After the Atlanta campaign, in the Department of the Missouri, every important bridge and town where detachments of troops were stationed was protected by block-houses and stockades, and during the Indian campaigns of 1864-5-6 our lines of communication, stage and telegraph, were all held successfully by small detachments of troops in block-houses and stockades, and were never captured unless overwhelming forces of the Indians attacked them, and only then when the defensive works were inferior or not properly constructed; and, even in cases where detachments left their stations, if they had remained they would have successfully held them. After I took command on the plains and issued positive orders for detachments to stay by their posts and never leave them, not a single detachment that I remember of was captured in its block-house or stockade. With the small force we had it would have been impossible to maintain our mail, telegraph and overland routes successfully, if it had not been for our system of block-houses and stockades, dotted for thousands of miles over each of the overland routes. It is evident from our experience in the West that our block-house and stockade system of defending our lines of communication was a great success, not only as against raids of cavalry, but from attacks of infantry and artillery, and saved to us a very large force for the field. I left on the line of the railway from Nashville to Athens during the Atlanta campaign only two Regiments of negroes, taking with me my entire Corps, and without the block-houses to defend the lines from Nashville to Stevenson and Stevenson to Atlanta, it would have taken a thousand men without block-house protection for every hundred required with it.

GRENVILLE M. DODGE.



AN INCIDENT OF THE WAR

EXECUTION OF THE CONFEDERATE SPY, SAMUEL DAVIS AT PULASKI, TENN., NOVEMBER, 1863

NEW YORK, June 15th, 1897.

To the Editor of The Confederate Veteran:

In fulfillment of my promise to give you my recollections of Sam Davis, (who was hung as a spy in November, 1863, at Pulaski, Tenn.,) I desire to say that in writing of matters which occurred thirty-four years ago one is apt to make mistakes as to minor details; but the principal facts were such that they impressed themselves upon my mind so that I can speak of them with some certainty.

When General Grant ordered General Sherman (whose head of column was near Eastport, on the Tennessee River) to drop everything and bring his army to Chattanooga, my Corps (the Sixteenth) was then located at Corinth, Miss., and I brought up the rear.

General Grant's anxiety to attack Bragg's command before Longstreet could return from East Tennessee brought on the battle before I could reach Chattanooga. General Grant, therefore, instructed General Sherman to halt my command in Middle Tennessee and to instruct me to rebuild the railway from Nashville to Decatur. The fulfilling of the above order is fully set forth by General Grant in his Memoirs.

When I reached the line of the Nashville and Decatur railroad, I distributed my troops from Columbia south towards Athens, Alabama. I had about 10,000 men and 8,000 animals, and was without provisions, with no railroad or water communication to any base of supply, and was obliged to draw subsistence for my command from the adjacent country until I could rebuild the railroad and receive my supplies from Nashville.

My command was a part of the Army of the Tennessee, occupying temporarily a portion of the territory of the Department of the Cumberland, but not reporting or subject to the commander of that department.

Upon an examination of the country, I found that there was an abundance of everything needed to supply my command, except where Sherman's forces had swept across it along Elk River. He wrote me, "I do not think that my forces have left a chicken for you." I also found that I was in a country where the sentiment of the people was almost unanimously against us. I had very little faith in converting them by the taking of the oath of allegiance; I therefore issued an order stating that I required the products of the country to supply my command, and that to all who had these products, regardless of their sentiments, who would bring them to the stations where my troops were located, I would pay a fair price for them; but that, if I had to send and bring the supplies myself, I should take them without making payment, giving them only receipts; and also issued instructions that every train going for supplies should be accompanied by an officer and receipt given for what he took. This had a good effect, the citizens generally bringing in their supplies to my command and receiving the proper voucher; but it also gave an opportunity for straggling bands to rob and charge up their depredations to my command. This caused many complaints to be filed with the military governor of Tennessee and the Department Commander of the Army of the Cumberland.

Upon investigation I found most of those depredations were committed by irresponsible parties of both sides, and I also discovered that there was a well-organized and disciplined Corps of scouts and spies within my lines, one force operating to the east of the line, under Captain Coleman, and another force operating to the west, having its headquarters in the vicinity of Florence, Alabama. I issued orders to my own spies to locate these parties, sending out scouting parties to wipe them out or drive them across the Tennessee River.

My cavalry had had considerable experience in this work in and around Corinth, and they were very successful and brought in many prisoners, most of whom could only be treated as prisoners of war.

The Seventh Kansas Cavalry was very efficient in this service, and they captured Samuel Davis, Joshua Brown, Smith, and General Bragg's Chief of Scouts and Secret Service Colonel S. Shaw, all about the same time. We did not know of the importance of the capture of Shaw, or that he was the Captain Coleman commanding Bragg's secret-service force. Nothing was found on any of the prisoners of importance, except upon Davis, who evidently had been selected to carry the information they had all obtained through to General Bragg. Upon Davis were found letters from Captain Coleman, the commander of the scouts to the east of us, and many others. I was very anxious to capture Coleman and break up his command, as my own scouts and spies within the Confederate lines were continually reporting to us the news sent south from and the movements of Coleman within my lines.

Davis was brought immediately to me, as his captors knew his importance. They believed he was an officer and also knew he was a member of Coleman's command.

When brought to my office I met him pleasantly. I knew what had been found upon him and I desired to locate Coleman and his command and ascertain, if possible, who was furnishing the information, which I saw was accurate and valuable, to General Bragg.

Davis met me modestly. He was a fine, soldierly-looking young man, dressed in a faded Federal soldier's coat, one of our army soft hats, and top boots. He had a frank, open face, which was inclined to brightness. I tried to impress upon him the danger he was in, and that I knew he was only a messenger, and held out to him the hope of lenient treatment if he would answer truthfully, as far as he could, my questions.

He listened attentively and respectfully to me, but, as I recollect, made no definite answer, and I had him returned to the prison. My recollection is that Captain Armstrong, my Provost Marshal, placed in the prison with him and the other prisoners one of our own spies, who claimed to them to be one of the Confederate scouting parties operating within my lines, and I think the man More, whom the other prisoners speak of as having been captured with them and escaping, was this man. However, they all kept their own counsel and we obtained no information of value from them.

The reason of this reticence was the fact that they all knew Colonel Shaw was one of our captives, and that if his importance was made known to us he would certainly be hung; and they did not think that Davis would be executed.

Upon Davis was found a large mail of value. Much of it was letters from the friends and relatives of soldiers in the Confederate Army. There were many small presents—one or two, I remember, to General Bragg—and much accurate information of my forces, of our defenses, our intentions, substance of my orders, criticisms as to my treatment of the citizens, and a general approval of my payment for supplies, while a few denounced severely some of the parties who had hauled in supplies under the orders. Captain Coleman mentioned this in one of his letters.

There were also intimations of the endeavor that would be made to interrupt my work, and plans for the capture of single soldiers and small parties of the command out after forage.

I had Davis brought before me again, after my Provost Marshal had reported his inability to obtain anything of value from him. I then informed him that he would be tried as a spy; that the evidence against him would surely convict him; and made a direct appeal to him to give me the information I knew he had. He very quietly, but firmly, refused to do it. I therefore let him be tried and suffer the consequences. Considerable interest was taken in young Davis by the Provost Marshal and Chaplain Young, and considerable pressure was brought to bear upon them by some of the citizens of Pulaski; and I am under the impression that some of them saw Davis and endeavored to induce him to save himself, but they failed. Mrs. John A. Jackson, I remember, made a personal appeal in his behalf directly to me. Davis was convicted upon trial and sentenced. Then one of my noted scouts, known as "Chickasaw," believed that he could prevail upon Davis to give the information we asked.

He took him in hand and never gave it up until the last moment, going to the scaffold with a promise of pardon a few moments before his execution.

Davis died to save his own chief, Colonel Shaw, who was in prison with him and was captured the same day.

The parties who were prisoners with Davis have informed me that it was Shaw who had selected Davis as the messenger to General Bragg, and had given to him part of his mail and papers.

I did not know this certainly until a long time after the war. I first learned of it by rumor and what some of my own scouts have told me since the war, and it has since been confirmed confidentially to me by one of the prisoners who was captured about the same time that Davis was and who was imprisoned with him up to the time he was convicted and sentenced, and knew Colonel Shaw, as well as all the facts in the case.

The statement made to me is, that Colonel S. Shaw was the chief or an important officer in General Bragg's Secret-Service Corps; that Shaw had furnished the important documents to Davis; and that their captors did not know Shaw and his importance.

Colonel Shaw I sent with the other prisoners North, as prisoners of war. I also learned that Shaw was greatly alarmed when he was informed I was trying to induce Davis to give me the information he had.

This is where Davis showed himself a true soldier. He had been entrusted with an important commission by an important officer, who was imprisoned with him, and died rather than betray him. He knew to a certainty, if he informed me of the facts, that Shaw would be executed, for he was a far more important person to us than was Davis.

During the war I had many spies captured; some executed who were captured within the Confederate lines and who were equally brave in meeting their fate.

By an extraordinary effort I saved the life of one who was captured by Forrest. Through my efforts this man escaped, though General Forrest sized him up correctly. He was one of the most important men we ever had within the Confederate lines.

Forrest was determined to hang him, but Major-General Polk believed him innocent and desired to save him.

Great interest was taken in Davis at the time, because it was known by all of the command that I desired to save him.

Your publication bears many evidences of this fact. It is not, therefore, necessary for me to state that I regretted to see sentence executed; but it was one of the fates of war, which is cruelty itself, and there is no refining it.

I find this letter bearing upon the case; it may be of interest. It is my first report to Major B. M. Sawyer, Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of the Tennessee, notifying him of the capture of Davis. It is dated, Pulaski, Tenn., November 20th, 1863, and is as follows:

I herewith inclose a copy of dispatches taken from one of Bragg's spies. He had a heavy mail, papers, etc., and shows Captain Coleman is pretty well posted.

We have broken up several bands of mounted robbers and Confederate cavalry in the last week, capturing some five commissioned officers and one hundred enlisted men, who have been forwarded.

I also forward a few of the most important letters found in the mail. The tooth-brushes and blank-books I was greatly in need of and therefore appropriated them. I am,

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. M. DODGE,

Brigadier General.

The severe penalty of death, where a spy is captured, is not because there is anything dishonorable in the fact of the person being a spy, as only men of peculiar gifts for such service, men of courage and cool judgment and undoubted patriotism, are selected. The fact that the information they obtain is found within their enemy's lines, and the probability of great danger to an Army, is what causes the penalty to be so very severe. A soldier caught in the uniform, or a part of the uniform, of his enemy, within his enemy's lines, establishes the fact that he is a spy and is there in violation of the Articles of War and for no good purpose. This alone will prohibit his being treated as a prisoner of war, when caught, as Davis was, in our uniform, with valuable documents upon him, and seals his fate.

I appreciate fully that the people of Tennessee and Davis's comrades understand his soldierly qualities and propose to honor his memory. I take pleasure in aiding in raising the monument to his memory, although the services he performed were for the purpose of injuring my command, but given in faithfully performing the duties he was assigned to. I am

Truly and respectfully,

GRENVILLE M. DODGE,

Major-General.



GEN. G. M. DODGE ON THE "WATER CURE"

[The following is a reprint of an article that appeared originally in the New York Evening Post.—G. M. D.]

The New York Evening Post has thus been "called down" by General Grenville M. Dodge, who is well known throughout Iowa and the Nation as one of the leading Corps Commanders of the Union Army during the Civil War:

To the Editor of the Evening Post:

As one who has had some experience in the necessities, usages, and cruelties of war, which always prevail during a campaign in an enemy's country, I am surprised at the position of your journal, and its bitterness against the alleged action of Major Glenn, Lieutenant Conger, and Assistant Surgeon Lyon.

The testimony of Sergeant Riley, upon which you base your attack on these officers, goes to prove that they gave the water cure to a Filipino who had been made presidente in one of the provinces by our Government, who had taken the oath of allegiance to our country, and then used his official position to cover his acts as captain of an insurgent company which was acting in arms against our Army and within our lines. Therefore, he was a traitor and a spy, and his every act was a violation of the laws of war, and branded him an outlaw and guerilla. If these are the facts, under the usages of war these officers were justified in what they did; in fact, if they had shot the traitor they would never have been called to account, and in all probability this is what would have happened to him in the Civil War.

An officer has great latitude under such circumstances, and it is not safe or fair to condemn one for almost any act that detects a traitor and spy in arms against the Government which he has sworn to protect, and which has put him in a position of trust. You ignore entirely this side of the question, and only treat Major Glenn's acts as cruelties to peaceable Filipino citizens. I can remember when the journals of this country upheld and applauded an officer who, in the Civil War, ordered a man shot if he attempted to haul down the American flag, and cannot understand the present hysterics of some journals over the terrible violation of the laws of war in punishing a traitor, caught in the act, with the water cure only. The treatment may have been severe, but it is not permanently harmful.

I am astonished that these fearfully wrought-up journals have no word of commendation for our soldiers in the Philippines, who have suffered untold cruelties, assassinations, burning by slow fires, burial alive, mutilations, and atrocities; who have submitted to every indignity without resentment or complaint; and I have been greatly gratified over their excellent behavior under such trying circumstances. In their comments these journals are very careful not to say why these punishments are given to such traitors, knowing well if they did our people would look upon the acts as one of the necessities of war, and would wonder at the leniency of Major Glenn and his command.

GRENVILLE M. DODGE.

New York, April 17.

There can be no doubt that "war is hell," no matter whether it be on the Philippine Islands or any other place in the world. There has been much howling over the administration of "the water cure" in the Philippines, but every man who has had one year's experience in real war will admit that that "cure" is not so severe as killing or wounding captured enemies who have knowledge of hidden arms or other Army supplies. Every one of the "water-cured" Filipinos was given the opportunity to escape that punishment, but refused to tell what he knew and was therefore rightly punished until he was willing to tell the truth. General Dodge's letter proves that the punishment was justified, and his opinion will be sustained by every person who has knowledge of "the necessities, usages, and cruelties of war," which "always prevail during a campaign in an enemy's country." The truth is that the armies of the United States have been too lenient in the Philippines. That is the reason why the war has been so long continued, and the only reason why the final peace will be still further delayed. War is never a picnic, but should at all times be made terrible in order that peace and safety may be speedily gained. "The water cure" is inclined to be slightly irritating to the throats of the traitors in the Philippines, it is true, but it is not so bad or so cruel as maiming them for life, or killing them. The yellow journals may continue to howl, but the loyal American people will sustain the soldiers of the Nation in every effort to compel peace that comes within the rules of war.



MISPLACED SYMPATHY

ADDRESS TO THE NEW YORK COMMANDERY, MILITARY ORDER OF LOYAL LEGION, ON CRUELTIES IN THE PHILIPPINES

I desire to enter my protest and call the attention of the companions to the position of a portion of the public press, and some people, towards our Army in the Philippines, and what they assert are cruelties perpetrated there.

There is a certain portion of the press, and also of the people, who are and always have been absolutely opposed to the operations of our army in the Philippines. They were very anxious to push us into a war which we were all opposed to, but after getting us there they refused to accept the results, and have persistently opposed everything done that was not in exact accordance with their views. In order to work upon the sympathies of the people, some of the papers are publishing pictures showing our soldiers in the very act of committing great outrages; the pictures were manufactured in their own offices, as were also most of the outrages complained of. You have not, however, seen in these papers any pictures portraying the cruelties perpetrated upon our soldiers, which have been worse than any acts ever committed by the savages in our wars with them; they are, in fact, too revolting to relate. I have had much to do with Indian warfare, but have never seen any cruelties to be compared with those inflicted upon our soldiers by the Filipinos, and these occurrences were not rare, but general,—happening all the time. Very little has been said on this subject, for it was not the policy of the Government to have the stories of these atrocities printed, or brought before the people; but now that our army is being so bitterly attacked, it is time that, the soldiers' side of the question should be presented, and we are learning of the soldiers who have been assassinated, their feet burned, buried alive, killed by slow-burning fires, their bowels cut open and wound around trees. The Filipinos indulged in every torture and indignity that was possible, and, as a general thing, our soldiers did not retaliate. How they managed to refrain from taking vengeance is beyond my comprehension, but their action is greatly to their credit and honor.

The questions I wish to bring before you, however, are, What are the rights of an officer in such matters? What are his duties and privileges in war in an enemy's country that is under martial law? Take, for instance, General Smith's position when he was sent to Samar, with instructions to wipe out the insurrection there. He is said to have issued instructions to kill everybody found in arms that was over ten years of age, and to burn the country, if it was necessary to wipe out the insurrection, and the result is that in ninety days or less he did wipe out the insurrection, and without any great loss on our side or on the part of the enemy. Now they are denouncing him for a threat,—not an act. The temptation to retaliate must have been very great, for the treatment the Ninth Infantry received from those savages was nothing short of murder, followed by the most horrible mutilation, by a people who pretended to be their friends and at peace. In the ninety days he was operating there General Smith brought the island to peace, everybody in it had surrendered, and it is quiet. If he had made war under the methods advocated, allowing no one to be hurt, in all probability the subjugation of the island would have required a year's time, and there would have been ten times the suffering and loss of life than actually occurred. He simply followed the plan of war that was pursued by Grant, Sherman, and other commanders in the Civil War; that is, made it just as effective and short as possible. You know Sherman's position was that after a certain length of time when an enemy had been whipped, it was their duty to cease making war, and if they did not do so, he considered that any means were justifiable in order to bring it to an end. He stated this very clearly in his St. Louis speech. He stated the case as follows:

I claim that when we took Vicksburg, by all the rules of civilized warfare the Confederates should have surrendered, and allowed us to restore peace in the land. I claim also that when we took Atlanta they were bound by every rule of civilized warfare to surrender their cause, which was then hopeless, and it was clear as daylight that they were bound to surrender and return to civil life; but they continued the war, and then we had a right under the rules of civilized warfare to commence a system that would make them feel the power of the Government, and make them succumb. I had to go through Georgia to let them see what war meant. I had a right to destroy, which I did, and I made them feel the consequences of war so fully they will never again invite an invading Army.

You all know of the troubles that occurred in the border states during the Civil War, and of the cruelties to the families of Union men who entered our Army. It was father against son, brother against brother, and, as General Sherman said, "It was cruelty, and there was no refining it." We know what severe orders were given for treatment of enemies within our lines, when their acts were in violation of the laws of war. In one case torpedoes were placed under a road over which our troops were marching, and several soldiers were killed. Sherman happened to come along just at that time, and said to the Colonel of the First Alabama Cavalry, which was his escort, "Burn the country within fifteen miles surrounding this spot." You all know what that meant; it was a license under which other things besides burning was done. An eye-witness describes Sherman's march to the sea and through the Carolinas as a "cloud of smoke by day and a pillar of fire by night." Who ever made the suggestion that Sherman's uniform should be stripped off for this, or that he should be shot, as some of our representatives in Congress and our press now demand should be done in the Philippines for making war in earnest?

Take another case, where Captain Anderson captured a train of convalescent unarmed Union soldiers in North Missouri, and placed them in line and shot every one of them. Shortly afterwards Colonel Johnson, of the Missouri State Militia, who was following Anderson, came up. Anderson attacked, this militia command of 160 men and killed 143, only seventeen getting away. Only one man was taken alive, and he saved himself by giving a Masonic sign. The war records are full of cases of individual acts, and I select one of which I had personal knowledge. It is found in volume 38, of the War Records. The orders in Missouri at that time were that any person who harbored a guerilla, and did not report the fact to the nearest commanding Union officer, should receive the same treatment as the guerilla. A man by the name of McReynolds violated these orders, and harbored Quantrell, the guerilla, and the officer who detected it, after stating all the facts and evidence, reported to me as follows:

On consultation with the squadron commanders, Captain Hamblin and Lieutenant Grain, it was decided to execute McReynolds, which was carried out under my orders.

R. M. BOX.

Captain Company H, Seventh Cavalry, Missouri State Militia.

In reporting this case to the Adjutant General in Washington I did not approve it, as my investigation showed that the statements of McReynolds's acts were true. I did not censure the officers, but issued an order that officers should follow more closely the orders of the Department, and ended that order as follows: "Hereafter men caught in arms will have no mercy shown them." General John McNeill, of Missouri, took twelve citizens out and shot them, it being claimed they were connected with guerillas that shot a Union man. In some histories it is known as the Palmyra massacre. It is claimed that the Union man turned up alive. If the reports of the numbers of robbers, guerillas and outlaws who were shot on sight in Kentucky, Missouri, Tennessee, and elsewhere, by both sides in 1864 and 1865, could be gathered up they would furnish retaliations and cruelties enough for these water-cure journals for years.

Consider this matter in a broader sense. Take the order of General Grant to General Sheridan to make the Shenandoah Valley a barren waste; it was absolutely destroyed so the enemy could not again occupy it. I can see no difference between an order to make the Shenandoah Valley a barren waste and Smith's order to make Samar a "howling wilderness." Take the order I received to go to the rear of Bragg's Army and destroy the Valley of the Tennessee, and all the supplies gathered there for the use of his Army, which valley was burned from Bear River to Decatur. These were orders from principal officers in our Army, and I only quote them to show the contrast between that time and the present. Senators in the halls of Congress find it necessary in these days to take up the question. Senator Rawlins, of Utah, made an attack upon our officers, and especially upon General Chaffee, which was nothing short of disgraceful, and should not be allowed to go without vigorous condemnation. He represents a state and people under whose orders Lieutenant Gunnison and his party were massacred by Mormons disguised as Indians. Some one should get up in the Senate and call him to account for these things, and ask him, in consideration of these facts, why he is so deeply outraged by the orders of General Chaffee, a gallant soldier and gentleman, a humane man, and one who, in my opinion, has done nothing in the Philippines but what was perfectly justified, and will in time be considered to have been humane.

The two Senators from Colorado have taken it upon themselves to denounce in bitter terms what they call unheard-of acts and cruelties of our Army. I would point them to a case in their own state, which was more severe than any act in the Philippines has been. A regiment of Colorado cavalry under Colonel J. M. Chivington, a minister by profession, attacked and destroyed a band of Indians encamped on the Big Sandy, near Camp Lyon, who claimed to be under the protection of the officers at Fort Lyon. This was a massacre of men, women and children of a friendly band of Indians, and was one of the main causes of bringing into arms against the United States every tribe of Indians south of the Yellowstone. When an investigation of this affair was ordered the State of Colorado almost unanimously protested against it, upholding the act, and quoted that old saying, "There is no good Indian except a dead one." Think of our wars with the Indians in which whole bands were wiped out, even the women and children being destroyed; think of the wars in which we employed Indians against Indians; they not only killed but scalped. I do not know of a single treaty ever made with the Indians that the United States has not violated, and when an Indian had the hardihood to object the Government started in to wipe him out. This has been the treatment of the Indians from the Atlantic to the Pacific, until at the present time there is not a wild Indian living in the entire country; yet I cannot remember that this press has ever been aroused; it was too near home.

Take the case of Major Glenn, who is about to be courtmartialed for giving the water cure to the presidente in one of the Provinces of Luzon, as the testimony goes to show. This presidente had been appointed to office by our Government, had taken the oath of allegiance, and was there to represent us. While he was occupying this position, it was discovered that he was the captain of an insurgent company, giving active assistance to the enemy, and he was, therefore, a traitor and a spy, and under the laws of war deserved to be shot; but instead they proposed to courtmartial Glenn for simply giving him the water cure; and this, in my opinion, is a great wrong.

Order 100, which is often quoted, was issued in the Civil War to govern officers. It was prepared by Professor Lieber, and was considered and adopted, I believe, by a board of officers; anyhow, it was very carefully drawn. I am told it has been considered and used by nearly all the nations. It gives an officer great latitude, and where an officer meets a savage enemy, or one that is violating the laws of war, those laws are suspended and it virtually is left to his own judgment as to how far he should go in inflicting punishment, and under this order there is no doubt both Smith and Glenn were protected in their actions. It may seem harsh, but you are all aware how many harsh orders were given in the Civil War for the purpose of forcing the enemy to obey our orders, and how often those orders and threats accomplished the purpose without any other act. When the colored troops were first organized, on several occasions Confederate officers sent in demands for them to surrender, coupled with the threat that if they refused the place would be taken and no quarter granted. I know of one instance where an officer believed this threat and surrendered a Regiment of colored infantry for the purpose of having them protected. Then there is the case of Fort Pillow; whether or not Forest gave the order it is claimed he gave, I do not know; but the fact that no quarter was shown there has been amply verified.

Within the past week there has been appointed a committee of distinguished citizens, most of whom are well-known opponents of our Government in its policies and acts during the Spanish War. They propose to hunt up and lay before Congress all cases of cruelty on the part of our Army, with the avowed purpose of sustaining the national honor. I must say this is the first time I ever heard of national honor being sustained by such methods. Have you, or any one else, ever heard a single word of protest from these people or any one connected with them against the revolting cruelties of the enemy in the Philippines? They evidently have no desire to learn about these things, but want some excuse for attacking our Army, hoping thereby to bring dishonor upon our country before the world. The national honor never has, never can, and never will be protected by such methods. It is upheld and maintained today, as it always has been, by the patriotism of our people as represented by our Army in the Civil War, in Cuba, the Philippines, and China.

These attacks upon the Army are for a double purpose, and you should not forget it. Every time they make this great hubbub about cruelties they are hitting back at those that were in the Civil War. There is an element in this country that already has no use for the soldier of the Civil War. They are continually crying about the pension he is getting; that he is favored in the Government service; etc., etc. They do not dare attack him openly, as yet, but do it covertly. There is no officer listening to me who did not see cruelties in the Civil War. Many of you have had to order them, but you know you were never brought to account for them when they were acts of necessity. We were always careful that no cruelties were committed by enlisted men, but whatever was done was by the order of an officer. It was the practice of the War Department never to interfere in these matters, leaving them to the officer who was in charge of the forces in the field. None of these things occurred without his knowledge; he was on the spot and knew the necessity for them, and if he did not take action it was considered that none was necessary, and they were seldom called to account for it afterwards; but in the Philippines they are bringing officers to account simply because of the outcry of people who care nothing for the merits of the case, except to make capital against our country's policy in maintaining itself in the Philippines. In view of all the facts, I must doubt the sincerity of those who are seeking to bring discredit upon our little Army, the marvellous efficiency of which has won the admiration of the world. Under the regulations, it is impossible for the Army to defend itself and make answer to these attacks, except through their own officers, and their reports do not reach the public, for the press seems to use only that which reflects upon the Army, and omits that which is in its favor. It is the duty of every companion here, as well as of every good citizen, to enter his protest against these unjust attacks. The right side is beginning to get a hearing, and when the facts and causes for the action of the Army are generally known, it will be found that our Army is as humane and well-behaved a body of troops as ever went into a foreign country, and we must all assist in seeing that it receives justice.

THE END