Capua, thus left to itself, held out but very little longer. After that such of its senators as had the chief hand in the revolt, and consequently could not expect any quarter from the Romans, had put themselves to a truly tragical death,(790) the city surrendered at discretion. The success of this siege, which, by the happy consequences wherewith it was attended, proved decisive, and fully restored to the Romans their superiority over the Carthaginians; displayed, at the same time, how formidable the power of the Romans was,(791) when they undertook to punish their perfidious allies; and the feeble protection which Hannibal could afford his friends at a time when they most wanted it.

(M127) The Defeat and Death of the two Scipios in Spain.(792)—The face of affairs was very much changed in Spain. The Carthaginians had three armies in that country; one commanded by Asdrubal, the son of Gisgo; the second by Asdrubal, son of Hamilcar; and a third under Mago, who had joined the first Asdrubal. The two Scipios, Cneus and Publius, were for dividing their forces, and attacking the enemy separately, which was the cause of their ruin. They agreed that Cneus, with a small number of Romans, and thirty thousand Celtiberians, should march against Asdrubal, the son of Hamilcar; whilst Publius, with the remainder of the forces, composed of Romans and the Italian allies, should advance against the other two generals.

Publius was vanquished first. To the two leaders whom he had to oppose, Masinissa, elate with the victories he had lately gained over Syphax, joined himself; and was to be soon followed by Indibilis, a powerful Spanish prince. The armies came to an engagement. The Romans, being thus attacked on all sides at once, made a brave resistance as long as they had their general at their head; but the moment he fell, the few troops which had escaped the slaughter, secured themselves by flight.

The three victorious armies marched immediately in quest of Cneus, in order to put an end to the war by his defeat. He was already more than half vanquished by the desertion of his allies, who all forsook him; and left to the Roman generals this important instruction;(793) viz. never to let their own forces be exceeded in number by those of foreigners. He guessed that his brother was slain, and his army defeated, upon seeing such great bodies of the enemy arrive. He survived him but a short time, being killed in the engagement. These two great men were equally lamented by their citizens and allies; and Spain deeply felt their loss, because of the justice and moderation of their conduct.

These extensive countries seemed now inevitably lost; but the valour of L. Marcius,(794) a private officer of the equestrian order, preserved them to the Romans. Shortly after this, the younger Scipio was sent thither, who severely revenged the death of his father and uncle, and restored the affairs of the Romans in Spain to their former flourishing condition.

(M128) The Defeat and Death of Asdrubal.(795)—One unforeseen defeat ruined all the measures, and blasted all the hopes of Hannibal with regard to Italy. The consuls of this year, which was the eleventh of the second Punic war, (for I pass over several events for brevity's sake,) were C. Claudius Nero, and M. Livius. The latter had, for his province, the Cisalpine Gaul, where he was to oppose Asdrubal, who, it was reported, was preparing to pass the Alps. The former commanded in the country of the Brutians, and in Lucania, that is, in the opposite extremity of Italy, and was there making head against Hannibal.

The passage of the Alps gave Asdrubal very little trouble, because his brother had cleared the way for him, and all the nations were disposed to receive him. Some time after this, he despatched couriers to Hannibal, but they were intercepted. Nero found by their letters, that Asdrubal was hastening to join his brother in Umbria. In a conjuncture of so important a nature as this, when the safety of Rome lay at stake, he thought himself at liberty to dispense with the established rules(796) of his duty, for the welfare of his country. In consequence of this, it was his opinion, that such a bold and unexpected blow ought to be struck, as might be capable of striking terror into the enemy; by marching to join his colleague, in order that they might charge Asdrubal unexpectedly with their united forces. This design, if the several circumstances of it are thoroughly examined, should not be hastily charged with imprudence. To prevent the two brothers from joining their armies, was to save the state. Very little would be hazarded, even though Hannibal should be informed of the absence of the consul. From his army, which consisted of forty-two thousand men, he drew out but seven thousand for his own detachment, which indeed were the flower of his troops, but, at the same time, a very inconsiderable part of them. The rest remained in the camp, which was advantageously situated, and strongly fortified. Now could it be supposed that Hannibal would attack, and force a strong camp defended by thirty-five thousand men?

Nero set out without giving his soldiers the least notice of his design. When he had advanced so far, as that it might be communicated without any danger, he told them, that he was leading them to certain victory: that, in war, all things depended upon reputation; that the bare rumour of their arrival would disconcert all the measures of the Carthaginians; and that the whole honour of this battle would fall to them.

They marched with extraordinary diligence, and joined the other consul in the night, but did not pitch separate camps, the better to impose upon the enemy. The troops which were newly arrived joined those of Livius. The army of Porcius the praetor was encamped near that of the consul, and in the morning a council of war was held. Livius was of opinion, that it would be better to allow the troops some days to refresh themselves; but Nero besought him not to ruin, by delay, an enterprise to which despatch only could give success; and to take advantage of the error of the enemy, as well absent as present. This advice was complied with, and accordingly the signal for battle was given. Asdrubal, advancing to his foremost ranks, discovered, by several circumstances, that fresh troops were arrived; and he did not doubt but that they belonged to the other consul. This made him conjecture, that his brother had sustained a considerable loss, and, at the same time, fear, that he was come too late to his assistance.

After making these reflections, he caused a retreat to be sounded, and his army began to march in great disorder. Night overtaking him, and his guides deserting, he was uncertain what way to go. He marched at random, along the banks of the river Metaurus,(797) and was preparing to cross it, when the three armies of the enemy came up with him. In this extremity, he saw it would be impossible for him to avoid coming to an engagement; and therefore did every thing which could be expected from the presence of mind and valour of a great captain. He seized an advantageous post, and drew up his forces on a narrow spot, which gave him an opportunity of posting his left wing (the weakest part of his army) in such a manner, that it could neither be attacked in front, nor charged in flank; and of giving to his main battle and right wing a greater depth than front. After this hasty disposition of his forces, he posted himself in the centre, and was the first to march to attack the enemy's left wing; well knowing that all was at stake, and that he must either conquer or die. The battle lasted a long time, and was obstinately disputed by both parties. Asdrubal, especially, signalized himself in this engagement, and added new glory to that he had already acquired by a series of shining actions. He led on his soldiers, trembling and quite dispirited, against an enemy superior to them both in numbers and resolution. He animated them by his words, supported them by his example, and, with entreaties and menaces, endeavoured to bring back those who fled; till, at last, seeing that victory declared for the Romans, and being unable to survive the loss of so many thousand men, who had quitted their country to follow his fortune, he rushed at once into the midst of a Roman cohort, and there died in a manner worthy the son of Hamilcar, and the brother of Hannibal.

This was the most bloody battle the Carthaginians had fought during this war: and, whether we consider the death of the general, or the slaughter made of the Carthaginian forces, it may be looked upon as a reprisal for the battle of Cannae. The Carthaginians lost fifty-five thousand men,(798) and six thousand were taken prisoners. The Romans lost eight thousand. These were so weary of killing, that some person telling Livius, that he might very easily cut to pieces a body of the enemy who were flying: "It is fit," says he, "that some should survive, in order that they may carry the news of this defeat to the Carthaginians."

Nero set out upon his march, on the very night which followed the engagement. Through every place where he passed, in his return, shouts of joy and loud acclamations welcomed him, instead of those fears and uneasiness which his coming had occasioned. He arrived in his camp the sixth day. Asdrubal's head being thrown into the camp of the Carthaginians, informed Hannibal of his brother's unhappy fate. Hannibal perceived, by this cruel stroke, the fortune of Carthage: "All is over," says he,(799) "I shall no longer send triumphant messages to Carthage. In losing Asdrubal, I have lost at once all my hope, all my good fortune." He afterwards retired to the extremities of the country of the Brutians, where he assembled all his forces, who found it a very difficult matter to subsist there, as no provisions were sent them from Carthage.

(M129) Scipio conquers all Spain. Is appointed Consul, and sails into Africa. Hannibal is recalled.(800)—The fate of arms was not more propitious to the Carthaginians in Spain. The prudent vivacity of young Scipio had restored the Roman affairs in that country to their former flourishing state, as the courageous slowness of Fabius had before done in Italy. The three Carthaginian generals in Spain, Asdrubal son of Gisco, Hanno, and Mago, having been defeated with their numerous armies by the Romans in several engagements, Scipio at last possessed himself of Spain, and subjected it entirely to the Roman power. It was at this time that Masinissa, a very powerful African prince, went over to the Romans, and Syphax, on the contrary, to the Carthaginians.

(M130) Scipio, at his return to Rome, was declared consul, being then thirty years of age. He had P. Licinius Crassus for his colleague. Sicily was allotted to Scipio, with permission for him to cross into Africa, if he found it convenient. He set out with all imaginable expedition for his province; whilst his colleague was to command in the country whither Hannibal was retired.

The taking of New Carthage, where Scipio had displayed all the prudence, the courage, and capacity which could have been expected from the greatest generals, and the conquest of all Spain, were more than sufficient to immortalize his name: but he had considered these only as so many steps by which he was to climb to a nobler enterprise: this was the conquest of Africa. Accordingly, he crossed over thither, and made it the seat of the war.

The devastation of the country, the siege of Utica, one of the strongest cities of Africa; the entire defeat of the two armies under Syphax and Asdrubal, whose camp was burnt by Scipio; and afterwards the taking Syphax himself prisoner, who was the most powerful resource the Carthaginians had left; all these things forced them at last to turn their thoughts to peace. For this purpose they deputed thirty of their principal senators, who were selected from that powerful body at Carthage, called the council of the hundred. Being introduced into the Roman general's tent, they all threw themselves prostrate on the earth, (such was the custom of their country,) spoke to him in terms of great submission, accusing Hannibal as the author of all their calamities, and promising, in the name of the senate, an implicit obedience to whatever the Romans should please to ordain. Scipio answered, that though he was come into Africa not for peace, but conquest, he would however grant them a peace, upon condition that they should deliver up all the prisoners and deserters to the Romans; that they should recall their armies out of Italy and Gaul; should never set foot again in Spain; should retire out of all the islands between Italy and Africa; should deliver up all their ships, twenty excepted, to the victor; should give to the Romans five hundred thousand bushels of wheat, three hundred thousand of barley, and pay fifteen thousand talents: that in case they were pleased with these conditions, they then, he said, might send ambassadors to the senate. The Carthaginians feigned a compliance, but this was only to gain time, till Hannibal should be returned. A truce was then granted to the Carthaginians, who immediately sent deputies to Rome, and at the same time an express to Hannibal, to order his return into Africa.

(M131) He was then, as was observed before, in the extremity of Italy. Here he received the orders from Carthage, which he could not listen to without groans, and almost shedding tears; and was exasperated almost to madness, to see himself thus forced to quit his prey. Never banished man(801) showed so much regret at leaving his native country, as Hannibal did in going out of that of an enemy. He often turned his eyes wishfully to Italy, accusing gods and men of his misfortunes, and calling down a thousand curses, says(802) Livy, upon himself, for not having marched his soldiers directly to Rome, after the battle of Cannae, whilst they were still reeking with the blood of its citizens.

At Rome, the senate, greatly dissatisfied with the excuses made by the Carthaginian deputies, in justification of their republic, and the ridiculous offer which they made, in its name, of adhering to the treaty of Lutatius; thought proper to refer the decision of the whole to Scipio, who, being on the spot, could best judge what conditions the welfare of the state required.

About the same time, Octavius the praetor sailing from Sicily into Africa with two hundred vessels of burden, was attacked near Carthage by a furious storm, which dispersed all his fleet. The citizens, not bearing to see so rich a prey escape them, demanded importunately that the Carthaginian fleet might sail out and seize it. The senate, after a faint resistance, complied. Asdrubal, sailing out of the harbour, seized the greatest part of the Roman ships, and brought them to Carthage, although the truce was still subsisting.

Scipio sent deputies to the Carthaginian senate, to complain of this, but they were little regarded. Hannibal's approach had revived their courage, and filled them with great hopes. The deputies were even in great danger of being ill treated by the populace. They therefore demanded a convoy, which was granted, and accordingly two ships of the republic attended them. But the magistrates, who were absolutely against peace, and determined to renew the war, gave private orders to Asdrubal, (who was with the fleet near Utica,) to attack the Roman galley when it should arrive in the river Bagrada near the Roman camp, where the convoy was ordered to leave them. He obeyed the order, and sent out two galleys against the ambassadors, who nevertheless made their escape, but with difficulty and danger.

This was a fresh subject for a war between the two nations, who now were more animated, or rather more exasperated, one against the other, than ever: the Romans, from a desire of taking vengeance for so black a perfidy; and the Carthaginians, from a persuasion that they were not now to expect a peace.

At the same time, Laelius and Fulvius, who carried the full powers with which the senate and people of Rome had invested Scipio, arrived in the camp, accompanied by the deputies of Carthage. As the Carthaginians had not only infringed the truce, but violated the law of nations, in the person of the Roman ambassadors, it might naturally be expected that they should order the Carthaginian deputies to be seized by way of reprisal. However, Scipio,(803) more attentive to what was required by the Roman generosity, than by the perfidy of the Carthaginians, in order not to deviate from the principles and maxims of his own countrymen, nor his own character, dismissed the deputies, without offering them the least injury. So astonishing an instance of moderation, and at such a juncture, terrified the Carthaginians, and even put them to the blush; and made Hannibal himself entertain a still higher idea of a general, who, to the dishonourable practices of his enemies, opposed only a rectitude and greatness of soul, that was still more worthy of admiration than all his military virtues.

In the mean time, Hannibal, being strongly importuned by his fellow-citizens, advanced forward into the country; and arriving at Zama, which is five days' march from Carthage, he there pitched his camp. He thence sent out spies to observe the position of the Romans. Scipio having seized these, so far from punishing them, only commanded them to be led about the Roman camp, in order that they might take an exact survey of it, and then sent them back to Hannibal. The latter knew very well whence so noble an assurance flowed. After the strange reverses he had met with, he no longer expected that fortune would again be propitious. Whilst every one was exciting him to give battle, himself only meditated a peace. He flattered himself that the conditions of it would be more honourable, as he was at the head of an army, and as the fate of arms might still appear uncertain. He, therefore, sent to desire an interview with Scipio, which accordingly was agreed to, and the time and place fixed.

(M132) The Interview between Hannibal and Scipio in Africa, followed by a Battle.(804)—These two generals, who were not only the most illustrious of their own age, but worthy of being ranked with the most renowned princes and warriors that had ever lived, having met at the place appointed, continued for some time in a deep silence, as though they were astonished, and struck with a mutual admiration at the sight of each other. At last Hannibal spoke, and after having praised Scipio in the most artful and delicate manner, he gave a very lively description of the ravages of the war, and the calamities in which it had involved both the victors and the vanquished. He conjured him not to suffer himself to be dazzled by the splendour of his victories. He represented to him, that how successful soever he might have hitherto been, he ought, however, to be aware of the inconstancy of fortune: that without going far back for examples, he himself, who was then speaking to him, was a glaring proof of this: that Scipio was at that time what Hannibal had been at Thrasymenus and Cannae: that he ought to make a better use of opportunity than himself had done, by consenting to a peace, now it was in his power to propose the conditions of it. He concluded with declaring, that the Carthaginians would willingly resign Sicily, Sardinia, Spain, and all the islands between Africa and Italy, to the Romans: that they must be forced, since such was the will of the gods, to confine themselves to Africa; whilst they should see the Romans extending their conquests to the most remote regions, and obliging all nations to pay obedience to their laws.

Scipio answered in few words, but not with less dignity. He reproached the Carthaginians for their perfidy, in plundering the Roman galleys before the truce was expired. He imputed to them alone, and to their injustice, all the calamities with which the two wars had been attended. After thanking Hannibal for the admonition he had given him, with regard to the uncertainty of human events, he concluded with desiring him to prepare for battle, unless he chose rather to accept of the conditions that had been already proposed; to which (he observed) some others would be added, in order to punish the Carthaginians for their having violated the truce.

Hannibal could not prevail with himself to accept these conditions, and the generals left one another, with the resolution to decide the fate of Carthage by a general battle. Each commander exhorted his troops to fight valiantly. Hannibal enumerated the victories he had gained over the Romans, the generals he had slain, the armies he had cut to pieces. Scipio represented to his soldiers, the conquest of both the Spains, his successes in Africa, and the confession the enemies themselves made of their weakness, by thus coming to sue for peace. All this he spoke(805) with the tone and air of a conqueror. Never were motives more powerful to prompt troops to behave gallantly. This day was to complete the glory of the one or the other of the generals; and to decide whether Rome or Carthage was to prescribe laws to all other nations.

I shall not undertake to describe the order of the battle, nor the valour of the forces on both sides. The reader will naturally suppose, that two such experienced generals did not forget any circumstance which could contribute to the victory. The Carthaginians, after a very obstinate fight, were obliged to fly, leaving twenty thousand men on the field of battle, and the like number of prisoners were taken by the Romans. Hannibal escaped in the tumult, and entering Carthage, owned that he was irrecoverably overthrown, and that the citizens had no other choice left than to accept of peace on any conditions. Scipio bestowed great eulogiums on Hannibal, chiefly with regard to his ability in taking advantages, his manner of drawing up his army, and giving out his orders in the engagement; and he affirmed, that Hannibal had this day surpassed himself, although the success had not answered his valour and conduct.

With regard to himself, he well knew how to make a proper advantage of the victory, and the consternation with which he had filled the enemy. He commanded one of his lieutenants to march his land army to Carthage, whilst himself prepared to conduct the fleet thither.

He was not far from the city, when he met a vessel covered with streamers and olive-branches, bringing ten of the most considerable persons of the state, as ambassadors to implore his clemency. However, he dismissed them without making any answer, and bade them come to him at Tunis, where he should halt. The deputies of Carthage, thirty in number, came to him at the place appointed, and sued for peace in the most submissive terms. He then called a council there, the majority of which were for rasing Carthage, and treating the inhabitants with the utmost severity. But the consideration of the time which must necessarily be employed before so strongly fortified a city could be taken; and Scipio's fear lest a successor might be appointed him whilst he should be employed in the siege, made him incline to clemency.

_A Peace concluded between the Carthaginians and the _ Romans. The End of the Second Punic War._(_806_)—The conditions of the peace dictated by Scipio to the Carthaginians were, "That the Carthaginians should continue free, and preserve their laws, their territories, and the cities they possessed in Africa before the war—That they should deliver up to the Romans all deserters, slaves, and prisoners belonging to them; all their ships, except ten triremes; all the elephants which they then had, and that they should not train up any more for war—That they should not make war out of Africa, nor even in that country, without first obtaining leave for that purpose from the Roman people—Should restore to Masinissa every thing of which they had dispossessed either him or his ancestors—Should furnish money and corn to the Roman auxiliaries, till their ambassadors should be returned from Rome—Should pay to the Romans ten thousand Euboic talents(807) of silver in fifty annual payments; and give a hundred hostages, who should be nominated by Scipio. And in order that they might have time to send to Rome, he agreed to grant them a truce, upon condition that they should restore the ships taken during the former, without which they were not to expect either a truce or peace."

When the deputies were returned to Carthage, they laid before the senate the conditions dictated by Scipio. But they appeared so intolerable to Gisgo, that rising up, he made a speech, in order to dissuade his citizens from accepting a peace on such shameful terms. Hannibal, provoked at the calmness with which such an orator was heard, took Gisgo by the arm, and dragged him from his seat. A behaviour so outrageous, and so remote from the manners of a free city like Carthage, raised an universal murmur. Hannibal himself was vexed when he reflected on what he had done, and immediately made an apology for it. "As I left," says he, "your city at nine years of age, and did not return to it till after thirty-six years' absence, I had full leisure to learn the arts of war, and flatter myself that I have made some improvement in them. As for your laws and customs, it is no wonder I am ignorant of them, and I therefore desire you to instruct me in them." He then expatiated on the indispensable necessity they were under of concluding a peace. He added, that they ought to thank the gods for having prompted the Romans to grant them a peace even on these conditions. He pointed out to them the great importance of their uniting in opinion; and of not giving an opportunity, by their divisions, for the people to take an affair of this nature under their cognizance. The whole city came over to his opinion; and accordingly the peace was accepted. The senate made Scipio satisfaction with regard to the ships reclaimed by him; and, after obtaining a truce for three months, they sent ambassadors to Rome.

These Carthaginians, who were all venerable for their years and dignity, were admitted immediately to an audience. Asdrubal, surnamed Hoedus, who was still an irreconcileable enemy to Hannibal and his faction, spoke first; and after having excused, to the best of his power, the people of Carthage, by imputing the rupture to the ambition of some particular persons, he added, that had the Carthaginians listened to his counsels and those of Hanno, they would have been able to grant the Romans the peace for which they now were obliged to sue. "But,"(808) continued he, "wisdom and prosperity are very rarely found together. The Romans are invincible, because they never suffer themselves to be blinded by good fortune. And it would be surprising should they act otherwise. Success dazzles those only to whom it is new and unusual; whereas the Romans are so much accustomed to conquer, that they are almost insensible to the charms of victory; and it may be said to their glory, that they have extended their empire, in some measure, more by the humanity they have shown to the conquered, than by the conquest itself." The other ambassadors spoke with a more plaintive tone of voice, and represented the calamitous state to which Carthage was going to be reduced, and the grandeur and power from which it was fallen.

The senate and people being equally inclined to peace, sent full power to Scipio to conclude it; left the conditions to that general, and permitted him to march back his army, after the treaty should be concluded.

The ambassadors desired leave to enter the city, to redeem some of their prisoners, and they found about two hundred whom they desired to ransom. But the senate sent them to Scipio, with orders that they should be restored without any pecuniary consideration, in case a peace should be concluded.

The Carthaginians, on the return of their ambassadors, concluded a peace with Scipio, on the terms he himself had prescribed. They then delivered up to him more than five hundred ships, all which he burnt in sight of Carthage; a lamentable spectacle to the inhabitants of that ill-fated city! He struck off the heads of the allies of the Latin name, and hanged all the Roman citizens who were surrendered up to him, as deserters.

When the time for the payment of the first tribute imposed by the treaty was expired, as the funds of the government were exhausted by this long and expensive war; the difficulty of levying so great a sum, threw the senate into deep affliction, and many could not refrain even from tears. Hannibal on this occasion is said to have laughed; and when he was reproached by Asdrubal Hoedus, for thus insulting his country in the affliction which he had brought upon it, "Were it possible," says Hannibal, "for my heart to be seen, and that as clearly as my countenance; you would then find that this laughter which offends so much, flows not from an intemperate joy, but from a mind almost distracted with the public calamities. But is this laughter more unseasonable than your unbecoming tears? Then, then, ought you to have wept, when your arms were ingloriously taken from you, your ships burnt, and you were forbidden to engage in any foreign wars. This was the mortal blow which laid us prostrate.—We are sensible of the public calamity, so far only as we have a personal concern in it; and the loss of our money gives us the most pungent sorrow. Hence it was, that when our city was made the spoil of the victor; when it was left disarmed and defenceless amidst so many powerful nations of Africa, who had at that time taken the field, not a groan, not a sigh was heard. But now, when you are called on to contribute individually to the tax imposed upon the state, you bewail and lament as if all were lost. Alas! I only wish that the subject of this day's grief does not soon appear to you the least of your misfortunes."

Scipio, after all things were concluded, embarked, in order to return to Italy. He arrived at Rome, through crowds of people, whom curiosity had drawn together to behold his march. The most magnificent triumph that Rome had ever seen was decreed him, and the surname of Africanus was bestowed upon this great man; an honour till then unknown, no person before him having assumed the name of a vanquished nation. Such was the conclusion of the second Punic war, after having lasted seventeen years.

(M133) A short Reflection on the Government of Carthage in the time of the Second Punic War.—I shall conclude the particulars which relate to the second Punic war, with a reflection of Polybius,(809) which will show the difference between the two commonwealths of Rome and Carthage. It may be affirmed, in some measure, that at the beginning of the second Punic war, and in Hannibal's time, Carthage was in its decline. The flower of its youth, and its sprightly vigour were already diminished. It had begun to fall from its exalted pitch of power, and was inclining towards its ruin; whereas Rome was then, as it were, in its bloom and prime of life, and swiftly advancing to the conquest of the universe. The reason of the declension of the one, and the rise of the other, is deduced, by Polybius, from the different form of government established in these commonwealths, at the time we are now speaking of. At Carthage, the common people had seized upon the sovereign authority with regard to public affairs, and the advice of their ancient men or magistrates was no longer listened to; all affairs were transacted by intrigue and cabal. To take no notice of the artifices which the faction adverse to Hannibal employed, during the whole time of his command, to perplex him; the single instance of burning the Roman vessels during a truce, a perfidious action to which the common people compelled the senate to lend their name and assistance, is a proof of Polybius's assertion. On the contrary, at this very time, the Romans paid the highest regard to their senate, that is, to a body composed of the greatest sages; and their old men were listened to and revered as oracles. It is well known that the Roman people were exceedingly jealous of their authority, and especially in whatever related to the election of magistrates. A century of young men, who by lot were to give the first vote, which generally directed all the rest, had nominated two consuls.(810) On the bare remonstrance of Fabius,(811) who represented to the people, that in a tempest, like that with which Rome was then struggling, the ablest pilots ought to be chosen to steer the vessel of the state, the century returned to their suffrages, and nominated other consuls. Polybius infers, that a people, thus guided by the prudence of old men, could not fail of prevailing over a state which was governed wholly by the giddy multitude. And indeed, the Romans, under the guidance of the wise counsels of their senate, gained at last the superiority with regard to the war considered in general, though they were defeated in several particular engagements; and established their power and grandeur on the ruin of their rivals.

The interval between the Second and Third Punic War.—This interval, though considerable enough with regard to its duration, since it took up above fifty years, is very little remarkable as to the events which relate to Carthage. They may be reduced to two heads; of which the one relates to the person of Hannibal, and the other to some particular differences between the Carthaginians and Masinissa king of the Numidians. We shall treat both separately, but at no great length.

SECT. I. CONTINUATION OF THE HISTORY OF HANNIBAL.—When the second Punic war was ended, by the treaty of peace concluded with Scipio, Hannibal, as he himself observed in the Carthaginian senate, was forty-five years of age. What we have farther to say of this great man, includes the space of twenty-five years.

Hannibal undertakes and completes the Reformation of the Courts of Justice, and the Treasury of Carthage.—After the conclusion of the peace, Hannibal, at least at first, was greatly respected at Carthage, where he filled the first employments of the state with honour and applause. He headed the Carthaginian forces in some wars against the Africans:(812) but the Romans, to whom the very name of Hannibal gave uneasiness, not being able to see him in arms without displeasure, made complaints on that account, and accordingly he was recalled to Carthage.

On his return he was appointed praetor, which seems to have been a very considerable employment, and to have conferred great authority. Carthage is therefore going to be, with regard to him, a new theatre, as it were, on which he will display virtues and qualities of a quite different nature from those we have hitherto admired in him, and which will finish the picture of this illustrious man.

Eagerly desirous of restoring the affairs of his afflicted country to their former happy condition, he was persuaded, that the two most powerful methods to make a state flourish, were, an exact and equal distribution of justice to all its subjects in general, and a scrupulous fidelity in the management of the public finances. The former, by preserving an equality among the citizens, and making them enjoy such a delightful, undisturbed liberty under the protection of the laws, as fully secures their honour, their lives, and properties; unites the individuals of the commonwealth more closely together, and attaches them more firmly to the state, to which they owe the preservation of all that is most dear and valuable to them. The latter, by a faithful administration of the public revenues, supplies punctually the several wants and necessities of the state; keeps in reserve a never failing resource for sudden emergencies, and prevents the people from being burthened with new taxes, which are rendered necessary by extravagant profusion, and which chiefly contribute to make men harbour an aversion for the government.

Hannibal saw, with great concern, the irregularities which had crept equally into the administration of justice, and the management of the finances. Upon his being nominated praetor, as his love for regularity and order made him uneasy at every deviation from it, and prompted him to use his utmost endeavours to restore it; he had the courage to attempt the reformation of this double abuse, which drew after it a numberless multitude of others, without dreading, either the animosity of the old faction that opposed him, or the new enmity which his zeal for the republic must necessarily draw upon him.

The judges exercised the most flagrant extortion with impunity.(813) They were so many petty tyrants, who disposed, in an arbitrary manner, of the lives and fortunes of the citizens; without there being the least possibility of putting a stop to their injustice, because they held their commissions for life, and mutually supported one another. Hannibal, as praetor, summoned before his tribunal an officer belonging to the bench of judges, who openly abused his power. Livy tells us that he was a questor. This officer, who was of the opposite faction to Hannibal, and had already assumed all the pride and haughtiness of the judges, among whom he was to be admitted at the expiration of his present office, insolently refused to obey the summons. Hannibal was not of a disposition to suffer an affront of this nature tamely. Accordingly, he caused him to be seized by a lictor, and brought him before an assembly of the people. There, not satisfied with directing his resentment against this single officer, he impeached the whole bench of judges; whose insupportable and tyrannical pride was not restrained, either by the fear of the laws, or a reverence for the magistrates. And, as Hannibal perceived that he was heard with pleasure, and that the lowest and most inconsiderable of the people discovered, on this occasion, that they were no longer able to bear the insolent pride of these judges, who seemed to have a design upon their liberties; he proposed a law, (which accordingly passed,) by which it was enacted, that new judges should be chosen annually; with a clause, that none should continue in office beyond that term. This law, at the same time that it acquired him the friendship and esteem of the people, drew upon him, proportionably, the hatred of the greatest part of the grandees and nobility.

He attempted another reformation, which created him new enemies, but gained him great honour.(814) The public revenues were either squandered away by the negligence of those who had the management of them, or were plundered by the chief men of the city and the magistrates; so that, money being wanting to pay the annual tribute due to the Romans, the Carthaginians were going to levy it upon the people in general. Hannibal, entering into a large detail of the public revenues, ordered an exact estimate of them to be laid before him; inquired in what manner they had been applied; the employments and ordinary expenses of the state; and having discovered, by this inquiry, that the public funds had been in a great measure embezzled by the fraud of the officers who had the management of them, he declared and promised, in a full assembly of the people, that, without laying any new taxes upon private men, the republic should hereafter be enabled to pay the tribute to the Romans; and he was as good as his word. The farmers of the revenues, whose plunder and rapine he had publicly detected, having accustomed themselves hitherto to fatten upon the spoils of their country, exclaimed(815) vehemently against these regulations, as if their own property had been forced out of their hands, and not the sums they had plundered from the public.

The Retreat and Death of Hannibal.(816)—This double reformation of abuses raised great clamours against Hannibal. His enemies were writing incessantly to the chief men, or their friends, at Rome, to inform them, that he was carrying on a secret intelligence with Antiochus king of Syria; that he frequently received couriers from him; and that this prince had privately despatched agents to Hannibal, to concert with him the measures for carrying on the war he was meditating: that as some animals are so extremely fierce, that it is impossible ever to tame them; in like manner this man was of so turbulent and implacable a spirit, that he could not brook ease, and therefore would, sooner or later, break out again. These informations were listened to at Rome; and as the transactions of the preceding war had been begun and carried on almost solely by Hannibal, they appeared more probable. However, Scipio strongly opposed the violent measures which the senate were going to take on their receiving this intelligence, by representing it as derogatory to the dignity of the Roman people, to countenance the hatred and accusations of Hannibal's enemies; to support, with their authority, their unjust passions; and obstinately to persecute him even in the very heart of his country; as though the Romans had not humbled him sufficiently, in driving him out of the field, and forcing him to lay down his arms.

But notwithstanding these prudent remonstrances, the senate appointed three commissioners to go and make their complaints to Carthage, and to demand that Hannibal should be delivered up to them. On their arrival in that city, though other motives were speciously pretended, yet Hannibal was perfectly sensible that himself only was aimed at. The evening being come, he conveyed himself on board a ship, which he had secretly provided for that purpose; on which occasion he bewailed his country's fate more than his own. Saepius patriae quam suorum(817) eventus miseratus. This was the eighth year after the conclusion of the peace. The first place he landed at was Tyre, where he was received as in his second country, and had all the honours paid him which were due to his exalted merit. (M134) After staying some days here, he set out for Antioch, which the king had lately left, and from thence waited upon him at Ephesus. The arrival of so renowned a general gave great pleasure to the king; and did not a little contribute to determine him to engage in war against Rome; for hitherto he had appeared wavering and uncertain on that head. In this city, a philosopher, who was looked upon as the greatest orator of Asia, had the imprudence to make a long harangue before Hannibal, on the duties of a general, and the rules of the art-military.(818) The speech charmed the whole audience. But Hannibal being asked his opinion of it, "I have seen," says he, "many old dotards in my life, but this exceeds them all."(819)

The Carthaginians, justly fearing that Hannibal's escape would certainly draw upon them the arms of the Romans, sent them advice that Hannibal was withdrawn to Antiochus.(820) The Romans were very much disturbed at this news; and the king might have turned it extremely to his advantage, had he known how to make a proper use of it.

The first advice that Hannibal gave him at this time, and which he frequently repeated afterwards, was, to make Italy the seat of the war.(821) He required an hundred ships, eleven or twelve thousand land forces, and offered to take upon himself the command of the fleet; to cross into Africa, in order to engage the Carthaginians in the war; and afterwards to make a descent upon Italy, during which the king himself should remain in Greece with his army, holding himself constantly in readiness to cross over into Italy, whenever it should be thought convenient. This was the only thing proper to be done, and the king very much approved the proposal at first.

Hannibal thought it would be expedient to prepare his friends at Carthage, in order to engage them the more strongly in his views.(822) The transmitting of information by letters, is not only unsafe, but they can give only an imperfect idea of things, and are never sufficiently particular. He therefore despatched a trusty person with ample instructions to Carthage. This man was scarce arrived in the city, but his business was suspected. Accordingly, he was watched and followed: and, at last, orders were issued for his being seized. However, he prevented the vigilance of his enemies, and escaped in the night; after having fixed, in several public places, papers, which fully declared the occasion of his journey. The senate immediately sent advice of this to the Romans.

(M135) Villius, one of the deputies who had been sent into Asia, to inquire into the state of affairs there, and, if possible, to discover the real designs of Antiochus, found Hannibal in Ephesus.(823) He had many conferences with him, paid him several visits, and speciously affected to show a particular esteem for him on all occasions. But his chief aim, by all this designing behaviour, was to make him be suspected, and to lessen his credit with the king, in which he succeeded but too well.(824)

Some authors affirm, that Scipio was joined in this embassy;(825) and they even relate the conversation which that general had with Hannibal. They tell us, that the Roman having asked him, who, in his opinion, was the greatest captain that had ever lived; he answered, Alexander the Great, because, with a handful of Macedonians, he had defeated numberless armies, and carried his conquests into countries so very remote, that it seemed scarce possible for any man only to travel so far. Being afterwards asked, to whom he gave the second rank; he answered, to Pyrrhus: Because this king was the first who understood the art of pitching a camp to advantage; no commander ever made a more judicious choice of his posts, was better skilled in drawing up his forces, or was more dexterous in winning the affection of foreign soldiers; insomuch that even the people of Italy were more desirous to have him for their governor, though a foreigner, than the Romans themselves, who had so long been settled in their country. Scipio proceeding, asked him next, whom he looked upon as the third: on which Hannibal made no scruple to assign that rank to himself. Here Scipio could not forbear laughing: "But what would you have said," continued Scipio, "had you conquered me?" "I would," replied Hannibal, "have ranked myself above Alexander, Pyrrhus, and all the generals the world ever produced." Scipio was not insensible of so refined and delicate a flattery, which he no ways expected; and which, by giving him no rival, seemed to insinuate, that no captain was worthy of being put in comparison with him.

The answer, as told by Plutarch,(826) is less witty, and not so probable. In this author, Hannibal gives Pyrrhus the first place, Scipio the second, and himself the third.

Hannibal, sensible of the coldness with which Antiochus received him, ever since his conferences with Villius or Scipio, took no notice of it for some time, and seemed insensible of it.(827) But at last he thought it advisable to come to an explanation with the king, and to open his mind freely to him. "The hatred (says he) which I bear to the Romans, is known to the whole world. I bound myself to it by an oath, from my most tender infancy. It is this hatred that made me draw the sword against Rome during thirty-six years. It is that, which, even in times of peace, has caused me to be driven from my native country, and forced me to seek an asylum in your dominions. For ever guided and fired by the same passion, should my hopes be frustrated here, I will fly to every part of the globe, and rouse up all nations against the Romans. I hate them, and will hate them eternally; and know that they bear me no less animosity. So long as you shall continue in the resolution to take up arms against them, you may rank Hannibal in the number of your best friends. But if other counsels incline you to peace, I declare to you, once for all, address yourself to others for advice, and not to me." Such a speech, which came from his heart, and expressed the greatest sincerity, struck the king, and seemed to remove all his suspicions; so that he now resolved to give Hannibal the command of part of his fleet.

But what havoc is not flattery capable of making in courts and in the minds of princes!(828) Antiochus was told, "that it was imprudent in him to put so much confidence in Hannibal, an exile, a Carthaginian, whose fortune or genius might suggest to him, in one day, a thousand different projects: that besides, this very fame which Hannibal had acquired in war, and which he considered as his peculiar inheritance, was too great for a man who fought only under the ensigns of another: that none but the king ought to be the general and conductor of the war, and that it was incumbent on him to draw upon himself alone the eyes and attention of all men; whereas, should Hannibal be employed, he (a foreigner) would have the glory of all the successes ascribed to him." "No minds,"(829) says Livy, on this occasion, "are more susceptible of envy, than those whose merit is below their birth and dignity; such persons always abhorring virtue and worth in others, for this reason alone, because they are strange and foreign to themselves." This observation was fully verified on this occasion. Antiochus had been taken on his weak side; a low and sordid jealousy, which is the defect and characteristic of little minds, extinguished every generous sentiment in that monarch. Hannibal was now slighted and laid aside: however, he was greatly revenged on Antiochus, by the ill success this prince met with; and showed how unfortunate that king is whose soul is accessible to envy, and his ears open to the poisonous insinuation of flatterers.

In a council held some time after, to which Hannibal, for form sake, was admitted, he, when it came to his turn to speak, endeavoured chiefly to prove, that Philip of Macedon ought, on any terms, to be engaged to form an alliance with Antiochus, which was not so difficult as might be imagined.(830) "With regard," says Hannibal, "to the operations of the war, I adhere immovably to my first opinion; and had my counsels been listened to before, Tuscany and Liguria would now be all in a flame: and Hannibal (a name that strikes terror into the Romans) in Italy. Though I should not be very well skilled as to other matters, yet the good and ill success I have met with must necessarily have taught me sufficiently how to carry on a war against the Romans. I have nothing now in my power, but to give you my counsel, and offer you my service. May the gods give success to all your undertakings!" Hannibal's speech was received with applause, but not one of his counsels was put in execution.

Antiochus, imposed upon and lulled asleep by his flatterers, remained quiet at Ephesus, after the Romans had driven him out of Greece;(831) not once imagining that they would ever invade his dominions. Hannibal, who was now restored to favour, was for ever assuring him, that the war would soon be removed into Asia, and that he would soon see the enemy at his gates: that he must resolve, either to abdicate his throne, or oppose vigorously a people who grasped at the empire of the world. This discourse awakened, in some little measure, the king out of his lethargy, and prompted him to make some weak efforts. But, as his conduct was unsteady, after sustaining a great many considerable losses, he was forced to terminate the war by an ignominious peace; one of the articles of which was, that he should deliver up Hannibal to the Romans. However, the latter did not give him opportunity to put it in execution, but retired to the island of Crete, to consider there what course it would be best for him to take.

The riches he had brought along with him, of which the people of the island got some notice, had like to have proved his ruin.(832) Hannibal was never wanting in stratagems, and he had occasion to employ them now, to save both himself and his treasure. He filled several vessels with molten lead, the tops of which he just covered over with gold and silver. These he deposited in the temple of Diana, in presence of several Cretans, to whose honesty, he said, he confided all his treasure. A strong guard was then posted round the temple, and Hannibal left at full liberty, from a supposition that his riches were secured. (M136) But he had concealed them in hollow statues of brass,(833) which he always carried along with him. And then, embracing a favourable opportunity to make his escape, he fled to the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia.(834)

It appears from history, that he made some stay in the court of this prince, who soon engaged in war with Eumenes, king of Pergamus, a professed friend to the Romans. By means of Hannibal, the troops of Prusias gained several victories both by land and sea.

He employed a stratagem of an extraordinary kind, in a sea-fight.(835) As the enemy's fleet consisted of more ships than his, he had recourse to artifice. He put into earthen vessels all kinds of serpents, and ordered these vessels to be thrown into the enemy's ships. His chief aim was to destroy Eumenes; and for that purpose it was necessary for him to find out which ship he was on board of. This Hannibal discovered by sending out a boat, upon pretence of conveying a letter to him. Having gained his point thus far, he ordered the commanders of the respective vessels to direct their attack principally against Eumenes's ship. They obeyed, and would have taken it, had he not outsailed his pursuers. The rest of the ships of Pergamus sustained the fight with great vigour, till the earthen vessels had been thrown into them. At first they only laughed at this, and were very much surprised to find such weapons employed against them. But when they saw themselves surrounded with the serpents, which darted out of these vessels when they flew to pieces, they were seized with dread, retired in disorder, and yielded the victory to the enemy.

(M137) Services of so important a nature seemed to secure for ever to Hannibal an undisturbed asylum at that prince's court.(836) However, the Romans would not suffer him to be easy there, but deputed Q. Flamininus to Prusias, to complain of the protection he gave Hannibal. The latter easily guessed the motive of this embassy, and therefore did not wait till his enemies had an opportunity of delivering him up. At first he attempted to secure himself by flight; but perceiving that the seven secret outlets, which he had contrived in his palace, were all seized by the soldiers of Prusias, who, by perfidiously betraying his guest, was desirous of making his court to the Romans; he ordered the poison, which he had long kept for this melancholy occasion, to be brought him; and taking it in his hand, "Let us," said he, "free the Romans from the disquiet with which they have so long been tortured, since they have not patience to wait for an old man's death. The victory which Flamininus gains over a man disarmed and betrayed will not do him much honour. This single day will be a lasting testimony of the great degeneracy of the Romans. Their fathers sent notice to Pyrrhus, to desire he would beware of a traitor who intended to poison him, and that at a time when this prince was at war with them in the very centre of Italy; but their sons have deputed a person of consular dignity to spirit up Prusias, impiously to murder one who is not only his friend, but his guest." After calling down curses upon Prusias, and having invoked the gods, the protectors and avengers of the sacred rights of hospitality, he swallowed the poison,(837) and died at seventy years of age.

This year was remarkable for the death of three great men, Hannibal, Philopoemen, and Scipio, who had this in common, that they all died out of their native countries, by a death little correspondent to the glory of their actions. The two first died by poison: Hannibal being betrayed by his host; and Philopoemen being taken prisoner in a battle against the Messenians, and thrown into a dungeon, was forced to swallow poison. As to Scipio, he banished himself, to avoid an unjust prosecution which was carrying on against him at Rome, and ended his days in a kind of obscurity.

The Character and Eulogium of Hannibal.—This would be the proper place for representing the excellent qualities of Hannibal, who reflected so much glory on Carthage. But as I have attempted to draw his character elsewhere,(838) and to give a just idea of him, by making a comparison between him and Scipio, I think myself dispensed from giving his eulogium at large in this place.

Persons who devote themselves to the profession of arms, cannot spend too much time in the study of this great man, who is looked upon, by the best judges, as the most complete general, in almost every respect, that ever the world produced.

During the whole seventeen years that the war lasted, two errors only are objected to him: first, his not marching, immediately after the battle of Cannae, his victorious army to Rome, in order to besiege that city: secondly, his suffering their courage to be softened and enervated during their winter-quarters in Capua: errors, which only show that great men are not so in all things;(839) summi enim sunt, homine tamen; and which, perhaps, may be partly excused.

But then, for these two errors, what a multitude of shining qualities appear in Hannibal! How extensive were his views and designs, even in his most tender years! What greatness of soul! What intrepidity! What presence of mind must he have possessed, to be able, even in the fire and heat of action, to turn every thing to advantage! With what surprising address must he have managed the minds of men, that, amidst so great a variety of nations which composed his army, who often were in want both of money and provisions, his camp was not once disturbed with any insurrection, either against himself or any of his generals! With what equity, what moderation must he have behaved towards his new allies, to have prevailed so far as to attach them inviolably to his service, though he was reduced to the necessity of making them sustain almost the whole burthen of the war, by quartering his army upon them, and levying contributions in their several countries! In short, how fruitful must he have been in expedients, to be able to carry on, for so many years, a war in a remote country, in spite of the violent opposition made by a powerful faction at home, which refused him supplies of every kind, and thwarted him on all occasions; it may be affirmed, that Hannibal, during the whole series of this war, seemed the only prop of the state, and the soul of every part of the empire of the Carthaginians, who could never believe themselves conquered, till Hannibal confessed that he himself was so.

But our acquaintance with Hannibal will be very imperfect, if we consider him only at the head of armies. The particulars we learn from history, concerning the secret intelligence he held with Philip of Macedon; the wise counsels he gave to Antiochus, king of Syria; the double reformation he introduced in Carthage, with regard to the management of the public revenues and the administration of justice, prove, that he was a great statesman in every respect. So superior and universal was his genius, that it took in all parts of government; and so great were his natural abilities, that he was capable of acquitting himself in all the various functions of it with glory. Hannibal shone as conspicuously in the cabinet as in the field; equally able to fill the civil as the military employments. In a word, he united in his own person the different talents and merits of all professions, the sword, the gown, and the finances.

He had some learning, and though he was so much employed in military labours, and engaged in so many wars, he, however, found some leisure to devote to literature.(840) Several smart repartees of Hannibal, which have been transmitted to us, show that he had a great fund of natural wit; and this he improved by the most polite education that could be bestowed at that time, and in such a republic as Carthage. He spoke Greek tolerably well, and even wrote some books in that language. His preceptor was a Lacedaemonian, named Sosilus, who, with Philenius, another Lacedaemonian, accompanied him in all his expeditions. Both these undertook to write the history of this renowned warrior.

With regard to his religion and moral conduct, he was not altogether so profligate and wicked as he is represented by Livy:(841) "cruel even to inhumanity, more perfidious than a Carthaginian; regardless of truth, of probity, of the sacred ties of oaths; fearless of the gods, and utterly void of religion." _Inhumana crudelitas, perfida plusquam Punica; nihil veri, nihil sancti, nullus deum metus, nullum jusjurandum, nulla _ religio._ According to Polybius,(842) he rejected a barbarous proposal that was made him before he entered Italy, which was, to eat human flesh, at a time when his army was in absolute want of provisions. Some years after, so far from treating with barbarity, as he was advised to do, the dead body of Sempronius Gracchus, which Mago had sent him, he caused his funeral obsequies to be solemnized in presence of the whole army.(843) We have seen him, on many occasions, evince the highest reverence for the gods; and Justin,(844) who copied Trogus Pompeius, an author worthy of credit, observes, that he always showed uncommon moderation and continence, with regard to the great number of women taken by him during the course of so long a war; insomuch that no one would have imagined he had been born in Africa, where incontinence is the predominant vice of the country. _Pudicitiamque eum tantam inter tot captivas habuisse, ut in Africa natum quivis negaret._

His disregard of wealth, at a time when he had so many opportunities to enrich himself by the plunder of the cities he stormed, and the nations he subdued, shows that he knew the true and genuine use which a general ought to make of riches, viz. to gain the affection of his soldiers, and to attach his allies to his interest, by diffusing his beneficence on proper occasions, and not being sparing in his rewards: a quality very essential, and at the same time as uncommon, in a commander. The only use Hannibal made of money was to purchase success; firmly persuaded, that a man who is at the head of affairs is sufficiently recompensed by the glory derived from victory.

He always led a very regular, austere life;(845) and even in times of peace, and in the midst of Carthage, when he was invested with the first dignity of the city, we are told that he never used to recline himself on a bed at meals, as was the custom in those ages, and that he drank but very little wine. So regular and uniform a life may serve as an illustrious example to our commanders, who often include, among the privileges of war and the duty of officers, the keeping of splendid tables, and living luxuriously.

I do not, however, pretend altogether to exculpate Hannibal from all the errors with which he is charged. Though he possessed an assemblage of the most exalted qualities, it cannot be denied but that he had some little tincture of the vices of his country; and that it would be difficult to excuse some actions and circumstances of his life. Polybius observes,(846) that Hannibal was accused of avarice in Carthage, and of cruelty in Rome. He adds, on the same occasion, that people were very much divided in opinion concerning him; and it would be no wonder, as he had made himself so many enemies in both cities, that they should have drawn him in disadvantageous colours. But Polybius is of opinion, that though it should be taken for granted, that all the defects with which he is charged are true; yet that they were not so much owing to his nature and disposition, as to the difficulties with which he was surrounded, in the course of so long and laborious a war; and to the complacency he was obliged to show to the general officers, whose assistance he absolutely wanted, for the execution of his various enterprises; and whom he was not always able to restrain, any more than he could the soldiers who fought under them.

SECT. II. DISSENSIONS BETWEEN THE CARTHAGINIANS AND MASINISSA, KING OF NUMIDIA.—Among the conditions of the peace granted to the Carthaginians, there was one which enacted, that they should restore to Masinissa all the territories and cities he possessed before the war; and further, Scipio, to reward the zeal and fidelity which that monarch had shown towards the Romans, had added to his dominions those of Syphax. This present afterwards gave rise to disputes and quarrels between the Carthaginians and Numidians.

These two princes, Syphax and Masinissa, were both kings in Numidia, but reigned over different nations. The subjects of Syphax were called Masaesuli, and their capital was Cirtha. Those of Masinissa were the Massyli: but they are better known by the name of Numidians, which was common to them both. Their principal strength consisted in their cavalry. They always rode without saddles, and some even without bridles, whence Virgil(847) calls them Numidae infraeni.

In the beginning of the second Punic war,(848) Syphax siding with the Romans, Gala, the father of Masinissa, to check the career of so powerful a neighbour, thought it his interest to join the Carthaginians, and accordingly sent out against Syphax a powerful army under the conduct of his son, at that time but seventeen years of age. Syphax, being overcome in a battle, in which it is said he lost thirty thousand men, escaped into Mauritania. However, the face of things was afterwards greatly changed.

Masinissa, after his father's death, was often reduced to the brink of ruin;(849) being driven from his kingdom by an usurper; pursued warmly by Syphax; in danger every instant of falling into the hands of his enemies; destitute of forces, money, and of every resource. He was at that time in alliance with the Romans, and the friend of Scipio, with whom he had had an interview in Spain. His misfortunes would not permit him to bring great succours to that general. When Laelius arrived in Africa, Masinissa joined him with a few horse, and from that time continued inviolably attached to the Roman interest. Syphax, on the contrary, having married the famous Sophonisba, daughter of Asdrubal, went over to the Carthaginians.(850)

The fate of these two princes again changed, but the change was now final.(851) Syphax lost a great battle, and was taken alive by the enemy. Masinissa, the victor, besieged Cirtha, his capital, and took it. But he met with a greater danger in that city than he had faced in the field, and this was Sophonisba, whose charms and endearments he was unable to resist. To secure this princess to himself, he married her, but a few days after, he was obliged to send her a dose of poison, as her nuptial present; this being the only way that he could devise to keep his promise with his queen, and preserve her from the power of the Romans.

This was a considerable error in itself, and one that could not fail to disoblige a nation that was so jealous of its authority: but this young prince gloriously made amends for his fault, by the signal services he afterwards rendered to Scipio. We observed, that after the defeat and capture of Syphax, the dominions of this prince were bestowed upon him;(852) and that the Carthaginians were forced to restore all he possessed before. This gave rise to the divisions which we are now going to relate.

A territory situated towards the sea-side, near the lesser Syrtis, was the subject of the dispute.(853) The country was very rich, and the soil extremely fruitful; a proof of which is, that the city of Leptis alone, which belonged to that territory, paid daily a talent to the Carthaginians, by way of tribute. Masinissa had seized part of this territory. Each side despatched deputies to Rome, to plead the cause of their respective superiors before the senate. This assembly thought proper to send Scipio Africanus, with two other commissioners, to examine the controversy upon the spot. However, they returned without coming to any decision, and left the business in the same uncertain state in which they had found it. Possibly they acted in this manner by order of the senate, and had received private instructions to favour Masinissa, who was then possessed of the district in question.

(M138) Ten years after, new commissioners having been appointed to examine the same affair, they acted as the former had done, and left the whole undetermined.(854)

(M139) After the like distance of time, the Carthaginians again brought their complaint before the senate, but with greater importunity than before.(855) They represented, that besides the lands at first contested, Masinissa had, during the two preceding years, dispossessed them of upwards of seventy towns and castles: their hands were bound up by that article of the last treaty, which forbade their making war upon any of the allies of the Romans: that they could no longer bear the insolence, the avarice, and cruelty of that prince: that they were deputed to Rome with three requests, (one of which they desired might be immediately complied with,) viz. either that the affair might be examined and decided by the senate; or, secondly, that they might be permitted to repel force by force, and defend themselves by arms; or, lastly, that, if favour was to prevail over justice, they then entreated the Romans to specify once for all, which of the Carthaginian lands they were desirous should be given up to Masinissa, that they, by this means, might hereafter know what they had to depend on, and that the Roman people would show some moderation in their behalf, at a time that this prince set no other bounds to his pretensions, than his insatiable avarice. The deputies concluded with beseeching the Romans, that if they had any cause of complaint against the Carthaginians since the conclusion of the last peace, that they themselves would punish them; and not to give them up to the wild caprice of a prince, by whom their liberties were made precarious, and their lives insupportable. After ending their speech, being pierced with grief, shedding floods of tears, they fell prostrate upon the earth; a spectacle that moved all who were present to compassion, and raised a violent hatred against Masinissa. Gulussa, his son, who was then present, being asked what he had to reply, he answered, that his father had not given him any instructions, not knowing that any thing would be laid to his charge. He only desired the senate to reflect, that the circumstance which drew all this hatred upon him from the Carthaginians, was, the inviolable fidelity with which he had always been attached to the side of the Romans. The senate, after hearing both sides, answered, that they were inclined to do justice to either party to whom it might be due: that Gulussa should set out immediately with their orders to his father, who was thereby commanded to send immediately deputies with those of Carthage; that they would do all that lay in their power to serve him, but not to the prejudice of the Carthaginians: that it was but just the ancient limits should be preserved; and that it was far from being the intention of the Romans, to have the Carthaginians dispossessed, during the peace, of those territories and cities which had been left them by the treaty. The deputies of both powers were then dismissed with the usual presents.

But all these assurances were but mere words.(856) It is plain that the Romans did not once endeavour to satisfy the Carthaginians, or do them the least justice; and that they protracted the business, on purpose to give Masinissa time to establish himself in his usurpation, and weaken his enemies.

(M140) A new deputation was sent to examine the affair upon the spot, and Cato was one of the commissioners.(857) On their arrival, they asked the parties if they were willing to abide by their determination. Masinissa readily complied. The Carthaginians answered, that they had fixed a rule to which they adhered, and that this was the treaty which had been concluded by Scipio, and desired that their cause might be examined with all possible rigour. They therefore could not come to any decision. The deputies visited all the country, and found it in a very good condition, especially the city of Carthage: and they were surprised to see it, after having been involved in such a calamity, so soon again raised to so exalted a pitch of power and grandeur. The deputies, on their return, did not fail to acquaint the senate with this circumstance; and declared, Rome could never be in safety, so long as Carthage should subsist. From this time, whatever affair was debated in the senate, Cato always added the following words to his opinion, "and I conclude that Carthage ought to be destroyed." This grave senator did not give himself the trouble to prove, that bare jealousy of the growing power of a neighbouring state, is a warrant sufficient for destroying a city, contrary to the faith of treaties. Scipio Nasica on the other hand, was of opinion, that the ruin of this city would draw after it that of their commonwealth; because that the Romans, having then no rival to fear, would quit the ancient severity of their manners, and abandon themselves to luxury and pleasures, the never-failing subverters of the most flourishing empires.

In the mean time, divisions broke out in Carthage.(858) The popular faction, being now become superior to that of the grandees and senators, sent forty citizens into banishment; and bound the people by an oath, never to suffer the least mention to be made of recalling those exiles. They withdrew to the court of Masinissa, who despatched Gulussa and Micipsa, his two sons, to Carthage, to solicit their recall. However, the gates of the city were shut against them, and one of them was closely pursued by Hamilcar, one of the generals of the republic. This gave occasion to a new war, and accordingly armies were levied on both sides. A battle was fought; and the younger Scipio, who afterwards ruined Carthage, was spectator of it. He had been sent from Lucullus, who was then carrying on war in Spain, and under whom Scipio then served, to Masinissa, to desire some elephants from that monarch. During the whole engagement, he stood upon a neighbouring hill; and was surprised to see Masinissa, then upwards of eighty years of age, mounted (agreeably to the custom of his country) on a horse without a saddle; flying from rank to rank like a young officer, and sustaining the most arduous toils. The fight was very obstinate, and continued from morning till night, but at last the Carthaginians gave way. Scipio used to say afterwards, that he had been present at many battles, but at none with so much pleasure as at this; having never before beheld so formidable an army engage, without any danger or trouble to himself. And being very conversant in the writings of Homer, he added, that till his time, there were but two more who had had the pleasure of being spectators of such an action, viz. Jupiter from mount Ida, and Neptune from Samothrace, when the Greeks and Trojans fought before Troy. I know not whether the sight of a hundred thousand men (for so many there were) butchering one another, can administer a real pleasure; or whether such a pleasure is consistent with the sentiments of humanity, so natural to mankind.

The Carthaginians, after the battle was over, entreated Scipio to terminate their contests with Masinissa.(859) Accordingly, he heard both parties, and the Carthaginians consented to yield up the territory of Emporium,(860) which had been the first cause of the dispute, to pay Masinissa two hundred talents of silver down, and eight hundred more, at such times as should be agreed. But Masinissa insisting on the return of the exiles, and the Carthaginians being unwilling to agree to this proposition, they did not come to any decision. Scipio, after having paid his compliments, and returned thanks to Masinissa, set out with the elephants for which he had been sent.

The king, immediately after the battle was over, had blocked up the enemy's camp, which was pitched upon a hill, whither neither troops nor provisions could come to them.(861) During this interval, there arrived deputies from Rome, with orders from the senate to decide the quarrel, in case the king should be defeated; otherwise, to leave it undetermined, and to give the king the strongest assurances of the continuation of their friendship; and they complied with the latter injunction. In the mean time, the famine daily increased in the enemy's camp; and to add to their calamity, it was followed by a plague, which made dreadful havoc. Being now reduced to the last extremity, they surrendered to Masinissa, promising to deliver up the deserters, to pay him five thousand talents of silver in fifty years, and restore the exiles, notwithstanding their oaths to the contrary. They all submitted to the ignominious ceremony of passing under the yoke,(862) and were dismissed, with only one suit of clothes for each. Gulussa, to satiate his vengeance for the ill treatment which, as we before observed, he had met with, sent out against them a body of cavalry, whom, from their great weakness, they could neither escape nor resist. So that of fifty-eight thousand men, very few returned to Carthage.

(M141) The Third Punic War.—The third Punic war, which was less considerable than either of the two former, with regard to the number and greatness of the battles, and its continuance, which was only four years, was still more remarkable with respect to the success and event of it, as it ended in the total ruin and destruction of Carthage.

The inhabitants of this city, from their last defeat, knew what they had to fear from the Romans, who had uniformly displayed great ill-will towards them, as often as they had addressed them upon their disputes with Masinissa.(863) To prevent the consequences of it, the Carthaginians, by a decree of the senate, impeached Asdrubal, general of the army, and Carthalo, commander of the auxiliary(864) forces, as guilty of high treason, for being the authors of the war against the king of Numidia. They then sent a deputation to Rome, to inquire what opinion that republic entertained of their late proceedings, and what was desired of them. The deputies were coldly answered, that it was the business of the senate and people of Carthage to know what satisfaction was due to the Romans. A second deputation bringing them no clearer answer, they fell into the greatest dejection; and being seized with the strongest terrors, from the recollection of their past sufferings, they fancied the enemy was already at their gates, and imagined to themselves all the dismal consequences of a long siege, and of a city taken sword in hand.

In the mean time, the senate debated at Rome on the measures it would be proper for them to take; and the disputes between Cato the elder and Scipio Nasica, who entertained totally different opinions on this subject, were renewed.(865) The former, on his return from Africa, had declared, in the strongest terms, that he had found Carthage, not as the Romans supposed it to be, exhausted of men or money, or in a weak and humble state; but, on the contrary, that it was crowded with vigorous young men, abounded with immense quantities of gold and silver, and prodigious magazines of arms and all warlike stores; and was so haughty and confident on account of this force, that their hopes and ambition had no bounds. It is farther said, that after he had ended his speech, he threw, out of the lappet of his robe, in the midst of the senate, some African figs; and, as the senators admired their beauty and size, "Know," says he, "that it is but three days since these figs were gathered. Such is the distance between the enemy and us."(866)

Cato and Nasica had each of them their reasons for voting as they did.(867) Nasica, observing that the people had risen to such a height of insolence, as led them into excesses of every kind; that their prosperity had swelled them with a pride which the senate itself was not able to check; and that their power was become so enormous, that they were able to draw the city, by force, into every mad design they might undertake; Nasica, I say, observing this, was desirous that they should continue in fear of Carthage, in order that this might serve as a curb to restrain and check their audacious conduct. For it was his opinion, that the Carthaginians were too weak to subdue the Romans; and at the same time too strong to be considered by them in a contemptible light. With regard to Cato, he thought that as his countrymen were become haughty and insolent by success, and plunged headlong into profligacy of every kind; nothing could be more dangerous, than for them to have for a rival and an enemy, a city that till now had been powerful, but was become, even by its misfortunes, more wise and provident than ever; and not to remove the fears of the inhabitants entirely with regard to a foreign power; since they had, within their own walls, all the opportunities of indulging themselves in excesses of every kind.

To lay aside, for one instant, the laws of equity, I leave the reader to determine which of these two great men reasoned most justly, according to the maxims of sound policy, and the true interest of a state. One undoubted circumstance is, that all historians have observed that there was a sensible change in the conduct and government of the Romans, immediately after the ruin of Carthage:(868) that vice no longer made its way into Rome with a timorous pace, and as it were by stealth, but appeared barefaced, and seized, with astonishing rapidity, upon all orders of the republic: that the senators, plebeians, in a word, all conditions, abandoned themselves to luxury and voluptuousness, without moderation or sense of decency, which occasioned, as it must necessarily, the ruin of the state. "The first Scipio,"(869) says Paterculus, speaking of the Romans, "had laid the foundations of their future grandeur; and the last, by his conquests, opened a door to all manner of luxury and dissoluteness. For, after Carthage, which obliged Rome to stand for ever on its guard, by disputing empire with that city, had been totally destroyed, the depravity of manners was no longer slow in its progress, but swelled at once into the utmost excess of corruption."

Be this as it may, the senate resolved to declare war against the Carthaginians; and the reasons or pretences urged for it were, their having maintained ships contrary to the tenour of the treaty; their having sent an army out of their territories, against a prince who was in alliance with Rome, and whose son they had treated ill, at the time that he was accompanied by a Roman ambassador.(870)

(M142) An event, that chance occasioned to happen very fortunately, at the time that the senate of Rome was debating on the affair of Carthage, doubtless contributed very much to make them take that resolution.(871) This was the arrival of deputies from Utica, who came to surrender up themselves, their effects, their lands, and their city, into the hands of the Romans. Nothing could have happened more seasonably. Utica was the second city of Africa, vastly rich, and had a port equally spacious and commodious; it stood within sixty furlongs of Carthage, so that it might serve as a place of arms in the attack of that city. The Romans now hesitated no longer, but formally proclaimed war. M. Manilius, and L. Marcius Censorinus, the two consuls, were desired to set out as soon as possible. They had secret orders from the senate, not to end the war but by the destruction of Carthage. The consuls immediately left Rome, and stopped at Lilybaeum in Sicily. They had a considerable fleet, on board of which were fourscore thousand foot, and about four thousand horse.

The Carthaginians were not yet acquainted with the resolutions which had been taken at Rome.(872) The answer brought back by their deputies, had only increased their fears, viz. "It was the business of the Carthaginians to consider what satisfaction was due to them."(873) This made them not know what course to take. At last they sent new deputies, whom they invested with full powers to act as they should see fitting; and even (what the former wars could never make them stoop to) to declare, that the Carthaginians gave up themselves, and all they possessed, to the will and pleasure of the Romans. This, according to the import of the clause, se suaque eorum arbitrio permittere, was submitting themselves, without reserve, to the power of the Romans, and acknowledging themselves their vassals. Nevertheless, they did not expect any great success from this condescension, though so very mortifying; because, as the Uticans had been beforehand with them on that occasion, this circumstance had deprived them of the merit of a ready and voluntary submission.

The deputies, on their arrival at Rome, were informed that war had been proclaimed, and that the army was set out. The Romans had despatched a courier to Carthage, with the decree of the senate; and to inform that city, that the Roman fleet had sailed. The deputies had therefore no time for deliberation, but delivered up themselves, and all they possessed, to the Romans. In consequence of this behaviour, they were answered, that since they had at last taken a right step, the senate granted them their liberty, the enjoyment of their laws, and all their territories and other possessions, whether public or private, provided that, within the space of thirty days, they should send, as hostages, to Lilybaeum, three hundred young Carthaginians of the first distinction, and comply with the orders of the consuls. This last condition filled them with inexpressible anxiety: but the concern they were under would not allow them to make the least reply, or to demand an explanation; nor, indeed, would it have been to any purpose. They therefore set out for Carthage, and there gave an account of their embassy.

All the articles of the treaty were extremely severe with regard to the Carthaginians; but the silence of the Romans, with respect to the cities of which no notice was taken in the concessions which that people was willing to make, perplexed them exceedingly.(874) But all they had to do was to obey. After the many former and recent losses which the Carthaginians had sustained, they were by no means in a condition to resist such an enemy, since they had not been able to oppose Masinissa. Troops, provisions, ships, allies, in a word, every thing was wanting, and hope and vigour more than all the rest.

They did not think it proper to wait till the thirty days, which had been allowed them, were expired, but immediately sent their hostages, in hopes of softening the enemy by the readiness of their obedience, though they dared not flatter themselves with the expectation of meeting with favour on this occasion. These hostages were the flower, and the only hopes, of the noblest families of Carthage. Never was any spectacle more moving; nothing was now heard but cries, nothing seen but tears, and all places echoed with groans and lamentations. But above all, the disconsolate mothers, bathed in tears, tore their dishevelled hair, beat their breasts, and, as if grief and despair had distracted them, they yelled in such a manner as might have moved the most savage breasts to compassion. But the scene was much more mournful, when the fatal moment of their separation was come; when, after having accompanied their dear children to the ship, they bid them a long last farewell, persuaded that they should never see them more; bathed them with their tears; embraced them with the utmost fondness; clasped them eagerly in their arms; could not be prevailed upon to part with them, till they were forced away, which was more grievous and afflicting than if their hearts had been torn out of their breasts. The hostages being arrived in Sicily, were carried from thence to Rome; and the consuls told the deputies, that when they should arrive at Utica, they would acquaint them with the orders of the republic.

In such a situation of affairs, nothing can be more grievous than a state of uncertainty, which, without descending to particulars, gives occasion to the mind to image to itself every misery.(875) As soon as it was known that the fleet was arrived at Utica, the deputies repaired to the Roman camp; signifying, that they were come in the name of their republic, in order to receive their commands, which they were ready to obey. The consul, after praising their good disposition and compliance, commanded them to deliver up to him, without fraud or delay, all their arms. This they consented to, but besought him to reflect on the sad condition to which he was reducing them, at a time when Asdrubal, whose quarrel against them was owing to no other cause than their perfect submission to the orders of the Romans, was advanced almost to their gates, with an army of twenty thousand men. The answer returned them was, that the Romans would set that matter right.

This order was immediately put in execution.(876) There arrived in the camp a long train of waggons, loaded with all the preparations of war, taken out of Carthage: two hundred thousand complete sets of armour, a numberless multitude of darts and javelins, with two thousand engines for shooting darts and stones.(877) Then followed the deputies of Carthage, accompanied by the most venerable senators and priests, who came purposely to try to move the Romans to compassion in this critical moment, when their sentence was going to be pronounced, and their fate would be irreversible. Censorinus, the consul, for it was he who had all along spoken, rose up for a moment at their coming, and expressed some kindness and affection for them; but suddenly assuming a grave and severe countenance: "I cannot," says he, "but commend the readiness with which you execute the orders of the senate. They have commanded me to tell you, that it is their absolute will and pleasure that you depart out of Carthage, which they have resolved to destroy; and that you remove into any other part of your dominions which you shall think proper, provided it be at the distance of eighty stadia(878) from the sea."

The instant the consul had pronounced this fulminating decree, nothing was heard among the Carthaginians but lamentable shrieks and howlings.(879) Being now in a manner thunderstruck, they neither knew where they were, nor what they did; but rolled themselves in the dust, tearing their clothes, and unable to vent their grief any otherwise, than by broken sighs and deep groans. Being afterwards a little recovered, they lifted up their hands with the air of suppliants one moment towards the gods, and the next towards the Romans, imploring their mercy and justice towards a people, who would soon be reduced to the extremes of despair. But as both the gods and men were deaf to their fervent prayers, they soon changed them into reproaches and imprecations; bidding the Romans call to mind, that there were such beings as avenging deities, whose severe eyes were for ever open on guilt and treachery. The Romans themselves could not refrain from tears at so moving a spectacle, but their resolution was fixed. The deputies could not even prevail so far, as to get the execution of this order suspended, till they should have an opportunity of presenting themselves again before the senate, to attempt, if possible, to get it revoked. They were forced to set out immediately, and carry the answer to Carthage.

The people waited for their return with such an impatience and terror, as words could never express.(880) It was scarce possible for them to break through the crowd that flocked round them, to hear the answer, which was but too strongly painted in their faces. When they were come into the senate, and had declared the barbarous orders of the Romans, a general shriek informed the people of their fate; and from that instant, nothing was seen and heard in every part of the city, but howling and despair, madness and fury.

The reader will here give me leave to interrupt the course of the history for a moment, to reflect on the conduct of the Romans. It is great pity that the fragment of Polybius, where an account is given of this deputation, should end exactly in the most interesting part of this narrative. I should set a much higher value on one short reflection of so judicious an author, than on the long harangues which Appian ascribes to the deputies and the consul. I can never believe, that so rational, judicious, and just a man as Polybius, could have approved the proceedings of the Romans on the present occasion. We do not here discover, in my opinion, any of the characteristics which distinguished them anciently; that greatness of soul, that rectitude, that utter abhorrence of all mean artifices, frauds, and impostures, which, as is somewhere said, formed no part of the Roman disposition; Minime Romanis artibus. Why did not the Romans attack the Carthaginians by open force? Why should they declare expressly in a treaty (a most solemn and sacred thing) that they allowed them the full enjoyment of their liberties and laws; and understand, at the same time, certain private conditions, which proved the entire ruin of both? Why should they conceal, under the scandalous omission of the word city in this treaty, the perfidious design of destroying Carthage? as if, beneath the cover of such an equivocation, they might destroy it with justice. In short, why did the Romans not make their last declaration, till after they had extorted from the Carthaginians, at different times, their hostages and arms, that is, till they had absolutely rendered them incapable of disobeying their most arbitrary commands? Is it not manifest, that Carthage, notwithstanding all its defeats and losses, though it was weakened and almost exhausted, was still a terror to the Romans, and that they were persuaded they were not able to conquer it by force of arms? It is very dangerous to be possessed of so much power, as to be able to commit injustice with impunity, and with a prospect of being a gainer by it. The experience of all ages shows, that states seldom scruple to commit injustice, when they think it will conduce to their advantage.

The noble character which Polybius gives of the Achaeans, differs widely from what was practised here.(881) That people, says he, far from using artifice and deceit towards their allies, in order to enlarge their power, did not think themselves allowed to employ them even against their enemies, considering only those victories as solid and glorious, which were obtained sword in hand, by dint of courage and bravery. He owns, in the same place, that there then remained among the Romans but very faint traces of the ancient generosity of their ancestors; and he thinks it incumbent on him (as he declares) to make this remark, in opposition to a maxim which was grown very common in his time among persons in the administration of the government, who imagined, that sincerity is inconsistent with good policy; and that it is impossible to succeed in the administration of state affairs, either in war or peace, without using fraud and deceit on some occasions.

I now return to my subject.(882) The consuls made no great haste to march against Carthage, not suspecting they had any thing to fear from that city, as it was now disarmed. The inhabitants took the opportunity of this delay to put themselves in a posture of defence, being all unanimously resolved not to quit the city. They appointed as general, without the walls, Asdrubal, who was at the head of twenty thousand men; and to whom deputies were sent accordingly, to entreat him to forget, for his country's sake, the injustice which had been done him, from the dread they were under of the Romans. The command of the troops, within the walls, was given to another Asdrubal, grandson of Masinissa. They then applied themselves to the making arms with incredible expedition. The temples, the palaces, the open markets and squares, were all changed into so many arsenals, where men and women worked day and night. Every day were made a hundred and and forty shields, three hundred swords, five hundred pikes or javelins, a thousand arrows, and a great number of engines to discharge them; and because they wanted materials to make ropes, the women cut off their hair, and abundantly supplied their wants on this occasion.

Masinissa was very much disgusted at the Romans, because, after he had extremely weakened the Carthaginians, they came and reaped the fruits of his victory, without acquainting him in any manner with their design, which circumstance caused some coldness between them.(883)

During this interval, the consuls were advancing towards the city, in order to besiege it.(884) As they expected nothing less than a vigorous resistance, the incredible resolution and courage of the besieged filled them with the utmost astonishment.

The Carthaginians were for ever making the boldest sallies, in order to repulse the besiegers, to burn their engines, and harass their foragers. Censorinus attacked the city on one side, and Manilius on the other. Scipio, afterwards surnamed Africanus, served then as tribune in the army; and distinguished himself above the rest of the officers, no less by his prudence than by his bravery. The consul, under whom he fought, committed many oversights, by having refused to follow his advice. This young officer extricated the troops from several dangers, into which the imprudence of their leaders had plunged them. A renowned officer, Phamaeas by name, who was general of the enemy's cavalry, and continually harassed the foragers, did not dare ever to keep the field, when it was Scipio's turn to support them; so capable was he of keeping his troops in good order, and posting himself to advantage. So great and universal a reputation excited some envy against him at first; but as he behaved, in all respects, with the utmost modesty and reserve, that envy was soon changed into admiration; so that when the senate sent deputies to the camp, to inquire into the state of the siege, the whole army gave him unanimously the highest commendations; the soldiers, as well as officers, nay, the very generals, with one voice extolled the merit of young Scipio: so necessary is it for a man to deaden, if I may be allowed the expression, the splendour of his rising glory, by a sweet and modest carriage; and not to excite jealousy, by haughty and self-sufficient behaviour, as this naturally awakens pride in others, and makes even virtue itself odious!