front.

"Lieutenant Frank Rodgers, of Rucker's staff, the night previous, with a small, select detachment of men, assisted by Captain Gooch, with the remnant of his company, hung constantly upon the Federal rear, with a daring never surpassed. Their series of attacks greatly harrassed and annoyed the enemy, numbers of whom were killed and wounded. The artillery followed to Salem, twenty-five miles distant from Ripley."

The Phalanx regiments would not consent to be whipped, even with the black flag flying in their front, and deserted by their white comrades. A correspondent of the Cleveland Leader, in giving an account of this "miserable affair," writes:

"About sunrise, June 11, the enemy advanced on the town of Ripley, and threatened our right, intending to cut us off from the Salem Road. Again the colored troops were the only ones that could be brought into line; the Fifty-ninth being on the right, and the Fifty-fifth on the left, holding the streets. At this time, the men had not more than ten rounds of ammunition, and the enemy were crowding closer and still closer, when the Fifty-ninth were ordered to charge on them, which they did in good style, while singing,

"'We'll rally round the flag, boys.'

"This charge drove the enemy back, so that both regiments retreated to a pine grove about two hundred yards distant.

"By this time, all the white troops, except one squadron of cavalry, that formed in the rear, were on the road to Salem and, when this brigade came up, they, too, wheeled and left, and in less than ten minutes this now little band of colored troops found themselves flanked. They then divided themselves into three squads, and charged the enemy's lines; one squad taking the old Corinth Road, then a by-road, to the left. After a few miles, they came to a road leading to Grand Junction. After some skirmishing, they arrived, with the loss of one killed and one wounded.

"Another and the largest squad covered the retreat of the white troops, completely defending them by picking up the ammunition thrown away by them, and with it repelling the numerous assaults made by the rebel cavalry, until they reached Collierville, a distance of sixty miles. When the command reached Dan's Mills, the enemy attempted to cut it off by a charge; but the colored boys in the rear formed, and repelled the attack, allowing the whole command to pass safely on, when they tore up the bridge. Passing on to an open country, the officers halted, and re-organized the brigade into an effective force. They then moved forward until about four, P. M.; when some Indian flank skirmishers discovered the enemy, who came up to the left, and in the rear, and halted. Soon a portion advanced, when a company faced about and fired, emptying three saddles. From this time until dark, the skirmishing was constant.

"A corporal in Company C, Fifty-ninth, was ordered to surrender. He let his would-be captor come close to him; when he struck him with the butt of his gun.

"While the regiment was fighting in a ditch, and the order came to retreat, the color-bearer threw out the flag, designing to jump out and get it; but the rebels rushed for it, and in the struggle one of the boys knocked down with his gun the reb who had the flag, caught it, and ran.

"A rebel, with an oath, ordered one of our men to surrender. He, thinking the reb's gun was loaded, dropped his gun; but, on seeing the reb commence loading, our colored soldier jumped for his gun, and with it struck his captor dead.

"Capt. H., being surrounded by about a dozen rebels, was seen by one of his men, who called several of his companions; they rushed forward and fired, killing several of the enemy, and rescued their captain.

"A rebel came up to one, and said, 'Come my good fellow, go with me and wait on me.' In an instant, the boy shot his would-be master dead.

"Once when the men charged on the enemy, they rushed forth with the cry, 'Remember Fort Pillow.' The rebs called back, and said, 'Lee's men killed no prisoners.'

"One man in a charge threw his antagonist to the ground, and pinned him fast; and, as he attempted to withdraw his bayonet, it came off his gun, and, as he was very busy just then, he left him transfixed to mother earth.

"One man killed a rebel by striking him with the butt of his gun, which he broke; but, being unwilling to stop his work, he loaded and fired three times before he could get a better gun; the first time not being cautious, the rebound of his gun badly cut his lip.

"When the troops were in the ditch, three rebels came to one man, and ordered him to surrender. His gun being loaded, he shot one and bayoneted another; and, forgetting he could bayonet the third, he turned the butt of his gun, and knocked him down."

General Sturgis was severely criticised by the press immediately after the affair. Historians since the war have followed up these criticisms. He has been accused of incompetency, rashness and drunkenness, none of which it is the purpose of this volume to endorse. Possibly his reports furnish a sufficient explanation for the disaster, which it is hoped they do, inasmuch as he is not charged with either treason or cowardice.

[General Sturgis' Report, No. 1.]

"HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES, COLLIERSVILLE, TENN., June 12, 1864.

"GENERAL:—I have the honor to report that we met the enemy in position and in heavy force about 10 A. M. on the 10th instant at Brice's Cross-Roads on the Ripley and Fulton road and about six miles northwest of Guntown, Miss. A severe battle ensued which lasted until about 4 P. M., when I regret to say my lines were compelled to give way before the overwhelming numbers by which they were assailed at every point. To fall back at this point was more than ordinarily difficult as there was a narrow valley in our rear through which ran a small creek crossed by a single narrow bridge. The road was almost impassable by reason of the heavy rains which had fallen for the previous ten days and the consequence was that the road soon became jammed by the artillery and ordnance wagons. This gradually led to confusion and disorder.

"In a few minutes, however, I succeeded in establishing two colored regiments in line of battle in a wood on this side of the little valley. These troops stood their ground well and checked the enemy for a time. The check, however, was only temporary and this line in turn gave way. My troops were seized with a panic and became absolutely uncontrollable. One and a half miles in rear by dint of great exertion and with pistol in hand, I again succeeded in checking up the flying column and placing it in line of battle.

"This line checked the enemy for ten or fifteen minutes only, when it again gave way and my whole army became literally an uncontrollable mob. Nothing now remained to do but allow the retreat to continue and endeavor to force it gradually into some kind of shape. The night was exceedingly dark, the roads almost impassable and the hope of saving my artillery and wagons altogether futile, so I ordered the artillery and wagons to be destroyed. The latter were burned and the former dismantled and spiked, that is all but six pieces which we succeeded in bringing off in safety. By 7 A. M. next morning we reached Ripley (nineteen miles). Here we re-organized and got into very respectable shape. The retreat was continued, pressed rapidly by the enemy. Our ammunition soon gave out, this the enemy soon discovered and pressed the harder. Our only hope now lay in continuing the retreat which we did to this place, where we arrived about 7 o'clock this morning.

"My losses in material of war was severe, being 16 guns and some 130 wagons. The horses of the artillery and mules of the train we brought away. As my troops became very greatly scattered and are constantly coming in in small parties, I am unable to estimate my loss in killed and wounded. I fear, however, it will prove severe, probably ten or twelve hundred. While the battle lasted it was well contested and I think the enemy's loss in killed and wounded will not fall short of our own.

"This, general, is a painful record, and yet it was the result of a series of unfortunate circumstances over which human ingenuity could have no control.

"The unprecedented rains so delayed our march across a desert country that the enemy had ample time to accumulate an overwhelming force in our front, and kept us so long in an exhausted region as to so starve and weaken our animals that they were unable to extricate the wagons and artillery from the mud.

"So far as I know every one did his duty well, and while they fought no troops ever fought better. The colored troops deserve great credit for the manner in which they stood to their work.

"This is a hasty and rather incoherent outline of our operations, but I will forward a more minute account as soon as the official reports can be received from division commanders.

"I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"S. D. STURGIS,

"Brig.-Gen. Commanding.

"To Maj.-Gen. C. C. WASHBURN, Commanding District W. Tenn."

An extract from a letter from Colonel Arthur T. Reeve, who commanded the 55th Colored Infantry in this fight, reads:

"Our (the Federal) command having been moved up on double-quick—a distance of about five miles—immediately before their arrival on the field and the consequent fact that this arm of our force went into the engagement very seriously blown, in fact, very nearly exhausted by heat and fatigue, with their ranks very much drawn out, were whipped in detail and overwhelmed by the very brilliant and vigorous assaults of your forces. When the engagement first began I was at the rear of the Federal column, in command of the train guard, and hence passed over the ground on the way to the battle-field after the balance of the army had passed, and am able to speak advisedly of the extreme exhaustion of the infantry, as I passed large numbers entirely prostrated by heat and fatigue, who did not reach the field of battle and must have fallen into your hands after the engagement."

[General Sturgis' Report, No. 2.]

"MEMPHIS, TENN., June 24, 1864.

"Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the expedition which marched from near La Fayette, Tenn., under my command on the 2nd instant. This expedition was organized and fitted out under the supervision of the major general commanding the District of West Tennessee and I assumed command of it on the morning of the 2nd of June, near the town of La Fayette, Tenn., in pursuance of Special Orders, No. 38, dated Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, Memphis, May 31, 1864, and which were received by me on the 1st inst. The strength of the command in round numbers was about 8,000 men,' (which included the following Phalanx regiments: 59th Regt., 61st Regt., 68th Regt., Battery I, 2nd Artillery, (Light,) 2 pieces.)

"My supply train, carrying rations for 18 days, consisted of 181 wagons, which with the regimental wagons made up a train of some 250 wagons. My instructions were substantially as follows, viz: To proceed to Corinth, Mississippi by way of Salem and Ruckersville, capture any force that might be there, then proceed south, destroying the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to Tupelo and Okolona and as far as possible towards Macon and Columbus with a portion of my force, thence to Grenada and back to Memphis. A discretion was allowed me as to the details of the movement where circumstances might arise which could not have been anticipated in my instructions. Owing to some misunderstanding on the part of the quartermaster, as to the point on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at which some forage was to have been deposited from the cars, there was some little delay occasioned in getting the column in motion.

"The following incidents of the march are taken from the journal kept from day to day by one of my staff, Capt. W. C. Rawolle, A. D. C. and A. A. A. G.:

"'Wednesday, June 1st.—Expedition started from Memphis and White's Station toward La Fayette.

"'Thursday, June 2nd.—The general and staff left Memphis on the 5 o'clock A. M. train and established headquarters at Leaks' House, near La Fayette, and assumed command. Cavalry moved to the intersection of State line and Early Grove roads, six miles from La Fayette. It rained at intervals all day and part of the night.

"'Friday, June 3rd.—Ordered the cavalry to move to within three four miles of Salem. Infantry marched to Lamar, 18 miles from La Fayette. Owing to the heavy rains during the day and the bad condition of the roads and bridges, the train could only move to within four miles of Lamar, and did not get into park until 11 o'clock P. M., the colored brigade remaining with the train as a guard.

"'Saturday, June 4th.—Informed General Grierson that the infantry and train under the most favorable circumstances could only make a few miles beyond Salem and to regulate his march accordingly. Train arrived at Lamar about noon, issued rations to the infantry and rested the animals. It rained heavily until 1 o'clock P. M., making the roads almost impassable. Moved headquarters to the Widow Spright's house, two miles west of Salem, and Colonel Hoge's brigade of infantry to Robinson's house, four miles from Salem.

"'Sunday, June 5th.—Infantry and train started at half past four o'clock A. M., and joined the cavalry, two miles east of Salem. At 10 o'clock A. M., issued rations to the cavalry and fed the forage collected by them. Infantry remained in camp during the day; cavalry moved to the intersection of the LaGrange and Ripley and the Salem and Ruckersville roads. Col. Joseph Karge, 2nd New Jersey, with 400 men, started at 6 P. M., with instructions to move via Ripley to Rienzi, to destroy the railroad; to proceed north, destroy bridge over Tuscumbia and to join General Grierson at Ruckersville. Heavy showers during the afternoon.

"'Monday, June 6th.—Infantry and train moved at 4 o'clock A. M., on the Ruckersville road. Commenced raining at 5 A. M., and continued at intervals all day. Progress very slow, marched 13 miles and made headquarters at Widow Childers, at intersection of the Saulsbury and Ripley and the Ruckersville and Salem roads. Cavalry moved to Ruckersville. The advance guard of the infantry encountered a small party of rebels about noon and chased them towards Ripley on La Grange and Ripley roads.

"'Tuesday, June 7th.—Upon information received from General Grierson that there was no enemy near Corinth, directed him to move toward Ellistown, on direct road from Ripley, and instruct Colonel Karge to join him by way of Blackland or Carrollsville. Infantry moved to Ripley and cavalry encamped on New Albany road two miles south. Encountered a small party of rebels near Widow Childers and drove them toward Ripley. In Ripley, met an advance of the enemy and drove them on New Albany road. Cavalry encountered about a regiment of rebel cavalry on that road and drove them south. Several showers during the afternoon, and the roads very bad.

"Wednesday, June 8th.—Received information at 4 o'clock A. M. that Colonel Karge was on an island in the Hatchie River and sent him 500 men and two howitzers as re-inforcements. Winslow's brigade of cavalry moved 6 miles on the Fulton Road. Infantry and train moved five miles on same road. Colonel Waring's brigade remained in Ripley awaiting return of Colonel Karge, who joined him at 5 o'clock P. M., having swam the Hatchie River. Rained hard during the night.

"'Thursday, June 9th.—Sent back to Memphis 400 sick and wounded men and 41 wagons. Cavalry and infantry moved to Stubbs', fourteen miles from Ripley; issued five days' rations (at previous camp.) Rained two hours in the evening.

"'Friday, June 10th.—Encountered the enemy at Brice's Cross-Roads, 23 miles from Ripley and six miles from Guntown.'

"At Ripley it became a serious question in my mind as to whether or not I should proceed any farther. The rain still fell in torrents; the artillery and wagons were literally mired down, and the starved and exhausted animals could with difficulty drag them along. Under these circumstances, I called together my division commanders and placed before them my views of our condition. At this interview, one brigade commander and two members of my staff were, incidentally, present also. I called their attention to the great delay we had undergone on account of the continuous rain and consequent bad condition of the roads; the exhausted condition of our animals; the great probability that the enemy would avail himself of the time thus afforded him to concentrate an overwhelming force against us in the vicinity of Tupelo and the utter hopelessness of saving our train or artillery in case of defeat, on account of the narrowness and general bad condition of the roads and the impossibility of procuring supplies of forage for the animals; all agreed with me in the probable consequences of defeat. Some thought our only safety lay in retracing our steps and abandoning the expedition. It was urged, however, (and with some propriety, too,) that inasmuch as I had abandoned a similar expedition only a few weeks before and given as my reasons for so doing, the "utter and entire destitution of the country," and that in the face of this we were again sent through the same country, it would be ruinous on all sides to return again without first meeting the enemy. Moreover, from all the information General Washburn had acquired, there could be no considerable force in our front and all my own information led to the same conclusion. To be sure my information was exceedingly meagre and unsatisfactory and had I returned I would have been totally unable to present any facts to justify my cause, or to show why the expedition might not have been successfully carried forward. All I could have presented would have been my conjectures as to what the enemy would naturally do under the circumstances and these would have availed but little against the idea that the enemy was scattered and had no considerable force in our front.

"Under these circumstances, and with a sad forboding of the consequences, I determined to move forward; keeping my force as compact as possible and ready for action at all times; hoping that we might succeed, and feeling that if we did not, yet our losses might at most be insignificant in comparison with the great benefits which might accrue to General Sherman by the depletion of Johnson's army to so large an extent.

"On the evening of the 8th, one day beyond Ripley, I assembled the commanders of infantry brigades at the headquarters of Colonel McMillen, and cautioned them as to the necessity of enforcing rigid discipline in their camps; keeping their troops always in hand and ready to act on a moment's notice. That it was impossible to gain any accurate or reliable information of the enemy, and that it behooved us to move and act constantly as though in his presence. That we were now where we might encounter him at any moment, and that we must under no circumstances allow ourselves to be surprised. On the morning of the 10th, the cavalry marched at half-past 5 o'clock and the infantry at seven, thus allowing the infantry to follow immediately in rear of the cavalry as it would take the cavalry a full hour and a half to clear their camp. The habitual order of march was as follows, viz: Cavalry with its artillery in advance; infantry with its artillery; next, and lastly, the supply train, guarded by the rear brigade with one of its regiments at the head, one near the middle and one with a section of artillery in the rear. A company of pioneers preceded the infantry for the purpose of repairing the roads, building bridges, &c., &c.

"On this morning, I had preceded the head of the infantry column and arrived at a point some five miles from camp, when I found an unusually bad place in the road and one that would require considerable time and labor to render practicable. While halted here to await the head of the column, I received a message from General Grierson that he had encountered a portion of the enemy's cavalry. In a few minutes more I received another message from him, saying the enemy numbered some 600 and were on the Baldwyn road. That he was himself at Brice's Cross-Roads and that his position was a good one and he would hold it. He was then directed to leave 600 or 700 men at the cross-roads, to precede the infantry on its arrival, on its march towards Guntown, and with the remainder of his forces to drive the enemy toward Baldwyn and there rejoin the main body by way of the line of the railroad, as I did not intend being drawn from my main purpose. Colonel McMillen arrived at this time and I rode forward toward the cross-roads. Before proceeding far, however, I sent a staff officer back directing Colonel McMillen to move up his advance brigade as rapidly as possible without distressing his troops. When I reached the cross-roads, found nearly all the cavalry engaged and the battle growing warm, but no artillery had yet opened on either side. We had four pieces of artillery at the cross-roads, but they had not been placed in position, owing to the dense woods on all sides and the apparent impossibility of using them to advantage. Finding, however, that our troops were being hotly pressed, I ordered one section to open on the enemy's reserves. The enemy's artillery soon replied, and with great accuracy, every shell bursting over and in the immediate vicinity of our guns.

"Frequent calls were now made for re-enforcements, but until the infantry should arrive, I had none to give. Colonel Winslow, 4th Iowa Cavalry, commanding a brigade and occupying a position on the Guntown road a little in advance of the cross-roads, was especially clamorous to be relieved and permitted to carry his brigade to the rear. Fearing that Colonel Winslow might abandon his position without authority, and knowing the importance of the cross-roads to us, I directed him in case he should be overpowered, to fall back slowly toward the cross-roads, thus contracting his line and strengthening his position. I was especially anxious on this point because through some misunderstanding, that I am yet unable to explain, the cavalry had been withdrawn without my knowledge from the left, and I was compelled to occupy the line, temporarily, with my escort, consisting of about 100 of the 19th Penn. Cavalry. This handful of troops under the gallant Lieut.-Colonel Hess, behaved very handsomely and held the line until the arrival of the infantry. About half-past 1 p. m. the infantry began to arrive. Col. Hodge's brigade was the first to reach the field and was placed in position by Colonel McMillen, when the enemy was driven a little. General Grierson now requested authority to withdraw the entire cavalry as it was exhausted and well nigh out of ammunition. This I authorized as soon as sufficient infantry was in position to permit it and he was directed to reorganize his command in the rear and hold it ready to operate on the flanks. In the mean time I had ordered a section of artillery to be placed in position on a knoll near the little bridge, some three or four hundred yards in the rear, for the purpose of opposing any attempt of the enemy to turn our left. I now went to this point to see that my orders had been executed and also to give directions for the management and protection of the wagon-train. I found the section properly posted and supported by the 72nd Ohio Infantry, with two companies thrown forward as skirmishers, and the whole under the superintendence of that excellent officer, Colonel Wilkins, of the 9th Minn. While here, the head of the wagon train, which had been reported still a mile and a half in rear, arrived. It was immediately ordered into an open field near where the cavalry were reorganizing, there to be turned round and carried farther toward the rear. The pressure on the right of the line was now becoming very great and General Grierson was directed to send a portion of his cavalry to that point. At this time I received a message from Colonel Hodge that he was satisfied that the movement on the right was a feint and that the real attack was being made on the left. Another section of artillery was now placed in position a little to the rear of Colonel Wilkins, but bearing on the left of our main line, and a portion of the cavalry was thrown out as skirmishers. The cavalry which had been sent to the extreme right began now to give way, and at the same time the enemy began to appear in force in rear of the extreme left, while Colonel McMillen required re-enforcements in the centre. I now endeavored to get hold of the colored brigade which formed the guard to the train. While traversing the short distance to where the head of that brigade should be found, the main line began to give way at various points; order soon gave way to confusion and confusion to panic. I sent an aid to Col. McMillen informing him that I was unable to render him any additional assistance, and that he must do all in his power with what he had to hold his position until I could form a line to protect his retreat. On reaching the head of the supply train, Lieut.-Colonel Hess was directed to place in position in a wood the first regiment of colored troops I could find. This was done, and it is due to those troops to say here that they stood their ground well and rendered valuable aid to Colonel McMillen, who was soon after compelled to withdraw from his original line and take up new positions in rear. It was now 5 o'clock P. M. For seven hours, these gallant officers and men had held their ground against overwhelming numbers, but at last overpowered and exhausted they were compelled to abandon not only the field, but many of their gallant comrades who had fallen to the mercy of the enemy. Everywhere the army now drifted toward the rear and was soon altogether beyond control. I requested General Grierson to accompany me and to aid in checking the fleeing column and establishing a new line. By dint of entreaty and force and the aid of several officers, whom I called to my assistance, with pistols in their hands we at length succeeded in checking some 1200 or 1500 and establishing them in a line of which Colonel Wilkins, 9th Minnesota, was placed in command. About this time it was reported to me that Col. McMillen was driving the enemy. I placed but little faith in this report, yet disseminated it freely for the good effect it might produce upon the troops. In a few minutes, however, the gallant Colonel McMillen, sad and disheartened, arrived himself, and reported his lines broken and in confusion. The new line under Colonel Wilkins also gave way soon after and it was now impossible to exercise any further control. The road became crowded and jammed with troops; the wagons and artillery sinking into the deep mud became inextricable and added to the general confusion which now prevailed. No power could now check or control the panic-stricken mass as it swept toward the rear, led off by Colonel Winslow at the head of his brigade of cavalry, and who never halted until he had reached Stubbs', ten miles in rear. This was the greater pity as his brigade was nearly, if not entirely, intact, and might have offered considerable resistance to the advancing foe. About 10 o'clock P. M., I reached Stubbs' in person, where I found Colonel Winslow and his brigade. I then informed him that his was the only organized body of men I had been able to find, and directed him to add to his own every possible force he could rally, as they passed, and take charge of the rear, remaining in position until all should have passed. I also informed him that on account of the extreme darkness of the night and the wretched condition of the road, I had little hope of saving anything more than the troops, and directed him therefore to destroy all wagons and artillery which he might find blocking up the road and preventing the passage of the men. In this way about 200 wagons and 14 pieces of artillery were lost, many of the wagons being burned and the artillery spiked and otherwise mutilated; the mules and horses were brought away. By 7 o'clock A. M., of the 11th, we had reorganized at Ripley, and the army presented quite a respectable appearance, and would have been able to accomplish an orderly retreat from that point but for the unfortunate circumstances that the cartridge boxes were well nigh exhausted. At 7 o'clock the column was again put in motion on the Salem road, the cavalry in advance, followed by the infantry. The enemy pressed heavily on the rear, and there was now nothing left but to keep in motion so as to prevent the banking up of the rear, and to pass all cross-roads before the enemy could reach them, as the command was in no condition to offer determined resistance, whether attacked in the front or the rear. At 8 o'clock a. m. on the 12th, the column reached Colliersville, worn out and exhausted by the fatigues of fighting and marching for two days and two nights without rest and without eating. About noon of the same day a train arrived from Memphis, bringing some 2,000 infantry, commanded by Colonel Wolf, and supplies for my suffering men, and I determined to remain here until next day for the purpose of resting and affording protection to many who had dropped by the wayside, through fatigue and other causes. Learning, however, toward evening, that the commander at White's Station had information of a large force of the enemy approaching that place from the southeast, and knowing that my men were in no condition to offer serious resistance to an enemy presenting himself across my line of march, I informed the general commanding the district, by telegraph, that I deemed it prudent to continue my march to White's Station. Accordingly, at 9 p. m., the column marched again, and arrived at White's Station at daylight next morning. This report having already become more circumstantial than was anticipated, I have purposely omitted the details of our march from Ripley to White's Station, as they would extend it to a tiresome length, but would respectfully refer you for these to the sub-reports herewith enclosed. Casualties are as follows:

"Killed, 223, wounded, 394; missing, 1623; total, 2240. That our loss was great, is true; yet that it was not much greater is due in an eminent degree to the personal exertions of that model soldier, Col. W. L. McMillen, of the 95th Ohio Infantry, who commanded the infantry, and to the able commanders under him.

"The strength of the enemy is variously estimated by my most intelligent officers at from 15,000 to 20,000 men. A very intelligent sergeant who was captured and remained five days in the hands of the enemy, reports the number of the enemy actually engaged, to have been 12,000, and that two divisions of infantry were held in reserve. It may appear strange that so large a force of the enemy could be in our vicinity and we be ignorant of the fact, but the surprise will exist only in the minds of those who are not familiar with the difficulty, (I may even say impossibility) of acquiring reliable information in the heart of the enemy's country. Our movements and numbers are always known to the enemy, because every woman and child is one of them, but we, as everybody knows who has had any experience in this war, can only learn the movements of the enemy and his numbers by actually fighting for the information; and in that case the knowledge often comes too late.

"While I will not prolong this already extended report by recording individual acts of good conduct, and the names of many brave officers and men who deserve mention, but will respectfully refer you for these to the reports of division and brigade commanders, yet I cannot refrain from expressing my high appreciation of the valuable services rendered by that excellent and dashing officer, Col. Joseph Karge, of the 2nd New Jersey Vols., in his reconnoissance to Corinth and his subsequent management of the rear-guard, during a part of the retreat, fighting and defending the rear during one whole afternoon and throughout the entire night following.

"To the officers of my staff,—Lieut.-Col. J. C. Hess, 19th Pa. Cavalry, commanding escort, Capt. W. C. Rawolle, A. D. C. and A. A. A. G.; Capt. W. C. Belden, 2nd Iowa Cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieut. E. Caulkins 7th Indiana Cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieut. Samuel (name illegible) 19th Penn. Cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieut. Dement, A. A. Q. M.; Lieut. W. H. Stratton, 7th Ills. Cavalry, A. A. C. S.,—whose names appear in no other report, I am especially grateful, for the promptness and zeal with which my orders were executed at all times and often under trying and hazardous circumstances.

"I am, major, very respectfully your obedient servant,

S. D. STURGIS, MAJ. W. H. MORGAN, A. A. G., Brig.-Gen. Commanding. Hdqrs. Dist. West Tenn., Memphis, Tenn.

"Amid these scenes we noted the arrival of 95 more men; those who had belonged to a raid sent from Memphis, Tenn., under command of General Sturgis, and were attacked and badly defeated by the rebel General Forrest, at a place in Mississippi. General Sturgis is said to have been intoxicated during the engagement, and that just as soon as he saw things were likely to go against him, he turned away with a portion of his cavalry, and sought to save himself from capture.—'Life and Death in Rebel Prisons.'"

Notwithstanding the arrangements usually and speedily entered into by two belligerent powers for the exchange of prisoners of war, it proved a most difficult task for the Federal Government to consummate an arrangement with the confederates, and much suffering was caused among the prisoners in the hands of the latter while negotiations were in progress. The agreement entered into by the commissioners, after a long delay, did not anticipate there being any black soldiers to exchange; nor would the confederate authorities thereafter allow the terms of the cartel to apply to the blacks, because Jefferson Davis and the confederate Congress regarded it as an outrage against humanity, and the rules of civilized warfare to arm the negroes against their masters.

It was a year after the black soldiers had become a part of the Union forces before even a quasi acknowledgment of their rights as prisoners was noted in Richmond. The grounds upon which the greatest difficulty lingered was the refusal of the Federal government at first to accord belligerent rights to the confederates but this difficulty was finally overcome in July, 1862, and the exchange of prisoners proceeded with until the confederate authorities refused to count the black soldiers captured in the interpretation of the cartel. But the time arrived when Grant assumed command of the armies, when it was no longer an open question, for the confederate Congress began devising plans for arming the slaves.

However, the inhuman treatment did not cease with "irresponsible parties," whose conduct was doubtless approved by the rebel authorities, Jefferson Davis having declared General Butler an outlaw, and committed him and his officers and black soldiers to the mercy of a chivalry which affected to regard them as mercenaries. With this spirit infused in the confederate army, what else than barbarity could be expected?



FOOTNOTES:

[28] Among the captured rebel flags now in the War Department, Washington, D. C., are several Black Flags. No. 205 was captured near North Mountain, Md., Aug. 1st, 1864. Another Captured from General Pillow's men at Fort Donelson, is also among the rebel archives in that Department. Several of them were destroyed by the troops capturing them, as at Pascagoula, Miss., and near Grand Gulf on the Mississippi.

[29] General Brisbin, in his account of the expedition which, in the Winter of 1864, left Bean Station, Tenn., under command of General Stoneman, for the purpose of destroying the confederate Salt Works in West Virginia, says the confederates after capturing some of the soldiers of the Sixth Phalanx Cavalry Regiment, butchered them. His statement is as follows:

"For the last two days a force of Confederate cavalry, under Witcher, had been following our command picking up stragglers and worn-out horses in our rear. Part of our troops were composed of negroes and these the Confederates killed as fast as they caught them, laying the dead bodies by the roadside with pieces of paper pinned to their clothing, on which were written such warnings as the following: 'This is the way we treat all nigger soldiers,' and, 'This is the fate of nigger soldiers who fight against the South.' We did not know what had been going on in our rear until we turned about to go back from Wytheville, when we found the dead colored soldiers along the road as above described. General Burbridge was very angry and wanted to shoot a Confederate prisoner for every one of his colored soldiers he found murdered, and would undoubtedly have done so had he not been restrained. As it was, the whole corps was terribly excited by the atrocious murders committed by Witcher's men, and if Witcher had been caught he would have been shot."

This gallant soldier,(?) twenty years after the close of the war, writes about the incidents and happenings during the march of the army to Saltville, and says:

"Before we reached Marion we encountered Breckenridge's advance and charged it vigorously driving it back in confusion along the Marion and Saltville road for several miles. In one of these charges (for there were several of them and a sort of running fight for several miles) one of Witcher's men was captured and brought in. He was reported to me and I asked him what his name was and to what command he belonged. He gave me his name and said 'Witcher's command.' Hardly were the words out of his mouth before a negro soldier standing near raised his carbine and aimed at the Confederate soldier's breast. I called out and sprang forward, but was too late to catch the gun. The negro fired and the poor soldier fell badly wounded. Instantly the negro was knocked down by our white soldiers, disarmed and tied. I drew my revolver to blow his brains out for his terrible crime, but the black man never flinched. All he said was, pointing to the Confederate soldier, 'He killed my comrades; I have killed him.' The negro was taken away and put among the prisoners. The Provost Marshal had foolishly changed the white guard over the prisoners and placed them under some colored troops. An officer came galloping furiously to the front and said the negroes were shooting the prisoners. General Burbridge told me to go back quickly and do whatever I pleased in his name to restore order. It was a lively ride, as the prisoners were more than four miles back, being forced along the road as rapidly as possible toward Marion. All the prisoners, except a few wounded men, were on foot, and of course they could not keep up with the cavalry. I soon reached them and never shall I forget that sight while I live. Men with sabres were driving the poor creatures along the road like beasts. I halted the motley crew and scolded the officer for his inhumanity. He said he had orders to keep the prisoners up with the column and he was simply trying to obey his orders. As I was General Burbridge's chief of staff and all orders were supposed to emanate from my office, I thought I had better not continue the conversation. As it was, I said such orders were at an end and I would myself take charge of the prisoners."

[30] "When the successful attempt was made, by tunneling, to escape from Libby Prison in 1862, many of the fugitives were honorably harbored by this unfortunate class till a more quiet opportunity occurred for leaving the city. This I have from one of the escaped officers."



CHAPTER XI.

THE PHALANX IN VIRGINIA.

The laurels won by the Phalanx in the Southern States, notwithstanding the "no quarter" policy, was proof of its devotion to the cause of liberty and the old flag, which latter, until within a short period had been but a symbol of oppression to the black man; Cailloux had reddened it with his life's blood, and Carney, in a seething fire had planted it on the ramparts of Wagner. The audacious bravery of the Phalanx had wrung from Generals Banks and Gillmore congratulatory orders, while the loyal people of the nation poured out unstinted praises. Not a breach of discipline marred the negro soldier's record; not one cowardly act tarnished their fame. Grant pronounced them gallant and reliable, and Weitzel was willing to command them.

In New York City, where negroes had been hung to lamp posts, and where a colored orphan asylum had been sacked and burned, crowds gathered in Broadway and cheered Phalanx regiments on their way to the front. General Logan, author of the Illinois Black Code, greeted them as comrades, and Jefferson Davis finally accorded to them the rights due captured soldiers as prisoners of war. Congress at last took up the question of pay, and placed the black on an equal footing with the white soldiers. Their valor, excelled by no troops in the field, had finally won full recognition from every quarter, and henceforth they were to share the full glory as well as the toils of their white comrades-in-arms. Not until those just rights and attentions were attained, was the Phalanx allowed, to any great extent, to show its efficiency and prowess in the manoeuvres in Virginia and vicinity, where that magnificent "Army of Northern Virginia," the hope and the pride of the Confederacy, was operating against the Federal government. But when General Grant came to direct the movements of the Eastern armies of the United States, there was a change. He had learned from his experience at Vicksburg and other places in his western campaigns, that the negro soldiers were valuable; that they could be fully relied upon in critical times, and their patriotic zeal had made a deep impression upon him. Therefore, as before stated, there were changes, and quite a good many Phalanx regiments—numbering about 20,000 men—were taken from Southern and Western armies and transferred to the different armies in Virginia.

The 19th Army Corps sent one brigade. General Gillmore brought a brigade from the Tenth Army Corps. At least ten thousand of them were veterans, and had driven many confederates out of their breastworks.

The world never saw such a spectacle as America presented in the winter and early spring of 1864. The attempt to capture Richmond and Petersburg had failed. The Army of the Potomac lay like a weary lion under cover, watching its opponent. Bruised, but spirited and defiant, it had driven, and in turn had been driven time and again, by its equally valient foe. It had advanced and retreated until the soldiers were foot-sore from marching and counter-marching, crossing and re-crossing the now historic streams of the Old Dominion. Of all this, the loyal people were tired and demanded of the Administration a change. The causes of the failures to take the confederate capitol were not so much the fault of the commanders of the brave army as that of the authorities at Washington, whose indecision and interference had entailed almost a disgrace upon McClellan, Hooker, Burnside and Meade. But finally the people saw the greatest of the difficulties, and demanded its removal, which the Administration signified its willingness to do. Then began an activity at the North, East and West, such as was never before witnessed. The loyal heart was again aroused by the President's call for troops, and all realized the necessity of a more sagacious policy, and the importance of bringing the war to a close. The lion of the South must be bearded in his lair, and forced to surrender Richmond, the Confederate Capitol, that had already cost the Government millions of dollars, and the North thousands of lives. The cockade city,—Petersburg,—like the Gibralter of the Mississippi, should haul down the confederate banner from her breastworks; in fact, Lee must be vanquished. That was the demand of the loyal nation, and right well did they enter into preparations to consummate it; placing brave and skillful officers in command.



The whole North became a recruiting station. Sumner, Wilson, Stevens and Sherman, in Congress, and Greeley, Beecher, Philips and Curtis, with the press, had succeeded in placing the fight upon the highest plane of civilization, and linked freedom to the cause of the Union thus making the success of one the success of the other,—"Liberty and Union, one and inseparable." What patriotism should fail in accomplishing, bounties—National, State, county, city and township—were to induce and effect. The depleted ranks of the army were filled to its maximum, and with a hitherto victorious and gallant leader would be hurled against the fortifications of the Confederacy with new energy and determination.

Early in January, General Burnside was ordered again to take command of the Ninth Army Corps, and to recruit its strength to fifty thousand effective men, which he immediately began to do. General Butler, then in command of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, began the organization of the Army of the James, collecting at Norfolk, Portsmouth and on the Peninsula, the forces scattered throughout his Department, and to recruit Phalanx regiments. In March, General Grant was called to Washington, and received the appointment of Lieutenant General, and placed in command of the armies of the Republic. He immediately began their reorganization, as a preliminary to attacking Lee's veteran army of northern Virginia.

As has before been stated, the negro had, up to this time, taken no very active part in the battles fought in Virginia. The seed of prejudice sown by Generals McDowell and McClellan at the beginning of hostilities, had ripened into productive fruit. The Army of the Potomac being early engaged in apprehending and returning runaway slaves to their presumed owners, had imbibed a bitter, unrelenting hatred for the poor, but ever loyal, negro. To this bitterness the Emancipation Proclamation gave a zest, through the pro-slavery press at the North, which taunted the soldiers with "fighting to free the negroes." This feeling had served to practically keep the negro, as a soldier, out of the Army of the Potomac.

General Burnside, upon assuming his command, asked for and obtained permission from the War Department to raise and unite a division of Negro troops to the 9th Army Corps. Annapolis, Md., was selected as the "depot and rendezvous," and very soon Camp Stanton had received its allowance of Phalanx regiments for the Corps. Early in April, the camp was broken, and the line of march taken for Washington. It was rumored throughout the city that the 9th Corps would pass through there, and that about 6,000 Phalanx men would be among the troops. The citizens were on the qui vive; members of Congress and the President were eager to witness the passage of the Corps.

At nine o'clock on the morning of the 25th of April, the head of the column entered the city, and at eleven the troops were marching down New York Avenue. Halting a short distance from the corner of 14th street, the column closed up, and prepared to pay the President a marching salute, who, with General Burnside and a few friends, was awaiting their coming. Mr. Lincoln and his party occupied a balcony over the entrance of Willard's Hotel. The scene was one of great beauty and animation. The day was superbly clear; the soft atmosphere of the early spring was made additionally pleasant by a cool breeze; rain had fallen the previous night, and there was no dust to cause discomfort to the soldiers or spectators. The troops marched and appeared well; their soiled and battered flags bearing inscriptions of battles of six States. The corps had achieved almost the first success of the war in North Carolina; it had hastened to the Potomac in time to aid in rescuing the Capitol, when Lee made his first Northern invasion; it won glory at South Mountain, and made the narrow bridge at Antietam, forever historic; it had likewise reached Kentucky in time to aid in driving the confederates from that State. Now it appeared with recruited ranks, and new regiments of as good blood as ever was poured out in the cause of right; and with a new element—those whom they had helped set free from the thraldom of slavery—whom they were proud to claim as comrades.

Their banners were silent, effective witnesses of their valor and their sacrifices; Bull's Run, Ball's Bluff, Roanoke, Newburn, Gaines' Mills, Mechanicsville, Seven Pines, Savage Station, Glendale, Malvern, Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, Antietam, South Mountain, Knoxville, Vicksburg, Port Hudson and Gettysburg, were emblazoned in letters of gold. The firm and soldierly bearing of the veterans, the eager and expectant countenances of the men and officers of the new regiments, the gay trappings of the cavalry, the thorough equipment and fine condition of the artillery, the clattering of hoofs, the clanking of sabres, the drum-beat, the bugle call, and the music of the bands were all subjects of interest. The President beheld the scene. Pavement, sidewalks, windows and roofs were crowded with people. A division of veterans passed, saluting the President and their commander with cheers. And then, with full ranks—platoons extending from sidewalk to sidewalk—brigades which had never been in battle, for the first time shouldered arms for their country; they who even then were disfranchised and were not American citizens, yet they were going out to fight for the flag. Their country was given them by the tall, pale, benevolent hearted man standing upon the balcony. For the first time, they beheld their benefactor. They were darker hued than their veteran comrades, but they cheered as lustily, "hurrah, hurrah, hurrah for Massa Linkun! Three cheers for the President!" They swung their caps, clapped their hands and shouted their joy. Long, loud and jubilant were the rejoicings of these redeemed sons of Africa. Regiment after regiment of stalwart men,—slaves once, but freemen now,—with steady step and even ranks, passed down the street, moving on to the Old Dominion. It was the first review of the negro troops by the President. Mr. Lincoln himself seemed greatly pleased, and acknowledged the plaudits and cheers of the Phalanx soldiers with a dignified kindness and courtesy. It was a spectacle which made many eyes grow moist, and left a life-long impression. Thus the corps that had never lost a flag or a gun, marched through the National Capitol, crossed long bridge and went into camp near Alexandria, where it remained until the 4th of May.

The Phalanx regiments composing the 4th division were the 19th, 23rd, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 31st, 39th and 43rd, commanded by General E. Ferrero.

The Army of the James, under General Butler, which was to act in conjunction with the Army of the Potomac, under Meade, was composed of the 10th and 18th Corps. The 10th Corps had two brigades of the Phalanx, consisting of the 7th, 9th, 29th, 16th, 8th, 41st, 45th and 127th Regiments, commanded by Colonels James Shaw, Jr., and Ulysses Doubleday, and constituted the 3rd division of that Corps commanded by Brigadier-General Wm. Birney.

The 3rd division of the 18th Corps, commanded by Brigadier-General Charles G. Paine, was composed of the 1st, 22nd, 37th, 5th, 36th, 38th, 4th, 6th, 10th, 107th, 117th, 118th and 2nd Cavalry, with Colonels Elias Wright, Alonzo G. Draper, John W. Ames and E. Martindale as brigade commanders of the four brigades. A cavalry force numbering about two thousand, comprising the 1st and 2nd, was under command of Colonel West,[31] making not less than 20,000 of the Phalanx troops, including the 4th Division with the Ninth Corps, and augmenting Butler's force to 47,000, concentrated at Yorktown and Gloucester Point.

On the 28th of April, Butler received his final orders, and on the night of the 4th of May embarked his troops on transports, descended the York river, passed Fortress Monroe and ascended the James River. Convoyed by a fleet of armored war vessels and gunboats, his transports reached Bermuda Hundreds on the afternoon of the 5th. General Wilde, with a brigade of the Phalanx, occupied Fort Powhatan, on the south bank of the river, and Wilson's Wharf, about five miles below on the north side of the James, with the remainder of his division of 5,000 of the Phalanx. General Hinks landed at City Point, at the mouth of the Appomattox. The next morning the troops advanced to Trent's, with their left resting on the Appomattox, near Walthall, and the right on the James, and intrenched. In the meantime, Butler telegraphed Grant:

"OFF CITY POINT, VA., May 5th.

"LIEUT. GEN. GRANT, Commanding Armies of the United States, Washington, D. C.:

"We have seized Wilson's Wharf Landing; a brigade of Wilde's colored troops are there; at Fort Powhatan landing two regiments of the same brigade have landed. At City Point, Hinks' division, with the remaining troops and battery, have landed. The remainder of both the 18th and 10th Army Corps are being landed at Bermuda Hundreds, above Appomattox. No opposition experienced thus far, the movement was comparatively a complete surprise. Both army corps left Yorktown during last night. The monitors are all over the bar at Harrison's landing and above City Point. The operations of the fleet have been conducted to-day with energy and success. Gens. Smith and Gillmore are pushing the landing of the men. Gen. Graham with the army gunboats, lead the advance during the night, capturing the signal station of the rebels. Colonel West, with 1800 cavalry, made several demonstrations from Williamsburg yesterday morning. Gen. Rantz left Suffolk this morning with his cavalry, for the service indicated during the conference with the Lieut.-General. The New York flag-of-truce boat was found lying at the wharf with four hundred prisoners, whom she had not time to deliver. She went up yesterday morning. We are landing troops during the night, a hazardous service in the face of the enemy.

"BENJ. F. BUTLER,

"A. F. PUFFER, Capt. and A. D. C. Maj.-Gen. Commanding."

About two miles in front of their line ran the Richmond & Petersburg Railroad, near which the enemy was encountered. Butler's movements being in concert with that of the Army of the Potomac and the 9th Corps,—the latter as yet an independent organization.

General Meade, with the Army of the Potomac, numbering 120,000 effective men, crossed the Rapidan en route for the Wilderness, each soldier carrying fifty rounds of ammunition and three days rations. The supply trains were loaded with ten days forage and subsistence. The advance was in two columns, General Warren being on the right and General Hancock on the left. Sedgwick followed closely upon Warren and crossed the Rapidan at Germania Ford. The Ninth Corps received its orders on the 4th, whereupon General Burnside immediately put the Corps in motion toward the front. Bivouacking at midnight, the line of march was again taken up at daylight, and at night the Rapidan was crossed at Germania Ford. The corps marched on a road parallel to that of its old antagonist, General Longstreet's army, which was hastening to assist Lee, who had met the Army of the Potomac in the entanglements of the wilderness, where a stubborn and sanguinary fight raged for two days. General Ferrero's division, composed of the Phalanx regiments, reached Germania Ford on the morning of the 6th, with the cavalry, and reported to General Sedgwick, of the 6th Corps, who had the care of the trains. The enemy was projecting an attack upon the rear of the advancing columns. Gen. Ferrero was ordered to guard with his Phalanx division, the bridges, roads and trains near and at the Rapidan river. That night the confederates attacked Sedgwick in force; wisely the immense supply trains had been committed to the care of the Phalanx, and the enemy was driven back before daylight, while the trains were securely moved up closer to the advance. General Grant, finding that the confederates were not disposed to continue the battle, began the movement toward Spottsylvania Court House on the night of the 7th. The 9th Corps brought up the rear, with the Phalanx division and cavalry covering the trains.

Butler and his Phalanx troops, as we have seen, was within six miles of Petersburg, and on the 7th, Generals Smith and Gillmore reached the railroad near Port Walthall Junction, and commenced destroying it; the confederates attacked them, but were repulsed. Col. West, on the north side of the James River, forded the Chickahominy with the Phalanx cavalry, and arrived opposite City Point, having destroyed the railroad for some distance on that side.

Leaving General Hinks with his Phalanx division to hold City Point, on the 9th Butler again moved forward to break up the railroad which the forces under Smith and Gillmore succeeded in doing, thus separating Beaureguard's force from Lee's. He announced the result of his operation's in the following message to Washington:

"May 9th, 1864.

"Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With one thousand and seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the Chickahominy and have safely brought them to our present position. These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advanced pickets toward Richmond. General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same day with our movement up James river, forced the Blackwater, burned the railroad bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting in two Beauregard's force at that point. We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got possession, which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies. Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south, by the cutting of the railroad by Kautz. That portion which reached Petersburg under Hill, I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a well contested fight. General Grant will not be troubled with any further re-inforcements to Lee from Beaureguard's force.

"BENJ. F. BUTLER, Major-General."

But for having been misinformed as to Lee's retreating on Richmond,—which led him to draw his forces back into his intrenchments,—Butler would have undoubtedly marched triumphantly into Petersburg. The mistake gave the enemy holding the approaches to that city time to be re-enforced, and Petersburg soon became well fortified and garrisoned. Beaureguard succeeded in a few days time in concentrating in front of Butler 25,000 troops, thus checking the latter's advance toward Richmond and Petersburg, on the south side of the James, though skirmishing went on at various points.

General Grant intended to have Butler advance and capture Petersburg, while General Meade, with the Army of the Potomac, advanced upon Richmond from the north bank of the James river. Gen. Butler failed to accomplish more than his dispatches related, though his forces entered the city of Petersburg, captured Chester Station, and destroyed the railroad connection between Petersburg and Richmond. Failure to support his troops and to intrench lost him all he had gained, and he returned to his intrenchments at Bermuda Hundreds.

The Phalanx (Hinks division) held City Point and other stations on the river, occasionally skirmishing with the enemy, who, ever mindful of the fact that City Point was the base of supplies for the Army of the James, sought every opportunity to raid it, but they always found the Phalanx ready and on the alert.

After the battle of Drewry's Bluff, May 16th, Butler thought to remain quiet in his intrenchments, but Grant, on the 22nd, ordered him to send all his troops, save enough to hold City Point, to join the Army of the Potomac; whereupon General W. F. Smith, with 16,000 men, embarked for the White House, on the Pamunky river, Butler retaining the Phalanx division and the Cavalry. Thus ended the operations of the Army of the James, until Grant crossed the river with the army of the Potomac.



On the 13th of May, Grant determined upon a flank movement toward Bowling Green, with a view of making Port Royal, instead of Fredericksburg, his depot for supplies. Sending his reserve artillery to Belle Plain, he prepared to advance. It was in this manoeuvre that Lee, for the last time, attacked the Federal forces, outside of cover, in any important movement. The attempt to change the base of supply was indeed a hazardous move for Grant; it necessitated the moving of his immense train, numbering four thousand wagons, used in carrying rations, ammunition and supplies for his army, and transportation of the badly wounded to the rear, where they could be cared for.

Up to this time the Wilderness campaign had been a continuous fight and march. The anxiety which Grant felt for his train, is perhaps best told by himself:

"My movements are terribly embarrassed by our immense wagon train. It could not be avoided, however."

It was the only means by which the army could obtain needful supplies, and was consequently indispensable. It was the near approach to the train that made the confederates often fight so desperately, for they knew if they could succeed in capturing a wagon they would probably get something to eat. Soon after the advance began, it was reported to Grant, that the confederate cavalry was in the rear, in search of the trains. On the 14th he ordered General Ferrero to "keep a sharp lookout for this cavalry, and if you can attack it with your (Phalanx) infantry and (white) cavalry, do so." On the 19th Ferrero, with his Phalanx division, (4th division, 9th Corps) was on the road to Fredericksburg, in rear of and to the right of General Tyler's forces, in the confederates' front. The road formed Grant's direct communication with his base, and here the confederates, under Ewell attacked the Federal troops. Grant sent this dispatch to Ferrero:

"The enemy have crossed the Ny on the right of our lines, in considerable force, and may possibly detach a force to move on Fredericksburg. Keep your cavalry pickets well out on the plank road, and all other roads leading west and south of you. If you find the enemy moving infantry and artillery to you, report it promptly. In that case take up strong positions and detain him all you can, turning all your trains back to Fredericksburg, and whatever falling back you may be forced to do, do it in that direction."

The confederates made a dash for the train and captured twenty-seven wagons, but before they had time to feast off of their booty the Phalanx was upon them. The enemy fought with uncommon spirit; it was the first time "F. F. V's," the chivalry of the South,—composing the Army of Northern Virginia,—had met the negro soldiers, and true to their instinctive hatred of their black brothers, they gave them the best they had; lead poured like rain for a while, and then came a lull. Ferrero knew what it meant, and prepared for their coming. A moment more and the accustomed yell rang out above the roar of the artillery. The confederates charged down upon the Phalanx, but to no purpose, save to make the black line more stable. They retaliated, and the confederates were driven as the gale drives chaff, the Phalanx recapturing the wagons and saving Grant's line of communication. General Badeau, speaking of their action, in his military history of Grant, says:

"It was the first time at the East when colored troops had been engaged in any important battle, and the display of soldierly qualities won a frank acknowledgment from both troops and commanders, not all of whom had before been willing to look upon negroes as comrades. But after that time, white soldiers in the army of the Potomac were not displeased to receive the support of black ones; they had found the support worth having."

Ferrero had the confidence of his men, who were ever ready to follow where Grant ordered them to be led.

But this was not the last important battle the Phalanx took part in. Butler, after sending the larger portion of his forces to join the Army of the Potomac, was not permitted to remain quiet in his intrenchments. The confederates felt divined to destroy, if not capture, his base, and therefore were continually striving to break through the lines. On the 24th of May, General Fitzhugh Lee made a dash with his cavalry upon Wilson's Wharf, Butler's most northern outpost, held by two Phalanx Regiments of General Wilde's brigade. Lee's men had been led to believe that it was only necessary to yell at the "niggers" in order to make them leave the Post, but in this affair they found a foe worthy of their steel. They fought for several hours, when finally the confederate troops beat a retreat. An eye witness of the fight says:

"The chivalry of Fitzhugh Lee and his cavalry division was badly worsted in the contest last Tuesday with negro troops, composing the garrison at Wilson's Landing; the chivalry made a gallant fight, however. The battle began at half-past twelve P. M., and ended at six o'clock, when the chivalry retired, disgusted and defeated. Lee's men dismounted far in the rear, and fought as infantry; they drove in the pickets and skirmishers to the intrenchments, and made several valiant charges upon our works. To make an assault, it was necessary to come across an opening in front of our position, up to the very edge of a deep and impassable ravine. The rebels, with deafening yells, made furious onsets, but the negroes did not flinch, and the mad assailants, discomforted, returned to cover with shrunken ranks. The rebels' fighting was very wicked; it showed that Lee's heart was bent on taking the negroes at any cost. Assaults on the center having failed, the rebels tried first the left, and then the right flank, with no greater success. When the battle was over, our loss footed up, one man killed outright, twenty wounded, and two missing. Nineteen rebels were prisoners in our hands. Lee's losses must have been very heavy; the proof thereof was left on the ground. Twenty-five rebel bodies lay in the woods unburied, and pools of blood unmistakably told of other victims taken away. The estimate, from all the evidence carefully considered, puts the enemy's casualties at two hundred. Among the corpses Lee left on the field, was that of Major Breckenridge, of the 2nd Virginia Cavalry. There is no hesitation here in acknowledging the soldierly qualities which the colored men engaged in the fight have exhibited. Even the officers who have hitherto felt no confidence in them are compelled to express themselves mistaken. General Wilde, commanding the Post, says that the troops stood up to their work like veterans."

Newspaper correspondents were not apt to overstate the facts, nor to give too much favorable coloring to the Phalanx in those days. Very much of the sentiment in the army—East and West—was manufactured by them. The Democratic partizan press at the North, especially in New York and Ohio, still engaged in throwing paper bullets at the negro soldiers, who were shooting lead bullets at the country's foes.

The gallantry and heroic courage of the Phalanx in the Departments of the Gulf and South, and their bloody sacrifices, had not been sufficient to stop the violent clamor and assertions of those journals, that the "niggers won't fight!"

Many papers favorable to the Emancipation; opposed putting negro troops in battle in Virginia. But to all these bomb-proof opinions Grant turned a deaf ear, and when and where necessity required it, he hurled his Phalanx brigades against the enemy as readily as he did the white troops. The conduct of the former was, nevertheless, watched eagerly by the correspondents of the press who were with the army, and when they began to chronicle the achievements of the Phalanx, the prejudice began to give way, and praises were substituted in the place of their well-worn denunciations. A correspondent of the New York Herald thus wrote in May:

"The conduct of the colored troops, by the way, in the actions of the last few days, is described as superb. An Ohio soldier said to me to-day, 'I never saw men fight with such desperate gallantry as those negroes did. They advanced as grim and stern as death, and when within reach of the enemy struck about them with a pitiless vigor, that was almost fearful.' Another soldier said to me, 'These negroes never shrink, nor hold back, no matter what the order. Through scorching heat and pelting storms, if the order comes, they march with prompt, ready feet.' Such praise is great praise, and it is deserved. The negroes here who have been slaves, are loyal, to a man, and on our occupation of Fredericksburg, pointed out the prominent secessionists, who were at once seized by our cavalry and put in safe quarters. In a talk with a group of faithful fellows, I discovered in them all a perfect understanding of the issues of the conflict, and a grand determination to prove themselves worthy of the place and privileges to which they are to be exalted."

The ice was thus broken, and then each war correspondent found it his duty to write in deservedly glowing terms of the Phalanx.

The newspaper reports of the engagements stirred the blood of the Englishman, and he eschewed his professed love for the freedom of mankind, and particularly that of the American negro. The London Times, in the following article, lashed the North for arming the negroes to shoot the confederates, forgetting, perhaps, that England employed negroes against the colonist in 1775, and at New Orleans, in 1814, had her black regiments to shoot down the fathers of the men whom it now sought to uphold, in rebellion against the government of the United States:

"THE NEGRO UNION SOLDIERS.

"Six months have now passed from the time Mr. Lincoln issued his proclamation abolishing slavery in the States of the Southern Confederacy. To many it may seem that this measure has failed of the intended effect and this is doubtless in some respects the case. It was intended to frighten the Southern whites into submission, and it has only made them more fierce and resolute than ever. It was intended to raise a servile war, or produce such signs of it as should compel the Confederates to lay down their arms through fear for their wives and families; and it has only caused desertion from some of the border plantations and some disorders along the coast. But in other respects the consequences of this measure are becoming important enough. The negro race has been too much attached to the whites, or too ignorant or too sluggish to show any signs of revolt in places remote from the presence of the federal armies: but on some points where the federals have been able to maintain themselves in force in the midst of a large negro population, the process of enrolling and arming black regiments has been carried on in a manner which must give a new character to the war. It is in the State of Louisiana, and under the command of General Banks, that this use of negro soldiers has been most extensive. The great city of New Orleans having fallen into the possession of the federals more than a year ago, and the neighboring country being to a certain degree abandoned by the white population, a vast number of negroes have been thrown on the hands of the General in command to support and, if he can, make use of. The arming of these was begun by General Butler, and it has been continued by his successor. Though the number actually under arms is no doubt exaggerated by Northern writers, yet enough have been brought into service to produce a powerful effect on the imaginations of the combatants, and, as we can now clearly see, to add almost grievously to the fury of the struggle.

"Of all wars, those between races which had been accustomed to stand to each other in the relation of master and slave have been so much the most horrible that by general consent the exciting of a servile insurrection has been considered as beyond the pale of legitimate warfare. This had been held even in the case of European serfdom, although there the rulers and the ruled are of the same blood, religion and language. But the conflict between the white men and the negro, and particularly the American white man and the American negro, is likely to be more ruthless than any which the ancient world, fruitful in such histories, or the modern records of Algeria can furnish. There was reason to hope that the deeds of 1857 in India would not be paralleled in our time or in any after age. The Asiatic savagery rose upon a dominant race scattered throughout the land, and wreaked its vengeance upon it by atrocities which it would be a relief to forget. But it has been reserved for the New World to present the spectacle of civil war, calling servile war to its aid, and of men of English race and language so envenomed against each other that one party places arms in the hands of the half savage negro, and the other acts as if resolved to give no quarter to the insurgent race or the white man who commands them or fights by their side. In the valley of the Mississippi, where these negro soldiers are in actual service, it seems likely that a story as revolting as that of St. Domingo is being prepared for the world. No one who reads the description of the fighting at Port Hudson, and the accounts given by the papers of scenes at other places, can help fearing that the worst part of this war has yet to come, and that a people who lately boasted that they took the lead in education and material civilization are now carrying on a contest without regard to any law of conventional warfare,—one side training negroes to fight against its own white flesh and blood, the other slaughtering them without mercy whenever they find them in the field.

" * * * It is pitiable to find these unhappy Africans, whose clumsy frames are no match for the sinewy and agile white American, thus led on to be destroyed by a merciless enemy. Should the war proceed in this manner, it is possible that the massacre of Africans may not be confined to actual conflict in the field. Hitherto the whites have been sufficiently confident in the negroes to leave them unmolested, even when the enemy was near; but with two or three black regiments in each federal corps, and such events as the Port Hudson massacre occuring to infuriate the minds on either side, who can foresee what three months more of war may bring forth?

"All that we can say with certainty is that the unhappy negro will be the chief sufferer in this unequal conflict. An even greater calamity, however, is the brutalization of two antagonistic peoples by the introduction into the war of these servile allies of the federals. Already there are military murders and executions on both sides. The horrors which Europe has foreseen for a year past are now upon us. Reprisal will provoke reprisal, until all men's natures are hardened, and the land flows with blood."

The article is truly instructive to the present generation; its malignity and misrepresentation of the Administration's intentions in regard to the arming of negroes, serves to illustrate the deep-seated animosity which then existed in England toward the union of the States. Nor will the American negro ever forget England's advice to the confederates, whose massacre of negro soldiers fighting for freedom she endorsed and applauded. The descendants of those black soldiers, who were engaged in the prolonged struggle for freedom, can rejoice in the fact that no single act of those patriots is in keeping with the Englishman's prediction; no taint of brutality is even charged against them by those whom they took prisoners in battle. The confederates themselves testify to the humane treatment they unexpectedly received at the hands of their negro captors. Mr. Pollard, the historian, says:

"No servile insurrections had taken place in the South."

But it is gratifying to know that all Englishmen did not agree with the writer of the Times. A London letter in the New York Evening Post, said:

"Mr. Spurgeon makes most effective and touching prayers, remembering, at least once on a Sunday, the United States. 'Grant, O God,' he said recently, 'that the right may conquer, and that if the fearful canker of slavery must be cut out by the sword, it be wholly eradicated from the body politic of which it is the curse.' He is seldom, however, as pointed as this; and, like other clergymen of England, prays for the return of peace. Indeed, it must be acknowledged that if the English press and government have done what they could to continue this war, the dissenting clergy of England have nobly shown their good will and hearty sympathy with the Americans, and their sincere desire for the settlement of our difficulties. 'If praying would do you Americans any good,' said an irreverent acquaintance last Sunday, 'you will be gratified to learn that a force of a thousand-clergymen-power is constantly at work for you over here.'"

After the heroic and bloody effort at Cold Harbor to reach Richmond, or to cross the James above the confederate capitol, and thus cut off the enemy's supplies,—after Grant had flanked, until to flank again would be to leave Richmond in his rear,—when Lee had withdrawn to his fortifications, refusing to accept Grant's challenge to come out and fight a decisive battle,—when all hope of accomplishing either of these objects had vanished, Grant determined to return to his original plan of attack from the coast, and turned his face toward the James river. On the 12th of June the Army of the Potomac began to move, and by the 16th it was, with all its trains across, and on the south side of the James.

Petersburg Grant regarded as the citadel of Richmond, and to capture it was the first thing on his list to be accomplished. General Butler was made acquainted with this, and as soon as General Smith, who, with a portion of Butler's forces had been temporarily dispatched to join the army of the Potomac at Cold Harbor, returned to Bermuda Hundreds with his force, he was ordered forward to capture the Cockade City. It was midnight on the 14th, when Smith's troops arrived. Butler ordered him immediately forward against Petersburg, and he moved accordingly. His force was in three divisions of Infantry, and one of Cavalry, under General Kautz, who was to threaten the line of works on the Norfolk road. General Hinks, with his division of the Phalanx, was to take position across the Jordon's Point road on the right of Kautz; Brooks' division of white troops was to follow, Hinks coming in at the center of the line, while General Martindale with the other division was to move along the Appomattox and strike the City Point road. Smith's movement was directed against the northeast side of Petersburg, extending from the City Point to the Norfolk railroad. About daylight on the 15th, as the columns advanced on the City Point road at Bailey's farm, six miles from Petersburg, a confederate battery opened fire. Kautz reconnoitered and found a line of rifle trench, extending along the front, on rapidly rising ground, with a thicket covering. The work was held by a regiment of cavalry and a light battery. At once there was use for the Phalanx; the works must be captured with the battery before the troops could proceed. The cavalry was re-called, and Hinks began the formation of an attacking party from his division. The confederates were in an open field, their battery upon a knoll in the same field, commanding a sweeping position to its approaches. The advancing troops must come out from the woods, rush up the slope and carry it at the point of the bayonet, exposed to the tempest of musketry and cannister of the battery. Hinks formed his line for the assault, and the word of command was given,—"forward." The line emerged from the woods, the enemy opened with cannister upon the steadily advancing column, which, without stopping, replied with a volley of Minie bullets.