[Footnote 228: Robert B. Mitchell was colonel, first of the Second Kansas Infantry, then of the Second Kansas Cavalry. He raised the former, in answer to President Lincoln's first call, 1861 [Crawford, Kansas in the Sixties, 20], chiefly in Linn County, and the latter in 1862.]

[Footnote 229: Connelley, Quantrilt and the Border Wars, 236 ff.]

[Footnote 230: Steele to Dole, March 26, 1862 [Indian Office General Files, Southern Superintendence, 1859-1862].]

once recovered, they were to be left in such shape as to be able to "protect and defend themselves."[231]

Halleck's preoccupation, prejudice, or whatever it was that prevented him from giving any satisfaction to Steele soon yielded, as all things sooner or later must, to necessity; but not to the extent of sanctioning the employment of Indians in warfare except as against other "Indians or in defense of their own territory and homes." The Pea Ridge atrocities were probably still fresh in his mind. On the fifth of April, he instructed[232] General Denver with a view to advancing, at last, the organization of the Indian expedition and Denver, Coffin, and Steele forthwith exerted all their energies in cooeperating effort[233]. Some time was spent in inspecting arms[234] but, on the eighth, enough for two thousand Indians went forward in the direction of Leroy and Humboldt[235] and on the sixteenth were delivered to the superintendent[236]. Coffin surmised that new complications would arise as soon as the distribution began; for all the Indians, whether they intended to enlist or not, would try to secure guns. Nothing had yet been said about their pay and nothing heard of an auxiliary force[237]. Again the question was, what,

[Footnote 231: Dole to Steele, March 21, 1862, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 67, 508-509.]

[Footnote 232: Official Records, vol. viii, 665.]

[Footnote 233: Dole's name might well be added to this list; for he had never lost his interest or relaxed his efforts. On the fifth of April, he communicated to Secretary Smith the intelligence that he had issued instructions to "the officers appointed to command the two Regiments of Indians to be raised as Home Guard to report at Fort Leavenworth to be mustered into service ... "—Indian Office Report Book, no. 12, 357.]

[Footnote 234: Steele to Dole, April 7, 1862 [Ibid., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862, S 538 of 1862].]

[Footnote 235: Denver to Halleck, April 8, 1862 [Official Records, vol. viii, 679].]

[Footnote 236: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, 148.]

[Footnote 237: "... I fear we shall have trouble in regard to the guns as many will take guns that will not go and whether they will give up their arms is doubtful. I had a long talk with Opothly-Oholo on that point and told (cont.)]

in the event of its not appearing, should the Indian agents do?[238]

The time was propitious for starting the expedition; for not the shadow of an enemy had been lately seen in the West, unless count be taken of Indians returning home or small roving bands of possible marauders that the people of all parties detested[239]. But the order for the supplanting of Denver by Sturgis had already been issued, April sixth[240], and Sturgis's policy was not yet

[Footnote 237: (cont.) him you could only get 2000 guns and you wanted every one to go and an Indian with it and that if any of them got guns that did not go they must give up their guns to those that would go but I know enough of the Indian character to know that it will be next thing to an impossibility to get a gun away from one when he once gets it and I shall put off the distribution of the guns till the last moment and it would be best to send them on a day or two before being distributed but that would make them mad and they would not go at all and how we are to know how many to look out for from others than those we have here I am not able to see but we will do all that we can but you may look out for dificulty in the matter they all seem anxious now to go and make no objections as yet nor have they said anything about their pay but as they were told before when we expect them to go into the Hunter Lane expedition that they would get the same pay as white troops and set off a part of it for their families it was so indelibly impressed upon their minds that I fear we will have a blow up on that score when it comes up we hear nothing yet of any troops being ordered to this service and I very much fear they will put off the matter so long that there will be no crop raised this season ... the mortality amongst them is great more since warm weather has set in than during the cold weather they foolishly physic themselves nearly to death danc [dance] all night and then jump into the river just at daylight to make themselves bullet proof they have followed this up now every night for over two weeks and it has no doubt caused many deaths Long Tiger the Uchee Chief and one of the best amongst them died to-day—yesterday we had 7 deaths and there will not be less to-day"—Coffin to Dole, April 7, 1862, Indian Office General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862, C 1578 of 1862.]

[Footnote 238: This was the query put to Dole by Steele in a letter of the thirteenth of April, which acknowledged Dole's of the third and ventured the opinion that Postmaster-general Blair "must be imitating General McClellan and practicing strategy with the mails." Steele further remarked, "Gen'l Denver, Maj. Wright and I are in the dark as to the plans of the Indian Expedition. Gen. Denver thinks I should proceed at once to Leroy without waiting for your instructions."—Ibid., S 539 of 1862.]

[Footnote 239: Curtis to Halleck, April 5, 1862 [Official Records, vol. viii, 662].]

[Footnote 240: Sturgis, upon the receipt of orders of this date, assumed command of (cont.)]

known. It soon revealed itself, however, and was hostile to the whole project that Dole had set his heart upon. Apparently that project, the moment it had been taken up by Denver, had ceased to have any interest for Lane on the score of its merits and had become identified with the Robinson faction in Kansas politics. At any rate, it was the anti-Robinson press that saw occasion for rejoicing in the complete removal of Denver from the scene, an event which soon took place[241].

The relieving of Denver from the command of the District of Kansas inaugurated[242] what contemporaries described as "Sturgis' military despotism,"[243] in amplification of which it is enough to say that it attempted the utter confounding, if not the annihilation, of the Indian Expedition, a truly noble undertaking to be sure, considering how much was hoped for from that expedition, how much of benefit and measure of justice to a helpless, homeless, impoverished people and considering, also, how much of time and thought and

[Footnote 240: (cont.) the District of Kansas; but Denver was not called east until the fourteenth of May. On the twenty-first of April, it was still expected that he would lead an expedition "down the borders of Arkansas into the Indian country." [KELTON to Curtis, April 21, 1862, Ibid., vol. xiii, 364].]

[Footnote 241: The Daily Conservative, for instance, rejoiced over this telegram from Sidney Clark of May 2, which gave advanced information of Denver's approaching departure: "Conservative: The Department of Kansas is reinstated. Gen. Blunt takes command. Denver reports to Halleck; Sturgis here." The newspaper comment was, "We firmly believe that a prolongation of the Denver-Sturgis political generalship, aided as it was by the corrupt Governor of this State, would have led to a revolution in Kansas ..."—Daily Conservative, May 6, 1862.]

[Footnote 242: General Sturgis assumed command, April 10, 1862 [Official Records, vol. viii, 683], and Denver took temporary charge at Fort Scott [Ibid., 668].]

[Footnote 243: Quoted from the Daily Conservative of May 20; but not with the idea of subscribing thereby to any verdict that would bear the implication that all of Sturgis's measures were arbitrary and wrong. Something strenuous was needed in Kansas. The arrest of Jennison and of Hoyt [Ibid., April 19, 23, 1862] because of their too radical anti-slavery actions was justifiable. Jennison had disorganized his regiment in a shameful manner [Ibid., June 3, 1862].]

energy, not to mention money, had already been expended upon it.

Sturgis's policy with reference to the Indian Expedition was initiated by an order[244], of April 25, which gained circulation as purporting to be in conformity with instructions from the headquarters of the Department of the Mississippi, although in itself emanating from those of the District of Kansas. It put a summary stop to the enlistment of Indians and threatened with arrest anyone who should disobey its mandate. Superintendent Coffin, in his inimitable illiteracy, at once entered protest[245] against it and coolly informed Sturgis that, in enrolling Indians for service, he was acting under the authority, not of the War, but of the Interior Department. At the same sitting, he applied to Commissioner Dole for new instructions[246].

[Footnote 244: Official Records, vol. xiii, 365.]

[Footnote 245:

LE ROY COFFEE COUNTY, KANSAS, April 29th 1862. BRIG. GENL S.D. STURGIS, Fort Leavenworth Kansas

Dear Sir: A Special Messenger arrived here last night from Fort Leavenworth with your orders No. 8 and contents noted. I would most respectfully inform you that I am acting under the controle and directions of the Interior and not of the War Department. I have been endeavoring to the best of my humble ability to carry out the instructions and wishes of that Department, all of which I hope will meet your aprobation.

Your Messenger reports himself Straped, that no funds were furnished him to pay his expenses, that he had to beg his way down here. I have paid his bill here and furnished him with five dollars to pay his way back. Very respectfully your Obedient Servant

W.G. COFFIN, Sup't. of Indian Affairs, Southern Superintendency. [Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, Southern Superintendency, C 1612 of 1862].]

[Footnote 246: LEROY COFFEY CO., KANSAS, April 29th, 1862.

SIR: Enclosed please find a communication from Brigadier General Sturgis in regard to the organising of the Indians and my reply to the same, the officers are here, or at least four of them. Col Furnace Agutant Elithurp Lieutenant Wattles and Agutant Dole I need scarcely say to you that we shall continue to act under your Instructions til further orders, the Officers above alluded to have been untiring in their efforts to get acquainted with and get the permanent (cont.)]

Colonel John Ritchie[247] of the inchoate Second Regiment Indian Home Guards did the same[248].

The reestablishment[249] of the Department of Kansas, at this critical moment, while much to be regretted as indicative of a surrender to politicians[250] and an abandonment of the idea, so fundamentally conducive to military success, that all parts must contribute to the good of the whole, had one thing to commend it, it restored vigor to the Indian Expedition. The department was reestablished, under orders[251] of May second, with James G. Blunt in command. He entered upon his duties, May fifth, and on that selfsame day authorized the issue of the following most significant instructions, in toto, a direct countermand of all that Sturgis had most prominently stood for:

[Footnote 246: (cont.) organization of the Indians under way and have made a fine impression upon them, and I should very much regret any failure to carry out the programe as they have been allready so often disappointed that they have become suspicious and it all has a tendency to lessen their confidence in us and to greatly increase our dificulties All of which is most Respectfully Submitted by your obedient Servant

W.G. COFFIN, Sup't of Indian Affairs. [Indian Office Special Files, no. 201, Southern Superintendency, C 1612 of 1862].]

[Footnote 247: For an inferential appraisement of Ritchie's character and abilities, see Kansas Historical Collections, vol. iii, 359-366.]

[Footnote 248: Ritchie to Dole, April 26, 1863 [Indian Office Miscellaneous Files, 1858-1863].]

[Footnote 249: The reestablishment, considered in the light of the first orders issued by Blunt, those set out here, was decidedly in the nature of a reflection upon the reactionary policy of Halleck and Sturgis; but Halleck had no regrets. Of Kansas, he said, "Thank God, it is no longer under my command." [Official Records, vol. xiii, 440.] Ever since the time, when he had been urged by the administration in Washington, peculiarly sensitive to political importunities, not to retain, outside of Kansas, the Kansas troops if he could possibly avoid it, there had been more or less of rancor between him and them. His opinion of them was that they were a "humbug" [Ibid., vol. viii, 661].]

[Footnote 250: Almost simultaneously, Schofield was given independent command in Missouri, a similar surrender to local political pressure.]

[Footnote 251: Official Records, vol. xiii, 368-369.]

General Orders, HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF KANSAS, No. 2. Fort Leavenworth, Kans., May 5, 1862.

I. General Orders, No. 8, dated Headquarters District of Kansas, April 25, 1862, is hereby rescinded.

II. The instructions issued by the Department at Washington to the colonels of the two Indian regiments ordered to be raised will be fully carried out, and the regiments will be raised with all possible speed.

By order of Brig. Gen. James G. Blunt,[252]

THOS. MOONLIGHT, Captain and Assistant Adjutant-general.[253]

The full extent, not only of Sturgis's failure to cooeperate with the Indian Office, but also of his intention utterly to block the organization of the Indian Expedition, is revealed in a letter[254] from Robert W. Furnas, colonel commanding the First Regiment Indian Home Guards, to Dole, May 4, 1862. That letter best explains itself. It was written from Leroy, Kansas, and reads thus:

Disclaiming any idea of violating "Regulations" by an "Official Report" to you, permit me to communicate certain facts extremely embarrassing, which surround the Indian Expedition.

In compliance with your order of Ap'l 5th. I reported myself "forthwith" to the U.S. mustering officer at Ft. Leavenworth and was "mustered into the service" on the 18th. of April. I "awaited the orders from Genl Halleck" as directed but rec'd none. On the 20th. Ap'l I rec'd detailed

[Footnote 252: The promotion of Blunt to a brigadier-generalship had caused surprise and some opposition. Referring to it, the Daily Conservative, April 12, 1862, said, "Less than three months ago Mr. Lincoln informed a gentleman from this State that no Kansas man would be made a Brigadier 'unless the Kansas Congressional delegation was unanimously and strenuously in his favor' ... Either the President has totally changed his policy or Lane, Pomeroy and Conway are responsible for this most unexpected and unprecedented appointment ..."]

[Footnote 253: Official Records, vol. xiii, 370.]

[Footnote 254: Indian Office General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862, F 363 of 1862.]

instructions from Adjt. Gen'l Thomas, authorizing me to proceed and raise "from the loyal Indians now in Kansas a Regiment of Infantry." I immediately repaired to this place and in a very few days enrolled a sufficient number of Indians to form a minimum[255] Regiment. I am particularly indebted to the Agts. Maj. Cutler of the Creeks and Maj. Snow of the Seminoles, for their valuable services. Immediately after the enrolling, and in compliance with my instructions from Adjt. Gen'l Thomas, I notified Lieut. Chas. S. Bowman U.S. mustering officer at Ft. Leavenworth of the fact, to which I have rec'd no answer.

At this point in my procedure a special messenger from Gen'l Sturgis reached this place with a copy of his "Order No. 8," a copy of which I herewith send you. On the next day Maj. Minor in command at Iola, Kansas, and who had been furnished with a copy of General Sturgis' "Order" came with a company of Cavalry to this place "to look into matters." I showed him my authority, and informed him what I had done. He made no arrest, seeming utterly at a loss to understand the seemingly confused state of affairs. Whether Gen'l Sturgis will on the reception of my notice at the Fort arrest me, or not, I know not. I have gone to the limits of my instructions and deem it, if not my duty, prudent at least to notify you of the condition of affairs, that you may be the better enabled to remove obstacles, that the design of the Department may be fully and promptly executed....[256]

[Footnote 255: The regiment, according to the showing of the muster roll, comprised one thousand nine men. Fifteen hundred was the more usual number of a regiment, which, normally, had three battalions with a major at the head of each.]

[Footnote 256: The remainder of the letter deals with the muster roll of the First Regiment Indian Home Guards, which was forwarded to Dole, under separate cover, the same day, and of which Dole acknowledged the receipt, May 16, 1862 [Indian Office Letter Book, no. 68, pp. 240-241]. The roll shows the captain and number of each company as here:

Company A Billy Bowlegs 106 Company B A-ha-luk-tus-ta-na-ke 100 Company C Tus-te-nu-ke-ema-ela 104 Company D Tus-te-nuk-ke 100 Company E Jon-neh (John) 101 Company F Mic-co-hut-ka (White Chief) 103 Company G Ah-pi-noh-to-me 103

(cont.)]

It soon developed that General Halleck had been equally at fault in disregarding the wishes of the government with respect to the mustering in of the loyal Indians. He had neglected to send on to Kansas the instructions which he himself had received from Washington.[257] It was incumbent, therefore, upon Blunt to ask for new. He had found the enlisted Indians with no arms, except guns, no shot pouches, no powder horns, although they were attempting to supply themselves as best they could.[258] Blunt thought they ought to be furnished with sheath, or bowie, knives; but the Indian Office had no funds for such a purpose.[259] The new instructions, when they came, were found to differ in no particular from those which had formerly been issued. The Indian Home Guards were to constitute an irregular force and were to be supported by such white troops, as Blunt should think necessary. They were to be supplied with transportation and subsistence and Blunt was to "designate the general to command." Blunt's own appointment was expected to remove all difficulties that had stood in the way of the Indian Expedition while under the control of Halleck.[260] On

[Footnote 256: (cont.)

Company H Lo-ga-po-koh 94 Company I Jan-neh (John 100 Company J Lo-ka-la-chi-ha-go 98]

[Footnote 257: Coffin to Dole, May 8, 1862, Indian Office General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862.]

[Footnote 258: Same to Same, May 13, 1862, Ibid., Land Files, Southern Superintendency, 1855-1870.]

[Footnote 259: Dole to Coffin, May 20, 1862, Ibid., Letter Book, no. 68, p. 252.]

[Footnote 260: "I visited the War Department today to ascertain what orders had been forwarded to you and your predecessor relative to the organization of two thousand Indians as a home guard, which when so organized would proceed to their homes in the Indian country in company with a sufficient number of white troops to protect them at their homes.

"I learn from Adjutant General Thomas that all necessary orders have been forwarded to enable you to muster these Indian Regiments into the service as an irregular force; and to send such white force with them as (cont.)]

May 8 came the order from Adjutant-general Thomas, "Hurry up the organization and departure of the two Indian regiments,"[261] which indicated that there was no longer any question as to endorsement by the Department of War.

As a matter of fact, the need for hurry was occasioned by the activity of secessionists, Indians and white men, in southwest Missouri, which would, of itself, suggest the inquiry as to what the Indian allies of the Confederacy had been about since the Battle of Pea Ridge. Van Dorn had ordered them to retire towards their own country and, while incidentally protecting it, afford assistance to their white ally by harassing the enemy, cutting off his supply trains, and annoying him generally. The order had been rigidly attended to and the Indians had done their fair share of the irregular warfare that terrorized and desolated the border in the late spring of the second year of the war. Not all of them, regularly enlisted, had participated in it, however; for General Pike had, with a considerable part of his brigade, gone away from the border as far as possible and had intrenched himself at a fort of his own planning, Fort McCulloch, in the Choctaw Nation, on the Blue River, a branch of the Red.[262] Furthermore,

[Footnote 260: (cont.) in your judgment may be deemed necessary, also that the difficulties we experienced while the expedition was under the control of Gen'l Halleck are now removed by your appointment, and that you will designate the general to command the whole expedition and see that such supplies for the transportation and subsistence as may be necessary are furnished to the whole expedition (Indians as well as whites). Lieut. Kile informs me that there was doubt whether the Quarter Master would be expected to act as Commissary for the Regiment. I suppose that you fully understand this was the intention...."—Dole to Blunt, May 16, 1862, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 68, pp. 241-242.]

[Footnote 261: Daily Conservative, May 9, 1862.]

[Footnote 262: "... General Albert Pike retreated from the battle of Pea Ridge, Arkansas, a distance of 250 miles, and left his new-made wards to the mercy (cont.)]

Colonel Drew and his men, later converts to secessionism, had, for a good part of the time, contented themselves with guarding the Cherokee Nation,[263] thus leaving Colonel Cooper and Colonel Stand Watie, with their commands, to do most of the scouting and

[Footnote 262: (cont.) of war, stringing his army along through the Cherokee, Creek and Choctaw Nations, passing through Limestone Gap, on among the Boggies, and halted at Carriage Point, on the Blue, 'away down along the Chickasaw line.' Cherokee Knights of the Golden Circle followed Pike's retreat to Texas ... "—Ross, Life and Times of Hon. William P. Ross, p. viii.]

[Footnote 263: These two letters from John Ross are offered in evidence of this. They are taken from Indian Office Miscellaneous Files, John Ross Papers:

(a)

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, PARK HILL, March 21st, 1862.

SIR: I am in receipt of your favor of the 23rd. inst. I have no doubt that forage can be procured for Col. Drew's men in this vicinity by hauling it in from the farms of the surrounding Districts. The subject of a Delegate in Congress shall be attended to so soon as arrangements can be made for holding an election. I am happy to learn that Col. Drew has been authorized to furlough a portion of the men in his Regiment to raise corn. I shall endeavor to be correctly informed of the movements of the enemy and advise you of the same. And I shall be gratified to receive any important information that you may have to communicate at all times. I am very respectfully and truly, Yours, etc. John Ross, Prin'l Chief, Cherokee Nation.

(b).

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, C.N. PARK HILL, April 10th, 1862.

SIR: I beg leave to thank you for your kind response to my letter of the 22nd ulto and your order stationing Col. Drew's Regiment in this vicinity. Though much reduced by furloughs in number it will be useful for the particular purposes for which it was ordered here. The unprotected condition of the country however is a source of general anxiety among the People, who feel that they are liable to be overrun at any time by small parties from the U.S. Army which remains in the vicinity of the late Battle Ground. This is more particularly the case since the removal of the Confederate Forces under your command and those under Major Gen'l Price. Without distrusting the wisdom that has prompted these movements, or the manifestation of any desire on my part to enquire into their policy it will be nevertheless a source of satisfaction to be able to assure the people of the country that protection will not be withheld from them and that they will not be left to their own feeble defense. Your response is respectfully requested, I have the honor to be Sir with high regards, Your Obt Servt. JOHN ROSS, Prin'l Chief, Cherokee Nation.

To Brig. Gen'l A. Pike Com'dg, Department Indian Territory, Head Qrs. Choctaw Nation.]

skirmishing. So kindly did the Indians take to that work that Colonel Cooper recommended[264] their employment as out-and-out guerrillas. That was on May 6 and was probably suggested by the fact that, on April 21, the Confederate government had definitely authorized the use of partisan rangers.[265] A good understanding of Indian military activity, at this particular time, is afforded by General Pike's report[266] of May 4,

... The Cherokee[267] and Creek troops are in their respective countries. The Choctaw troops are in front of me, in their country, part on this side of Boggy and part at Little Boggy, 34 miles from here. These observe the roads to Fort Smith and by Perryville toward Fort Gibson. Part of the Chickasaw battalion is sent to Camp McIntosh, 11 miles this side of the Wichita Agency, and part to Fort Arbuckle, and the Texan company is at Fort Cobb.

I have ordered Lieutenant-colonel Jumper with his Seminoles to march to and take Fort Larned, on the Pawnee Fork of the Arkansas, where are considerable stores and a little garrison. He will go as soon as their annuity is paid.

The Creeks under Colonel McIntosh are about to make an extended scout westward. Stand Watie, with his Cherokees, scouts along the whole northern line of the Cherokee country from Grand Saline to Marysville, and sends me information continually of every movement of the enemy in Kansas and Southwestern Missouri.

The Comanches, Kiowas, and Reserve Indians are all peaceable and quiet. Some 2,000 of the former are encamped about three days' ride from Fort Cobb, and some of them come in at intervals to procure provisions. They have sent to me to know

[Footnote 264: Cooper to Van Dorn, May 6, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 823-824.]

[Footnote 265: Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States, vol. v, 285.]

[Footnote 266: Official Records, vol. xiii, 819-823.]

[Footnote 267: This situation, so eminently satisfactory to John Ross, did not continue long, however, and on May 10, the Cherokee Principal Chief had occasion to complain that his country had been practically divested of a protecting force and, at the very moment, too, when the Federals were showing unwonted vigor near the northeastern border [Ross to Davis, May 10, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 824-825].]

if they can be allowed to send a strong party and capture any trains on their way from Kansas to New Mexico, to which I have no objection. To go on the war-path somewhere else is the best way to keep them from troubling Texas ...

Stand Watie's scouting had brought him, April 26,[268] into a slight action with men of the First Battalion First Missouri Cavalry at Neosho, in the vicinity of which place he lingered many days and where his men[269] again fought, in conjunction with Colonel Coffee's, May 31.[270] The skirmish of the later date was disastrous to the Federals under Colonel John M. Richardson of the Fourteenth Missouri State Militia Cavalry and proved to be a case where the wily and nimble Indian had taken the Anglo-Saxon completely by surprise.[271] From Neosho, Stand Watie moved down, by slow and destructive stages, through Missouri and across into Indian Territory. His next important engagement was at Cowskin Prairie, June 6.

Meanwhile, the organization of the Indian Expedition, or Indian Home Guard, as it was henceforth most commonly styled, was proceeding apace.[272] The

[Footnote 268: Official Records, vol. xiii, 61-63; Britton, Civil War on the Border, vol. i, 281-282.]

[Footnote 269: Stand Watie's whole force was not engaged and he, personally, was not present. Captain Parks led Watie's contingent and was joined by Coffee.]

[Footnote 270: Official Records, vol. xiii, 90-92, 94-95.]

[Footnote 271:—Ibid., 92-94, 409. Watie, although not present, seems to have planned the affair [Ibid., 95]. Lieutenant-colonel Mills, who reported upon the Neosho engagement, was of the opinion that "the precipitate flight" of the Federals could be accounted for only upon the supposition that the "screaming and whooping of the Indians" unnerved them and "rendered their untrained horses nearly unmanageable."—Ibid., 93.]

[Footnote 272: The progress in organization is indicated by these communications to the Indian Office:

(a).

The enrollment, organizing etc. etc. of the Indians, and preparations for their departure, are progressing satisfactorily, though as I anticipated, it will be difficult to raise two Regiments, and I have some fears of our success in getting the full number for the 2nd Regiment. But if we get one full company of Delawares and Shawnees, (cont.)]

completion of the first regiment gave little concern. It was composed of Creeks and Seminoles, eight companies of the former and two of the latter. The second regiment was miscellaneous in its composition and took longer to

[Footnote 272: (cont.) as promised, and four companies of Osages, which the chiefs say they can raise, I think we shall succeed.

Two Regiments of white troops and Rabb's Battery have already started and are down by this time in the Cherokee Nation. Col. Doubleday, who is in command, has notified the officers here to prepare with all possible despatch, for marching orders. We are looking for Aliens Battery here this week and if it comes I hope to make considerable addition to the Army from the loyal Refugee Indians here, as they have great confidence in "them waggons that shoot," this has been a point with them all the time.

We were still feeding those that are mustered in and shall I suppose have to do so until the requisitions arive. The Dellawares and Shaw-nees also, I had to make arrangements to feed from the time of their arrival at the Sac and Fox Agency. But from all the indications now we expect to see the whole Expedition off in ten days or two weeks.—Coffin to Dole, June 4, 1862, Indian Office General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862, C 1661.

(b).

It has been some time since I wrote you and to fill my promise I again drop you a line. I presume you feel a lively interest in whatever relates to the Indians. The 1st. Regt. is now mustered into the service and will probably to-day number something over a minimum Regt. It is composed entirely of Creeks and Seminoles, eight companys of the former and two of the latter.

I have understood that the report of the Creek Agent gave the number of Creek men at 1990—If this is a fact it is far from a correct statement—The actual number of Creek men over 14 years of age (refugees) will not number over 900. Some of these are unable to be soldiers. The actual number of Seminoles (men) will not excede 300 over 14 years of age, many of them are old and disabled as soldiers. Thus you will see that but one Regt. could be raised from that quarter. You are aware that the Creeks and Seminoles speak one language nearly and are thus naturally drawn together and they were not willing to be divided.

The second regt. is now forming from the various other tribes and I have no doubt will be filled, it would have been filled long ago, but Col. Ritchie did not repair here for a long time in fact not till after our Regt. was raised—Adjutant Dole came here promptly to do his duty—but in the absence of his Col. could not facilitate his regt. without assuming a responsibility that would have been unwise. I regret that he could not have been placed in our regt. for he will prove a faithful and reliable officer and should I be transfered to (cont.)]

organize, largely because its prospective commander, Colonel John Ritchie, who had gone south to persuade the Osages to enlist,[273] was slow in putting in an appearance at Humboldt. The Neosho Agency, to which the Osages belonged, was in great confusion, partly due to

[Footnote 272: (cont.) any other position which I am strongly in hopes I may be, I hope you will exercise your influence to transfer him to my place, this will be agreable to all the officers of the 1st. regiment and desirable on his part.

The condition of the Indians here at the present writing is very favorable, sickness is abating and their spirits are reviving. I think I have fully settled the fact of the Indians capability and susceptibility to arive at a good state of military disipline. You would be surprised to see our Regt. move. They accomplish the feat of regular time step equal to any white soldier, they form in line with dispatch and with great precission; and what is more they now manifest a great desire to learn the entire white man's disiplin in military matters. That they will make brave and ambitious soldiers I have no doubt. Our country may well feel proud that these red men have at last fell into the ranks to fight for our flag, and aid in crushing treason. Much honor is due them. I am sorry that Dr. Kile did not accept the appointment of Quartermaster but owing to some misunderstanding with Col. Ritchie he declines.

You will please remember me to Gen'l Lane and say that I have not heard from him since I left Washington.—A.C. ELITHORPE to Dole, June 9, 1862, Indian Office General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862, C 1661.

(c).

The Indian Brigade, consisting of about one thousand Creeks and Seminoles, sixty Quapaws, sixty Cherokees and full companies of wild Delawares, Kechees, Ironeyes, Cadoes, and Kickapoos, left this place (Leroy) yesterday for Humboldt, at which place I suppose they will join the so much talked of Indian expedition. Although I have not as yet fully ascertained the exact number of each Tribe, represented in said Brigade, but they may be estimated at about Fifteen Hundred, all of the Southern Refugee Indians who have been fed here by the Government, besides sixty Delawares from the Delaware Reservation, and about two Hundred Osages, the latter of which I have been assured will be increased to about four or five hundred, ere they get through the Osage Nation ...

The news from the Cherokee Nation is very cheering and encouraging; it has been reported that nearly Two Thousand Cherokees will be ready to join the expedition on its approach into that country....—Coffin to Dole, June 15, 1862, Ibid., C 1684.]

[Footnote 273: Coffin to Dole, June 4, 1862, Ibid., Neosho, C 1662 of 1862. See also Carruth to Coffin, September 19, 1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, 164-166.]

the fact that, at this most untoward moment, the Osages were being approached for a cession of lands, and partly to the fact that Indians of the neighborhood, of unionist sympathies, Cherokees and Delawares[274] from the Cherokee country, Shawnees, Quapaws,[275] and Seneca-Shawnees, were being made refugees, partly, also, to the fact that Agent Elder and Superintendent Coffin were not working in harmony with each other. Their differences dated from the first days of their official relationship. Elder had been influential, for reasons most satisfactory to himself and not very complimentary to Coffin, in having the Neosho Agency transferred to the Central Superintendency.[276] Coffin had vigorously objected and with such effect that, in March, 1862, a retransfer had been ordered;[277] but not before Coffin had reported[278] that everything was now amicable between him and Elder. Elder was evidently of a different opinion and before long was asking to be allowed again to report officially to Superintendent Branch at St. Joseph.[279] There was a regular tri-weekly post between that place and Fort Scott, Elder's present headquarters, and the chances were good that Branch would be in a position to attend to mail more promptly than was Coffin.[280] The counter arguments

[Footnote 274: F. Johnson to Dole, April 2, 1862, Indian Office, Central Superintendency, Delaware, J 627 of 1862.]

[Footnote 275: The propriety of permitting the refugee Quapaws to "return to their homes by accompanying the military expedition" was urged upon the Indian Office in a letter from Elder to Coffin, May 29, 1862 [Coffin to Dole, June 4, 1862, Ibid., Southern Superintendency, Neosho, C 1663 of 1862].]

[Footnote 276: Office letter of June 5, 1861.]

[Footnote 277: Mix to Branch, March 1, 1862, Indian Office Letter Book, no. 67.]

[Footnote 278: Coffin to Dole, February 28, 1862, Ibid., General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862, C 1541 of 1862.]

[Footnote 279: Elder to Dole, May 16, 1862, Ibid., Neosho, E 106 of 1862.]

[Footnote 280: Coffin was spending a good deal of his time at Leroy. Leroy was one hundred twenty-five miles, so Elder computed, from Leavenworth, where he (cont.)]

of Coffin[281] were equally plausible and the request for transfer refused.

The outfit for the Indians of the Home Guard was decidedly inferior. Opoeth-le-yo-ho-la wanted batteries, "wagons that shoot."[282] His braves, many of them, were given guns that were worthless, that would not shoot at all.[283] In such a way was their eagerness to learn the white man's method of fighting and to acquire his discipline rewarded. The fitting out was done at Humboldt, although Colonel William Weer[284] of the Tenth Kansas Infantry, who was the man finally selected to command the entire force, would have preferred it done at Fort Scott.[285] The Indians had a thousand and one excuses for not expediting matters. They seemed to have a deep-seated distrust of what the Federal intentions regarding them might be when

[Footnote 280: (cont.) directed his mail, and sixty or seventy from Fort Scott. His communications were held up until Coffin happened to go to Leavenworth. Moreover, Coffin was then expecting to go soon "into the Indian country."]

[Footnote 281: Coffin complained that Elder neglected his duties. It was Coffin's intention to remove the headquarters of the Southern Superintendency from Fort Scott to Humboldt. It would then be very convenient for Elder to report to him, especially if he would go back to his own agency headquarters and not linger, as he had been doing, at Fort Scott [Coffin to Dole, June 10, 1862, Ibid., C 1668 of 1862.]]

[Footnote 282: Daily Conservative, May 10, 1862.]

[Footnote 283: Weer to Doubleday, June 6, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 418; Coffin to Dole, June 17, 1862, Indian Office General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862.]

[Footnote 284: Weer was one of the men in disfavor with Governor Robinson [Daily Conservative, May 25, 1862]. He had been arrested and his reinstatement to command that came with the appearance of Blunt upon the scene was doubtless the circumstance that afforded opportunity for his appointment to the superior command of the Indian Expedition. Sturgis had refused to reinstate him. In December, 1861, a leave of absence had been sought by Weer, who was then with the Fourth Kansas Volunteers, in order that he might go to Washington, D.C., and be a witness in the case involving Lane's appointment as brigadier-general [Thomas to Hunter, December 12, 1861, Congressional Globe, 37th congress, second session, part i, 128].]

[Footnote 285: Weer to Moonlight, June 6, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 419.]

once they should be back in their own country. They begged that some assurance be given them of continued protection against the foe and in their legal rights. And, in the days of making preparations, they asked again and again for tangible evidence that white troops were really going to support them in the journey southward.

The main portion of the Indian Expedition auxiliary white force had all this time been more or less busy, dealing with bushwhackers and the like, in the Cherokee Neutral Lands and in the adjoining counties of Missouri. When Blunt took command of the Department of Kansas, Colonel Frederick Salomon[286] of the Ninth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry was in charge at Fort Scott and the troops there or reporting there were, besides eight companies of his own regiment, a part of the Second Ohio Cavalry under Colonel Charles Doubleday, of the Tenth Kansas Infantry under Colonel William F. Cloud, and the Second Indiana Battery.[287] Blunt's first thought was to have Daubleday[288] lead the Indian Expedition, the auxiliary white force of which was to be selected from the regiments at Fort Scott. Doubleday accordingly made his plans, rendezvoused his men, and arranged that the mouth of Shoal Creek should be a rallying point and temporary headquarters;[289] but events were already in train for Colonel

[Footnote 286: Salomon was born in Prussia in 1826 [Rosengarten, The German Soldier in the Wars of the United States, 150]. He had distinguished himself in some of the fighting that had taken place in Missouri in the opening months of the war and, when the Ninth Wisconsin Infantry, composed solely of German-Americans, had been recruited, he was called to its command [Love, Wisconsin in the War of the Rebellion, 578].]

[Footnote 287: Official Records, vol. xiii, 371-372, 377.]

[Footnote 288: for an account of Doubleday's movements in April that very probably gained him the place, see Britton, Civil War on the Border, vol. i, 296.]

[Footnote 289: Official Records, vol. xiii, 397, 408.]

Weer to supersede him and for his own assignment to the Second Brigade of the expedition.

Previous to his supersedure by Weer, Doubleday conceived that it might be possible to reach Fort Gibson with ease,[290] provided the attempt to do so should be undertaken before the various independent secessionist commands could unite to resist.[291] That they were planning to unite there was every indication.[292] Doubleday[293] was especially desirous of heading off Stand Watie who was still hovering around in the neighborhood of his recent adventures, and was believed now to have an encampment on Cowskin Prairie near Grand River. Accordingly, on the morning of June 6, Doubleday started out, with artillery and a thousand men, and, going southward from Spring River, reached the Grand about sundown.[294] Watie was three miles away and, Doubleday continuing the pursuit, the two forces came to an engagement. It was indecisive,[295] however, and Watie slipped away under

[Footnote 290: Doubleday to Moonlight, May 25, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 397.]

[Footnote 291: Doubleday to Blunt, June 1, 1862, Ibid., 408.]

[Footnote 292: General Brown reported on this matter, June 2 [Ibid., 409] and June 4 [Ibid., 414], as did also General Ketchum, June 3 [Ibid., 412]. They all seem to have had some intimation that General Pike was to unite with Stand Watie as well as Coffee and others, and that was certainly General Hindman's intention. On May 31, the very day that he himself assumed command, Hindman had ordered Pike to advance from Fort McCulloch to the Kansas border. The order did not reach Pike until June 8 and was repeated June 17 [Ibid., 40].]

[Footnote 293: The idea seems to have obtained among Missourians that Doubleday was all this time inactive. They were either ignorant of or intent upon ignoring the Indian Expedition. June 4, Governor Gamble wrote to Secretary Stanton asking that the Second Ohio and the Ninth Wisconsin, being at Fort Scott and unemployed, might be ordered to report to Schofield [Ibid., 414, 438], who at the instance of politicians and contrary to the wishes of Halleck [Ibid., 368] had been given an independent command in Missouri.]

[Footnote 294: Doubleday to Weer, June 8, 1862 [Ibid., 102].]

[Footnote 295: Doubleday reported to Weer that it was a pronounced success, so did Blunt to Schofield [Ibid., 427]; but subsequent events showed that it was (cont.)]

cover of the darkness. Had unquestioned success crowned Doubleday's efforts, all might have been well; but, as it did not, Weer, who had arrived at Fort Scott[296] a few days before and had been annoyed to find Doubleday gone, ordered him peremptorily to make no further progress southward without the Indians. The Indian contingent had in reality had a set-back in its preparations. Its outfit was incomplete and its means for transportation not forthcoming.[297] Under such circumstances, Weer advised the removal of the whole concern to Fort Scott, but that was easier said than done, inasmuch, as before any action was taken, the stores were en route for Humboldt.[298] Nevertheless, Weer was determined to have the expedition start before Stand Watie could be reinforced by Rains.[299] Constant and insistent were the reports that the enemy was massing its forces to destroy the Indian Expedition.[300]

[Footnote 295: (cont.) anything but that and the Daily Conservative tried to fix the blame upon Weer [Weer to Moonlight, June 23, 1862, Ibid., 446]. The newspaper account of the whole course of affairs may be given, roughly paraphrased, thus: Doubleday, knowing, perhaps, that Weer was to supersede him and that his time for action was short, "withdrew his detachment from Missouri, concentrated them near Iola, Kansas, and thence directed them to march to the mouth of Shoal Creek, on Spring River, himself taking charge of the convoying of a train of forty days supplies to the same place ..." He arrived June 4. Then, "indefatigible in forwarding the preparations for a blow upon the camp of organization which the rebels had occupied unmolested on Cowskin Prairie," he made his plans for further advance. At that moment came the news that Weer had superseded him and had ordered him to stop all movement south. He disregarded the order and struck, even though not fully prepared [Daily Conservative, June 13, 1862].]

[Footnote 296: Weer to Moonlight, June 5, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 418.]

[Footnote 297:—Ibid.; Weer to Doubleday, June 6, 1862, Ibid., 418-419.]

[Footnote 298: Weer to Moonlight, June 13, 1862, Ibid., 430.]

[Footnote 299: Same to same, June 7, 1862, Ibid., 422.]

[Footnote 300: The destruction of the Indian Expedition was most certainly the occasion for the massing, notwithstanding the fact that Missourians were apprehensive for the safety of their state only and wanted to have Weer's white troops diverted to its defence. Curtis, alone, of the commanders in Missouri seems to have surmised rightly in the matter [Curtis to Schofield, Ibid., 432].]

Weer, therefore, went on ahead to the Osage Catholic Mission and ordered the Fort Scott troops to meet him there. His purpose was to promote the enlistment of the Osages, who were now abandoning the Confederate cause.[301] He would then go forward and join Doubleday, whom he had instructed to clear the way.[302]

Weer's plans were one thing, his embarrassments, another. Before the middle of June he was back again at Leroy,[303] having left Salomon and Doubleday[304] at Baxter Springs on the west side of Spring River in the Neutral Lands, the former in command. Weer hoped by his presence at Leroy to hurry the Indians along; for it was high time the expedition was started and he intended to start it, notwithstanding that many officers were absent from their posts and the men of the Second Indian Regiment not yet mustered in. It was absolutely necessary, if anything were going to be done with Indian aid, to get the braves away from under the influence of their chiefs, who were bent upon delay and determent. By the sixteenth he had the warriors all ready at Humboldt,[305] their bullet-proof medicine taken, their grand war dance indulged in. By the twenty-first, the final packing up began,[306] and it was not long thereafter before the Indian Expedition, after having experienced so many vicissitudes, had definitely materialized and was on its way south. Accompanying Weer were the Reverend Evan Jones, entrusted with

[Footnote 301: Weer to Moonlight, June 13, 1862.]

[Footnote 302: Weer to Doubleday, June 6, 1862.]

[Footnote 303: Weer to Moonlight, June 13, 1862.]

[Footnote 304: On the twentieth, General Brown requested Salomon to send Doubleday to southwest Missouri [Official Records, vol. xiii, 440] and Salomon so far complied with the request as to post some companies of Doubleday's regiment, under Lieutenant-colonel Ratliff, at Neosho [Ibid., 445, 459].]

[Footnote 305:—Ibid., 434.]

[Footnote 306:—Ibid., 441.]

a confidential message[307] to John Ross, and two special Indian agents, E.H. Carruth, detailed at the instance of the Indian Office, and H.W. Martin, sent on Coffin's own responsibility, their particular task being to look out for the interests and welfare of the Indians and, when once within the Indian Territory, to take careful stock of conditions there, both political and economic.[308] The Indians were in fine spirits and, although looking

[Footnote 307: The message, addressed to "Mutual Friend," was an assurance of the continued interest of the United States government in the inhabitants of Indian Territory and of its determination to protect them [Coffin to Ross, June 16, 1862, Indian Office General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862, C 1684].]

[Footnote 308: "... You will assure all loyal Indians in the Indian Territory of the disposition and the ability of the Government of the United States to protect them in all their rights, and that there is no disposition on the part of said government to shrink from any of its Treaty Obligations with all such of the Indian Tribes, who have been, are now, and remaining loyal to the same. Also that the government will, at the earliest practicable period, which is believed not to be distant, restore to all loyal Indians the rights, privileges, and immunities, that they have enjoyed previous to the present unfortunate rebellion.

"If, during the progress of the Army you should find Indians in a suffering condition whose loyalty is beyond doubt, you will, on consultation with the officers, render such assistance, as you may think proper, with such aid as the officers may render you.

"You will carefully look into the condition of the country, ascertain the quantity of Stock, Hogs, and Cattle, also the quantity of Corn, wheat etc. which may be in the hands of the loyal Indians, and the amount of the crops in the ground the present season, their condition and prospects.

"You are requested to communicate with me at this office at every suitable opportunity on all the above mentioned points, in order to enable me to keep the Hon. Com'r of Indian Aff'rs well advised of the condition of affairs in the Indian Territory, and that the necessary steps may be taken at the earliest possible moment, consistent with safety and economy, to restore the loyal Indians now in Kansas to their homes.

"Should any considerable number of the Indians, now in the Army, remain in the Indian Territory, or join you from the loyal Indians, now located therein you will very probably find it best, to remain with them, until I can get there with those, who are now here. But of these matters you will be more able to judge on the ground."—Extract from Coffin's instructions to Carruth, June 16, 1862, Ibid., Similar instructions, under date of June 23, 1862, were sent to H.W. Martin.]

somewhat ludicrous in their uniforms,[309] were not much behind their comrades of the Ninth and Tenth Kansas[310] in earnestness and in attention to duty.[311] Nevertheless, they had been very reluctant to leave their families and were, one and all, very apprehensive as to the future.

[Footnote 309: "I have just returned from Humboldt—the army there under Col. Weer consisting of the 10th Kansas Regiment 4 Companys of the 9th Kansas Aliens Battery of Six Tenths Parrot Guns and the first and second Indian Regements left for the Indian Territory in good stile and in fine spirits the Indians with their new uniforms and small Military caps on their Hugh Heads of Hair made rather a Comecal Ludecrous apperance they marched off in Columns of 4 a breast singing the war song all joining in the chourse and a more animated seen is not often witnessed. The officers in command of the Indian Regements have labored incessantly and the improvement the Indians have made in drilling is much greater than I supposed them capabell of and I think the opinion and confidence of all in the eficency of the Indian Regements was very much greater when they left than at any previous period and I have little doubt that for the kind of service that will be required of them they will be the most efecient troops in the Expedition."—COFFIN to Dole, June 25, 1862, Indian Office General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862, C 1684.]

[Footnote 310: Weer took with him as white anxiliary "the Tenth Kansas, Allen's battery, three companies Ninth Kansas..." [Official Records, vol. xiii, 441]. It seems to have been his intention to take the Second Kansas also; but that regiment was determined to stay at Humboldt until it had effected a change in its colonels in favor of Owen A. Bassett [Ibid., 434].]

[Footnote 311: Weer was disgusted with conditions surrounding his white force. This is his complaint, on the eve of his departure:

"Commissions to officers from the Governor are pouring in daily. I am told that the Tenth is rapidly becoming a regiment of officers. To add to these difficulties there are continual intrigues, from colonels down, for promotions and positions of command. Officers are leaving their posts for Fort Leavenworth and elsewhere to engage in these intrigues for more prominent places. The camps are filled with rumors of the success of this or that man. Factions are forming, and a general state of demoralization being produced..."—WEER to Moonlight, June 21, 1862, Ibid., 441-442.]



V. THE MARCH TO TAHLEQUAH AND THE RETROGRADE MOVEMENT OF THE "WHITE AUXILIARY"

Towards the end of June, the various elements designed to comprise the First Indian Expedition had encamped at Baxter Springs[312] and two brigades formed. As finally organized, the First Brigade was put under the command of Colonel Salomon and the Second, of Colonel William R. Judson. To the former, was attached the Second Indian Regiment, incomplete, and, to the latter, the First. Brigaded with the Indian regiments was the white auxiliary that had been promised and that the Indians had almost pathetically counted upon to assist them in their straits. Colonel Weer's intention was not to have the white and red people responsible for the same duties nor immediately march together. The red were believed to be excellent for scouting and, as it would be necessary to scout far and wide all the way down into the Indian Territory, the country being full of bushwhackers, also, most likely, of the miscellaneous forces of General Rains, Colonel Coffee, and Colonel Stand Watie, they were to be reserved for that work.

The forward movement of the Indian Expedition began at daybreak on the twenty-eighth of June. It was then that the First Brigade started, its white contingent, "two sections Indiana Battery, one battalion of

[Footnote 312: Baxter Springs was a government post, established on Spring River in the southwest corner of the Cherokee Neutral Lands, subsequent to the Battle of Pea Ridge [Kansas Historical Society, Collections, vol. vi, 150].]

Second Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, and six companies of Ninth Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry,"[313] taking the military road across the Quapaw Strip and entering the Indian Territory, unmolested. A day's journey in the rear and travelling by the same route came the white contingent of the Second Brigade and so much of the First Indian as was unmounted.[314] Beyond the border, the cavalcade proceeded to Hudson's Crossing of the Neosho River, where it halted to await the coming of supply trains from Fort Scott. In the meantime, the Second Indian Regiment, under Colonel John Ritchie, followed, a day apart, by the mounted men of the First under Major William A. Phillips,[315] had also set out, its orders[316] being to leave the military road and to cross to the east bank of Spring River, from thence to march southward and scour the country thoroughly between Grand River and the Missouri state line.

The halt at Hudson's Crossing occupied the better part of two days and then the main body of the Indian Expedition resumed its forward march. It crossed the Neosho and moved on, down the west side of Grand River, to a fording place, Carey's Ford, at which point, it passed over to the east side of the river and camped, a short distance from the ford, at Round Grove, on Cowskin Prairie, Cherokee ground, and the scene of Doubleday's recent encounter with the enemy. At this

[Footnote 313: Salomon to Weer, June 30, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 458.]

[Footnote 314: James A. Phillips to Judson, June 28, 1862 [Official Records, vol. xiii, 456].]

[Footnote 315: William A. Phillips, a Scotsman by birth, went out to Kansas in the autumn of 1855 as regular staff correspondent of the New York Tribune [Kansas Historical Society Collections, vol. v, 100, 102]. He was a personal friend of Dana's [Britton, Memoirs, 89], became with Lane an active Free State man and later was appointed on Lane's staff [Daily Conservative, January 24, 31, 1862]. He served as correspondent of the Daily Conservative at the time when that newspaper was most guilty of incendiarism.]

[Footnote 316: James A. Phillips to Judson, June 28, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 456.]

place it anxiously awaited the return of Lieutenant-colonel Ratliff, who had been despatched to Neosho in response to an urgency call from General E.B. Brown in charge of the Southwestern Division of the District of Missouri.[317]

The Confederates were still in the vicinity, promiscuously wandering about, perhaps; but, none the less, determined to check, if possible, the Federal further progress; for they knew that only by holding the territorial vantage, which they had secured through gross Federal negligence months before, could they hope to maintain intact the Indian alliance with the Southern States. Stand Watie's home farm was in the neighborhood of Weer's camp and Stand Watie himself was even then scouting in the Spavinaw hills.[318]

In the latter part of May, under directions from General Beauregard[319] but apparently without the avowed knowledge of the Confederate War Department and certainly without its official[320] sanction, Thomas C.

[Footnote 317: Weer to Moonlight, June 23, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 445, and same to same, July 2, 1862, Ibid., 459-461.]

[Footnote 318: Anderson, Life of General Stand Watie, 18.]

[Footnote 319: Official Records, vol. xiii, 28.]

[Footnote 320: The emphasis should be upon the word, official, since the government must assuredly have acquiesced in Hindman's appointment. Hindman declared that the Secretary of War, in communicating on the subject to the House of Representatives, "ignored facts which had been officially communicated to him," in order to convey the impression that Hindman had undertaken to fill the post of commander in the Trans-Mississippi Department without rightful authority [Hindman to Holmes, February 8, 1863, Ibid., vol. xxii, part 2, p. 785]. The following telegram shows that President Davis had been apprised of Hindman's selection, and of its tentative character.

BALDWIN, June 5, 1862.

(Received 6th.)

THE PRESIDENT:

Do not send any one just now to command the Trans-Mississippi District. It will bring trouble to this army. Hindman has been sent there temporarily. Price will be on to see you soon.

EARL VAN DORN, Major-General.

[Ibid., vol. lii, part 2, supplement, p. 320.]]

Hindman had assumed the command of the Trans-Mississippi Department.[321] As an Arkansan, deeply moved by the misfortunes and distress of his native state, he had stepped into Van Dorn's place with alacrity, intent upon forcing everything within his reach to subserve the interests of the Confederate cause in that particular part of the southern world. To the Indians and to their rights, natural or acquired, he was as utterly indifferent as were most other American men and all too soon that fact became obvious, most obvious, indeed, to General Pike, the one person who had, for reasons best known to himself, made the Indian cause his own.

General Hindman took formal command of the Trans-Mississippi Department at Little Rock, May 31. It was a critical moment and he was most critically placed; for he had not the sign of an army, Curtis's advance was only about thirty-five miles away, and Arkansas was yet, in the miserable plight in which Van Dorn had left her in charge of Brigadier-general J.S. Roane, it is true, but practically denuded of troops. Pike was at Fort McCulloch, and he had a force not wholly to be despised.[322] It was to him, therefore, that Hindman

[Footnote 321: Department seems to be the more proper word to use to designate Hindman's command, although District and Department are frequently used interchangeably in the records. In Hindman's time and in Holmes's, the Trans-Mississippi Department was not the same as the Trans-Mississippi District of Department No. 2 [See Thomas Jordan, Chief of Staff, to Hindman, July 17, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 855]. On the very date of Hindman's assignment, the boundaries of his command were defined as follows:

"The boundary of the Trans-Mississippi Department will embrace the States of Missouri and Arkansas, including Indian Territory, the State of Louisiana west of the Mississippi, and the State of Texas."—Ibid., 829.]

[Footnote 322: Yet Hindman did, in a sense, despise it and, from the start, he showed a tendency to disparage Pike's abilities and efforts. On the nineteenth of June, he reported to Adjutant-general Cooper, among other things, that he had ordered Pike to establish his headquarters at Fort Gibson and added, "His force does not amount to much, but there is no earthly need of its (cont.)]

made one of his first appeals for help and he ordered him so to dispose of his men that some of the more efficient, the white, might be sent to Little Rock and the less efficient, the red, moved upward "to prevent the incursions of marauding parties," from Kansas.[323] The orders were repeated about a fortnight later; but Pike had already complied to the best of his ability, although not without protest[324] for he had collected his brigade and accoutered it by his own energies and his own contrivances solely. Moreover, he had done it for the defence of Indian Territory exclusively.

Included among the marauders, whose enterprises General Hindman was bent upon checking, were Doubleday's men; for, as General Curtis shrewdly surmised,[325] some inkling of Doubleday's contemplated maneuvers had most certainly reached Little Rock. Subsequently, when the Indian Expedition was massing at Baxter Springs, more vigorous measures than any yet taken were prepared for and all with the view of delaying or defeating it. June 23, Pike ordered Colonel Douglas H. Cooper to repair to the country north of the Canadian River and to take command of all troops, except Jumper's Seminole battalion, that should be there or placed there.[326] Similarly, June 26, Hindman, in ignorance of Pike's action, assigned Colonel J.J. Clarkson[327] to the supreme command, under

[Footnote 322: (cont.) remaining 150 miles south of the Kansas line throwing up intrenchments." [Official Records, vol. xiii, 837].]

[Footnote 323: Hindman to Pike, May 31, 1862 [Ibid., 934].]

[Footnote 324: Pike to Hindman, June 8, 1862 [Ibid., 936-943].]

[Footnote 325:—Ibid., 398, 401.]

[Footnote 326: General Orders, Ibid., 839, 844-845.]

[Footnote 327: Of Clarkson, Pike had this to say: "He applied to me while raising his force for orders to go upon the Santa Fe' road and intercept trains. I wrote him that he could have such orders if he chose to come here, and the next I heard of him he wrote for ammunition, and, I learned, was going to make (cont.)]

Pike, "of all forces that now are or may hereafter be within the limits of the Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole countries."[328] As fate would have it, Clarkson was the one of these two to whom the work in hand first fell.

The Indian Expedition was prepared to find its way contested; for its leaders believed Rains,[329] Coffey, and Stand Watie to be all in the immediate vicinity, awaiting the opportunity to attack either singly or with combined forces; but, except for a small affair between a reconnoitering party sent out by Salomon and the enemy's pickets,[330] the march was without incident worth recording until after Weer had broken camp at Cowskin Prairie. Behind him the ground seemed clear enough, thanks to the very thorough scouting that had been done by the Indians of the Home Guard regiments, some of whom, those of Colonel Phillips's command, had been able to penetrate Missouri.[331] Of conditions ahead of him, Weer was not so sure and he was soon made aware of the near presence of the foe.

Colonel Watie, vigilant and redoubtable, had been on the watch for the Federals for some time and, learning of their approach down the east side of Grand River, sent two companies of his regiment to head off their advance guard. This was attempted in a surprise movement at Spavinaw Creek and accomplished with some measure of success.[332] Colonel Clarkson was at

[Footnote 327: (cont.) forays into Missouri. I had no ammunition for that business. He seized 70 kegs that I had engaged of Sparks in Fort Smith, and soon lost the whole and Watie's also. Without any notice to me he somehow got in command of the northern part of the Indian country over two colonels with commissions nine months older than his."—Pike to Hindman, July 15, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 858.]

[Footnote 328: Official Records, vol. xiii, 845-846.]

[Footnote 329: Rains had made Tahlequah the headquarters of the Eighth Division Missouri State Guards.—PIKE to Hindman, July 15, 1862, Ibid., 858.]

[Footnote 330:—Ibid., vol. xiii, 458, 460.]

[Footnote 331:—Ibid., 460.]

[Footnote 332: Anderson, Life of General Stand Watie, 18. This incident is most (cont.)]

Locust Grove and Weer, ascertaining that fact, prepared for an engagement. His supplies and camp equipage, also an unutilized part of his artillery he sent for safety to Cabin Creek, across Grand River and Lieutenant-colonel Lewis R. Jewell of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry he sent eastward, in the direction of Maysville, Arkansas, his expectation being—and it was realized—that Jewell would strike the trail of Watie and engage him while Weer himself sought out Clarkson.[333]

The looked-for engagement between the main part of the Indian Expedition and Clarkson's force, a battalion of Missourians that had been raised by Hindman's orders and sent to the Indian Territory "at the urgent request of Watie and Drew,"[334] occurred at Locust Grove on the third of July. It was nothing but a skirmish, yet had very significant results. Only two detachments of Weer's men were actively engaged in it.[335] One of them was from the First Indian Home Guard and upon it the brunt of the fighting fell.[336]

[Footnote 332: (cont.) likely the one that is referred to in Carruth and Martin's letter to Coffin, August 2, 1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, p. 162.]

[Footnote 333: Britton, Civil War on the Border, vol. i, 300-301.]

[Footnote 334: Report of General Hindman, Official Records, vol. xiii, 40.]

[Footnote 335: Weer to Moonlight, July 6, 1862, Ibid., 137.]

[Footnote 336: Carruth and Martin reported to Coffin, August 2, 1862, that the Indians did practically all the fighting on the Federal side. In minor details, their account differed considerably from Weer's.

"When near Grand Saline, Colonel Weer detached parts of the 6th, 9th, and 10th Kansas regiments, and sent the 1st Indian regiment in advance. By a forced night march they came up to the camp of Colonel Clarkson, completely surprising him, capturing all his supplies, and taking one hundred prisoners; among them the colonel himself.

"The Creek Indians were first in the fight, led by Lieutenant Colonel Wattles and Major Ellithorpe. We do not hear that any white man fired a gun unless it was to kill the surgeon of the 1st Indian regiment. We were since informed that one white man was killed by the name of McClintock, of the 9th Kansas regiment. In reality, it was a victory gained by the 1st Indian regiment; and while the other forces would, no doubt, have acted well, it is the height of injustice to claim this victory for the whites...."—Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, p. 162.]

The Confederates were worsted and lost their train and many prisoners. Among the prisoners was Clarkson himself. His battalion was put to flight and in that circumstance lay the worst aspect of the whole engagement; for the routed men fled towards Tahlequah and spread consternation among the Indians gathered there, also among those who saw them by the way or heard of them. Thoroughly frightened the red men sought refuge within the Federal lines. Such conduct was to be expected of primitive people, who invariably incline towards the side of the victor; but, in this case, it was most disastrous to the Confederate Indian alliance. For the second time since the war began, Colonel John Drew's enlisted men defected from their own ranks[337] and, with the exception of a small body under Captain Pickens Benge,[338] went boldly over to the enemy. The result was, that the Second Indian Home Guard, Ritchie's regiment, which had not previously been filled up, had soon the requisite number of men[339] and there were more to spare. Indeed, during the days that followed, so many recruits came in, nearly all of them Cherokees, that lists were opened for starting a third regiment of Indian Home Guards.[340] It was not long before it was organized, accepted by Blunt, and W.A. Phillips commissioned as its colonel.[341] The regular mustering in of the new recruits had to be done at Fort Scott and thither Ritchie sent the men, intended for his regiment, immediately.

The Indian Expedition had started out with a very definite preliminary programme respecting the

[Footnote 337: Official Records, vol. xiii, 138.]

[Footnote 338: Hindman's Report, Ibid., 40.]

[Footnote 339: Ritchie to Blunt, July 5, 1862, Ibid., 463-464.]

[Footnote 340: Weer to Moonlight, July 12, 1862, Ibid., 488.]

[Footnote 341: Blunt to Salomon, August 3, 1862, Ibid., 532; Britton, Civil War on the Border, vol. i, 304.]

management of Indian affairs, particularly as those affairs might be concerned with the future attitude of the Cherokee Nation. The programme comprised instructions that emanated from both civil and military sources. The special Indian agents, Carruth and Martin, had been given suitable tasks to perform and the instructions handed them have already been commented upon. Personally, these two men were very much disposed to magnify the importance of their own position and to resent anything that looked like interference on the part of the military. As a matter of fact, the military men treated them with scant courtesy and made little or no provision for their comfort and convenience.[342] Colonel Weer seems to have ignored, at times, their very existence. On more than one occasion, for instance, he deplored the absence of some official, accredited by the Indian Office, to take charge of what he contemptuously called "this Indian business,"[343] which business, he felt, greatly complicated all military undertakings[344] and was decidedly beyond the bounds of his peculiar province.[345]

[Footnote 342: Pretty good evidence of this appears in a letter, which Carruth and Martin jointly addressed to Coffin, September 4, 1862, in anticipation of the Second Indian Expedition, their idea being to guard against a repetition of some of the experiences of the first. "We wish to call your attention," wrote they, "to the necessity of our being allowed a wagon to haul our clothing, tents, etc. in the Southern expedition.

"In the last expedition we had much annoyance for the want of accommodations of our own. Unless we are always by at the moment of moving, our things are liable to be left behind, that room may be made for army baggage which sometimes accumulates amazingly....

"The cold nights of autumn and winter will overtake us in the next expedition and we ought to go prepared for them. We must carry many things, as clothing, blankets, etc."—General Files, Southern Superintendency, 1859-1862.]

[Footnote 343: Official Records, vol. xiii, 460.]

[Footnote 344:—Ibid., 487.]

[Footnote 345: Weer, nevertheless, was not long in developing some very pronounced ideas on the subject of Indian relations. The earliest and best indication of (cont.)]

The military instructions for the management of Indian affairs outlined a policy exceedingly liberal, a policy that proceeded upon the assumption that stress of circumstances had conditioned the Indian alliance with the Confederacy. This idea was explicitly conveyed in a communication from Weer, through his acting assistant adjutant-general, to John Ross, and again in the orders issued to Salomon and Judson. Ross and his people were to be given an opportunity to return to their allegiance, confident that the United States government would henceforth protect them.[346] And the military commanders were invited to give their "careful attention to the delicate position" which the Indian Expedition would occupy

In its relation to the Indians. The evident desire of the government is to restore friendly intercourse with the tribes and return the loyal Indians that are with us to their homes. Great care must be observed that no unusual degree of vindictiveness be tolerated between Indian and Indian. Our policy toward the rebel portion must be a subject of anxious consideration, and its character will to a great degree be shaped by yourself (Judson) in conjunction with Colonel Salomon. No settled policy can at present be marked out. Give all questions their full share of investigation. No spirit of private vengeance should be tolerated.[347]

After the skirmish at Locust Grove, Colonel Weer deemed that the appropriate moment had come for approaching John Ross with suggestions that the Cherokee Nation abandon its Confederate ally and return to its allegiance to the United States government. From

[Footnote 345: (cont.) that is to be found in his letter of July twelfth, in which he gave his opinion of the negroes, whom he found very insolent. He proposed that the Cherokee Nation should abolish slavery by vote.]

[Footnote 346: J.A. Phillips to Ross, June 26, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 450.]

[Footnote 347: Phillips to Judson, June 28, 1862, Ibid., 456. Orders, almost identically the same, were issued to Salomon. See Phillips to Salomon, June 27, 1862, Ibid., 452.]

his camp on Wolf Creek, therefore, he addressed a conciliatory communication[348] to the Cherokee chief, begging the favor of an interview and offering to make full reparation for any outrages or reprisals that his men, in defiance of express orders to the contrary, might have made upon the Cherokee people through whose country they had passed.[349] Weer had known for several days, indeed, ever since he first crossed the line, that the natives were thoroughly alarmed at the coming of the Indian Expedition. They feared reprisals and Indian revenge and, whenever possible, had fled out of reach of danger, many of them across the Arkansas River, taking with them what of their property they could.[350] Weer had done his best to restrain his troops, especially the Indian, and had been very firm in insisting that no "outrages perpetrated after Indian fashion" should occur.[351]

Weer's message to Ross was sent, under a flag of truce, by Doctor Gillpatrick, a surgeon in the Indian Expedition, who had previously served under Lane.[352] Ross's reply,[353] although prompt, was scarcely satisfactory from Weer's standpoint. He refused pointblank the request for an interview and reminded Weer that the Cherokee Nation, "under the sanction and authority of the whole Cherokee people," had made a formal alliance with the Confederate government and

[Footnote 348: Weer to Ross, July 7, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 464.]

[Footnote 349: That there had been outrages and reprisals, Carruth and Martin admitted but they claimed that they had been committed by white men and wrongfully charged against Indians [Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, 162-163].]

[Footnote 350: Weer to Moonlight, July 2, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 460.]

[Footnote 351:—Ibid., 452, 456, 461.]

[Footnote 352: Daily Conservative, December 27, 1861.]

[Footnote 353: Ross to Weer, July 8, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 486-487; Moore, Rebellion Record, vol. v, 549.]

proposed to remain true, as had ever been its custom, to its treaty obligations. To fortify his position, he submitted documents justifying his own and tribal actions since the beginning of the war.[354] Weer was naturally much embarrassed. Apparently, he had had the notion that the Indians would rush into the arms of the Union with the first appearance of a Federal soldier; but he was grievously mistaken. None the less, verbal reports that reached his headquarters on Wolf Creek restored somewhat his equanimity and gave him the impression that Ross, thoroughly anti-secessionist at heart himself, was acting diplomatically and biding his time.[355] Weer referred[356] the matter to Blunt for instructions at the very moment when Blunt, ignorant that he had already had communication with Ross, was urging[357] him to be expeditious, since it was "desirable to return the refugee Indians now in Kansas to their homes as soon as practicable."

There were other reasons, more purely military, why a certain haste was rather necessary. Some of those reasons inspired Colonel Weer to have the country around about him well reconnoitered. On the fourteenth of July, he sent out two detachments. One, led by Major W.T. Campbell, was to examine "the alleged position of the enemy south of the Arkansas," and the other, led by Captain H.S. Greeno, to repair to Tahlequah and Park Hill.[358] Campbell, before he had advanced far, found out that there was a strong Confederate force at Fort Davis[359] so he halted at Fort Gibson and was

[Footnote 354: Weer to Moonlight, July 12, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 487. The documents are to be found accompanying Weer's letter, Ibid., 489-505.]

[Footnote 355: Blunt to Stanton, July 21, 1862, Ibid., 486.]

[Footnote 356: Weer to Moonlight, July 12, 1862, Ibid., 487-488.]

[Footnote 357: Blunt to Weer, July 12, 1862, Ibid., 488-489.]

[Footnote 358: Weer to Moonlight, July 16, 1862, Ibid., 160-161.]

[Footnote 359: Campbell to Weer, July 14, 1862, Ibid., 161.]

there joined by Weer. Meanwhile, Greeno with his detachment of one company of whites and fifty Cherokee Indians had reached Tahlequah and had gone into camp two and one-half miles to the southward.[360] He was then not far from Park Hill, the residence of Chief Ross. All the way down he had been on the watch for news; but the only forces he could hear of were some Indian, who were believed to be friendly to the Union although ostensibly still serving the Confederacy. It was a time of crisis both with them and with him; for their leaders had just been summoned by Colonel Cooper, now in undisputed command north of the Canadian, to report immediately for duty at Fort Davis, his headquarters. Whatever was to be done would have to be done quickly. There was no time to lose and Greeno decided the matter for all concerned by resorting to what turned out to be a very clever expedient. He made the commissioned men all prisoners of war[361] and then turned his attention to the Principal Chief, who was likewise in a dilemma, he having received a despatch from Cooper ordering him, under authority of treaty provisions and "in the name of President Davis, Confederate States of America, to issue a proclamation calling on all Cherokee Indians over 18 and under 35 to come forward and assist in protecting the country from invasion."[362] Greeno thought the matter over and concluded there was nothing for him to do but to capture Ross also and to release him, subsequently, on parole. These things he did and there were many people who thought, both then and long

[Footnote 360: Greeno to Weer, July 15, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 473; Carruth and Martin to Coffin, July 19, 1862, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, 158-160.]

[Footnote 361: Greeno to Weer, July 17, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 161-162.]

[Footnote 362: Official Records, vol. xiii, 473.]

afterwards, that the whole affair had been arranged for beforehand and that victor and victim had been in collusion with each other all the way through.

Up to this point the Indian Expedition can be said to have met with more than a fair measure of success; but its troubles were now to begin or rather to assert themselves; for most of them had been present since the very beginning. Fundamental to everything else was the fact that it was summer-time and summer-time, too, in a prairie region. Troops from the north, from Wisconsin and from Ohio, were not acclimated and they found the heat of June and July almost insufferable. There were times when they lacked good drinking water, which made bad matters worse. The Germans were particularly discontented and came to despise the miserable company in which they found themselves. It was miserable, not so much because it was largely Indian, but because it was so ill-equipped and so disorderly. At Cowskin Prairie, the scouts had to be called in, not because their work was finished, but because they and their ponies were no longer equal to it.[363] They had played out for the simple reason that they were not well fitted out. The country east of Grand River was "very broken and flinty and their ponies unshod." It has been claimed, although maybe with some exaggeration, that not "a single horse-shoe or nail" had been provided for Colonel Salomon's brigade.[364]

The supplies of the Indian Expedition were insufficient and, although at Spavinaw Creek Colonel Watie's entire commissary had been captured[365] and Clarkson's at Locust Grove, there was great scarcity. Weer had

[Footnote 363: Official Records, vol. xiii, 460.]

[Footnote 364: Love, Wisconsin in the War of Rebellion, 580.]

[Footnote 365: Anderson, Life of General Stand Watie, 19.]

been cautioned again and again not to cut himself off from easy communication with Fort Scott.[366] He had shown a disposition to wander widely from the straight road to Fort Gibson; but Blunt had insisted that he refrain altogether from making excursions into adjoining states.[367] He had himself realized the shortness of his provisions and had made a desperate effort to get to the Grand Saline so as to replenish his supply of salt at the place where the Confederates had been manufacturing that article for many months. He had known also that for some things, such as ordnance stores, he would have to look even as far as Fort Leavenworth.[368]

The climax of all these affairs was reached July 18, 1862. On that day, Frederick Salomon, colonel of the First Brigade, took matters into his own hands and arrested his superior officer. It was undoubtedly a clear case of mutiny[369] but there was much to be said in extenuation of Salomon's conduct. The reasons for his action, as stated in a pronunciamento[370] to his associates in command and as submitted to General Blunt[371] are here given. They speak for themselves.

Headquarters Indian Expedition, Camp on Grand River, July 18, 1862.

To Commanders of the different Corps constituting Indian Expedition:

Sirs: In military as well as civil affairs great and violent wrongs need speedy and certain remedies. The time had arrived, in my judgment, in the history of this expedition when the greatest wrong ever perpetrated upon any troops was about

[Footnote 366: Consider, for example, Blunt's orders of July 14 [Official Records, vol. xiii, 472].]

[Footnote 367: Blunt to Weer, July 3, 1862, Ibid., 461.]

[Footnote 368: Weer to Moonlight, July 2, 1862, Ibid.]

[Footnote 369: As such the Indian agents regarded it. See their communication on the subject, July 19, 1862, Ibid., 478.]

[Footnote 370: Ibid., 475-476.]

[Footnote 371: Ibid., 484-485.]

to fall with crushing weight upon the noble men composing the command. Some one must act, and that at once, or starvation and capture were the imminent hazards that looked us in the face.

As next in command to Colonel Weer, and upon his express refusal to move at all for the salvation of his troops, I felt the responsibility resting upon me.

I have arrested Colonel Weer and assumed command.

The causes leading to this arrest you all know. I need not reiterate them here. Suffice to say that we are 160 miles from the base of operations, almost entirely through an enemy's country, and without communication being left open behind us. We have been pushed forward thus far by forced and fatiguing marches under the violent southern sun without any adequate object. By Colonel Weer's orders we were forced to encamp where our famishing men were unable to obtain anything but putrid, stinking water. Our reports for disability and unfitness for duty were disregarded; our cries for help and complaints of unnecessary hardships and suffering were received with closed ears. Yesterday a council of war, convened by the order of Colonel Weer, decided that our only safety lay in falling back to some point from which we could reopen communication with our commissary depot. Colonel Weer overrides and annuls the decision of that council, and announces his determination not to move from this point. We have but three days' rations on hand and an order issued by him putting the command on half rations. For nearly two weeks we have no communication from our rear. We have no knowledge when supply trains will reach us, neither has Colonel Weer. Three sets of couriers, dispatched at different times to find these trains and report, have so far made no report. Reliable information has been received that large bodies of the enemy were moving to our rear, and yet we lay here idle. We are now and ever since our arrival here have been entirely without vegetables or healthy food for our troops. I have stood with arms folded and seen my men faint and fall away from me like the leaves of autumn because I thought myself powerless to save them.

I will look upon this scene no longer. I know the responsibility I have assumed. I have acted after careful thought

and deliberation. Give me your confidence for a few days, and all that man can do, and with a pure purpose and a firm faith that he is right, shall be done for the preservation of the troops.

F. Salomon, Colonel Ninth Wis. Vols., Comdg. Indian Expedition.

Headquarters Indian Expedition, Camp on Wolf Creek, Cherokee Nation, July 20, 1862. Brig. Gen. James G. Blunt,

Commanding Department of Kansas:

Sir: I have the honor to report that I have arrested Col. William Weer, commanding the Indian Expedition, and have assumed command. Among the numerous reasons for this step a few of the chief are as follows:

From the day of our first report to him we have found him a man abusive and violent in his intercourse with his fellow-officers, notoriously intemperate in habits, entirely disregarding military usages and discipline, always rash in speech, act, and orders, refusing to inferior officers and their reports that consideration which is due an officer of the U.S. Army.

Starting from Cowskin Prairie on the 1st instant, we were pushed rapidly forward to the vicinity of Fort Gibson, on the Arkansas River, a distance of 160 miles from Fort Scott. No effort was made by him to keep communication open behind us. It seemed he desired none. We had but twenty-three days' rations on hand. As soon as he reached a position on Grand River 14 miles from Fort Gibson his movements suddenly ceased. We could then have crossed the Arkansas River, but it seemed there was no object to be attained in his judgment by such a move. There we lay entirely idle from the 9th to the 19th. We had at last reached the point when we had but three days' rations on hand. Something must be done. We were in a barren country, with a large force of the enemy in front of us, a large and now impassable river between us, and no news from our train or from our base of operations for twelve days. What were we to do? Colonel Weer called a council of war, at which he stated that the Arkansas River was now impassable to our forces; that a train containing commissary stores had been expected for three days; that three different sets of couriers sent out some time previous had

entirely failed to report; that he had been twelve days entirely without communication with or from the department, and that he had received reliable information that a large force of the enemy were moving to our rear via the Verdigris River for the purpose of cutting off our train.

Upon this and other information the council of war decided that our only safety lay in falling back to some point where we could reopen communication and learn the whereabouts of our train of subsistence. To this decision of the council he at the time assented, and said that he would arrange with the commanders of brigades the order of march. Subsequently he issued an order putting the command on half rations, declaring that he would not fall back, and refused utterly, upon my application, to take any steps for the safety or salvation of his command. I could but conclude that the man was either insane, premeditated treachery to his troops, or perhaps that his grossly intemperate habits long continued had produced idiocy or monomania. In either case the command was imperiled, and a military necessity demanded that something be done, and that without delay. I took the only step I believed available to save your troops. I arrested this man, have drawn charges against him, and now hold him subject to your orders.

On the morning of the 19th I commenced a retrograde march and have fallen back with my main force to this point.

You will see by General Orders, No. 1, herewith forwarded, that I have stationed the First and Second Regiments Indian Home Guards as a corps of observation along the Grand and Verdigris Rivers; also to guard the fords of the Arkansas. Yesterday evening a courier reached me at Prior Creek with dispatches saying that a commissary train was at Hudson's Crossing, 75 miles north of us, waiting for an additional force as an escort. Information also reaches me this morning that Colonel Watie, with a force of 1,200 men, passed up the east side of Grand River yesterday for the purpose of cutting off this train. I have sent out strong reconnoitering parties to the east of the river, and if the information proves reliable will take such further measures as I deem best for its security.

I design simply to hold the country we are now in, and will make no important moves except such as I may deem necessary for the preservation of this command until I receive specific

instructions from you. I send Major Burnett with a small escort to make his way through to you. He will give you more at length the position of this command, their condition, &c.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, F. Salomon, Colonel Ninth Wis. Vols., Comdg. Indian Expedition.

Salomon's insubordination brought the Indian Expedition in its original form to an abrupt end, much to the disgust and righteous indignation of the Indian service. The arrest of Colonel Weer threw the whole camp into confusion,[372] and it was some hours before anything like order could be restored. A retrograde movement of the white troops had evidently been earlier resolved upon and was at once undertaken. Of such troops, Salomon assumed personal command and ordered them to begin a march northward at two o'clock on the morning of the nineteenth.[373] At the same time, he established the troops, he was so brutally abandoning, as a corps of observation on or near the Verdigris and Grand Rivers. They were thus expected to cover his retreat, while he, unhampered, proceeded to Hudson's Crossing.[374]

With the departure of Salomon and subordinate commanders in sympathy with his retrograde movement, Robert W. Furnas, colonel of the First Indian, became the ranking officer in the field. Consequently it was his duty to direct the movements of the troops that remained. The troops were those of the three Indian regiments, the third of which had not yet been formally recognized and accepted by the government. Not all of these troops were in camp when the arrest of Weer took place. One of the last official acts of Weer as

[Footnote 372: Carruth and Martin to Blunt, July 19, 1862.]

[Footnote 373: Blocki, by order of Salomon, July 18, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 477.]

[Footnote 374: Carruth and Martin to Coffin, August 2, 1862.]

commander of the Indian Expedition had been to order the First Indian to proceed to the Verdigris River and to take position "in the vicinity of Vann's Ford." Only a detachment of about two hundred men had as yet gone there, however, and they were there in charge of Lieutenant A.C. Ellithorpe. A like detachment of the Third Indian, under John A. Foreman, major, had been posted at Fort Gibson.[375] Salomon's pronunciamento and his order, placing the Indian regiments as a corps of observation on the Verdigris and Grand Rivers, were not communicated to the regimental commanders of the Indian Home Guard until July 22;[376] but they had already met, had conferred among themselves, and had decided that it would be bad policy to take the Indians out of the Territory.[377] They, therefore agreed to consolidate the three regiments into a brigade, Furnas in command, and to establish camp and headquarters on the Verdigris, about twelve miles directly west of the old camp on the Grand.[378]

The brigading took place as agreed upon and Furnas, brigade commander, retained his colonelcy of the First Indian, while Lieutenant-colonel David B. Corwin took command of the Second and Colonel William A. Phillips of the Third. Colonel Ritchie had, prior to recent happenings, been detached from his command in order to conduct a party of prisoners to Fort Leavenworth, also to arrange for the mustering in of Indian recruits.[379] But two days' rations were on hand, so jerked beef was accepted as the chief article of diet until other supplies could be obtained.[380] There was likely to be plenty of

[Footnote 375: Furnas to Blunt, July 25, 1862, Official Records, vol. xiii, 512.]

[Footnote 376:—Ibid., 512.]

[Footnote 377: Britton, Civil War on the border, vol. i, 309.]

[Footnote 378: Official Records, vol. xii, 512; Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, 163.]

[Footnote 379: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, 163-164.]

[Footnote 380: Carruth and Martin to Coffin, July 25, 1862, Ibid., 160.]

that; for, as Weer had once reported, cattle were a drug on the market in the Cherokee country, the prairies "covered with thousands of them."[381] The encampment on the Verdigris was made forthwith; but it was a failure from the start.

The Indians of the First Regiment showed signs of serious demoralization and became unmanageable, while a large number of the Second deserted.[382] It was thought that deprivation in the midst of plenty, the lack of good water and of the restraining influence of white troops had had much to do with the upheaval, although there had been much less plundering since they left than when they were present. With much of truth back of possible hatred and malice, the special agents reported that such protection as the white men had recently given Indian Territory "would ruin any country on earth."[383]

With the hope that the morale of the men would be restored were they to be more widely distributed and their physical conditions improved, Colonel Furnas concluded to break camp on the Verdigris and return to the Grand. He accordingly marched the Third Indian to Pryor Creek[384] but had scarcely done so when orders came from Salomon, under cover of his usurped authority as commander of the Indian Expedition, for him to cross the Grand and advance northeastward to Horse Creek and vicinity, there to pitch his tents. The new camp was christened Camp Wattles. It extended from Horse to Wolf Creek and constituted a point from which the component parts of the Indian Brigade did

[Footnote 381: Weer to Moonlight, July 12, 1862.]

[Footnote 382: Furnas to Blunt, July 25, 1862.]

[Footnote 383: Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Report, 1862, 160-161.]

[Footnote 384: Named in honor of Nathaniel Pryor of the Lewis and Clark expedition and of general frontier fame, and, therefore, incorrectly called Prior Creek in Furnas's report.]