At the conclusion of the debate, two young farmers, in their exuberant enthusiasm, rushed forward, seized Lincoln in spite of his remonstrances, and carried him off upon their stalwart shoulders. "It was really a ludicrous sight," writes an eye-witness,[719] "to see the grotesque figure holding frantically to the heads of his supporters, with his legs dangling from their shoulders, and his pantaloons pulled up so as to expose his underwear almost to his knees." Douglas was not slow in using this incident to the discomfiture of his opponent. "Why," he said at Joliet, "the very notice that I was going to take him down to Egypt made him tremble in his knees so that he had to be carried from the platform. He laid up seven days, and in the meantime held a consultation with his political physicians,"[720] etc. Strangely enough, Lincoln with all his sense of humor took this badinage seriously, and accused Douglas of telling a falsehood.[721]

The impression prevailed that Douglas had cornered Lincoln by his adroit use of the Springfield resolutions of 1854. Within a week, however, an editorial in the Chicago Press and Tribune reversed the popular verdict, by pronouncing the resolutions a forgery. The Republicans were jubilant. "The Little Dodger" had cornered himself. The Democrats were chagrined. Douglas was thoroughly nonplussed. He had written to Lanphier for precise information regarding these resolutions, and he had placed implicit confidence in the reply of his friend. It now transpired that they were the work of a local convention in Kane County.[722] Could any blunder have been more unfortunate?

When the contestants met at Freeport, far in the solid Republican counties of the North, Lincoln was ready with his answers to the questions propounded by Douglas at Ottawa. In most respects Lincoln was clear and explicit. While not giving an unqualified approval of the Fugitive Slave Law, he was not in favor of its repeal; while believing that Congress possessed the power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, he favored abolition only on condition that it should be gradual, acceptable to a majority of the voters of the District, and compensatory to unwilling owners; he would favor the abolition of the slave-trade between the States only upon similar conservative principles; he believed it, however, to be the right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the Territories; he was not opposed to the honest acquisition of territory, provided that it would not aggravate the slavery question. The really crucial questions, Lincoln did not face so unequivocally. Was he opposed to the admission of more slave States? Would he oppose the admission of a new State with such a constitution as the people of that State should see fit to make?

Lincoln answered hesitatingly: "In regard to the other question, of whether I am pledged to the admission of any more slave States into the Union, I state to you very frankly that I would be exceedingly sorry ever to be put in a position of having to pass upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to know that there would never be another slave State admitted into the Union; but I must add, that if slavery shall be kept out of the Territories during the territorial existence of any one given Territory, and then the people shall, having a fair chance and a clear field, when they come to adopt the Constitution, do such an extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave Constitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but to admit them into the Union."[723]

It was now Lincoln's turn to catechise his opponent. He had prepared four questions, the second of which caused his friends some misgivings.[724] It read: "Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution?"

Lincoln knew well enough that Douglas held to the power of the people practically to exclude slavery, regardless of the decision of the Supreme Court; Douglas had said as much in his hearing at Bloomington. What he desired to extort from Douglas was his opinion of the legality of such action in view of the Dred Scott decision. Should Douglas answer in the negative, popular sovereignty would become an empty phrase; should he answer in the affirmative, he would put himself, so Lincoln calculated, at variance with Southern Democrats, who claimed that the people of a Territory were now inhibited from any such power over slave property. In the latter event, Lincoln proposed to give such publicity to Douglas's reply as to make any future evasion or retraction impossible.[725]

Douglas faced the critical question without the slightest hesitation. "It matters not what way the Supreme Court may hereafter decide as to the abstract question whether slavery may or may not go into a Territory under the Constitution, the people have the lawful means to introduce it or exclude it as they please, for the reason that slavery cannot exist a day or an hour anywhere, unless it is supported by local police regulations. Those police regulations can only be established by the local legislature; and if the people are opposed to slavery, they will elect representatives to that body who will by unfriendly legislation effectually prevent the introduction of it into their midst. If, on the contrary, they are for it, their legislation will favor its extension. Hence, no matter what the decision of the Supreme Court may be on that abstract question, still the right of the people to make a slave Territory or a free Territory is perfect and complete under the Nebraska Bill. I hope Mr. Lincoln deems my answer satisfactory on that point"[726]

The other three questions involved less risk for the advocate of popular sovereignty. He would vote to admit Kansas without the requisite population for representation in Congress, if the people should frame an unobjectionable constitution. He would prefer a general rule on this point, but since Congress had decided that Kansas had enough people to form a slave State, she surely had enough to constitute a free State. He scouted the imputation in the third question, that the Supreme Court could so far violate the Constitution as to decide that a State could not exclude slavery from its own limits. He would always vote for the acquisition of new territory, when it was needed, irrespective of the question of slavery.[727]

Smarting under Lincoln's animadversions respecting the Springfield resolutions, Douglas explained his error by quoting from a copy of the Illinois State Register, which had printed the resolutions as the work of the convention at the capital. He gave notice that he would investigate the matter, "when he got down to Springfield." At all events there was ample proof that the resolutions were a faithful exposition of Republican doctrine in the year 1854. Douglas then read similar resolutions adopted by a convention in Rockford County. One Turner, who was acting as one of the moderators, interrupted him at this point, to say that he had drawn those very resolutions and that they were the Republican creed exactly. "And yet," exclaimed Douglas triumphantly, "and yet Lincoln denies that he stands on them. Mr. Turner says that the creed of the Black Republican party is the admission of no more slave States, and yet Mr. Lincoln declares that he would not like to be placed in a position where he would have to vote for them. All I have to say to friend Lincoln is, that I do not think there is much danger of his being placed in such a position.... I propose, out of mere kindness, to relieve him from any such necessity."[728]

As he continued, Douglas grew offensively denunciatory. His opponents were invariably Black Republicans; Lincoln was the ally of rank Abolitionists like Giddings and Fred Douglass; of course those who believed in political and social equality for blacks and whites would vote for Lincoln. Lincoln had found fault with the resolutions because they were not adopted on the right spot. Lincoln and his friends were great on "spots." Lincoln had opposed the Mexican War because American blood was not shed on American soil in the right spot. Trumbull and Lincoln were like two decoy ducks which lead the flock astray. Ambition, personal ambition, had led to the formation of the Black Republican party. Lincoln and his friends were now only trying to secure what Trumbull had cheated them out of in 1855, when the senatorship fell to Trumbull. Under this savage attack the crowd grew restive. As Douglas repeated the epithet "Black" Republican, he was interrupted by indignant cries of "White," "White." But Douglas shouted back defiantly, "I wish to remind you that while Mr. Lincoln was speaking there was not a Democrat vulgar and blackguard enough to interrupt him," and browbeat his hearers into quiet again.[729]

Realizing, perhaps, the immense difficulty of exposing the fallacy of Douglas's reply to his questions, in the few moments at his disposal, Lincoln did not refer to the crucial point. He contented himself with a defense of his own consistency. His best friends were dispirited, when the half-hour ended. They could not shake off the impression that Douglas had saved himself from defeat by his adroit answers to Lincoln's interrogatories.[730]

The next joint debate occurred nearly three weeks later down in Egypt. By slow stages, speaking incessantly at all sorts of meetings, Douglas and Lincoln made their several ways through the doubtful central counties to Jonesboro in Union County. This was the enemy's country for Lincoln; and by reason of the activities of United States Marshal Dougherty, a Buchanan appointee, the county was scarcely less hostile to Douglas. The meeting was poorly attended. Those who listened to the speakers were chary of applause and appeared politically apathetic.[731]

Douglas opened the debate by a wild, unguarded appeal to partisan prejudices. Knowing his hearers, he was personally vindictive in his references to Black Republicans in general and to Lincoln in particular. He reiterated his stock arguments, giving new vehemence to his charge of corrupt bargain between Trumbull and Lincoln by quoting Matheny, a Republican and "Mr. Lincoln's especial and confidential friend for the last twenty years."[732]

Lincoln begged leave to doubt the authenticity of this new evidence, in view of the little episode at Ottawa, concerning the Springfield resolutions. At all events the whole story was untrue, and he had already declared it to be such.[733] Why should Douglas persist in misrepresenting him? Brushing aside these lesser matters, however, Lincoln addressed himself to what had now come to be known as Douglas's Freeport doctrine. "I hold," said he, "that the proposition that slavery cannot enter a new country without police regulations is historically false.... There is enough vigor in slavery to plant itself in a new country even against unfriendly legislation. It takes not only law but the enforcement of law to keep it out." Moreover, the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case had created constitutional obligations. Now that the right of property in slaves was affirmed by the Constitution, according to the Court, how could a member of a territorial legislature, who had taken the oath to support the Constitution, refuse to give his vote for laws necessary to establish slave property? And how could a member of Congress keep his oath and withhold the necessary protection to slave property in the Territories?[734]

Of course Lincoln was well aware that Douglas held that the Court had decided only the question of jurisdiction in the Dred Scott case; and that all else was a mere obiter dictum. Nevertheless, "the Court did pass its opinion.... If they did not decide, they showed what they were ready to decide whenever the matter was before them. They used language to this effect: That inasmuch as Congress itself could not exercise such a power [i.e., pass a law prohibiting slavery in the Territories], it followed as a matter of course that it could not authorize a Territorial Government to exercise it; for the Territorial Legislature can do no more than Congress could do."[735]

The only answer of Douglas to this trenchant analysis was a reiterated assertion: "I assert that under the Dred Scott decision [taking Lincoln's view of that decision] you cannot maintain slavery a day in a Territory where there is an unwilling people and unfriendly legislation. If the people are opposed to it, our right is a barren, worthless, useless right; and if they are for it, they will support and encourage it."[736]

Douglas made much of Lincoln's evident unwillingness to commit himself on the question of admitting more slave States. In various ways he sought to trip his adversary, believing that Lincoln had pledged himself to his Abolitionist allies in 1855 to vote against the admission of more slave States, if he should be elected senator. "Let me tell Mr. Lincoln that his party in the northern part of the State hold to that Abolition platform [no more slave States], and if they do not in the South and in the center, they present the extraordinary spectacle of a house-divided-against-itself."[737]

Douglas turned the edge of Lincoln's thrust at the duties of legislators under the Dred Scott decision by saying, "Well, if you are not going to resist the decision, if you obey it, and do not intend to array mob law against the constituted authorities, then, according to your own statement, you will be a perjured man if you do not vote to establish slavery in these Territories."[738] And it did not save Lincoln from the horns of this uncomfortable dilemma to repeat that he did not accept the Dred Scott decision as a rule for political action, for he had just emphasized the moral obligation of obeying the law of the Constitution.

From the darkness of Egypt, Douglas and Lincoln journeyed northward toward Charleston in Coles County, where the fourth debate was to be held. Both paused en route to visit the State Fair, then in full blast at Centralia. Curious crowds followed them around the fair grounds, deeming the rival candidates quite as worthy of close scrutiny as the other exhibits.[739] Ten miles from Charleston, they left the train to be escorted by rival processions along the dusty highway to their destination. From all the country-side people had come to town to cheer on their respective champions.[740] This twenty-fifth district, comprising Coles and Moultrie counties, had been carried by the Democrats in 1856, but was now regarded as doubtful. The uncertainty added piquancy to the debate.

It was Lincoln's turn to open the joust. At the outset he tried to allay misapprehensions regarding his attitude toward negro equality. "I will say, then, that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races; that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition to this, that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race. I say upon this occasion I do not perceive that because the white man is to have the superior position the negro should be denied everything. I do not understand that because I do not want a negro woman for a slave I must necessarily want her for a wife. My understanding is that I can just let her alone."[741] This was by far the most explicit statement that he had yet made on the hazardous subject.

Lincoln then turned upon his opponent, with more aggressiveness than, he had hitherto exhibited, to drive home the charge which Trumbull had made earlier in the campaign. Prompted by Trumbull, probably, Lincoln reviewed the shadowy history of the Toombs bill and Douglas's still more enigmatical connection with it. The substance of the indictment was, that Douglas had suppressed that part of the original bill which provided for a popular vote on the constitution to be drafted by the Kansas convention. In replying to Trumbull, Douglas had damaged his own case by denying that the Toombs bill had ever contained such a provision. Lincoln proved the contrary by the most transparent testimony, convicting Douglas not only of the original offense but of an untruth in connection with it.[742]

This was not a vague charge of conspiracy which could be treated with contempt, but an indictment, accompanied by circumstantial evidence. While a dispassionate examination of the whole incident will acquit Douglas of any part in a plot to prevent the fair adoption of a constitution by the people of Kansas, yet he certainly took a most unfortunate and prejudicial mode of defending himself.[743] His personal retorts were so vindictive and his attack upon Trumbull so full of venom, that his words did not carry conviction to the minds of his hearers. It was a matter of common observation that Democrats seemed ill at ease after the debate.[744] "Judge Douglas is playing cuttle-fish," remarked Lincoln, noting with satisfaction the very evident discomfiture of his opponent, "a small species of fish that has no mode of defending itself when pursued except by throwing out a black fluid, which makes the water so dark the enemy cannot see it, and thus it escapes."[745]

Douglas, however, did his best to recover his ground by accusing Lincoln of shifting his principles as he passed from the northern counties to Egypt; the principles of his party in the north were "jet-black," in the center, "a decent mulatto," and in lower Egypt "almost white." Lincoln then dared him to point out any difference between his speeches. Blows now fell thick and fast, both speakers approaching dangerously near the limit of parliamentary language. Reverting to his argument that slavery must be put in the course of ultimate extinction, Lincoln made this interesting qualification: "I do not mean that when it takes a turn toward ultimate extinction it will be in a day, nor in a year, nor in two years. I do not suppose that in the most peaceful way ultimate extinction would occur in less than a hundred years at least; but that it will occur in the best way for both races, in God's own good time, I have no doubt."[746]

Douglas was now feeling the full force of the opposition within his own party. The Republican newspapers of the State had seized upon his Freeport speech to convince the South and the administration that he was false to their creed. The Washington Union had from the first denounced him as a renegade, with whom no self-respecting Democrat would associate.[747] Slidell was active in Illinois, spending money freely to defeat him.[748] The Danites in the central counties plotted incessantly to weaken his following. Daniel S. Dickinson of New York sent "a Thousand Greetings" to a mass-meeting of Danites in Springfield,—a liberal allowance, commented some Douglasite, as each delegate would receive about ten greetings.[749] Yet the dimensions of this movement were not easily ascertained. The declination of Vice-President Breckinridge to come to the aid of Douglas was a rebuff not easily laughed down, though to be sure, he expressed a guarded preference for Douglas over Lincoln. The coolness of Breckinridge was in a measure offset by the friendliness of Senator Crittenden, who refused to aid Lincoln, because he believed Douglas's re-election "necessary as a rebuke to the administration and a vindication of the great cause of popular rights and public justice."[750] The most influential Republican papers in the East gave Lincoln tardy support, with the exception of the New York Times.[751]

Unquestionably Douglas drew upon resources which Lincoln could not command. The management of the Illinois Central Railroad was naturally friendly toward him, though there is no evidence that it countenanced any illegitimate use of influence on his behalf. If Douglas enjoyed special train service, which Lincoln did not, it was because he drew upon funds that exceeded Lincoln's modest income. How many thousands of dollars Douglas devoted from his own exchequer to his campaign, can now only be conjectured. In all probability, he spent all that remained from the sale of his real estate in Chicago, and more which he borrowed in New York by mortgaging his other holdings in Cook County.[752] And not least among his assets was the constant companionship of Mrs. Douglas, whose tact, grace, and beauty placated feelings which had been ruffled by the rude vigor of "the Little Giant."[753]

When the rivals met three weeks later at Galesburg, they were disposed to drop personalities. Indeed, both were aware that they were about to address men and women who demanded an intelligent discussion of the issues of the hour. Lincoln had the more sympathetic hearing, for Knox County was consistently Republican; and the town with its academic atmosphere and New England traditions shared his hostility to slavery. Vast crowds braved the cold, raw winds of the October day to listen for three hours to this debate.[754] From a platform on the college campus, Douglas looked down somewhat defiantly upon his hearers, though his words were well-chosen and courteous. The circumstances were much the same as at Ottawa; and he spoke in much the same vein. He rang the changes upon his great fundamental principle; he defended his course in respect to Lecomptonism; he denounced the Republican party as a sectional organization whose leaders were bent upon "outvoting, conquering, governing, and controlling the South." Douglas laid great stress upon this sectional aspect of Republicanism, which made its southward extension impossible. "Not only is this Republican party unable to proclaim its principles alike in the North and in the South, in the free States and in the slave States, but it cannot even proclaim them in the same forms and give them the same strength and meaning in all parts of the same State. My friend Lincoln finds it extremely difficult to manage a debate in the center part of the State, where there is a mixture of men from the North and the South."[755]

Here Douglas paused to read from Lincoln's speeches at Chicago and at Charleston, and to ask his hearers to reconcile the conflicting statements respecting negro equality. He pronounced Lincoln's doctrine, that the negro and the white man are made equal by the Declaration of Independence and Divine Providence, "a monstrous heresy."

Lincoln protested that nothing was farther from his purpose than to "advance hypocritical and deceptive and contrary views in different portions of the country." As for the charge of sectionalism, Judge Douglas was himself fast becoming sectional, for his speeches no longer passed current south of the Ohio as they had once done. "Whatever may be the result of this ephemeral contest between Judge Douglas and myself, I see the day rapidly approaching when his pill of sectionalism, which he has been thrusting down the throats of Republicans for years past, will be crowded down his own throat."[756]

And Lincoln again scored on his opponent, when he pointed out that his political doctrine rested upon the major premise, that there was no wrong in slavery. "If you will take the Judge's speeches, and select the short and pointed sentences expressed by him,—as his declaration that he 'don't care whether slavery is voted up or down'—you will see at once that this is perfectly logical, if you do not admit that slavery is wrong.... Judge Douglas declares that if any community wants slavery they have a right to have it. He can say that logically, if he says that there is no wrong in slavery; but if you admit that there is a wrong in it, he cannot logically say that anybody has a right to do wrong."[757]

Those who now read these memorable debates dis-passionately, will surely acquit Lincoln of inconsistency in his attitude toward the negro. His speech at Charleston supplements the speech at Chicago; at Galesburg, he made an admirable re-statement of his position. Nevertheless, there was a marked difference in point of emphasis between his utterances in Northern and in Southern Illinois. Even the casual reader will detect subtle omissions which the varying character of his audience forced upon Lincoln. In Chicago he said nothing about the physical inferiority of the negro; he said nothing about the equality of the races in the Declaration of Independence, when he spoke at Charleston. Among men of anti-slavery leanings, he had much to say about the moral wrong of slavery; in the doubtful counties, Lincoln was solicitous that he should not be understood as favoring social and political equality between whites and blacks.

Feeling keenly this diplomatic shifting of emphasis, Douglas persisted in accusing Lincoln of inconsistency: "He has one set of principles for the Abolition counties and another set for the counties opposed to Abolitionism." If Lincoln had said in Coles County what he has to-day said in old Knox, Douglas complained, "it would have settled the question between us in that doubtful county."[758] And in this Douglas was probably correct.

At Quincy, Douglas was in his old bailiwick. Three times the Democrats of this district had sent him to Congress; and though the bounds of the congressional district had since been changed, Adams County was still Democratic by a safe majority. Among the people who greeted the speakers, however, were many old-time Whigs, for whose special benefit the Republicans of the city carried on a pole, at the head of their procession, a live raccoon. With a much keener historic sense, the Democrats bore aloft a dead raccoon, suspended by its tail.[759]

Lincoln again harked back to his position that slavery was "a moral, a social, and a political wrong" which the Republican party proposed to prevent from growing any larger; and that "the leading man—I think I may do my friend Judge Douglas the honor of calling him such—advocating the present Democratic policy, never himself says it is wrong."[760]

The consciousness that he was made to seem morally obtuse, cut Douglas to the quick. Even upon his tough constitution this prolonged campaign was beginning to tell. His voice was harsh and broken; and he gave unmistakable signs of nervous irritability, brought on by physical fatigue. When he rose to reply to Lincoln, his manner was offensively combative. At the outset, he referred angrily to Lincoln's "gross personalities and base insinuations."[761] In his references to the Springfield resolutions and to his mistake, or rather the mistake of his friends at the capital, he was particularly denunciatory. "When I make a mistake," he boasted, "as an honest man, I correct it without being asked to, but when he, Lincoln, makes a false charge, he sticks to it and never corrects it."[762]

But Douglas was too old a campaigner to lose control of himself, and no doubt the rude charge and counter-charge were prompted less by personal ill-will than by controversial exigencies. Those who have conceived Douglas as the victim of deep-seated and abiding resentment toward Lincoln, forget the impulsive nature of the man. There is not the slightest evidence that Lincoln took these blows to heart. He had himself dealt many a vigorous blow in times past. It was part of the game.

Douglas found fault with Lincoln's answers to the Ottawa questions: "I ask you again, Lincoln, will you vote to admit New Mexico, when she has the requisite population with such a constitution as her people adopt, either recognizing slavery or not, as they shall determine!" He was well within the truth when he asserted that Lincoln's answer had been purposely evasive and equivocal, "having no reference to any territory now in existence."[763] Of Lincoln's Republican policy of confining slavery within its present limits, by prohibiting it in the Territories, he said, "When he gets it thus confined, and surrounded, so that it cannot spread, the natural laws of increase will go on until the negroes will be so plenty that they cannot live on the soil. He will hem them in until starvation seizes them, and by starving them to death, he will put slavery in the course of ultimate extinction."[764] A silly argument which Douglas's wide acquaintance with Southern conditions flatly contradicted and should have kept him from repeating.

To the charge of moral obliquity on the slavery question, Douglas made a dignified and worthy reply. "I hold that the people of the slave-holding States are civilized men as well as ourselves; that they bear consciences as well as we, and that they are accountable to God and their posterity, and not to us. It is for them to decide, therefore, the moral and religious right of the slavery question for themselves within their own limits."[765]

On the following day both Lincoln and Douglas took passage on a river steamer for Alton. The county of Madison had once been Whig in its political proclivities. In the State legislature it was now represented by two representatives and a senator who were Native Americans; and in the present campaign, the county was classed as doubtful. In Alton and elsewhere there was a large German vote which was likely to sway the election.

Douglas labored under a physical disadvantage. His voice was painful to hear, while Lincoln's betrayed no sign of fatigue.[766] Both fell into the argument ad hominem. Lincoln advocated holding the Territories open to "free white people" the world over—to "Hans, Baptiste, and Patrick." Douglas contended that the equality referred to in the Declaration of Independence, was the equality of white men—"men of European birth and European descent." Both conjured with the revered name of Clay. Douglas persistently referred to Lincoln as an Abolitionist, knowing that his auditors had "strong sympathies southward," as Lincoln shrewdly guessed; while Lincoln sought to unmask that "false statesmanship that undertakes to build up a system of policy upon the basis of caring nothing about the very thing that everybody does care the most about."[767]

Douglas made a successful appeal to the sympathy of the crowd, when he said of his conduct in the Lecompton fight, "Most of the men who denounced my course on the Lecompton question objected to it, not because I was not right, but because they thought it expedient at that time, for the sake of keeping the party together, to do wrong. I never knew the Democratic party to violate any one of its principles, out of policy or expediency, that it did not pay the debt with sorrow. There is no safety or success for our party unless we always do right, and trust the consequences to God and the people. I chose not to depart from principle for the sake of expediency on the Lecompton question, and I never intend to do it on that or any other question."[768]

Both at Quincy and at Alton, Douglas paid his respects to the "contemptible crew" who were trying to break up the party and defeat him. At first he had avoided direct attacks upon the administration; but the relentless persecution of the Washington Union made him restive. Lincoln derived great satisfaction from this intestine warfare in the Democratic camp. "Go it, husband! Go it, bear!" he cried.

In this last debate, both sought to summarize the issues. Said Lincoln, "You may turn over everything in the Democratic policy from beginning to end, ... it everywhere carefully excludes the idea that there is anything wrong in it [slavery].

"That is the real issue. That is the issue that will continue in this country when these poor tongues of Judge Douglas and myself shall be silent. It is the eternal struggle between these two principles—right and wrong—throughout the world.... I was glad to express my gratitude at Quincy, and I re-express it here, to Judge Douglas,—that he looks to no end of the institution of slavery. That will help the people to see where the struggle really is."[769]

To the mind of Douglas, the issue presented itself in quite another form. "He [Lincoln] says that he looks forward to a time when slavery shall be abolished everywhere. I look forward to a time when each State shall be allowed to do as it pleases. If it chooses to keep slavery forever, it is not my business, but its own; if it chooses to abolish slavery, it is its own business,—not mine. I care more for the great principle of self-government, the right of the people to rule, than I do for all the negroes in Christendom. I would not endanger the perpetuity of this Union, I would not blot out the great inalienable rights of the white men, for all the negroes that ever existed."[770]

With this encounter at Alton, the joint debates, but not the campaign closed. Douglas continued to speak at various strategic points, in spite of inclement weather and physical exhaustion, up to the eve of the election.[771] The canvass had continued just a hundred days, during which Douglas had made one hundred and thirty speeches.[772] During the last weeks of the campaign, election canards designed to injure Douglas were sedulously circulated, adding no little uncertainty to the outcome in doubtful districts. The most damaging of these stories seems to have emanated from Senator John Slidell of Louisiana, whose midsummer sojourn in Illinois has already been noted. A Chicago journal published the tale that Douglas's slaves in the South were "the subjects of inhuman and disgraceful treatment—that they were hired out to a factor at fifteen dollars per annum each—that he, in turn, hired them out to others in lots, and that they were ill-fed, over-worked, and in every way so badly treated that they were spoken of in the neighborhood where they are held as a disgrace to all slave-holders and the system they support." The explicit denial of the story came from Slidell some weeks after the election, when the slander had accomplished the desired purpose.[773]

All signs pointed to a heavy vote for both tickets. As the campaign drew to a close, the excitement reached a pitch rarely equalled even in presidential elections. Indeed, the total vote cast exceeded that of 1856 by many thousands,—an increase that cannot be wholly accounted for by the growth of population in these years.[774] The Republican State ticket was elected by less than four thousand votes over the Democratic ticket. The relative strength of the rival candidates for the senatorship, however, is exhibited more fully in the vote for the members of the lower house of the State legislature.. The avowed Douglas candidates polled over 174,000, while the Lincoln men received something over 190,000. Administration candidates received a scant vote of less than 2,000. Notwithstanding this popular majority, the Republicans secured only thirty-five seats, while the Democratic minority secured forty. Out of fifteen contested senatorial seats, the Democrats won eight with a total of 44,826 votes, while the Republicans cast 53,784 votes and secured but seven. No better proof could be offered of Lincoln's contention that the State was gerrymandered in favor of the Democrats. Still, this was part of the game; and had the Republicans been in office, they would have undoubtedly used an advantage which has proved too tempting for the virtue of every American party.

When the two houses of the Illinois Legislature met in joint session, January 6, 1859, not a man ventured, or desired, to record his vote otherwise than as his party affiliations dictated. Douglas received fifty-four votes and Lincoln forty-six. "Glory to God and the Sucker Democracy," telegraphed the editor of the State Register to his chief. And back over the wires from Washington was flashed the laconic message, "Let the voice of the people rule." But had the will of the people ruled?

* * * * *

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 669: Hollister, Life of Colfax pp. 119 ff; Wilson, Rise and Fall of the Slave Power, II, p. 567.]

[Footnote 670: Hollister, Colfax, p. 121.]

[Footnote 671: Wilson, p. 567.]

[Footnote 672: Bancroft, Life of Seward, I, pp. 449-450.]

[Footnote 673: Pike, First Blows of the Civil War, p. 403.]

[Footnote 674: Hollister, Colfax, p. 119.]

[Footnote 675: Ibid., p. 121.]

[Footnote 676: Wilson, II, p 567; Greeley, Recollections of a Busy Life, p. 397.]

[Footnote 677: Hollister, Colfax, p. 120.]

[Footnote 678: Herndon-Weik, Life of Lincoln, II, pp. 59 ff.]

[Footnote 679: Sheahan, Douglas, p. 394.]

[Footnote 680: Foote, Casket of Reminiscences, p. 135.]

[Footnote 681: Forney, Anecdotes, II, p. 179.]

[Footnote 682: Lincoln-Douglas Debates (Edition of 1860), p. 1.]

[Footnote 683: Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 398-400.]

[Footnote 684: Sheahan, Douglas, p. 400; Mr. Horace White in Herndon-Weik, Life of Lincoln, II, p. 93.]

[Footnote 685: Debates, p. 9.]

[Footnote 686: Debates, p. 9.]

[Footnote 687: Ibid., p. 10.]

[Footnote 688: Ibid., p. 11.]

[Footnote 689: Debates, p. 18.]

[Footnote 690: Debates, p. 20.]

[Footnote 691: Ibid., p. 24.]

[Footnote 692: Flint, Douglas, pp. 114-117; Chicago Times, July 18, 1858.]

[Footnote 693: Debates, p. 24.]

[Footnote 694: Debates, p. 27.]

[Footnote 695: Ibid., p. 30.]

[Footnote 696: Ibid., pp. 33-34.]

[Footnote 697: Debates, p. 35.]

[Footnote 698: Ibid., p. 39.]

[Footnote 699: Sheahan, Douglas, p. 417; Chicago Times, July 21, 1858.]

[Footnote 700: Debates, p. 44.]

[Footnote 701: Ibid., p. 60.]

[Footnote 702: Ibid., p. 61.]

[Footnote 703: Ibid., p. 63.]

[Footnote 704: Debates, p. 64.]

[Footnote 705: Ibid., pp. 64-65.]

[Footnote 706: Ibid., p. 66.]

[Footnote 707: Debates, p. 66.]

[Footnote 708: Mr. Horace White in Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, II, pp. 104-105.]

[Footnote 709: For the following description I have drawn freely from the narratives of eye-witnesses. I am particularly indebted to the graphic account by Mr. Carl Schurz in McClure's Magazine, January, 1907.]

[Footnote 710: Mr. Schurz in McClure's, January, 1907.]

[Footnote 711: Debates, p. 67.]

[Footnote 712: Debates, p. 68.]

[Footnote 713: Ibid., p. 69.]

[Footnote 714: Herndon in Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, II, pp. 76-77; Mr. Carl Schurz in McClure's, January, 1907.]

[Footnote 715: Debates, p. 73.]

[Footnote 716: Debates, p. 75.]

[Footnote 717: Ibid., p. 82.]

[Footnote 718: Ibid., p. 86.]

[Footnote 719: Henry Villard, Memoirs, I, p. 93; Mr. Horace White in Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, II, p. 108.]

[Footnote 720: Debates, p. 129.]

[Footnote 721: Ibid., p. 130.]

[Footnote 722: Holland, Lincoln, p. 185; Tarbell, Lincoln, McClure's Magazine, VII, pp. 408-409.]

[Footnote 723: Debates, p. 89.]

[Footnote 724: Holland, Lincoln, pp. 188-189; Mr. Horace White in Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, II, p. 109.]

[Footnote 725: Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, II, p. 109.]

[Footnote 726: Debates, p. 95.]

[Footnote 727: Debates, pp. 94-97.]

[Footnote 728: Debates, pp. 100-101.]

[Footnote 729: Debates, p. 101.]

[Footnote 730: Mr. Horace White in Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, p. 110.]

[Footnote 731: Mr. Horace White in Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, p. 118.]

[Footnote 732: Debates, pp. 113-114.]

[Footnote 733: Ibid., p. 120.]

[Footnote 734: Debates, p. 127.]

[Footnote 735: Ibid., p. 129.]

[Footnote 736: Ibid., p. 135.]

[Footnote 737: Debates, p. 133. Lamon is authority for the statement that Lincoln pledged himself to Lovejoy and his faction to favor the exclusion of slavery from all the territory of the United States. Douglas did not know of this pledge, but suspected an understanding to this effect. If Lamon may be believed, this statement explains the persistence of Douglas on this point and the evasiveness of Lincoln. See Lamon, Lincoln, pp. 361-365.]

[Footnote 738: Ibid., p. 135.]

[Footnote 739: Mr. Horace White in Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, p. 119.]

[Footnote 740: Mr. Horace White in Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, p. 121.]

[Footnote 741: Debates, p. 136.]

[Footnote 742: Debates, pp. 137-143.]

[Footnote 743: See above pp. 303-304.]

[Footnote 744: Mr. Horace White in Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, p. 122.]

[Footnote 745: Debates, p. 159.]

[Footnote 746: Ibid., p. 157.]

[Footnote 747: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, p. 342.]

[Footnote 748: Foote, Casket of Reminiscences, p. 135; Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, II, p. 127.]

[Footnote 749: Mr. Horace White in Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, II, p. 129.]

[Footnote 750: Coleman, Life of Crittenden, II, p. 163.]

[Footnote 751: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, p. 341.]

[Footnote 752: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, p. 338, note 3. The record of the Circuit Court of Cook County, December term, 1867, states that the entire lien upon the estate in 1864 exceeded $94,000. The mortgages were held by Fernando Wood and others of New York.]

[Footnote 753: Villard, Memoirs, I, p. 92.]

[Footnote 754: Mr. Horace White in Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, II, p. 123.]

[Footnote 755: Debates p. 173.]

[Footnote 756: Ibid., p. 180.]

[Footnote 757: Debates, p. 181.]

[Footnote 758: Debates, p. 188.]

[Footnote 759: Mr. Horace White in Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, II, pp. 123-124.]

[Footnote 760: Debates, p. 198.]

[Footnote 761: Debates, p. 199; McClure's Magazine, January, 1907.]

[Footnote 762: Debates, p. 201.]

[Footnote 763: Ibid., p. 201.]

[Footnote 764: Debates, p. 204.]

[Footnote 765: Ibid., p. 209.]

[Footnote 766: Mr. Horace White in Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, II, p. 124.]

[Footnote 767: Debates, p. 231.]

[Footnote 768: Ibid., p. 218.]

[Footnote 769: Debates, p. 234.]

[Footnote 770: Ibid., p. 238.]

[Footnote 771: Sheahan, Douglas, p. 432.]

[Footnote 772: Nicolay and Hay, Lincoln, II, p. 146 note.]

[Footnote 773: Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 439-442; Herndon-Weik, Lincoln, II, p. 128.]

[Footnote 774: It has not been generally observed that the Democrats gained more than their opponents over the State contest of 1856. The election returns were as follows:

Democratic ticket in 1856, 106,643; in 1858, 121,609; gain, 14,966. Republican ticket in 1856, 111,375; in 1858, 125,430; gain, 14,055. ]



CHAPTER XVII

THE AFTERMATH

Douglas had achieved a great personal triumph. Not even his Republican opponents could gainsay it. In the East, the Republican newspapers applauded him undisguisedly, not so much because they admired him or lacked sympathy with Lincoln, as because they regarded his re-election as a signal condemnation of the Buchanan administration. Moreover, there was a general expectation in anti-slavery circles to which Theodore Parker gave expression when he wrote, "Had Lincoln succeeded, Douglas would be a ruined man.... But now in place for six years more, with his own personal power unimpaired and his positional influence much enhanced, he can do the Democratic party a world of damage."[775] There was cheer in this expectation even for those who deplored the defeat of Lincoln.

As Douglas journeyed southward soon after the November elections, he must have felt the poignant truth of Lincoln's shrewd observation that he was himself becoming sectional. Though he was received with seeming cordiality at Memphis and New Orleans, he could not but notice that his speeches, as Lincoln predicted, "would not go current south of the Ohio River as they had formerly." Democratic audiences applauded his bold insistence upon the universality of the principles of the party creed, but the tone of the Southern press was distinctly unfriendly to him and his Freeport doctrine.[776] He told his auditors at Memphis that he indorsed the decision of the Supreme Court; he believed that the owners of slaves had the same right to take them into the Territories as they had to take other property; but slaves once in the Territory were then subject to local laws for protection, on an equal footing with all other property. If no local laws protecting slave property were passed, slavery would be practically excluded. "Non-action is exclusion." It was a matter of soil, climate, interests, whether a Territory would permit slavery or not. "You come right back to the principle of dollars and cents ... If old Joshua E. Giddings should raise a colony in Ohio and settle down in Louisiana, he would be the strongest advocate of slavery in the whole South; he would find when he got there, his opinion would be very much modified; he would find on those sugar plantations that it was not a question between the white man and the negro, but between the negro and the crocodile." "The Almighty has drawn the line on this continent, on one side of which the soil must be cultivated by slave labor; on the other by white labor."[777]

At New Orleans, he repeated more emphatically much the same thought. "There is a line, or belt of country, meandering through the valleys and over the mountain tops, which is a natural barrier between free territory and slave territory, on the south of which are to be found the productions suitable to slave labor, while on the north exists a country adapted to free labor alone.... But in the great central regions, where there may be some doubt as to the effect of natural causes, who ought to decide the question except the people residing there, who have all their interests there, who have gone there to live with their wives and children!"[778]

It was characteristic of the man that he thought politics even when he was in pursuit of health. Advised to take an ocean voyage, he decided to visit Cuba so that even his recreative leisure might be politically profitable, for the island was more than ever coveted by the South and he wished to have the advantage of first-hand information about this unhappy Spanish province. Landing in New York upon his return, he was given a remarkable ovation by the Democracy of the city; and he was greeted with equal warmth in Philadelphia and Baltimore.[779] Even a less ambitious man might have been tempted to believe in his own capacity for leadership, in the midst of these apparently spontaneous demonstrations of regard. At the capital, however, he was less cordially welcomed. He was not in the least surprised, for while he was still in the South, the newspapers had announced his deposition from the chairmanship of the Committee on Territories. He knew well enough what he had to expect from the group of Southern Democrats who had the ear of the administration.[780] Nevertheless, his removal from a position which he had held ever since he entered the Senate was a bitter pill.

For the sake of peace Douglas smothered his resentment, and, for a brief time at least, sought to demonstrate his political orthodoxy in matters where there was no conflict of opinion. As a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, he cordially supported the bill for the purchase of Cuba, even though the chairman, Slidell, had done more to injure him in the recent campaign than any other man. There were those who thought he demeaned himself by attending the Democratic caucus and indorsing the Slidell project.[781]

It was charged that the proposed appropriation of $30,000,000 was to be used to bribe Spanish ministers to sell Cuba; that the whole project was motived by the desire of the South to acquire more slave territory; and that Douglas was once more cultivating the South to secure the presidency in 1860. The first of these charges has never been proved; the second is probably correct; but the third is surely open to question. As long ago as Folk's administration, Douglas had expressed his belief that the Pearl of the Antilles must some day fall to us; and on various occasions he had advocated the annexation of Cuba, with the consent of Spain and the inhabitants. At New Orleans, he had been called upon to express his views regarding the acquisition of the island; and he had said, without hesitation, "It is folly to debate the acquisition of Cuba. It naturally belongs to the American continent. It guards the mouth of the Mississippi River, which is the heart of the American continent and the body of the American nation." At the same time he was careful to add that he was no filibuster: he desired Cuba only upon terms honorable to all concerned.[782]

Subsequent events acquit Douglas of truckling to the South at this time. No doubt he would have been glad to let bygones be bygones, to close up the gap of unpleasant memories between himself and the administration, and to restore Democratic harmony. For Douglas loved his party and honored its history. To him the party of Jefferson and Jackson was inseparably linked with all that made the American Commonwealth the greatest of democracies. Yet where men are acutely conscious of vital differences of opinion, only the hourly practice of self-control can prevent clashing. Neither Douglas nor his opponents were prepared to undergo any such rigid self-discipline.

On February 23d, the pent-up feeling broke through all barriers and laid bare the thoughts and intents of the Democratic factions. The Kansas question once more recurring, Brown of Mississippi now demanded adequate protection for property; that is, "protection sufficient to protect animate property." Any other protection would be a delusion and a cheat. If the territorial legislature refused such protection, he for one would demand it of Congress. He dissented altogether from the doctrine of the Senator from Illinois, that by non-action, or unfriendly legislation a Territory could annul a decision of the Supreme Court and exclude slavery. That was mistaking power for right. "What I want to know is, whether you will interpose against power and in favor of right.... If the Territorial Legislature refuses to act, will you act?... If it pass laws hostile to slavery, will you annul them, and substitute laws favoring slavery in their stead?" "What I and my people ask is action; positive, unqualified action. Our understanding of the doctrine of non-intervention was, that you were not to intervene against us, but I never understood that we could have any compromise or understanding here which could release Congress from an obligation imposed on it by the Constitution of the United States."[783]

Reluctant as Douglas must have been to accentuate the differences between himself and the Southern Democrats, he could not remain silent, for silence would be misconstrued. With all the tact which he could muster out of a not too abundant store, he sought to conciliate, without yielding his own opinions. It was a futile effort. At the very outset he was forced to deny the right of slave property to other protection than common property. Thence he passed with wider and wider divergence from the Southern position over the familiar ground of popular sovereignty. To the specific demands which Brown had voiced, he replied that Congress had never passed an act creating a criminal code for any organized Territory, nor any law protecting any species of property. Congress had left these matters to the territorial legislatures. Why, then, make an exception of slave property? The Supreme Court had made no such distinction. "I know," said Douglas, in a tone little calculated to soothe the feelings of his opponents, "I know that some gentlemen do not like the doctrine of non-intervention as well as they once did. It is now becoming fashionable to talk sneeringly of 'your doctrine of non-intervention,' Sir, that doctrine has been a fundamental article in the Democratic creed for years." "If you repudiate the doctrine of non-intervention and form a slave code by act of Congress, when the people of a Territory refuse it, you must step off the Democratic platform.... I tell you, gentlemen of the South, in all candor, I do not believe a Democratic candidate can ever carry any one Democratic State of the North on the platform that it is the duty of the Federal government to force the people of a Territory to have slavery when they do not want it."[784]

What Brown had asserted with his wonted impulsiveness, was then reaffirmed more soberly by his colleague, Jefferson Davis, upon whom more than any other Southerner the mantle of Calhoun had fallen. State sovereignty was also his major premise. The Constitution was a compact. The Territories were common property of the States. The territorial legislatures were mere instruments through which the Congress of the United States "executed its trust in relation to the Territories." If, as the Senator from Illinois insisted, Congress had granted full power to the inhabitants of the Territories to legislate on all subjects not inconsistent with the Constitution, then Congress had exceeded its authority. Turning to Douglas, Davis said, "Now, the senator asks, will you make a discrimination in the Territories? I say, yes, I would discriminate in the Territories wherever it is needful to assert the right of citizens.... I have heard many a siren's song on this doctrine of non-intervention; a thing shadowy and fleeting, changing its color as often as the chameleon."[785]

When Douglas could again get the floor, he retorted sharply, "The senator from Mississippi says, if I am not willing to stand in the party on his platform, I can go out. Allow me to inform him that I stand on the platform, and those that jump off must go out of the party."

Hot words now passed between them. Davis spoke disdainfully of men who seek to build up a political reputation by catering to the prejudice of a majority, to exclude the property of the minority. And Douglas retorted, "I despise to see men from other sections of the Union pandering to a public sentiment against what I conceive to be common rights under the Constitution." "Holding the views that you do," said Davis, "you would have no chance of getting the vote of Mississippi to-day." The senator has "confirmed me in the belief that he is now as full of heresy as he once was of adherence to the doctrine of popular sovereignty, correctly construed; that he has gone back to his first love of squatter sovereignty, a thing offensive to every idea of conservatism and sound government."

Davis made repeated efforts to secure an answer to the question whether, in the event that slavery should be excluded by the people of a Territory and the Supreme Court should decide against such action, Douglas would maintain the rights of the slave-holders. Douglas replied, somewhat evasively, that when the Supreme Court should decide upon the constitutionality of the local laws, he would abide by the decision. "That is not the point," rejoined Davis impatiently; "Congress must compel the Territorial Legislature to perform its proper functions"; i.e. actively protect slave property. "Well," said Douglas with exasperating coolness, "on that point, the Senator and I differ. If the Territorial Legislature will not pass such laws as will encourage mules, I will not force them to have them." Again Davis insisted that his question had not been answered. Douglas repeated, "I will vote against any law by Congress attempting to interfere with a regulation made by the Territories, with respect to any kind of property whatever, whether horses, mules, negroes, or anything else."[786]

But there was a flaw in Douglas's armor which Green of Missouri detected. Had the Senator from Illinois not urged the intervention of Congress to prevent polygamy in Utah? "Not at all," replied Douglas; "the people of that Territory were in a state of rebellion against the Federal authorities." What he had urged was the repeal of the organic act of the Territory, so that the United States might exercise absolute jurisdiction and protect property in that region. "But if the people of a Territory took away property in slaves, were they not also defying the Federal authorities?" persisted Green. Unquestionably Congress might revoke the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Douglas admitted; but it should be remembered that the act was bottomed upon an agreement. There was a distinct understanding that the question whether territorial laws affecting the right of property in slaves were constitutional, should be referred to the Supreme Court. "If constitutional, they were to remain in force until repealed by the Territorial Legislature; if not, they were to become void not by action of Congress but by the decision of the court."[787] And Douglas quoted at length from a speech by Senator Benjamin in 1856, to prove his point. But it was precisely this agreement of 1854, which was now being either repudiated or construed in the interest of the South. Jefferson Davis frankly deprecated the "great hazard" which representatives from his section ran in 1854; but, he added, "I take it for granted my friends who are about me must have understood at that time clearly that this was the mere reference of a right; and that if decided in our favor, congressional legislation would follow in its train, and secure to us the enjoyment of the right thus defined."[788]

The wide divergence of purpose and opinion which this debate revealed, dashed any hope of a united Democratic party in 1860. Men who looked into the future were sobered by the prospect. If the Democratic party were rent in twain,—the only surviving national party,—if Northerners and Southerners could no longer act together within a party of such elastic principles, what hope remained for the Union? The South was already boldly facing the inevitable. Said Brown, passionately, "If I cannot obtain the rights guaranteed to me and my people under the Constitution, as expounded by the Supreme Court, then, Sir, I am prepared to retire from the concern.... When our constitutional rights are denied us, we ought to retire from the Union.... If you are going to convert the Union into a masked battery from behind which to make war on me and my property, in the name of all the gods at once, why should I not retire from it?"[789]

After the 23d of February, Douglas neither gave nor expected quarter from the Southern faction led by Jefferson Davis. So far from avoiding conflict, he seems rather to have forced the fighting. He flaunted his views in the faces of the fire-eaters. Prudence would have suggested silence, when a convention of Southern States met at Vicksburg and resolved that "all laws, State and Federal, prohibiting the African slave-trade, ought to be repealed,"[790] but Douglas, who knew something of the dimensions which this illicit traffic had already assumed, at once declared himself opposed to it. He said privately in a conversation, which afterwards was reported by an anonymous correspondent to the New York Tribune, that he believed fifteen thousand Africans were brought into the country last year. He had seen "with his own eyes three hundred of those recently imported miserable beings in a slave-pen at Vicksburg, Mississippi, and also large numbers at Memphis, Tennessee."[791]

In a letter which speedily became public property, Douglas said that he would not accept the nomination of the Democratic party, if the convention should interpolate into the party creed "such new issues as the revival of the African slave-trade, or a congressional slave code for the Territories."[792] And to leave no doubt as to his attitude he wrote a second letter, devoted exclusively to this subject; it also found its way, as the author probably intended it should, into the newspapers. He opposed the revival of the African slave-trade because it was abolished by one of the compromises which had made the Federal Union and the Constitution. "In accordance with this compromise, I am irreconcilably opposed to the revival of the African slave-trade, in any form and under any circumstances."[793] How deeply this unequivocal condemnation lacerated the feelings of the South, will never be known until the economic necessities and purposes of the large plantation owners are more clearly revealed.

The captious criticism of the Freeport doctrine by Southerners of the Calhoun-Jefferson Davis school was less damaging, from a legal point of view, than the sober analysis of Lincoln. The emphasis in Lincoln's famous question at Freeport fell upon the word lawful: "Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful way," etc. Douglas had replied to the question of legal right by an assertion of the power of the people of the Territories. This answer, as Lincoln pointed out subsequently, was equivalent to saying that "a thing may be lawfully driven away from where it has the lawful right to be."[794] As a prediction, Douglas's simple statement, that if the people of a Territory wanted slavery they would have it, and if they did not, they would not let it be forced on them, was fully justified by the facts of American history. It has been characteristic of the American people that, without irreverence for law, they have not allowed it to stand in the way of their natural development: they have not, as a rule, driven rough-shod over law, but have quietly allowed undesirable laws to fall into innocuous desuetude.

But such an answer was unworthy of a man who prided himself upon his fidelity to the obligation of the Constitution and the laws. Feeling the full force of Lincoln's inexorable logic,[795] but believing that it was bottomed on a false premise, Douglas endeavored to give his Freeport doctrine its proper constitutional setting. During the summer, he elaborated an historical and constitutional defense of popular sovereignty. The editors of Harper's Magazine so far departed from the traditions of that popular periodical as to publish this long and tedious essay in the September number. Douglas probably calculated that through this medium better than almost any other, he would reach those readers to whom Lincoln made his most effective appeal.[796]

The essay bore the title "The Dividing Line between Federal and Local Authority," with the sub-caption, "Popular Sovereignty in the Territories." In his interpretation of history, the author proved himself rather a better advocate than historian. He had traversed much the same ground in his speeches—and with far more vivacity and force. Douglas searched the colonial records, and found—one is tempted to say, to find—our fathers contending unremittingly for "the inalienable right, when formed into political communities, to exercise exclusive power of legislation in their local legislatures in respect to all things affecting their internal polity—slavery not excepted."[797]

Douglas took issue with the fundamental postulate of Lincoln's syllogism—that a Territory is the mere creature of Congress and cannot be clothed with powers not possessed by the creator. He denied that such an inference could be drawn from that clause in the Constitution which permits Congress to dispose of, and make all needful rules for, the territory or other property belonging to the United States. Names were deceptive. The word "territory" in this connection was not used in a political, but in a geographical sense. The power of Congress to organize governments for the Territories must be inferred rather from the power to admit new States into the Union. The Federal government possessed only expressly delegated powers; and the absence of any explicit authority to interfere in local territorial affairs must be held to inhibit any exercise of such power. It was on these grounds that the Supreme Court had ruled that Congress was not authorized by the Constitution to prohibit slavery in the Territories.

It had been erroneously held by some, continued the essayist, that the Court decided in the Dred Scott case that a territorial legislature could not legislate in respect to slave property like other property. He understood the Court to speak only of forbidden powers—powers denied to Congress, to State legislatures and to territorial legislatures alike. But if ever slavery should be decided to be one of these forbidden subjects of legislation, then the conclusion would be inevitable that the Constitution established slavery in the Territories beyond the power of the people to control it by law, and guaranteed to every citizen the right to go there and be protected in the enjoyment of his slave property; then every member of Congress would be in duty bound to supply adequate protection, if the rights of property should be invaded. Not only so, but another conclusion would follow,—if the Constitution should be held to establish slavery in the Territories beyond the power of the people to control it,—Congress would be bound to provide adequate protection for slave property everywhere, in the States as well as in the Territories.

Douglas immediately went on to show that such was not the decision of the Court in the Dred Scott case. The Court had held that "the right of property in slaves is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution." Yes, but where? Why in that provision which speaks of persons "held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof"; not under the Constitution, not under the laws of Congress, Douglas emphasized, but under the laws of the particular State where such service is due. And so, when the Court declared that "the government, in express terms, is pledged to protect it [slave property] in all future time," it added "if the slave escapes from his owner." "This is the only contingency," Douglas maintained, "in which the Federal Government is authorized, required, or permitted to interfere with slavery in the States or Territories; and in that case only for the purpose of 'guarding and protecting the owner in his rights' to reclaim his slave property." Slave-owners, therefore, who moved with their property to a Territory, must hold it like all other property, subject to local law, and look to local authorities for its protection.

One other question remained: was the word "State," as used in the clause just cited, intended to include Territories? Douglas so contended. Otherwise, "the Territories must become a sanctuary for all fugitives from service and justice." In numerous clauses in the Constitution, the Territories were recognized as States.

Clever as this reasoning was, it clearly was not a fair exposition of the opinion of the Court in the case of Dred Scott. If the Court did not deny the right of a territorial legislature to interfere with slave property, it certainly left that proposition open to fair inference by the phrasing and emphasis of the critical passages. It should be noted that Douglas, in quoting the decision, misplaced the decisive clause so as to bring it in juxtaposition to the reference to the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution, thus redistributing the emphasis and confusing the real significance of the foregoing paragraph.[798] Douglas stated subsequently that he did not believe the decision of the Court reached the power of a territorial legislature, because there was no territorial legislature in the record nor any allusion to one; because there was no territorial enactment before the Court; and because there was no fact in the case alluding to or connected with territorial legislation.[799] All this was perfectly true. The opinion of the Court was obiter dicens; but the Court expressed its opinion nevertheless. As Lincoln said, men knew what to expect of the Court when a territorial act prohibiting slavery came before it. Yet this was what Douglas would not concede. He would not admit the inference. Congress could confer powers upon a territorial legislature which it could not itself exercise. The dividing line between Federal and local authority was so drawn as to permit Congress to institute governments with legislative, judicial, and executive functions but without permitting Congress to exercise those functions itself. From Douglas's point of view, a Territory was not a dependency of the Federal government, but an inchoate Commonwealth, endowed with many of the attributes of sovereignty possessed by the full-fledged States.

So unusual an event as a political contribution by a prominent statesman to a popular magazine, created no little excitement.[800] Attorney-General Black came to the defense of the South with an unsigned contribution to the Washington Constitution, the organ of the administration.[801] And Douglas, who had meantime gone to Ohio to take part in the State campaign, replied caustically to this critique in his speech at Wooster, September 16th. Black rejoined in a pamphlet under his own name. Whereupon Douglas returned to the attack with a slashing pamphlet, which he sent to the printer in an unfinished form and which did him little credit.[802]

This war of pamphlets was productive of no results. Douglas and Black were wide apart upon their major premises, and diverged inevitably in their conclusions. Holding fast to the premise that a Territory was not sovereign but a "subordinate dependency," Black ridiculed the attempts of Douglas to clothe it, not with complete sovereignty but with "the attributes of sovereignty."[803] Then Douglas denounced in scathing terms the absurdity of Black's assumption that property in the Territories would be held by the laws of the State from which it came, while it must look for redress of wrongs to the law of its new domicile.[804]

The Ohio campaign attracted much attention throughout the country, not only because the gubernatorial candidates were thoroughgoing representatives of the Republican party and of Douglas Democracy, but because both Lincoln and Douglas were again brought into the arena.[805] While the latter did not meet in joint debate, their successive appearance at Columbus and Cincinnati gave the campaign the aspect of a prolongation of the Illinois contest. Lincoln devoted no little attention to the Harper's Magazine article, while Douglas defended himself and his doctrine against all comers. There was a disposition in many quarters to concede that popular sovereignty, whether theoretically right or wrong, would settle the question of slavery in the Territories.[806] Apropos of Douglas's speech at Columbus, the New York Times admitted that at least his principles were "definite" and uttered in a "frank, gallant and masculine" spirit;[807] and his speeches were deemed of enough importance to be printed entire in the columns of this Republican journal. "He means to go to Charleston," guessed the editor shrewdly, "as the unmistakable representative of the Democratic party of the North and to bring this influence to bear upon Southern delegates as the only way to secure their interests against anti-slavery sentiment represented by the Republicans. He will claim that not a single Northern State can be carried on a platform more pro-slavery than his. The Democrats of the North have yielded all they will."[808]

While Douglas was in Ohio, he was saddened by the intelligence that Senator Broderick of California, his loyal friend and staunch supporter in the Lecompton fight, had fallen a victim to the animosity of the Southern faction in his State. The Washington Constitution might explain his death as an affair of honor—he was shot in a duel—but intelligent men knew that Broderick's assailant had desired to rid Southern "chivalry" of a hated political opponent.[809] A month later, on the night of October 16th, John Brown of Kansas fame marshalled his little band of eighteen men and descended upon the United States arsenal at Harper's Ferry. What did these events portend?

* * * * *

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 775: Weiss, Life and Correspondence of Theodore Parker, II, p. 243.]

[Footnote 776: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, p. 355.]

[Footnote 777: Memphis Avalanche, November 30, 1858, quoted by Chicago Times, December 8, 1858.]

[Footnote 778: New Orleans Delta, December 8, 1858, quoted by Chicago Times, December 19, 1858.]

[Footnote 779: Rhodes, History of United States, II, p. 355.]

[Footnote 780: See reported conversation of Douglas with the editor of the Chicago Press and Tribune, Hollister, Life of Colfax, p. 123.]

[Footnote 781: Letcher to Crittenden; Coleman. Life of John J. Crittenden, II, p. 171; Hollister, Colfax, p. 124.]

[Footnote 782: New Orleans Delta, December 8, 1858.]

[Footnote 783: Globe, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 1243.]

[Footnote 784: Globe, 35 Cong., 2: Sess., p. 1245.]

[Footnote 785: Ibid., pp. 1247-1248.]

[Footnote 786: Globe, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 1259.]

[Footnote 787: Ibid., p. 1258.]

[Footnote 788: Globe, 35 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 1256.]

[Footnote 789: Ibid., p. 1243.]

[Footnote 790: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, p. 371.]

[Footnote 791: Ibid., pp. 369-370.]

[Footnote 792: Letter to J.B. Dorr, June 22, 1859; Flint, Douglas, pp. 168-169.]

[Footnote 793: Letter to J.L. Peyton, August 2, 1859; Sheahan, Douglas, pp. 465-466.]

[Footnote 794: Speech at Columbus, Ohio, September, 1859; see Debates, p. 250.]

[Footnote 795: On his return to Washington after the debates, Douglas said to Wilson, "He [Lincoln] is an able and honest man, one of the ablest of the nation. I have been in Congress sixteen years, and there is not a man in the Senate I would not rather encounter in debate." Wilson, Slave Power in America, II, p. 577.]

[Footnote 796: It does not seem likely that Douglas hoped to reach the people of the South through Harper's Magazine, as it never had a large circulation south of Mason and Dixon's line. See Smith, Parties and Slavery, p. 292.]

[Footnote 797: Harper's Magazine, XIX, p. 527.]

[Footnote 798: Compare the quotation in Harper's, p. 531, with the opinion of the Court, U.S. Supreme Court Reports, 19 How., p. 720. The clause beginning "And if the Constitution recognizes" is taken from its own paragraph and put in the middle of the following paragraph.]

[Footnote 799: Globe, 36 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 2152. This statement was confirmed by Reverdy Johnson, who was one of the lawyers that argued the case. See the speech of Reverdy Johnson, June 7, 1860.]

[Footnote 800: Rhodes, History of the United States, II., p. 374.]

[Footnote 801: Washington Constitution, September 10, 1859. The article was afterward published in a collection of his essays and speeches.]

[Footnote 802: Flint, Douglas, p. 181.]

[Footnote 803: One of the most interesting commentaries on Black's argument is his defense of the people of Utah, many years later, against the Anti-Polygamy Laws, when he used Douglas's argument without the slightest qualms. See Essays and Speeches, pp. 603, 604, 609.]

[Footnote 804: Flint, Douglas, pp. 172-181 gives extracts from these pamphlets.]

[Footnote 805: Rhodes History of United States, II, p. 381.]

[Footnote 806: Ibid., p. 382.]

[Footnote 807: New York Times, September 9, 1859.]

[Footnote 808: Ibid., September 9, 1859.]

[Footnote 809: Rhodes, History of the United States, II, pp. 374-379.]



CHAPTER XVIII

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1860

Deeds of violence are the inevitable precursors of an approaching war. They are so many expressions of that estrangement which is at the root of all sectional conflicts. The raid of John Brown upon Harper's Ferry, like his earlier lawless acts in Kansas, was less the crime of an individual than the manifestation of a deep social unrest. Occurring on the eve of a momentous presidential election, it threw doubts upon the finality of any appeal to the ballot. The antagonism between North and South was such as to make an appeal to arms seem a probable last resort. The political question of the year 1860 was whether the law-abiding habit of the American people and the traditional mode of effecting changes in governmental policy, would be strong enough to withstand the primitive instinct to decide the question of right by an appeal to might. To actors in the drama the question assumed this simple, concrete form: could the national Democratic party maintain its integrity and achieve another victory over parties which were distinctly sectional?

The passions aroused by the Harper's Ferry episode had no time to cool before Congress met. They were again inflamed by the indorsement of Helper's "Impending Crisis" by influential Republicans. As the author was a poor white of North Carolina who hated slavery and desired to prove that the institution was inimical to the interests of his class, the book was regarded by slave-holders as an incendiary publication, conceived in the same spirit as John Brown's raid. The contest for the Speakership of the House turned upon the attitude of candidates toward this book. At the North "The Impending Crisis" had great vogue, passing through many editions. All events seemed to conspire to prevent sobriety of judgment and moderation in speech.

From a legislative point of view, this exciting session of Congress was barren of results. The paramount consideration was the approaching party conventions. What principles and policies would control the action of the Democratic convention at Charleston, depended very largely upon who should control the great body of delegates. Early in January various State conventions in the Northwest expressed their choice. Illinois took the lead with a series of resolutions which rang clear and true on all the cardinal points of the Douglas creed.[810] Within the next sixty days every State in the greater Northwest had chosen delegates to the national Democratic convention, pledged to support the nomination of Stephen A. Douglas.[811] It was with the knowledge, then, that he spoke for the Democracy of the Northwest that Douglas took issue with those Southern senators who plumed themselves on their party orthodoxy.

In a debate which was precipitated by a resolution of Senator Pugh, the old sores were rent open. Senator Davis of Mississippi was particularly irritating in his allusions to the Freeport, and other recent, heresies of the Senator from Illinois. In the give and take which followed, Douglas was beset behind and before. But his fighting blood was up and he promised to return blow for blow, with interest. Let every man make his assault, and when all were through, he would "fire into the lump."[812] "I am not seeking a nomination," he declared, "I am willing to take one provided I can assume it on principles that I believe to be sound; but in the event of your making a platform that I could not conscientiously execute in good faith if I were elected, I will not stand upon it and be a candidate." For his part he would like to know "who it is that has the right to say who is in the party and who not?" He believed that he was backed by two-thirds of the Democracy of the United States. Did one-third of the Democratic party propose to read out the remaining two-thirds? "I have no grievances, but I have no concessions. I have no abandonment of position or principle; no recantation to make to any man or body of men on earth."[813]

Some days later Douglas made it equally clear that he had no recantation to make for the sake of Republican support. Speaking of the need of some measure by which the States might be protected against acts of violence like the Harper's Ferry affair, he roundly denounced that outrage as "the natural, logical, inevitable result of the doctrines and teachings of the Republican party, as explained and enforced in their platform, their partisan presses, their pamphlets and books, and especially in the speeches of their leaders in and out of Congress."[814] True, they disavowed the act of John Brown, but they should also repudiate and denounce the doctrines and teachings which produced the act. Fraternal peace was possible only upon "that good old golden principle which teaches all men to mind their own business and let their neighbors' alone." When men so act, the Union can endure forever as the fathers made it, composed of free and slave States.[815] "Then the senator is really indifferent to slavery, as he is reported to have said?" queried Fessenden. "Sir," replied Douglas, "I hold the doctrine that a statesman will adapt his laws to the wants, conditions, and interests of the people to be governed by them. Slavery may be very essential in one climate and totally useless in another. If I were a citizen of Louisiana I would vote for retaining and maintaining slavery, because I believe the good of the people would require it. As a citizen of Illinois I am utterly opposed to it, because our interests would not be promoted by it."[816]

The lines upon which the Charleston convention would divide, were sharply drawn by a series of resolutions presented to the Senate by Jefferson Davis. They were intended to serve as an ultimatum, and they were so understood by Northern Democrats. They were deliberately wrought out in conference as the final expression of Southern conviction. In explicit language the right of either Congress or a territorial legislature to impair the constitutional right of property in slaves, was denied. In case of unfriendly legislation, it was declared to be the duty of Congress to provide adequate protection to slave property. Popular sovereignty was completely discarded by the assertion that the people of a Territory might pass upon the question of slavery only when they formed a State constitution.[817]

As the delegates to the Democratic convention began to gather in the latter part of April, the center of political interest shifted from Washington to Charleston. Here the battle between the factions was to be fought out, but without the presence of the real leaders. The advantages of organization were with the Douglas men. The delegations from the Northwest were devoted, heart and soul, to their chief. As they passed through the capital on their journey to the South, they gathered around him with noisy demonstrations of affection; and when they continued on their way, they were more determined than ever to secure his nomination.[818] From the South, too, every Douglas man who was likely to carry weight in his community, was brought to Charleston to labor among the Ultras of his section.[819] The Douglas headquarters in Hibernian Hall bore witness to the business-like way in which his candidacy was being promoted. Not the least striking feature within the committee rooms was the ample supply of Sheahan's Life of Stephen A. Douglas, fresh from the press.[820]

Recognized leader of the Douglas forces was Colonel Richardson of Illinois, a veteran in convention warfare, seasoned by years of congressional service and by long practice in managing men.[821] It was he who had led the Douglas cohorts in the Cincinnati convention. The memory of that defeat still rankled, and he was not disposed to yield to like contingencies. Indeed, the spirit of the delegates from the Northwest,—and they seemed likely to carry the other Northern delegates with them,—was offensively aggressive; and their demonstrations of enthusiasm assumed a minatory aspect, as they learned of the presence of Slidell, Bigler, and Bright, and witnessed the efforts of the administration to defeat the hero of the Lecompton fight.[822]

Those who observed the proceedings of the convention could not rid themselves of the impression that opposing parties were wrestling for control, so bitter and menacing was the interchange of opinion. It was matter of common report that the Southern delegations would withdraw if Douglas were nominated.[823] Equally ominous was the rumor that Richardson was authorized to withdraw the name of Douglas, if the platform adopted should advocate the protection of slavery in the Territories.[824] The temper of the convention was such as to preclude an amicable agreement, even if Douglas withdrew.

The advantages of compact organization and conscious purpose were apparent in the first days of the convention. At every point the Douglas men forced the fighting. On the second day, it was voted that where a delegation had not been instructed by a State convention how to give its vote, the individual delegates might vote as they pleased. This rule would work to the obvious advantage of Douglas.[825] On the third day, the convention refused to admit the contesting delegations from New York and Illinois, represented by Fernando Wood and Isaac Cook respectively.[826]

Meantime the committee on resolutions, composed of one delegate from each State, was in the throes of platform-making. Both factions had agreed to frame a platform before naming a candidate. But here, as in the convention, the possibility of amiable discussion and mutual concession was precluded. The Southern delegates voted in caucus to hold to the Davis resolutions; the Northern, with equal stubbornness, clung to the well-known principles of Douglas. On the fifth day of the convention, April 27th, the committee presented a majority report and two minority reports. The first was essentially an epitome of the Davis resolutions; the second reaffirmed the Cincinnati platform, at the same time pledging the party to abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court on those questions of constitutional law which should affect the rights of property in the States or Territories; and the third report simply reaffirmed the Cincinnati platform without additional resolutions.[827] The defense of the main minority report fell to Payne of Ohio. In a much more conciliatory spirit than Douglas men had hitherto shown, he assured the Southern members of the convention that every man who had signed the report felt that "upon the result of our deliberations and the action of this convention, in all human probability, depended the fate of the Democratic party and the destiny of the Union." The North was devoted to the principle of popular sovereignty, but "we ask nothing for the people of the territories but what the Constitution allows them."[828] The argument of Payne was cogent and commended itself warmly to Northern delegates; but it struck Southern ears as a tiresome reiteration of arguments drawn from premises which they could not admit.

It was Yancey of Alabama, chief among fire-eaters, who, in the afternoon of the same day, warmed the cockles of the Southern heart. Gifted with all the graces of Southern orators, he made an eloquent plea for Southern rights. Protection was what the South demanded: protection in their constitutional rights and in their sacred rights of property. The proposition contained in the minority report would ruin the South. "You acknowledged that slavery did not exist by the law of nature or by the law of God—that it only existed by State law; that it was wrong, but that you were not to blame. That was your position, and it was wrong. If you had taken the position directly that slavery was right, and therefore ought to be ... you would have triumphed, and anti-slavery would now have been dead in your midst.... I say it in no disrespect, but it is a logical argument that your admission that slavery is wrong has been the cause of all this discord."[829]

These words brought Senator Pugh to his feet. Wrought to a dangerous pitch of excitement, he thanked God that a bold and honest man from the South had at last spoken, and had told the whole of the Southern demands. The South demanded now nothing less than that Northern Democrats should declare slavery to be right. "Gentlemen of the South," he exclaimed, "you mistake us—you mistake us—we will not do it."[830] The convention adjourned before Pugh had finished; but in the evening he told the Southern delegates plainly that Northern Democrats were not children at the bidding of the South. If the gentlemen from the South could stay only on the terms they proposed, they must go. For once the hall was awed into quiet, for Senator Pugh stood close to Douglas and the fate of the party hung in the balance.[831]

Sunday intervened, but the situation remained unchanged. Gloom settled down upon the further deliberations of the convention. On Monday, the minority report (the Douglas platform) was adopted by a vote of 165 to 138. Thereupon the chairman of the Alabama delegation protested and announced the formal withdrawal of his State from the convention. The crisis had arrived. Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas followed in succession, with valedictories which seemed directed less to the convention than to the Union. Indeed, more than one face blanched at the probable significance of this secession. Southerners of the Yancey following, however, were jubilant and had much to say about an independent Southern Republic.[832]

On the following day, what Yancey scornfully dubbed the "Rump Convention," proceeded to ballot, having first voted that two-thirds of the full vote of the convention should be necessary to nominate. On the first ballot, Douglas received 145-1/2, Hunter of Virginia 42, Guthrie of Kentucky 35-1/2; and the remaining thirty were divided among several candidates. As 202 votes were necessary for a choice, the hopelessness of the outlook was apparent to all. Nevertheless, the balloting continued, the vote of Douglas increasing on four ballots to 152-1/2. After the thirty-sixth ballot, he failed to command more than 151-1/2. In all, fifty-seven ballots were taken.[833] On the tenth day of the convention, it was voted to adjourn to meet at Baltimore, on the 18th of June.

The followers of Douglas left Charleston with wrath in their hearts. Chagrin and disappointment alternated with bitterness and resentment toward their Southern brethren. Moreover, contact with the South, so far from having lessened their latent distrust of its culture and institutions, had widened the gulf between the sections. Such speeches as that of Goulden of Georgia, who had boldly advocated the re-opening of the African slave-trade, saying coarsely that "the African slave-trade man is the Union man—the Christian man," caused a certain ethical revolt in the feelings of men, hitherto not particularly susceptible to moral appeals on the slavery question.[834] Added to all these cumulative grievances was the uncomfortable probability, that the next President was about to be nominated in the Republican convention at Chicago.

What were the feelings of the individual who had been such a divisive force in the Charleston convention? The country was not long left in doubt. Douglas was quite ready to comment upon the outcome; and it needed only the bitter arraignment of his theories by Davis, to bring him armed cap-a-pie into the arena.

Aided by his friend Pugh, who read long extracts from letters and speeches, Douglas made a systematic review of Democratic principles and policy since 1848. His object, of course, was to demonstrate his own consistency, and at the same time to convict his critics of apostasy from the party creed. There was, inevitably, much tiresome repetition in all this. It was when he directed his remarks to the issues at Charleston that Douglas warmed to his subject. He refused to recognize the right of a caucus of the Senate or of the House, to prescribe new tests, to draft party platforms. That was a task reserved, under our political system, for national conventions, made up of delegates chosen by the people. Tried by the standard of the only Democratic organization competent to pronounce upon questions of party faith, he was no longer a heretic, no longer an outlaw from the Democratic party, no longer a rebel against the Democratic organization. "The party decided at Charleston also, by a majority of the whole electoral college, that I was the choice of the Democratic party of America for the Presidency of the United States, giving me a majority of fifty votes over all other candidates combined; and yet my Democracy is questioned!" "But," he added, and there is no reason to doubt his sincerity, "my friends who know me best know that I have no personal desire or wish for the nomination;... know that my name never would have been presented at Charleston, except for the attempt to proscribe me as a heretic, too unsound to be the chairman of a committee in this body, where I have held a seat for so many years without a suspicion resting on my political fidelity. I was forced to allow my name to go there in self-defense; and I will now say that had any gentleman, friend or foe, received a majority of that convention over me, the lightning would have carried a message withdrawing my name from the convention."[835]

Douglas was ready to acquit his colleagues in the Senate of a purpose to dissolve the Union, but he did not hesitate to assert that such principles as Yancey had advocated at Charleston would lead "directly and inevitably" to a dissolution of the Union. Why was the South so eager to repudiate the principle of non-intervention? By it they had converted New Mexico into slave Territory; by it, in all probability, they would extend slavery into the northern States of Mexico, when that region should be acquired. "Why," he asked, "are you not satisfied with these practical results? The only difference of opinion is on the judicial question, about which we agreed to differ—which we never did decide; because, under the Constitution, no tribunal on earth but the Supreme Court could decide it." To commit the Democratic party to intervention was to make the party sectional and to invite never-ceasing conflict. "Intervention, North or South, means disunion; non-intervention promises peace, fraternity, and perpetuity to the Union, and to all our cherished institutions."[836]

The challenge contained in these words was not permitted to pass unanswered. Davis replied with offensive references to the "swelling manner" and "egregious vanity" of the Senator from Illinois. He resented such dictation.[837] On the following day, May 17th, an exciting passage-at-arms occurred between these representatives of the Northwest and the Southwest. Douglas repeated his belief that disunion was the prompting motive which broke up the Charleston convention. Davis resented the insinuation, with fervent protestations of affection for the Union of the States. It was the Senator from Illinois, who, in his pursuit of power, had prevented unanimity, by trying to plant his theory upon the party. The South would have no more to do with the "rickety, double-construed platform" of 1856. "The fact is," said Davis, "I have a declining respect for platforms. I would sooner have an honest man on any sort of a rickety platform you could construct, than to have a man I did not trust on the best platform which could be made. A good platform and an honest man on it is what we want."[838] Douglas reminded his opponent sharply that the bolters at Charleston seceded, not on the candidate, but on the platform. "If the platform is not a matter of much consequence, why press that question to the disruption of the party? Why did you not tell us in the beginning of this debate that the whole fight was against the man, and not upon the platform?"[839]