Here again Agathocles left no time for reflection. He marched his army towards a place called the Great City, which was part of the domain of Carthage. The country through which they marched to this place, afforded the most delicious and agreeable prospect in the world. On either side were seen large meads, watered by beautiful streams, and covered with innumerable flocks of all kinds of cattle; country seats built with extraordinary magnificence; delightful avenues planted with olive and all sorts of fruit trees; gardens of a prodigious extent, and kept with a care and elegance which delighted the eye. This prospect reanimated the soldiers. They marched full of courage to the Great City, which they took sword in hand, and enriched themselves with the plunder of it, which was entirely abandoned to them. Tunis made as little resistance; and this place was not far distant from Carthage.

The Carthaginians were in prodigious alarm when it was known that the enemy was in the country, advancing by hasty marches. This arrival of Agathocles made the Carthaginians conclude, that their army before Syracuse had been defeated, and their fleet lost. The people ran in disorder to the great square of the city, whilst the senate assembled in haste and in a tumultuous manner. Immediately they deliberated on the means for preserving the city. They had no army in readiness to oppose the enemy; and their imminent danger did not permit them to wait the arrival of those forces which might be raised in the country and among the allies. It was therefore resolved, after several different opinions had been heard, to arm the citizens. The number of the forces thus levied, amounted to forty thousand foot, a thousand horse, and two thousand armed chariots. Hanno and Bomilcar, though divided betwixt themselves by some family quarrels, were however joined in the command of these troops. They marched immediately to meet the enemy; and, on sight of them, drew up their forces in order of battle. Agathocles(643) had, at most, but thirteen or fourteen thousand men. The signal was given, and an obstinate fight ensued. Hanno, with his sacred cohort, (the flower of the Carthaginian forces,) long sustained the fury of the Greeks, and sometimes even broke their ranks; but at last, overwhelmed with a shower of stones, and covered with wounds, he fell dead on the field. Bomilcar might have changed the face of things; but he had private and personal reasons not to obtain a victory for his country. He therefore thought proper to retire with the forces under his command, and was followed by the whole army, which, by that means, was forced to leave the field to Agathocles. After pursuing the enemy some time, he returned, and plundered the Carthaginian camp. Twenty thousand pair of manacles were found in it, with which the Carthaginians had furnished themselves, in the firm persuasion of their taking many prisoners. The result of this victory was the capture of a great number of strong-holds, and the defection of many of the natives of the country, who joined the victor.

This descent of Agathocles into Africa, doubtless gave birth to Scipio's design of making a like attempt upon the same republic, and from the same place.(644) Wherefore, in his answer to Fabius, who ascribed to temerity his design of making Africa the seat of the war, he forgot not to mention the example of Agathocles, as an instance in favour of his enterprise; and to show, that frequently there is no other way to get rid of an enemy who presses too closely upon us, than by carrying the war into his own country; and that men are much more courageous when they act upon the offensive, than when they stand only upon the defensive.

While the Carthaginians were thus warmly attacked by their enemies, ambassadors arrived to them from Tyre.(645) They came to implore their succour against Alexander the Great, who was upon the point of taking their city, which he had long besieged. The extremity to which their countrymen (for so they called them) were reduced, touched the Carthaginians as sensibly as their own danger. Though they were unable to relieve, they at least thought it their duty to comfort them; and deputed thirty of their principal citizens to express their grief that they could not spare them any troops, because of the present melancholy situation of their own affairs. The Tyrians, though disappointed of the only hope they had left, did not however despond; they committed their wives, children,(646) and old men, to the care of these deputies; and thus, being delivered from all inquietude, with regard to persons who were dearer to them than any thing in the world, they thought alone of making a resolute defence, prepared for the worst that might happen. Carthage received this afflicted company with all possible marks of amity, and paid to guests who were so dear and worthy of compassion, all the services which they could have expected from the most affectionate and tender parents.

Quintus Curtius places this embassy from Tyre to the Carthaginians at the same time that the Syracusans were ravaging Africa, and had advanced to the very gates of Carthage. But the expedition of Agathocles against Africa cannot agree in time with the siege of Tyre, which was more than twenty years before it.

At the same time, Carthage was solicitous how to extricate itself from the difficulties with which it was surrounded. The present unhappy state of the republic was considered as the effect of the wrath of the gods: and it was acknowledged to be justly deserved, particularly with regard to two deities, towards whom the Carthaginians had been remiss in the discharge of certain duties prescribed by their religion, and which had once been observed with great exactness. It was a custom (coeval with the city itself) at Carthage, to send annually to Tyre (the mother city) the tenth of all the revenues of the republic, as an offering to Hercules, the patron and protector of both cities. The domain, and consequently the revenues of Carthage, having increased considerably, the portion, on the contrary, of the god, had been lessened; and they were far from remitting the whole tenth to him. They were seized with a scruple on this point: they made an open and public confession of their insincerity and sacrilegious avarice; and, to expiate their guilt, they sent to Tyre a great number of presents, and small shrines of their deities all of gold, which amounted to a prodigious value.

Another violation of religion, which to their inhuman superstition seemed as flagrant as the former, gave them no less uneasiness. Anciently, children of the best families in Carthage used to be sacrificed to Saturn. They now reproached themselves with having failed to pay to the god the honours which they thought were due to him; and with having used fraud and dishonest dealing towards him, by having substituted, in their sacrifices, children of slaves or beggars, bought for that purpose, in the room of those nobly born. To expiate the guilt of so horrid an impiety, a sacrifice was made to this blood-thirsty god, of two hundred children of the first rank; and upwards of three hundred persons, through a sense of this terrible neglect, offered themselves voluntarily as victims, to pacify, by the effusion of their blood, the wrath of the gods.

After these expiations, expresses were despatched to Hamilcar in Sicily, with the news of what had happened in Africa, and, at the same time, to request immediate succours. He commanded the deputies to observe the strictest silence on the subject of the victory of Agathocles; and spread a contrary report, that he had been entirely defeated, his forces all cut off, and his whole fleet taken by the Carthaginians; and, in confirmation of this report, he showed the irons of the vessels pretended to be taken, which had been carefully sent to him. The truth of this report was not at all doubted in Syracuse; the majority were for capitulating;(647) when a galley of thirty oars, built in haste by Agathocles, arrived in the port; and through great difficulties and dangers forced its way to the besieged. The news of Agathocles's victory immediately flew through the city, and restored alacrity and resolution to the inhabitants. Hamilcar made a last effort to storm the city, but was beaten off with loss. He then raised the siege, and sent five thousand men to the relief of his distressed country. Some time after,(648) having resumed the siege, and hoping to surprise the Syracusans by attacking them in the night, his design was discovered; and falling alive into the enemy's hands, he was put to death with the most exquisite tortures.(649) Hamilcar's head was sent immediately to Agathocles, who, advancing to the enemy's camp, threw it into a general consternation, by displaying to them the head of this general, which manifested the melancholy situation of their affairs in Sicily.

To these foreign enemies was joined a domestic one, which was more to be feared, as being more dangerous than the others;(650) this was Bomilcar their general, who was then in possession of the first post in Carthage. He had long meditated the establishment of himself as tyrant at Carthage, and attaining the sovereign authority there; and imagined that the present troubles offered him the wished-for opportunity. He therefore entered the city, and being seconded by a small number of citizens, who were the accomplices of his rebellion, and a body of foreign soldiers, he proclaimed himself tyrant; and showed himself literally such, by cutting the throats of all the citizens whom he met with in the streets. A tumult arising immediately in the city, it was at first thought that the enemy had taken it by some treachery; but when it was known that Bomilcar caused all this disturbance, the young men took up arms to repel the tyrant, and from the tops of the houses discharged whole volleys of darts and stones upon the heads of his soldiers. When he saw an army marching in order against him, he retired with his troops to an eminence, with design to make a vigorous defence, and to sell his life as dear as possible. To spare the blood of the citizens, a general pardon was proclaimed for all without exception who would lay down their arms. They surrendered upon this proclamation, and all enjoyed the benefit of it, Bomilcar their chief excepted: for the Carthaginians, without regarding their oath, condemned him to death, and fastened him to a cross, where he suffered the most exquisite torments. From the cross, as from a rostrum, he harangued the people; and thought himself justly entitled to reproach them for their injustice, their ingratitude, and perfidy, which he did by enumerating many illustrious generals, whose services they had rewarded with an ignominious death. He expired on the cross whilst uttering these reproaches.(651)

Agathocles had won over to his interest a powerful king of Cyrene,(652) named Ophellas, whose ambition he had flattered with the most splendid hopes, by leading him to understand, that, contenting himself with Sicily, he would leave to Ophellas the empire of Africa. But, as Agathocles did not scruple to commit the most horrid crimes when he thought them conducive to his interest, the credulous prince had no sooner put himself and his army in his power, than, by the blackest perfidy, he caused him to be murdered, in order that Ophellas's army might be entirely at his devotion. Many nations were now joined in alliance with Agathocles, and several strongholds were garrisoned by his forces. As he now saw the affairs of Africa in a flourishing condition, he thought it proper to look after those of Sicily; accordingly he sailed back thither, having left the command of the army to his son Archagathus. His renown, and the report of his victories, flew before him. On the news of his arrival in Sicily many towns revolted to him; but bad news soon recalled him to Africa. His absence had quite changed the face of things; and all his endeavours were incapable of restoring them to their former condition. All his strong-holds had surrendered to the enemy; the Africans had deserted him; some of his troops were lost, and the remainder were unable to make head against the Carthaginians; he had no way to transport them into Sicily, as he was destitute of ships, and the enemy were masters at sea: he could not hope for either peace or treaty with the barbarians, since he had insulted them in so outrageous a manner, by his being the first who had dared to make a descent in their country. In this extremity, he thought only of providing for his own safety. After many adventures, this base deserter of his army, and perfidious betrayer of his own children, who were left by him to the wild fury of his disappointed soldiers, stole away from the dangers which threatened him, and arrived at Syracuse with very few followers. His soldiers, seeing themselves thus betrayed, murdered his sons, and surrendered to the enemy. Himself died miserably soon after, and ended, by a cruel death,(653) a life that had been polluted with the blackest crimes.

In this period may be placed another incident related by Justin.(654) The fame of Alexander's conquests made the Carthaginians fear, that he might think of turning his arms towards Africa. The disastrous fate of Tyre, whence they drew their origin, and which he had so lately destroyed; the building of Alexandria upon the confines of Africa and Egypt, as if he intended it as a rival city to Carthage; the uninterrupted successes of that prince, whose ambition and good fortune were boundless; all this justly alarmed the Carthaginians. To sound his inclinations, Hamilcar, surnamed Rhodanus, pretending to have been driven from his country by the cabals of his enemies, went over to the camp of Alexander, to whom he was introduced by Parmenio, and offered him his services. The king received him graciously, and had several conferences with him. Hamilcar did not fail to transmit to his country whatever discoveries he made from time to time of Alexander's designs. Nevertheless, on his return to Carthage, after Alexander's death, he was considered as a betrayer of his country to that prince; and accordingly was put to death, by a sentence which displayed equally the ingratitude and cruelty of his countrymen.

(M105) I am now to speak of the wars of the Carthaginians in Sicily, in the time of Pyrrhus, king of Epirus.(655) The Romans, to whom the designs of that ambitious prince were not unknown, in order to strengthen themselves against any attempts he might make upon Italy, had renewed their treaties with the Carthaginians, who, on their side, were no less afraid of his crossing into Sicily. To the articles of the preceding treaties, there was added an engagement of mutual assistance, in case either of the contracting powers should be attacked by Pyrrhus.

The foresight of the Romans was well founded: Pyrrhus turned his arms against Italy, and gained many victories.(656) The Carthaginians, in consequence of the last treaty, thought themselves obliged to assist the Romans; and accordingly sent them a fleet of six-score sail, under the command of Mago. This general, in an audience before the senate, signified to them the interest which his superiors took in the war which they heard was carrying on against the Romans, and offered them their assistance. The senate returned thanks for the obliging offer of the Carthaginians, but at present thought fit to decline it.

Mago,(657) some days after, repaired to Pyrrhus, upon pretence of offering the mediation of Carthage for terminating his quarrel with the Romans; but in reality to sound him, and discover, if possible, his designs with regard to Sicily, which common fame reported he was going to invade. The Carthaginians were afraid that either Pyrrhus or the Romans would interfere in the affairs of that island, and transport forces thither for the conquest of it. And, indeed, the Syracusans, who had been besieged for some time by the Carthaginians, had sent pressingly for succour to Pyrrhus. This prince had a particular reason to espouse their interests, having married Lanassa, daughter of Agathocles, by whom he had a son named Alexander. He at last sailed from Tarentum, passed the Strait, and arrived in Sicily. His conquests at first were so rapid, that he left the Carthaginians, in the whole island, only the single town of Lilybaeum. He laid siege to it, but meeting with a vigorous resistance, was obliged to raise the siege; not to mention that the urgent necessity of his affairs called him back to Italy, where his presence was absolutely necessary. Nor was it less so in Sicily, which, on his departure, returned to the obedience of its former masters. Thus he lost this island with the same rapidity that he had won it. As he was embarking, he turned his eyes back to Sicily, and exclaimed to those about him,(658) "What a fine field of battle(659) do we leave the Carthaginians and Romans!" His prediction was soon verified.

After his departure, the chief magistracy of Syracuse was conferred on Hiero, who afterwards obtained the name and dignity of king, by the united suffrages of the citizens; so greatly had his government pleased. He was appointed to carry on the war against the Carthaginians, and obtained several advantages over them. But now a common interest reunited them against a new enemy, who began to appear in Sicily, and justly alarmed both: these were the Romans, who, having crushed all the enemies which had hitherto exercised their arms in Italy itself, were now powerful enough to carry them out of it; and to lay the foundation of that vast power there to which they afterwards attained, and of which it was probable they had even then formed the design. Sicily lay too commodious for them, not to form a resolution of establishing themselves in it. They therefore eagerly snatched this opportunity for crossing into it, which caused the rupture between them and the Carthaginians, and gave rise to the first Punic war. This I shall treat of more at large, by relating the causes of that war.



Chapter II. The History of Carthage from the first Punic War to its destruction.

The plan which I have laid down does not allow me to enter into an exact detail of the wars between Rome and Carthage; since that pertains rather to the Roman history, which I do not intend to touch upon, except transiently and occasionally. I shall therefore relate such facts only as may give the reader a just idea of the republic whose history lies before me; by confining myself to those particulars which relate chiefly to the Carthaginians, and to their most important transactions in Sicily, Spain, and Africa: a subject in itself sufficiently extensive.

I have already observed, that from the first Punic war to the ruin of Carthage, a hundred and eighteen years elapsed. This whole time may be divided into five parts or intervals.

I. The first Punic war lasted twenty-four years.

II. The interval betwixt the first and second Punic war is also twenty-four years.

III. The second Punic war took up seventeen years.

IV. The interval between the second and third is forty-nine years.

V. The third Punic war, terminated by the destruction of Carthage, continued but four years and some months.

Total: 118 years.

(M106) ARTICLE I. THE FIRST PUNIC WAR.—The first Punic war arose from the following cause. Some Campanian soldiers, in the service of Agathocles, the Sicilian tyrant, having entered as friends into Messina, soon after murdered part of the townsmen, drove out the rest, married their wives, seized their effects, and remained sole masters of that important city.(660) They then assumed the name of Mamertines. In imitation of them, and by their assistance, a Roman legion treated in the same cruel manner the city of Rhegium, lying directly opposite to Messina, on the other side of the strait. These two perfidious cities, supporting one another, rendered themselves at length formidable to their neighbours; and especially Messina, which became very powerful, and gave great umbrage and uneasiness both to the Syracusans and Carthaginians, who possessed one part of Sicily. As soon as the Romans had got rid of the enemies they had so long contended with, and particularly of Pyrrhus, they began to think of punishing the crime of their citizens, who had settled themselves at Rhegium, in so cruel and treacherous a manner, nearly ten years before. Accordingly, they took the city, and killed, in the attack, the greatest part of the inhabitants, who, instigated by despair, had fought to the last gasp: three hundred only were left, who were carried to Rome, whipped, and then publicly beheaded in the forum. The view which the Romans had in making this bloody execution, was, to prove to their allies their own sincerity and innocence. Rhegium was immediately restored to its lawful possessors. The Mamertines, who were considerably weakened, as well by the ruin of their confederate city, as by the losses which they had sustained from the Syracusans, who had lately placed Hiero at their head, thought it time to provide for their own safety. But divisions arising among them, one part surrendered the citadel to the Carthaginians, whilst the other called in the Romans to their assistance, and resolved to put them in possession of their city.

The affair was debated in the Roman senate, where, being considered in all its lights, it appeared to have some difficulties.(661) On one hand, it was thought base, and altogether unworthy of the Roman virtue, for them to undertake openly the defence of traitors, whose perfidy was exactly the same with that of the Rhegians, whom the Romans had recently punished with so exemplary a severity. On the other hand, it was of the utmost consequence to stop the progress of the Carthaginians, who, not satisfied with their conquests in Africa and Spain, had also made themselves masters of almost all the islands of the Sardinian and Hetrurian seas; and would certainly get all Sicily into their hands, if they should be suffered to possess themselves of Messina. From thence into Italy, the passage was very short; and it was in some manner to invite an enemy to come over, to leave the entrance open. These reasons, though so strong, could not prevail with the senate to declare in favour of the Mamertines; and accordingly, motives of honour and justice prevailed in this instance over those of interest and policy. (M107) But the people were not so scrupulous; for, in an assembly held on this subject, it was resolved that the Mamertines should be assisted.(662) The consul Appius Claudius immediately set forward with his army, and boldly crossed the strait, after he had, by an ingenious stratagem, eluded the vigilance of the Carthaginian general. The Carthaginians, partly by art and partly by force, were driven out of the citadel; and the city was surrendered immediately to the consul. The Carthaginians hanged their general, for having given up the citadel in so cowardly a manner, and prepared to besiege the town with all their forces. Hiero joined them with his own. But the consul, having defeated them separately, raised the siege, and laid waste at pleasure the neighbouring country, the enemy not daring to face him. This was the first expedition which the Romans made out of Italy.

It is doubted(663) whether the motives which prompted the Romans to undertake this expedition, were very upright, and exactly conformable to the rules of strict justice. Be this as it may, their passage into Sicily, and the succour they gave to the inhabitants of Messina, may be said to have been the first step by which they ascended to that height of glory and grandeur which they afterwards attained.

(M108) Hiero, having reconciled himself to the Romans, and entered into an alliance with them, the Carthaginians bent all their thoughts on Sicily, and sent numerous armies thither.(664) Agrigentum was their place of arms; which, being attacked by the Romans, was won by them, after they had besieged it seven months, and gained one battle.

Notwithstanding the advantage of this victory, and the conquest of so important a city, the Romans were sensible, that whilst the Carthaginians should continue masters at sea, the maritime places in the island would always side with them, and put it out of their power ever to drive them out of Sicily.(665) Besides, they saw with reluctance Africa enjoy a profound tranquillity, at a time that Italy was infested by the frequent incursions of its enemies. They now first formed the design of having a fleet, and of disputing the empire of the sea with the Carthaginians. The undertaking was bold, and in outward appearance rash; but it evinces the courage and magnanimity of the Romans. They were not at that time possessed of a single vessel which they could call their own; and the ships which had transported their forces into Sicily had been borrowed of their neighbours. They were unexperienced in sea affairs, had no carpenters acquainted with the building of ships, and did not know even the shape of the Quinqueremes, or galleys with five benches of oars, in which the chief strength of fleets at that time consisted. But happily, the year before, one had been taken upon the coasts of Italy, which served them as a model. They therefore applied themselves with incredible industry and ardour to the building of ships in the same form; and in the mean time they got together a set of rowers, who were taught an exercise and discipline utterly unknown to them before, in the following manner. Benches were made, on the shore, in the same order and fashion with those of galleys. The rowers were seated on these benches, and taught, as if they had been furnished with oars, to throw themselves backwards with their arms drawn to their breasts; and then to throw their bodies and arms forward in one regular motion, the instant their commanding officer gave the signal. In two months, one hundred galleys of five benches of oars, and twenty of three benches, were built; and after some time had been spent in exercising the rowers on shipboard, the fleet put to sea, and went in quest of the enemy. The consul Duillius had the command of it.

(M109) The Romans coming up with the Carthaginians near the coast of Myle, they prepared for an engagement.(666) As the Roman galleys, by their being clumsily and hastily built, were neither very nimble nor easy to work; this inconvenience was supplied by a machine invented for this occasion, and afterwards known by the name of the Corvus,(667) (Crow, or Crane,) by the help of which they grappled the enemy's ships, boarded them, and immediately came to close engagement. The signal for fighting was given. The Carthaginian fleet consisted of a hundred and thirty sail, under the command of Hannibal.(668) He himself was on board a galley of seven benches of oars, which had once belonged to Pyrrhus. The Carthaginians, thoroughly despising enemies who were utterly unacquainted with sea affairs, imagined that their very appearance would put them to flight, and therefore came forward boldly, with little expectation of fighting; but firmly imagining they should reap the spoils, which they had already devoured with their eyes. They were nevertheless a little surprised at the sight of the above-mentioned engines, raised on the prow of every one of the enemy's ships, and which were entirely new to them. But their astonishment increased, when they saw these engines drop down at once; and being thrown forcibly into their vessels, grapple them in spite of all resistance. This changed the form of the engagement, and obliged the Carthaginians to come to close engagement with their enemies, as though they had fought them on land. They were unable to sustain the attack of the Romans: a horrible slaughter ensued, and the Carthaginians lost fourscore vessels, among which was the admiral's galley, he himself escaping with difficulty in a small boat.

So considerable and unexpected a victory raised the courage of the Romans, and seemed to redouble their vigour for the continuance of the war. Extraordinary honours were bestowed on the consul Duillius, who was the first Roman that had a naval triumph decreed him. A rostral pillar was erected in his honour, with a noble inscription; which pillar is yet standing in Rome.(669)

During the two following years, the Romans grew still stronger at sea, by their success in several engagements.(670) But these were considered by them only as essays preparatory to the great design they meditated of carrying the war into Africa, and of combating the Carthaginians in their own country. There was nothing the latter dreaded more; and to divert so dangerous a blow, they resolved to fight the enemy, whatever might be the consequence.

(M110) The Romans had elected M. Atilius Regulus, and L. Manlius, consuls for this year.(671) Their fleet consisted of three hundred and thirty vessels, on board of which were one hundred and forty thousand men, each vessel having three hundred rowers, and a hundred and twenty soldiers. That of the Carthaginians, commanded by Hanno and Hamilcar, had twenty vessels more than the Romans, and a greater number of men in proportion. The two fleets came in sight of each other near Ecnomus in Sicily. No man could behold two such formidable navies, or be a spectator of the extraordinary preparations they made for fighting, without being under some concern, on seeing the danger which menaced two of the most powerful states in the world. As the courage on both sides was equal, and no great disparity in the forces, the fight was obstinate, and the victory long doubtful; but at last the Carthaginians were overcome. More than sixty of their ships were taken by the enemy, and thirty sunk. The Romans lost twenty-four, not one of which fell into the enemy's hands.

The fruit of this victory, as the Romans had designed it, was their sailing to Africa, after having refitted their ships, and provided them with all necessaries for carrying on a long war in a foreign country.(672) They landed happily in Africa, and began the war by taking a town called Clypea, which had a commodious haven. From thence, after having sent an express to Rome, to give advice of their landing, and to receive orders from the senate, they overran the open country, in which they made terrible havoc; bringing away whole flocks of cattle, and twenty thousand prisoners.

(M111) The express returned in the mean time with the orders of the senate, who decreed, that Regulus should continue to command the armies in Africa, with the title of Proconsul; and that his colleague should return with a great part of the fleet and the forces; leaving Regulus only forty vessels, fifteen thousand foot, and five hundred horse. Their leaving the latter with so few ships and troops, was a visible renunciation of the advantages which might have been expected from this descent upon Africa.

The people at Rome depended greatly on the courage and abilities of Regulus; and the joy was universal, when it was known that he was continued in the command in Africa; he alone was afflicted on that account.(673) When news was brought him of it, he wrote to Rome, and desired, in the strongest terms, that he might be appointed a successor. His chief reason was, that the death of the farmer who rented his grounds, having given one of his hirelings an opportunity of carrying off all the implements of tillage, his presence was necessary for taking care of his little spot of ground, (but seven acres,) which was all his family subsisted upon. But the senate undertook to have his lands cultivated at the public expense; to maintain his wife and children; and to indemnify him for the loss he had sustained by the robbery of his hireling. Thrice happy age! in which poverty was thus had in honour, and was united with the most rare and uncommon merit, and the highest employments of the state! Regulus thus freed from his domestic cares, bent his whole thoughts on discharging the duty of a general.

After taking several castles, he laid siege to Adis one of the strongest fortresses of the country.(674) The Carthaginians, exasperated at seeing their enemies thus laying waste their lands at pleasure, at last took the field, and marched against them, to force them to raise the siege. With this view, they posted themselves on a hill, which overlooked the Roman camp, and was convenient for annoying the enemy; but, at the same time, by its situation, rendered one part of their army useless. For the strength of the Carthaginians lay chiefly in their horses and elephants, which are of no service but in plains. Regulus did not give them an opportunity of descending from the hill; but, in order to take advantage of this essential mistake of the Carthaginian generals, fell upon them in this post; and after meeting with a feeble resistance, put the enemy to flight, plundered their camp, and laid waste the adjacent country. Then, having taken Tunis,(675) an important city, and which brought him near Carthage, he made his army encamp there.

The enemy were in the utmost alarm. All things had succeeded ill with them, their forces had been defeated by sea and land, and upwards of two hundred towns had surrendered to the conqueror. Besides, the Numidians made greater havoc in their territories than even the Romans. They expected every moment to see their capital besieged. And their affliction was increased by the concourse of peasants with their wives and children, who flocked from all parts to Carthage for safety: which gave them melancholy apprehensions of a famine in case of a siege. Regulus, afraid of having the glory of his victories torn from him by a successor, made some proposal of an accommodation to the vanquished enemy; but the conditions appeared so hard, that they could not listen to them. As he did not doubt his being soon master of Carthage, he would not abate any thing in his demands; but, by an infatuation which is almost inseparable from great and unexpected success, he treated them with haughtiness; and pretended, that every thing he suffered them to possess, ought to be esteemed a favour; adding this farther insult, "That they ought either to overcome like brave men, or learn to submit to the victor."(676) So harsh and disdainful a treatment only fired their resentment; and they resolved rather to die sword in hand, than to do any thing which might derogate from the dignity of Carthage.

Reduced to this fatal extremity, they received, in the happiest juncture, a reinforcement of auxiliary troops out of Greece, with Xanthippus the Lacedaemonian at their head, who had been educated in the discipline of Sparta, and learnt the art of war in that renowned and excellent school. When he had heard the circumstances of the last battle, which were told him at his request; had clearly discerned the occasion of its being lost; and perfectly informed himself in what the strength of Carthage consisted; he declared publicly, and repeated it often, in the hearing of the rest of the officers, that the misfortunes of the Carthaginians were owing entirely to the incapacity of their generals. These discourses came at last to the ear of the public council; the members of it were struck with them, and they requested him to attend them. He enforced his opinion with such strong and convincing reasons, that the oversights committed by the generals were visible to every one; and he proved as clearly, that, by a conduct opposite to the former, they would not only secure their dominions, but drive the enemy out of them. This speech revived the courage and hopes of the Carthaginians; and Xanthippus was entreated, and, in some measure, forced, to accept the command of the army. When the Carthaginians saw, in his exercising of their forces near the city, the manner in which he drew them up in order of battle, made them advance or retreat on the first signal, file off with order and expedition; in a word, perform all the evolutions and movements of the military art; they were struck with astonishment, and owned, that the ablest generals which Carthage had hitherto produced, knew nothing in comparison of Xanthippus.

The officers, soldiers, and every one, were lost in admiration; and, what is very uncommon, jealousy gave no alloy to it; the fear of the present danger, and the love of their country, stifling, without doubt, all other sentiments. The gloomy consternation, which had before seized the whole army, was succeeded by joy and alacrity. The soldiers were urgent to be led against the enemy, in the firm assurance (as they said) of being victorious under their new leader, and of obliterating the disgrace of former defeats. Xanthippus did not suffer their ardour to cool; and the sight of the enemy only inflamed it. When he had approached within little more than twelve hundred paces of them, he thought proper to call a council of war, in order to show respect to the Carthaginian generals, by consulting them. All unanimously deferred to his opinion; upon which it was resolved to give the enemy battle the following day.

The Carthaginian army was composed of twelve thousand foot, four thousand horse, and about a hundred elephants. That of the Romans, as near as may be guessed from what goes before, (for Polybius does not mention their numbers here,) consisted of fifteen thousand foot and three hundred horse.

It must be a noble sight to see two armies like these before us, not overcharged with numbers, but composed of brave soldiers, and commanded by very able generals, engaged in battle. In those tumultuous fights, where two or three hundred thousand are engaged on both sides, confusion is inevitable; and it is difficult, amidst a thousand events, where chance generally seems to have a greater share than counsel, to discover the true merit of commanders, and the real causes of victory. But in such engagements as this before us, nothing escapes the curiosity of the reader; for he clearly sees the disposition of the two armies; imagines he almost hears the orders given out by the generals; follows all the movements of the army; can point out the faults committed on both sides; and is thereby qualified to determine, with certainty, the causes to which the victory or defeat is owing. The success of this battle, however inconsiderable it may appear from the small number of the combatants, was nevertheless to decide the fate of Carthage.

The disposition of both armies was as follows. Xanthippus drew up all his elephants in front. Behind these, at some distance, he placed the Carthaginian infantry in one body or phalanx. The foreign troops in the Carthaginian service were posted, one part of them on the right, between the phalanx and the horse; and the other, composed of light-armed soldiers, in platoons, at the head of the two wings of the cavalry.

On the side of the Romans, as they apprehended the elephants most, Regulus, to provide against them, posted his light-armed soldiers, on a line, in the front of the legions. In the rear of these, he placed the cohorts one behind another, and the horse on the wings. In thus straitening the front of his main battle, to give it more depth, he indeed took a just precaution, says Polybius, against the elephants; but he did not provide for the inequality of his cavalry, which was much inferior in numbers to that of the enemy.

The two armies being thus drawn up, waited only for the signal. Xanthippus orders the elephants to advance, to break the ranks of the enemy; and commands the two wings of the cavalry to charge the Romans in flank. At the same time, the latter, clashing their arms, and shouting after the manner of their country, advance against the enemy. Their cavalry did not stand the onset long, being so much inferior to that of the Carthaginians. The infantry in the left wing, to avoid the attack of the elephants, and show how little they feared the mercenaries who formed the enemies' right wing, attacks it, puts it to flight, and pursues it to the camp. Those in the first ranks, who were opposed to the elephants, were broken and trodden under foot, after fighting valiantly; and the rest of the main body stood firm for some time, by reason of its great depth. But when the rear, being attacked by the enemy's cavalry, was obliged to face about and receive it; and those who had broken through the elephants, met the phalanx of the Carthaginians, which had not yet engaged, and which received them in good order, the Romans were routed on all sides, and entirely defeated. The greatest part of them were crushed to death by the enormous weight of the elephants: and the remainder, standing in the ranks, were shot through and through with arrows from the enemy's horse. Only a small number fled; and as they were in an open country, the horse and elephants killed a great part of them. Five hundred, or thereabouts, who went off with Regulus, were taken prisoners with him. The Carthaginians lost in this battle eight hundred mercenaries, who were opposed to the left wing of the Romans; and of the latter only two thousand escaped, who, by their pursuing the enemy's right wing, had drawn themselves out of the engagement. All the rest, Regulus and those taken with him excepted, were left dead in the field. The two thousand, who had escaped the slaughter, retired to Clypea, and were saved in an almost miraculous manner.

The Carthaginians, after having stripped the dead, entered Carthage in triumph, dragging after them the unfortunate Regulus, and five hundred prisoners. Their joy was so much the greater, as, but a very few days before, they had seen themselves upon the brink of ruin. The men and women, old and young people, crowded the temples, to return thanks to the immortal gods; and several days were devoted wholly to festivities and rejoicings.

Xanthippus, who had contributed so much to this happy change, had the wisdom to withdraw shortly after, from the apprehension lest his glory, which had hitherto been unsullied, might, after this first blaze, insensibly fade away, and leave him exposed to the darts of envy and calumny, which are always dangerous, but most in a foreign country, when a man stands alone, unsustained by friends and relations, and destitute of all support.

Polybius tells us, that Xanthippus's departure was related in a different manner, and promises to take notice of it in another place: but that part of his history has not come down to us. We read in Appian,(677) that the Carthaginians, excited by a mean and detestable jealousy of Xanthippus's glory, and unable to bear the thoughts that they should stand indebted to Sparta for their safety; upon pretence of conducting him and his attendants back with honour to his own country, with a numerous convoy of ships, gave private orders to have them all put to death in their passage; as if with him they could have buried in the waves for ever the memory of his services, and their horrid ingratitude to him.(678)

"This battle," says Polybius,(679) "though not so considerable as many others, may yet furnish very salutary instructions; which," adds that author, "is the greatest benefit that can be reaped from the study of history."

First, ought any man to put a great confidence in his good fortune, after he has considered the fate of Regulus? That general, insolent with victory, inexorable to the conquered, scarcely deigning to listen to them, saw himself a few days after vanquished by them, and made their prisoner. Hannibal suggested the same reflection to Scipio, when he exhorted him not to be dazzled with the success of his arms. Regulus, said he, would have been recorded as one of the most uncommon instances of valour and felicity, had he, after the victory obtained in this very country, granted our fathers the peace which they sued for. But putting no bounds to his ambition and the insolence of success, the greater his prosperity, the more ignominious was his fall.(680)

In the second place, the truth of the saying of Euripides is here seen in its full extent, "That one wise head is worth a great many hands."(681) A single man here changes the whole face of affairs. On one hand, he defeats troops which were thought invincible; on the other, he revives the courage of a city and an army, whom he had found in consternation and despair.

Such, as Polybius observes, is the use which ought to be made of the study of history. For there being two ways of acquiring improvement and instruction, first by one's own experience, and secondly by that of other men; it is much more wise and useful to improve by other men's miscarriages than by our own.

I return to Regulus, that I may here finish what relates to him; Polybius, to our great disappointment, taking no further notice of that general.(682)

(M112) After being kept some years in prison, he was sent to Rome to propose an exchange of prisoners.(683) He had been obliged to take an oath, that he would return in case he proved unsuccessful. He then acquainted the senate with the subject of his voyage; and being invited by them to give his opinion freely, he answered, that he could no longer do it as a senator, having lost both this quality, and that of a Roman citizen, from the time that he had fallen into the hands of his enemies; but he did not refuse to offer his thoughts as a private person. This was a very delicate affair. Every one was touched with the misfortunes of so great a man. "He needed only," says Cicero, "to have spoken one word, and it would have restored him to his liberty, his estate, his dignity, his wife, his children, and his country;" but that word appeared to him contrary to the honour and welfare of the state. He therefore plainly declared, that an exchange of prisoners ought not to be so much as thought of: that such an example would be of fatal consequence to the republic: that citizens who had so basely surrendered their arms to the enemy, were unworthy of the least compassion, and incapable of serving their country; that with regard to himself, as he was so far advanced in years, his death ought to be considered as nothing; whereas they had in their hands several Carthaginian generals, in the flower of their age, and capable of doing their country great services for many years. It was with difficulty that the senate complied with so generous and unexampled a counsel. The illustrious exile therefore left Rome, in order to return to Carthage, unmoved either with the deep affliction of his friends, or the tears of his wife and children, although he knew but too well the grievous torments which were prepared for him.(684) And indeed, the moment his enemies saw him returned without having obtained the exchange of prisoners, they put him to every kind of torture their barbarous cruelty could invent. They imprisoned him for a long time in a dismal dungeon, whence (after cutting off his eye-lids) they drew him at once into the sun, when its beams darted the strongest heat. They next put him into a kind of chest stuck full of nails, whose points wounding him did not allow him a moment's ease either day or night. Lastly, after having been long tormented by being kept for ever awake in this dreadful torture, his merciless enemies nailed him to a cross, their usual punishment, and left him to expire on it. Such was the end of this great man. His enemies, by depriving him of some days, perhaps years, of life, brought eternal infamy on themselves.

The blow which the Romans had received in Africa did not discourage them.(685) They made greater preparations than before, to retrieve their loss; and put to sea, the following campaign, three hundred and sixty vessels. The Carthaginians sailed out to meet them with two hundred; but were beaten in an engagement fought on the coasts of Sicily, and a hundred and fourteen of their ships were taken by the Romans. The latter sailed into Africa to take in the few soldiers who had escaped the pursuit of the enemy, after the defeat of Regulus; and had defended themselves vigorously in Clupea,(686) where they had been unsuccessfully besieged.

Here again we are astonished that the Romans, after so considerable a victory, and with so large a fleet, should sail into Africa, only to bring from thence a small garrison; whereas they might have attempted the conquest of it, since Regulus, with much fewer forces, had almost completed it.

The Romans, on their return, were overtaken by a storm, which almost destroyed their whole fleet.(687) The like misfortune befell them also the following year.(688) However, they consoled themselves for this double loss, by a victory which they gained over Asdrubal, from whom they took near a hundred and forty elephants. This news being brought to Rome, filled the whole city with joy; not only because the strength of the enemy's army was considerably diminished by the loss of their elephants, but chiefly because this victory had inspired the land forces with fresh courage; who, since the defeat of Regulus, had not dared to venture upon an engagement; so great was the terror with which those formidable animals had filled the minds of all the soldiers. It was therefore judged proper to make a greater effort than ever, in order to finish, if possible, a war which had continued fourteen years. The two consuls set sail with a fleet of two hundred ships, and arriving in Sicily, formed the bold design of besieging Lilybaeum. This was the strongest town which the Carthaginians possessed, and the loss of it would be attended with that of every part of the island and open to the Romans a free passage into Africa.

The reader will suppose, that the utmost ardour was shown, both in the assault and defence of the place.(689) Imilcon was governor there, with ten thousand regular forces, exclusive of the inhabitants; and Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, soon brought him as many more from Carthage; he having, with the most intrepid courage, forced his way through the enemy's fleet, and arrived happily in the port.

The Romans had not lost any time. Having brought forward their engines, they beat down several towers with their battering rams; and gaining ground daily, they made such progress, as gave the besieged, who now were closely pressed, some fears. The governor saw plainly that there was no other way left to save the city, but by firing the engines of the besiegers. Having therefore prepared his forces for this enterprise, he sent them out at daybreak with torches in their hands, tow, and all kind of combustible matters; and at the same time attacked all the engines. The Romans exerted their utmost efforts to repel them, and the engagement was very bloody. Every man, assailant as well as defendant, stood to his post, and chose to die rather than quit it. At last, after a long resistance and dreadful slaughter, the besieged sounded a retreat, and left the Romans in possession of their works. This conflict being over, Hannibal embarked in the night, and concealing his departure from the enemy, sailed for Drepanum, where Adherbal commanded for the Carthaginians. Drepanum was advantageously situated; having a commodious port, and lying about a hundred and twenty furlongs from Lilybaeum; and the Carthaginians had been always very desirous of preserving it.

The Romans, animated by their late success, renewed the attack with greater vigour than ever; the besieged not daring to make a second attempt to burn their machines, so much were they disheartened by the ill success of the former. But a furious wind rising suddenly, some mercenary soldiers represented to the governor, that now was the favourable opportunity for them to fire the engines of the besiegers, especially as the wind blew full against them; and they offered themselves for the enterprise. The offer was accepted, and accordingly they were furnished with every thing necessary. In a moment the fire caught all the engines; and the Romans could not possibly extinguish it, because the flames being spread instantly every where, the wind carried the sparks and smoke full in their eyes, so that they could not see where to apply relief; whereas their enemies saw clearly where to aim their strokes, and throw their fire. This accident made the Romans lose all hopes of being ever able to carry the place by force. They therefore turned the siege into a blockade; raised a strong line of contravallation round the town; and, dispersing their army in every part of the neighbourhood, resolved to effect by time, what they found themselves absolutely unable to perform any other way.

When the transactions of the siege of Lilybaeum, and the loss of part of the forces, were known at Rome, the citizens, so far from desponding at this ill news, seemed to be fired with new vigour.(690) Every man strove to be foremost in the muster roll; so that, in a very little time, an army of ten thousand men was raised, who, crossing the strait, marched by land to join the besiegers.

(M113) At the same time, P. Claudius Pulcher, the consul, formed a design of attacking Adherbal in Drepanum.(691) He thought himself sure of surprising him, because, after the loss lately sustained by the Romans at Lilybaeum, the enemy could not imagine that they would venture out again at sea. Flushed with these hopes, he sailed out with his fleet in the night, the better to conceal his design. But he had to do with an active general, whose vigilance he could not elude, and who did not even give him time to draw up his ships in line of battle, but fell vigorously upon him whilst his fleet was in disorder and confusion. The Carthaginians gained a complete victory. Of the Roman fleet, only thirty vessels got off, which being in company with the consul, fled with him, and got away in the best manner they could along the coast. All the rest, amounting to fourscore and thirteen, with the men on board them, were taken by the Carthaginians; a few soldiers excepted, who had escaped from the wreck of their vessels. This victory displayed as much the prudence and valour of Adherbal, as it reflected shame and ignominy on the Roman consul.

Junius, his colleague, was neither more prudent nor more fortunate than himself, but lost his whole fleet by his ill conduct.(692) Endeavouring to atone for his misfortune by some considerable action, he held a secret correspondence with the inhabitants of Eryx,(693) and by that means got the city surrendered to him. On the summit of the mountain stood the temple of Venus Erycina, which was certainly the most beautiful as well as the richest of all the Sicilian temples. The city stood a little below the summit of this mountain, and the only access to it was by a road very long and very rugged. Junius posted one part of his troops upon the top, and the remainder at the foot of the mountain, imagining that he now had nothing to fear; but Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, father of the famous Hannibal, found means to get into the city, which lay between the two camps of the enemy, and there fortified himself. From this advantageous post he harassed the Romans incessantly for two years. One can scarce conceive how it was possible for the Carthaginians to defend themselves, when thus attacked from both the summit and foot of the mountain; and unable to get provisions, but from a little port, which was the only one open to them. By such enterprises as these, the abilities and prudent courage of a general, are as well, or perhaps better discovered, than by the winning of a battle.

For five years, nothing memorable was performed on either side.(694) The Romans had imagined that their land forces would alone be capable of finishing the siege of Lilybaeum: but as they saw it protracted beyond their expectation, they returned to their first plan, and made extraordinary efforts to fit out a new fleet. The public treasury was at a low ebb; but this want was supplied by the zeal of individuals; so ardent was the love which the Romans bore their country. Every man, according to his circumstances, contributed to the common expense; and, upon public security, advanced money, without the least scruple, for an expedition on which the glory and safety of Rome depended. One man fitted out a ship at his own charge; another was equipped by the contributions of two or three; so that, in a very little time, two hundred were ready for sailing. (M114) The command was given to Lutatius the consul, who immediately put to sea. The enemy's fleet had retired into Africa: the consul therefore easily seized upon all the advantageous posts in the neighbourhood of Lilybaeum; and foreseeing that he should soon be forced to fight, he omitted no precautions to ensure success; and employed the interval in exercising his soldiers and seamen at sea.

He was soon informed that the Carthaginian fleet drew near, under the command of Hanno, who landed in a small island called Hiera, opposite to Drepanum. His design was to reach Eryx undiscovered by the Romans, in order to supply the army there; to reinforce his troops, and take Barca on board to assist him in the expected engagement. But the consul, suspecting his intention, was beforehand with him; and having assembled all his best forces, sailed for the small island AEgusa,(695) which lay near the other. He acquainted his officers with the design he had of attacking the enemy on the morrow. Accordingly, at daybreak, he prepared to engage: unfortunately the wind was favourable for the enemy, which made him hesitate whether he should give him battle. But considering that the Carthaginian fleet, when unloaded of its provisions, would become lighter and more fit for action; and, besides, would be considerably strengthened by the forces and presence of Barca he came to a resolution at once; and, notwithstanding the foul weather, made directly to the enemy. The consul had choice forces, able seamen, and excellent ships, built after the model of a galley that had been lately taken from the enemy; and which was the completest in its kind that had ever been seen. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, were destitute of all these advantages. As they had been the entire masters at sea for some years, and the Romans did not once dare to face them, they held them in the highest contempt, and looked upon themselves as invincible. On the first report of the enemy being in motion, the Carthaginians had put to sea a fleet fitted out in haste, as appeared from every circumstance of it: the soldiers and seamen being all mercenaries, newly levied, without the least experience, resolution, or zeal, since it was not for their own country they were going to fight. This soon appeared in the engagement. They could not sustain the first attack. Fifty of their vessels were sunk, and seventy taken, with their whole crews. The rest, favoured by a wind which rose very seasonably for them, made the best of their way to the little island from whence they had sailed. There were upwards of ten thousand taken prisoners. The consul sailed immediately for Lilybaeum, and joined his forces to those of the besiegers.

When the news of this defeat arrived at Carthage, it occasioned so much the greater surprise and terror, as it was less expected. The senate, however, did not lose their courage, though they saw themselves quite unable to continue the war. As the Romans were now masters of the sea, it was not possible for the Carthaginians to send either provisions, or reinforcements, to the armies in Sicily. An express was therefore immediately despatched to Barca, the general there, empowering him to act as he should think proper. Barca, so long as he had room to entertain the least hopes, had done every thing that could be expected from the most intrepid courage and the most consummate wisdom. But having now no resource left, he sent a deputation to the consul, in order to treat about a peace. "Prudence," says Polybius, "consists in knowing how to resist and yield at a seasonable juncture." Lutatius was not insensible how tired the Romans were grown of a war, which had exhausted them both of men and money; and the dreadful consequences which had attended on Regulus's inexorable and imprudent obstinacy, were fresh in his memory. He therefore complied without difficulty, and dictated the following treaty.

THERE SHALL BE PEACE BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE (IN CASE THE ROMAN PEOPLE APPROVE OF IT) ON THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS: THE CARTHAGINIANS SHALL EVACUATE ALL SICILY; SHALL NO LONGER MAKE WAR UPON HIERO, THE SYRACUSANS, OR THEIR ALLIES: THEY SHALL RESTORE TO THE ROMANS, WITHOUT RANSOM, ALL THE PRISONERS WHICH THEY HAVE TAKEN FROM THEM; AND PAY THEM, WITHIN TWENTY YEARS, TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED EUBOIC TALENTS OF SILVER.(696) It is worth the reader's remarking, by the way, the simple, exact, and clear terms in which this treaty is expressed; that, in so short a compass, adjusts the interests of two powerful republics and their allies, both by sea and land.

When these conditions were brought to Rome, the people, not approving of them, sent ten commissioners to Sicily, to terminate the affair. These made no alteration as to the substance of the treaty;(697) only shortening the time appointed for the payment, reducing it to ten years: a thousand talents were added to the sum that had been stipulated, which were to be paid immediately; and the Carthaginians were required to depart out of all the islands situated between Italy and Sicily. Sardinia was not comprehended in this treaty; but they gave it up by another treaty which was made some years afterwards.

(M115) Such was the conclusion of a war, one of the longest mentioned in history, since it continued twenty-four years without intermission. The obstinacy, in disputing for empire, was equal on either side: the same resolution, the same greatness of soul, in forming as well as in executing of projects, being conspicuous on both sides. The Carthaginians had the superiority in their acquaintance with naval affairs; in their skill in the construction of their vessels; the working of them; the experience and capacity of their pilots; the knowledge of coasts, shallows, roads, and winds; and in the inexhaustible fund of wealth, which furnished all the expenses of so long and obstinate a war. The Romans had none of these advantages; but their courage, zeal for the public good, love of their country, and a noble emulation of glory, supplied all other deficiencies. We are astonished to see a nation, so raw and inexperienced in naval affairs, not only making head against a people who were better skilled in them, and more powerful than any that had ever been before; but even gaining several victories over them at sea. No difficulties or calamities could discourage them. They certainly would not have thought of peace, in the circumstances under which the Carthaginians demanded it. One unfortunate campaign dispirits the latter; whereas the Romans are not shaken by a succession of them.

As to soldiers, there was no comparison between those of Rome and Carthage, the former being infinitely superior in point of courage. Among the generals who commanded in this war, Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, was, doubtless, the most conspicuous for his bravery and prudence.

The Libyan War; or against the Mercenaries.(698)—The war which the Carthaginians waged against the Romans, was succeeded immediately by another,(699) which, though of much shorter continuance, was infinitely more dangerous; as it was carried on in the very heart of the republic, and attended with such cruelty and barbarity, as is scarce to be paralleled in history; I mean the war which the Carthaginians were obliged to sustain against their mercenary troops, who had served under them in Sicily, and which is commonly called the African or Libyan war.(700) It continued only three years and a half, but was a very bloody one. The occasion of it was this:

As soon as the treaty was concluded with the Romans,(701) Hamilcar, having carried to Lilybaeum the forces which were in Eryx, resigned his commission; and left to Gisgo, governor of the place, the care of transporting these forces into Africa. Gisgo, as though he had foreseen what would happen, did not ship them all off at once, but in small and separate parties, in order that those who came first might be paid off, and sent home, before the arrival of the rest. This conduct evinced great forecast and wisdom, but was not seconded equally at Carthage. As the republic had been exhausted by the expense of a long war, and the payment of near one hundred and thirty thousand pounds to the Romans on signing the peace, the forces were not paid off in proportion as they arrived; but it was thought proper to wait for the rest, in the hopes of obtaining from them (when they should be all together) a remission of some part of their arrears. This was the first oversight.

Here we discover the genius of a state composed of merchants, who know the full value of money, but are little acquainted with that of the services of soldiers; who bargain for blood, as though it were an article of trade, and always go to the cheapest market. In such a republic, when an exigency is once answered, the merit of services is no longer remembered.

These soldiers, most of whom came to Carthage, having been long accustomed to a licentious life, caused great disturbances in the city; to remedy which, it was proposed to their officers, to march them all to a little neighbouring town called Sicca, and there supply them with whatever was necessary for their subsistence, till the arrival of the rest of their companions; and that then they should all be paid off, and sent home. This was a second oversight.

A third was, the refusing to let them leave their baggage, their wives, and children in Carthage, as they desired; and the forcing them to remove these to Sicca; whereas, had they staid in Carthage, they would have been in a manner so many hostages.

Being all met together at Sicca, they began (having little else to do) to compute the arrears of their pay, which they made amount to much more than was really due to them. To this computation, they added the mighty promises which had been made them, at different times, as an encouragement for them to do their duty; and pretended that these likewise ought to be brought into the account. Hanno, who was then governor of Africa, and had been sent to them from the magistrates of Carthage, proposed to them to consent to some abatement of their arrears; and to content themselves with receiving a part, in consideration of the great distress to which the commonwealth was reduced, and its present unhappy circumstances. The reader will easily guess how such a proposal was received. Complaints, murmurs, seditious and insolent clamours, were every where heard. These troops being composed of different nations, who were strangers to one another's language, were incapable of hearing reason when they once mutinied. Spaniards, Gauls, Ligurians; inhabitants of the Balearic isles; Greeks, the greatest part of them slaves or deserters, and a very great number of Africans, composed these mercenary forces. Transported with rage, they immediately break up, march towards Carthage, (being upwards of twenty thousand,) and encamp at Tunis, not far from that metropolis.

The Carthaginians discovered too late their error. There was no compliance, how grovelling soever, to which they did not stoop, to soothe these exasperated soldiers: who, on their side, practised every knavish art which could be thought of, in order to extort money from them. When one point was gained, they immediately had recourse to a new artifice, on which to ground some new demand. Was their pay settled beyond the agreement made with them, they still would be reimbursed for the losses which they pretended to have sustained, either by the death of their horses, by the excessive price which, at certain times, they had paid for bread-corn; and still insisted on the recompense which had been promised them. As nothing could be fixed, the Carthaginians, with great difficulty, prevailed on them to refer themselves to the opinion of some general who had commanded in Sicily. Accordingly they pitched upon Gisgo, who had always been very acceptable to them. This general harangued them in a mild and insinuating manner; recalled to their memories the long time they had been in the Carthaginian service; the considerable sums they had received from the republic; and granted almost all their demands.

The treaty was upon the point of being concluded, when two mutineers occasioned a tumult in every part of the camp. One of those was Spendius a Capuan, who had been a slave at Rome, and had fled to the Carthaginians. He was tall and bold. The fear he was under, of falling into the hands of his former master, by whom he was sure to be hanged, (as was the custom,) prompted him to break off the agreement. He was seconded by one Matho,(702) who had been very active in forming the conspiracy. These two represented to the Africans, that the instant after their companions should be discharged and sent home, they, being thus left alone in their own country, would fall a sacrifice to the rage of the Carthaginians, who would take vengeance upon them for the common rebellion. This was sufficient to raise them to fury. They immediately made choice of Spendius and Matho for their chiefs. No remonstrances were heard; and whoever offered to make any, was immediately put to death. They ran to Gisgo's tent, plundered it of the money designed for the payment of the forces: dragged that general himself to prison, with all his attendants; after having treated them with the utmost indignities. All the cities of Africa, to whom they had sent deputies to exhort them to recover their liberty, came over to them, Utica and Hippacra excepted, which they therefore immediately besieged.

Carthage had never been before exposed to such imminent danger. The citizens individually drew each his subsistence from the rents or revenues of their lands, and the public expenses from the tribute paid by Africa. But all this was stopped at once; and (a much worse circumstance) was turned against them. They found themselves destitute of arms and forces, either for sea or land; of all necessary preparations either for the sustaining of a siege, or the equipping of a fleet; and, to complete their misfortunes, without any hopes of foreign assistance, either from their friends or allies.

They might, in some sense, impute to themselves the distress to which they were reduced. During the last war, they had treated the African nations with the utmost rigour, by imposing excessive tributes on them, in the exaction of which no allowance was made for poverty and extreme misery; and governors, such as Hanno, were treated with the greater respect, the more severe they had been in levying those tributes. So that no great efforts were necessary to prevail upon the Africans to engage in this rebellion. At the very first signal that was made, it broke out, and in a moment became general. The women, who had often, with the deepest affliction, seen their husbands and fathers dragged to prison for non-payment, were more exasperated than the men; and with pleasure gave up all their ornaments towards the expenses of the war; so that the chiefs of the rebels, after paying all they had promised the soldiers, found themselves still in the midst of plenty: an instructive lesson, says Polybius, to ministers, how a people should be treated; as it teaches them to look, not only to the present occasion, but to extend their views to futurity.

The Carthaginians, notwithstanding their present distress, did not despond, but made the most extraordinary efforts. The command of the army was given to Hanno. Troops were levied by land and sea; horse as well as foot. All citizens, capable of bearing arms, were mustered; mercenaries were invited from all parts; and all the ships which the republic had left were refitted.

The rebels discovered no less ardour. We related before, that they had formed the siege of the two only cities which refused to join them. Their army was now increased to seventy thousand men. After detachments had been drawn from it to carry on those sieges, they pitched their camp at Tunis; and thereby held Carthage in a kind of blockade, filling it with perpetual alarms, and frequently advancing up to its very walls by day as well as by night.

Hanno had marched to the relief of Utica, and gained a considerable advantage, which, had he made a proper use of it, might have proved decisive: but entering the city, and only diverting himself there, the mercenaries, who had retreated to a neighbouring hill covered with trees, hearing how careless the enemy were, poured down upon them; found the soldiers straggling in all parts; took and plundered the camp, and seized upon all the supplies that had been brought from Carthage for the relief of the besieged. Nor was this the only error committed by Hanno; and errors, in such critical junctures, are much the most fatal. Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, was therefore appointed to succeed him. This general answered the idea which had been entertained of him; and his first success was the obliging the rebels to raise the siege of Utica. He then marched against their army which was encamped near Carthage; defeated part of it, and seized almost all their advantageous posts. These successes revived the courage of the Carthaginians.

The arrival of a young Numidian nobleman, Naravasus by name, who, out of esteem for the person and merit of Barca, joined him with two thousand Numidians, was of great service to that general. Animated by this reinforcement, he fell upon the rebels, who had cooped him up in a valley; killed ten thousand of them, and took four thousand prisoners. The young Numidian distinguished himself greatly in this battle. Barca took into his troops as many of the prisoners as were desirous of being enlisted, and gave the rest free liberty to go wherever they pleased, on condition that they should never take up arms any more against the Carthaginians; otherwise, that every man of them, if taken, should be put to death. This conduct proves the wisdom of that general. He thought this a better expedient than extreme severity. And indeed where a multitude of mutineers are concerned, the greatest part of whom have been drawn in by the persuasions of the most hotheaded, or through fear of the most furious, clemency seldom fails of being successful.

Spendius, the chief of the rebels, fearing that this affected lenity of Barca might occasion a defection among his troops, thought the only expedient left him to prevent it, would be, to strike some signal blow, which would deprive them of all hopes of being ever reconciled to the enemy. With this view, after having read to them some fictitious letters, by which advice was given him, of a secret design concerted betwixt some of their comrades and Gisgo for rescuing him out of prison, where he had been so long detained; he brought them to the barbarous resolution of murdering him and all the rest of the prisoners; and any man, who durst offer any milder counsel, was immediately sacrificed to their fury. Accordingly, this unfortunate general, and seven hundred prisoners who were confined with him, were brought out to the front of the camp, where Gisgo fell the first sacrifice, and afterwards all the rest. Their hands were cut off, their thighs broken, and their bodies, still breathing, were thrown into a hole. The Carthaginians sent a herald to demand their remains, in order to pay them the last sad office, but were refused; and the herald was further told, that whoever presumed to come upon the like errand, should meet with Gisgo's fate. And, indeed, the rebels immediately came to the unanimous resolution, of treating all such Carthaginians as should fall into their hands in the same barbarous manner; and decreed farther, that if any of their allies were taken, they should, after their hands were cut off, be sent back to Carthage. This bloody resolution was but too punctually executed.

The Carthaginians were now just beginning to breathe, as it were, and recover their spirits, when a number of unlucky accidents plunged them again into fresh dangers. A division arose among their generals; and the provisions, of which they were in extreme necessity, coming to them by sea, were all cast away in a storm. But the misfortune which they most keenly felt, was, the sudden defection of the two only cities which till then had preserved their allegiance, and in all times adhered inviolably to the commonwealth. These were Utica and Hippacra. These cities, without the least reason, or even so much as a pretence, went over at once to the rebels; and, transported with the like rage and fury, murdered the governor, with the garrison sent to their relief; and carried their inhumanity so far, as to refuse their dead bodies to the Carthaginians, who demanded them back in order for burial.

The rebels, animated by so much success, laid siege to Carthage, but were obliged immediately to raise it. They nevertheless continued the war. Having drawn together, into one body, all their own troops and those of the allies, (making upwards of fifty thousand men in all,) they watched the motions of Hamilcar's army, but carefully kept their own on the hills; and avoided coming down into the plains, because the enemy would there have had too great an advantage over them, on account of their elephants and cavalry. Hamilcar, more skilful in the art of war than they, never exposed himself to any of their attacks; but taking advantage of their oversights, often dispossessed them of their posts, if their soldiers straggled but ever so little; and harassed them a thousand ways. Such of them as fell into his hands, were thrown to wild beasts. At last, he surprised them at a time when they least expected it, and shut them up in a post which was so situated, that it was impossible for them to get out of it. Not daring to venture a battle, and being unable to get off, they began to fortify their camp, and surrounded it with ditches and intrenchments. But an enemy among themselves, and which was much more formidable, had reduced them to the greatest extremity: this was hunger, which was so raging, that they at last ate one another; Divine Providence, says Polybius, thus revenging upon themselves the barbarous cruelty they had exercised on others. They now had no resource left; and knew but too well the punishments which would be inflicted on them, in case they should fall alive into the hands of the enemy. After such bloody scenes as had been acted by them, they did not so much as think of peace, or of coming to an accommodation. They had sent to their forces encamped at Tunis for assistance, but with no success. In the mean time the famine increased daily. They had first eaten their prisoners, then their slaves; and now their fellow-citizens only were left. Their chiefs, now no longer able to resist the complaints and cries of the multitude, who threatened to massacre them if they did not surrender, went themselves to Hamilcar, after having obtained a safe conduct from him. The conditions of the treaty were, that the Carthaginians should select any ten of the rebels, to treat them as they should think fit, and that the rest should be dismissed with only one suit of clothes for each. When the treaty was signed, the chiefs themselves were arrested and detained by the Carthaginians, who plainly showed, on this occasion, that they did not pride themselves upon their good faith and sincerity. The rebels, hearing that their chiefs were seized, and knowing nothing of the convention, suspected that they were betrayed, and thereupon immediately took up arms. But Hamilcar, having surrounded them, brought forward his elephants; and either trod them all under foot, or cut them to pieces, they being upwards of forty thousand.

The consequence of this victory was, the reduction of almost all the cities of Africa, which immediately returned to their allegiance. Hamilcar, without loss of time, marched against Tunis, which, ever since the beginning of the war, had been the asylum of the rebels, and their place of arms. He invested it on one side, whilst Hannibal, who was joined in the command with him, besieged it on the other. Then advancing near the walls, and ordering crosses to be set up, he hung Spendius on one of them, and his companions who had been seized with him on the rest, where they all expired. Matho, the other chief, who commanded in the city, saw plainly by this what he himself might expect; and for that reason was much more attentive to his own defence. Perceiving that Hannibal, as being confident of success, was very negligent in all his motions, he made a sally, attacked his quarters, killed many of his men, took several prisoners, among whom was Hannibal himself, and plundered his camp. Then taking Spendius from the cross, he put Hannibal in his place, after having made him suffer inexpressible torments; and sacrificed round the body of Spendius thirty citizens of the first quality in Carthage, as so many victims of his vengeance. One would conclude, that there had been a mutual emulation betwixt the contending parties, which of them should outdo the other in acts of the most barbarous cruelty.

Barca being at that time at a distance, it was long before the news of his colleague's misfortune reached him; and besides, the road lying betwixt the two camps being impassable, it was impossible for him to advance hastily to his assistance. This disastrous accident caused a great consternation in Carthage. The reader may have observed, in the course of this war, a continual vicissitude of prosperity and adversity, of security and fear, of joy and grief; so various and inconstant were the events on either side.

In Carthage it was thought advisable to make one bold effort. Accordingly, all the youth capable of bearing arms were pressed into the service. Hanno was sent to join Hamilcar; and thirty senators were deputed to conjure those generals, in the name of the republic, to forget past quarrels, and sacrifice their resentments to their country's welfare. This was immediately complied with; they mutually embraced, and were reconciled sincerely to one another.

From this time, the Carthaginians were successful in all things; and Matho, who in every attempt after this came off with disadvantage, at last thought himself obliged to hazard a battle; and this was just what the Carthaginians wanted. The leaders on both sides animated their troops, as going to fight a battle which would for ever decide their fate. An engagement ensued. Victory was not long in suspense; for the rebels every where giving ground, the Africans were almost all slain, and the rest surrendered. Matho was taken alive and carried to Carthage. All Africa returned immediately to its allegiance, except the two perfidious cities which had lately revolted; however, they were soon forced to surrender at discretion.

And now the victorious army returned to Carthage, and was there received with shouts of joy, and the congratulations of the whole city. Matho and his soldiers, after having adorned the public triumph, were led to execution; and finished, by a painful and ignominious death, a life that had been polluted with the blackest treasons and unparalleled barbarities. Such was the conclusion of the war against the mercenaries, after having lasted three years and four months. It furnished, says Polybius, an ever-memorable lesson to all nations, not to employ in their armies a greater number of mercenaries than citizens; nor to rely, for the defence of their state, on a body of men who are not attached to it either by interest or affection.

I have hitherto purposely deferred taking notice of such transactions in Sardinia, as passed at the time I have been speaking of, and which were, in some measure, dependent on, and resulting from, the war waged in Africa against the mercenaries. They exhibit the same violent methods to promote rebellion; the same excesses of cruelty; as if the wind had carried the same spirit of discord and fury from Africa into Sardinia.

When the news was brought there of what Spendius and Matho were doing in Africa, the mercenaries in that island also shook off the yoke, in imitation of these incendiaries. They began by the murder of Bostar their general, and of all the Carthaginians under him. A successor was sent; but all the forces which he carried with him went over to the rebels; hung the general on a cross; and, throughout the whole island, put all the Carthaginians to the sword, after having made them suffer inexpressible torments. They then besieged all the cities one after another, and soon got possession of the whole country. But feuds arising between them and the natives, the mercenaries were driven entirely out of the island, and took refuge in Italy. Thus the Carthaginians lost Sardinia, an island of great importance to them, on account of its extent, its fertility, and the great number of its inhabitants.

The Romans, ever since their treaty with the Carthaginians, had behaved towards them with great justice and moderation. A slight quarrel, on account of some Roman merchants who were seized at Carthage for having supplied the enemy with provisions, had embroiled them a little. But these merchants being restored on the first complaint made to the senate of Carthage; the Romans, who prided themselves upon their justice and generosity on all occasions, made the Carthaginians a return of their former friendship; served them to the utmost of their power; forbade their merchants to furnish any other nation with provisions; and even refused to listen to the proposals made by the Sardinian rebels, when invited by them to take possession of the island.

But these scruples and delicacy wore off by degrees; and Caesar's advantageous testimony (in Sallust) of their honesty and plain-dealing, could not with any propriety be applied here:(703) "Although," says he, "in all the Punic wars, the Carthaginians, both in peace and during truces, had committed a number of detestable actions, the Romans could never (how inviting soever the opportunity might be) be prevailed upon to retaliate such usage; being more attentive to their own glory, than to the revenge they might have justly taken on such perfidious enemies."

(M116) The mercenaries, who, as was observed, had retired into Italy, brought the Romans at last to the resolution of sailing over into Sardinia, to render themselves masters of it. The Carthaginians were deeply afflicted at the news, upon pretence that they had a more just title to Sardinia than the Romans; they therefore put themselves in a posture to take a speedy and just revenge on those who had excited the people of that island to take up arms against them. But the Romans, pretending that these preparations were made not against Sardinia but their state, declared war against the Carthaginians. The latter, quite exhausted in every respect, and scarce beginning to breathe, were in no condition to sustain a war. The necessity of the times was therefore to be complied with, and they were forced to yield to a more powerful rival. A fresh treaty was thereupon made, by which they gave up Sardinia to the Romans; and obliged themselves to a new payment of twelve hundred talents, to keep off the war with which they were menaced. This injustice of the Romans was the true cause of the second Punic war, as will appear in the sequel.

The second Punic War.(704)—The second Punic war, which I am now going to relate, is one of the most memorable recorded in history, and most worthy the attention of an inquisitive reader; whether we consider the boldness of the enterprises; the wisdom employed in the execution; the obstinate efforts of two rival nations, and the ready resources they found in their lowest ebb of fortune; the variety of uncommon events, and the uncertain issue of so long and bloody a war; or lastly, the assemblage of the most perfect models in every kind of merit; and the most instructive lessons that occur in history, either with regard to war, policy, or government. Never did two more powerful, or at least more warlike, states or nations make war against each other; and never had these in question seen themselves raised to a more exalted pitch of power and glory. Rome and Carthage were, doubtless, at that time, the two first states of the world. Having already tried their strength in the first Punic war, and thereby made an essay of each other's power, they knew perfectly well what either could do. In this second war, the fate of arms was so equally balanced, and the success so intermixed with vicissitudes and varieties, that that party triumphed which had been most in danger of being ruined. Great as the forces of these two nations were, it may almost be said, that their mutual hatred was still greater. The Romans, on one side, could not without indignation see the vanquished presuming to attack them; and the Carthaginians, on the other, were exasperated at the equally rapacious and harsh treatment which they pretended to have received from the victor.

The plan which I have laid down does not permit me to enter into an exact detail of this war, whereof Italy, Sicily, Spain, and Africa, were the several seats; and which has a still closer connection with the Roman history than with that I am now writing. I shall confine myself therefore, principally, to such transactions as relate to the Carthaginians: and endeavour, as far as I am able, to give my reader an idea of the genius and character of Hannibal, who perhaps was the greatest warrior that antiquity has to boast of.

The remote and more immediate Causes of the second Punic War.—Before I come to speak of the declaration of war betwixt the Romans and Carthaginians, I think it necessary to explain the true causes of it; and to point out by what steps this rupture, betwixt these two nations, was so long preparing, before it openly broke out.