Does any one doubt, that if a constitution is left to the unrestricted interpretation of every one who swears to support it, there would be this diversity? Let him look at the various commentaries on the same text in the New Testament. Let him look at the various interpretations of the same decrees of the Senate by the Edicts of the Pretors in Roman jurisprudence—to say nothing of those countless decisions of the civil law, by which, before the time of Justinian, it was buried beneath its own rubbish. Let him look at the voluminous reports in our own language on the written, as well as common law—on the infinite number of questions that have arisen, and are yet arising on a single statute, or even one of its sections,—let him consider these apposite examples, and ask whether our constitution is likely to share a different fate? Such, indeed, is the indefinite nature of language, the ever-varying character of human concerns, and the subtlety of the human intellect, that it is utterly impossible to pen a constitution on which numerous questions would not arise, which no sagacity of man could foresee, and which his language is too vague to provide for.

Constitutional questions then must arise, and the true point of inquiry is, whether our constitution meant that they should be finally settled, or whether they are to remain suspended between heaven and earth, until they are compelled to make their appearance by the necromancy of legal subtlety, or occasionally laid in the Red Sea.

But the evil would not stop with the federal government. We know that each state has also its own constitution, and that if their legislatures or executives transcend their powers, their acts, by the doctrines we are considering, are utterly void. They cannot exceed the limits of their charter, and those limits they have no exclusive right to define. Who that has attended the deliberations of a state legislature, and remarked the frequent recurrence of constitutional questions about their powers, but must see that there is scarcely any law concerning property, or office, or crime, on which ingenuity may not raise a doubt respecting either the letter or spirit of the constitution? And the same uncertainty and want of uniformity which would arise in the federal government, would arise in a much greater ratio in that of a state; so that no man could say certainly what were his duties or his rights. If such a state of things may now ensue, how would it be when the population of a single state should amount to several millions, and when the spirit of litigation, united with the extension of legal science, would give more than Norman acuteness to our constitutional lawyers? When that era shall arrive, if this quibbling spirit that is now so rife, shall not receive a timely check, where is the law, whose authority may not be questioned? Now is the time to arrest it, before our habits become indurated, and while our national character has that ductility which the changes our country is ever undergoing, naturally produces. Whoever is capable of taking a wide survey of human affairs, and of comparing ages and nations, must perceive that every generation of the civilized world is becoming more and more metaphysical—that the understanding is more appealed to, and has greater sway than formerly, and the imagination less. The age of magic, and witches, and ghosts, has passed away. That of poetry is on the wane. Speculation has taken the place of taste. What once passed unheeded, or was perceived only as it was felt, must now be analyzed, and sifted, and decompounded, until we have reached its elements, and a reason is required for every thing. Such is the spirit of the age, and it is eminently favourable to constitutional doubts and scruples.

We may already perceive the progress of this captious, inquisitive, hair-splitting spirit, in the brief chronicle of the federal government. When congress met, immediately after the formation of the constitution, in laying an impost, they endeavoured so to lay it, as to give encouragement to those species of industry for which the country seemed best suited, and their successors continued the same policy for about thirty years, when it was discovered, (we think by a member from Maine) that the policy was contrary to the constitution. The discovery was soon welcomed by many of the politicians of the South, and it has since been so cordially embraced by them, that the opposite opinion is now looked upon as downright political heresy.

A bankrupt law was passed during the first Mr. Adams's administration, by virtue of the express power given to congress on that subject. When Mr. Jefferson came into power, the law was repealed as inexpedient, because it was believed to produce as much fraud and mischief in some ways as it prevented in others. But nobody had then discovered that the law was unconstitutional. Yet in 1822, that doctrine was broached and zealously maintained by three or four members from the South, so as to induce Mr. Lowndes, who was himself opposed to a bankrupt law, to disavow the doctrines of his associates. That exemplary man, the character of whose mind was sufficiently inclined to refined speculation, if it had not been so tempered by candour and sound practical sense, never lost sight of the end of government, in his view of the means; and he believed that in interpreting the constitution, we ought not to look at it through a microscope, for this plain reason, if for no other, because those who are finally to decide on it look at it with their ordinary eyes. Accordingly, in the first half of his speech, he aimed to show that congress had the power to pass the law, and in the last, that they ought not to exercise it.

Again: Mr. Jefferson gave his sanction to the Cumberland road, to be made at the national expense, provided the states through which it would pass gave their express assent to it. The states of Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania, did pass laws giving such consent. It was not then considered that congress had not the power of appropriating the money in the treasury to all purposes of general utility, provided they did not assume any other power, in the exercise of this; and it is clear that Mr. Jefferson did not think that the construction of a road, with the consent of the states through which it passed, was such an exercise of power. Yet after the road was made, by this growing disposition to strict construction, it was discovered that congress had no power to make such appropriations, under the constitution, and if the power could not be derived from that instrument, the consent of the states interested could not give it. It is here worthy of remark, that many of those who maintained that the general government possessed the power of making roads, independently of the states, concurred in the preceding position; and thus a majority was obtained who agreed that congress could use the public money for no purpose, which they had not the independent power of executing. Each party hoped to derive strength by this decision. The one, because it advanced a step forward in strict construction; and the other, looking to the influence of the practical benefits to be derived from the exercise of the power of making roads and canals, flattered themselves that many, when they found themselves not able to attain their object by mere appropriations, would, rather than forego the promised benefits altogether, support a still more enlarged construction of the constitution; and the issue seems so far to have justified their expectations.

We will give one more example. It had been supposed that the vice-president, as presiding officer of the senate, had, by the force of the term itself, the power of keeping order and regulating the debate; yet three or four years ago, it was discovered by that officer, or some of his friends, that he did not possess that power, in certain cases, and he accordingly forbore to exercise it.

These remarks are made in no invidious spirit. We do not mean to give any opinions on these questions. In some of them, indeed, we scarcely know whether, in this age of nice discrimination, our impressions deserve to be called opinions. But we merely meant to refer to facts which are a part of the history of the country. They go to show, that constitutional doubts and difficulties are continually increasing, not only from the new positions and aspects of things in the endless vicissitudes of human affairs, but also by the progress of refinement in reasoning; because much is now considered unconstitutional that was not deemed so formerly.

If this doubting, disputatious spirit—this habit of questioning every thing whenever a quibble can be raised—should continue to advance, where is the law, which, after fighting its way through both houses of the legislature, and, perhaps, escaping the veto, may not be eventually contested and defeated? We know that in many of the states there are Bills of Rights, which are considered to have equal authority with their constitutions. Some, indeed, regard them as settling the principles of primordial law, which the constitution itself cannot countervail. These, then, may also be appealed to for the purpose of proving the unconstitutionality of a state law; and in the inferences which ingenuity, or even stupidity, may draw from such broad and indefinite principles, the clearest right may be disputed, and the most atrocious crime defended. The right of a community to take the life of any one of its citizens has been gravely denied, and the argument rests for its support on the imprescriptible and immutable rights of man. If the net-work of the laws shall be thus chafed and frittered away, little fish, as well as big ones, may break through it when and where they please.

We are aware, that, in the ordinary concerns of life, nature and reason will often assert their empire. They cannot be altogether cheated out of their rights by sophisms and quibbling. But the latter will but too often prevail. They have prevailed, are yet prevailing; and, if a barrier is to be presented to their further progress, it must be by the common sense of the nation, frowning into contempt this constitutional casuistry, which would degrade our legislative halls into schools of sophists—would employ the best powers of the human mind, not in clearing up doubts, but in creating them—which considers that the most obvious and direct meaning of the constitution is always the wrong one, and that what the convention made the people say by that instrument, can be understood but by one man in ten thousand, who cannot show he is right, but by a commentary a hundred times as large as the text. It must be by going further, and saying that after a question has been fully discussed and solemnly decided—after it has been recognised by every department of the government—and acquiesced in by the people, it should be considered as the best exposition the constitution is capable of, and as no longer open to controversy: and if the decision was wrong, according to a maxim of the common law, and which became common law only because it was common sense, the universality of the error makes it right.

Let it not be supposed, that if a false or inconvenient construction is put on the constitution, or its meaning is considered doubtful and uncertain, the evil may be corrected by an amendment. Supposing it to take place, may we not, like bad tinkers, in stopping one hole, make two? We can judge of the probable success of this course, by the various laws passed to alter, or amend, or repeal, previous emendatory acts. But if the remedy were effectual when attained, is it attainable? What probability is there that three-fourths of the states will concur in any amendment, or that motives of interest—of party sympathy—of delusive argument—or the mere nonchalance of men about evils which are not immediately pressing, would not unite more than one-fourth of the states? Besides, if the constitution were always to be changed whenever a serious question of its construction arose, and amendments were as practicable as they are difficult, the time required for the operation would leave us nothing else to do. A century would scarcely suffice to settle the questions which may occur in a single year.

There is another mischief, of no insignificant character, which results from these excessive refinements in interpreting the constitution, and from the doctrine that no length of time can settle its meaning. They afford ready pretexts to cunning and timid politicians for screening their real motives from the people. When they wish to evade responsibility for their votes, they have nothing more to do than to plead scruples of conscience, and the sacred obligation of an oath. Where is the measure which a moderate degree of ingenuity may not show—we may almost say—has not shown to be against the words, or the meaning and spirit of the constitution? It is true, if the people distrust the sincerity of this plea of conscience, or disapprove it, they may remove their representative. But that remedy may come too late, and may not always be applied. The people have always shown great indulgence and forbearance towards this plea: besides, before the time of re-election comes about, these inconvenient scruples may, in the din of new contests, be forgotten, or remembered only to be forgiven, and, by the hocus pocus of party, even metamorphosed into a recommendation. When, then, it is so easy to take shelter behind the ark of the constitution, ought we to enlarge the limits of this place of refuge for cunning and cowardice?

One more argument in favour of a fair, liberal, manly construction of the constitution. There would be a certain degree of inconvenience incident to every written constitution, if there were no difficulties in its interpretation, and its language was always understood in the same sense by all men. In making that distribution of its various powers which is deemed most likely to secure a safe and healthy action, the hands of its functionaries must often be tied up from doing that which particular circumstances may make highly expedient. Some imperative claim of humanity, some yet more pressing emergency of state, may call for powers which the constitution has withheld. Mr. Jefferson considered the acquisition of Louisiana to be a case of that character. He questioned the power of acquiring foreign territory under the constitution. But when he reflected that France could not retain possession of Louisiana, and that hither the constitution must be stretched, (his letter to W. C. Nicholas might almost justify a stronger expression,) or we must submit to having the greatest commercial nation in Europe—our most active rival in peace, our most powerful enemy in war—posted on our right and left flank, and, by and by, in our rear,—he sacrificed his opinions to the safety of the republic. The present president was no doubt actuated by similar considerations, when he pursued the Seminoles into the Spanish territory, and made war on the country in which they had taken refuge—the occasion not appearing to him to admit of the delay of a formal declaration by congress. Commodore Porter may be presumed to have acted on the same principle in Cuba. No one regards these as fit cases for precedents. All agree, that if we have a constitution, its mandates should be obeyed, and that we must be content to put up with its partial inconvenience, for the sake of its general benefits. But surely we ought not to go to the other extreme, and so fetter the constituted authorities of the nation, by a spirit of interpretation which will deprive them of all salutary power, except by usurping it. Let us not lose sight of "the expedient," in discussing "the right;" but rather, as the common sense of mankind dictates in ordinary cases of conscience or morality, be liberal in construing the constitution, when its power is to be used for the good of the people, and captious and astute only when its exercise may be pernicious.

On these grounds, we earnestly beseech those who are friendly to our political institutions—who believe that no other than the complex government we have adopted can unite the adaptation of laws to local circumstances with the strength and security of a great empire, to discountenance the pestilent and absurd doctrine that the constitution is to be on all points forever unsettled. We beseech them to save this monument of our country's wisdom—this instrument of its safety, its liberty, and its future greatness, from the peril and reproach to which it is thus exposed. It is in their power to protect it from an evil which would convert a government intended to secure domestic peace, into one of perpetual civil strife, and which would confide the destinies of the country to sophists, and quibblers, and casuists—or rather to those political managers who would use them as tools to persuade the people that a good measure was unconstitutional, that they might pursue a bad one with impunity.

2. The next objection is, that the bank possesses a "formidable" influence on the community. It must be admitted, that this complaint of bank influence is not now brought forward for the first time. It was a favourite theme of the demagogue, from the time the first Bank of the United States was established, until its charter expired, when it appeared that its influence was not equal to its own preservation.

If, indeed, no other corporation had the right to issue notes of circulation, then the power of enlarging or contracting the common currency at pleasure would be a very great one—greater than ought to be put into the hands of any others than persons chosen by the people, or their representatives, and responsible to them. But as the bank and its offices are every where surrounded by competitors, some of which have a yet larger capital than themselves, they have no such exclusive control over the amount of money in circulation, and their influence, whatever it may be, can be exerted only as to its quality. It is precisely on this last influence that the friends of the bank mainly rely for the public favour.

Let us inquire a little further into the extent of the bank's influence. The principal functions of this institution, except the services it renders the government, consist in discounting promissory notes, selling or buying bills of exchange, and receiving deposits of coin, or of its own notes, for safe keeping. It has no exclusive privilege of doing either of these acts, as every state bank may do, and actually does the same. But by means of its superior capital, and consequently its superior credit and resources, it can, in some of its operations, either undersell the other banks, or command a preference in the market;—aye, there's the rub. The banks in some of the large cities have persuaded themselves that if this "formidable" rival was out of the way, they would be able to buy and sell more bills, and upon better terms than at present. But if this consideration should make them an object of dread and dislike to the state banks, it should also recommend them to the favour of the public. Their notes, too, are generally preferred by travellers, and for distant remittances. But neither does this fact furnish any ground of dread to the community, whatever it may to their rivals.

It thus appears that they have the same advantage over other banks, which one tradesman or mechanic occasionally has over others of the same calling. He who does his work best, and sells it cheapest, will always get the most and best custom; and it would be just as reasonable for his rivals in business to complain of his making better wares, of being more accommodating, and of underselling them, as for the other banks to complain of the Bank of the United States. It is clear, that if the rival banks are losers, the public is a gainer, unless they can succeed in persuading the people, that competition, which is so salutary and beneficial to the public in every other business, should be mischievous only in this. The argument thus used against the Bank of the United States, is precisely that which might have been used, and, we presume, was used, by the owners of the Albany sloops against steam-boats; and which might be used against canals and rail-roads, by those who would find employment for their wagons in the former more expensive modes of conveyance.

But by an influence which is supposed to be so "formidable," is meant, perhaps, a political and corrupt influence. If there be such a one, it must be seen and felt; and we would ask in what way does it exert itself? Does the bank use its money in the elections? If so, its accounts must show it; and as there are men of all parties who own, or may own, shares in the stock, let those who suspect this abuse scrutinize those accounts for the purpose of detecting it. But those who manage the banks, know very well, and so do those who accuse them, that nine-tenths, or rather ninety-nine hundredths of the stockholders, would not have given a five dollar note to get the president elected, or to get him turned out. Your office-seekers, indeed, might pay pretty liberally for such service, but they are seldom stockholders. These are, for the most part, thrifty, cautious men, who choose to vest their money in some fund which gives them regular returns; and they are content that they shall be small, provided they be certain. The rest are widows, guardians of orphan children, trustees of public institutions, and merchants who have more capital than they can safely and profitably employ. Now, who of these would allow a president and directors to squander their money in a matter in which they felt little interest, and that probably a divided one. No body believes this, and yet it is not easy to say in what other mode they could exercise a corrupt influence.

But if the stockholders were disposed to spend their money in electioneering, can they be prevented from acting so foolishly by putting down the bank? If the charter is not renewed, their money will be returned to them, and they would then have both the power and the inducement to use it for political purposes, which they cannot have while it is supplying a currency to the country, and invigorating its industry and commerce. But, in truth, it is well known, that those persons do not make ducks and drakes of their money now, and are not likely to do it then.

It is true, that in case of an extraordinary demand for money, beyond the means of supply by the state banks, the Bank of the United States may sometimes prefer discounting the note of one man to that of another—the paper of A to that of B; and that some of the directors might have given the preference to A, because he was a neighbour—others by his being a friend or relative, and others again by mere party sympathies. But we believe that none of these things go very far at bank. The object of its directors being to make money, they prefer the paper of a rich man they hate, to that of a poor friend. Nor do they widely differ from the rest of the world in this particular. But granting that moral and political considerations do influence the bank in its loans, who does not see that they could have no effect, except when the supply of money for loan was not equal to the demand, and that the mischief would be increased by putting down the richest and most substantial bank in the country?

Upon the whole, this cry against the influence of the bank, resolves itself into that of wealth and property. These do exert a certain influence in the community on some occasions, and it is more than counteracted on others, by the jealousy and ill will it engenders. Whatever influence wealth may have, it is inseparable from our present condition, as we presume the United States are not yet prepared for the Agrarian system, and every man will be permitted to enjoy the fruits of his own industry, or that of his ancestors; but be it little or much, we cannot reasonably expect to see it exerted more harmlessly or more beneficially than in a solid, well managed bank. If, however, in spite of all these considerations, the power of these institutions be thought too great, and too liable to abuse, then there is no more effectual way of weakening it than by diffusion. As most of the state banks are more or less under the control of the state authorities, who may use the influence of these banks for political purposes, it must be desirable to all those who wish the public mind as free and unbiassed as possible, to see this influence weakened, if not neutralized; and there seems no more effectual mode of doing this than establishing a rival bank, over which the state politicians could exercise no sort of authority. Let us, for example, suppose that a system of banking was adopted for a state, by which, under the colour of guarding the public against their insolvency, those institutions were subjected to a surveillance and control which were calculated to make them feel their dependence on the state government, and when the plan was matured, to make them obsequious to its will. Would not every friend to the political purity of the state, and the independent spirit of its citizens, wish to see a scheme of this character frustrated? and what means so conducive to this end as the Bank of the United States, which, in the first place, by bringing so much capital into the market for loans, lessens the influence of all banks, and, in the next, may perform its several functions without regard to the smiles or frowns of any politicians whatever.

This is probably the influence which is really objected to in the Bank of the United States, that of disenthralling the people from an utter dependence on the state banks for the various accommodations those institutions afford—an influence which it appears to us no true friend to his country should wish to see diminished, however inconvenient it may be to those who would make banks and every thing else subservient to their purposes.

3. But the Bank of the United States, it seems, must be brought into collision with the local authorities, and occasion perpetual apprehensions and discontent on the part of the states and the people. We know not upon what facts the president or his advisers have made this statement. It is in direct contradiction to that made by the committee of ways and means, who say—

"It is due to the persons, who for the last ten years, have been concerned in the administration of the bank, to state, that they have performed the delicate and difficult trust committed to them, in such a manner as, at the same time, to accomplish the great national ends for which it was established, and promote the permanent interest of the stockholders, with the least practicable pressure upon the local banks. As far as the committee are enabled to form an opinion, from careful inquiry, the bank has been liberal and indulgent in its dealings with these institutions, and, with scarcely an exception, now stands in the most amicable relation to them. Some of those institutions have borne the most disinterested and unequivocal testimony in favour of the bank.

"It is but strict justice also to remark, that the direction of the mother bank appears to have abstained, with scrupulous care, from bringing the power and influence of the bank to bear upon political questions, and to have selected, for the direction of the various branches, business men in no way connected with party politics. The Committee advert to this part of the conduct of the directors, not only with a view to its commendation, but for the purpose of expressing their strong and decided conviction that the usefulness and stability of such an institution will materially depend upon a steady and undeviating adherence to the policy of excluding party politics and political partisans from all participation in its management. It is gratifying to conclude this branch of the subject by stating, that the affairs of the present bank, under the able, efficient, and faithful guidance of its two last presidents and their associates, have been brought from a state of great embarrassment into a condition of the highest prosperity. Having succeeded in restoring the paper of the local banks to a sound state, its resources are now such as to justify the directors in extending the issue and circulation of this paper so as to satisfy the wants of the community, both as it regards bank accommodations and a circulating medium."

The committee, coming immediately from the people, are somewhat more likely to have accurate information on this subject than the president. We have heard of no recent collisions between any state and the bank; and those which formerly took place with the states of Ohio and Maryland, respectively, have been long since settled in the Supreme Court. The people of Tennessee, too, once objected, through their representatives, to the location of a branch bank in that state; but a subsequent legislature, believing that they better understood the interests or wishes of their constituents, withdrew their opposition, and the branch bank which was therefore established, is now in successful operation. The legislature of Mississippi, in like manner, has, within a few months, repealed a hostile act passed two years ago, and invited the establishment of a branch. The executive council of Florida, has recently requested a branch, and we understand that there are numerous applications for branches from all parts of the Western and Southern states. Surely the people of these and the neighbouring states cannot seriously object, that a portion of the moneyed capital which has been accumulated in the Atlantic states should be brought among them, to encourage their industry and facilitate their trade—to enable their own merchants to give them ready money, and a somewhat higher price for their cotton—to furnish one man with the means of building a mill—another a manufactory—and a third a steam-boat. We cannot believe that they are such novices in political economy. If their citizens do not want the money, they need not borrow it; and if they do, it is better to find it at home, than to be dependant on New-York, Philadelphia, or Boston, for it. In the state of Alabama, if we are to believe the public prints, the United States Bank there has afforded great and most seasonable aid to the state bank. Nor do we know of a single state, in which there are any manifestations of popular discontent with the bank, notwithstanding the pains taken by some of the friends of the president to excite them.

Perhaps the apprehensions mentioned in the message may refer to the state banks rather than the people; and the president has presumed, that, as some of the states are interested in the stock of these institutions, and as their interests may conflict with those of the Bank of the United States, the people would be likely to side with their own institutions. The presumption is far from being unfounded. The sympathies of the people will always be with the states, rather than the general government, when the two are in conflict—a fact of which politicians are sufficiently apt to avail themselves. Thus, when the present Bank of the United States first went into operation, fears were entertained by the state banks and their friends, that the United States Bank and its branches would prove troublesome and dangerous neighbours. Their strength to oppress, and even crush, a rival, was supposed to be in proportion to their capital; and, comparing them with things with which they had no sort of analogy, it was argued, that a state bank, in the neighbourhood of a branch of the national bank, would be not more likely to thrive, than a delicate shrub under the shade of a spreading oak, or to find safety, than a light armed brig under the battery of a seventy-four. These arguments prevailed for a season in some of the states; but at length the experiment was made, in spite of these gloomy predictions, and it was found, as well it might be, that a small capital, if prudently managed, is as independent of the attacks of a rival, in banking, as in any other business. And why should there be a difference? A tailor or shoemaker who employs but two or three journeymen, may do as safe, though not so profitable a business, as he who employs twenty or thirty—in the same way as a small vessel may navigate the ocean as safely as a large one, and may be even less likely to overset in a storm, if it carry less sail in proportion to its ballast.

We do not mean to deny, that a bank with a superior capital, if it were disposed to injure a rival at all hazards, might prove an inconvenient neighbour, and greatly curtail its business. If it were to put itself to the trouble of procuring the paper of the other, as soon as it was issued, and convert it immediately into specie, the loans of that other might be restricted to the amount of its specie capital. But this could not be effected without a degree of trouble and expense which would make it impracticable. What means does such a bank possess of drawing in the paper of the other bank, except so far as the debtors of the one institution chance to be the debtors of the other, or it choose to give a premium for the notes of its rival? It is not likely, that the same individuals would be the debtors to both banks, to a great extent; and as to a premium, such sacrifices seldom take place in individual competition, much less in that of banks. Besides, as soon as the bank which was thus assailed found that a premium was given for its paper, it would issue notes for the purpose of obtaining it, and the faster its notes were bought up and returned for specie, the more would be found in the market—a new swarm being attracted by the premium as soon as the first disappeared—until in a few months its hostile rival would share the fate of those who attempt to break another sort of banks—its own coffers would be exhausted.

The means then which a bank possesses of narrowing the sphere of circulation of a rival's paper, are much more limited than is commonly imagined; and such as they are, it will be cautious of exerting, lest the same game should be played on itself. A combination of the state banks, or even a single one of respectable capital, may practise the same means of annoyance against a Bank of the United States, as that could put in operation against them. But if both parties were wise, or rather not utterly foolish, they would each pursue their own business; and one not otherwise interfere with the other, than by occasionally exchanging notes, and receiving the difference in specie. This course might indeed prove a check to extravagant issues by either, but it is precisely that check which the public is interested in maintaining.

There is a further security against the wanton and bootless mischief which fear or design has imputed to the Bank of the United States. Public opinion would cry out against its illiberal course, and would fully avenge the wrong. Some of their best customers would desert them. They would lose most of their deposits. Their notes would be industriously collected and prematurely returned to them, and they would thus not only lessen their present profits, but furnish their enemies with arguments against the renewal of their charter. The supposition of such a course presumes the bank to be utterly regardless of their own interests, as well as of all sense of fairness and liberality—considerations which still have some weight with some men—and it is at variance with all that we have ever heard of the officers of that institution. As a proof that no fears or jealousies against the Bank of the United States are entertained by safe and substantial banks, we may remind our readers, that Mr. Girard, the greatest banker we have, was one of the most efficient supporters of the present national bank. No other individual in the United States would be so much affected as he, if its competition and neighbourhood were pernicious, and yet no one subscribed so largely to its stock, and no one, we have reason to believe, deplores more strongly the confusion in the moneyed concerns of the country, which he thinks would be inevitable on the destruction of the bank.

It is probable enough, that although these alleged causes of jealousy and alarm are known to be groundless by the state banks, the proposition against re-chartering the bank addresses itself to those institutions in another way. They have been led to believe that the benefits of the business now done by the bank, and of the government deposits, would be apportioned among them. But let them not flatter themselves with profiting by a division of this spoil. That great void in the circulation which the withdrawal of the capital of the bank would occasion, would immediately and imperatively call for new banks, which the states would be sure to establish; and when once they began to meet the demand, it would not be strange if the supply sometimes exceeded it, according to the common occurrence of a scarcity being followed by a glut. In that event, the present state banks might find too late that they had exchanged one old and liberal rival for two or more new ones, of a different character, who would be their competitors not only for the profits of banking, but also for the favour or forbearance of the state politicians. What the community at large is likely to regret or to wish after the change, it is not difficult to conjecture.

One of the complaints against the Bank of the United States has been, that the notes issued by any one of its offices were not payable at every other indiscriminately; and to this the president must have referred, when, in his first message, he said that the bank "had failed in the great end of establishing a uniform and sound currency." As the same objection is not repeated in the last message, we are left at a loss to decide whether he has been convinced, by the very lucid and satisfactory views of Mr. Lowndes and Mr. M'Duffie, that the complaint was unfounded, or whether he means to comprehend this among the causes of discontent on the part of the states and the people.

As this subject has received so thorough an investigation in the report of the committee, and in our last number, it cannot be necessary to say more on it. It is there shown, as we think conclusively, that the Bank of the United States has done in this matter all that a bank can do—more, indeed, than could have been reasonably expected of it—towards furnishing the community with a sound and uniform currency: that its notes, at the places where they are issued, are, for all purposes, worth as much as gold and silver, and for distant payments something more: that if its notes are sometimes worth, in one place, a trifle less than specie, it is because they have been worth, at another place, more than specie, since no one would transfer them to a great distance from the place of emission, unless he found them more convenient than specie: that as every bank has a direct interest in giving its notes as great a credit and as wide a circulation as it can, this institution will, for its own sake, redeem its notes at par, wherever issued, when it can safely do so; and that in most cases, it has actually done this; but that to make this obligatory would not only be unjust to the bank, but would be highly impolitic, by counteracting the natural and most efficient corrective of the over issues of banks, and the overtrading of individuals; and would be moreover impracticable.

To these irrefragable positions we may add, that the public has quite as much interest as the bank in keeping this matter on its present footing. One of the greatest benefits which a community derives from banking institutions, is the substitution for a part of its currency of the cheap article of paper for the costly one of specie, by which the capital that would otherwise have been used as money, may be employed for other useful purposes. But if the Bank of the United States, and each of its offices, were obliged, as a matter of right, to redeem the notes of every other, it would require an increase of specie which would deprive the country of the benefits of this substitution, as well as the bank of its profits. The same remark applies to their demanding a small premium for their drafts on each other. For each of the offices to be prepared not only to redeem its own paper, but to meet the drafts which others may draw on it, it is obliged to keep on hand an extra supply of specie; but if the check of the premium were removed, and it was no longer a matter of discretion, a much larger amount would be necessary, and nothing but experience could determine whether any thing short of the whole capital of the bank, or even that, would be sufficient for the purpose, under extraordinary circumstances, and great fluctuations of trade. So that upon the whole this complaint against the bank seems to be pretty much of the same character as these—that rivers do not run upwards as well as downwards—or that the same season which gives us ice does not also give us melons and peaches—or that a rail-road or a canal, which reduces the expense of carriage to one-tenth, does not reduce it to nothing.

4. Having thus noticed all the objections which the president has made to the bank, let us now turn our attention to the substitute that he has proposed. This is a national bank, at the seat of government, which is to be a branch of the treasury department, and which is, we presume, to have subordinate offices distributed among the several states. Its business will be to receive the public revenue from the collectors of the customs, receivers of the land offices, and postmasters, together with such deposits as individuals choose to make, and to give drafts, from time to time, on distant offices, for a premium.

According to this project, the funds of the treasury, instead of being, as now, deposited in the several banks convenient to the receiving offices, are to be in the immediate keeping of the new corps of the treasury to be levied for the purpose, by which means the public is to lose one of its present checks on the malversation of its agents. It is known that there are in most banks various officers, each with his appropriate duty—as—one or more to keep accounts—another to receive money—another to pay it away—another to be its general depositary—and that they are all placed under the superintendence of a president, whose character and station in society give assurance for the faithful discharge of his duty. That there is, moreover, a board of directors, who hold their offices only for a year, and who, once a month or oftener, appoint a committee to examine the affairs of the bank, and especially to ascertain whether the amount of notes, securities, and specie, correspond with the accounts of the institution. Yet, with all these safeguards, it is found, now and then, that men who had previously been above all suspicion, have not been able to withstand the temptation to use the money thus placed in their charge, and that, occasionally, these frauds and peculations are practised a long time without detection. If this is the case, when there is such strict accountability, and unremitted vigilance, how would it be when there was neither, and when those who received the public money, instead of being compelled to deposit it in a bank, as soon as they received it, and to check for it when they paid it over, might use it as they pleased, provided they were always ready to meet the drafts of the government. At many places they might do this, and yet, in consequence of the large sum which is always lying idle, or rather unappropriated in the treasury, they might have the use of the excess, to a considerable amount, as long as they remained in office. For several years the amount in the treasury has never been less than five millions, and sometimes considerably more; and of this, according to the ordinary current of business, one-third or upwards would commonly be in the city of New-York, if it were not transferred to Washington; and this money, which is now invigorating industry and trade, it is proposed to consign either to utter idleness, or to the exclusive use of the officers of the treasury. In addition to that aversion to change which is felt by all office-holders, this plan might furnish them with no ordinary means of effecting their object.

But if for the sake of guarding against such strong temptation to speculate with the public funds, and against such an encouragement to corruption, by affording materials for it, the public money were required, as now, to be deposited in the banks; though that plan would be free from the objection we have just made, it would be liable to another quite as great—the very one of influence which the president has made to the bank of the United States—with this difference, however, that the influence derived from the government funds is now exercised by the Bank of the United States, and is a salutary check upon that exercised by the state banks, but then, it would be added to that patronage which is already thought sufficiently great for every desirable purpose, and sometimes for purposes not desirable. The large receipts of public money in our chief importing cities, would be distributed among those banks which were most in favour with the government, by which is always meant those that were its most zealous and efficient supporters; and thus the revenue of the nation, that is, the use of it, would be set up at auction, to be purchased by the obsequious devotion of the state banks to the existing administration. In a division of parties, not more equal than that we often witness in our country, the vote of a single state may decide that of the Union, and the vote of its principal city may decide that of the state. All this is perfectly well known to some of the friends of the scheme, but it is not so to those who are to pay for it, and who are less familiar with the workings of the political wires.

There is another part of this notable scheme, (we mean no pun,) which merits our attention. This new bank and its offices are to sell drafts on each other for a premium, and as the bank itself is to issue no paper, the drafts may be paid for in the notes of the state banks, "only so long as they continue to be redeemed in specie,"—such are the President's words. But suppose the very common case of a bank paying specie to-day, and not paying it, and not being able to pay it, to-morrow, what becomes of the public revenue then? To be placed no doubt first to the account of "unavailable funds," and then, to the credit of the treasury. When these new bureaux of finance are distributed over the Union, and having no paper of their own, must carry on their operations altogether in gold and silver, and the paper of the banks in their vicinity, it is impossible that, with the highest degree of vigilance, prudence, impartiality, and firmness, united, they would always avoid loss. But does any one believe that this delicate and important trust would always be exercised with impartiality and firmness? To believe it, would be to disregard all experience, and to shut our eyes to what is passing before them every day. When the officers of the government—themselves dependant more or less directly on popular favour—were to have the power of discriminating between what paper they would take and what refuse, how many motives would be for ever presenting themselves for exercising it improperly? To reject the paper of a substantial bank, that was hostile to the administration, if there were any such, and to take that of a tottering one, which was friendly. Let us suppose, by way of illustration, that some orator, or political manager, no matter which, being about to set out for congress, should apply to one of the treasury banks for a draft on Washington for a few thousand dollars, and should offer in payment of it the paper, not of a substantial bank, but of one which though poorer, was more patriotic,—this being the best he could get—is it probable that his application would be rejected? or that the officer would do more than inquire whether the bank then paid specie, without troubling his head to ascertain whether it merely made a show of paying it, and whether it would not be insolvent in a month. Let it not be said, that if doubts were entertained of the solidity of the bank, its paper might be immediately converted into specie; for, in the first place, the bank may be some hundreds of miles distant; and though it were in the immediate vicinity, payment of specie would not always be demanded before it was too late. Besides, the very demand of specie may, like a new weight breaking down an overloaded packhorse, make it stop payment at once. The bill now before congress, for allowing the treasury credit for certain "unavailable funds," received some years since, would form an excellent precedent for such occurrences, and it is one to which there would be frequent occasions of appealing. And this mode of managing the public revenue is proposed to take the place of that which now exists through the Bank of the United States, by which the government has not lost a dollar; and it is next to impossible can lose one. Verily, if the nation were to suffer itself to be gulled by such a scheme as this, they would deserve to suffer the loss they would be sure to incur.

But pecuniary loss may be but a small part of the price which the nation would pay for this new treasury bank. It may be made to pay, in addition, the richest jewel it possesses—its political purity. The influence which the national executive exercises over the present Bank of the United States, is moderate, and not more than is salutary. It annually appoints a part of its directors, and, at stated periods, may, moreover, exercise its right, of having the government funds transferred from one part of the Union to the other, in a more or less accommodating way. But here its influence stops. The law, in pursuance of the charter, directs that the public money shall be deposited in the Bank of the United States or its branches, and in these it must be deposited, whether the president or his secretaries have good will or ill will to the bank, or whether the bank is willing to give any thing in return for their favour or not. These public deposits are valuable to the bank; and, for the benefit, they have paid, and we presume are yet willing to pay, a fair price. But the compensation is not paid to any officer of the government; it goes into the national treasury, and it consists of gold and silver, and not in the base metal of political influence.

We are well aware that many of the state banks are under the management of high-minded and honourable men, who would not be bidders at this auction, and who would scorn to purchase a share of the public deposits, at the price of their independence. But such might not prove to be the character of the greater number. Besides, in some of these cases, a majority of the stockholders might not sit idly by, and see the bank deprived of its share of government favour by the squeamishness of its officers, and might therefore either coerce them into compliance, or remove them.

If so much has been said about the influence attached to the office of the secretary of state, arising from the paltry patronage of printing the laws of the United States, what should be thought of that privilege of giving the permanent and uncompensated use of many millions of dollars to such powerful corporations as the state banks—embracing some thousands of directors, and some tens, nay, hundreds of thousands of stockholders and borrowers? We would appeal to that intelligent class of our citizens, who are quietly pursuing their occupations or professions at home, by which they secure to themselves independence and respectability, and who see, in the purity of our political institutions, their country's present happiness and future greatness, to take these things into consideration, and say whether they are willing to give to any administration such powerful means of exercising an influence of the worst sort over the minds of the people—whether they will take the money now gained or saved to the nation by means of the Bank of the United States, to enable a president and his cabinet to buy golden opinions of that numerous class who have them to sell.

The president lays some stress on the circumstance that his proposed treasury bank would not be a corporation, as is the Bank of the United States. But the lawyers tell us that there are two kinds of corporations—aggregate and sole—and the question is, whether influence is likely to be less extensive, or less dangerous, when it is transferred from the corporation aggregate, (the bank) to the corporation sole, (the executive). In the first case, the influence of the bank has checks from its charter—from its stockholders—from its directors—from public opinion—and, lastly, from the legislature. In the last, the influence would be added to that which is already deemed by many too great for the public tranquillity or safety. Whatever means the Bank of the United States possesses, of operating "on the hopes, fears, or interests of large masses of the community," the state banks possess, to a far greater extent; and it would always be in the power of the government to act on these corporations, either by the treasury bank "checking their issues," as the president proposes; or, in case that monstrous scheme should be rejected, by means of the public deposits; so that, in any event, if the charter of the present bank is not renewed, the influence of the executive will receive a most formidable increase.

Nor could the proposed national bank answer the same useful purposes to the commercial world, as the present Bank of the United States. And, first, as to transmitting values from one part of the Union to another, by means of bills of exchange. The president informs us the new bank might sell these at a moderate premium. But its means of doing so would be evidently far more limited than those of the present bank, since the latter, in addition to all the means possessed by the treasury bank, has its own large capital and credit. In the year 1829, the amount of drafts on each other which the bank and its offices sold, was upwards of twenty-four millions, and the amount of its transfers of public money, by means of treasury drafts, amounted to upwards of nine millions; making, in all, more than thirty-three millions. Now, although the annual public revenue is about twenty-four millions, yet as the expenditures of the nation are going on at the same time as its receipts, the money on hand, at any one time, seldom exceeds six or seven millions. According to the monthly statement of the bank, for the 1st of January of the present year, the amount of deposits on account of the treasury of the United States, was, after deducting over drafts, 6,940,628 dollars. But as this sum would be distributed very unequally over the United States, there would be in some places more money than the government had occasion for, and in others less, so that it would be compelled to draw on the former, to meet the public exigencies, without regard to the state of the exchange market, by reason of which, it would not only not be able to afford the public that general accommodation which the Bank of the United States now does, but be sometimes obliged to sell its drafts for a discount, instead of a premium. Thus, suppose the government has a large sum lying in New-York, (it sometimes has more than two millions there,) and it has occasion for 200,000 dollars in Maine, as much in Missouri, &c. Although it might have found a ready sale in these places for its drafts, for a small amount, at par, or even at a premium, yet the amount offered exceeding the demands of the market, the government must either sell its drafts at a discount, or be at the expense of transmitting the specie. In the mean while, the drafts which are thus sold at one place at a loss, might be in demand at another, but that demand the government cannot meet, because it must give its money another direction. We therefore think that this part of the scheme cannot be of much utility to the public, or of profit to the treasury.

It must be recollected, too, that the Bank of the United States is a buyer as well as a seller of bills of exchange, to the great advantage of the commercial community. Its purchases, during the same year, 1829, amounted to upwards of twenty-nine millions of dollars; and that in this business, the treasury bank, according to the president's programme, could not engage.

But besides the want of the accommodation now afforded by the purchase or sale of inland bills to all parts of the Union, there is a large further arrear of utility which the treasury bank would owe to the public. In what way would it make amends for the immense amount of currency withdrawn from circulation? The notes of the United States Bank in actual circulation, commonly amount to fourteen or fifteen millions, exclusive of its drafts, which, to a certain extent, perform the office of currency. As the new bank is to issue no paper, the chasm must be filled, either with the paper of the state banks, or not filled at all. If with the former, whence are they to derive their increased means of circulation, seeing that nearly all of them have carried their issues to the extreme verge of safety, and some of them, perhaps, beyond it? It will, however, be said, that there will be new banks established—the capital that is vested in the Bank of the United States will not be annihilated by the termination of that establishment, but will seek employment in new banks. Let it be so. In that case what becomes of the increased profits of which many of the state banks have been dreaming, and the hope of obtaining which has been so artfully appealed to?

But an addition to the state banks would fall far short of filling the void. Much of the capital of the present bank was obtained from Europe. We are told in the report of the committee, that foreigners own stock to the amount of seven millions. Is it probable that these capitalists will be as ready to venture their money in the state banks, as in one chartered by the general government? Would they even venture it again in a national bank, after we had shown so vacillating a policy? We establish a bank of that description in 1791—we put it down in 1811, as unconstitutional—we charter another, five years afterwards, 1816, and discontinue that in 1836. Assuredly, after this experience, they would prefer a somewhat smaller interest nearer home, rather than risk their money in a country exhibiting so little stability, and where what had been long determined to be legal by the highest authorities of the country, is liable to be revoked on the first revolution of parties.

There are persons who will consider the withdrawal of seven millions from our circulation, as no source of regret; and who think the money paid for the use of foreign capital, is so much lost to the country; for the truths of political economy are not obvious to all. But no one who is acquainted with the elements of that science, will doubt, that a nation, not having as much capital as it can advantageously employ, may be improved and enriched by foreign capital as well as its own; and the benefit of these seven millions in stimulating the productive industry of the country—in building ships, and wharves, and mills, and manufactories, and steam-boats, is precisely the same as if they were domestic capital, with the single difference of the interest. Ask the owner of a thriving manufactory of woollens in Cincinnati, or of iron in Pittsburg, if he had been assisted in his enterprise by a loan of 10,000, or 20,000 dollars from the Bank of the United States—and he might answer, that, by the use of the money, in a few years, he had, besides paying the interest, realized the sum borrowed. Ask him further whether he would gain more by keeping the money longer, or returning it to the European stockholder, and he would laugh at you, thinking your question conveyed its own answer, as he had not chosen to return the money.

The president's project then of a treasury bank, seems to be liable to all the objections he makes to the present Bank of the United States, in a tenfold degree, as to influence, by adding so enormously to the executive patronage. It offers a far inferior substitute for the safety, and the easy transmission of the revenue; and no substitute at all for much of the accommodation now afforded to commerce, and the large amount of active capital it would throw out of circulation.

In making this comparison, we have had no reference to the former services of the Bank of the United States in restoring the currency of the country to a sound state, or to its power of so preserving it, if the country should be again involved in war. We have contented ourselves with refuting the objections which have been brought forward against that institution, under the sanction of the chief magistrate of the country, and with pointing out to the unprejudiced mind the inconveniences and serious mischiefs attendant on the scheme which has been proposed in its stead. In our last number, we asserted that the resumption of specie payments by the state banks, in 1817, was to be probably attributed to the establishment of the Bank of the United States, and we stated the facts upon which that opinion was founded. It was, then, with some surprise, that we saw the position roundly denied in a quarter (the North American Review) where we have been accustomed to look for just views on all commercial affairs; and the resumption of cash payments imputed to the resolution of congress, forbidding the officers of the government from receiving the notes of any banks which were not redeemable in specie. The question is not one of primary importance, yet as it may affect our future policy, and concerns our present justice, we will add a few remarks on the subject. When we see that the measure of the government alluded to was not immediately followed by the desired effect, but that as soon as the Bank of the United States was about to go into operation, an arrangement was voluntarily entered into with it by the banks of New-York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Virginia, by which they all agreed to resume cash payments at the same time, it seems to afford prima facie evidence, that it is to the Bank of the United States, and not to the legislature, that the resumption is directly attributable. Whether the state banks might not, at some subsequent time, have paid specie, and at what time, must now remain a matter of conjecture; but we think it quite as likely, that the banks, making extraordinary profits as they were, so long as they were not compelled to redeem their notes in specie, would have procured a repeal of the resolution of congress, as that that measure would have operated coercively on them. In some of the states, the resumption of specie payments was discountenanced by the state legislatures; and in Virginia, if we mistake not, after the measure had been enjoined on the banks by the legislature, it afterwards retraced its steps, on the ground, that if they ventured to pay specie, the Bank of the United States, then about to go into operation, would immediately draw every dollar from their vaults. The banks of that state thus had the express sanction of its legislature for continuing the suspension; nor was it until after the meeting of the convention, mentioned in our last number, that they paid specie.

But in what way, it may be asked, could the Bank of the United States have compelled the state banks to resume specie payments, if they had not been so disposed? We answer, by giving the public the option of a better currency than theirs, and presenting an easy and ready standard in every part of the Union, by which the depreciation of their notes would have been manifest. As soon as the paper of the national bank had been put into circulation, it would command, by its convertibility into specie, a preference in the market over the paper of the state banks, and the difference would have been shown by the reduced rate at which the latter would have passed. The public then having such a standard of comparison, could no longer be deceived, and every one would have seen the depreciation, and known the extent of it. What would have been the natural consequence? The paper of the state banks, thus depreciated in the market, would have been bought up by their more prudent and substantial borrowers, and returned to them in discharge of their debts; and thus they would have had no notes in circulation except what was represented by the paper of their most straitened and doubtful customers, nor would any others have continued to borrow of them. Thus, with a business decreased in amount and impaired in character, they would have found it impossible to make a profit equal to defraying their expenses and yielding a dividend to the stockholders.

All this the state banks distinctly foresaw, and not wishing to be compelled to resume specie payments, by which their profits would be diminished, they generally opposed the establishment of a national bank. But when they found that all opposition had been ineffectual, and that the bank was about to go into operation, and to pay specie, they immediately saw that they must follow the example, or that their gains were at an end—that the public, which took their paper, during the war and immediately after the peace, when there was no other currency, would not continue to take it, when they had the choice of a better—and thus the compact which has been mentioned was formed.

It is said, however, that the depreciated paper of the Baltimore banks would have circulated so long as the government received it at the custom-house, and that it was only after the government decided to receive it no longer, that those banks found themselves compelled to pay specie. But would this measure have been effectual without a national bank? We have already intimated that we thought not. It would have been vehemently attacked in congress and out, and all the states, except perhaps Massachusetts, might have instructed their representatives that the measure was premature, oppressive, and detrimental to the public interests. But after the Bank of the United States went into operation, the question was at an end. The government, whether the resolution of congress had been passed or not, could not with decency have taken, or been asked to take, any more than an individual, depreciated paper for its dues, when there was good paper and specie in circulation; and the Baltimore banks, as well as all others, must have followed suit, or given up the game.

For these reasons we must continue to think, that the claim urged by the friends of the Bank of the United States, that it operated, by its example, a salutary coercion on the state banks in their return to specie payments, is as well established as a question of its character can be, and that the same means by which it proved that remedy for the mischiefs of an unsound currency—its solid capital—unquestionable credit—and practical skill in business—would operate, on future occasions, as a preventive of similar mischiefs.

The same distinguished critic differs from the chairman of the committee of ways and means, as to the effect of an increase of money in producing depreciation. The proposition controverted is thus stated by Mr. M'Duffie in the Report.

"No proposition is better established than that the value of money, whether it consists of specie or paper, is depreciated in exact proportion to the increase of its quantity, in any given state of the demand for it. If, for example, the banks, in 1816, doubled the quantity of the circulating medium by their excessive issues, they produced a general degradation of the entire mass of the currency, including gold and silver, proportioned to the redundancy of the issues, and wholly independent of the relative depreciation of bank paper at different places as compared with specie. The nominal money price of every article was of course one hundred per cent. higher than it would have been, but for the duplication of the quantity of the circulating medium. Money is nothing more nor less than the measure by which the relative value of all articles of merchandise is ascertained. If, when the circulating medium is fifty millions, an article should cost one dollar, it would certainly cost two, if, without any increase of the uses of a circulating medium, its quantity should be increased to one hundred millions. This rise in the price of commodities, or depreciation in the value of money, as compared with them, would not be owing to the want of credit in the bank bills, of which the currency happened to be composed. It would exist, though these bills were of undoubted credit, and convertible into specie at the pleasure of the holder, and would result simply from the redundancy of their quantity. It is important to a just understanding of the subject, that the relative depreciation of bank paper at different places, as compared with specie, should not be confounded with this general depreciation of the entire mass of the circulating medium, including specie."

Although the principle appears to us to be laid down somewhat too broadly by Mr. M'Duffie, as we shall presently state, yet he is supported in his position, to the letter, by Hume, by Mr. Jefferson, and virtually by Adam Smith, if we suppose that from any cause the excess of gold and silver, which causes the depreciation, cannot be exported. They all agree in this, that the amount of money which can circulate, and which does in fact circulate in any country, depends upon the number and value of its exchanges, and that, as its quantity increases, its value diminishes. But Hume and Smith, concurring in this general principle, drew very different inferences from it as to the paper currency of banks. Hume thought that the equilibrium between the money required for the country and that in circulation, was effected by depreciation; while Smith considered, that it was maintained by an exportation of the precious metals in proportion to the increase of paper. And the general principle thus ably supported by authority, was all, no doubt, that Mr. M'Duffie meant to assert. There is then probably no real difference between him and his reviewer in the North American.

We conceive that Mr. M'Duffie, in his application of the principle to our own situation, twelve or fifteen years since, has not greatly overrated the depreciation, if we regard the effect of the increase of money on every species of exchangeable value; but that it was very different with the different kinds. This difference requires explanation; but first, of the general principle itself, which, it seems to us, must be received with some qualification.

The effect of an increase of money is certainly to diminish its value; but the extent of the diminution is one of those nice problems in political economy which has never been accurately settled. It has not yet been adjusted to a formula which will explain all the facts attending such increase. Although the quantity of money required in a country mainly depends upon the number and value of its purchases in a given time, yet with the same amount of these, much less money may be in circulation at one time than another. There are various expedients and substitutes for supplying a temporary deficiency of currency, which make the quantity of money in a commercial country a variable one, capable of considerable contraction or expansion. The actual money can be more or less aided by credit. A farmer, a horse-dealer, a shopkeeper, a mechanic—will all wait with a substantial purchaser for their money, rather than lose the sale of their commodities; and a sudden rise in the price of the staples of the country, such as our own often experience, while it increases the demand for money, proportionally improves the credit of individuals, and fits it as a substitute for cash. Money too may be much more active at one time than another; and when there has been a considerable increase of it, the greater comparative idleness of a part of it, in the strong boxes or pocket-books of individuals, may prevent or lessen its depreciation. These circumstances, and others which might be added, all inappreciable except by approximations, prevent the value of money from either rising or falling, in exact proportion to its increase or decrease in quantity.

To this qualification of the general principle, we would add another. When the money of a country has been considerably increased, and the excess cannot be exported, as was the case with our paper currency during the suspension of cash payments, the depreciation is much greater upon some articles than others. Its effect is least upon those commodities which find a market abroad, because the price there regulates the price here. It is by reason of this irregularity that depreciation is often so disguised as not to be perceptible to all, and that sometimes it is a matter of dispute whether it exists or not; as was the case in England in the controversy between the bullionists and their opponents, concerning the fact of the depreciation of their bank paper during the suspension of cash payments.

But if the increase of the currency has little effect on the prices of some articles, it has the greater on those for the estimation of which there is no such definite standard—as lands, town lots, and houses—and those domestic products which look exclusively to domestic consumption for a market, as butchers' meat, game, &c. All these took a prodigious rise in all parts of the Union, and most men mistaking the effect of a redundancy of money for a real rise of price consequent on our increased population and capital, believed that real estate was the best investment they could make of their money, and purchased it accordingly—looking for remuneration, not to the rent or immediate profit, but to that future rise in value which was inferred from the past. This erroneous opinion brought capitalists into the market for real estate, and the competition created by their money, and that which others borrowed from the banks, raised the price extravagantly high. A natural though singular result of this state of things was, that those who had sold lands or lots at these factitious prices, could have made no use of their money that would have been so profitable as not using it at all; and the policy of hoarding, usually as unwise as it is odious, would have been, on this occasion, the most rational and gainful that could have been pursued.

If, then, we take the prices of every species of merchandise among us, together with that of real estate, we believe it will be found that such average of prices then, is very near double of what it is now; and consequently that Mr. M'Duffie's estimate of the late depreciation of our currency was not extravagant. But granting that it was exaggerated, he appears to us to have taken juster views than his critic, of its pernicious effects, as well as of the agency of the bank in arresting them; and we must think that he is the safer physician, who merely overrates the danger of a disease, than he, who, though he rightly judges it not mortal, mistakes both its cause and its remedy.

We think, too, that the report of the committee was correct in supposing, that the depreciation would not have taken place, if the Bank of the United States had then been in existence. At any rate it would have been postponed, and if not prevented altogether, under the disadvantages of having neither a navy to protect our commerce, nor manufactures to supply its place, it would have been greatly mitigated. It is probable that the suspension of cash payments would not have taken place at all, if the bank had followed the prudent course of the banks of Boston, and not lent its money to the government; but though it had, its paper would have been more nearly at par and more uniform than that of the state banks, which varied in value according to the public opinion of their prudence and solidity, as well as of the varying quantity of notes thrown into circulation in different places. It is possible that the national bank, being conducted with greater skill and knowledge of banking, would have seen that they could not safely accommodate the government with any large loan, and that when they were reduced to the dilemma of either suspending cash payments and having a depreciated currency, or of maintaining the currency sound, by withholding assistance to the government, they would have preferred the latter; and that the government would have been thereby induced to resort sooner than they did to a system of taxation to support the war. It is indeed impossible to say, at this time, what would have been the precise result if we had possessed a national bank, but we think that this much may be affirmed with confidence, that the depreciation of its notes would have been far less, would have been uniform, and would have taken the place of much paper which had no solid foundation for the short-lived credit it obtained.

It remains for us now to see what will be the extent of the immediate pecuniary cost to the nation for pulling down the Bank of the United States, and building up the Treasury Bank on its ruins. This view is intelligible to all, and there are minds who will give more weight to this objection than that of increasing executive influence.

We know that it is an important function of every government to regulate its money, weights, and measures, not from any mystical notions of sovereignty, but because uniformity in these several standards is of the greatest utility in saving time and trouble, and in preventing frauds and disputes, and there is no effectual way of attaining uniformity except by the legislative power. It is, therefore, that these subjects were placed under the control of the general government, by the constitution, and it is in the exercise of the powers thus granted that it coins money of gold and silver, and determines their relative value.

But as among the inventions of commerce, it is found that such metallic money can be, to a considerable extent, substituted by paper, and thus a measure of value which costs nothing, can be made and is made to answer the same, and even a better purpose, than that which would cost a great deal, the same reasons which made the regulation of the coin by the government, necessary and proper, apply to the regulation of its substitute. The government thus having control over the subject, is furnished with the ready means of making a great profit by the substitution; and this it may do in two ways. It may either become a banker itself, and issue notes of circulation, having currency as money, in return for the notes of individuals bearing interest, or it may transfer the right of doing this to such a set of men as it deems worthy of the trust, and make them pay a fair price for the valuable privilege thus conferred.

Of these two modes of profiting by the substitution of paper for specie, the last is by far the best, for the same reason that it is best for the government to sell its public lands, rather than to cultivate them. It is incapable of commanding agents who will practise the same economy, industry, and skill, in the management of the public concerns, as their own. It must always pay higher than individuals for the same work, and the various peculations to which it is exposed, besides the costly apparatus of superintendents, would make banking, carried on by itself, a bad measure of economy, to say nothing of the objections arising from its disturbing the distribution of political power, by affording the means of influence, patronage, and corruption.

But the scheme which the president has been persuaded to recommend, proposes, that the government should give up the advantages of both plans: that it should forego both the profit of issuing paper itself, and that of disposing of it to a corporate body, in which the community had entire confidence, and which has proved, by its previous unexampled success, its fitness for the duty—and in lieu of these plans, to let the valuable privilege evaporate into a sort of electioneering material, for whomsoever may hold the office of president, or may rule his cabinet. And what is it which the people of the United States are thus asked to surrender? Let us estimate it.

According to the bank charter, the government takes stock to the amount of seven millions of dollars, on which it pays to the bank an interest of 5 per cent., and it now receives on this stock an interest of 7 per cent, making a clear profit of 140,000 dollars a year, equal to a gross capital of 2,800,000 dollars, all of which must be lost on the proposed plan. But this is not all. The bank keeps the money of the government—keeps its accounts—keeps its officers out of temptation—and transfers the money from one part of the Union to another with promptitude and certainty, without the loss of a single dollar. We have seen that for some of these operations the treasury bank would be obliged to pay.

We do not mean to say that these various services of the bank are gratuitous. On the contrary, it is fairly remunerated for them by the privileges it enjoys, and by the public deposits; but still they are valuable services, and in this way the government obtains a fair equivalent for what it surrenders. Nor let it be supposed that as good a bargain could be made with the state banks. The general government could not be interested in their stock, nor could they afford to give as much for the privileges, because they would be more local. Being connected only by voluntary compacts, they could not do the business of the government to the same advantage as a single corporation. They could not circulate as much paper with the same safety, nor could they sell or buy bills at as small a profit. The superior advantages which the Bank of the United States enjoys in capital, in banking skill, and in the greater credit and wider circulation of its notes, enables it to give a liberal price for its charter, and the government would be false to the people to surrender this benefit.

But it would not become the government to attempt to extort, or to be illiberal, but to act on the principle of justice to the public and the bank. The legislature should not furnish the bank with either the temptation or excuse of an Irish middle man, who grinds his sub-tenants in proportion as his landlord has pressed him. Upon these principles, we think the government should, by way of bonus, charge the bank a moderate interest on its deposits, and pay a small commission for the services of the bank. An adjustment of these several claims, by some general estimate, might leave to the nation the clear annual gain of perhaps 200,000 dollars, or a gross capital of four millions, instead of giving it away for the improvement of the machinery of our political wire-workers.

There is yet another mode by which the government might derive a profit from the bank, and which has this further recommendation, that it would not be at the expense of the stockholders, and it would be a value saved to the nation that would be otherwise lost. It is now a favourite object both with the people and the government to pay off the national debt; and from the novelty of the phenomenon it will give great eclat to the administration in which it takes place. It is known that upwards of thirteen millions of this debt bears an interest of but 3 per cent. This part of the public funds is held chiefly in Europe by large capitalists, it being preferred by them, because it could not be redeemed but at par, unless with the consent of the holders, and it was hardly expected that the government would choose to redeem it at par rather than pay so low an interest on it. They thus thought that the owners of the stock had the means of postponing its redemption in their own hands. For these reasons this stock has always been something higher in the market than any other, and it now sells at 93 dollars a share of 100 dollars, which is about 3-1/4 per cent. At the price at which the commissioners of the sinking fund are limited, they cannot buy this stock; but when all the rest of the debt is paid, this must come next, and as soon as the government offers to purchase, it will rise still higher, perhaps to par. In that event, the government will have to pay upwards of thirteen millions of dollars, drawn from the pockets of the poor as well as the rich, which they might keep for ever, by paying an annual interest of 3 per cent, or 390,000 dollars.

Now the use of this money, has been of immense advantage to this country, and may continue to be so, considering how inadequately many parts of it are supplied with real capital. It will build ships—erect mills and manufactories—salt works and iron works—and help to make rail roads and canals, by which our free and industrious population will be able to improve the condition of the country in bettering their own. This money, too, does not consist of paper which we can create at will, but of gold and silver, or their equivalents, which we must send out of the country. Had it not better remain here? Every good economist will say yes. It will be not difficult, we should presume, for the government to make an arrangement with the bank to pay this 390,000 dollars, and release us from our obligations, and to receive a less sum than the thirteen millions. Their capital may be enlarged, and the rapid growth of our country will soon require its enlargement. The holders of this stock will indeed have a right to look to the United States for their money, but that would make only a nominal difference, and they might be offered stock of the bank in exchange on advantageous terms. Thus the money which would be appropriated to the payment of this debt, might be kept in the country and be vested in banking capital, by which it would give vigour to commerce, manufactures, and navigation, and, through them, render benefit to the whole nation.

THE END