[Footnote A: A comic piece—the production of one of the most popular of the French writers in his way—had possession of the Paris stage last winter. When one of the personages SEPARATES HUSBAND AND WIFE, he cries out, "BRAVO! THIS IS THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES!" [Bravo! C'est la Declaration d'Independence des Etats Unis.]

One of our distinguished College-professors, lately on a tour in Europe, had his attention called, while passing along the street of a German city, to the pictorial representation of a WHITE MAN SCOURGING A SUPPLICATING COLORED FEMALE, with this allusion underwritten:—"A SPECIMEN OF EQUALITY—FROM REPUBLICAN AMERICA."

Truly might our countryman have exclaimed in the language, if not with the generous emotions of the Trojan hero, when he beheld the noble deeds of his countrymen pencilled in a strange land—

—"Quis jam locus— Quae regio in terris nostri non plena laboris?" ]

Instead of being thus seated on a "heaven-kissing hill," and seen of all in its pure radiance; instead of enjoying its delightful airs, and imparting to them the healthful savor of justice, truth, mercy, magnanimity, see what a picture we present;—our cannibal burnings of human beings—our Lynch courts—our lawless scourgings and capital executions, not only of slaves, but of freemen—our demoniac mobs raging through the streets of our cities and large towns at midday as well as at midnight, shedding innocent blood, devastating property, and applying the incendiaries' torch to edifices erected and dedicated to FREE DISCUSSION—the known friends of order, of law, of liberty, of the Constitution—citizens, distinguished for their worth at home, and reflecting honor on their country abroad, shut out from more than half our territory, or visiting it at the hazard of their lives, or of the most degrading and painful personal inflictions—freedom of speech and of the press overthrown and hooted at—the right of petition struck down in Congress, where, above all places, it ought to have been maintained to the last—the people mocked at, and attempted to be gagged by their own servants—the time the office-honored veteran, who fearlessly contended for the right, publicly menaced for words spoken in his place as a representative of the people, with an indictment by a slaveholding grand jury—in fine, the great principles of government asserted by our fathers in the Declaration of Independence, and embodied in our Constitution, with which they won for us the sympathy, the admiration of the world—all forgotten, dishonoured, despised, trodden under foot! And this for slavery!!

Horrible catalogue!—yet by no means a complete one—for so young a nation, boasting itself, too, to be the freest on earth! It is the ripe fruit of that chef d'oeuvre of political skill and patriotic achievement—the MISSOURI COMPROMISE.

Another such compromise—or any compromise now with slavery—and the nation is undone.

APPENDIX F.

The following is believed to be a correct exhibit of the legislative resolutions against the annexation of Texas—of the times at which they were passed, and of the votes by which they were passed:—

1. VERMONT.

"1. Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representatives, That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representatives requested, to use their influence in that body to prevent the annexation of Texas to the Union.

2. Resolved, That representing, as we do, the people of Vermont, we do hereby, in their name, SOLEMNLY PROTEST against such annexation in any form."

[Passed unanimously, Nov. 1, 1837.]

2. RHODE ISLAND.

(In General Assembly, October Session, A. D. 1837.)

"Whereas the compact of the Union between these states was entered into by the people thereof in their respective states, 'in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity;' and, therefore, a Representative Government was instituted by them, with certain limited powers, clearly specified and defined in the Constitution—all other powers, not therein expressly relinquished, being 'reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.'

And whereas this limited government possesses no power to extend its jurisdiction over any foreign nation, and no foreign nation, country, or people, can be admitted into this Union but by the sovereign will and act of the free people of all and each of these United States, nor without the formation of a new compact of Union—and another frame of government radically different, in objects, principles, and powers, from that which was framed for our own self-government, and deemed to be adequate to all the exigencies of our own free republic:—

Therefore, Resolved, That we have witnessed, with deep concern, the indications of a disposition to bring into this Union, as a constituent member thereof, the foreign province or territory of Texas.

Resolved, That, although we are fully aware of the consequences which must follow the accomplishment of such a project, could it be accomplished—aware that it would lead speedily to the conquest and annexation of Mexico itself, and its fourteen remaining provinces or intendencies—which, together with the revolted province of Texas, would furnish foreign territories and foreign people for at least twenty members of the new Union; that the government of a nation so extended and so constructed would soon become radically [changed] in character, if not in form—would unavoidably become a military government; and, under the plea of necessity, would free itself from the restraints of the Constitution and from its accountability to the people. That the ties of kindred, common origin and common interests, which have so long bound this people together, and would still continue to bind them: these ties, which ought to be held sacred by all true Americans, would be angrily dissolved, and sectional political combinations would be formed with the newly admitted foreign states, unnatural and adverse to the peace and prosperity of the country. The civil government, with all the arbitrary powers it might assume, would be unable to control the storm. The usurper would find himself in his proper element; and, after acting the patriot and the hero for a due season, as the only means of rescuing the country from the ruin which he had chiefly contributed to bring upon it, would reluctantly and modestly allow himself to be declared 'Protector of the Commonwealth.'

We are now fully aware of the deep degradation into which the republic would sink itself in the eyes of the whole world, should it annex to its own vast territories other and foreign territories of immense though unknown extent, for the purpose of encouraging the propagation of slavery, and giving aid to the raising of slaves within its own bosom, the very bosom of freedom, to be esported and sold in those unhallowed regions. Although we are fully aware of these fearful evils, and numberless others which would come in their train, yet we do not here dwell upon them; because we are here firmly convinced that the free people of most, and we trust of all these states, will never suffer the admission of the foreign territory of Texas into this Union as a constituent member thereof—will never suffer the integrity of this Republic to be violated, either by the introduction and addition to it of foreign nations or territories, one or many, or by dismemberment of it by the transfer of any one or more of its members to a foreign nation. The people will be aware, that should one foreign state or country be introduced, another and another may be, without end, whether situated in South America, in the West India islands, or in any other part of the world; and that a single foreign state, thus admitted, might have in its power, by holding the balance between contending parties, to wrest their own government from the hands and control of the people, by whom it was established for their own benefit and self-government. We are firmly convinced, that the free people of these states will look upon any attempt to introduce the foreign territory of Texas, or any other foreign territory or nation into this Union, as a constituent member or members thereof, as manifesting a willingness to prostrate the Constitution and dissolve the Union.

Resolved, That His Excellency, the Governor, be requested to forward a copy of the foregoing resolutions to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress, and to each of the Executives of the several states, with a request that the same may be laid before the respective Legislatures of said states."

[The Preamble and Resolutions were unanimously adopted, Nov. 3, 1837.]

3. OHIO.

"Resolved, by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio, That in the name, and on behalf of the people of the State of Ohio, we do hereby SOLEMNLY PROTEST against the annexation of Texas to the Union of these United States.

And be it further resolved, That the Governor be requested to transmit to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress, and to the Governors of each of the States, a copy of the foregoing resolution, with a statement of the votes by which it was passed in each branch of the Legislature."

[Passed by 64 out of 72, the whole number in the House of Representatives—unanomously in the Senate. Feb. 24, 1838.]

4. MASSACHUSETTS.

"Resolves against the annexation of Texas to the United States.

Whereas a proposition to admit into the United States as a constituent member thereof, the foreign nation of Texas, has been recommended by the legislative resolutions of several States, and brought before Congress for its approval and sanction; and whereas such a measure would involve great wrong to Mexico, and otherwise be of evil precedent, injurious to the interests and dishonorable to the character of this country; and whereas its avowed objects are doubly fraught with peril to the prosperity and permanence of this Union, as tending to disturb and destroy the conditions of those compromises and concessions, entered into at the formation of the Constitution, by which the relative weights of different sections and interests were adjusted, and to strengthen and extend the evils of a system which is unjust in itself, in striking contrast with the theory of our institutions, and condemned by the moral sentiment of mankind; and whereas the people of these United States have not granted to any or all of the departments of their Government, but have retained in themselves, the only power adequate to the admission of a foreign nation into this confederacy; therefore,

Resolved, That we, the Senate and House of Representatives, in General Court assembled, do in the name of the people of Massachusetts, earnestly and solemnly protest against the incorporation of Texas into this Union, and declare, that no act done or compact made, for such purpose by the government of the United States, will be binding on the States or the People.

Resolved, That his Excellency the Governor be requested to forward a copy of these resolutions and the accompanying report to the Executive of the United States, and the Executive of each State and also to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress, with a request that they present the resolves to both Houses of Congress."

[Passed MARCH 16, 1838, UNANIMOUSLY, in both Houses.]

* * * * *

5. MICHIGAN.

Whereas, propositions have been made for the annexation of Texas to the United States, with a view to its ultimate incorporation into the Union:

"And whereas, the extension of this General Government over so large a country on the south-west, between which and that of the original states, there is little affinity, and less identity of interest, would tend, in the opinion of this Legislature, greatly to disturb the safe and harmonious operations of the Government of the United States, and put in imminent danger the continuance of this happy Union: Therefore,

Be it resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Michigan, That in behalf, and in the name of the State of Michigan, this Legislature doth hereby dissent from, and solemnly protest against the annexation, for any purpose, to this Union, of Texas, or of any other territory or district of country, heretofore constituting a part of the dominions of Spain in America, lying west or south-west of Louisiana.

And be it further Resolved, by the Authority aforesaid, That the Governor of this State be requested to transmit a copy of the foregoing preamble and resolve, under the great seal of this state, to the President of the United States; also, that he transmit one copy thereof, authenticated in manner aforesaid, to the President of the Senate of the United States, with the respectful request of this Legislature, that the same may be laid before the Senate; also, that he transmit one copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States, authenticated in like manner, with the respectful request of this Legislature, that the same may be laid before the House of Representatives; and also, that he transmit to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress, one copy thereof, together with the Report adopted by this Legislature, and which accompanies said preamble and resolves."

[Passed nearly if not quite unanimously, April 2, 1838].

* * * * *

6. CONNECTICUT.

"Resolved, That we, the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened, do, in the name of the people of this State, solemnly protest against the annexation of Texas to this Union."

[Passed, it is believed, unanimously in both houses.]

* * * * *

(Those which follow were passed by but one branch of the respective Legislatures in which they were introduced.)

7. PENNSYLVANIA.

Resolutions relative to the admission of Texas into the Union.

"Whereas the annexation of Texas to the United States has been advocated and strongly urged by many of our fellow-citizens, particularly in the southern part of our country, and the president of Texas has received authority to open a correspondence with, and appoint, a commissioner to our government to accomplish the object;—And whereas such a measure would bring to us a dangerous extension of territory, with a population generally not desirable, and would probably involve us in war;—And whereas the subject is now pressed upon and agitated in Congress; therefore,

Resolved, &c, That our Senators in Congress be instructed, and our Representatives requested, to use their influence and vote against the annexation of Texas to the territory of the united States.

Resolved, That the Governor transmit to each of our Senators and Representatives a copy of the foregoing preamble and resolutions."

[Passed the Senate March 9, 1835, by 22 to 6. Postponed indefinitely in the House of Representatives, April 13, by 41 to 39.]

* * * * *

8. MAINE.

"Resolved, That the Legislature of the State of Maine, on behalf of the people of said state, do earnestly and solemnly protest against the annexation of the Republic of Texas to these United States; and that our Senators and Representatives in Congress be, and they hereby are, requested to exert their utmost influence to prevent the adoption of a measure at once so clearly unconstitutional, and so directly calculated to disturb our foreign relations, to destroy our domestic peace, and to dismember our blessed Union."

[Passed in the House of Representatives, March 22, 1838, by 85 to 30. Senate (same day) refused to concur by 11 to 10.]

* * * * *

9. NEW-YORK.

"Resolved, (if the Senate concur,) That the admission of the Republic of Texas into this Union would be entirely repugnant to the will of the people of this state, and would endanger the union of these United States.

Resolved, (if the Senate concur,) That this Legislature do, in the name of the people of the State of New York, solemnly protest against the admission of the Republic of Texas into this Union.

Resolved, (if the Senate concur.) That his Excellency the Governor be requested to transmit a copy of the foregoing resolutions to each of our Senators and Representatives in Congress, and also to the governors of each of the United States, with a request that the same be laid before their respective Legislatures."

[These resolutions passed the House of Representatives in April, by a large majority—the newspapers say, 83 to 13. They were indefinitely postponed in the Senate, by a vote of 21 to 9.]

* * * * *

APPENDIX G.

The number of petitioners for abolition in the District of Columbia, and on other subjects allied to it, have been ascertained (in the House of Representatives) to be as follows:—

Men. Women. Total. For abolition in the District, 51,366 78,882 130,248 Against the annexation of Texas, 104,973 77,419 182,392 Rescinding the gag resolution, 21,015 10,821 31,836 Against admitting any new slave state, 11,770 10,391 22,161 For abolition of the slave-trade between the states, 11,864 11,541 23,405 For abolition of slavery in the territories, 9,129 12,083 21,212 At the extra session for rescinding the gag resolution of Jan. 21, 1837, 3,377 3,377 —————————————— Total, 213,494 201,137 414,631

The number in the Senate, where some difficulty was interposed that prevented its being taken, is estimated to have been about two-thirds as great as that in the House.

* * * * *

APPENDIX H.

[On the 1st of December, one of the secretaries of the American Anti-Slavery Society addressed a note to each of the Governors of the slave states, in which he informed them, in courteous and respectful terms, that he had directed the Publishing Agent of this society, thereafter regularly to transmit to them, free of charge, the periodical publications issued from the office of the society. To this offer the following replies were received:—]

GOVERNOR CAMPBELL'S LETTER.

JAMES G. BIRNEY, Esq., New York

"RICHMOND, Dec. 4, 1837.

SIR,—I received, by yesterday's mail, your letter of the 1st instant, in which you state that you had directed the publishing agent of the American Anti-Slavery Society, hereafter, regularly to transmit, free of charge, by mail, to all the governors of the slave states, the periodical publications issued from that office.

Regarding your society as highly mischievous, I decline receiving any communications from it, and must request that no publications from your office be transmitted to me.

I am, &c,

DAVID CAMPBELL."

* * * * *

GOVERNOR BAGBY'S LETTER.

"TUSCALOOSA, Jan. 6, 1838

SIR,—I received, by due course of mail, your favor of the 1st of December, informing me that you had directed the publishing agent of the American Anti-Slavery Society to forward to the governors of the slaveholding states the periodicals issued from that office. Taking it for granted, that the only object which the society or yourself could have in view, in adopting this course, is, the dissemination of the opinions and principles of the society—having made up my own opinion, unalterably, in relation to the whole question of slavery, as it exists in a portion of the United States, and feeling confident that, in the correctness of this opinion, I am sustained by the entire free white population of Alabama, as well as the great body of the people of this Union, I must, with the greatest respect for yourself, personally but not for the opinions or principles advocated by the society—positively decline receiving said publications, or any others of a similar character, either personally or officially. Indeed, it is presuming a little too much, to expect that the chief magistrate of a free people, elected by themselves, would hold correspondence or give currency to the publications of an organized society, openly engaged in a scheme fraught with more mischievous consequences to their interest and repose, than any that the wit or folly of mankind has heretofore devised.

I am, very respectfully,

Your ob't servant,

A.P. BAGBY"

JAMES G. BIRNEY, Esq., New York.

* * * * *

GOVERNOR CANNON'S LETTER.

[This letter required so many alterations to bring it up to the ordinary standard of epistolary, grammatical, and orthographical accuracy, that it is thought best to give it in word and letter, precisely as it was received at the office.]

"EXECUTIVE DEPT.—

NASHVILLE. Dec. 12th, 1837.

Sir

I have rec'd yours of the 1st Inst notifying me, that you had directed, your periodical publications, on the subject of Slavery to be sent to me free of charge &c—and you are correct, if sincere, in your views, in supposing that we widely differ, on this subject, we do indeed widely differ, on it, if the publications said to have emanated from you, are honest and sincere, which, I admit, is possible.

My opinions are fix'd and settled, and I seldom Look into or examine, the, different vague notions of others who write and theorise on that subject. Hence I trust you will not expect me to examine, what you have printed on this subject, or cause to have printed. If you or any other man are influenced by feelings of humanity, and are laboring to relieve the sufferings, of the human race, you may find objects enough immediately around you, where you are, in any nonslaveholding State, to engage your, attention, and all your exertions, in that good cause.

But if your aim is to make a flourish on the subject, before the world, and to gain yourself some notoriety, or distinction, without, doing good to any, and evil to many, of the human race, you are, pursuing the course calculated to effect. Such an object, in which no honest man need envy. Your honours, thus gaind, I know there are many such in our country, but would fain hope, you are not one of them. If you have Lived, as you state forty years in a Slave holding State, you know that, that class of its population, are not the most, miserable, degraded, or unhappy, either in their feelings or habits, You know they are generally governd, and provided for by men of information and understanding sufficient to guard them against the most, odious vices, and hibets of the country, from which, you know the slaves are in a far greater degree, exempt than, are other portions of the population. That the slaves are the most happy, moral and contented generally, and free from suffering of any kind, having, each full confidence, in his masters, skill means and disposition to provide well for him, knowing also at the same time that it is his interest to do it. Hence in this State of Society more than any other, Superior intelligence has the ascendency, in governing and provideing, for the wants of those inferior, also in giveing direction to their Labour, and industry, as should be the case, superior intelligence Should govern, when united with Virtue, and interest, that great predominating principle in all human affairs. It is my rule of Life, when I see any man labouring to produce effects, at a distance from him, while neglecting the objects immediately around him, (in doing good) to suspect his sincerity, to suspect him for some selfish, or sinister motive, all is not gold that glitters, and every man is not what he, endeavours to appear to be, is too well known. It is the duty of masters to take care of there slaves and provide for them, and this duty I believe is as generally and as fully complyd with as any other duty enjoind on the human family, for next to their children their own offspring, their slaves stand next foremost in their care and attention, there are indeed very few instances of a contrary character.

You can find around you, I doubt not a large number of persons intemix'd, in your society, who are entirely destitute of that care, and attention, towards them that is enjoyed by our slaves, and who are destitute of that deep feeling of interest, in guarding their morals and habits, and directing them through Life in all things, which is here enjoyd by our slaves, to those let your efforts be directed immediately around you and do not trouble with your vague speculations those who are contented and happy, at a distance from you.

Very respectfully yours,

N. CANNON."

Mr. JAS. G. BIRNEY, Cor. Sec. &c.

* * * * *

[The letter of the Secretary to the governor of South Carolina was not answered, but was so inverted and folded as to present the subscribed name of the secretary, as the superscription of the same letter to be returned. The addition of New York to the address brought it back to this office.

Whilst governor Butler was thus refusing the information that was proffered to him in the most respectful terms from this office, he was engaged in another affair, having connection with the anti-slavery movement, as indiscreet, as it was unbecoming the dignity of the office he holds. The following account of it is from one of the Boston papers:—]

"Hoaxing a Governor.—The National Aegis says, that Hollis Parker, who was sentenced to the state prison at the late term of the criminal court for Worcester county, for endeavoring to extort money from governor Everett, had opened an extensive correspondence, previous to his arrest, with similar intent, with other distinguished men of the country. Besides several individuals in New York, governor Butler, of South Carolina, was honored with his notice. A letter from that gentleman, directed to Parker, was lately received at the post office in a town near Worcester, enclosing a check for fifty dollars. So far as the character of Parker's letter can be inferred from the reply of governor Butler, it would appear, that Parker informed the governor, that the design was entertained by some of our citizens, of transmitting to South Carolina a quantity of 'incendiary publications,' and that with the aid of a little money, he (Parker) would be able to unravel the plot, and furnish full information concerning it to his excellency. The bait took, and the money was forwarded, with earnest appeals to Parker to be vigilant and active in thoroughly investigating the supposed conspiracy against the peace and happiness of the South.

The Aegis has the following very just remarks touching this case:—'Governor Butler belongs to a state loud in its professions of regard for state rights and state sovereignty. We, also, are sincere advocates of that good old republican doctrine. It strikes us, that it would have comported better with the spirit of that doctrine, the dignity, of his own station and character, the respect and courtesy due to a sovereign and independent state, if governor Butler had made the proper representation, if the subject was deserving of such notice, to the acknowledged head and constituted authorities of that state, instead of holding official correspondence with a citizen of a foreign jurisdiction, and employing a secret agent and informer, whose very offer of such service was proof of the base and irresponsible character of him who made it.'"

* * * * *

GOVERNOR CONWAY'S LETTER.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, March 1, 1838.

Sir—A newspaper, headed 'The Emancipator,' in which you are announced the 'publishing agent,' has, for some weeks past, arrived at the post office in this city, to my address. Not having subscribed, or authorized any individual to give my name as a subscriber, for that or any such paper, it is entirely gratuitous on the part of its publishers to send me a copy; and not having a favorable opinion of the intentions of the authors and founders of the 'American Anti-Slavery Society;' I have to request a discontinuance of 'The Emancipator.'

Your ob't servant, "J.S. CONWAY."

R. G. WILLIAMS, Esq., New York.

* * * * *

[NOTE.—The following extract of a letter, from the late Chief Justice Jay to the late venerable Elias Boudinot, dated Nov. 17, 1819, might well have formed part of Appendix E. Its existence, however, was not known till it was too late to insert it in its most appropriate place. It shows the view taken of some of the constitutional questions by a distinguished jurist,—one of the purest patriots too, by whom our early history was illustrated.]

"Little can be added to what has been said and written on the subject of slavery. I concur in the opinion, that it ought not to be introduced, nor permitted in any of the new states; and that it ought to be gradually diminished, and finally, abolished, in all of them.

To me, the constitutional authority of the Congress to prohibit the migration and importation of slaves into any of the states, does not appear questionable.

The first article of the Constitution specifics the legislative powers committed to Congress. The ninth section of that article has these words:—'The migration or importation of such persons as any of the now existing states shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808—but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation not exceeding ten dollars for each person.'

I understand the sense and meaning of this clause to be, That the power of the Congress, although competent to prohibit such migration and importation, was not to be exercised with respect to the THEN existing states, and them only, until the year 1808; but that Congress were at liberty to make such prohibition as to any new state which might in the meantime be established. And further, that from and after that period, they were authorized to make such prohibition as to all the states, whether new or old.

Slaves were the persons intended. The word slaves was avoided, on account of the existing toleration of slavery, and its discordancy with the principles of the Revolution; and from a consciousness of its being repugnant to those propositions to the Declaration of Independence:—'We hold these truths to be self-evident—that all men are created equal—that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights—and that, among these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.'"

* * * * *



NO. 9.

THE ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER.

* * * * *

LETTER

OF

GERRIT SMITH,

TO

HON. HENRY CLAY.

* * * * *

NEW YORK:

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, NO. 143 NASSAU STREET. ——- 1839.

* * * * * This No. contains 3-1/2 sheets.—Postage, under 100 miles, 6 cts. over 100, 10 cts.

Please Read and circulate.



LETTER.

* * * * *

PETERBORO, MARCH 21, 1839.

HON. HENRY CLAY:

DEAR SIR,

In the Annual Meeting of the American Colonization Society, held in the Capitol in the city of Washington, December, 1835, you commented on a speech made by myself, the previous autumn. Your objections to that speech formed the principal subject matter of your remarks. Does not this fact somewhat mitigate the great presumption of which I feel myself guilty, in undertaking, all unhonored and humble as I am, to review the production of one of the most distinguished statesmen of the age?

Until the appearance of your celebrated speech on the subject of slavery, I had supposed that you cherished a sacred regard for the right of petition. I now find, that you value it no more highly than they do, who make open war upon it. Indeed, you admit, that, in relation to this right, "there is no substantial difference between" them and yourself. Instead of rebuking, you compliment them; and, in saying that "the majority of the Senate" would not "violate the right of petition in any case, in which, according to its judgment, the object of the petition could be safely or properly granted," you show to what destructive conditions you subject this absolute right. Your doctrine is, that in those cases, where the object of the petition is such, as the supplicated party can approve, previously to any discussion of its merits—there, and there only, exists the right of petition. For aught I see, you are no more to be regarded as the friend of this right, than is the conspicuous gentleman[A] who framed the Report on that subject, which was presented to the Senate of my state the last month. That gentleman admits the sacredness of "the right to petition on any subject;" and yet, in the same breath, he insists on the equal sacredness of the right to refuse to attend to a petition. He manifestly failed to bear in mind, that a right to petition implies the correlative right to be heard. How different are the statesmen, who insist "on the right to refuse to attend to a petition," from Him, who says, "Whoso stoppeth his ears at the cry of the poor, he also shall cry himself, but shall not be heard." And who are poor, if it be not those for whom the abolitionists cry? They must even cry by proxy. For, in the language of John Quincy Adams, the champion of the right of petition, "The slave is not permitted to cry for mercy—to plead for pardon—to utter the shriek of perishing nature for relief." It may be well to remark, that the error, which I have pointed out in the Report in question, lies in the premises of the principal argument of that paper; and that the correction of this error is necessarily attended with the destruction of the premises, and with the overthrow of the argument, which is built upon them.

[Footnote A: Colonel Young.]

I surely need not stop to vindicate the right of petition. It is a natural right—one that human laws can guarantee, but can neither create nor destroy. It is an interesting fact, that the Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which guarantees the right of petition, was opposed in the Congress of 1789 as superfluous. It was argued, that this is "a self-evident, inalienable right, which the people possess," and that "it would never be called in question." What a change in fifty years!

You deny the power of Congress to abolish the inter-state traffic in human beings; and, inasmuch as you say, that the right "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states," does not include the right to prohibit and destroy commerce; and, inasmuch as it is understood, that it was in virtue of the right to regulate commerce, that Congress enacted laws to restrain our participation in the "African slave trade," you perhaps also deny, that Congress had the power to enact such laws. The history of the times in which the Federal Constitution was framed and adopted, justifies the belief, that the clause of that instrument under consideration conveys the power, which Congress exercised. For instance, Governor Randolph, when speaking in the Virginia Convention of 1788, of the clause which declares, that "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808," said, "This is an exception from the power of regulating commerce, and the restriction is to continue only till 1808. Then Congress can, by the exercise of that power, prevent future importations."

Were I, however, to admit that the right "to regulate commerce," does not include the right to prohibit and destroy commerce, it nevertheless would not follow, that Congress might not prohibit or destroy certain branches of commerce. It might need to do so, in order to preserve our general commerce with a state or nation. So large a proportion of the cloths of Turkey might be fraught with the contagion of the plague, as to make it necessary for our Government to forbid the importation of all cloths from that country, and thus totally destroy one branch of our commerce with it, to the end that the other branches might be preserved. No inconsiderable evidence that Congress has the right to prohibit or destroy a branch of commerce, is to be found in the fact, that it has done so. From March, 1794, to May, 1820, it enacted several laws, which went to prohibit or destroy, and, in the end, did prohibit or destroy the trade of this country with Africa in human beings. And, if Congress has the power to pass embargo laws, has it not the power to prohibit or destroy commerce altogether?

It is, however, wholly immaterial, whether Congress could prohibit our participation in the "African slave trade," in virtue of the clause which empowers it "to regulate commerce." That the Constitution does, in some one or more of its passages, convey the power, is manifest from the testimony of the Constitution itself. The first clause of the ninth section says: "The migration or importation of such persons, as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to they year 1808." Now the implication in this clause of the existence of the power in question, is as conclusive, as would be the express and positive grant of it. You will observe, too, that the power of Congress over "migration or importation," which this clause implies, is a power not merely to "regulate," as you define the word, but to "prohibit."

It is clear, then, that Congress had the power to interdict our trade in human beings with Africa. But, in view of what has been said on that point—in view of the language of the Federal Constitution—of the proceedings of the Convention, which framed it—and of the cotemporary public sentiment—is it any less clear, that Congress has the power to interdict the inter-state traffic in human beings?

There are some, who assert that the words "migration" and "importation," instead of referring, as I maintain they do—the former to the removal of slaves from state to state, and the latter to their introduction from Africa—are used in the Constitution as synonyms, and refer exclusively to the "African slave trade." But there is surely no ground for the imputation of such utter tautology, if we recollect that the Constitution was written by scholars, and that remarkable pains were taken to clear it of all superfluous words—a Committee having been appointed for that special purpose. But, it may be asked, Why, in reference to the taking of slaves from one state to another, use the word "migration," which denotes voluntary removal? One answer is—that it can be used with as much propriety in that case, as in the removal of slaves from Africa—the removal in the one case being no less involuntary than in the other. Another answer is—that the framers of the Constitution selected the word "migration," because of its congruity with that of "persons," under which their virtuous shame sought to conceal from posterity the existence of seven hundred thousand slaves amongst a people, who had but recently entered upon their national career, with the solemn declaration, that "all men are created equal."

John Jay, whose great celebrity is partly owing to his very able expositions of the Constitution, says: "To me, the constitutional authority of the Congress to prohibit the migration and importation of slaves into any of the states, does not appear questionable." If the disjunctive between "migration" and "importation" in the Constitution, argues their reference to the same thing, Mr. Jay's copulative argues more strongly, that, in his judgment, they refer to different things.

The law of Congress constituting the "Territory of Orleans," was enacted in 1804. It fully recognizes the power of that body to prohibit the trade in slaves between a territory and the states. But, if Congress had this power, why had it not as clear a power to prohibit, at that time, the trade in slaves between any two of the states? It might have prohibited it, but for the constitutional suspension of the exercise of the power. The term of that suspension closed, however, in 1808; and, since that year, Congress has had as full power to abolish the whole slave trade between the states, as it had in 1804 to abolish the like trade between the Territory of Orleans and the states.

But, notwithstanding the conclusive evidence, that the Constitution empowers Congress to abolish the inter-state slave trade, it is incomprehensible to many, that such states as Virginia and Maryland should have consented to deprive themselves of the benefit of selling their slaves into other states. It is incomprehensible, only because they look upon such states in the light of their present character and present interests. It will no longer be so, if they will bear in mind, that slave labor was then, as it is now, unprofitable for ordinary agriculture, and that Whitney's cotton-gin, which gave great value to such labor, was not yet invented, and that the purchase of Louisiana, which has had so great an effect to extend and perpetuate the dominion of slavery, was not yet made. It will no longer be incomprehensible to them, if they will recollect, that, at the period in question, American slavery was regarded as a rapidly decaying, if not already expiring institution. It will no longer be so, if they will recollect, how small was the price of slaves then, compared with their present value; and that, during the ten years, which followed the passage of the Act of Virginia in 1782, legalizing manumissions, her citizens emancipated slaves to the number of nearly one-twentieth of the whole amount of her slaves in that year. To learn whether your native Virginia clung in the year 1787 to the inter-state traffic in human flesh, we must take our post of observation, not amongst her degenerate sons, who, in 1836, sold men, women, and children, to the amount of twenty-four millions of dollars—not amongst her President Dews, who write books in favor of breeding human stock for exportation—but amongst her Washingtons, and Jeffersons, and Henrys, and Masons, who, at the period when the Constitution was framed, freely expressed their abhorrence of slavery.

But, however confident you may be, that Congress has not the lawful power to abolish the branch of commerce in question; nevertheless, would the abolition of it be so clearly and grossly unconstitutional, as to justify the contempt with which the numerous petitions for the measure are treated, and the impeachment of their fidelity to the Constitution, and of their patriotism and purity, which the petitioners are made to endure?

I was about to take it for granted, that, although you deny the power of Congress to abolish the inter-state traffic in human beings, you do not justify the traffic—when I recollected the intimation in your speech, that there is no such traffic. For, when you speak of "the slave trade between the states," and add—"or, as it is described in abolition petitions, the traffic in human beings between the states"—do you not intimate there is no such traffic? Whence this language? Do you not believe slaves are human beings? And do you not believe that they suffer under the disruption of the dearest earthly ties, as human beings suffer? I will not detain you to hear what we of the North think of this internal slave trade. But I will call your attention to what is thought of it in your own Kentucky and in your native Virginia. Says the "Address of the Presbyterian Synod of Kentucky to the Churches in 1835:"—"Brothers and sisters, parents and children, husbands and wives, are torn asunder, and permitted to see each other no more. Those acts are daily occurring in the midst of us. The shrieks and the agony often witnessed on such occasions, proclaim with a trumpet tongue the iniquity and cruelty of the system. There is not a neighborhood where these heart-rending scenes are not displayed. There is not a village or road that does not behold the sad procession of manacled outcasts, whose chains and mournful countenances tell that they are exiled by force from all that their hearts hold dear." Says Thomas Jefferson Randolph, in the Virginia Legislature in 1832, when speaking of this trade: "It is a practice, and an increasing practice, in parts of Virginia, to rear slaves for market. How can an honourable mind, a patriot, and a lover of his country, bear to see this ancient dominion, rendered illustrious by the noble devotion and patriotism of her sons in the cause of liberty, converted into one grand menagerie, where men are to be reared for the market like oxen for the shambles. Is it better—is it not worse than the (foreign) slave trade—that trade which enlisted the labor of the good and wise of every creed and every clime to abolish? The (foreign) trader receives the slave, a stranger in language, aspect, and manner, from the merchant who has brought him from the interior. The ties of father, mother, husband, and child, have already been rent in twain; before he receives him, his soul has become callous. But here, sir, individuals whom the master has known from infancy, whom he has seen sporting in the innocent gambols of childhood—who have been accustomed to look to him for protection, he tears from the mother's arms, and sells into a strange country—among strange people, subject to cruel taskmasters."

You are in favor of increasing the number of slave states. The terms of the celebrated "Missouri compromise" warrant, in your judgment, the increase. But, notwithstanding you admit, that this unholy compromise, in which tranquillity was purchased at the expense of humanity and righteousness, does not "in terms embrace the case," and "is not absolutely binding and obligatory;" you, nevertheless, make no attempt whatever to do away any one of the conclusive objections, which are urged against such increase. You do not attempt to show how the multiplication of slave states can consist with the constitutional duty of the "United States to guarantee to every state in the Union a republican form of government," any more than if it were perfectly clear, that a government is republican under which one half of the people are lawfully engaged in buying and selling the other half; or than if the doctrine that "all men are created equal" were not the fundamental and distinctive doctrine of a republican government. You no more vindicate the proposition to enlarge the realm of slavery, than if the proposition were as obviously in harmony with, as it is opposed to the anti-slavery tenor and policy of the Constitution—the rights of man—and the laws of God.

You are perhaps of the number of those, who, believing, that a state can change its Constitution as it pleases, deem it futile in Congress to require, that States, on entering the Union, shall have anti-slavery Constitutions. The Framers of the Federal Constitution doubtless foresaw the possibility of treachery, on the part of the new States, in the matter of slavery: and the restriction in that instrument to the old States—"the States now existing"—of the right to participate in the internal and "African slave trade" may be ascribed to the motive of diminishing, if not indeed of entirely preventing, temptation to such treachery. The Ordinance concerning the North-west Territory, passed by the Congress of 1787, and ratified by the Congress of 1790, shows, so far as those bodies can be regarded as correct interpreters of the Constitution which was framed in 1787, and adopted in 1789, that slavery was not to have a constitutional existence in the new States. The Ordinance continues the privilege of recapturing fugitive slaves in the North-west Territory to the "existing States." Slaves in that territory, to be the subjects of lawful recapture, must in the language of the Ordinance, owe "labour or service in one of the original States."

I close what I have to say on this topic, with the remark, that were it admitted, that the reasons for the increase of the number of slave States are sound and satisfactory, it nevertheless would not follow, that the moral and constitutional wrong of preventing that increase is so palpable, as to justify the scorn and insult, which are heaped by Congress upon this hundred thousand petitioners for this measure.

It has hitherto been supposed, that you distinctly and fully admitted the Constitutional power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. But, on this point, as on that of the right of petition, you have for reasons known to yourself, suddenly and greatly changed your tone. Whilst your speech argues, at no small length, that Congress has not the right to abolish slavery in the District, all that it says in favor of the Constitutional power to abolish it, is that "the language (of the Constitution) may possibly be sufficiently comprehensive to include a power of abolition." "Faint praise dams;" and your very reluctant and qualified concession of the Constitutional power under consideration, is to be construed, rather as a denial than a concession.

Until I acquire the skill of making white whiter, and black blacker, I shall have nothing to say in proof of the Constitutional power of Congress over slavery in the District of Columbia, beyond referring to the terms, in which the Constitution so plainly conveys this power. That instrument authorises Congress "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District." If these words do not confer the power, it is manifest that no words could confer it. I will add that, never, until the last few years, had doubts been expressed, that these words do fully confer that power.

You will, perhaps, say, that Virginia and Maryland made their cessions of the territory, which constitutes the District of Columbia, with reservations on the subject of slavery. We answer, that none were expressed;[A] and that if there had been, Congress would not, and in view of the language of the Constitution, could not, have accepted the cessions. You may then say, that they would not have ceded the territory, had it occurred to them, that Congress would have cleared it of slavery; and that, this being the fact, Congress could not thus clear it, without being guilty of bad faith, and of an ungenerous and unjustifiable surprise on those States. There are several reasons for believing, that those States, not only did not, at the period in question, cherish a dread of the abolition of slavery; but that the public sentiment within them was decidedly in favor of its speedy abolition. At that period, their most distinguished statesmen were trumpet-tongued against slavery. At that period, there was both a Virginia and a Maryland society "for promoting the abolition of slavery;" and, it was then, that, with the entire consent of Virginia and Maryland, effectual measures were adopted to preclude slavery from that large territory, which has since given Ohio and several other States to the Union. On this subject, as on that of the inter-state slave trade, we misinterpret Virginia and Maryland, by not considering, how unlike was their temper in relation to slavery, amidst the decays and dying throes of that institution half a century ago, to what it is now, when slavery is not only revivified, but has become the predominant interest and giant power of the nation. We forget, that our whole country was, at that time, smitten with love for the holy cause of impartial and universal liberty. To judge correctly of the view, which our Revolutionary fathers took of oppression, we must go back and stand by their side, in their struggles against it,—we must survey them through the medium of the anti-slavery sentiment of their own times, and not impute to them the pro-slavery spirit so rampant in ours.

[Footnote A: There is a proviso in the Act of Virginia. It was on this, that three years ago, in the Senate of the United States, Benjamin Watkins Leigh built his argument against the constitutional power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. I well remember that you then denied the soundness of his argument. This superfluous proviso virtually forbids Congress to pass laws, which shall "affect the rights of individuals" in the ceded territory. Amongst the inviolable "rights" was that of holding slaves, as Mr. Leigh contended. I regret, that, in replying to him, you did not make use of the fact, that all the members of Congress from Virginia voted in favor of the Ordinance, which abolished slavery in the North-West Territory; and this too, notwithstanding, that, in the Act of 1784, by which she ceded the North-West Territory to the Confederacy, she provided, that the "citizens of Virginia" in the said Territory, many of whom held slaves, should "be protected in the enjoyment of their rights." This fact furnishes striking evidence that at, or about, the time of the cession by Virginia of her portion of the District of Columbia, her statesmen believed, that the right to hold slaves in those portions of our country under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, was not beyond the reach of the controlling power of Congress.]

I will, however, suppose it true, that Virginia and Maryland would not have made the cessions in question, had they foreseen, that Congress would abolish slavery in the District of Columbia:—and yet, I affirm, that it would be the duty of Congress to abolish it. Had there been State Prisons in the territory, at the time Congress acquired jurisdiction over it, and had Congress immediately opened their doors, and turned loose hundreds of depraved and bloody criminals, there would indeed have been abundant occasion for complaint. But, had the exercise of its power in the premises extended no farther than to the liberation of such convicts, as, on a re-examination of their cases, were found to be clearly guiltless of the crimes charged upon them; the sternest justice could not have objected to such an occasion for the rejoicing of mercy. And are not the thousands in the District, for whose liberation Congress is besought, unjustly deprived of their liberty? Not only are they guiltless, but they are even unaccused of such crimes, as in the judgment of any, justly work a forfeiture of liberty. And what do Virginia and Maryland ask? Is it, that Congress shall resubject to their control those thousands of deeply wronged men? No—for this Congress cannot do. They ask, that Congress shall fulfil the tyrant wishes of these States. They ask, that the whole people of the United States—those who hate, as well as those who love slavery, shall, by their representatives, assume the guilty and awful responsibility of perpetuating the enslavement of their innocent fellow men:—of chaining the bodies and crushing the wills, and blotting out the minds of such, as have neither transgressed, nor even been accused of having transgressed, a single human law. And the crime, which Virginia and Maryland, and they, who sympathise with them, would have the nation perpetrate, is, not simply that of prolonging the captivity of those, who were slaves before the cession—for but a handful of them are now remaining in the District. Most of the present number became slaves under the authority of this guilty nation. Their wrongs originated with Congress: and Congress is asked, not only to perpetuate their oppression, but to fasten the yoke of slavery on generations yet unborn.

There are those, who advocate the recession of the District of Columbia. If the nation were to consent to this, without having previously exercised her power to "break every yoke" of slavery in the District, the blood of those so cruelly left there in "the house of bondage," would remain indelible and damning upon her skirts:—and this too, whether Virginia and Maryland did or did not intend to vest Congress with any power over slavery. It is enough, that the nation has the power "to deliver them that are drawn unto death, and those that are ready to be slain," to make her fearfully guilty before God, if she "forbear" to exercise it.

Suppose, I were to obtain a lease of my neighbor's barn for the single and express purpose of securing my crops; and that I should find, chained up in one of its dark corners, an innocent fellow man, whom that neighbor was subjecting to the process of a lingering death; ought I to pause and recall President Wayland's, "Limitations of Human Responsibility," and finally let the poor sufferer remain in his chains; or ought I not rather, promptly to respond to the laws of my nature and my nature's God, and let him go free? But, to make this case analogous to that we have been considering—to that, which imposes its claims on Congress—we must strike out entirely the condition of the lease, and with it all possible doubts of my right to release the victim of my neighbor's murderous hate.

I am entirely willing to yield, for the sake of argument, that Virginia and Maryland, when ceding the territory which constitutes the District of Columbia, did not anticipate, and did not choose the abolition of slavery in it. To make the admission stronger, I will allow, that these States were, at the time of the cession, as warmly opposed to the abolition of slavery in the District as they are said to be now: and to make it stronger still, I will allow, that the abolition of slavery in the District would prove deeply injurious, not only to Virginia and Maryland but to the nation at large. And, after all these admissions, I must still insist, that Congress is under perfectly plain moral obligation to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.

They, who are deterred from favoring the abolition of slavery in the District by the apprehension, that Virginia and Maryland, if not, indeed, the nation at large, might suffer injurious consequences from the measure, overlook the fact, that there is a third party in the case. It is common to regard the nation as constituting one of the parties—Virginia and Maryland another, and the only other. But in point of fact, there is a third party. Of what does it consist? Of horses, oxen, and other brutes? Then we need not be greatly concerned about it—since its rights in that case, would be obviously subordinate to those of the other parties. Again, if such be the composition of this third party, we are not to be greatly troubled, that President Wayland and thousands of others entirely overlook its rights and interests; though they ought to be somewhat mindful even of brutes. But, this third party is composed, not of brutes—but of men—of the seven thousand men in the District, who have fallen under the iron hoofs of slavery—and who, because they are men, have rights equal to, and as sacred as the rights of any other men—rights, moreover, which cannot be innocently encroached on, even to the breadth of one hair, whether under the plea of "state necessity"—of the perils of emancipation—or under any other plea, which conscience-smitten and cowardly tyranny can suggest.

If these lines shall ever be so favored, as to fall under the eye of the venerable and beloved John Quincy Adams, I beg, that, when he shall have read them, he will solemnly inquire of his heart, whether, if he should ever be left to vote against the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and thus stab deeply the cause of civil liberty, of humanity, and of God; the guilty act would not result from overlooking the rights and interests, and even the existence itself, of a third party in the case—and from considering the claims of the nation and those of Virginia and Maryland, as the only claims on which he was called to pass, because they were the claims of the only parties, of which he was aware.

You admit that "the first duty of Congress in relation to the District, of Columbia, is to render it available, comfortable, and convenient as a seat of the government of the whole Union." I thank you for an admission, which can be used, with great effect, against the many, who maintain, that Congress is as much bound to consult the interests and wishes of the inhabitants of the District, and be governed by them, as a State Legislature is to study and serve the interests and wishes of its constituents. The inhabitants of the District have taken up their residence in it, aware, that the paramount object of Congressional legislation is not their, but the nation's advantage. They judge, that their disfranchisement and the other disadvantages attending their residence are more than balanced by their favorable position for participating in Governmental patronage and other benefits. They know, that they have no better right to complain, that the legislation of Congress is not dictated by a primary regard to their interests, than has the Colonization Society, of which you are President, to complain, that the Capitol, in which it holds its annual meetings, is not constructed and fitted up in the best possible manner for such occasions. They know, that to sacrifice the design and main object of that building to its occasional and incidental uses, would be an absurdity no greater than would Congress be guilty of in shaping its legislation to the views of the thirty thousand white inhabitants of the District of Columbia, at the expense of neglecting the will and interests of the nation.

You feel, that there is no hazard in your admission, that the paramount object in relation to the District of Columbia, is its suitableness for a seat of Government, since you accompany that admission with the denial, that the presence of slavery interferes with such suitableness. But is it not a matter of deep regret, that the place, in which our national laws are made—that the place from which the sentiment and fashion of the whole country derive so much of their tone and direction—should cherish a system, which you have often admitted, is at war with the first principles of our religion and civil polity;[A] and the influences of which are no less pervading and controlling than corrupting? Is it not a matter of deep regret, that they, whom other governments send to our own, and to whom, on account of their superior intellect and influence, it is our desire, as it is our duty, to commend our free institutions, should be obliged to learn their lessons of practical republicanism amidst the monuments and abominations of slavery? Is it no objection to the District of Columbia, as the seat of our Government, that slavery, which concerns the political and moral interests of the nation, more than any other subject coming within the range of legislation, is not allowed to be discussed there—either within or without the Halls of Congress? It is one of the doctrines of slavery, that slavery shall not be discussed. Some of its advocates are frank enough to avow, as the reason for this prohibition, that slavery cannot bear to be discussed. In your speech before the American Colonization Society in 1835, to which I have referred, you distinctly take the ground, that slavery is a subject not open to general discussion. Very far am I from believing, that you would employ, or intentionally countenance violence, to prevent such discussion. Nevertheless, it is to this doctrine of non-discussion, which you and others put forth, that the North is indebted for her pro-slavery mobs, and the South for her pro-slavery Lynchings. The declarations of such men as Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun, that slavery is a question not to be discussed, are a license to mobs to burn up halls and break up abolition meetings, and destroy abolition presses, and murder abolition editors. Had such men held the opposite doctrine, and admitted, yea, and insisted, as it was their duty to do, that every question in morals and politics is a legitimate subject of free discussion—the District of Columbia would be far less objectionable, as the seat of our Government. In that case the lamented Dr. Crandall would not have been seized in the city of Washington on the suspicion of being an abolitionist, and thrown into prison, and subjected to distresses of mind and body, which resulted in his premature death. Had there been no slavery in the District, this outrage would not have been committed; and the murders, chargeable on the bloodiest of all bloody institutions, would have been one less than they now are. Talk of the slaveholding District of Columbia being a suitable locality for the seat of our Government! Why, Sir, a distinguished member of Congress was threatened there with an indictment for the crime of presenting, or rather of proposing to present, a petition to the body with which he was connected! Indeed the occasion of the speech, on which I am now commenting, was the impudent protest of inhabitants of that District against the right of the American people to petition their own Congress, in relation to matters of vital importance to the seat of their own Government! I take occasion here to admit, that I have seen but references to this protest—not the protest itself. I presume, that it is not dissimilar, in its spirit, to the petition presented about the same time by Mr. Moore in the other House of Congress—his speech on which, he complains was ungenerously anticipated by yours on the petition presented by yourself. As the petition presented by Mr. Moore is short, I will copy it, that I may say to you with the more effect—how unfit is the spirit of a slaveholding people, as illustrated in this petition, to be the spirit of the people at the seat of a free Government!

[Footnote A: "It (slavery) is a sin and a curse both to the master and the slave:"—Henry Clay.]

"To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States:

The petition of the undersigned, citizens of the District of Columbia represents—That they have witnessed with deep regret the attempts which are making to disturb the integrity of the Union by a BAND OF FANATICS, embracing men, women, and children, who cease not day and night to crowd the tables of your halls with SEDITIOUS MEMORIALS—and solicit your honorable bodies that you will, in your wisdom, henceforth give neither support nor countenance to such UNHALLOWED ATTEMPTS, but that you will, in the most emphatic manner, set the seal of your disapprobation upon all such FOUL AND UNNATURAL EFFORTS, by refusing not only to READ and REFER, but also to RECEIVE any papers which either directly or indirectly, or by implication, aim at any interference with the rights of your petitioners, or of those of any citizen of any of the States or Territories of the United States, or of this District of which we are inhabitants."

A Legislature should be imbued with a free, independent, fearless spirit. But it cannot be, where discussion is overawed and interdicted, or its boundaries at all contracted. Wherever slavery reigns, the freedom of discussion is not tolerated: and whenever slavery exists, there slavery reigns;—reigns too with that exclusive spirit of Turkish despotism, that, "bears no brother near the throne."

You agree with President Wayland, that it is as improper for Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, as to create it in some place in the free States, over which it has jurisdiction. As improper, in the judgment of an eminent statesman, and of a no less eminent divine, to destroy what they both admit to be a system of unrighteousness, as to establish it! As improper to restrain as to practice, a violation of God's law! What will other countries and coming ages think of the politics of our statesmen and the ethics of our divines?

But, besides its immorality, Congress has no Constitutional right to create slavery. You have not yet presumed to deny positively, that Congress has the right to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia; and, notwithstanding the intimation in your speech, you will not presume to affirm, that Congress has the Constitutional right to enact laws reducing to, or holding in slavery, the inhabitants of West Point, or any other locality in the free States, over which it has exclusive jurisdiction. I would here remark, that the law of Congress, which revived the operation of the laws of Virginia and Maryland in the District of Columbia, being, so far as it respects the slave laws of those States, a violation of the Federal Constitution, should be held of no avail towards legalizing slavery in the District—and the subjects of that slavery, should, consequently, be declared by our Courts unconditionally free.

You will admit that slavery is a system of surpassing injustice:—but an avowed object of the Constitution is to "establish justice." You will admit that it utterly annihilates the liberty of its victims:—but another of the avowed objects of the Constitution is to "secure the blessings of liberty." You will admit, that slavery does, and necessarily must, regard its victims as chattels. The Constitution, on the contrary, speaks of them as nothing short of persons. Roger Sherman, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, a framer of the Federal Constitution, and a member of the first Congress under it, denied that this instrument considers slaves "as a species of property." Mr. Madison, in the 54th No. of the Federalist admits, that the Constitution "regards them as inhabitants." Many cases might be cited, in which Congress has, in consonance with the Constitution, refused to recognize slaves as property. It was the expectation, as well as the desire of the framers of the Constitution, that slavery should soon cease to exist is our country; and, but for the laws, which both Congress and the slave States, have, in flagrant violation of the letter and spirit and obvious policy of the Constitution, enacted in behalf of slavery, that vice would, ere this, have disappeared from our land. Look, for instance, at the laws enacted in the fact of the clause: "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States"—laws too, which the States that enacted them, will not consent to repeal, until they consent to abandon slavery. It is by these laws, that they shut out the colored people of the North, the presence of a single individual of whom so alarms them with the prospect of a servile insurrection, that they immediately imprison him. Such was the view of the Federal Constitution taken by James Wilson one of its framers, that, without, as I presume, claiming for Congress any direct power over slavery in the slave States, he declared that it possessed "power to exterminate slavery from within our borders." It was probably under a like view, that Benjamin Franklin, another of its framers, and Benjamin Rush, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and other men of glorious and blessed memory, petitioned the first Congress under the Constitution to "countenance the restoration to liberty of those unhappy men," (the slaves of our country). And in what light that same Congress viewed the Constitution may be inferred from the fact, that, by a special act, it ratified the celebrated Ordinance, by the terms of which slavery was forbidden for ever in the North West Territory. It is worthy of note, that the avowed object of the Ordinance harmonizes with that of the Constitution: and that the Ordinance was passed the same year that the Constitution was drafted, is a fact, on which we can strongly rely to justify a reference to the spirit of the one instrument for illustrating the spirit of the other. What the spirit of the Ordinance is, and in what light they who passed it, regarded "republics, their laws and constitutions," may be inferred from the following declaration in the Ordinance of its grand object: "For extending the fundamental principles of civil and religious liberty, which form the basis wherever these Republics, their laws and constitutions are erected; to fix and establish those principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions, and governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in the said territory, &c.; it is hereby ordained and declared that the following articles, &c." One of these articles is that, which has been referred to, and which declares that "there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Territory."

You will perhaps make light of my reference to James Wilson and Benjamin Franklin, for I recollect you say, that, "When the Constitution was about going into operation, its powers were not well understood by the community at large, and remained to be accurately interpreted and defined." Nevertheless, I think it wise to repose more confidence in the views, which the framers of the Constitution took of the spirit and principles of that instrument, than in the definitions and interpretations of the pro-slavery generation, which has succeeded them.

It should be regarded as no inconsiderable evidence of the anti-slavery genius and policy of the Constitution, that Congress promptly interdicted slavery in the first portion of territory, and that, too, a territory of vast extent, over which it acquired jurisdiction. And is it not a perfectly reasonable supposition, that the seat of our Government would not have been polluted by the presence of slavery, had Congress acted on that subject by itself, instead of losing sight of it in the wholesale legislation, by which the laws of Virginia and Maryland were revived in the District?

If the Federal Constitution be not anti-slavery in its general scope and character; if it be not impregnated with the principles of universal liberty; why was it necessary, in order to restrain Congress, for a limited period, from acting against the slave trade, which is but a branch or incident of slavery, to have a clause to that end in the Constitution? The fact that the framers of the Constitution refused to blot its pages with the word "slave" or "slavery;" and that, by periphrase and the substitution of "persons" for "slaves," they sought to conceal from posterity and the world the mortifying fact, that slavery existed under a government based on the principle, that governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed," contains volumes of proof, that they looked upon American slavery as a decaying institution; and that they would naturally shape the Constitution to the abridgment and the extinction, rather than the extension and perpetuity of the giant vice of the country.

It is not to be denied, that the Constitution tolerates a limited measure of slavery: but it tolerates this measure only as the exception to its rule of impartial and universal liberty. Were it otherwise, the principles of that instrument could be pleaded to justify the holding of men as property, in cases, other than those specifically provided for in it. Were it otherwise, these principles might be appealed to, as well to sanction the enslavement of men, as the capture of wild beasts. Were it otherwise, the American people might be Constitutionally realizing the prophet's declaration: "they all lie in wait for blood: they hunt every man his brother with a net." But mere principles, whether in or out of the Constitution, do not avail to justify and uphold slavery. Says Lord Mansfield in the famous Somerset case: "The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being now introduced by courts of justice upon mere reasoning or inferences from any principles, natural or political; it must take its rise from positive law; the origin of it can in no country or age be traced back to any other source. A case so odious as the condition of slaves, must be taken strictly." Grotius says, that "slavery places man in an unnatural relation to man—a relation which nothing but positive law can sustain." All are aware, that, by the common law, man cannot have property in man; and that wherever that law is not counteracted on this point by positive law, "slaves cannot breathe," and their "shackles fall." I scarcely need add, that the Federal Constitution does, in the main, accord with the common law. In the words of a very able writer: "The common law is the grand element of the United States Constitution. All its fundamental provisions are instinct with its spirit; and its existence, principles, and paramount authority, are presupposed and assumed throughout the whole."

To argue the anti-slavery character of the Federal Constitution, it is not necessary to take the high ground of some, that whatever in the Constitution favors slavery is void, because opposed to the principles and general tenor of that instrument. Much less is it necessary to take the still higher ground, that every law in favor of slavery, in whatever code or connection it may be found, is utterly invalid because of its plain contravention of the law of nature. To maintain my position, that the Constitution is anti-slavery in its general character, and that constitutional slavery is, at the most, but an exception to that general character, it was not necessary to take either of these grounds; though, had I been disposed to take even the higher of them, I should not have lacked the countenance of the most weighty authorities. "The law of nature," says Blackstone, "being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no human laws are of any validity if contrary to this." The same writer says, that "The law of nature requires, that man should pursue his own true and substantial happiness." But that slavery allows this pursuit to its victims, no one will pretend. "There is a law," says Henry Brougham, "above all the enactments of human codes. It is the law written by the finger of God on the heart of man; and by that law, unchangeable and eternal, while men despise fraud, and loathe rapine, and abhor blood, they shall reject with indignation the wild and guilty phantasy, that man can hold property in man."

I add no more to what I have said on the subject of slavery in the District of Columbia, than to ask, as I have done in relation to the inter-state slave trade and the annexation of slave states, whether petitions for its abolition argue so great a contempt of the Constitution, and so entire a recklessness of propriety, as to merit the treatment which they receive at the hands of Congress. Admitting that Congress has not the constitutional power to abolish slavery in the District—admitting that it has not the constitutional power to destroy what itself has established—admitting, too, that if it has the power, it ought not to exercise it;—nevertheless, is the case so perfectly clear, that the petitioners for the measure deserve all the abuse and odium which their representatives in Congress heap upon them? In a word, do not the three classes of petitions to which you refer, merit, at the hands of those representatives, the candid and patient consideration which, until I read your acknowledgment, that, in relation to these petitions, "there is no substantial difference between" yourself and those, who are in favor of thrusting them aside undebated, unconsidered, and even unread, I always supposed you were willing to have bestowed on them?

I pass to the examination of your charges against the abolitionists.

They contemn the "rights of property."

This charge you prefer against the abolitionists, not because they believe that a Legislature has the right to abolish slavery, nor because they deny that slaves are legally property; for this obvious truth they do not deny. But you prefer it, because they believe that man cannot rightfully be a subject of property.

Abolitionists believe, to use words, which I have already quoted, that it is "a wild and guilty phantasy, that man can hold property in man." They believe, that to claim property in the exalted being, whom God has made in His own image, and but "a little lower than the angels," is scarcely less absurd than to claim it in the Creator himself. You take the position, that human laws can rightfully reduce a race of men to property; and that the outrage, to use your own language, is "sanctioned and sanctified" by "two hundred years" continuance of it. Abolitionists, on the contrary, trace back man's inalienable self-ownership to enactments of the Divine Legislator, and to the bright morning of time, when he came forth from the hand of his Maker, "crowned with glory and honor," invested with self-control, and with dominion over the brute and inanimate creation. You soothe the conscience of the slaveholder, by reminding him, that the relation, which he has assumed towards his down-trodden fellow-man, is lawful. The abolitionist protests, that the wickedness of the relation is none the less, because it is legalized. In charging abolitionists with condemning "the rights of property," you mistake the innocent for the guilty party. Were you to be so unhappy as to fall into the hands of a kidnapper, and be reduced to a slave, and were I to remonstrate, though in vain, with your oppressor, who would you think was the despiser of "the rights of property"—myself, or the oppressor? As you would judge in that case, so judges every slave in his similar case.

The man-stealer's complaint, that his "rights of property" in his stolen fellow men are not adequately respected by the abolitionist, recalls to my mind a very similar, and but little more ludicrous case of conscientious regard for the "rights of property." A traveler was plundered of the whole of his large sum of money. He pleaded successfully with the robber for a little of it to enable him to reach his home. But, putting his hand rather deeper into the bag of stolen coins than comported with the views of the robber, he was arrested with the cry, "Why, man, have you no conscience?" You will perhaps inquire, whether abolitionists regard all the slaves of the South as stolen—as well those born at the South, as those, who were confessedly stolen from Africa? I answer, that we do—that every helpless new-born infant, on which the chivalry of the South pounces, is, in our judgment, the owner of itself—that we consider, that the crime of man-stealing which is so terribly denounced in the Bible, does not consist, as is alleged, in stealing a slave from a third person, but in stealing him from himself—in depriving him of self control, and subjecting him, as property, to the absolute control of another. Joseph's declaration, that he "was stolen," favors this definition of man-stealing. Jewish Commentators authorise it. Money, as it does not own itself, cannot be stolen from itself But when we reflect, that man is the owner of himself, it does not surprise us, that wresting away his inalienable rights—his very manhood—should have been called man-stealing.

Whilst on this subject of "the rights of property," I am reminded of your "third impediment to abolition." This "impediment" consists in the fact of the great value of the southern slaves—which, according to your estimation, is not less than "twelve hundred millions of dollars." I will adopt your estimate, and thus spare myself from going into the abhorrent calculation of the worth in dollars and cents of immortal man—of the worth of "the image of God." I thank you for your virtual admission, that this wealth is grasped with a tenacity proportioned to its vast amount. Many of the wisest and best men of the North have been led into the belief that the slaveholders of the South are too humane and generous to hold their slaves fur the sake of gain. Even Dr. Channing was a subject of this delusion; and it is well remembered, that his too favorable opinions of his fellow men, made it difficult to disabuse him of it. Northern Christians have been ready to believe, that the South would give up her slaves, because of her conscious lack of title to them. But in what age of the world have impenitent men failed to cling as closely to that, which they had obtained by fraud, as to their honest acquisitions? Indeed, it is demonstrable on philosophical principles, that the more stupendous the fraud, the more tenacious is the hold upon that, which is gotten by it. I trust, that your admission to which I have just referred, will have no small effect to prevent the Northern apologist for slavery from repeating the remark that the South would gladly liberate her slaves, if she saw any prospect of bettering the condition of the objects of her tender and solicitous benevolence. I trust, too, that this admission will go far to prove the emptiness of your declaration, that the abolitionists "have thrown back for half a century the prospect of any species of emancipation of the African race, gradual or immediate, in any of the states," and the emptiness of your declaration, that, "prior to the agitation of this subject of abolition, there was a progressive melioration in the condition of slaves throughout all the slave states," and that "in some of them, schools of instruction were opened," &c.; and I further trust, that this admission will render harmless your intimation, that this "melioration" and these "schools" were intended to prepare the slaves for freedom. After what you have said of the great value of the slaves, and of the obstacle it presents to emancipation, you will meet with little success in your endeavors to convince the world, that the South was preparing to give up the "twelve hundred millions of dollars," and that the naughty abolitionists have postponed her gratification "for half a century." If your views of the immense value of the slaves, and of the consequent opposition to their freedom, be correct, then the hatred of the South towards the abolitionists must be, not because their movements tend to lengthen, but because they tend to shorten the period of her possession of the "twelve hundred millions of dollars." May I ask you, whether, whilst the South clings to these "twelve hundred millions of dollars," it is not somewhat hypocritical in her to be complaining, that the abolitionists are fastening the "twelve hundred millions of dollars" to her? And may I ask you, whether there is not a little inconsistency between your own lamentations over this work of the abolitionists, and your intimation that the South will never consent to give up her slaves, until the impossibility, of paying her "twelve hundred millions of dollars" for them, shall have been accomplished? Puerile and insulting as is your proposition to the abolitionists to raise "twelve hundred millions of dollars" for the purchase of the slaves, it is nevertheless instructive; inasmuch as it shows, that, in your judgment, the South is as little willing to give up her slaves, as the abolitionists are able to pay "twelve hundred millions of dollars" for them; and how unable the abolitionists are to pay a sum of money far greater than the whole amount of money in the world, I need not explain.

But if the South must have "twelve hundred millions of dollars" to induce her to liberate her present number of slaves, how can you expect success fur your scheme of ridding her of several times the present number, "in the progress of some one hundred and fifty, or two hundred years?" Do you reply, that, although she must have "four hundred dollars" a-piece for them, if she sell them to the abolitionists, she is, nevertheless, willing to let the Colonization Society have them without charge? There is abundant proof, that she is not. During the twenty-two years of the existence of that Society, not so many slaves have been emancipated and given to it for expatriation, as are born in a single week. As a proof that the sympathies of the South are all with the slaveholding and real character of this two-faced institution, and not at all with the abolition purposes and tendencies, which it professes at the North, none of its Presidents, (and slave-holders only are deemed worthy to preside over it,) has ever contributed from his stock of slaves to swell those bands of emigrants, who, leaving our shores in the character of "nuisances," are instantly transformed, to use your own language, into "missionaries, carrying with them credentials in the holy cause of Christianity, civilization, and free institutions." But you were not in earnest, when you held up the idea in your recent speech, that the rapidly multiplying millions of our colored countrymen would be expatriated. What you said on that point was but to indulge in declamation, and to round off a paragraph. It is in that part of your speech where you say that "no practical scheme for their removal or separation from us has yet been devised or proposed," that you exhibit your real sentiments on this subject, and impliedly admit the deceitfulness of the pretensions of the American Colonization Society.

Before closing my remarks on the topic of "the rights of property," I will admit the truth of your charge, that Abolitionists deny, that the slaveholder is entitled to "compensation" for his slaves.

Abolitionists do not know, why he, who steals men is, any more than he, who steals horses, entitled to "compensation" for releasing his plunder. They do not know, why he, who has exacted thirty years' unrequited toil from the sinews of his poor oppressed brother, should be paid for letting that poor oppressed brother labor for himself the remaining ten or twenty years of his life. But, it is said, that the South bought her slaves of the North, and that we of the North ought therefore to compensate the South for liberating them. If there are individuals at the North, who have sold slaves, I am free to admit, that they should promptly surrender their ill-gotten gains; and no less promptly should the inheritors of such gains surrender them. But, however this may be, and whatever debt may be due on this score, from the North to the South, certain it is, that on no principle of sound ethics, can the South hold to the persons of the innocent slaves, as security for the payment of the debt. Your state and mine, and I would it were so with all others, no longer allow the imprisonment of the debtor as a means of coercing payment from him. How much less, then, should they allow the creditor to promote the security of his debt by imprisoning a third person—and one who is wholly innocent of contracting the debt? But who is imprisoned, if it be not he, who is shut up in "the house of bondage?" And who is more entirely innocent than he, of the guilty transactions between his seller and buyer?

Another of your charges against abolitionists is, that, although "utterly destitute of Constitutional or other rightful power—living in totally distinct communities—as alien to the communities in which the subject on which they would operate resides, so far as concerns political power over that subject, as if they lived in Africa or Asia; they nevertheless promulgate to the world their purpose to be, to manumit forthwith, and without compensation, and without moral preparation, three millions of negro slaves, under jurisdictions altogether separated from those under which they live."

I will group with this charge several others of the same class.

1. Abolitionists neglect the fact, that "the slavery which exists amongst us (southern people) is our affair—not theirs—and that they have no more just concern with it, than they have with slavery as it exists throughout the world."

2. They are regardless of the "deficiency of the powers of the General Government, and of the acknowledged and incontestable powers of the States."

_3._ "Superficial men (meaning no doubt abolitionists) confound the totally different cases together of the powers of the British Parliament and those of the Congress of the United States in the matter of slavery."_

Are these charges any thing more than the imagery of your own fancy, or selections from the numberless slanders of a time-serving and corrupt press? If they are founded on facts, it is in your power to state the facts. For my own part, I am utterly ignorant of any, even the least, justification for them. I am utterly ignorant that the abolitionists hold any peculiar views in relation to the powers of the General or State Governments. I do not believe, that one in a hundred of them supposes, that slavery in the states is a legitimate subject of federal legislation. I believe, that a majority of the intelligent men amongst them accord much more to the claims of "state sovereignty," and approach far more nearly to the character of "strict constructionists," than does the distinguished statesman, who charges them with such latitudinarian notions. There may be persons in our country, who believe that Congress has the absolute power over all American slavery, which the British Parliament had over all British slavery; and that Congress can abolish slavery in the slave states, because Great Britain abolished it in her West India Islands; but, I do not know them; and were I to look for them, I certainly should not confine my search to abolitionists—for abolitionists, as it is very natural they should be, are far better instructed in the subject of slavery and its connections with civil government, than are the community in general.

It is passing strange, that you, or any other man, who is not playing a desperate game, should, in the face of the Constitution of the American Anti-Slavery Society, which "admits, that each state, in which slavery exists, has, by the Constitution of the United States, the exclusive right to legislate in regard to the abolition of slavery in said state;" make such charges, as you have done.