When that empire had emerged, shorn of several provinces—in Europe, of Rumania, Serbia, and northern Greece, with Bulgaria also well on the road they had travelled to emancipation, and in Asia, of a broad slice of Caucasia—Abdul Hamid cut his losses, and, under the new guarantee of the Berlin Treaty, took heart to try his hand at reviving Osmanli power. He and his advisers had their idea, the contrary of the idea of Midhat and all the sultans since Mahmud. The empire must be made, not more European, but more Asiatic. In the development of Islamic spirit to pan-Islamic unity it would find new strength; and towards this end in the early eighties, while he was yet comparatively young, with intelligence unclouded and courage sufficient, Abdul Hamid patiently set himself. In Asia, naturally sympathetic to autocracy, and the home of the faith of his fathers, he set on foot a pan-Islamic propaganda. He exalted his caliphate; he wooed the Arabs, and he plotted with extraneous Moslems against whatever foreign government they might have to endure.

It cannot be denied that this idea was based on the logic of facts, and, if it could be realized, promised better than Midhat's for escape from shameful dependence. Indeed, Abdul Hamid, an autocrat bent on remaining one, could hardly have acted upon any other. By far the greater part of the territorial empire remaining to him lay in Asia. The little left in Europe would obviously soon be reduced to less. The Balkan lands were waking, or already awake, to a sense of separate nationality, and what chance did the Osmanli element, less progressive than any, stand in them? The acceptance of the Ottoman power into the Concert of Europe, though formally notified to Abdul Mejid, had proved an empty thing. In that galley there was no place for a sultan except as a dependent or a slave. As an Asiatic power, however, exerting temporal sway over some eighteen million bodies and religious influence over many times more souls, the Osmanli caliph might command a place in the sun.

The result belied these hopes. Abdul Hamid's failure was owed in the main to facts independent of his personality or statecraft. The expansion of Islam over an immense geographical area and among peoples living in incompatible stages of sophistication, under most diverse political and social conditions, has probably made any universal caliphial authority for ever impossible. The original idea of the caliphate, like that of the jehad or holy war of the faithful, presupposed that all Moslems were under governments of their own creed, and, perhaps, under one government. Moreover, if such a caliph were ever to be again, an Osmanli sultan would not be a strong candidate. Apart from the disqualification of his blood, he being not of the Prophet's tribe nor even an Arab, he is lord of a state irretrievably compromised in purist eyes (as Wahabis and Senussis have testified once and again) by its Byzantine heritage of necessary relations with infidels. Abdul Hamid's predecessors for two centuries or more had been at no pains to infuse reality into their nominal leadership of the faithful. To call a real caliphate out of so long abeyance could hardly have been effected even by a bold soldier, who appealed to the general imagination of Moslems; and certainly was beyond the power of a timid civilian.

When Abdul Hamid had played this card and failed, he had no other; and his natural pusillanimity and shiftiness induced him to withdraw ever more into the depths of his palace, and there use his intelligence in exploiting this shameful dependence of his country on foreign powers. Unable or unwilling to encourage national resistance, he consoled himself, as a weak malcontent will, by setting one power against another, pin-pricking the stronger and blustering to the weaker. The history of his reign is a long record of protests and surrenders to the great in big matters, as to Great Britain in the matter of Egypt in 1881, to Russia in that of Eastern Rumelia in 1885, to France on the question of the Constantinople quays and other claims, and to all the powers in 1881 in the matter of the financial control. Between times he put in such pin-pricks as he could, removing his neighbours' landmarks in the Aden hinterland or the Sinaitic peninsula. He succeeded, however, in keeping his empire out of a foreign war with any power for about thirty years, with the single exception of a brief conflict with Greece in 1897. While in the first half of his reign he was at pains to make no European friend, in the latter he fell more and more under the influence of Germany, which, almost from the accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II, began to prepare a southward way for future use, and alone of the powers, never browbeat the sultan.

Internally, the empire passed more and more under the government of the imperial household. Defeated by the sheer geographical difficulty of controlling directly an area so vast and inadequately equipped with means of communication, Abdul Hamid soon relaxed the spasmodic efforts of his early years to better the condition of his subjects; and, uncontrolled and demoralized by the national disgrace, the administration went from bad to much worse. Ministers irresponsible; officials without sense of public obligation; venality in all ranks; universal suspicion and delation; violent remedies, such as the Armenian massacres of 1894, for diseases due to neglect; the peasantry, whether Moslem or Christian, but especially Christian, forced ultimately to liquidate all accounts; impoverishment of the whole empire by the improvidence and oppression of the central power— such phrasing of the conventional results of 'Palace' government expresses inadequately the fruits of Yildiz under Abdul Hamid II.

Pari passu with this disorder of central and provincial administration increased the foreign encroachments on the empire. The nation saw not only rapid multiplication of concessions and hypothecations to aliens, and of alien persons themselves installed in its midst under extra-territorial immunity from its laws, secured by the capitulations, but also whole provinces sequestered, administered independently of the sultan's government, and prepared for eventual alienation. Egypt, Tunisia, Eastern Rumelia, Krete—these had all been withdrawn from Ottoman control since the Berlin settlement, and now Macedonia seemed to be going the same way. Bitter to swallow as the other losses had been—pills thinly sugared with a guarantee of suzerainty—the loss of Macedonia would be more bitter still; for, if it were withdrawn from Ottoman use and profit, Albania would follow and so would the command of the north Aegean and the Adriatic shores; while an ancient Moslem population would remain at Christian mercy.

It was partly Ottoman fault, partly the fault of circumstances beyond Ottoman control, that this district had become a scandal and a reproach. In the days of Osmanli greatness Macedonia had been neglected in favour of provinces to the north, which were richer and more nearly related to the ways into central Europe. When more attention began to be paid to it by the Government, it had already become a cockpit for the new-born Christian nationalities, which had been developed on the north, east, and south. These were using every weapon, material and spiritual, to secure preponderance in its society, and had created chronic disorder which the Ottoman administration now weakly encouraged to save itself trouble, now violently dragooned. Already the powers had not only proposed autonomy for it, but begun to control its police and its finance. This was the last straw. The public opinion which had slowly been forming for thirty years gained the army, and Midhat's seed came to fruit.

By an irony of fate Macedonia not only supplied the spectacle which exasperated the army to revolt, but by its very disorder made the preparation of that revolt possible; for it was due to local limitations of Ottoman sovereignty that the chief promoters of revolution were able to conspire in safety. By another irony, two of the few progressive measures ever encouraged by Abdul Hamid contributed to his undoing. If he had not sent young officers to be trained abroad, the army, the one Ottoman institution never allowed wholly to decay, would have remained outside the conspiracy. If he had never promoted the construction of railways, as he began to do after 1897, the Salonika army could have had no such influence on affairs in Constantinople as it exerted in 1908 and again in 1909. As it was, the sultan, at a mandate from Resna in Macedonia, re-enacted Midhat's Constitution, and, a year later, saw an army from Salonika arrive to uphold that Constitution against the reaction he had fostered, and to send him, dethroned and captive, to the place whence itself had come.



7

Revolution

Looking back on this revolution across seven years of its consequences, we see plainly enough that it was inspired far less by desire for humane progress than by shame of Osmanli military decline. The 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' programme which its authors put forward (a civilian minority among them, sincerely enough), Europe accepted, and the populace of the empire acted upon for a moment, did not express the motive of the movement or eventually guide its course. The essence of that movement was militant nationalism. The empire was to be regenerated, not by humanizing it but by Ottomanizing it. The Osmanli, the man of the sword, was the type to which all others, who wished to be of the nation, were to conform. Such as did not so wish must be eliminated by the rest.

The revolutionary Committee in Salonika, called 'of Union and Progress', held up its cards at first, but by 1910 events had forced its hand on the table. The definite annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by Austria-Hungary in 1908, and the declaration of independence and assumption of the title Tsar by the ruler of Bulgaria, since they were the price to be paid by the revolutionaries for a success largely made in Germany, were opposed officially only pro forma; but when uninformed opinion in the empire was exasperated thereby against Christendom, the Committee, to appease reactionaries, had to give premature proof of pan-Osmanli and pro-Moslem intentions by taking drastic action against rayas. The Greeks of the empire, never without suspicions, had failed to testify the same enthusiasm for Ottoman fraternity which others, e.g. the Armenians, had shown; now they resumed their separatist attitude, and made it clear that they still aspired, not to Ottoman, but to Hellenic nationality. Nor were even the Moslems of the empire unanimous for fraternity among themselves. The Arab-speaking societies complained of under-representation in the councils and offices of the state, and made no secret of their intention not to be assimilated by the Turk-speaking Osmanlis. To all suggestions, however, of local home-rule and conciliation of particularist societies in the empire, the Committee was deaf. Without union, it believed in no progress, and by union it understood the assimilation of all societies in the empire to the Osmanli.

Logic was on the side of the Committee in its choice of both end and means. In pan-Ottomanism, if it could be effected, lay certainly the single chance of restoring Osmanli independence and power to anything like the position they had once held. In rule by a militarist oligarchy for some generations to come, lay the one hope of realizing the pan-Ottoman idea and educating the resultant nation to self-government. That end, however, it was impossible to realize under the circumstances in which past history had involved the Ottoman Empire. There was too much bad blood between different elements of its society which Osmanli rulers had been labouring for centuries rather to keep apart than to unite; and certain important elements, both Moslem and Christian, had already developed too mature ideas of separate nationality. With all its defects, however, the new order did undoubtedly rest on a wider basis than the old, and its organization was better conceived and executed. It retained some of the sympathy of Europe which its beginnings had excited, and the western powers, regarding its representative institutions as earnests of good government, however ill they might work at the first, were disposed to give it every chance.

Unfortunately the Young Turks were in a hurry to bring on their millennium, and careless of certain neighbouring powers, not formidable individually but to be reckoned with if united, to whom the prospect of regenerated Osmanlis assimilating their nationals could not be welcome. Had the Young Turks been content to put their policy of Ottomanization in the background for awhile, had they made no more than a show of accepting local distinctions of creed and politics, keeping in the meantime a tight rein on the Old Turks, they might long have avoided the union of those neighbours, and been in a better position to resist, should that union eventually be arrayed against themselves.

But a considerable and energetic element among them belonged to the nervous Levantine type of Osmanli, which is as little minded to compromise as any Old Turk, though from a different motive. It elected to deal drastically and at once with Macedonia, the peculiar object not only of European solicitude but also of the interest of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece. If ever a province required delicate handling it was this. It did not get it. The interested neighbours, each beset by fugitives of its oppressed nationals, protested only to be ignored or browbeaten. They drew towards one another; old feuds and jealousies were put on one side; and at last, in the summer of 1912, a Holy League of Balkan States, inspired by Venezelos, the new Kretan Prime Minister of Greece, and by Ferdinand of Bulgaria, was formed with a view to common action against the oppressor of Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian nationals in Macedonia. Montenegro, always spoiling for a fight, was deputed to fire the train, and at the approach of autumn the first Balkan war blazed up.



8

Balkan War

The course of the struggle is described elsewhere in this volume. Its event illustrates the danger of an alliance succeeding beyond the expectations in which it was formed. The constituent powers had looked for a stiff struggle with the Ottoman armies, but for final success sufficient to enable them, at the best, to divide Macedonia among themselves, at the worst, to secure its autonomy under international guarantee. Neither they nor any one else expected such an Ottoman collapse as was in store. Their moment of attack was better chosen than they knew. The Osmanli War Office was caught fairly in the middle of the stream. Fighting during the revolution, subsequently against Albanians and other recalcitrant provincials, and latterly against the Italians, who had snatched at Tripoli the year before, had reduced the Nizam, the first line of troops, far below strength. The Redif, the second line, had received hardly more training, thanks to the disorganization of Abdul Hamid's last years and of the first years of the new order, than the Mustafuz, the third and last line. Armament, auxiliary services, and the like had been disorganized preparatory to a scheme for thorough reorganization, which had been carried, as yet, but a very little way. A foreign (German) element, introduced into the command, had had time to impair the old spirit of Ottoman soldiers, but not to create a new one. The armies sent against the Bulgarians in Thrace were so many mobs of various arms; those which met the Serbs, a little better; those which opposed the Greeks, a little worse.

It followed that the Bulgarians, who had proposed to do no more in Thrace than block Adrianople and immobilize the Constantinople forces, were carried by their own momentum right down to Chataldja, and there and at Adrianople had to prosecute siege operations when they ought to have been marching to Kavala and Salonika. The Serbs, after hard fighting, broke through not only into Macedonia but into Albania, and reached the Adriatic, but warned off this by the powers, consoled themselves with the occupation of much more Macedonian territory than the concerted plans of the allies had foreseen. The Greeks, instead of hard contests for the Haliacmon Valley and Epirus—their proper Irredenta—pushed such weak forces before them that they got through to Salonika just in time to forestall a Bulgarian column. Ottoman collapse was complete everywhere, except on the Chataldja front. It remained to divide the spoil. Serbia might not have Adriatic Albania, and therefore wanted as much Macedonia as she had actually overrun. Greece wanted the rest of Macedonia and had virtually got it. Remained Bulgaria who, with more of Thrace than she wanted, found herself almost entirely crowded out of Macedonia, the common objective of all.

Faced with division ex post facto, the allies found their a priori agreement would not resolve the situation. Bulgaria, the predominant partner and the most aggrieved, would neither recognize the others' rights of possession nor honestly submit her claims to the only possible arbiter, the Tsar of Russia. Finding herself one against two, she tried a coup de main on both fronts, failed, and brought on a second Balkan war, in which a new determining factor, Rumania, intervened at a critical moment to decide the issue against her. The Ottoman armies recovered nearly all they had lost in eastern and central Thrace, including Adrianople, almost without firing a shot, and were not ill pleased to be quit of a desperate situation at the price of Macedonia, Albania, and western Thrace.

Defeated and impoverished, the Ottoman power came out of the war clinging to a mere remnant of its European empire—one single mutilated province which did not pay its way. With the lost territories had gone about one-eighth of the whole population and one-tenth of the total imperial revenue. But when these heavy losses had been cut, there was nothing more of a serious nature to put to debit, but a little even to credit. Ottoman prestige had suffered but slightly in the eyes of the people. The obstinate and successful defence of the Chataldja lines and the subsequent recovery of eastern Thrace with Adrianople, the first European seat of the Osmanlis, had almost effaced the sense of Osmanli disgrace, and stood to the general credit of the Committee and the individual credit of its military leader, Enver Bey. The loss of some thousands of soldiers and much material was compensated by an invaluable lesson in the faultiness of the military system, and especially the Redif organization. The way was now clearer than before for re-making the army on the best European model, the German. The campaign had not been long, nor, as wars go, costly to wage. In the peace Turkey gained a new lease of life from the powers, and, profligate that she was, the promise of more millions of foreign money.

Over and above all this an advantage, which she rated above international guarantees, was secured to her—the prospective support of the strongest military power in Europe. The success of Serbia so menaced Germano-Austrian plans for the penetration of the Balkans, that the Central Powers were bound to woo Turkey even more lavishly than before, and to seek alliance where they had been content with influence. In a strong Turkey resided all their hope of saving from the Slavs the way to the Mediterranean. They had kept this policy in view for more than twenty years, and in a hundred ways, by introduction of Germans into the military organization, promotion of German financial enterprise, pushing of German commerce, pressure on behalf of German concessions which would entail provincial influence (for example, the construction of a transcontinental railway in Asia), those powers had been manifesting their interest in Turkey with ever-increasing solicitude. Now they must attach her to themselves with hoops of steel and, with her help, as soon as might be, try to recast the Balkan situation.

The experience of the recent war and the prospect in the future made continuance and accentuation of military government in the Ottoman Empire inevitable. The Committee, which had made its way back to power by violent methods, now suppressed its own Constitution almost as completely as Abdul Hamid had suppressed Midhat's parliament. Re-organization of the military personnel, accumulation of war material, strengthening of defences, provision of arsenals, dockyards, and ships, together with devices for obtaining money to pay for all these things, make Ottoman history for the years 1912-14. The bond with Germany was drawn lighter. More German instructors were invited, more German engineers commissioned, more munitions of war paid for in French gold. By 1914 it had become so evident that the Osmanlis must array themselves with Austro-Germany in any European war, that one wonders why a moment's credit was ever given to their protestations of neutrality when that war came at last in August 1914. Turkey then needed other three months to complete her first line of defences and mobilize. These were allowed to her, and in the late autumn she entered the field against Great Britain, France, and Russia, armed with German guns, led by German officers, and fed with German gold.



9

The Future

Turkey's situation, therefore, in general terms has become this. With the dissolution of the Concert of Europe the Ottoman Empire has lost what had been for a century its chief security for continued existence. Its fate now depends on that of two European powers which are at war with the rest of the former Concert. Among the last named are Turkey's two principal creditors, holding together about seventy-five per cent. of her public debt. In the event of the defeat of her friends, these creditors will be free to foreclose, the debtor being certainly in no position to meet her obligations. Allied with Christian powers, the Osmanli caliph has proved no more able than his predecessors to unite Islam in his defence; but, for what his title is worth, Mohammed V is still caliph, no rival claim having been put forward. The loyalty of the empire remains where it was, pending victory or defeat, the provinces being slow to realize, and still slower to resent, the disastrous economic state to which the war is reducing them.

The present struggle may leave the Osmanli Empire in one of three situations: (1) member of a victorious alliance, reinforced, enlarged, and lightened of financial burdens, as the wages of its sin; (2) member of a defeated alliance, bound to pay the price of blood in loss of territory, or independence, or even existence; (3) party to a compromise under which its territorial empire might conceivably remain Ottoman, but under even stricter European tutelage than of old.

The first alternative it would be idle to discuss, for the result of conditions so novel are impossible to foresee. Nor, indeed, when immediate events are so doubtful an at the present moment, is it profitable to attempt to forecast the ultimate result of any of the alternatives. Should, however, either the second or the third become fact, certain general truths about the Osmanlis will govern the consequences; and these must be borne in mind by any in whose hands the disposal of the empire may lie.

The influence of the Osmanlis in their empire to-day resides in three things: first, in their possession of Constantinople; second, in the sultan's caliphate and his guardianship of the holy cities of Islam; third, in certain qualities of Osmanli character, notably 'will to power' and courage in the field.

What Constantinople means for the Osmanlis is implied in that name Roum by which the western dominions of the Turks have been known ever since the Seljuks won Asia Minor. Apart from the prestige of their own early conquests, the Osmanlis inherited, and in a measure retain in the Near East, the traditional prestige of the greatest empire which ever held it. They stand not only for their own past but also for whatever still lives of the prestige of Rome. Theirs is still the repute of the imperial people par excellence, chosen and called to rule.

That this repute should continue, after the sweeping victories of Semites and subsequent centuries of Ottoman retreat before other heirs of Rome, is a paradox to be explained only by the fact that a large part of the population of the Near East remains at this day in about the same stage of civilization and knowledge as in the time of, say, Heraclius. The Osmanlis, be it remembered, were and are foreigners in a great part of their Asiatic empire equally with the Greeks of Byzantium or the Romans of Italy; and their establishment in Constantinople nearly five centuries ago did not mean to the indigenous peoples of the Near East what it meant to Europe—a victory of the East over the West—so much as a continuation of immemorial 'Roman' dominion still exercised from the same imperial centre. Since Rome first spread its shadow over the Near East, many men of many races, whose variety was imperfectly realised, if realised at all, by the peasants of Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt, have ruled in its name; the Osmanlis, whose governmental system was in part the Byzantine, made but one more change which meant the same old thing. The peasants know, of course, about those Semitic victories; but they know also that if the Semite has had his day of triumph and imposed, as was right and proper, his God and his Prophet on Roum—even on all mankind as many believed, and some may be found in remoter regions who still believe—he has returned to his own place south of Taurus; and still Roum is Roum, natural indefeasible Lord of the World.

Such a belief is dying now, of course; but it dies slowly and hard. It still constitutes a real asset of the Osmanlis, and will not cease to have value until they lose Constantinople. On the possession of the old imperial city it depends for whatever vitality it has. You may demonstrate, as you will, and as many publicists have done since the Balkan War and before, what and how great economic, political, and social advantages would accrue to the Osmanlis, if they could bring themselves to transfer their capital to Asia. Here they would be rid of Rumelia, which costs, and will always cost them, more than it yields. Here they could concentrate Moslems where their co-religionists are already the great majority, and so have done with the everlasting friction and weakness entailed in jurisdiction over preponderant Christian elements. Here they might throw off the remnants of their Byzantinism as a garment and, no longer forced to face two ways, live and govern with single minds as the Asiatics they are.

Vain illusion, as Osmanli imperialists know! It is their empire that would fall away as a garment so soon as the Near East realized that they no longer ruled in the Imperial City. Enver Pasha and the Committee were amply justified in straining the resources of the Ottoman Empire to cracking-point, not merely to retain Constantinople but also to recover Adrianople and a territory in Europe large enough to bulk as Roum. Nothing that happened in that war made so greatly for the continuation of the old order in Asiatic Turkey as the reoccupation of Adrianople. The one occasion on which Europeans in Syria had reason to expect a general explosion was when premature rumours of the entry of the Bulgarian army into Stambul gained currency for a few hours. That explosion, had the news proved true or not been contradicted in time, would have been a panic-stricken, ungovernable impulse of anarchy—of men conscious that an old world had passed away and ignorant what conceivable new world could come to be.

But the perilous moment passed, to be succeeded by general diffusion of a belief that the inevitable catastrophe was only postponed. In the breathing-time allowed, Arabs, Kurds, and Armenians discussed and planned together revolt from the moribund Osmanli, and, separately, the mutual massacre and plundering of one another. Arab national organizations and nationalist journals sprang to life at Beirut and elsewhere. The revival of Arab empire was talked of, and names of possible capitals and kings were bandied about. One Arab province, the Hasa, actually broke away. Then men began to say that the Bulgarians would not advance beyond Chataldja: the Balkan States were at war among themselves: finally, Adrianople had been re-occupied. And all was as in the beginning. Budding life withered in the Arab movement, and the Near East settled down once more in the persistent shadow of Roum.

Such is the first element in Osmanli prestige, doomed to disappear the moment that the Ottoman state relinquishes Europe. Meanwhile there it is for what it is worth; and it is actually worth a tradition of submission, natural and honourable, to a race of superior destiny, which is instinctive in some millions of savage simple hearts.

* * * * *

What of the second element? The religious prestige of the Ottoman power as the repository of caliphial authority and trustee for Islam in the Holy Land of Arabia, is an asset almost impossible to estimate. Would a death struggle of the Osmanlis in Europe rouse the Sunni world? Would the Moslems of India, Afghanistan, Turkestan, China, and Malaya take up arms for the Ottoman sultan as caliph? Nothing but the event will prove that they would. Jehad, or Holy War, is an obsolescent weapon difficult and dangerous for Young Turks to wield: difficult because their own Islamic sincerity is suspect and they are taking the field now as clients of giaur peoples; dangerous because the Ottoman nation itself includes numerous Christian elements, indispensable to its economy.

Undoubtedly, however, the Ottoman sultanate can count on its religious prestige appealing widely, overriding counteracting sentiments, and, if it rouses to action, rousing the most dangerous temper of all. It is futile to ignore the caliph because he is not of the Koreish, and owes his dignity to a sixteenth-century transfer. These facts are either unknown or not borne in mind by half the Sunnites on whom he might call, and weigh far less with the other half than his hereditary dominion over the Holy Cities, sanctioned by the prescription of nearly four centuries.

One thing can be foretold with certainty. The religious prestige of an Ottoman sultan, who had definitely lost control of the Holy Places, would cease as quickly and utterly as the secular prestige of one who had evacuated Constantinople: and since the loss of the latter would probably precipitate an Arab revolt, and cut off the Hejaz, the religious element in Ottoman prestige may be said to depend on Constantinople as much as the secular. All the more reason why the Committee of Union and Progress should not have accepted that well-meant advice of European publicists! A successful revolt of the Arab-speaking provinces would indeed sound the death-knell of the Ottoman Empire. No other event would be so immediately and surely catastrophic.

* * * * *

The third element in Osmanli prestige, inherent qualities of the Osmanli 'Turk' himself, will be admitted by every one who knows him and his history. To say that he has the 'will to power' is not, however, to say that he has an aptitude for government. He wishes to govern others; his will to do so imposes itself on peoples who have not the same will; they give way to him and he governs them indifferently, though often better than they can govern themselves. For example, bad as, according to our standards, Turkish government is, native Arab government, when not in tutelage to Europeans, has generally proved itself worse, when tried in the Ottoman area in modern times. Where it is of a purely Bedawi barbaric type, as in the emirates of central Arabia, it does well enough; but if the population be contaminated ever so little with non-Arab elements, practices, or ideas, Arab administration seems incapable of producing effective government. It has had chances in the Holy Cities at intervals, and for longer periods in the Yemen. But a European, long resident in the latter country, who has groaned under Turkish administration, where it has always been most oppressive, bore witness that the rule of the native Imam only served to replace oppressive government by oppressive anarchy.

As for the Osmanli's courage as a fighting man, that has often been exemplified, and never better than in the Gallipoli peninsula. It is admitted. The European and Anatolian Osmanlis yield little one to the other in this virtue; but the palm, if awarded at all, must be given to the levies from northern and central Asia Minor.

* * * * *

If Constantinople should be lost, the Arab-speaking parts of the empire would in all likelihood break away, carrying the Holy Cities with them. When the constant risk of this consummation, with the cataclysmic nature of its consequences is considered, one marvels why the Committee, which has shown no mean understanding of some conditions essential to Osmanli empire, should have done so little hitherto to conciliate Arab susceptibilities. Neither in the constitution of the parliament nor in the higher commands of the army have the Arab-speaking peoples been given anything like their fair share; and loudly and insistently have they protested. Perhaps the Committee, whose leading members are of a markedly Europeanized type, understands Asia less well than Europe. Certainly its programme of Ottomanization, elaborated by military ex-attaches, by Jew bankers and officials from Salonika, and by doctors, lawyers, and other intellectuels fresh from Paris, was conceived on lines which offered the pure Asiatic very little scope. The free and equal Osmanlis were all to take their cue from men of the Byzantine sort which the European provinces, and especially the city of Constantinople, breed. After the revolution, nothing in Turkey struck one so much as the apparition on the top of things everywhere of a type of Osmanli who has the characteristic qualities of the Levantine Greek. Young officers, controlling their elders, only needed a change of uniform to pass in an Athenian crowd. Spare and dapper officials, presiding in seats of authority over Kurds and Arabs, reminded one of Greek journalists. Osmanli journalists themselves treated one to rhodomontades punctuated with restless gesticulation, which revived memories of Athenian cafes in war-time. It was the Byzantine triumphing over the Asiatic; and the most Asiatic elements in the empire were the least likely to meet with the appreciation or sympathy of the Byzantines.

Are the Arab-speaking peoples, therefore, likely to revolt, or be successful in splitting the Ottoman Empire, if they do? The present writer would like to say, in parenthesis, that, in his opinion, this consummation of the empire is not devoutly to be wished. The substitution of Arab administration for Osmanli would necessarily entail European tutelage of the parts of the Arab-speaking area in which powers, like ourselves, have vital interests—Syria, for example, southern Mesopotamia, and, probably, Hejaz. The last named, in particular, would involve us in so ticklish and thankless a task, that one can only be thankful for the Turkish caretaker there to-day, and loth to see him dismissed.

An Arab revolt, however, might break out whether the Triple Entente desired its success or not. What chance of success would it have? The peoples of the Arab part of the Ottoman Empire are a congeries of differing races, creeds, sects, and social systems, with no common bond except language. The physical character of their land compels a good third of them to be nomadic, predatory barbarians, feared by the other two-thirds. The settled folk are divided into Moslem and Christian (not to mention a large Jewish element), the cleavage being more abrupt than in western Turkey and the tradition and actual spirit of mutual enmity more separative. Further, each of those main creed-divisions is subdivided. Even Islam in this region includes a number of incompatible sects, such as the Ansariye, the Metawali, and the Druses in the Syrian mountains, Shiite Arabs on the Gulf coast and the Persian border, with pagan Kurds and Yezidis in the latter region and north Mesopotamia. As for the Christians, their divisions are notorious, most of these being subdivided again into two or more hostile communions apiece. It is almost impossible to imagine the inhabitants of Syria concerting a common plan or taking common action. The only elements among them which have shown any political sense or capacity for political organization are Christian. The Maronites of the Lebanon are most conspicuous among these; but neither their numbers nor their traditional relations with their neighbours qualify them to form the nucleus of a free united Syria. The 'Arab Movement' up to the present has consisted in little more than talk and journalese. It has not developed any considerable organization to meet that stable efficient organization which the Committee of Union and Progress has directed throughout the Ottoman dominions.

As for the rest of the empire, Asia Minor will stand by the Osmanli cause, even if Europe and Constantinople, and even if the Holy Places and all the Arab-speaking provinces be lost. Its allegiance does not depend on either the tradition of Roum or the caliphate, but on essential unity with the Osmanli nation. Asia Minor is the nation. There, prepared equally by Byzantine domination and by Seljukian influence, the great mass of the people long ago identified itself insensibly and completely with the tradition and hope of the Osmanlis. The subsequent occupation of the Byzantine capital by the heirs of the Byzantine system, and their still later assumption of caliphial responsibility, were not needed to cement the union. Even a military occupation by Russia or by another strong power would not detach Anatolia from the Osmanli unity; for a thing cannot be detached from itself. But, of course, that occupation might after long years cause the unity itself to cease to be.

Such an occupation, however, would probably not be seriously resisted or subsequently rebelled against by the Moslem majority in Asia Minor, supposing Osmanli armaments to have been crushed. The Anatolian population is a sober, labouring peasantry, essentially agricultural and wedded to the soil. The levies for Yemen and Europe, which have gone far to deplete and exhaust it of recent years, were composed of men who fought to order and without imagination, steadily and faithfully, as their fathers had fought. They have no lust for war, no Arabian tradition of fighting for its own sake, and little, if any, fanaticism. Attempts to inspire Anatolian troops with religious rage in the Balkan War were failures. They were asked to fight in too modern a way under too many Teutonic officers. The result illustrated a prophecy ascribed to Ghasri Mukhtar Pasha. When German instructors were first introduced into Turkey, he foretold that they would be the end of the Ottoman army. No, these Anatolians desire nothing better than to follow their plough-oxen, and live their common village life, under any master who will let them be.

Elements of the Christian minority, however, Armenian and Greek, would give trouble with their developed ideas of nationality and irrepressible tendency to 'Europize'. They would present, indeed, problems of which at present one cannot foresee the solution. It seems inevitable that an autonomous Armenia, like an autonomous Poland, must be constituted ere long; but where? There is no geographical unit of the Ottoman area in which Armenians are the majority. If they cluster more thickly in the vilayets of Angora, Sivas, Erzerum, Kharput, and Van, i.e. in easternmost Asia Minor, than elsewhere, and form a village people of the soil, they are consistently a minority in any large administrative district. Numerous, too, in the trans-Tauric vilayets of Adana and Aleppo, the seat of their most recent independence, they are townsmen in the main, and not an essential element of the agricultural population. Even if a considerable proportion of the Armenians, now dispersed through towns of western Asia Minor and in Constantinople, could be induced to concentrate in a reconstituted Armenia (which is doubtful, seeing how addicted they are to general commerce and what may be called parasitic life), they could not fill out both the Greater and the Lesser Armenias of history, in sufficient strength to overbear the Osmanli and Kurdish elements. The widest area which might he constituted an autonomous Armenia with good prospect of self-sufficiency would be the present Russian province, where the head-quarters of the national religion lie, with the addition of the provinces of Erzerum, Van, and Kharput.

But, if Russia had brought herself to make a self-denying ordinance, she would have to police her new Armenia very strongly for some years; for an acute Kurdish problem would confront it, and no concentration of nationals could be looked for from the Armenia Irredenta of Diarbekr, Urfa, Aleppo, Aintab, Marash, Adana, Kaisariyeh, Sivas, Angora, and Trebizond (not to mention farther and more foreign towns), until public security was assured in what for generations has been a cockpit. The Kurd is, of course, an Indo-European as much as the Armenian, and rarely a true Moslem; but it would be a very long time indeed before these facts reconciled him to the domination of the race which he has plundered for three centuries. Most of the Osmanlis of eastern Asia Minor are descendants of converted Armenians; but their assimilation would be slow and doubtful. Islam, more rapidly and completely than any other creed, extinguishes racial sympathies and groups its adherents anew.

The Anatolian Greeks are less numerous but not less difficult to provide for. The scattered groups of them on the plateau—in Cappadocia, Pontus, the Konia district—and on the eastward coast-lands would offer no serious difficulty to a lord of the interior. But those in the western river-basins from Isbarta to the Marmora, and those on the western and north-western littorals, are of a more advanced and cohesive political character, imbued with nationalism, intimate with their independent nationals, and actively interested in Hellenic national politics. What happens at Athens has long concerned them more than what happens at Constantinople; and with Greece occupying the islands in the daily view of many of them, they are coming to regard themselves more and more every day as citizens of Graecia Irredenta. What is to be done with these? What, in particular, with Smyrna, the second city of the Ottoman Empire and the first of 'Magna Graecia'? Its three and a half hundred thousand souls include the largest Greek urban population resident in any one city. Shall it be united to Greece? Greece herself might well hesitate. It would prove a very irksome possession, involving her in all sorts of continental difficulties and risks. There is no good frontier inland for such an enclave. It could hardly be held without the rest of westernmost Asia, from Caria to the Dardanelles, and in this region the great majority of the population is Moslem of old stocks, devotedly attached both to their faith and to the Osmanli tradition.

The present writer, however, is not among the prophets. He has but tried to set forth what may delay and what may precipitate the collapse of an empire, whose doom has been long foreseen, often planned, invariably postponed; and, further, to indicate some difficulties which, being bound to confront heirs of the Osmanlis, will be better met the better they are understood before the final agony—If this is, indeed, to be!



INDEX

Abbasid Empire, Abdul Aziz, Sultan, Abdul Hamid, Sultan, Abdul Mejid, Sultan, Achaia, Achmet III: see Ahmed III. Adalia, Adana, Aden, Adhamandios Korais, Adrianople, captured by the Turks (1361), captured by Serbians and Bulgarians (1913), first European seat of the Osmanlis, foundation of, Peace and Treaty of (1829), restored to Turkey (1913), Russians before (1878), siege of (1912-13), Adriatic, the, Aegean, the, islands of, trade of, Aehrenthal, Baron and Count, Afium Kara Hissar, Agram (Zagreb), capital of Croatia, Agram high treason trial, the, Agrapha, clansmen of, Ahiolu (Anchialo), Ahmed I, Sultan, Ahmed III, Sultan, Ahmed ibn Tulun, Aidin, Aintab, Aigina, Ainos, See also Enos. Aivali, See also Kydhonies. Akarnania, Akerman, Convention of (1826), Alaeddin, Sultan, Ala Shehr (Philadelphia), Albania, and the Macedonian question, conquest of, by the Turks, during the Slav immigration, in classical times, made independent, revolts against Young Turks, under the Turks, Albanian language, the, Albanians, the, migrations of, Aleppo, Alexander the Great, Alexander I, King of Serbia (1889-1903), Alexander I, Emperor of Russia, Alexander II, Emperor of Russia, Alexander III, Emperor of Russia, Alexander, Crown Prince of Serbia, Alexander of Battenberg, Prince of Bulgaria (1879-85), Alexander Karagjorgjević, Prince of Serbia (1843-58), Alexandria, Alexis Comnenus, the Emperor, Ali Pasha, Ambelakia, America, effect of emigration from south-eastern Europe to, Anatolia, the Turks and, character of the population, feudal families, Anatolikon, captured by the Turks (1825), Andrassy, Count, Angora, battle of (1402), Arabia, Turkish prestige in, and the Turks, movement of, in the direction of revolt, Arabs and Anatolia, and Bulgars, and Islam, Arcadiopolis: see Lule-Burgas. Argos, Arian controversy, the, Armatoli, or Christian militia, Armenians, the, character of the, massacres of (1894), Arnauts: see Albanians. Arta, Gulf of, plain of, Asen dynasty, the, Asia Minor, Turks in, Asparukh (Bulgar prince), Aspropotamo, the, Astypalia, Athens, Duchy of, University of, siege of (1821-2), (1827), Athos, Mount, Attila, Austerlitz, battle of (1805), Austria-Hungary and the Adriatic, and the Macedonian question, and Serbia, relations between, and the Serbs, and the Treaty of Berlin, and Turkey, relations between, wars between, annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by, occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by, relations with the Balkan League, relations with Rumania, Ruman and South Slavonic populations in, Austrian politics in Rumania, Austrians and Serbs, relations between, and Turks, Avars, the: their invasion of the Balkan peninsula with the Slavs, their war with the Bulgars, Avlona, bay of, Avshar tribe, 'Ayon Oros', Azerbaijan,

Backa, Bagdad, 'Balance of Power', the, Balkan League, the, formation of the, dissolution of the, Balkan peninsula, the, annexation of, by Mohammed II, control of, economic unity of, German policy in, nationalism in, Slav inhabitants of, Turkish power in, under Roman rule, Balkan States, relations between the, zollverein, Balkan war, the first (1912-13), the second (June 1913), Banat, the, Baranya, Basil I, the Emperor, Basil II, the Emperor, 'Slayer of the Bulgars', Bassarab, dynasty of, Bayezid I, Sultan, Bayezid II, Sultan, Beaconsfield, Earl of, Beirut, Belgrade, capital of Serbia, captured by the Serbs (1807), captured by the Turks (1521), (1813), its Celtic name, Treaty of (1739), Belisarius, Berchtold, Count, Bergama, Berlin, Congress of (1878), Treaty of (1878), Bessarabia, Bulgars in, 25, lost(1812), regained (1856), lost again (1878), importance with regard to present situation, Bieberstein, Duron Marschall von, Bismarck, Bitolj: see Monastir. Black Castle of Afiun, Black Sea, Russian exclusion from, Bogomil heresy, the, Boja, lord of Kashgar, Boris, Bulgar prince (852-88), Boris, Crown Prince of Bulgaria, Bosnia, annexation of, independence of, and conquest of, by the Turks, in relation to the other Serb territories, its Slavonic population, relations of, with Hungary, revolts in, against Turkey, under Austro-Hungarian rule, under Turkish rule, Bosphorus, the, Botzaris, Marko, Branković, George, Branković, Vuk, Bratianu, Ioan (father), (son), Bregalnica, battle of the (1913), Brusa, Bucarest, Committee of, Peace Conference (1913), Treaty of (1812), (1913), Bucovina, acquisition by Austria, Rumanians in, Buda, Budapest, in relation to the Serbo-Croats, Budua, Bulgaria, declaration of independence by, and assumption of title Tsar by its ruler, conflicting interests with Greece, early wars between, and the Greeks, geographical position of, growth of, intervention on the side of the Central Powers in the European War, its division into eastern and western, extent of western, in the two Balkan wars (1912-13), its early relations with Rome, its relations with Russia, obtains recognition as a nationality in the Ottoman Empire, of Slav speech and culture, place of, in the Balkan peninsula, Turkish atrocities in, Bulgaria and Rumania, Bulgaria and Serbia, contrasted, the agreement between, wars between (1885, 1913), Bulgaria and Turkey, relations between, Bulgarian bishoprics in Macedonia, Church, early vicissitudes of the, claims and propaganda in Macedonia, Exarchist Church, the, literature, monarchy, origins of the, Bulgarians, general distribution of, their attitude to the Slavs and the Germans, Bulgarians and Serbians, contrast between, Bulgars, the, their origin, their advance westwards and then southwards into the Balkan peninsula, their absorption by the Slavs, north of the Danube, adherents of the Orthodox Church, Burke, Edmund, Byron, Lord, Byzantine Christianity, commerce, diplomacy, its attitude towards the Slav and other invaders, Empire, heritage and expansion of, by the Turks, Byzantium, ascendancy of, over Bulgaria, decline of, Greek colony of, Roman administrative centre,

Cairo, Caliphate, the, Campo Formio, Treaty of (1797), Candia, siege of, Canea, Cantucuzene, John, Cape Malea, Cappadocia, Caria, Carinthia, Carlowitz, Treaty of (1699), Carniola, Carol, Prince of Rumania, his accession, joins Russia against Turkey, intention to abdicate, proclaimed king, King, and the Balkans, personal points, Carp, P.P., Carpathian mountains, the, Catargiu, Lascar, Catherine, Empress, Cattaro, Bocche di, Caucasia, Cefalonia, Celts, the, in the Balkan peninsula, Cerigo, Cetina river (Dalmatia), Cetinje, Chaeronea, Charlemagne, crushes the Avars, Charles VI, Emperor of Austria, Charles, Prince and King of Rumania: see Carol. Caslav, revolts against Bulgars, Chataldja, lines of, Chesme, destruction of Turkish fleet in, Chios: see Khios. Christianity, in the Balkan peninsula in classical times, introduced into Bulgaria, introduced amongst the Serbs, Christians, their treatment by the Turks, Church, division of the, affects the Serbs and Croats, Church, Generalissimo Sir Richard, Churches, rivalry of the eastern and western, Cilicia, Claudius, the Emperor, Coalition, Serbo-Croat or Croato-Serb, the, Cochrane, Grand Admiral, Cogalniceanu, M., Comnenus: see Alexis and Manuel. Concert of Europe, Constantine the Great, Constantine, King of Greece, Constantine, ruler of Bulgaria, Constantinople, and the Serbian Church, ascendancy of, over Bulgaria, cathedral of Aya Sophia, commercial interests of, decline of, defences of, ecclesiastical influence of, fall of (1204), (1453), its position at the beginning of the barbarian invasions, made an imperial city, Patriarchate at, 'Phanari', the, spiritual rivalry of, with Rome, Constitution, Rumanian, Corfu, Corinth: see Korinth. Crete: see Krete. Crimea, abandoned to Russia, Crimean War, the, Croatia, absorbed by Hungary, position of, in relation to the Serb territories, Croato-Serb unity, movement in favour of, Croats, Crotians, general distribution of, their origin, Croats and Serbs, difference between, Crusaders, the, in the Balkan peninsula, Crusades; the first; the fourth, Cuza, Prince of Rumania, Cyclades, the, Cyprus, in Latin hands, in Ottoman hands, under the British, Cyrenaica, Cyril, St., Cyrillic alphabet, the,

Dacia, subjection to, and abandonment by, the Romans, Dacians, settlement in Carpathian regions, wars with Rome, Dalmatia, acquired by Austria-Hungary, and Venice, in classical times, in relation to other Serb territories, its Slavonic population, relations of, with Hungary, Daniel, Prince-Bishop of Montenegro, Danilo, Prince of Montenegro, Danube, the, as frontier of Roman Empire, Danube (continued): Bulgars cross the, Slavs cross the, Danubian principalities, Russian protectorate in, Dardanelles, the, Decius, the Emperor, Dedeagach, Deliyannis, Demotika, Dhimitzana, Diocletian, the Emperor, his redistribution of the imperial provinces, Dnieper, the, Dniester, the, Dobrudja, acquisition by Rumania, Bulgarian aspirations in regard to, Draga, Queen-Consort of Serbia, Dramali, Drave, the, Drina, the, Dubrovnik: see Ragusa. Dulcigno (Ulcinj), Durazzo, Durostorum: see Silistria. Dushan: see Stephen Dusan.

Eastern Church, the, Eastern Slavs; see Russians. Edremid, Egypt, Egyptian expedition (1823-4), Enos-Midia line, the, Enver Bey, Epirus, power of Hellenism in, Ertogrul, Osmanli chief, Erzerum, Eugen, Prince, of Savoy, Euphrates, the, Euxine trade, Evyenios Voulgaris, Exarchist Church, the,

Fabvier, Ferdinand, Prince and King of Bulgaria (1886-), his relations with foreign powers, Ferdinand, King of Rumania, Filipescu, Nicholas, Fiume (Rjeka), France, and the Macedonian question, and the struggle for Greek independence, and the struggle for the Mediterranean, and the Turks, relations with Rumania, French, the, in the Balkan peninsula, in Dalmatia, in Morocco, influence in Rumania, French Revolution and the rights of nationalities, Friedjung, Dr., and the accusation against Serbia,

Galaxidhi, Galicia, Gallipoli, Genoese, George, Crown Prince of Serbia, George, King of Greece, assassination of, George, Prince of Greece, German diplomacy at Constantinople, influence in the Near East, influence in Rumania, influence in Turkey, German Empire, restlessness of, German hierarchy, early struggles of, against Slavonic liturgy, Germanic peoples, southward movement of, Germanos, metropolitan bishop of Patrae, Germany and the Turkish frontier, efforts to reach the Adriatic, its expansion eastward, and the Macedonian question, and Russia, relations between, and the Treaty of Berlin, relations with Rumania, revolutions promoted by, Gjorgjević, Dr. V., Golden Horn, Goluchowski, Count, Gorazd, Gorchakov, Prince, Goths, invasion of the, Great Britain and the Balkan States, relations between, and Egypt, and Rumania, and Syria, and the Ionian Islands, and the Macedonian question, and the struggle for Greek independence, and the struggle for the Mediterranean, and the Treaty of Berlin, loan to Greece, occupation of Cyprus, Greece, anarchy in, ancient, and Macedonia, and Russia, and Serbia, and the adjacent islands, and the Christian religion, and the first Balkan war, and the Ionian Islands, and the Orthodox Church, and the Slav migration, brigandage in, conflict of interests with Bulgaria, conquest of, by the Turks, delimitation of the frontier (1829), dispute with Italy as to possession of Epirus, effect of the French Revolution on, invasion of, by Goths, land-tax, loans to, local liberties, 'Military League' of 1909, minerals of, monarchy established, and its results, 'National Assembly', oppressive relations with Turkey, and efforts for liberation, revolutions in 1843 and 1862. territorial contact with Turkey. 'tribute-children' for Turkish army from. war with Turkey (1828); (1897); (1912). Greek agriculture. anti-Greek movement in Rumania. army. art and architecture. ascendancy in Bulgaria. bourgeoisie. claims and propaganda in Macedonia. coalition with the Seljuks. commerce and economic progress. dialects of Ancient Greece. education. influence in the Balkan peninsula. influence in Bulgaria. influence in Rumania. language in Rumanian Church. literature. monastic culture. nationalism. national religion. navy. officials tinder the Turks. Patriarch. public finance. public spirit. public works. railways. renaissance. shipping. unity. Greek Empire, decline of. Greek hierarchy, in Bulgaria, the. Greeks, Anatolian. Byzantine. general distribution of. Ottoman. their attitude with regard to the barbarian invasions. Gregorios, Greek Patriarch at Constantinople. Gulkhaneh.

Hadrian, the Emperor. Haliacmon Valley. Halys river. Hasa. Hatti Sherif. Hejaz. Hellenic culture and civilization. Hellenic Republic. Hellespont, the. Hercegovina. annexation of, by Austria-Hungary. its Slavonic population. origin and independence of, and conquest of, by the Turks. revolts in, against Turkey. under Austro-Hungarian rule. under Turkish rule. Hilmi Pasha. Hungarians. and the Turks. invade the Balkan peninsula. Hungary, and the Balkan peninsula, and the Serbo-Croats, and the Serbs, and Turkey, wars between, conquest of, by Suleiman I, growth of, loss of, by the Turks, Slavs in, Huns, arrival of the, in Europe, their origin, settled in Hungary, Hunyadi, John, Hydhra and the Hydhriots, Hypsilantis, Prince Alexander, Prince Demetrius,

Ibar, the, Ibrahim Pasha, Ida, Mount, Ignatiyev, Count, Illyria, Celtic invasion of, prefecture of, Roman conquest of, Illyrians, the, Imbros, Ionescu, Take, Ionian islands, presented to Greece by Great Britain, Ipek: see Peć Iran, Iskanderoun, Gulf of, Italian influence in the Balkan peninsula, trading cities, Italy, and the Macedonian question, and the possession of Epirus, diocese of, prefecture of, war with Turkey (1911-12), Ivan III, Tsar of Russia, Ivan IV, Tsar of Russia,

Jehad, or Holy War, Jenghis Khan, Jerusalem, Jews, at Constantinople, in Rumania, in Turkey, Jezzar the Butcher, Jidda, John Alexander, ruler of Bulgaria, John Asen I, Bulgar Tsar (1186-96), John Asen II, Bulgar Tsar (1218-41), John Tzimisces, the Emperor, John the Terrible, Prince of Moldavia, Joseph II, Emperor of Austria, Judah, Jugo-Slav(ia), Justin I, the Emperor, Justinian I, the Emperor,

Kaisariyeh, Kalamata, Kaloian, Bulgar Tsar (1196-1207), Kama, Bulgars on the, Kanaris, Constantine, Kapodistrias, John, Kara-George (Petrović), Karagjorgjević (sc. family of Kara-George) dynasty, the, Karaiskakis, Karamania, Karasi, Karlovci (Carlowitz, Karlowitz), Karpathos, Kasos; destruction of (1824), Kavala, Kazan, Khalkidhiki, Kharput, siege of (1822), Khorasan, Khurshid Pasha, Kiev, Kilkish, Greek victory at, Kirk-Kilisse, battle of, Kisseleff, Count, Kladovo, Knights Hospitallers of St. John, Kochana, Kolettis, Kolokotronis, Theodore, Kondouriottis, Konia, battle of, Kopais basin, draining of, Korinth, surrender of (1822), Korinthian Gulf, Kos, Kosovo, vilayet of, Kosovo Polje, battle of, Kraljević, Marko: see Marko K. Krete, conquest of, by Turks, intervention of the powers and constituted an autonomous state, speech of, Krum (Bulgar prince), Krusevac, Kubrat (Bulgar prince), Kumanovo, battle of (1912), Kumans, the Tartar, Kurdistan, Kurds, the, Kutchuk Kainardji, Treaty of, Kydhonies, destruction of,

Laibach (Ljubljana), Lansdowne, Marquess of, Larissa, Latin Empire at Constantinople, the, influence in the Balkan peninsula, Lausanne, Treaty of (1912), Lazar (Serbian Prince), 'League of Friends', Leipsic, battle of (1813), Lemnos, Leo, the Emperor, Leopold II, Emperor of Austria, Lepanto, battle of (1571), Lerna, Leskovac, Levant, the, commerce of, Libyan war (1911-12), Lombards, the, London, Conference of (1912-13), Treaty of (1913), Louis, conquers the Serbs, Lule-Burgas, battle of (1912),

Macedonia, anarchy in, defeat of the Turks by the Serbians in, establishment of Turks in, general characteristics of, in classical times, inhabitants of, revolt in, place-names in, Macedonian question, the, Slavs, the, Magnesia, Magyars, the, their irruption into Europe, growing power and ambitions of the, influence upon the Rumanians, Mahmud I, Sultan, Mahmud II, Sultan, Maina, Maiorescu, Titu Malasgerd, battle of, Malta, siege of, Mamelukes, Egyptian, Manichaean heresy, the, Manuel Comnenus, the Emperor, Marash, Marcus Aurelius, the Emperor, Marghiloman, Alexander, Maria Theresa, Empress of Austria, Maritsa, the, battle of, Marko Kraljević, Marmora, Sea of, Mavrokordatos, Alexander, Mavromichalis clan, Mavromichalis, Petros, Mediterranean, the, Megaspelaion, Mehemet Ali: see Mohammed Ali. Melek Shah, of Persia, Mendere (Maiandros), Mesolonghi, Mesopotamia, Messenia, Mesta, Meteora, Methodius, St., Michael Obrenović III, Prince of Serbia (1840-2, 1860-8), Michael III, the Emperor, Michael the Brave, Prince of Wallachia, Midhat Pasha and representative institutions in Turkey, Media, Milan Obrenović II, Prince of Serbia (1839), Milan Obrenović IV, Prince and King of Serbia (1868-89), Milesevo, monastery of, Milica, Princess, Military colonies, Austro-Hungarian, of Serbs against Turkey, Milos Obrenović I, Prince of Serbia (1817-39, 1858-60), Milovanović, Dr., Mircea the Old, Prince of Wallachia, Misivria (Mesembria), Mitylini, Modhon, Mohacs, battle of, Mohammed II, Sultan, Mohammed IV, Sultan, Mohammed V, Sultan, Mohammed Ali Pasha, of Egypt, Mohammedan influence in the Balkan peninsula, Mohammedan Serbs, of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the, Moldavia, foundation of, Monastir (Bitolj, in Serbian), battle of (1912), Montenegro, achieves its independence, and the Balkan League, autonomous, becomes a kingdom, conquered by the Turks, during the Napoleonic wars, in the Balkan war (1912-13), position of, amongst the other Serb territories, relations with Russia, revolt in, under Turkish rule, war with Turkey, Montesquieu, Morava, the, Moravia, its conversion to Christianity, Morea: see Peloponnesos. Morocco crisis, the, Moslems, Mukhtar Pasha, Muntenia (Wallachia), foundation of, Murad I, Sultan, murder of, Murad II, Sultan, Murad III, Sultan, Murad V, Sultan, Murzsteg programme of reforms, the, Mustapha II, Sultan, Mustapha III, Sultan,

Naissus: see Nish. Napoleon I, Napoleon III, and Rumania, Natalie, Queen-Consort of Serbia, Nationalism, Nauplia, fall of (1822), Nauplia Bay, Navarino, battle of (1827), Negrepont, Nemanja dynasty, the, Nicaea, Nicholas I, Prince and King of Montenegro (1860-), Nicholas I, Emperor of Russia, Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia, Nicomedia, Nikaria, 230. Nikiphoros Phokas, the Emperor, Nikopolis, battle of, Niksić, Nilufer, Nish (Naissus, Nis), Celtic origin, Goths defeated at, Bulgarians march on, geographical position of, Nish-Salonika railway, Nizib, Normans, the, Novae: see Svishtov. Novi Pazar, Sandjak of, occupied by Austria-Hungary, evacuated by Austria-Hungary, occupied by Serbia and Montenegro,

Obilić, Milos, Obrenović dynasty, the, Odessa, Committee of, Odhysseus, Oecumenical Patriarch, the, Okhrida, Archbishopric and Patriarchate of, Lake of, Old Serbia (northern Macedonia), Orient, prefecture of the, Orkhan, Orthodox Church: see Eastern Church. Osman (Othman), Sultan, Osmanli: see Turkey and Turks. Ostrogoths, the, Otranto, straits of, Otto, Prince, of Bavaria, King of Greece, driven into exile, Ottoman Empire: see Turkey. Ouchy, Treaty of: see Lausanne, Treaty of. Oxus,

Palaiologos, Romaic dynasty of, Pannonia, Bulgars in, Pan-Serb movement, the Pan-Slavism, Paris, Congress of (1856), Convention (1858), Treaty of (1856), Pasa, M, Passarowitz, Treaty of, Pasvanoghlu, Patmos, Patras, Gulf of, Paul, Emperor of Russia, Paulicians, the, Peć (Ipek, in Turkish), patriarchate of, Pechenegs, the Tartar, Petraeus, 'Peloponnesian Senate', Peloponnesos (Morea), Pera, Persia and the Turks, at war with Constantinople, Grand Seljuk of, Persian Gulf, Peter the Great, 'Testament' of, Peter, Bulgar Tsar (927-69) Peter I, King of Serbia (1903), Peter I, Prince-Bishop of Montenegro, Petrović-Njegos, dynasty of, Petta, battle of, Phanariote Greeks, the, See Greek officials under the Turks, and Turkey, Phanariot regime. 'Philhellenes', 'Philiki Hetairia', Philip, Count of Flanders, Philip of Macedonia, Philippopolis, Bogomil centre, foundation of, revolts against Turks, Pindus, Pirot, Place-names, the distribution of classical, indigenous, and Slavonic, in the Balkan peninsula, Plevna, siege of, Podgorica, Poland, Pontus, Popes, attitude of the, towards the Slavonic liturgy, Poros, Porto Lagos, Pozarevac, Preslav, Bulgarian capital, Prespa, Pressburg, Treaty of (1805), Prilep, battle of (1912), 'Primates', the, Prizren, Prussia and Austria, war between (1866), Psara,

Radowitz, Baron von, Ragusa (Dubrovnik, in Serbian), its relations with the Serbian state, prosperity of, under Turkish rule, decline of, Railways in the Balkan peninsula, Rashid Pasha, Raska, centre of Serb state, Reglement Organique, Religious divisions in the Balkan peninsula, Resna, in Macedonia, Rhodes, siege of, Ristić, M., Rodosto, Romaic architecture, government, language, 'Romaioi', Roman Catholicism in the Balkan peninsula, Roman Empire, Roman law, Rome, its conquest of the Balkan peninsula, relations of, with Bulgaria, relations of, with Serbia, spiritual rivalry of, with Constantinople, Rosetti, C.A., Rovine, battle of, Rumania and the Balkan peninsula, and the second Balkan war(1913), and Bulgaria, and the Russo-Turkish war (1877), anti-Greek movement in, anti-Russian revolution in, commerce of, convention with Russia (1877), dynastic question in, education in, influences at work in, military situation, nationalist activity in, neutrality of, origins of, Patriarch's authority in, peasantry of, Phanariotes in, political parties in, politics of, internal, relations with Russia, religion and Church in, Roman civilization, influence in, rural question in, Russian influence in; politics in, struggle for independence, territorial gains, territorial losses, Turkish rule in, Upper class in (cneazi, boyards), origins of, social evolution of, economic and political supremacy, Rumanian army, claims in Macedonia, principalities, foundation of, union of, revolt (1822), Rumanians, early evidences of, in Bessarabia, in Bucovina, in Hungary, in Macedonia, Rumelia, Eastern, Russia and Bulgaria, and Greece, and Montenegro, and Rumania, and Serbia, and Turkey, and the Macedonian question, and the struggle for Greek independence, Bulgars in, commercial treaty with Turkey (1783), convention with Rumania (1877), conversion to Christianity, occupation of Kars, re-organization under Peter the Great, wars with Turkey (1769-84), (1787), (1807), (1828), (1877-8), (1914-15), Russian diplomacy at Constantinople, influence in Bulgaria, invasion of Balkan peninsula, relations with the Balkan Christians, relations with the Balkan League, Russians, the, comparison of, with the Southern Slavs, see Slavs, the Eastern,

Sabac (Shabatz), Salisbury, Lord, Salonika, Salonika-Nish railway, the, Samos, Samothraki, Samuel, Tsar of western Bulgaria (977-1014), San Stefano, Treaty of (1878), Saracens, the, Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia, Sava, St., Save, the, Scutari (di Albania), Skodra, Selim I, Sultan, Selim III, Sultan, Seljuks, the, Semendria: see Smederevo. Semites, the, Serb migrations, national life, centres of, political centres, race, home of the, territories, divisions of the, Serbia and Austria-Hungary, relations between, and Bulgaria, contrasted, the agreement between, and Macedonia, and Russia, relations between, and the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the Balkan League, and Turkey, dissensions in, geography of, Patriarch's authority in, the barrier to German expansion eastwards, Turkish conquest of, wars with Turkey (1875-7), Serbian Church, the, claims and propaganda in Macedonia, Empire, its extent under Stephen Dusan, literature, nation, centre of gravity of, principality, its extent in 1830, Serbo-Bulgarian war (1885), (1913), Serbo-Croat nationality, formation of the, Serbo-Croat unity, movement in favour of, Serbo-Croats, general distribution of, Serbs, defeat Bulgars and Greeks, distribution of the, in the Balkan peninsula, general distribution of the, north of the Danube, outside the boundaries of the Serb state, religious persecution of, revolt against Bulgaria, revolt against the Magyars, revolts against Turkey, their attitude towards the Germans, Serbs and Croats, difference between, Shabatz: see Sabac. Shipka Pass, Shishman, revolts against Bulgaria, Sicily, Silistria, Simeon the Great, Bulgar Tsar (893-927), Singidunum: see Belgrade. Sitvatorok, Treaty of, Sivas, Skanderbey, Skodra: see Scutari. Skoplje (Ueskueb, in Turkish), Slav influence in Rumania, Slavonia, absorbed by Hungary, Slavonic immigration, the streams of, in the Balkan peninsula, languages, the, use of, in Rumanian Church, liturgy, the, southern, nationalities, Slavs, maritime, method of their migration southwards into the Balkan peninsula migration, in the seventh century, their lack of cohesion, their attacks on Salonika and Constantinople with the Avars, their original home, their settlement south of the Danube, the Balkan, their attitude towards the Church, under Turkish rule, the Eastern (Russians), the Southern, general distribution of, the Western, Slivnitsa, battle of (1885), Slovenes, the, Smederevo (Semendria), Smyrna, Sofia, captured by the Bulgars from the Greeks, captured by the Turks, Soudha Bay, Southern Slav nationalities, the, Spain, Jews expelled from, Spalajković, Dr., Spetza, Sporades, the, Srem: see Syrmia. Stambul, Sultanate of, Stambulov, Stephen Dragutin, Stephen Dusan, King of Serbia(1331-45), Tsar of Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks (1345-55), Stephen (Lazarević), Serbian Prince, Stephen Nemanja, veliki zupan, Stephen Nemanjić, King of Serbia (1196-1223), the First-Crowned, Stephen Radoslav, King of Serbia (1223-33), Stephen Uros I, King of Serbia (1242-76), Stephen Uros II (Milutin), King of Serbia (1282-1321), Stephen Uros III (Dećanski), King of Serbia (1321-31), Stephen Vladislav, King of Serbia (1233-42), Stephen the Great, Prince of Moldavia, Struma, the, Suleiman I, Sultan (the Magnificent), Suli, clansmen of, Sumadija, Svetoslav, ruler of Bulgaria, Svishtov, Svyatoslav, Prince of Kiev, Syria, Syrian question, the, Syrmia,

Tabriz, Tanzimat, the, Tarabos, Mount, Tarsus, Tartar invasion, the, Tartars of the Golden Horde, Tenedos, Teutons, the, Thasos, Theodore Lascaris, the Emperor, Theodoric, Theodosius, the Emperor, Theophilus of Constantinople, Thessaly, Thrace, Thu-Kiu, people of, Tilsit, peace of (1807), Timok, the, Timur, Tirnovo, centre and capital of second Bulgarian empire, Trajan, the Emperor, in the Balkan peninsula, his conquest of Dacia, Transylvania, Trebizond, Trieste, Trikeri, destruction of, Trikoupis, Greek statesman, Tripoli, Tripolitza, Tunisia, Turcomans, the, Turkestan, Turkey: administrative systems, and the Armenian massacres (1894), and the Balkans, and Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian atrocities, and Greece, and the islands of southeastern Europe, and Rumania, and Russia, and Serbia, and the struggle for Greek independence, and the suzerainty of Krete, Christians in, position of, codification of the civil law, commercial treaties, Committee of Union and Progress, conquests in Europe, in Asia, of the Balkan peninsula, decline and losses of territory in Europe and Asia, 'Dere Beys', Dragoman, office of, 184, 185, expansion: of the Osmanli kingdom, of the Byzantine Empire, extent of the empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, territorial expansion in Asia, feudal aristocracy of, financial embarrassments and public debt, frontier beyond the Danube, German influence in, Grand Vizierate, military organization, soldiery recruited from Christian races, 'tribute-children' system of recruiting, name of, pan-Islamic propaganda under Abdul Hamul, pan-Ottomanism, Phanariot regime, praetorians, railway construction, effect of, reforms in, representative institutions inaugurated, revival and relapse in the nineteenth century, revolution of 1910, war in the Balkans (1912), war with Great Britain, France, and Russia (1914-15), wars with Greece (1821), (1897), (1912), war with Italy (1911-12), wars with Russia (1769-74), (1787), (1807), (1828), (1877-8), (1914-15), wars with Serbia (1875-7), Young Turks, the, Turkish conquests in Europe, fleet, janissaries, Turks (Osmanlis), entry into Europe, general distribution of, nomadic tribes of, origin of, vitality and inherent qualities of the, Tzakonia,

Uighurs, Turkish tribe, Unkiar Skelessi, Treaty of (1833), Uros, King of Serbia: see Stephen Uros. Uros, Serbian Tsar (1355-71), Ueskub: see Skoplje,

Valens, the Emperor, Valtetzi, battle of, Van, Vardar, the, Varna, battle of (1444), captured by the Bulgars, Venezelos, E., Kretan and Greek statesman, his part in the Kretan revolution, becomes premier of Greece, work as a constructive statesman, the formation of the Balkan League, his proposals to Bulgaria for settlement of claims, his handling of the problem of Epirus, results of his statesmanship, Venice and the Venetian Republic, Victoria, Queen of England, Vienna, besieged by the Turks (1526), (1683), Congress of (1814), in relation to the Serbo-Croats: see Budapest. Visigoths, the, Vlad the Impaler, Prince of Wallachia, Vlakhs, the, Volga, Bulgars of the, Volo, Gulf of, Vranja, Vrioni, Omer,

Wallachia, advent of the Turks in, subjugation of, by the Turks, Wied, Prince of, William II, German Emperor,

Yannina, Yantra, the, Yemen, Yenishehr, Yuruk tribe, Yuzgad,

Zabergan, Zaimis, high commissioner of Krete, Zante, Zeta, the, river and district,

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