The change of the strategic front to a position perpendicular to the base may be a temporary movement for an operation of a few days' duration, or it may be for an indefinite time, in order to profit by important advantages afforded by certain localities, to strike decisive blows, or to procure for the army a good line of defense and good pivots of operations, which would be almost equivalent to a real base.

It often happens that an army is compelled to have a double strategic front, either by the features of the theater of war, or because every line of offensive operations requires protection on its flanks. As an example of the first, the frontiers of Turkey and Spain may be cited. In order to cross the Balkan or the Ebro, an army would be obliged to present a double front,—in the first case, to face the valley of the Danube; in the second, to confront forces coming from Saragossa or Leon.

All extensive countries necessitate, to a greater or less degree, the same precaution. A French army in the valley of the Danube will require a double front as soon as the Austrians have thrown sufficient troops into the Tyrol or Bohemia to give rise to any anxiety. Those countries which present a narrow frontier to the enemy are the only exception, since the troops left on the frontier to harass the flanks of the enemy could themselves be cut off and captured. This necessity of double strategic fronts is one of the most serious inconveniences of an offensive war, since it requires large detachments, which are always dangerous. (See Article XXXVI.)

Of course, all that precedes relates to regular warfare. In a national or intestine war the whole country is the scene of hostilities. Nevertheless, each large fraction of an army having a defined aim would have its own strategic front determined by the features of the country and the positions occupied by the large bodies of the enemy. Thus, Suchet in Catalonia and Massena in Portugal each had a strategic front, while the front of some other corps of the army was not clearly defined.

LINES OF DEFENSE.

Lines of defense are classified as strategical and tactical. Strategical lines of defense are subdivided into two classes: 1. Permanent lines of defense, which are a part of the defensive system of a state, such as the line of a fortified frontier; 2. Eventual lines of defense, which relate only to the temporary position of an army.

The frontier is a permanent line of defense when it presents a well-connected system of obstacles, natural and artificial, such as ranges of mountains, broad rivers, and fortresses. Thus, the range of the Alps between France and Piedmont is a line of defense, since the practicable passes are guarded by forts which would prove great obstacles in the way of an army, and since the outlets of the gorges in the valleys of Piedmont are protected by large fortresses. The Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe may also be considered as permanent lines of defense, on account of the important forts found upon them.

Every river of any considerable width, every range of mountains, and every defile, having their weak points covered by temporary fortifications, may be regarded as eventual lines of defense, both strategic and tactical, since they may arrest for some time the progress of the enemy, or may compel him to deviate to the right or left in search of a weaker point,—in which case the advantage is evidently strategic. If the enemy attack in front, the lines present an evident tactical advantage, since it is always more difficult to drive an army from its position behind a river, or from a point naturally and artificially strong, than to attack it on an open plain. On the other hand, this advantage must not be considered unqualified, lest we should fall into the system of positions which has been the ruin of so many armies; for, whatever may be the facilities of a position for defense, it is quite certain that the party which remains in it passive and receiving all the attacks of his adversary will finally yield.[9] In addition to this, since a position naturally very strong[10] is difficult of access it will be as difficult of egress, the enemy may be able with an inferior force to confine the army by guarding all the outlets. This happened to the Saxons in the camp of Pirna, and to Wurmser in Mantua.

STRATEGIC POSITIONS.

There is a disposition of armies to which the name of strategic position may be applied, to distinguish from tactical positions or positions for battle.

Strategic positions are those taken for some time and which are intended to cover a much greater portion of the front of operations than would be covered in an actual battle. All positions behind a river or upon a line of defense, the divisions of the army being separated by considerable distances, are of this class, such as those of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnago to overlook the Adige. His positions in 1813 in Saxony and Silesia in advance of his line of defense were strategic. The positions of the Anglo-Prussian armies on the frontier of Belgium before the battle of Ligny, (1814,) and that of Massena on the Limmat and Aar in 1799, were also strategic. Even winter quarters, when compact and in face of the enemy and not protected by an armistice, are strategic positions,—for instance, Napoleon on the Passarge in 1807. The daily positions taken up by an army beyond the reach of the enemy, which are sometimes spread out either to deceive him or to facilitate movements, are of this class.

This class also includes positions occupied by an army to cover several points and positions held by the masses of an army for the purposes of observation. The different positions taken up on a line of defense, the positions of detachments on a double front of operations, the position of a detachment covering a siege, the main army in the meanwhile operating on another point, are all strategic. Indeed, all large detachments or fractions of an army may be considered as occupying strategic positions.

The maxims to be given on the preceding points are few, since fronts, lines of defense, and strategic positions generally depend upon a multitude of circumstances giving rise to infinite variety.

In every case, the first general rule is that the communications with the different points of the line of operations be thoroughly assured.

In the defense it is desirable that the strategic fronts and lines of defense should present both upon the flanks and front formidable natural or artificial obstacles to serve as points of support. The points of support on the strategic front are called pivots of operations, and are practical temporary bases, but quite different from pivots of maneuver. For example, in 1796 Verona was an excellent pivot of operations for all Napoleon's enterprises about Mantua for eight months. In 1813 Dresden was his pivot.

Pivots of maneuver are detachments of troops left to guard points which it is essential to hold, while the bulk of the army proceeds to the fulfillment of some important end; and when this is accomplished the pivot of maneuver ceases to exist. Thus, Ney's corps was the pivot of Napoleon's maneuver by Donauwerth and Augsburg to cut Mack from his line of retreat. A pivot of operations, on the contrary, is a material point of both strategical and tactical importance, serves as a point of support and endures throughout a campaign.

The most desirable quality of a line of defense is that it should be as short as possible, in order to be covered with facility by the army if it is compelled to take the defensive. It is also important that the extent of the strategic front should not be so great as to prevent the prompt concentration of the fractions of the army upon an advantageous point.

The same does not altogether apply to the front of operations; for if it be too contracted it would be difficult for an army on the offensive to make strategic maneuvers calculated to produce great results, since a short front could be easily covered by the defensive army. Neither should the front of operations be too extended. Such a front is unsuitable for offensive operations, as it would give the enemy, if not a good line of defense, at least ample space to escape from the results of a strategic maneuver even if well planned. Thus, the beautiful operations of Marengo, Ulm, and Jena could not have produced the same results upon a theater of the magnitude of that of the Russian War in 1812, since the enemy, even if cut off from his line of retreat, could have found another by adopting a new zone of operations.

The essential conditions for every strategic position are that it should be more compact than the forces opposed, that all fractions of the army should have sure and easy means of concentrating, free from the intervention of the enemy. Thus, for forces nearly equal, all central or interior positions would be preferable to exterior ones, since the front in the latter case would necessarily be more extended and would lead to a dangerous division of force. Great mobility and activity on the part of the troops occupying these positions will be a strong element of security or of superiority over the enemy, since it renders possible rapid concentration at different and successive points of the front.

An army should never long occupy any strategic point without making selection of one or two tactical positions, for the purpose of there concentrating all the disposable force, and giving battle to the enemy when he shall have unveiled his designs. In this manner Napoleon prepared the fields of Rivoli and Austerlitz, Wellington that of Waterloo, and the Archduke Charles that of Wagram.

When an army either camps or goes into quarters, the general should be careful that the front be not too extended. A disposition which might be called the strategic square seems best, presenting three nearly-equal faces, so that the distance to be passed over would be about equal for all the divisions in concentrating upon the common center to receive an attack.

Every strategic line of defense should always possess a tactical point upon which to rally for defense should the enemy cross the strategic front. For instance, an army guarding a bank of a river, not being able to occupy in force the whole line, ought always to have a position in rear of the center selected, upon which to collect all his divisions, so as to oppose them united to the enemy when he has succeeded in effecting a passage.

For an army entering a country with the purpose either of subjugation or of temporary occupation, it would always be prudent, however brilliant may have been its earlier successes, to prepare a line of defense as a refuge in case of reverse. This remark is made to complete the subject: the lines themselves are intimately connected with temporary bases, and will be discussed in a future article, (XXIII.)

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 9: This does not refer to intrenched camps, which make a great difference. They are treated of in Article XXVII.]

[Footnote 10: It is a question here of positions of camps, and not of positions for battle. The latter will be treated of in the chapter devoted to Grand Tactics, (Article XXX.)]



ARTICLE XXI.

Zones and Lines of Operations.

A zone of operations is a certain fraction of the whole theater of war, which may be traversed by an army in the attainment of its object, whether it act singly or in concert with other and secondary armies. For example, in the plan of campaign of 1796, Italy was the zone of the right, Bavaria that of the center, Franconia that of the left army.

A zone of operations may sometimes present but a single line of operations, either on account of the configuration of the country, or of the small number of practicable routes for an army found therein. Generally, however, a zone presents several lines of operations, depending partly upon the plans of the campaign, partly upon the number of great routes of communication existing in the theater of operations.

It is not to be understood from this that every road is of itself a line of operations,—though doubtless it may happen that any good road in a certain turn of affairs may become for the time-being such a line; but as long as it is only traversed by detachments, and lies beyond the sphere of the principal enterprises, it cannot truly be called the real line of operations. Moreover, the existence of several routes leading to the same front of operations, and separated by one or two marches, would not constitute so many lines of operations, but, being the communications of the different divisions of the same army, the whole space bounded by them would constitute but a single line.

The term zone of operations is applied to a large fraction of the general theater of war; the term lines of operations will designate the part of this fraction embraced by the enterprises of the army. Whether it follow a single or several routes, the term strategic lines will apply to those important lines which connect the decisive points of the theater of operations either with each other or with the front of operations; and, for the same reason, we give this name to those lines which the army would follow to reach one of these decisive points, or to accomplish an important maneuver which requires a temporary deviation from the principal line of operations. Lines of communications designate the practicable routes between the different portions of the army occupying different positions throughout the zone of operations.

For example, in 1813, after the accession of Austria to the Grand Coalition, three allied armies were to invade Saxony, one Bavaria, and another Italy: so that Saxony, or rather the country between Dresden, Magdeburg, and Breslau, formed the zone of operations of the mass of the forces. This zone had three lines of operations leading to Leipsic as an objective: the first was the line of the army of Bohemia, leading from the mountains of Erzgebirge by Dresden and Chemnitz upon Leipsic; the second was the line of the army of Silesia, going from Breslau by Dresden or by Wittenberg upon Leipsic; the third was that of Bernadotte from Berlin by Dessau to the same objective point. Each of these armies marched upon two or more adjacent parallel routes, but it could not be said that there were as many lines of operations as roads. The principal line of operations is that followed by the bulk of the army, and upon which depots of provisions, munitions, and other supplies are echeloned, and over which, if compelled, it would retreat.

If the choice of a zone of operations involves no extensive combinations, since there can never be more than two or three zones on each theater, and the advantages generally result from the localities, it is somewhat different with lines of operations, as they are divided into different classes, according to their relations to the different positions of the enemy, to the communications upon the strategic field, and to the enterprises projected by the commander.

Simple lines of operations are those of an army acting from a frontier when it is not subdivided into large independent bodies.

Double lines of operations are those of two independent armies proceeding from the same frontier, or those of two nearly equal armies which are commanded by the same general but are widely separated in distance and for long intervals of time.[11]

Interior lines of operations are those adopted by one or two armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the general can concentrate the masses and maneuver with his whole force in a shorter period of time than it would require for the enemy to oppose to them a greater force.[12] Exterior lines lead to the opposite result, and are those formed by an army which operates at the same time on both flanks of the enemy, or against several of his masses.

Concentric lines of operations are those which depart from widely-separated points and meet at the same point, either in advance of or behind the base.

Divergent lines are those by which an army would leave a given point to move upon several distinct points. These lines, of course, necessitate a subdivision of the army.

There are also deep lines, which are simply long lines.

The term maneuver-lines I apply to momentary strategic lines, often adopted for a single temporary maneuver, and which are by no means to be confounded with the real lines of operations.

Secondary lines are those of two armies acting so as to afford each other mutual support,—as, in 1796, the army of the Sambre and Meuse was secondary to the army of the Rhine, and, in 1812, the army of Bagration was secondary to that of Barclay.

Accidental lines are those brought about by events which change the original plan and give a new direction to operations. These are of the highest importance. The proper occasions for their use are fully recognized only by a great and active mind.

There may be, in addition, provisional and definitive lines of operations. The first designate the line adopted by an army in a preliminary, decisive enterprise, after which it is at liberty to select a more advantageous or direct line. They seem to belong as much to the class of temporary or eventual strategic lines as to the class of lines of operations.

These definitions show how I differ from those authors who have preceded me. Lloyd and Bulow attribute to these lines no other importance than that arising from their relations to the depots of the army: the latter has even asserted that when an army is encamped near its depots it has no lines of operations.

The following example will disprove this paradox. Let us suppose two armies, the first on the Upper Rhine, the second in advance of Dusseldorf or any other point of this frontier, and that their large depots are immediately behind the river,—certainly the safest, nearest, and most advantageous position for them which could possibly be adopted. These armies will have an offensive or defensive object: hence they will certainly have lines of operations, arising from the different proposed enterprises.

1. Their defensive territorial line, starting from their positions, will extend to the second line which they are to cover, and they would both be cut off from this second line should the enemy establish himself in the interval which separates them from it. Even if Melas[13] had possessed a year's supplies in Alessandria, he would none the less have been cut off from his base of the Mincio as soon as the victorious enemy occupied the line of the Po.

2. Their line would be double, and the enemy's single if he concentrated his forces to defeat these armies successively; it would be a double exterior line, and the enemy's a double interior, if the latter divided his forces into two masses, giving them such directions as to enable him to concentrate all his forces before the two armies first referred to could unite.

Bulow would have been more nearly right had he asserted that an army on its own soil is less dependent on its primitive line of operations than when on foreign ground; for it finds in every direction points of support and some of the advantages which are sought for in the establishment of lines of operations; it may even lose its line of operations without incurring great danger; but that is no reason why it has no line of operations.

OBSERVATIONS UPON THE LINES OF OPERATIONS IN THE WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.

At the beginning of this terrible and ever-varying struggle, Prussia and Austria were the only avowed enemies of France, and Italy was included in the theater of war only for purposes of reciprocal observation, it being too remote for decisive enterprises in view of the end proposed. The real theater extended from Huningue to Dunkirk, and comprised three zones of operations,—the first reaching along the Rhine from Huningue to Landau, and thence to the Moselle; the center consisting of the interval between the Meuse and Moselle; the third and left was the frontier from Givet to Dunkirk.

When France declared war, in April, 1792, her intention was to prevent a union of her enemies; and she had then one hundred thousand men in the zones just described, while Austria had but thirty-five thousand in Belgium. It is quite impossible to understand why the French did not conquer this country, when no effectual resistance could have been made. Four months intervened between the declaration of war and the concentration of the allied troops. Was it not probable that an invasion of Belgium would have prevented that of Champagne, and have given the King of Prussia a conception of the strength of France, and induced him not to sacrifice his armies for the secondary object of imposing upon France another form of government?

When the Prussians arrived at Coblentz, toward the end of July, the French were no longer able to invade. This role was reserved for the allies; and it is well known how they acquitted themselves.

The whole force of the French was now about one hundred and fifteen thousand men. It was scattered over a frontier of one hundred and forty leagues and divided into five corps d'armee, and could not make a good defense; for to paralyze them and prevent their concentration it was only necessary to attack the center. Political reasons were also in favor of this plan of attack: the end proposed was political, and could only be attained by rapid and vigorous measures. The line between the Moselle and Meuse, which was the center, was less fortified than the rest of the frontier, and, besides, gave the allies the advantage of the excellent fortress of Luxembourg as a base. They wisely adopted this plan of attack; but the execution was not equal to the conception.

The court of Vienna had the greatest interest in the war, for family reasons, as well as on account of the dangers to which a reverse might subject her provinces. For some reason, difficult to understand, Austria co-operated only to the extent of thirty battalions: forty-five thousand men remained as an army of observation in Brisgau, on the Rhine, and in Flanders. Where were the imposing armies she afterward displayed? and what more useful disposition could have been made of them than to protect the flanks of the invading army? This remarkable conduct on the part of Austria, which cost her so much, may account for the resolution of Prussia to retire at a later period, and quit the field, as she did, at the very moment when she should have entered it. During the campaign the Prussians did not exhibit the activity necessary for success. They spent eight days uselessly in camp at Kons. If they had anticipated Dumouriez at the Little Islands, or had even made a more serious effort to drive him from them, they would still have had all the advantage of a concentrated force against several scattered divisions, and could have prevented their junction and overthrown them separately. Frederick the Great would have justified the remark of Dumouriez at Grandpre,—that, if his antagonist had been the great king, he (Dumouriez) would already have been driven behind Chalons.

The Austrians in this campaign proved that they were still imbued with the false system of Daun and Lascy, of covering every point in order to guard every point.

The fact of having twenty thousand men in Brisgau while the Moselle and Sarre were uncovered, shows the fear they had of losing a village, and how their system led to large detachments, which are frequently the ruin of armies.

Forgetting that the surest hope of victory lies in presenting the strongest force, they thought it necessary to occupy the whole length of a frontier to prevent invasion,—which was exactly the means of rendering invasion upon every point feasible.

I will further observe that, in thin campaign, Dumouriez foolishly abandoned the pursuit of the allies in order to transfer the theater from the center to the extreme left of the general field. Moreover, he was unable to perceive the great results rendered possible by this movement, but attacked the army of the Duke of Saxe-Teschen in front, while by descending the Meuse to Namur he might have thrown it back upon the North Sea toward Meuport or Ostend, and have destroyed it entirely in a more successful battle than that of Jemmapes.

The campaign of 1793 affords a new instance of the effect of a faulty direction of operations. The Austrians were victorious, and recovered Belgium, because Dumouriez unskillfully extended his front of operations to the gates of Rotterdam. Thus far the conduct of the allies deserves praise: the desire of reconquering these rich provinces justified this enterprise, which, moreover, was judiciously directed against the extreme right of the long front of Dumouriez. But after the French had been driven back under the guns of Valenciennes, and were disorganized and unable to resist, why did the allies remain six months in front of a few towns and permit the Committee of Public Safety to organize new armies? When the deplorable condition of France and the destitution of the wreck of the army of Dampierre are considered, can the parades of the allies in front of the fortresses in Flanders be understood?

Invasions of a country whose strength lies mainly in the capital are particularly advantageous. Under the government of a powerful prince, and in ordinary wars, the most important point is the head-quarters of the army; but under a weak prince, in a republic, and still more in wars of opinion, the capital is generally the center of national power.[14] If this is ever doubtful, it was not so on this occasion. Paris was France, and this to such an extent that two-thirds of the nation had risen against the government which oppressed them. If, after having beaten the French army at Famars, the allies had left the Dutch and Hanoverians to observe what remained of it, while the English and the Austrians directed their operations upon the Meuse, the Sarre, and the Moselle, in concert with the Prussians and a part of the useless army of the Upper Rhine, a force of one hundred and twenty thousand men, with its flanks protected by other troops, could have been pushed forward. It is even probable that, without changing the direction of the war or running great risks, the Dutch and Hanoverians could have performed the duty of observing Maubeuge and Valenciennes, while the bulk of the army pursued the remains of Dampierre's forces. After gaining several victories, however, two hundred thousand men were engaged in carrying on a few sieges and were not gaining a foot of ground. While they threatened France with invasion, they placed fifteen or sixteen bodies of troops, defensively, to cover their own frontier! When Valenciennes and Mayence capitulated, instead of falling with all their forces upon the camp at Cambray, they flew off, excentrically, to Dunkirk on one side and Landau on the other.

It is not less astonishing that, after making the greatest efforts in the beginning of the campaign upon the right of the general field, they should have shifted them afterward to the extreme left, so that while the allies were operating in Flanders they were in no manner seconded or aided by the imposing army upon the Rhine; and when, in its turn, this army took up the offensive, the allies remained inactive upon the Sambre. Do not these false combinations resemble those of Soubise and Broglie in 1761, and all the operations of the Seven Years' War?

In 1794 the phase of affairs is wholly changed. The French from a painful defensive pass to a brilliant offensive. The combinations of this campaign were doubtless well considered; but it is wrong to represent them as forming a new system of war. To be convinced of this, it is only necessary to observe that the respective positions of the armies in this campaign and in that of 1757 were almost identical, and the direction of the operations is quite the same. The French had four corps, which constituted two armies, as the King of Prussia had four divisions, which composed two armies.

These two large bodies took a concentric direction leading on Brussels, as Frederick and Schwerin had adopted in 1757 on Prague. The only difference between the two plans is that the Austrian troops in Flanders were not so much scattered as those of Brown in Bohemia; but this difference is certainly not favorable to the plan of 1794. The position of the North Sea was also unfavorable for the latter plan. To outflank the Austrian right, Pichegru was thrown between the sea and the mass of the enemy,—a direction as dangerous and faulty as could be given to great operations. This movement was the same as that of Benningsen on the Lower Vistula which almost lost the Russian army in 1807. The fate of the Prussian army, cut off from its communications and forced upon the Baltic, is another proof of this truth.

If the Prince of Coburg had acted with ability, he could easily have made Pichegru suffer for this audacious maneuver, which was performed a month before Jourdan was prepared to follow it up.

The center of the grand Austrian army intended to act upon the offensive was before Landrecies; the army was composed of one hundred and six battalions and one hundred and fifty squadrons; upon its right flank Flanders was covered by the corps d'armee of Clairfayt, and upon the left Charleroi was covered by that of the Prince de Kaunitz. The gain of a battle before Landrecies opened its gates; and upon General Chapuis was found a plan of the diversion in Flanders: only twelve battalions were sent to Clairfayt. A long time afterward, and after the French were known to have been successful, the corps of the Duke of York marched to Clairfayt's relief; but what was the use of the remainder of the army before Landrecies, after it was obliged by a loss of force to delay invasion? The Prince of Coburg threw away all the advantages of his central position, by allowing the French to concentrate in Belgium and to beat all his large detachments in detail.

Finally, the army moved, leaving a division at Cateau, and a part having been sent to the Prince de Kaunitz at Charleroi. If, instead of dividing this grand army, it had been directed upon Turcoing, there would have been concentrated there one hundred battalions and one hundred and forty squadrons; and what must then have been the result of this famous diversion of Pichegru, cut off from his own frontiers and shut up between the sea and two fortresses?

The plan of invasion adopted by the French had not only the radical error of exterior lines: it also failed in execution. The diversion on Courtray took place on April 26, and Jourdan did not arrive at Charleroi till the 3d of June,—more than a month afterward. Here was a splendid opportunity for the Austrians to profit by their central position. If the Prussian army had maneuvered by its right and the Austrian army by its left,—that is, both upon the Meuse,—the state of affairs would have been different. By establishing themselves in the center of a line of scattered forces they could have prevented the junction of the different fractions. It may be dangerous in a battle to attack the center of a close line of troops when it can be simultaneously sustained by the wings and the reserves; but it is quite different on a line of three hundred miles in extent.

In 1795 Prussia and Spain retired from the coalition, and the principal theater of war was shifted from the Rhine to Italy,—which opened a new field of glory for the French arms. Their lines of operations in this campaign were double; they desired to operate by Dusseldorf and Manheim. Clairfayt, wiser than his predecessors, concentrated his forces alternately upon these points, and gained victories at Manheim and in the lines of Mayence so decisive that they caused the army of the Sambre and Meuse to recross the Rhine to cover the Moselle, and brought Pichegru back to Landau.

In 1796 the lines of operations on the Rhine were copied from those of 1757 and those in Flanders in 1794, but with different results. The armies of the Rhine, and of the Sambre and Meuse, set out from the extremities of the base, on routes converging to the Danube. As in 1794, they were exterior lines. The Archduke Charles, more skillful than the Prince of Coburg, profited by his interior lines by concentrating his forces at a point nearer than that expected by the French. He then seized the instant when the Danube covered the corps of Latour, to steal several marches upon Moreau and attack and overwhelm Jourdan: the battle of Wurzburg decided the fate of Germany and compelled the army of Moreau to retreat.

Bonaparte now commences in Italy his extraordinary career. His plan is to separate the Piedmontese and Austrian armies. He succeeds by the battle of Millesimo in causing them to take two exterior strategic lines, and beats them successively at Mondovi and Lodi. A formidable army is collected in the Tyrol to raise the siege of Mantua: it commits the error of marching there in two bodies separated by a lake. The lightning is not quicker than Napoleon. He raises the siege, abandons every thing before Mantua, throws the greater part of his force upon the first column, which debouches by Brescia, beats it and forces it back upon the mountains: the second column arrives upon the same ground, and is there beaten in its turn, and compelled to retire into the Tyrol to keep up its communications with the right. Wurmser, upon whom these lessons are lost, desires to cover the two lines of Roveredo and Vicenza; Napoleon, after having overwhelmed and thrown the first back upon the Lavis, changes direction by the right, debouches by the gorges of the Brenta upon the left, and forces the remnant of this fine army to take refuge in Mantua, where it is finally compelled to surrender.

In 1799 hostilities recommence: the French, punished for having formed two exterior lines in 1796, nevertheless, have three upon the Rhine and the Danube. The army on the left observes the Lower Rhine, that of the center marches upon the Danube, Switzerland, flanking Italy and Swabia, being occupied by a third army as strong as both the others. The three armies could be concentrated only in the valley of the Inn, eighty leagues from their base of operations. The archduke has equal forces: he unites them against the center, which he defeats at Stockach, and the army of Switzerland is compelled to evacuate the Grisons and Eastern Switzerland. The allies in turn commit the same fault: instead of following up their success on this central line, which cost them so dearly afterward, they formed a double line in Switzerland and on the Lower Rhine. The army of Switzerland is beaten at Zurich, while the other trifles at Manheim.

In Italy the French undertake a double enterprise, which leaves thirty-two thousand men uselessly employed at Naples, while upon the Adige, where the vital blows were to be given or received, their force is too weak and meets with terrible reverses. When the army of Naples returns to the North, it commits the error of adopting a strategic direction opposed to Moreau's, and Suwaroff, by means of his central position, from which he derives full profit, marches against this army and beats it, while some leagues from the other.

In 1800, Napoleon has returned from Egypt, and every thing is again changed, and this campaign presents a new combination of lines of operations; one hundred and fifty thousand men march upon the two flanks of Switzerland, and debouch, one upon the Danube and the other upon the Po. This insures the conquest of vast regions. Modern history affords no similar combination. The French armies are upon interior lines, affording reciprocal support, while the Austrians are compelled to adopt an exterior line, which renders it impossible for them to communicate. By a skillful arrangement of its progress, the army of the reserve cuts off the enemy from his line of operations, at the same time preserving its own relations with its base and with the army of the Rhine, which forms its secondary line.

Fig. 3 demonstrates this truth, and shows the respective situations of the two parties. A and A A indicate the front of operations of the armies of the Rhine and of the reserve; B and B B, that of Kray and Melas; C C C C, the passes of the Saint-Bernard, of the Simplon, of the Saint-Gothard, and of the Splugen; D indicates the two lines of operations of the army of the reserve; E, the two lines of retreat of Melas; H J K, the French divisions preserving their line of retreat. It may thus be seen that Melas is cut off from his base, and that, on the contrary, the French general runs no risk, since he preserves all his communications with the frontiers and with his secondary lines.



The analysis of the memorable events just sketched shows clearly the importance of a proper selection of lines of maneuver in military operations. Indeed, discretion on this point may repair the disasters of defeat, destroy the advantages of an adversary's victory, render his invasion futile, or assure the conquest of a province.

By a comparison of the combinations and results of the most noted campaigns, it will be seen that the lines of operations which have led to success have been established in conformity to the fundamental principle already alluded to,—viz.: that simple and interior lines enable a general to bring into action, by strategic movements, upon the important point, a stronger force than the enemy. The student may also satisfy himself that those which have failed contained faults opposed to this principle. An undue number of lines divides the forces, and permits fractions to be overwhelmed by the enemy.

MAXIMS ON LINES OF OPERATIONS.

From the analysis of all the events herein referred to, as well as from that of many others, the following maxims result:—

1. If the art of war consists in bringing into action upon the decisive point of the theater of operations the greatest possible force, the choice of the line of operations, being the primary means of attaining this end, may be regarded as the fundamental idea in a good plan of a campaign. Napoleon proved this by the direction he gave his armies in 1805 on Donauwerth and in 1806 on Gera,—maneuvers that cannot be too much studied by military men.

Of course, it is impossible to sketch in advance the whole campaign. The objective point will be determined upon in advance, the general plan to be followed to attain it, and the first enterprise to be undertaken for this end: what is to follow will depend upon the result of this first operation and the new phases it may develop.

2. The direction to be given to this line depends upon the geographical situation of the theater of operations, but still more upon the position of the hostile masses upon this strategic field. In every case, however, it must be directed upon the center or upon one of the extremities. Only when the assailing forces are vastly preponderating would it be otherwise than a fatal error to act upon the center and the two extremities at the same time.[15]

It may be laid down as a general principle, that, if the enemy divide his forces on an extended front, the best direction of the maneuver-line will be upon his center, but in every other case, when it is possible, the best direction will be upon one of the flanks, and then upon the rear of his line of defense or front of operations.

The advantage of this maneuver arises more from the opportunity it affords of taking the line of defense in reverse than from the fact that by using it the assailant has to contend with but a part of the enemy's force. Thus, the army of the Rhine in 1800, gaining the extreme left of the line of defense of the Black Forest, caused it to yield almost without an effort. This army fought two battles on the right bank of the Danube, which, although not decisive, yet, from the judicious direction of the line of operations, brought about the invasion of Swabia and Bavaria. The results of the march of the army of the reserve by the Saint-Bernard and Milan upon the extreme right of Melas were still more brilliant.

3. Even when the extremity of the enemy's front of operations is gained, it is not always safe to act upon his rear, since by so doing the assailant in many cases will lose his own communications. To avoid this danger, the line of operations should have a geographic and strategic direction, such that the army will always find either to its rear or to the right or left a safe line of retreat. In this case, to take advantage of either of these flank lines of retreat would require a change of direction of the line of operations, (Maxim 12.)

The ability to decide upon such a direction is among the most important qualities of a general. The importance of a direction is illustrated by these examples.

If Napoleon in 1800, after passing the Saint-Bernard, had marched upon Asti or Alessandria, and had fought at Marengo without having previously protected himself on the side of Lombardy and of the left bank of the Po, he would have been more thoroughly cut off from his line of retreat than Melas from his; but, having in his possession the secondary points of Casale and Pavia on the side of the Saint-Bernard, and Savona and Tenda toward the Apennines, in case of reverse he had every means of regaining the Var or the Valais.

In 1806, if he had marched from Gera directly upon Leipsic, and had there awaited the Prussian army returning from Weimar, he would have been cut off from the Rhine as much as the Duke of Brunswick from the Elbe, while by falling back to the west in the direction of Weimar he placed his front before the three roads of Saalfeld, Schleiz, and Hof, which thus became well-covered lines of communication. If the Prussians had endeavored to cut him off from these lines by moving between Gera and Baireuth, they would have opened to him his most natural line,—the excellent road from Leipsic to Frankfort,—as well as the two roads which lead from Saxony by Cassel to Coblentz, Cologne, and even Wesel.

4. Two independent armies should not be formed upon the same frontier: such an arrangement could be proper only in the case of large coalitions, or where the forces at disposal are too numerous to act upon the same zone of operations; and even in this case it would be better to have all the forces under the same commander, who accompanies the principal army.

5. As a consequence of the last-mentioned principle, with equal forces on the same frontier, a single line of operations will be more advantageous than a double one.

6. It may happen, however, that a double line will be necessary, either from the topography of the seat of war, or because a double line has been adopted by the enemy, and it will be necessary to oppose a part of the army to each of his masses.

7. In this case, interior or central lines will be preferable to exterior lines, since in the former case the fractions of the army can be concentrated before those of the enemy, and may thus decide the fate of the campaign.[16] Such an army may, by a well-combined strategic plan, unite upon and overwhelm successively the fractions of the adversary's forces. To be assured of success in these maneuvers, a body of observation is left in front of the army to be held in check, with instructions to avoid a serious engagement, but to delay the enemy as much as possible by taking advantage of the ground, continually falling back upon the principal army.

8. A double line is applicable in the case of a decided superiority of force, when each army will be a match for any force the enemy can bring against it. In this case this course will be advantageous,—since a single line would crowd the forces so much as to prevent them all from acting to advantage. However, it will always be prudent to support well the army which, by reason of the nature of its theater and the respective positions of the parties, has the most important duty to perform.

9 The principal events of modern wars demonstrate the truth of two other maxims. The first is, that two armies operating on interior lines and sustaining each other reciprocally, and opposing two armies superior in numbers, should not allow themselves to be crowded into a too contracted space, where the whole might be overwhelmed at once. This happened to Napoleon at Leipsic.[17] The second is, that interior lines should not be abused by extending them too far, thus giving the enemy the opportunity of overcoming the corps of observation. This risk, however, may be incurred if the end pursued by the main forces is so decisive as to conclude the war,—when the fate of these secondary bodies would be viewed with comparative indifference.

10. For the same reason, two converging lines are more advantageous than two divergent. The first conform better to the principles of strategy, and possess the advantage of covering the lines of communication and supply; but to be free from danger they should be so arranged that the armies which pass over them shall not be separately exposed to the combined masses of the enemy, before being able to effect their junction.

11. Divergent lines, however, may be advantageous when the center of the enemy has been broken and his forces separated either by a battle or by a strategic movement,—in which case divergent operations would add to the dispersion of the enemy. Such divergent lines would be interior, since the pursuers could concentrate with more facility than the pursued.

12. It sometimes happens that an army is obliged to change its line of operations in the middle of a campaign. This is a very delicate and important step, which may lead to great successes, or to equally great disasters if not applied with sagacity, and is used only to extricate an army from an embarrassing position. Napoleon projected several of these changes; for in his bold invasions he was provided with new plans to meet unforeseen events.

At the battle of Austerlitz, if defeated, he had resolved to adopt a line of operations through Bohemia on Passau or Ratisbon, which would have opened a new and rich country to him, instead of returning by Vienna, which route lay through an exhausted country and from which the Archduke Charles was endeavoring to cut him off. Frederick executed one of these changes of the line of operations after the raising of the siege of Olmutz.

In 1814 Napoleon commenced the execution of a bolder maneuver, but one which was favored by the localities. It was to base himself upon the fortresses of Alsace and Lorraine, leaving the route to Paris open to the allies. If Mortier and Marmont could have joined him, and had he possessed fifty thousand more men, this plan would have produced the most decisive results and have put the seal on his military career.

13. As before stated, the outline of the frontiers, and the geographical character of the theater of operations, exercise a great influence on the direction to be given to these lines, as well as upon the advantages to be obtained. Central positions, salient toward the enemy, like Bohemia and Switzerland, are the most advantageous, because they naturally lead to the adoption of interior lines and facilitate the project of taking the enemy in reverse. The sides of this salient angle become so important that every means should be taken to render them impregnable. In default of such central positions, their advantages may be gained by the relative directions of maneuver-lines, as the following figure will explain. C D maneuvering upon the right of the front of the army A B, and H I upon the left flank of G F, will form two interior lines I K and C K upon an extremity of the exterior lines A B, F G, which they may overwhelm separately by combining upon them. Such was the result of the operations of 1796, 1800, and 1809.

[Illustration: Fig. 4.

K / / / / F LLLLLLLLLLLLL G / A LLLLLLLLLLLLLL B / / / / / / / / H TTTTTTTTTTTTT I C TTTTTTTTTTTTTT D ]

14. The general configuration of the bases ought also to influence the direction to be given to the lines of operations, these latter being naturally dependent upon the former. It has already been shown that the greatest advantage that can result from a choice of bases is when the frontiers allow it to be assumed parallel to the line of operations of the enemy, thus affording the opportunity of seizing this line and cutting him from his base.

But if, instead of directing the operations upon the decisive point, the line of operations be badly chosen, all the advantages of the perpendicular base may be lost, as will be seen by referring to the figure on page 79. The army E, having the double base A C and C D, if it marched toward F, instead of to the right toward G H, would lose all the strategic advantages of its base C D.

The great art, then, of properly directing lines of operations, is so to establish them in reference to the bases and to the marches of the army as to seize the communications of the enemy without imperiling one's own, and is the most important and most difficult problem in strategy.

15. There is another point which exercises a manifest influence over the direction to be given to the line of operations; it is when the principal enterprise of the campaign is to cross a large river in the presence of a numerous and well-appointed enemy. In this case, the choice of this line depends neither upon the will of the general nor the advantages to be gained by an attack on one or another point; for the first consideration will be to ascertain where the passage can be most certainly effected, and where are to be found the means for this purpose. The passage of the Rhine in 1795, by Jourdan, was near Dusseldorf, for the same reason that the Vistula in 1831 was crossed by Marshal Paskevitch near Ossiek,—viz., that in neither case was there the bridge-train necessary for the purpose, and both were obliged to procure and take up the rivers large boats, bought by the French in Holland, and by the Russians at Thorn and Dantzic. The neutrality of Prussia permitted the ascent of the river in both cases, and the enemy was not able to prevent it. This apparently incalculable advantage led the French into the double invasions of 1795 and 1796, which failed because the double line of operations caused the defeat of the armies separately. Paskevitch was wiser, and passed the Upper Vistula with only a small detachment and after the principal army had already arrived at Lowicz.

When an army is sufficiently provided with bridge-trains, the chances of failure are much lessened; but then, as always, it is necessary to select the point which may, either on account of its topography or the position of the enemy, be most advantageous. The discussion between Napoleon and Moreau on the passage of the Rhine in 1800 is one of the most curious examples of the different combinations presented by this question, which is both strategic and tactical.

Since it is necessary to protect the bridges, at least until a victory is gained, the point of passage will exercise an influence upon the directions of a few marches immediately subsequent to the passage. The point selected in every case for the principal passage will be upon the center or one of the flanks of the enemy.

A united army which has forced a passage upon the center of an extended line might afterward adopt two divergent lines to complete the dispersion of the enemy, who, being unable to concentrate, would not think of disturbing the bridges.

If the line of the river is so short that the hostile army is more concentrated, and the general has the means of taking up after the passage a front perpendicular to the river, it would be better to pass it upon one of the extremities, in order to throw off the enemy from the bridges. This will be referred to in the article upon the passage of rivers.

16. There is yet another combination of lines of operations to be noticed. It is the marked difference of advantage between a line at home and one in a hostile country. The nature of the enemy's country will also influence these chances. Let us suppose an army crosses the Alps or the Rhine to carry on war in Italy or Germany. It encounters states of the second rank; and, even if they are in alliance, there are always rivalries or collisions of interest which will deprive them of that unity and strength possessed by a single powerful state. On the other hand, a German army invading France would operate upon a line much more dangerous than that of the French in Italy, because upon the first could be thrown the consolidated strength of Franco, united in feeling and interest. An army on the defensive, with its line of operations on its own soil, has resources everywhere and in every thing: the inhabitants, authorities, productions, towns, public depots and arsenals, and even private stores, are all in its favor. It is not ordinarily so abroad.

Lines of operations in rich, fertile, manufacturing regions offer to the assailants much greater advantages than when in barren or desert regions, particularly when the people are not united against the invader. In provinces like those first named the army would find a thousand necessary supplies, while in the other huts and straw are about the only resources. Horses probably may obtain pasturage; but every thing else must be carried by the army,—thus infinitely increasing the embarrassments and rendering bold operations much more rare and dangerous. The French armies, so long accustomed to the comforts of Swabia and Lombardy, almost perished in 1806 in the bogs of Pultusk, and actually did perish in 1812 in the marshy forests of Lithuania.

17. There is another point in reference to these lines which is much insisted upon by some, but which is more specious than important. It is that on each side of the line of operations the country should be cleared of all enemies for a distance equal to the depth of this line: otherwise the enemy might threaten the line of retreat. This rule is everywhere belied by the events of war. The nature of the country, the rivers and mountains, the morale of the armies, the spirit of the people, the ability and energy of the commanders, cannot be estimated by diagrams on paper. It is true that no considerable bodies of the enemy could be permitted on the flanks of the line of retreat; but a compliance with this demand would deprive an army of every means of taking a step in a hostile country; and there is not a campaign in recent wars, or in those of Marlborough and Eugene, which does not contradict this assertion. Was not General Moreau at the gates of Vienna when Fussen, Scharnitz, and all the Tyrol were in possession of the Austrians? Was not Napoleon at Piacenza when Turin, Genoa, and the Col-di-Tenda were occupied by the army of Melas? Did not Eugene march by way of Stradella and Asti to the aid of Turin, leaving the French upon the Mincio but a few leagues from his base?

OBSERVATIONS UPON INTERIOR LINES—WHAT HAS BEEN SAID AGAINST THEM.

Some of my critics have disputed as to the meaning of words and upon definitions; others have censured where they but imperfectly understood; and others have, by the light of certain important events, taken it upon themselves to deny my fundamental principles, without inquiring whether the conditions of the case which might modify the application of these principles were such as were supposed, or without reflecting that, even admitting what they claimed to be true, a single exception cannot disprove a rule based upon the experience of ages and upon natural principles.

In opposition to my maxims upon interior lines, some have quoted the famous and successful march of the allies upon Leipsic. This remarkable event, at first glance, seems to stagger the faith of those who believe in principles. At best, however, it is but one of those exceptional cases from which nothing can be inferred in the face of thousands of opposed instances. Moreover, it is easy to show that, far from overthrowing the maxims it has been brought to oppose, it will go to establish their soundness. Indeed, the critics had forgotten that in case of a considerable numerical superiority I recommended double lines of operations as most advantageous, particularly when concentric and arranged to combine an effort against the enemy at the decisive moment. Now, in the allied armies of Schwarzenberg, Bluecher, Bernadotte, and Benningsen, this case of decided superiority is found. The inferior army, to conform to the principles of this chapter, should have directed its efforts against one of the extremities of his adversary, and not upon the center as it did: so that the events quoted against me are doubly in my favor.

Moreover, if the central position of Napoleon between Dresden and the Oder was disastrous, it must be attributed to the misfortunes of Culm, Katzbach, and Dennewitz,—in a word, to faults of execution, entirely foreign to the principles in question.

What I propose is, to act offensively upon the most important point with the greater part of the forces, but upon the secondary points to remain on the defensive, in strong positions or behind a river, until the decisive blow is struck, and the operation ended by the total defeat of an essential part of the army. Then the combined efforts of the whole army may be directed upon other points. Whenever the secondary armies are exposed to a decisive shock during the absence of the mass of the army, the system is not understood; and this was what happened in 1813.

If Napoleon, after his victory at Dresden, had vigorously pursued the allies into Bohemia, he would have escaped the disaster at Culm, have threatened Prague, and perhaps have dissolved the Coalition. To this error may be added a fault quite as great,—that of fighting decisive battles when he was not present with the mass of his forces. At Katzbach his instructions were not obeyed. He ordered Macdonald to wait for Bluecher, and to fall upon him when he should expose himself by hold movements. Macdonald, on the contrary, crossed his detachments over torrents which were hourly becoming more swollen, and advanced to meet Bluecher. If he had fulfilled his instructions and Napoleon had followed up his victory, there is no doubt that his plan of operations, based upon interior strategic lines and positions and upon a concentric line of operations, would have met with the most brilliant success. The study of his campaigns in Italy in 1796 and in France in 1814 shows that he knew how to apply this system.

There is another circumstance, of equal importance, which shows the injustice of judging central lines by the fate of Napoleon in Saxony,—viz.: that his front of operations was outflanked on the right, and even taken in reverse, by the geographical position of the frontiers of Bohemia. Such a case is of rare occurrence. A central position with such faults is not to be compared to one without them. When Napoleon made the application of these principles in Italy, Poland, Prussia, and France, he was not exposed to the attack of a hostile enemy on his flanks and rear. Austria could have threatened him in 1807; but she was then at peace with him and unarmed. To judge of a system of operations, it must be supposed that accidents and chances are to be as much in favor of as against it,—which was by no means the case in 1813, either in the geographic positions or in the state of the respective forces. Independently of this, it is absurd to quote the reverses at Katzbach and Dennewitz, suffered by his lieutenants, as proof capable of destroying a principle the simplest application of which required these officers not to allow themselves to be drawn into a serious engagement. Instead of avoiding they sought collisions. Indeed, what advantage can be expected from the system of central lines, if the parts of the army which have been weakened in order to strike decisive blows elsewhere, shall themselves seek a disastrous contest, instead of being contented with being bodies of observation?[18] In this case it is the enemy who applies the principle, and not he who has the interior lines. Moreover, in the succeeding campaign, the defense of Napoleon in Champagne, from the battle of Brienne to that of Paris, demonstrates fully the truth of these maxims.

The analysis of these two celebrated campaigns raises a strategic question which it would be difficult to answer by simple assertions founded upon theories. It is, whether the system of central lines loses its advantages when the masses are very large. Agreeing with Montesquieu, that the greatest enterprises fail from the magnitude of the arrangements necessary to consummate them, I am disposed to answer in the affirmative. It is very clear to me that an army of one hundred thousand men, occupying a central zone against three isolated armies of thirty or thirty-five thousand men, would be more sure of defeating them successively than if the central mass were four hundred thousand strong against three armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each; and for several good reasons:—

1. Considering the difficulty of finding ground and time necessary to bring a very large force into action on the day of battle, an army of one hundred and thirty or one hundred and forty thousand men may easily resist a much larger force.

2. If driven from the field, there will be at least one hundred thousand men to protect and insure an orderly retreat and effect a junction with one of the other armies.

3. The central army of four hundred thousand men requires such a quantity of provisions, munitions, horses, and materiel of every kind, that it will possess less mobility and facility in shifting its efforts from one part of the zone to another; to say nothing of the impossibility of obtaining provisions from a region too restricted to support such numbers.

4. The bodies of observation detached from the central mass to hold in check two armies of one hundred and thirty-five thousand each must be very strong, (from eighty to ninety thousand each;) and, being of such magnitude, if they are drawn into a serious engagement they will probably suffer reverses, the effects of which might outweigh the advantages gained by the principal army.

I have never advocated exclusively either a concentric or eccentric system. All my works go to show the eternal influence of principles, and to demonstrate that operations to be successful must be applications of principles.

Divergent or convergent operations may be either very good or very bad: all depends on the situation of the respective forces. The eccentric lines, for instance, are good when applied to a mass starting from a given point, and acting in divergent directions to divide and separately destroy two hostile forces acting upon exterior lines. Such was the maneuver of Frederick which brought about, at the end of the campaign of 1767, the fine battles of Rossbach and Leuthen. Such were nearly all the operations of Napoleon, whose favorite maneuver was to unite, by closely-calculated marches, imposing masses on the center, and, having pierced the enemy's center or turned his front, to give them eccentric directions to disperse the defeated army.[19]

On the other hand, concentric operations are good in two cases: 1. When they tend to concentrate a scattered army upon a point where it will be sure to arrive before the enemy; 2. When they direct to the same end the efforts of two armies which are in no danger of being beaten separately by a stronger enemy.

Concentric operations, which just now seem to be so advantageous, may be most pernicious,—which should teach us the necessity of detecting the principles upon which systems are based, and not to confound principles and systems; as, for instance, if two armies set out from a distant base to march convergently upon an enemy whose forces are on interior lines and more concentrated, it follows that the latter could effect a union before the former, and would inevitably defeat them; as was the case with Moreau and Jourdan in 1796, opposed to the Archduke Charles.

In starting from the same points, or from two points much less separated than Dusseldorf and Strasbourg, an army may be exposed to this danger. What was the fate of the concentric columns of Wurmser and Quasdanovitch, wishing to reach the Mincio by the two banks of Lake Garda? Can the result of the march of Napoleon and Grouchy on Brussels be forgotten? Leaving Sombref, they were to march concentrically on this city,—one by Quatre-Bras, the other by Wavre. Bluecher and Wellington, taking an interior strategic line, effected a junction before them, and the terrible disaster of Waterloo proved to the world that the immutable principles of war cannot be violated with impunity.

Such events prove better than any arguments that a system which is not in accordance with the principles of war cannot be good. I lay no claim to the creation of these principles, for they have always existed, and were applied by Caesar, Scipio, and the Consul Nero, as well as by Marlborough and Eugene; but I claim to have been the first to point them out, and to lay down the principal chances in their various applications.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 11: This definition has been criticized; and, as it has given rise to misapprehension, it becomes necessary to explain it.

In the first place, it must be borne in mind that it is a question of maneuver-lines, (that is, of strategic combinations,) and not of great routes. It must also be admitted that an army marching upon two or three routes, near enough to each other to admit of the concentration of the different masses within forty-eight hours, would not have two or three lines of operations. When Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany with two armies of 70,000 men each, being independent of each other, there was a double line of operations; but a French army of which only a detachment starts from the Lower Rhine to march on the Main, while the five or six other corps set out from the Upper Rhine to march on Ulm, would not have a double line of operations in the sense in which I use the term to designate a maneuver. Napoleon, when he concentrated seven corps and set them in motion by Bamberg to march on Gera, while Mortier with a single corps marched on Cassel to occupy Hesse and flank the principal enterprise, had but a single general line of operations, with an accessory detachment. The territorial line was composed of two arms or radii, but the operation was not double.]

[Footnote 12: Some German writers have said that I confound central positions with the line of operations,—in which assertion they are mistaken. An army may occupy a central position in the presence of two masses of the enemy, and not have interior lines of operations: these are two very different things. Others have thought that I would have done better to use the term radii of operations to express the idea of double lines. The reasoning in this case is plausible if we conceive the theater of operations to be a circle; but, as every radius is, after all, a line, it is simply a dispute about words.]

[Footnote 13: This assertion has been disputed. I think it is correct; for Melas, confined between the Bormida, the Tanaro, and the Po, was unable to recruit for his army, barely able to maintain a communication by couriers with his base, and he certainly would have been obliged to cut his way out or to surrender in case he had not been reinforced.]

[Footnote 14: The capture of Paris by the allies decided the fate of Napoleon; but he had no army, and was attacked by all Europe, and the French people had, in addition, separated their cause from his. If he had possessed fifty thousand more old soldiers, he would have shown that the capital was at his head-quarters.]

[Footnote 15: The inferiority of an army does not depend exclusively upon the number of soldiers: their military qualities, their morale, and the ability of their commander are also very important elements.]

[Footnote 16: When the fractions of an army are separated from the main body by only a few marches, and particularly when they are not intended to act separately throughout the campaign, these are central strategic positions, and not lines of operations.]

[Footnote 17: In the movements immediately preceding the battle of Leipsic, Napoleon, strictly speaking, had but a single line of operations, and his armies were simply in central strategic positions; but the principle is the same, and hence the example is illustrative of lines of operations.]

[Footnote 18: I am well aware that it is not always possible to avoid a combat without running greater risks than would result from a check; but Macdonald might have fought Bluecher to advantage if he had better understood Napoleon's instructions.]

[Footnote 19: It will not be thought strange that I sometimes approve of concentric, and at other times divergent, maneuvers, when we reflect that among the finest operations of Napoleon there are some in which he employed these two systems alternately within twenty-four hours; for example, in the movements about Ratisbon in 1809.]



ARTICLE XXII.

Strategic Lines.

Mention has already been made of strategic lines of maneuvers, which differ essentially from lines of operations; and it will be well to define them, for many confound them. We will not consider those strategic lines which have a great and permanent importance by reason of their position and their relation to the features of the country, like the lines of the Danube and the Meuse, the chains of the Alps and the Balkan. Such lines can best be studied by a detailed and minute examination of the topography of Europe; and an excellent model for this kind of study is found in the Archduke Charles's description of Southern Germany.

The term strategic is also applied to all communications which lead by the most direct or advantageous route from one important point to another, as well as from the strategic front of the army to all of its objective points. It will be seen, then, that a theater of war is crossed by a multitude of such lines, but that at any given time those only which are concerned in the projected enterprise have any real importance. This renders plain the distinction between the general line of operations of a whole campaign, and these strategic lines, which are temporary and change with the operations of the army.

Besides territorial strategic lines, there are strategic lines of maneuvers.

An army having Germany as its general field might adopt as its zone of operations the space between the Alps and the Danube, or that between the Danube and the Main, or that between the mountains of Franconia and the sea. It would have upon its zone a single line of operations, or, at most, a double concentric line, upon interior, or perhaps exterior, directions,—while it would have successively perhaps twenty strategic lines as its enterprises were developed: it would have at first one for each wing which would join the general line of operations. If it operated in the zone between the Danube and the Alps, it might adopt, according to events, the strategic line leading from Ulm on Donauwerth and Ratisbon, or that from Ulm to the Tyrol, or that which connects Ulm with Nuremberg or Mayence.

It may, then, be assumed that the definitions applied to lines of operations, as well as the maxims referring to them, are necessarily applicable to strategic lines. These may be concentric, to inflict a decisive blow, or eccentric, after victory. They are rarely simple, since an army does not confine its march to a single road; but when they are double or triple, or even quadruple, they should be interior if the forces be equal, or exterior in the case of great numerical superiority. The rigorous application of this rule may perhaps sometimes be remitted in detaching a body on an exterior line, even when the forces are equal, to attain an important result without running much risk; but this is an affair of detachments, and does not refer to the important masses.

Strategic lines cannot be interior when our efforts are directed against one of the extremities of the enemy's front of operations.

The maxims above given in reference to lines of operations holding good for strategic lines, it is not necessary to repeat them, or to apply them to particular examples; but there is one, however, which deserves mention,—viz.: that it is important generally, in the selection of these temporary strategic lines, not to leave the line of operations exposed to the assaults of the enemy. Even this may, however, be done, to extricate the army from great danger, or to attain a great success; but the operation must be of short duration, and care must have been taken to prepare a plan of safe retreat, by a sudden change of the line of operations, if necessary, as has already been referred to.

We will illustrate this by the campaign of Waterloo. The Prussian army was based upon the Rhine, its line of operations extended from Cologne and Coblentz on Luxembourg and Namur; Wellington's base was Antwerp, and his line of operations the short road to Brussels. The sudden attack by Napoleon on Flanders decided Bluecher to receive battle parallel to the English base, and not to his own, about which he seemed to have no uneasiness. This was pardonable, because he could always have a good chance of regaining Wesel or Nimeguen, and even might seek a refuge in Antwerp in the last extremity; but if the army had not had its powerful maritime allies it would have been destroyed. Beaten at Ligny, and seeking refuge at Gembloux and then at Wavre, Bluecher had but three strategic lines to choose from: that which led directly to Maestricht, that farther north on Venloo, or the one leading to the English army near Mont St. Jean. He audaciously took the last, and triumphed by the application of interior strategic lines,—which Napoleon here, perhaps for the first time in his life, neglected. It will readily be seen that the line followed from Gembloux by Wavre to Mont St. Jean was neither a line of operations of the Prussian army nor a line of battle, but a strategic line of maneuver, and was interior. It was bold, because he exposed fully his own natural line of operations. The fact that he sought a junction with the English made his movement accord with the principles of war.

A less successful example was that of Ney at Dennewitz. Leaving Wittenberg, and going in the direction of Berlin, he moved to the right to gain the extreme left of the allies, but in so doing he left his primitive line of retreat exposed to the attacks of an enemy superior in force. His object was to gain communication with Napoleon, whose intention was to join him by Herzberg or Luckau; but Ney should from the beginning have taken all logistic and tactical means of accomplishing this change of strategic line and of informing his army of it. He did nothing of this kind,—either from forgetfulness, or on account of the feeling of aversion he had to any thing like a retreat,—and the severe losses at Dennewitz were the result.

Napoleon in 1796 gave one of the best illustrations of these different combinations of strategic lines. His general line of operations extended from the Apennines to Verona. When he had driven Wurmser upon Roveredo and determined to pursue him into the Tyrol, he pushed on in the valley of the Adige to Trent and the Lavis, where he learned that Wurmser had moved by the Brenta on the Frioul, doubtless to take him in reverse. There were but three courses open to him,—to remain in the narrow valley of the Adige at great risk, to retreat by Verona to meet Wurmser, or the last,—which was sublime, but rash,—to follow him into the valley of the Brenta, which was encircled by rugged mountains whose two passages might be held by the Austrians. Napoleon was not the man to hesitate between three such alternatives. He left Vaubois on the Lavis to cover Trent, and marched with the remainder of his forces on Bassano. The brilliant results of this bold step are well known. The route from Trent to Bassano was not the line of operations of the army, but a strategic line of maneuver still bolder than that of Bluecher on Wavre. However, it was an operation of only three or four days' duration, at the end of which time Napoleon would either beat or be beaten at Bassano: in the first case, he would open direct communication with Verona and his line of operations; in the second, he could regain in great haste Trent, where, reinforced by Vaubois, he could fall back either upon Verona or Peschiera. The difficulties of the country, which made this march audacious in one respect, were favorable in another; for even if Wurmser had been victorious at Bassano he could not have interfered with the return to Trent, as there was no road to enable him to anticipate Napoleon. If Davidovitch on the Lavis had driven Vaubois from Trent, he might have embarrassed Napoleon; but this Austrian general, previously beaten at Roveredo, and ignorant of what the French army was doing for several days, and thinking it was all upon him, would scarcely have thought of resuming the offensive before Napoleon beaten at Bassano would have been on his retreat. Indeed, if Davidovitch had advanced as far as Roveredo, driving Vaubois before him, he would there have been surrounded by two French armies, who would have inflicted upon him the fate of Vandamme at Culm.

I have dwelt on this event to show that a proper calculation of time and distances, joined to great activity, may lead to the success of many adventures which may seem very imprudent. I conclude from this that it may be well sometimes to direct an army upon a route which exposes its line of operations, but that every measure must be taken to prevent the enemy from profiting by it, both by great rapidity of execution and by demonstrations which will deceive him and leave him in ignorance of what is taking place. Still, it is a very hazardous maneuver, and only to be adopted under an urgent necessity.



ARTICLE XXIII.

Means of protecting a Line of Operations by Temporary Bases or Strategic Reserves.

When a general enters a country offensively, he should form eventual or temporary bases,—which, of course, are neither so safe nor so strong as his own frontiers. A river with tetes de ponts, and one or two large towns secure from a coup de main to cover the depots of the army and to serve as points of assembling for the reserve troops, would be an excellent base of this kind. Of course, such a line could not be a temporary base if a hostile force were near the line of operations leading to the real base on the frontiers. Napoleon would have had a good real base on the Elbe in 1813 if Austria had remained neutral; but, she having joined his enemies, this line was taken in reverse, and became but a pivot of operations, favorable indeed for the execution of a single enterprise, but dangerous for a prolonged occupation, particularly in case of a serious reverse. As every army which is beaten in an enemy's country is exposed to the danger of being cut off from its own frontiers if it continues to occupy the country, these distant temporary bases are rather temporary points of support than real bases, and are in a measure eventual lines of defense. In general, we cannot expect to find in an enemy's country safe positions suitable even for a temporary base; and the deficiency must be supplied by a strategic reserve,—which is purely a modern invention. Its merits and demerits deserve notice.

STRATEGIC RESERVES.

Reserves play an important part in modern warfare. From the executive, who prepares national reserves, down to the chief of a platoon of skirmishers, every commander now desires a reserve. A wise government always provides good reserves for its armies, and the general uses them when they come under his command. The state has its reserves, the army has its own, and every corps d'armee or division should not fail to provide one.

The reserves of an army are of two kinds,—those on the battle-field, and those which are intended to recruit and support the army: the latter, while organizing, may occupy important points of the theater of war, and serve even as strategic reserves; their positions will depend not only on their magnitude, but also on the nature of the frontiers and the distance from the base to the front of operations. Whenever an army takes the offensive, it should always contemplate the possibility of being compelled to act on the defensive, and by the posting of a reserve between the base and front of operations the advantage of an active reserve on the field of battle is gained: it can fly to the support of menaced points without weakening the active army. It is true that to form a reserve a number of regiments must be withdrawn from active service; but there are always reinforcements to arrive, recruits to be instructed, and convalescents to be used; and by organizing central depots for preparation of munitions and equipments, and by making them the rendezvous of all detachments going to and coming from the army, and adding to them a few good regiments to give tone, a reserve may be formed capable of important service.

Napoleon never failed to organize these reserves in his campaigns. Even in 1797, in his bold march on the Noric Alps, he had first Joubert on the Adige, afterward Victor (returning from the Roman States) in the neighborhood of Verona. In 1805 Ney and Augereau played the part alternately in the Tyrol and Bavaria, and Mortier and Marmont near Vienna.

In 1806 Napoleon formed like reserves on the Rhine, and Mortier used them to reduce Hesse. At the same time, other reserves were forming at Mayence under Kellermann, which took post, as fast as organized, between the Rhine and Elbe, while Mortier was sent into Pomerania. When Napoleon decided to push on to the Vistula in the same year, he directed, with much ostentation, the concentration of an army on the Elbe sixty thousand strong, its object being to protect Hamburg against the English and to influence Austria, whose disposition was as manifest as her interests.

The Prussians established a similar reserve in 1806 at Halle, but it was badly posted: if it had been established upon the Elbe at Wittenberg or Dessau, and had done its duty, it might have saved the army by giving Prince Hohenlohe and Bluecher time to reach Berlin, or at least Stettin.

These reserves are particularly useful when the configuration of the country leads to double fronts of operations: they then fulfill the double object of observing the second front, and, in case of necessity, of aiding the operations of the main army when the enemy threatens its flanks or a reverse compels it to fall back toward this reserve.

Of course, care must be taken not to create dangerous detachments, and whenever these reserves can be dispensed with, it should be done, or the troops in the depots only be employed as reserves. It is only in distant invasions and sometimes on our own soil that they are useful: if the scene of hostilities be but five or six marches distant from the frontier, they are quite superfluous. At home they may generally be dispensed with: it is only in the case of a serious invasion, when new levies are organizing, that such a reserve, in an intrenched camp, under the protection of a fortress which serves as a great depot, will be indispensable.