"The long, dusky line, arm to arm, knee to knee."



Then shells came crashing through the line, dealing death and shattering the ranks; but on they went, with a wild cheer, running up the slope; again a storm of cannister met them; a shower of musketry came down upon the advancing column, whose bristling bayonets were to make the way clear for their white comrades awaiting on the roadside. A hundred black men went down under the fire; the ranks were quickly closed however, and with another wild cheer the living hundreds went over the works with the impetuosity of a cyclone; they seized the cannon and turned them upon the fleeing foe, who, in consternation, stampeded toward Petersburg, to their main line of intrenchments on the east. Thus the work of the 5th and 22nd Phalanx regiments was completed and the road made clear for the 18th Corps.

Brooks now moved up simultaneously with Martindale, on the river road. By noon the whole corps was in front of the enemy's main line of works, Martindale on the right, Brooks in the center, the Phalanx and cavalry on the left, sweeping down to the Jerusalem Plank Road on the southeast. Hinks, with the Phalanx, in order to gain the position assigned him, had necessarily to pass over an open space exposed to a direct and cross-fire. Nevertheless, he prepared to occupy his post, and forming a line of battle, he began the march. The division numbered about 3,000, a portion of it being still at Wilson's Landing, Fort Powhatan, City Point and Bermuda Hundreds. This was a march that veterans might falter in, without criticism or censure. The steady black line advanced a few rods at a time, when coming within range of the confederate guns they were obliged to lie down and wait for another opportunity. Now a lull,—they would rise, go forward, and again lie down. Thus they continued their march, under a most galling, concentrated artillery fire until they reached their position, from which they were to join in a general assault; and here they lay, from one till five o'clock,—four long hours,—exposed to ceaseless shelling by the enemy. Badeau says, in speaking of the Phalanx in this ordeal:

"No worse strain on the nerves of troops is possible, for it is harder to remain quiet under cannon fire, even though comparatively harmless, than to advance against a storm of musketry."

General W. F. Smith, though brave, was too cautious and particular in detail, and he spent those four hours in careful reconnoissance, while the troops lay exposed to the enemy's concentric fire.

The main road leading east from Petersburg ascends a hill two or more miles out, upon the top of which stood what was then known as Mr. Dunn's house. In front of it was a fort, and another south, and a third north, with other works; heavy embankments and deep ravines and ditches, trunks of hewn trees blackened by camp fires, formed an abatis on the even ground. Here the sharpshooters and riflemen had a fair view of the entire field. The distance from these works to the woods was about three hundred and sixty paces, in the edge of which lay the black Phalanx division, ready, like so many tigers, waiting for the command, "forward." The forts near Dunn's house had direct front fire, and those on the north an enfilading fire on the line of advance. Smith got his troops in line for battle by one o'clock, but there they lay. Hinks impatiently awaited orders; oh! what a suspense—each hour seemed a day,—what endurance—what valor. Shells from the batteries ploughed into the earth where they stood, and began making trouble for the troops. Hinks gave the order, "lie down;" they obeyed, and were somewhat sheltered. Five o'clock—yet no orders. At length the command was given, "forward." The skirmishers started at quick time; the enemy opened upon them vigorously from their batteries and breastworks, upon which they rested their muskets, in order to fire with accuracy. A torrent of bullets was poured upon the advancing line, and the men fell fast as autumn leaves in a gale of wind. Then the whole line advanced, the Phalanx going at double-quick; their well aligned ranks, with bayonets glittering obliquely in the receding sunlight, presented a spectacle both magnificent and grand.



Duncan rushed his skirmishers and reached the ditches in front of the breastworks, which, without waiting for the main body, they entered and clambered up the steep embankments. A sheet of flame from above was rained down, causing many a brave man to stagger and fall back into the ditch, never to rise again. The troops following, inspired by the daring of the skirmishers, pressed forward on the run up to the forts, swept round the curtains, scaled the breastworks and dashed with patriotic rage at the confederate gunners, who deserted their pieces and ran for their lives. Brooks and Martindale advanced simultaneously upon the works at Osborn's house and up the railroad, sweeping everything before them. The Phalanx seized upon the guns and turned them instantly upon the fleeing foe, and then with spades and shovels reversed the fortifications and prepared to hold them. Fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred confederates were captured. "The Phalanx," says the official report, took two-thirds of the prisoners and nine pieces of artillery. General Smith, finding that General Birney, with the 2nd Corps, had not arrived, instead of marching the troops into Petersburg, waited for re-inforcements unnecessarily, and thereby lost his chance of taking the city, which was soon garrisoned with troops enough to defy the whole army. Thus Grant was necessitated afterward to lay siege to the place.

The confederates never forgot nor forgave this daring of the "niggers," who drove them, at the point of the bayonet, out of their breastworks, killing and capturing their comrades and their guns. They were chided by their brother confederates for allowing negroes to take their works from them. The maidens of the Cockade City were told that they could not trust themselves to men who surrendered their guns to "niggers." The soldiers of the Phalanx were delirious with joy. They had caught "ole massa," and he was theirs. General Hinks had their confidence, and they were ready to follow wherever he led.

The chaplin of the 9th Corps, in his history, says:

"In this movement a division of colored troops, under Brigadier-General Hinks, seems to have won the brightest laurels. They first attacked and carried the enemy's outpost at Bailey's farm, capturing one piece of artillery in the most gallant manner. On their arrival before Petersburg, they lay in front of the works for nearly five hours, waiting for the word of command. They then, in company with the white troops, and showing equal bravery, rushed and carried the enemy's line of works, with what glorious success has already been related."

This, indeed, was a victory, yet shorn of its full fruits; but that Petersburg was not captured was no fault of the Phalanx. They had carried and occupied the most formidable obstacles.

Badeau, in chronicling these achievements, says:

"General Smith assaulted the works on the City Point and Prince George Court House roads. The rebels resisted with a sharp infantry fire, but the center and left dashed into the works, consisting of five redan's on the crest of a deep and difficult ravine. Kiddoo's (22d) black regiment was one of the first to gain the hill. In support of this movement, the second line was swung around and moved against the front of the remaining works. The rebels, assaulted thus in front and flank, gave way, four of the guns already captured were turned upon them by the negro conquerors, enfilading the line, and before dark, Smith was in possession of the whole of the outer works, two and a half miles long, with fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. Petersburg was at his mercy."

This failure made a siege necessary, and General Grant began by regular approaches to invest the place, after making the three desperate assaults on the 16th, 17th and 18th. It had been indeed a bloody June; the soil of the Old Dominion, which for two centuries the negro had tilled and made to yield the choicest products, under a system of cruel and inhuman bondage he now reddened with his blood in defense of his liberty, proving by his patriotism, not only his love of liberty, but his courage and capacity to defend it. The negro troops had marched and fought with the white regiments with equal intrepidity and courage; they were no longer despised by their comrades; they now had recognition as soldiers, and went into the trenches before Petersburg as a part of as grand an army as ever laid siege to a stronghold or stormed a fortification.

On the 18th of June, General Ferrero reported to General Meade, with his division of the Phalanx, (4th Division, 9th Corps), and was immediately ordered to join its own proper corps,—from which it had been separated since the 6th of May,—at the crossing of the Rapidan. It had served under Sedgwick and Sheridan until the 17th, when it came under the direct command of General Grant, and thus remained until the 25th of May, when General Burnside, waiving rank to Meade, the 9th Corps was incorporated into the Army of the Potomac. During its absence the division sustained the reputable renown of its corps, not only in protecting the trains, but in fighting the enemy, and capturing prisoners. Before rejoining the corps, the division was strengthened by three regiments of cavalry,—the 5th New York, 3rd New Jersey and 2nd Ohio. From the 9th of May till the 17th, the division occupied the plank road, looking to the old Wilderness tavern, covering the extreme right of the army, extending from Todd's to Banks' Ford. On the 17th, the division moved to Salem Church, near the main road to Fredericksburg, where, as we have seen, it defended the rear line against the attack made by the confederates, under General Ewell.

The historian of the corps says:

"The division on the 21st of May was covering Fredericksburg, and the roads leading hence to Bowling Green. On the 22nd it marched toward Bowling Green, and on the 23rd it moved to Milford Station. From that date to the 27th it protected the trains of the army in the rear of the positions on the North Anna. On the 27th, the division moved to Newtown; on the 28th, to Dunkirk, crossing the Maltapony; on the 29th, to the Pamunkey, near Hanovertown. On the 1st of June the troops crossed the Pamunkey, and from the 2nd to the 6th, covered the right of the army; from the 6th to the 12th they covered the approaches from New Castle Ferry, Hanovertown, Hawe's shop, and Bethusda Church. From the 12th to the 18th they moved by easy stages, by way of Tunstall's New Kent Court House, Cole's Ferry, and the pontoon bridge across the James, to the line of the army near Petersburg. The dismounted cavalry were left to guard the trains, and the 4th Division prepared to participate in the more active work of soldiers. Through the remainder of the month of June, and the most of July, the troops were occupied in the second line of trenches, and in active movements towards the left, under Generals Hancock and Warren. While they were engaged in the trenches they were also drilled in the movements necessary for an attack and occupation of the enemy's works. A strong feeling of pride and esprit de corps sprung up within the hearts of the blacks, and they began to think that they too might soon have the opportunity of some glory for their race and country."

How natural was this feeling. As we have seen, their life for more than a month had been one of marching and counter-marching, though hazardous and patriotic. When on the 18th, they entered upon the more active duty of soldiers, they found the 3rd Division of the 18th Corps, composed of the Phalanx of the Army of the James, covered with glory, and the welkin ringing with praises of their recent achievements. The men of the 4th Division chafed with eager ambition to rival their brothers of the 18th Corps, in driving the enemy from the Cockade City. General Burnside was equally as anxious to give his black boys a chance to try the steel of the chivalry in deadly conflict, and this gave them consolation, with the assurance that their day would ere long dawn, so they toiled and drilled carefully for their prospective glory.

But the situation of the Phalanx before Petersburg was far from being enviable. Smarting under the thrashing they had received from Hinks' division, the confederates were ever ready now to slaughter the "niggers" when advantage offered them the opportunity. A steady, incessant fire was kept up against the positions the Phalanx occupied, and their movements were watched with great vigilance. Although they did not raise the black flag, yet manifestly no quarter to negro troops, or to white troops that fought with them, was the confederates' determination.

"Judging from their actions, the presence of the negro soldiers, both in the Eighteenth and Ninth Corps," says Woodbury, "seemed to have the effect of rendering the enemy more spiteful than ever before the Fourth Division came. The closeness of the lines on the front of the corps rendered constant watchfulness imperative, and no day passed without some skirmishing between the opposing pickets. When the colored soldiers appeared, this practice seemed to increase, while in front of the Fifth Corps, upon the left of our line, there was little or no picket firing, and the outposts of both armies were even disposed to be friendly. On the front of the Ninth, the firing was incessant, and in many cases fatal."



"General Potter, in his report, mentions that, when his division occupied the front, his loss averaged some fourteen or fifteen officers killed and wounded per diem. The sharpshooters on either side were vigilant, and an exposure of any part of the person was the signal for the exchange of shots. The men, worn by hard marching, hard fighting and hard digging, took every precaution to shield themselves, and sought cover at every opportunity. They made fire proofs of logs and earth, and with tortuous covered ways and traverse, endeavoring to secure themselves from the enemy's fire. The artillery and mortars on both sides were kept almost constantly at work. These were all precursors of the coming, sanguinary struggle for the possession of Cemetery Hill. Immediately in front of the salient occupied by the Ninth Corps, the rebels had constructed a very strong redoubt, a short distance below Cemetery Hill. In the rear of the redoubt ran a ridge nearly at right angles with the rebels' lines, to the hill. It appeared that if this redoubt was captured, the enemy's line would be seriously threatened, if not entirely broken up. A feasible plan for the destruction of the redoubt, was seriously discussed among the soldiers of the corps; finally Colonel Pleasants, of the 48th Pennsylvania Regiment, devised a plan to run a mine under the intervening space between the line of the corps and the redoubt, with the design of exploding it, directly under the redoubt. To this plan General Burnside lent his aid, and preparations were made for an assault upon Cemetery Hill, at the time of its explosion. The work of digging and preparing the mine was prosecuted under the most disadvantageous circumstances. General Meade reluctantly gave official sanction, and the work of excavation proceeded with, despite the fact that General Burnside's requisitions for supplies were not responded to. Nevertheless, in less than a month the mine was ready, and after considerable discussion, and not without some bickering, the plan of attack was arranged, which, in brief, was to form two columns, and to charge with them through the breach caused by the explosion of the mine. Then to sweep along the enemy's line, right and left, clearing away the artillery and infantry, by attacking in the flank and rear. Other columns were to make for the crest, the whole to co-operate. General Ferrero, in command of the Phalanx division was informed, that in accordance with the plan of attack, he was to lead in the assault, when the attack was made, after the mine had been fired. He was ordered to drill his troops accordingly. After a careful examination of the ground, Ferrero decided upon his methods of advance,—not to go directly in the crater formed by the explosion, but rather upon one side of it, and then to take the enemy in flank and reverse. When he informed his officers and men that they would be called upon to lead in the assault, they received the information with delight. His men, desirous of emulating their comrades of the Third Division of the Eighteenth Corps, felt that their cherished hope,—the opportunity for which they had prayed,—was near at hand; the hour in which they would show themselves worthy of the honor of being associated with the Army of the Potomac. They rejoiced at the prospect of wiping off whatever reproach an ill-judged prejudice might have cast upon them, by proving themselves brave, thereby demanding the respect which brave men deserve. For three weeks they drilled with alacrity in the various movements; charging upon earthworks, wheeling by the right and left, deployment, and other details of the expected operations. General Burnside had early expressed his confidence in the soldierly capabilities of the men of the Phalanx, and now wished to give them an opportunity to justify his good opinion."

His white troops, moreover, had been greatly exposed throughout the whole campaign, had suffered severely, and had been so much under the fire of the sharpshooters that it had become a second nature with them to dodge bullets. The negro troops had not been so much exposed, and had already shown their steadiness under fire in one or two pretty severe skirmishes in which they had previously been engaged. The white officers and men of the corps were elated with the selection made by General Burnside, and they, too, manifested an uncommon interest in their dark-hued comrades. The demeanor of the former toward the latter was very different from that of the other corps, of which that particular army was composed. The 9th Corps had seen more service than any other corps in the Army of the Potomac. Its operations in six States had given to the men an experience calculated to destroy, very greatly, their race prejudice; besides a very large portion of the regiments in the corps came from the New England States, especially Massachusetts, Vermont and Rhode Island, where race prejudice was not so strong; consequently the treatment of the men in the 4th Division was tempered by humanity, and pregnant with a fraternal feeling of comradeship. And then there was a corps pride very naturally existing among the white troops, which prompted a desire for the achievement of some great and brilliant feat by their black comrades. This feeling was expressed in more than one way by the entire corps, and greatly enhanced the ambition of the Phalanx to rout the enemy and drive him out of his fortifications before Petersburg, if not to capture the city.

These high hopes were soon dissipated, however. General Meade had an interview with General Burnside on the 28th; the subject was fully discussed as to the plan of the assault, as proposed by General Burnside, and made known to Meade by Burnside, in writing, on the 26th. It was at this meeting that General Meade made his objections to the Phalanx leading the assault. General Burnside argued with all the reason he could command, in favor of his plans, and especially for the Phalanx, going over the grounds already cited; why his white troops were unfit and disqualified for performing the task of leading the assault, but in vain. Meade was firm in his purpose, and, true to his training, he had no use for the negro but as a servant; he never had trusted him as a soldier. The plan, with General Meade's objection was referred to General Grant for settlement. Grant, doubting the propriety of agreeing with a subordinate, as against the commander of the army, dismissed the dispute by agreeing with Meade; therefore the Phalanx was ruled out of the lead and placed in the supporting column. It was not till the night of the 29th, a few hours before the assault was made, that the change was made known to General Ferrero and his men, who were greatly chagrined and filled with disappointment.

General Ledlie's division of white troops was to lead the assault, after the explosion of the mine on the morning of the 30th. It was on the night of the 29th, when General Burnside issued his battle order, in accordance with General Meade's plan and instructions, and at the appointed hour all the troops were in readiness for the conflict. The mine, with its several tons of powder, was ready at a quarter past three o'clock on the eventful morning of the 30th of July. The fuses were fired, and "all eyes were turned to the confederate fort opposite," which was discernible but three hundred feet distant. The garrison was sleeping in fancied security; the sentinels slowly paced their rounds, without a suspicion of the crust which lay between them and the awful chasm below. Our own troops, lying upon their arms in unbroken silence, or with an occasional murmur, stilled at once by the whispered word of command, looked for the eventful moment of attack to arrive. A quarter of an hour passed,—a half hour, yet there was no report. Four o'clock, and the sky began to brighten in the east; the confederate garrison was bestirring itself. The enemy's lines once more assumed the appearance of life; the sharpshooters, prepared for their victims, began to pick off those of our men, who came within range of their deadly aim. Another day of siege was drawing on, and still there was no explosion. What could it mean? The fuses had failed;—the dampness having penetrated to the place where the parts had been spliced together, prevented the powder from burning. Two men (Lieut. Jacob Douty and Sergeant—afterwards Lieutenant—Henry Rees,) of the 48th Pennsylvania volunteered to go and ascertain where the trouble was. At quarter past four o'clock they bravely entered the mine, re-arranged the fuses and relighted them. In the meantime, General Meade had arrived at the permanent headquarters of the 9th Corps. Not being able to see anything that was going forward, and not hearing any report, he became somewhat impatient. At fifteen minutes past four o'clock he telegraphed to General Burnside to know what was the cause of the delay. Gen. Burnside was too busy in remedying the failure already incurred to reply immediately, and expected, indeed, that before a dispatch could be sent that the explosion would take place. General Meade ill-naturedly telegraphed the operator to know where General Burnside was. At half-past four, the commanding general became still more impatient, and was on the point of ordering an immediate assault upon the enemy's works, without reference to the mine. Five minutes later he did order an assault. General Grant was there when, at sixteen minutes before five o'clock, the mine exploded. Then ensued a scene which beggars description.

General Badeau, in describing the spectacle, says:

"The mine exploded with a shock like that of an earthquake, tearing up the rebels' work above them, and vomiting men, guns and caissons two hundred feet into the air. The tremendous mass appeared for a moment to hang suspended in the heavens like a huge, inverted cone, the exploding powder still flashing out here and there, while limbs and bodies of mutilated men, and fragments of cannon and wood-work could be seen, then all fell heavily to the ground again, with a second report like thunder. When the smoke and dust had cleared away, only an enormous crater, thirty feet deep, sixty wide, and a hundred and fifty long stretched out in front of the Ninth Corps, where the rebel fort had been."

The explosion was the signal for the federal batteries to open fire, and immediately one hundred and ten guns and fifty mortars opened along the Union front, lending to the sublime horror of the upheaved and quaking earth, the terror of destruction.

A confederate soldier thus describes the explosion, in the Philadelphia Times, January, 1883:

"About fifteen feet of dirt intervened between the sleeping soldiers and all this powder. In a moment the superincumbent earth, for a space forty by eighty feet, was hurled upward, carrying with it the artillery-men, with their four guns, and three companies of soldiers. As the huge mass fell backwards it buried the startled men under immense clods—tons of dirt. Some of the artillery was thrown forty yards towards the enemy's line. The clay subsoil was broken and piled in large pieces, often several yards in diameter, which afterwards protected scores of Federals when surrounded in the crater. The early hour, the unexpected explosion, the concentrated fire of the enemy's batteries, startled and wrought confusion among brave men accustomed to battle."

Says a Union account:

"Now was the time for action, forward went General Ledlie's column, with Colonel Marshall's brigade in advance. The parapets were surmounted, the abatis was quickly removed, and the division prepared to pass over the intervening ground, and charge through the still smoking ruins to gain the crest beyond. But here the leading brigade made a temporary halt; it was said at the time our men suspected a counter mine, and were themselves shocked by the terrible scene they had witnessed. It was, however, but momentary; in less than a quarter of an hour, the entire division was out of its entrenchments, and was advancing gallantly towards the enemy's line. The ground was somewhat difficult to cross over, but the troops pushed steadily on with soldiery bearing, overcoming all the obstacles before them. They reached the edge of the crater, passed down into the chasm and attempted to make their way through the yielding sand, the broken clay, and the masses of rubbish that were everywhere about. Many of the enemy's men were lying among the ruins, half buried, and vainly trying to free themselves. They called for mercy and for help. The soldiers stopped to take prisoners, to dig out guns and other material. Their division commander was not with them, there was no responsible head, the ranks were broken, the regimental organizations could not be preserved, and the troops were becoming confused. The enemy was recovering from his surprise, our artillery began to receive a spirited response, the enemy's men went back to their guns; they gathered on the crest and soon brought to bear upon our troops a fire in front from the Cemetery Hill, and an enfilading and cross-fire from their guns in battery. Our own guns could not altogether silence or overcome this fire in flank, our men in the crater were checked, felt the enemy's fire, sought cover, began to entrench. The day was lost, still heroic men continued to push forward for the crest, but in passing through the crater few got beyond it. Regiment after regiment, brigade followed brigade, until the three white divisions filled the opening and choked the passage to all. What was a few moments ago organization and order, was now a disordered mass of armed men. At six o'clock, General Meade ordered General Burnside to push 'his men forward, at all hazards, white and black.' His white troops were all in the crater, and could not get out. As instructed, he ordered General Ferrero to rush in the Phalanx; Colonel Loving was near when the order came to Ferrero; as the senior staff officer present, seeing the impossibility of the troops to get through the crater, at that time countermanded the order, and reported in person to General Burnside, but he had no discretion to exercise, his duty was simply to repeat Meade's order. The order must be obeyed; it was repeated; away went the Phalanx division, loudly cheering, but to what purpose did they advance? The historian of that valiant corps, presumably more reliable than any other writer, says:

"'The colored troops charged forward, cheering with enthusiasm and gallantry. Colonel J. K. Sigfried, commanding the first brigade, led the attacking column. The command moved out in rear of Colonel Humphrey's brigade of the Third Division. Colonel Sigfried, passing Colonel Humphrey by the flank, crossed the field immediately in front, went down the crater, and attempted to go through. The passage was exceedingly difficult, but after great exertions the brigade made its way through the crowded masses in a somewhat broken and disorganized condition, and advanced towards the crest. The 43rd U. S. Colored troops moved over the lip of the crater toward the right, made an attack upon the enemy's line of intrenchments, and won the chief success of the day, capturing a number of prisoners and rebel colors, and re-capturing a stand of national colors. The other regiments of the brigade were unable to get up, on account of white troops in advance of them crowding the line. The second brigade, under command of Colonel H. G. Thomas, followed the first with equal enthusiasm. The men rushed forward, descended into the crater, and attempted to pass through. Colonel Thomas' intention was to go to the right and attack the enemy's rifle-pits. He partially succeeded in doing so, but his brigade was much broken up when it came under the enemy's fire. The gallant brigade commander endeavored, in person, to rally his command, and at last formed a storming column, of portions of the 29th, 28th, 23rd, and 19th Regiments of the Phalanx division.'

"'These troops' made a spirited attack, but lost heavily in officers and became somewhat disheartened. Lieutenant-Colonel Bross, of the 29th, with the colors in his hands, led the charge; was the first man to leap upon the enemy's works, and was instantly killed. Lieutenant Pennell seized the colors, but was shot down, riddled through and through. Major Theodore H. Rockwood, of the 19th, sprang upon the parapet, and fell while cheering on his regiment to the attack. The conduct of these officers and their associates was indeed magnificent. No troops were ever better lead to an assault; had they been allowed the advance at the outset, before the enemy had recovered from his first surprise, their charge would have been successful. But it was made too late. The fire to which they were exposed was very hot and destructive; it came from front and flank, it poured into the faces of the men. It enfiladed their lines. The enemy's rage against the colored troops had its bloody opportunity."

And they made use of it.

Captain W. L. Fagan, of the 8th Alabama Regiment, thus gives an account of the fight, from the confederate side:

"The crater combat, unlike other battles in Virginia, was a series of deeds of daring, of bloody hand-to-hand fighting, where the survivor could count with a certainty the men he had slain. A few days ago a soldier said to me: 'I killed two at the crater; they were not three feet from me when they fell. I had followed the fortunes of the Confederacy from Williamsburg to Appomattox Court House, and had, to the morning of July 30, only seen two bayonet wounds;—one received at Frazier's Farm, the other at Turkey Ridge, June 3, 1864.' Men stood face to face at the crater. Often a bayonet thrust was given before the Minie ball went crashing through the body. Every man took care of himself, intent on selling his life as dearly as possible. The negroes did not all stampede. They mingled with the white troops. The troops of Mahone, Wilcox and Wright were greeted with defiant yells, while their ranks were mowed down by withering fires. Many officers commanding negro troops held their commissions for bravery. Encouraged, threatened, emulating the white troops, the black men fought with desperation. Some Confederate soldiers recognized their slaves at the crater. Captain J——, of the Forty-first Virginia, gave the military salute to 'Ben' and 'Bob,' whom he had left hoeing corn down in Dinwiddie. If White's Division had occupied Reservoir Hill, Richmond would have been evacuated."

But let the writer of the following tell what the brave black men met after having advanced beyond the crater, where they grappled with the sullen foe filled with the recollection of the capture, in June, of their works, guns and comrades by the "niggers" of the 18th Corps. It was not lex talionis that they observed, but a repetition of the Fort Pillow Massacre. Under the head of "The Confederate Charge," the particulars are given:

"The Federals now held the crater and the inner line. Generals Lee and Mahone arrived on the field about 7:30 A. M. A ravine, which deepened on our right, ran parallel with this inner line and was used by Mahone in which to form his brigade when preparing to attack. At 8 A. M. Mahone's Brigade, commanded by Colonel D. A. Weisiger, brought from the right of Hoke's Division, was formed in this ravine and advanced to the assault. The Federals, concentrating a terrific fire of musketry and artillery, ploughed out great gaps in these fearless Virginians. Nothing daunted, they pressed forward and recaptured the inner line. The loss of this brigade was heavy, both in men and officers, more than two hundred Virginians falling between the ravine and the captured works. The Federal troops, white and colored, fought with a desperation never witnessed on former battle-fields. The negroes, it is said, cried 'No quarter.' Mahone and Wright's Brigades took only twenty-nine of them prisoners. The Federals still held the crater and part of the line. Another charge was necessary and Wright's Georgia Brigade was ordered up from Anderson's Division. Wright's Brigade, forming in the ravine, moved forward to drive the Federals from the line they still held. The enemy, expecting their attack, poured a volley into the Georgians that decimated their ranks, killing and wounding nearly every field officer in the brigade. The men rushing forward, breasting a storm of lead and iron, failed to oblique far enough to the right to recapture the whole line, but gained the line occupied by and contiguous to the line already captured by Weisiger, commanding Mahone's Brigade. Mahone's Brigade and Wright's Brigade had captured forty-two officers, three hundred and ninety men and twenty-nine negroes.

"It was now about 10 A. M. General Grant made no effort to reinforce his line or to dislodge Wright and Mahone from the positions they held. A courier dashed up to General J. C. C. Sanders, commanding Wilcox's Brigade, informing him that his brigade was wanted. The men were expecting this courier, as they were next in line, and they distinctly heard the shouts of Mahone's and Wright's men, followed by the heavy artillery firing, while the word had passed down the line that the salient had not been recaptured. General Sanders moved his brigade, consisting of the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Fourteenth Alabama Regiments, to the left and occupied the ravine. There was no shade or water in this ravine, while the men were exposed nearly four hours to a scorching sun. The heat was almost beyond human endurance. Strong men fainted and were carried to the rear. The waves of hot air at times were almost suffocating. For the first and only time the men were told what was expected of them. General Saunders explained the situation to the officers of the regiments. Each captain spoke to his men, urging them to retake the salient, or Petersburg and Richmond must be evacuated. The men were ordered to fix their bayonets securely, to trail arms—not to fire, not to yell, but to move quietly up the side of the ravine, and then, every man run for his life to the breastworks. They were told that Generals Lee, Beauregard, Hill, Mahone, Hoke and every general officer of the army would watch them as they moved forward.

"At 1:30 P. M. the firing had almost ceased and the Federals, overcome with heat, did not expect an attack. Saunders formed his brigade and moved quietly up the side of the ravine. Hardly a word was spoken, for the Alabamians expected to die or retake that salient. The eye of General Lee was fixed on them. When they caught sight of the works their old feelings came back to them and yell they must. With the fury of a whirlwind they rushed upon the line they had been ordered to take. The movement was so unexpected and so quickly executed that only one shell was thrown into the brigade. The works gained, they found the enemy on the other side. It was stated that Lee, speaking to Beauregard, said: 'Splendid!' Beauregard spoke with enthusiasm of the brilliant charge.

"In an instant the Federal army was aroused, and batteries opened along the whole line, while the infantry fire was a continuous roar. Only a breastwork divided Wilcox's Brigade from the Federals. A moment was required for Saunders to reform, and his brigade mounted the inner line and forced the enemy backwards to the outer line and the crater. The crater was full of white and negro soldiers. The Confederates, surrounding it on every side, poured volley after volley into this heaped-up mass of terrified negroes and their brave officers. The negroes ran in every direction and were shot down without a thought. Bayonets, swords and the butts of muskets were used. The deafening roar of artillery and musketry, the yells and imprecations of the combatants, drowned the commands of officers. A negro in the crater attempted to raise a white flag, and it was instantly pulled down by a Federal officer. The Federal colors were planted on a huge lump of dirt, and waved until Sergeant Wallace, of the Eleventh Alabama, followed by others, seized them and tore them from the staff. Instantly a white flag was raised, and the living, who were not many, surrendered. The crater was won."

With the exception of General Burnside, no commander of the Army of the Potomac was in favor of the Phalanx participating in a battle. What, then, had the Phalanx to expect of those to whom they had borne the relation of slave? The confederates had a right to expect hard fighting when they met the Phalanx, and the Phalanx knew they had to fight hard when they met the confederates. It was the previous associations and habits of the negro that kept him from retaliating for the several massacres that had been perpetrated upon his brother-soldiers. It was not for a want of courage to do it: it was only necessary for those who commanded them to have ordered it, and they would never have taken a confederate prisoner.

Many of those who commanded them needed but public opinion to sustain them, to give such an order as would have made every battle between the Phalanx and the confederates bloody and inhuman. It was but the enlightened sentiment of the North, the religious teaching of the brotherhood of man, the high character and moral training of the statesmen on the side of the Union, that restrained the Phalanx from retaliation, else they possessed none of the characteristics of a courageous, sensitive and high tempered people. The negro is not naturally docile; his surroundings, rather than his nature, have given him the trait; it is not naturally his, but something which his trainers have given him; and it is not a difficult task to untrain him and advance him beyond his apparent unconsciousness of self-duty and self-preservation. Let him feel that he is to be supported in any transaction uncommon to him, and he can act as aggressively as any race of men who are naturally quicker in temperament. It is this characteristic that made the negro what General Grant said he was: in discipline a better soldier than the white man. It was said that he would not fight: there is no man in the South who met him on the battle-field that will say so now.

These are a few of the thoughts that came to me as I listened for an hour, one evening in June, 1883, to the confederate Gen. Mahone, whose acquaintance the writer enjoys, reciting the story of the fight at the crater, where the negro met the confederate, and in a hand-to-hand struggle one showed as much brute courage as the other. It would not be doing the negro justice to accord him less, and yet that courage never led him to acts of inhumanity. It is preferable that the confederates themselves should tell the stories of their butcheries than for me to attempt them. Not the stories told at the time, but fifteen years afterward, when men could reflect and write more correctly. There is one, an orator, who has described the fight, whose reference to the crater so gladdened the hearts of his audience that they reproduced the "yell," and yelled themselves hoarse. No battle fought during the war, not even that of Bull Run, elicited so much comment and glorification among the confederates as that of the crater. It was the bloodiest fight on the soil of the Old Dominion, and has been the subject of praise by poets and orators upon the confederate side. Capt. J. B. Hope eulogized "Mahone's brigade" in true Southern verse. Capt. McCabe, on the 1st of November, 1876, in his oration before the "Association of the Army of Northern Virginia," in narrating the recapture of the works, said:

"It was now 8 o'clock in the morning. The rest of Potter's (Federal) division moved out slowly, when Ferrero's negro division, the men, beyond question, inflamed with drink, (there are many officers and men, myself among the number, who will testify to this), burst from the advanced lines, cheering vehemently, passed at a double quick over a crest under a heavy fire, and rushed with scarcely a check over the heads of the white troops in the crater, spread to their right, and captured more than two hundred prisoners and one stand of colors. At the same time Turner, of the Tenth corps, pushed forward a brigade over the Ninth Corps' parapet, seized the Confederate line still further to the north, and quickly dispersed the remaining brigades of his division to confirm his successes."

The truth is over-reached in the statement of this orator if he intended to convey the idea that the men of the Phalanx division were drunk from strong drink; but it may be looked upon as an excuse offered for the treatment the courageous negro soldiers received at the hands of their captors, who, worse than enraged by strong drink, gave the battle-cry on their way to the front, "No quarter to niggers!" This has been admitted by those in a position, at the time, to know what went on. In his "Recollections of the Recapture of the Lines," Colonel Stewart of the 61st Virginia Regiment, says:

"When nearly opposite the portions of our works held by the Federal troops, we met several soldiers who were in the works at the time of the explosion. Our men began ridiculing them for going to the rear, when one of them remarked, 'Ah, boys, you have got hot work ahead,—they are negroes, and show no quarter.' This was the first intimation we had that we were to fight negro troops, and it seemed to infuse the little band with impetuous daring, as they pressed toward the fray. I never felt more like fighting in my life. Our comrades had been slaughtered in a most inhuman and brutal manner, and slaves were trampling over their mangled and bleeding corpses. Revenge must have fired every heart, and strung every arm with nerves of steel, for the herculean task of blood."

On the Monday morning after the assault of Saturday, the Richmond Enquirer said:

"Grant's war cry of 'no quarter' shouted by his negro soldiers, was returned with interest, we regret to hear, not so heavily as ought to have been, since some negroes were captured instead of being shot. Let every salient we are called upon to defend, be a Fort Pillow, and butcher every negro that Grant hurls against our brave troops, and permit them not to soil their hands, with the capture of one negro."

There is no truth in the statement. No such cry was ever made by negro soldiers; and when it is remembered that the confederate congress, in four short months after this declaration, began arming slaves for the defense of Richmond, it is readily seen how deep and with what sincerity such declarations were made. The Southern historian Pollard thus describes the situation after the assault and the ground had again come into the possession of the confederates:



"The ground all around was dotted with the fallen, while the sides and bottom of the crater were literally lined with dead, the bodies lying in every conceivable position. Some had evidently been killed with the butts of muskets, as their crushed skulls and badly smashed faces too plainly indicated.' Within this crater—this hole of forty by eighty feet—were lying one hundred and thirty-six dead soldiers, besides the wounded. The soil was literally saturated with blood. General Bartlett was here, with his steel leg broken. He did not look as though he had been at a 'diamond wedding,' but was present at a 'dance of death.' A covered way for artillery was so full of dead that details were made to throw them out, that artillery might be brought in. The dead bodies formed a heap on each side. The Alabamians captured thirty-four officers, five hundred and thirty-six white and one hundred and thirty-nine colored soldiers. The three brigades had seventeen stands of colors, held by seventeen as brave, sweaty, dirty, powder-stained fellows as ever wore the gray, who knew that, when presenting their colors to division headquarters, to each a furlough of thirty days would be granted.

"The crater was filled with wounded, to whom our men gave water. Adjutant Morgan Cleveland, of the 8th Alabama Regiment, assisted a federal captain who was mortally wounded and suffering intensely. Near him lay a burly, wounded negro. The officer said he would die. The negro, raising himself on his elbow, cried out: 'Thank God. You killed my brother when we charged, because he was afraid and ran. Now the rebels have killed you.' Death soon ended the suffering of one and the hatred of the other. A darkness came down on the battle-field and the victors began to repair the salient. The crater was cleared of the dead and wounded. Men were found buried ten feet under the dirt. Twenty-two of the artillery company were missing. Four hundred and ninety-eight dead and wounded confederates were buried or sent to the hospitals. Between the lines lay hundreds of wounded federals, who vainly called for water. These men had been without water since early morning. Some calling louder than others, their voices were recognized, and as their cries grew fainter, we knew their lives were ebbing away. Our men, risking their lives, carried water to some.

"I find in my diary these lines: 'Sunday, July 31, 1864. Everything comparatively quiet along the lines. Hundreds of federal soldiers are lying in front of the crater exposed to a scorching sun; some are crying for water. The enemy's fire is too heavy for a soldier to expose himself.' Late on Sunday evening a flag of truce was sent in and forwarded to General Lee. General Grant had asked permission to bury his dead and remove his wounded. The truce was granted, to begin on Monday at 5 A. M. and conclude at 9 A. M. Punctual to the hour the federal details came on the field and by 9 A. M. had buried about three hundred. The work was hardly begun and the truce was extended. Hour after hour was granted until it was evening before the field was cleared."

With these selections from the mass of confederate testimony before us, of their "daring, bloody work," given by participants, it is well to read some of the statements of those who battled for the Union on that occasion.

Many of the correspondents at the seat of war, ignorant of the real facts regarding the assault, attributed the failure, not to General Meade's interference with General Burnside's plan, but to the Phalanx division, the men who bore the brunt of the battle and gained for themselves a fame for desperate fighting. But some of those who were acquainted with the facts have left records that tell the true story and give honor to whom honor is due. Gen. Grant is among the number; he perfectly understood the whole matter, knew that General Burnside, not being allowed to carry out his own plans, but at the last moment compelled to act contrary to his judgment, could not fight with that enthusiasm and confidence that he would have done had he been allowed to carry out his own ideas. In his "Memoirs," General Grant gives an account of the explosion of the mine and the assault after placing the blame for the "stupendous failure" where it belongs. I quote a few preliminary words which not only intimate where the trouble lies, but gives the key to the whole matter. Speaking of General Burnside's command, he says:

"The four divisions of his corps were commanded by Generals Potter, Wilcox, Ledlie and Ferrero. The last was a colored division; and Burnside selected it to make the assault. Meade interfered with this. Burnside then took Ledlie's division—a worse selection than the first could have been. * * * * Ledlie, besides being otherwise inefficient, proved also to possess disqualifications less common among soldiers."

A correspondent of the New York Evening Post says:

"We have been continually notified for the last fortnight, that our sappers were mining the enemy's position. As soon as ready, our division was to storm the works on its explosion. This rumor had spread so wide we had no faith in it. On the night of the 29th, we were in a position on the extreme left. We were drawn in about nine P. M., and marched to General Burnside's headquarters, and closed in mass by division, left in front. We there received official notice that the long-looked-for mine was ready charged, and would be fired at daylight next morning. The plan of storming was as follows: One division of white troops was to charge the works immediately after the explosion, and carry the first and second lines of rebel intrenchments. Our division was to follow immediately, and push right into Petersburg, take the city, and be supported by the remainder of the Ninth and Twenty-eighth corps. We were up bright and early, ready and eager for the struggle to commence. I had been wishing for something of this sort to do for some time, to gain the respect of the Army of the Potomac. You know their former prejudices. At thirty minutes after five, the ball opened. The mine, with some fifty pieces of artillery, went off almost instantaneously; at the same time, the white troops, according to the plan, charged the fort, which they carried, for there was nothing to oppose them; but they did not succeed in carrying either of the lines of intrenchments.

"We were held in rear until the development of the movement of the white troops; but, on seeing the disaster which was about to occur, we pushed in by the flank (for we could go in in no other way to allow us to get in position); so you see on this failure we had nothing to do but gain by the flank. A charge in that manner has never proved successful, to my knowledge; when it does, it is a surprise.

"Our men went forward with enthusiasm equal to anything under different circumstances; but, in going through the fort that had been blown up, the passage was almost impeded by obstacles thrown up by the explosion. At the same time, we were receiving a most deadly cross-fire from both flanks. At this time, our lieutenant-colonel (E. W. Ross) fell, shot through the left leg, bravely leading the men. I immediately assumed command, but only to hold it a few minutes, when I fell, struck by a piece of shell in the side. Capt. Robinson, from Connecticut, then took command; and, from all we can learn, he was killed. At this time, our first charge was somewhat checked, and the men sought cover in the works. Again our charge was made, but, like the former, unsuccessful. This was followed by the enemy making a charge. Seeing the unorganized condition and the great loss of officers, the men fell back to our own works. Yet a large number still held the fort until two P. M., when the enemy charged again, and carried it. That ended the great attempt to take Petersburg.

"It will be thus seen that the colored troops did not compose the first assaulting, but the supporting column; and they were not ordered forward until white troops in greater numbers had made a desperate effort to carry the rebel works, and had failed. Then the colored troops were sent in; moved over the broken ground, and up the slope, and within a short distance of the parapet, in order, and with steady courage; but finally broke and retreated under the same fire which just before had sent a whole division of white regiments to the right-about. If there be any disgrace in that, it does not belong exclusively nor mainly to the negroes. A second attack is far more perilous and unlikely to succeed than a first; the enemy having been encouraged by the failure of the first, and had time to concentrate his forces. And, in this case, there seems to have been a fatal delay in ordering both the first and second assault."

An officer in the same engagement says:

"In regard to the bravery of the colored troops, although I have been in upwards of twenty battles, I never saw so many cases of gallantry. The 'crater,' where we were halted, was a perfect slaughter-pen. Had not 'some one blundered,' but moved us up at daylight, instead of eight o'clock, we should have been crowned with success, instead of being cut to pieces by a terrific enfilading fire, and finally forced from the field in a panic. We had no trouble in rallying the troops and moving them into the rifle-pits; and, in one hour after the rout I had nearly as many men together as were left unhurt.

"I was never under such a terrific fire, and can hardly realize how any escaped alive. Our loss was heavy. In the Twenty-eighth (colored) for instance, commanded by Lieut.-Col. Russell (a Bostonian), he lost seven officers out of eleven, and ninety-one men out of two hundred and twenty-four; and the colonel himself was knocked over senseless, for a few minutes, by a slight wound in the head; both his color-sergeants and all his color-guard were killed. Col. Bross, of the Twenty-ninth, was killed outright, and nearly every one of his officers hit. This was nearly equal to Bunker Hill. Col. Ross, of the Thirty-first, lost his leg. The Twenty-eighth, Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth (colored), all charged over the works; climbing up an earthwork six feet high, then down into a ditch, and up on the other side, all the time under the severest fire in front and flank. Not being supported, of course the storming party fell back. I have seen white troops run faster than these blacks did, when in not half so tight a place. Our brigade lost thirty-six prisoners, all cut off after leaving the 'crater.' My faith in colored troops is not abated one jot.'"

The Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War investigated the affair, before which General Grant testified. He was severe upon General Ledlie, whom he regarded as an inefficient officer; he blamed himself for allowing that officer to lead the assault. General Grant also testified:

"General Burnside wanted to put his colored division in front; I believe if he had done so it would have been a success."

On the morning of the 13th of August, 1864, a brigade of the Phalanx, consisting of the 7th, 8th, 9th and 29th Regiments, crossed from Bermuda Hundreds to the north side of the James river, on pontoons, near Jones' landing, and bivouacked for the night. General Grant was led to believe that General Lee had sent a portion of his troops, at least three divisions of infantry, and one of cavalry, from the front of Petersburg, to re-enforce Gen. Early, then operating in the valley. Consequently he thought it a favorable opportunity to threaten Richmond, and ordered Hancock with the 2nd, and Birney with a part of the 10th Corps, with Gregg's Cavalry, to attack the confederate works on the north side of the James. The object was two-fold: to prevent Lee from re-enforcing Early, confronted by Sheridan's troops; and likewise to drive the confederates from out their works. The troops crossed the James on the 13th, the 2d Corps going to Deep Bottom by transports, the other troops crossing the river by pontoons, and advancing, found the enemy in force. Several spirited engagements took place, after which the main forces withdrew again across the river, to the front of Petersburg. The following account applies to the brigade as well as the 7th Phalanx Regiment, from whose record it is extracted:

"During the forenoon of the 14th the (7th) Regiment acted as reserve, moving forward occasionally as the line advanced. Most of the work of the day was done to the right, little being done in the immediate front except skirmishing. About 5 P. M. a portion of the Seventh and Ninth, forming line in the edge of some timber, moved across an open field and charged upon reaching the farther side and captured the enemy's line of rifle-pits. The companies of the Seventh pushed on some distance further toward their second line, but were met with so severe a fire that they fell back to the captured line; which was held. This charge, known as the action of Kingsland Road, was made in fine style. The battalion of the Seventh was commanded by Capt. Weiss—Col. Shaw having been detailed as Corps Officer of the day, and Lieut.-Col. Haskell being temporarily in command of the brigade. Our losses were two men killed, and one officer (Lieut. Eler) and thirty-two men wounded.

"About 10 o'clock P. M., the troops moved down the road to the right, and at 1 o'clock Col. Shaw withdrew the pickets of the corps, re-crossed the pontoons, where we had crossed in the morning, and moved down the neck. Then followed four hours of the most wearisome night-marching—moving a few rods at a time and then halting for troops ahead to get out of the way; losing sight of them and hurrying forward to catch up; straggling out into the darkness, stumbling and groping along the rough road, and all the time the rain coming down in a most provoking, exasperating drizzle. About daylight crossed back to the north side and halted for coffee, and then moved forward some four miles and rejoined the corps, taking position behind the crest of a hill. The Eighth and Twenty-ninth were left in a work on the hill.

"About 3:30 P. M. orders came to pile knapsacks and be ready to march immediately. A little after 4 o'clock the brigade moved to the right, some three-quarters of a mile, into an open cornfield, and, after halting a few moments, turned down a road through the woods to the left with Gen. Wm. Birney, who ordered Col. Shaw to throw out skirmishers and advance with his brigade down a road which he pointed out, find the enemy and attack vigorously, and then rode away. Finding the road turning to the left, Col. Shaw sent word to Gen. Birney that the designated road would probably bring him back on our own line. The order came back from Gen. Birney to go ahead. The road still bearing to the left, word was again sent that we should strike our own line if we continued to advance in the direction we were going. A second time the answer came to move on. A third messenger having brought from Gen. Birney the same reply, Col. Shaw decided to disobey the order and call in the skirmishers. Before it could be done firing commenced and continued briskly for several minutes, before the men recognized each other, and it was discovered that we had been firing into our own Second Brigade—Col. Osborn's. This sad affair, which would not have occurred had Col Shaw's caution been heeded, resulted in the killing of the lieutenant commanding the picket-line and the wounding of many men on both sides. After this fiasco the brigade moved out into the cornfield, where it had halted earlier in the day, and bivouacked for the night. The regiment had been more or less exposed all day to shell-fire, but lost from it only four or five men wounded, in addition to the ten or twelve men wounded in the skirmish with Osborn's brigade.

"Early on the morning of the 16th, the regiment marched back to its knapsacks and halted for breakfast. About 10 o'clock it was ordered out to support two batteries, and remained on this duty until 3 P. M., changing position frequently, in the meantime Gen. Terry, with the First Division of the Tenth Corps, had charged the rebel line, near Fuzzel's mills, and captured it, together with three colors and some three hundred prisoners. But the enemy rallied, and with reinforcements, soon compelled Gen. Terry to relinquish the captured line. About dark Gen. Wm. Birney came up, and taking the left wing of the Seventh—the right wing, under Col. Shaw, was in support of a battery—and two companies of the Ninth, placed them under command of Lieut.-Col. Haskell, and ordered him with this handful of men to take an earthwork in his front which a division a short time before had failed to carry. The timely arrival of Gen. Terry put an end to this mad scheme. The regiment lost during the day eight or ten men wounded.

"The general results of the day's fighting had been unsatisfactory, for not only had Terry's attack failed in its object, but the advance on the right, along the Charles City road, by the troops of the Second Corps and Gregg's cavalry division, had been equally unsuccessful. The rebel General Chambliss was among the killed.

"About 2:30 A. M. of the 17th, the left wing of the regiment was sent back to a line of rifle-pits that had been thrown up some two hundred yards to the rear, where it was joined by the right wing in the morning after breakfast. Picket-firing continued during the day and heavy artillery firing was heard in the direction of Petersburg. At 4 P. M. a flag of truce was sent out and two hours given to bring in the dead from between the lines. Gen. Chambliss' body was delivered, and we received that of Capt. Williams, of the Thirty-ninth Illinois. Early in the evening the regiment was ordered on picket. Considerable picket-firing occurred during the night and day, the men being with difficulty restrained from it. We were relieved about noon of the 18th by the One Hundred and Fifteenth New York and Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania. * * *

"Early in the morning the Eighth and the Twenty-ninth Connecticut rejoined the regiment, and after the regiment was relieved from picket, it, with the Twenty-ninth, fell back a quarter of a mile, leaving the Eighth and Ninth on the line. Rations having been drawn, the men got supper and prepared for a good night's sleep. Suddenly a heavy musketry fire broke out toward the left which rapidly extended to the right and the entire line was soon under fire. The regiment moved forward at double-quick, but by the time it reached the front and formed line, darkness set in and the enemy fell back. About 11 P. M. our forces were withdrawn, and, after several hours spent in marching and halting, the regiment went into camp two miles from the pontoons. Here it lay all day of the 19th. The following congratulatory order was received from corps headquarters, in which the brigade was spoken of in very flattering terms by Maj.-Gen. D. B. Birney, commanding:

"'HEADQUARTERS TENTH ARMY CORPS, FUZZEL'S MILLS, VA., August 19, 1864.

"'General Orders.—The Major-General commanding congratulates the Tenth Army Corps upon its success. It has, on each occasion, when ordered, broken the enemy's strong lines. It has captured during this short campaign four siege guns protected by formidable works, six colors and many prisoners. It has proved itself worthy of its old Wagner and Fort Sumter renown.

"'Much fatigue, patience and heroism, may still be demanded of it, but the Major-General commanding is confident of the response. To the colored troops, recently added to us, and fighting with us, the Major-General tenders his thanks for their uniform good conduct and soldierly bearing. They have set a good example to our veterans, by the entire absence of straggling from their ranks on the march.

"'By order of Maj.-Gen. D. B. BIRNEY.

"'E.W. SMITH, Lieutenant-Colonel and Assistant Adjutant-General.'

"The special correspondent of the New York Tribune said:

"'Gen. Butler, in a dispatch to the Tenth Corps, on receiving official report of its work, said: 'All honor to the brave Tenth Corps; you have done more than was expected of you by the Lieutenant-General.'

"'The loss in the four colored regiments is about three hundred. The Seventh U. S. C. T. on the first day, carried, with fixed bayonets, a line of rifle-pits, and carried it without a shot, but with a loss of 35. It was one of the most stirring and gallant affairs I have ever known'.

"It began to rain in the afternoon and continued during the night and until nearly noon of the following day, 20th. During the afternoon of the 20th, orders were received to send all sick to the rear and be ready to withdraw quietly at dark. The movement began at 7 P. M., both the Second and Tenth Corps participating—the Second Corps and the cavalry returning to the Petersburg line, and the Tenth to the Bermuda Hundred front. The night was dark and the roads muddy, and after various delays the pontoons were crossed; and at 2 A. M., the regiment went into camp near the spot it occupied the first night after its arrival in Virginia.

"An amusing incident occurred when we halted, after crossing the river. When the fires were lighted our line presented the appearance of a checker-board—alternate black and white men. The latter belonged to the Second Corps, and having straggled from their commands, and belonging to regiments with the same numbers, had fallen into our solid ranks by mistake. Their astonishment and our amusement were about equal. Capt. Walker, having been asked if his men were all present, replied: 'Yes, and about twenty recruits.'

"Thus ended a very hard week's work, during which the regiment was almost constantly under fire; marching, counter-marching, supporting a battery here or strengthening the line there—duties which required almost constant wakefulness and watchfulness. The losses of the brigade footed up some two hundred and fifty.

"This movement, which had begun on the 12th by the withdrawal of the Second Corps, Gen. Hancock, and Gregg's cavalry division, from the Petersburg front to the north bank of the James, to act in conjunction with the Tenth Corps in an attempt to turn the left of the rebel line, proved as abortive as the similar attempt made by the same corps in the latter part of June; Gen. Lee, in both instances, seeming to have received timely information of our plans to enable him to transfer re-enforcements from the Petersburg to the Richmond front. The Union losses during the movement have been estimated at five thousand.

"Sunday, the 21st, was a day of rest. The men put up shelter tents and made themselves as comfortable as circumstances would allow. Gen. Birney resumed command of the brigade and Col. Shaw returned to the regiment. About 6 P. M. orders came to be ready to move during the night with one day's rations. Moved out of camp at 2 A. M., 22nd, and reported at Maj.-Gen. Birney's headquarters, where, after remaining a short time, the regiment returned to camp. About 8 P. M. orders were received to pack everything, and at 5 the regiment marched to the front and went into the trenches near Battery Walker, (No. 7), relieving a regiment of hundred-days' men, whose time had expired.

"The 23d passed quietly. Tents were pitched, and in the evening a dress-parade was held. Lieut. Mack returned to duty from absent sick.

"Line was formed at dawn on the 24th, and again about noon—rapid picket-firing in each instance rendering an attack probable.

"About daybreak on the 25th, the enemy attacked toward the left, drove in our pickets—Capts. Weld and Thayer in command—but were checked before reaching the main line. The regiment was placed in support of Battery England (No. 5). Two men were wounded.

"Some changes in the division here took place—the Twenty-ninth Connecticut was transferred to another brigade, and the Tenth U. S. C. T. to ours, and Col. Duncan was placed in command.

"About noon (25th) packed up everything, crossed the Appomattox, and after a fatiguing march through the heat and dust, reached the Petersburg front a little before sunset and halted for orders. Soon after dark moved to the left in a heavy rain squall, and lay down on a hillside as reserve to the troops in the trenches. At 11 P. M. ordered to report to Gen. Terry. Marched back a mile and reported. Another mile's march in another direction brought the regiment, about 1 A. M., to its position, where it lay down in the woods, again as a reserve. A rattling fire of musketry was kept up all night.

"On the 26th, a camp was selected and had been partially cleared up, when orders were received for the regiment to go into the trenches. Reported at brigade headquarters at sunset, and soon afterward, through the mud and darkness, the men silently felt their way into the trenches, which the rain had reduced to the condition of a quagmire. It was a slow process, and 10 o'clock came before all were in their places.

"During the following day (27th,) the parapet was raised and paths made through the muddier portions of the trenches. Soon after dark a furious cannonade began which lasted for several hours, and afforded to the spectators on both sides a brilliant pyrotechnic display.

"Just after daybreak on the 28th, the enemy opened a heavy musketry fire which lasted until after sunrise. He did not leave his works, however, and our men remained stationary. A man of Company B, while watching for a shot through a section of stove-pipe, which he had improvised into a port-hole, was struck and killed by a sharpshooter's bullet.

"Soon after midnight on the 28th-29th, the regiment moved out of the trenches, and after daylight marched a quarter of a mile to the right and rear and went into camp in a cornfield. The men were at once put to work constructing bomb-proofs, as the position was within sight and range of the enemy's line. This occupied the entire day.

"Brig.-Gen. Birney's arrangement of the brigade did not seem to have given satisfaction to higher authority, and it was broken up, and the old brigade—Seventh, Eighth, Ninth U. S. C. T., and Twenty-ninth Connecticut—were again united, with Col. Shaw in command.

"From this time until the 24th of September, the Seventh and Eighth alternated with the Ninth and Twenty-ninth for duty in the trenches—two days in and two out; and on the 'off' days furnishing details of officers and men for fatigue purposes, in constructing new works and strengthening old ones. The main lines at this point were scarcely over a hundred yards apart, while from the advanced posts a stone could almost be thrown into the enemy's works, and it was considered the most disagreeable portion of the line.

"During the evening of the 4th of September, there was a grand salute along the whole line, in honor of the fall of Atlanta. At every battery the men stood at the guns, and when the monster mortar—"The Petersburg Express"—gave the expected signal, every lanyard was pulled. The effect was exceedingly grand.

"At 9 o'clock on the morning of the 5th, the regiment met with an irreparable loss in the death of Capt. A. R. Walker. Capt. Walker, who was at the time in the trenches, had raised his head above the parapet to observe the enemy's movements, when he was struck in the head by a bullet, and fell without speaking against the parapet. He was carried back and laid upon the ground in rear of the trench, but all efforts failed to elicit any token of recognition. He breathed for a few moments and life was extinct. His body was sent to the rear the same afternoon under charge of Lieut. Teeple, upon whom the command of his company devolved, who made the necessary arrangements for having it embalmed and forwarded to his friends at Caledonia, New York.

* * * *

"On the 14th Col. Howell, who was commanding the division in the absence of Gen. Birney, who was absent sick, died of injuries received from a fall from his horse, and the command of the division devolved upon Col. Pond. Col. Howell was highly esteemed, and was a thorough gentleman and a good officer.

"On the 17th, Sergt. Wilson, Company F, color-sergeant, was reduced to the ranks for cowardice, and Sergt. Griffin, Company B, appointed in his place.

"On the 21st, Capt. Thayer resigned.

"On the 22d, Gen. Birney returned and resumed command of the brigade; the division having been temporarily broken up by the withdrawal of troops, and Col. Shaw returned to the regiment.

"On the 23d, companies B and C were detailed to garrison Fort Steadman.

"On the evening of the 24th, the regiment was relieved from duty in the trenches by the Sixty-ninth New York, and moving about two miles to the rear, went into camp with the remainder of the brigade—some four miles from City Point. Here regular drills and parades were resumed.

"At 3 P. M. on the 28th, camp was broken, and an hour later the brigade followed the two divisions of the corps on the road toward Bermuda Hundred. A tedious night-march followed, during which the north side of the James was reached by way of Broadway and Jones' landings. After an hour or two of rest on the morning of the 29th, the brigade moved forward as a support to the First Division (Paine's), the First Brigade of which, under Col. Duncan, charged and carried the enemy's works on Signal-Hill, on the New Market road, beyond the line of works taken by the Seventh and Ninth on the 14th of August.[32] [See foot-note next page.] * * * The Eighteenth Corps at the same time charged and carried Fort Harrison and a long line of rebel works. Soon after noon, while the brigade, which had been moving by the flank down the New Market road, had halted in the road, orders came to form column of regiments, faced to the left, in the woods. Scarcely had this been done when Gen. Wm. Birney, commanding brigade, rode up to the right of the column and ordered the Seventh to move off by the right flank. As it was crossing the Mill road, Col. Shaw reached the head of the line and received from him the order to "form on the right by file into line, and charge and take the work that is firing," and adding, "if that work is taken when you reach it, push right on and take the next before Gen. Foster can get there." In the meantime the Ninth had charged a work on the right and had been repulsed, and the commanding officer of the Eighth had been ordered to send four companies deployed as skirmishers to take the work to the left, but when Major Wagner found how strong it was he halted his line and remained in advance as skirmishers. As the regiment was forming for the charge, behind the crest of a knoll, Capt. Bailey, Gen. Birney's Adjutant-General, rode up to Col. Shaw with the order to send four companies deployed as skirmishers to 'attack and take the work that is firing.' Col. Shaw replied that he had orders to charge it with his regiment, to which Capt. Bailey answered, 'well, now the General directs you to send four companies, deployed as skirmishers, to take the work.' Lieut.-Col. Haskell, being absent on leave, and Maj. Mayer sick, companies C, D, G and K were placed under command of Capt. Weiss, who, when he received the order to charge, replied, 'what! take a fort with a skirmish line?' and then added, 'I will try, but it can't be done.' What followed can best be described by quoting his own words:

"Captain Weiss says: 'I at once, about 1 P. M., ordered the four companies on the right of the regiment, C, D, G and K, twenty-five or thirty paces to the front, where a slight depression in the ground secured them from the eyes, if not the projectiles, of the enemy. After being deployed by the flank on the right of the second company from the right, the command advanced in ordinary quick step against the objective point. Emerging from the swale into view, it became at once the target for a seemingly redoubled fire, not only from the fort in front, but also from the one on its right. The fire of the latter had been reported silenced, but instead, from its position to the left oblique, it proved even more destructive than that of the one in front.

"'Both forts were most advantageously situated for defense, at the extremity of a plain, variously estimated at from 500 to 700 yards wide, whose dead level surface afforded at no point shelter from view or shot to an assailing party. The forts were connected by a curtain of rifle-pits containing a re-entrant angle, thus providing for a reciprocal enfilading fire in case either was attacked.

"'The nature of the ground and the small altitude of the ordnance above the level of the plain also made the fire in the nature of a ricochet.

"'As the party advanced the enemy's shell and schrapnel were exchanged for grape and cannister, followed soon by a lively rattle of musketry. When within range of the latter, and after having traversed about three-fourths of the distance, the order to charge was given and obeyed with an alacrity that seemed to make the execution almost precede the order. For a moment, judging from the slacking of their fire, the enemy seemed to be affected by a panicky astonishment, but soon recovering, they opened again with cannister and musketry, which, at the shorter range, tore through the ranks with deadlier effect. Capt. Smith and Lieut. Prime, both of Company G, here fell grievously wounded, while forty or fifty enlisted-men dotted the plain with their prostrate forms.

"'In a few minutes the ditch of the fort was reached. It was some six or seven feet deep and ten or twelve wide, the excavated material sufficing for the embankments of the fort. Some 120 men and officers precipitated themselves into it, many losing their lives at its very edge. After a short breathing spell men were helped up the exterior of the parapet on the shoulders of others; fifty or sixty being thus disposed an attempt was made to storm the fort. At the signal nearly all rose, but the enemy, lying securely sheltered behind the interior slope, the muzzles of their guns almost touching the storming party, received the latter with a crushing fire, sending many into the ditch below shot through the brain or breast. Several other attempts were made with like result, till at last forty or fifty of the assailants were writhing in the ditch or resting forever.

"'The defense having been obviously re-enforced meanwhile from other points not so directly attacked, and having armed the gunners with muskets, it was considered impolitic to attempt another storm with the now greatly reduced force on hand, especially as the cessation of the artillery fire of the fort was considered a sufficient hint to the commander of the Union forces that the attacking party had come to close quarters and were proper subjects for re-enforcements. No signs, however, of the latter appearing, it was decided to surrender, especially as the rebels had now commenced to roll lighted shells among the stormers, against which there was no defense, thus inviting demoralization. Seven officers, Capts. Weiss and McCarty, Lieuts. Sherman, Mack, Spinney, Ferguson and Eler, and from seventy to eighty enlisted-men, delivered up their arms to an enemy gallant enough to have fought for a better cause.

"'Many, in mounting the parapet, could not help taking a last mournful look on their dead comrades in the ditch, whose soldierly qualities had endeared them to their best affections; and many, without for a moment selfishly looking at their own dark future, were oppressed with inexpressible sadness when reflecting on the immensity of the sacrifice and the deplorableness of the result. It was a time for manly tears.'

"Lieut. Spinney gives the following account of the charge against Fort Gilmer:

"'The charge was made in quick time, in open order of about three paces, until we could plainly see the enemy; then the order was given by Capt. Weiss to 'double-quick,' which was promptly obeyed, the line preserving its order as upon drill. Upon arriving at the ditch there was no wavering, but every man jumped into the trap from which but one man returned that day (George W. Washington, Company D.)

"'Upon looking about us after getting into the ditch we found there was but one face where the enemy could not touch us, so all the survivors rallied at that face. Then commenced a scene which will always be very fresh in my memory.

"'Capt. Weiss gave orders to raise men upon the parapet, which was done by two men assisting one to climb. Capt. Weiss, having from thirty to forty men up, attempted to gain the inside of the fort, but he with all of his storming party were knocked back, either killed or wounded, into the ditch. A second attempt was made with the same result, Lieut. Ferguson being wounded by a bullet across the top of his head. A third attempt was made with no better success.

"'The enemy during this time had been rolling shell upon us, and calling upon us to surrender, which was answered by some of the men in the words, 'we will show you how to surrender,' at the same time rising and firing into the fort. One of these men I remember to have been Perry Wallace, Company D.

"'Upon a consultation of the officers who were in the ditch, it was decided to surrender what was left of the command. I was still upon the face of the parapet, when Lieut. Sherman passed me a handkerchief which I raised upon the point of my sword. But the rebels, fearing it was only done to gain a foothold, would not take notice of it, but called upon me to come in, which I did, and met with a warm reception at their hands, being plucked of all they could lay hands upon. An adjutant of an Alabama regiment coming up, ordered his men to return to me what they had taken, but this was not done, however. I stated that our men had disarmed themselves and were ready to give up the hopeless struggle. Still they would not believe me, but made me mount the parapet first, when they had the courage to do so themselves, when the remnant of the four companies marched into the fort.

"'The march to Richmond was one continued insult from the troops that were hurrying to the front; one man being determined to kill Capt. Weiss, whom he thought was not humble enough. The female portion of the inhabitants were also very insolent.

"'Upon arriving at Libby Prison the officer in charge asked the commander of our guard if the 'niggers' would fight. His answer was, 'by G—d! if you had been there you would have thought so. They marched up just as if they were on drill, not firing a shot.'

"'After being lodged in Libby, Salisbury and Danville prisons, we were returned to Richmond about February 17th, paroled on the 21st, and reached our lines on the 22d.'

"An article in the New York Herald of November 4th, 1864, copied from a rebel newspaper, arguing for the arming of slaves, has in it the following passage:

"'But A. B. says that negroes will not fight. We have before us a letter from a distinguished general (we wish we were at liberty to use his name and influence) who says 'Fort Gilmer proved the other day that they would fight. They raised each other on the parapet to be shot as they appeared above.'

"The officer referred to was understood to be Gen. Lee.

"After the four companies had disappeared in the ditch of the fort, Capt. Pratt, with Company F, was ordered to move forward as near the work as he could get and keep down its fire and cover their retreat. Capt. Smith and Lieut. Prime came back, both severely wounded. Later in the day companies A, B, E and I, under Capt. Spaulding, moved to the left and relieved the four companies of the Eighth, who were out of ammunition. Co. F lost two men killed and twenty-three wounded, and the four companies under Capt. Spaulding had eleven men killed and wounded. Lieut. Teeple, commanding Company I, was wounded in the arm, but remained in command of his company during the day.

"Four companies annihilated, 70 killed, 110 wounded and 129 missing tells the story of Fort Gilmer.

"The regiment, or what was left of it, remained at the front until 9 o'clock P. M., when the wounded were gathered together and it moved half a mile to the rear and slept on its arms.

"This day proved the most unfortunate one in the history of the regiment. The storming of a strong field-work, whose garrison was on the alert, with a thin skirmish line without supports, resulted as could easily have been foreseen. First, the Ninth was sent unsupported to charge a work to the left of Fort Gilmer, across an open field where its line was enfiladed by the enemy's fire, and was repulsed; then four companies of the Eighth, as skirmishers, were sent against the same work, with no better success, and after this bitter experience, four companies of the Seventh were sent to their destruction on an errand equally hopeless. Had the brigade been sent together, instead of its three regiments in detail, the rebel line would have been carried and the road to Richmond opened to us. This is no conjecture. The testimony of a rebel staff-officer on duty at Fort Gilmer, and that of our own officers who were captured, fully substantiate the statement.

"About noon on the following day, the 30th, the regiment moved a mile to the left and went into the rifle-pits to the left of Fort Harrison. Soon after, the rebel Maj.-Gen. Field, who had commanded the Ft. Gilmer line the day previous, made a determined assault on Fort Harrison from one side, while Hoke's division attacked on the other; but the attack was not made simultaneously and was repulsed with heavy loss. While this charge was being made, Col. Shaw was struck on the head by a rifle bullet, but was uninjured. The next morning the rebels opened their batteries on our line. During the cannonade, Lieut. Bjornmark was wounded in the foot by the fragment of a shell.

"The following is the report of Capt. Weiss to the commanding officer of the regiment, announcing his arrival in Richmond:

"'LIBBY PRISON, RICHMOND, VA., September 30, 1864.

"'Sir:—I respectfully inform you that the following officers of the Seventh U. S. C. T. are here, prisoners: Capts. Weiss and McCarty, Lieuts. Mack, Sherman, Eler, Ferguson and Spinney. Lieut. Ferguson and myself are wounded in the head, but doing well.

"'Please inform our friends of the above, and oblige,

"'Yours, on the part of my associates,

"'JULIUS A. WEISS,

"'Capt. Seventh U. S. C. T."

"On the 5th of October, the regiment was relieved from duty in the trenches by the Eight, and moving a short distance to the rear, went into camp near division headquarters.

"On the 6th, Gen. Birney divided the regiments of his command into two brigades. The First Brigade, composed of the Seventh, Ninth and One Hundred and Twenty-seventh, was placed under command of Col. Voris, of the Sixty-seventh Ohio, although each regiment had a colonel serving with it; and the Second, composed of the Eighth, Twenty-ninth and Forty-fifth, under Lieut.-Col. Armstrong, of the Ninth. Capt. Rice returned from sick-leave the same day and was assigned to the command of Company A, his own company (K) having disappeared in the melee of the 29th of September.

"During the forenoon of the 7th, the enemy attacked in force on the right, driving in Kautz's cavalry and capturing Elder's battery of the First United States Artillery, but was checked and driven back by the First Division of the Tenth Corps. The regiment was moved to the right, and after changing positions several times, went into the trenches near the New Market road.

"On the afternoon of the 12th, orders came for the regiment to be ready to move in light marching order, and later it moved out about half of a mile to the front and right, and deployed two companies as skirmishers. Shortly after dark it was withdrawn to the position it held earlier in the day. A cold rain was falling, and as the men were without overcoats, they suffered considerably.

"About 3 o'clock on the morning of the 13th, our own division (Third), together with the First, moved out of camp and marched to the right until it reached the Darbytown road. Here it formed line, and advancing through the thick undergrowth finally lay down in front of the enemy's works to await developments. At 10 o'clock the First Division, which, with the cavalry, had gone to the right, charged the enemy's line, but failed to break it and had to withdraw with considerable loss. About noon the regiment relieved the Eighth on the skirmish line. Capt. Dickey, of the Eighth, was killed during the movement. Here it remained until about 4 o'clock, when, the remainder of the division having been withdrawn, it fell back covering the movement of the corps and returned to its old camp on the New Market road. * * *

"The regiment remained in camp until the 26th, furnishing in the meantime a large picket detail, together with details for fatigue, employed in the construction of earthworks, abattis, etc. On this date Col. Voris was relieved from command of the brigade by Col. Shaw, Lieut.-Col. Haskell taking command of the regiment.

"On the evening of this day orders were received for the regiment to be ready to move on the following morning, with three days' cooked rations, and in light marching order. At 5 A. M. we moved out of camp and took the road toward the right. The Eighteenth, as well as our own corps, was in motion. The orders were for the Tenth Corps to threaten the enemy's line near the Darbytown road, while the Eighteenth moving by the rear to the right, was to strike their left flank. If they weakened their line in its front, the Tenth Corps was to advance. The whole movement being made to cover the advance of the Army of the Potomoc against the rebel lines covering Hatcher's run and the Boydtown plank-road.

"Marching about two miles to the right we struck the Darbytown road, when line of battle was formed to the left, and moved forward through the woods, and, in places, almost impassable undergrowth—the Seventh having the left of the division as well of the line. Our ears were soon greeted with the scattering fire of our skirmish line, interspersed by the crashing of an occasional shell through the tree-tops. After an advance of half a mile the division halted to await the result of the attack on the right. The irregular skirmish fire soon swelled out into long, heavy volleys, deepened by the hoarser notes of the artillery. From 8 A. M. until 8 P. M. we lay and listened to this concert of diabolical sounds, momentarily expecting the order would be passed along the line to advance. About 11 A. M. it began to rain, which continued until far into the night. At 8 P. M. we fell back out of the woods, behind an old line of rebel rifle-pits, and bivouacked for the night near Kell's House.

"At 3 o'clock the following morning we were ordered in to relieve the Twenty-ninth on the picket-line. The clouds had cleared away and the air was keen and cold. We felt our way through the dense, dripping undergrowth to the musical accompaniment of rebel bullets singing above our heads. By daybreak we were in position along the edge of a belt of woods, something less than a quarter of a mile from the rebel works. Their skirmishers kept up a lively fire all through the forenoon, and as a consequence we lost some thirty odd men, killed and wounded, from their fire. About 3 P. M. orders were given to fall back, but through some misunderstanding, the two companies holding the extreme left of the line failed to receive the order, and held their ground until their retreat was nearly cut off by the rebel advance, when they fell back without orders, meeting on their way the remainder of the brigade coming to their rescue. The same evening the troops returned to their camps.

"Here ended our fighting for the fall. * * *

"On the 28th, Gen. Birney returned and relieved Gen. Hawley in command of the division, which he had held during the absence of the former in Philadelphia, where he had gone about the 21st to attend the funeral of his brother, Maj.-Gen. D. B. Birney. Col. Shaw was placed permanently in command of the First Brigade, and Col. Wright, Tenth U. S. C. T., of the Second.

"About the 30th, a general order was received from Gen. Butler thanking Capt. Weiss and the officers under him for their gallant conduct on the 29th, and saying that their absence in prison alone prevented their promotion.

"On the 1st of November, the division was reviewed by Gen. Birney, and the proclamation of the Governor of Maryland, announcing the adoption of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery in that State, was read to the command. This paper, which conveyed to the men the knowledge that their wives and children were no longer slaves, produced an effect more easily imagined than described.

* * * *

"On the 5th, Capt. Cheney and Lieut. Teeple, with companies H and I, were detached from the regiment to garrison Fort 'No. 3,' at Spring Hill—a work on the right flank of the Army of the James—where they remained until the 6th of December.

"On the 1st of December, the reorganization of the Tenth and Eighteenth Corps was determined upon. The white troops of the two corps were consolidated and formed the Twenty-fourth Corps, under Gen. Foster; and the colored troops of the Ninth, Tenth and Eighteenth Corps, with other colored troops not assigned, formed the Twenty-fifth Corps, under Gen. Weitzel. Its three divisions were commanded by Gens. Wild, Birney and Paine, respectively. The First Brigade of Birney's division was made up of the Seventh, One Hundred and Ninth, One Hundred and Sixteenth and One hundred and Seventeenth, under Col. Shaw. The Forty-first Forty-fifth and One Hundred and Twenty-seventh had at different times been attached to the brigade—to learn our ways, as they said at headquarters. Eventually, however, the One Hundred and Fifteenth was substituted for the One Hundred and Seventeenth in the brigade.

"On the 4th, a general re-assignment of positions was made. The Seventh moved from the New Market road to Fort Burnham (Harrison), which was garrisoned by the First Brigade. The Second Brigade, under Doubleday, was on our right, and the Third on our left. The Second Brigade joined the Twenty-fourth Corps, near the New Market road, and Paine's division was on our left and extended to the river. The other division was in reserve to the rear. The Seventh was under command of Lieut.-Col. Pratt, and so remained during the remainder of our stay in Virginia."

The prolonged but decisive struggle began to draw near. General Grant had pushed the troops nearer and closer, at every opportunity, to the beleaguered cities, until they were well-nigh completely invested. General Sherman's splendid victories influenced the veteran corps lying before these places, and filled them with the spirit of sure success. The intrepid commander, having reached North Carolina, visited Grant at the latter's headquarters at City Point, where he also found President Lincoln, and received their congratulations for his successful march to the sea, which achievement had not been surpassed by any of the undertakings of either Hannibal or Bonaparte in point of daring and strategy. An important conference then took place, and on the 28th of March Sherman returned to his command.



Grant throughout the winter had been preparing for the spring campaign. The Phalanx regiments heretofore in the 9th, 10th and 18th Corps had been consolidated, and formed the 25th Corps, under the command of Major-General Godfrey Weitzel, who at New Orleans refused to command negro troops. The Corps was divided into three divisions, with Brigadier-Generals Wilde, Birney and Paine as commanders. Major-General Ord had succeeded to the command of the Army of the James, then numbering about 28,000 effective men, and was to take part with three divisions of his command in the onward movement to commence on the 29th of March, while Weitzel was to command the remainder of the troops north of the James and at Bermuda Hundreds.

Lee, as though he had knowledge of Grant's intention and meant to frustrate his plans by taking the initiative, attacked the 9th Corps at Fort Steadman on the 25th, with signal success. He was finally repulsed, however, and Grant began moving the Union troops. On the morning of the 29th, General Birney with the 2nd Division of the 25th Corps was near Hatcher's Run, with General Ord's command. The division consisted of three brigades of Phalanx Infantry, commanded by Colonels James Shaw, Jr., Ulysses Doubleday and William W. Woodward. A brigade of artillery commanded by Captain Louis L. Langdon was attached to the Corps; but, owing to the country being wooded, it was of little use, and most of it was left on the north side with General Weitzel.