FINAL NOTE

In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne in mind:—

(1) That if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably find it in a place where you cannot destroy it except at heavy cost.

(2) That seeing that the defensive is a stronger form of war than the offensive, it is prima facie better strategy to make the enemy come to you than to go to him and seek a decision on his own ground.

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WAR COURSE

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Notes on Strategy

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PART ONE

GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND DEFINITIONS

INTRODUCTORY

Naval strategy is a section of the Art of War.

The study for officers is the Art of War, which includes Naval Strategy.

War is the application of force to the attainment of political ends.

MAJOR AND MINOR STRATEGY

We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be ulterior or primary.

Primary objects are the special objects of particular operations or movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the campaign. Consequently it must be remembered that every particular operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.

Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. There are two kinds—Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.

Every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in relation (1) to the general plan of the war; (2) to the object to which it is immediately directed.

Major Strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province the plan of the war and includes: (1) Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2) Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces. Major Strategy in its broadest sense deals with the whole resources of the nation for war. It is a branch of statesmanship which regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled together as the instrument of war. But it also has to keep in constant touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained). The friction due to these considerations is inherent in war, and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. It is usually regarded as a disease. It is really a vital factor in every strategical problem. It may be taken as a general rule that no question of major strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versa. For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice versa. To decide a question of Major Strategy, without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. Neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. This inter-action has to be accepted as part of the inevitable "friction of war." A good example is Pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years' War, for fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.

Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations. It deals with—

(1) The selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to secure the object of the particular operation.

(2) The direction of the force assigned for the operation.

Minor Strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:—

(1) Naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet only.

(2) Military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army only.

(3) Combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and navy together.

It will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called Naval Strategy or Fleet Strategy is only a sub-division of Strategy, and that therefore Strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. Naval Strategy, being a part of General Strategy, is subject to the same friction as Major Strategy, though in a less degree. Individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient.

Example.—For example, take Boscawen's attack on De la Motte on the eve of the Seven Years' War in 1755. His orders were to prevent the troops and warlike stores which De la Motte was taking out from reaching Canada. It was not diplomatically expedient to open hostilities; but if Boscawen succeeded, the result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it would entail. He missed the expedition, but captured two isolated vessels; thus striking the first blow in such a way as to entail the utmost amount of harm with the least possible good.

OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE

Nature of Object

Upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental distinction between offensive and defensive, upon which all strategical calculation must be based. Consequently, the solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view.

All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative.

A positive object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for ourselves.

A negative object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent his gaining something.

Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.

Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.

This is the only certain test by which we can decide whether any particular operation is offensive or defensive.

Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as the primary or secondary objects which lead up to them; e.g., ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the primary objects may be defensive, and vice versa. For example, in the Russo-Japanese War the ulterior object of the war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive (positive). The ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive).

Relation of Offensive to Defensive

The Offensive, being positive in its aim, is naturally the more effective form of war and, as a rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power. The Defensive, being negative in its aim, is the more lasting form of war, since it requires less force to keep what one has than to take what is another's, and, as a rule, is adopted by the weaker Power. In most cases where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive, it is due to his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or concentration is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal in succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy.

The advantages of the Offensive are well known.

Its disadvantages are:—

That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its communications, and that it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground.

The advantages of the Defensive are chiefly:—

Proximity to the base of supply and repair stations, familiar ground, facility for arranging surprise by counter attack, and power of organising in advance.

The disadvantages of the Defensive are mainly moral. They become, however, real and practical when the enemy's objective or line of operations cannot be ascertained, for then we have to spread or attenuate our force to cover all probable objectives, but this disadvantage can be neutralised when it is possible to secure an interior position.

Functions and Characteristics of the Defensive

True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.

To assume the defensive does not necessarily mean that we do not feel strong enough to attack. It may mean that we see our way by using the defensive to force certain movements on the enemy which will enable us to hit harder.

A well-designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack. Unless it does this it will not deflect the enemy's strategy in our favour. Thus, in 1756, the French, by assuming the defensive in the Channel, threatened an attack on our coasts, and concealed their attack on Minorca.

This power inherent in the defensive is peculiarly strong in naval warfare, since the mobility of fleets enables them to pass instantaneously from the defensive to the offensive without any warning. When we assume the defensive because we are too weak for the offensive, we still do not lay aside attack. The whole strength and essence of the defensive is the counter-stroke. Its cardinal idea is to force the enemy to attack us in a position where he will expose himself to a counter-stroke.

The stock instance upon which naval defensive is usually condemned is the burning of our ships at Chatham by the Dutch. But in that case we were not acting on the defensive at all. We had laid up our battle fleet and were doing nothing. We were purely passive, in expectation of peace. It is really an instance of the successful use of defensive by the Dutch. Being no longer strong enough for a general offensive, they assumed the defensive, and induced us to lay up our ships and so expose ourselves to a counter-stroke. It was a counterstroke by the worsted belligerent to get better terms of peace.

So far is the defensive from excluding the idea of attack, that it may consist entirely of a series of minor offensive operations. Clausewitz calls it "a shield of blows." It is often called offensive-defensive, or active defence. Neither term is really necessary. For a defensive which excludes the idea of offence or action is not war at all-at least at sea. The old Elizabethan term Preventive most closely expresses the idea.

The most important function of the defensive is that of covering, buttressing, and intensifying the main attack. No plan of campaign, however strong the offensive intention, is perfect which does not contemplate the use of the defensive. Without some use of the defensive the cardinal principle of concentration can rarely be fully developed. To develop the highest possible degree of concentration upon the main object or objective, the defensive must be assumed everywhere else. Because it is only by using the defensive in the minor or less important theatres of operation that the forces in those theatres can be reduced to the minimum of security, and the maximum of concentration can thereby be obtained in the main theatre.

In considering the defensive as a general plan of campaign the maxim is: If not relatively strong enough to assume the offensive, assume the defensive till you become so—

(1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or otherwise;

(2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or securing allies.

It must always be remembered that, except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action, the defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the continued use of the defensive alone nothing can be acquired, though the enemy may be prevented from acquiring anything. But where we are too weak to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and permitting us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; we then pass to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a preparation. At sea we have had little occasion for the defensive as a general plan. But that is no reason for neglecting its study. In despising the defensive ourselves we have consistently ignored the strength it gives our enemies. The bulk of our naval history is the story of how we have been baffled and thwarted by our enemies assuming the defensive at sea in support of their offensive on land. We have seldom succeeded in treating this attitude with success, and it is only by studying the defensive we can hope to do so.

Offensive Operations used with a Defensive Intention

(A) Counter attacks. (B) Diversions.

Counter attacks are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this form of attack which constitutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise advantage of defence."

Diversions are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside the limit of his theatre of offensive operations.

Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention, and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less likely they are to divert a force greater than their own.

Diversions involve a breach of the law of concentration, and it is only their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their own that justifies their use.

This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities are most highly developed in combined expeditions.

Diversions must be carefully distinguished from eccentric attacks. Eccentric attacks are true offensive movements. They have a positive object, i.e., they aim to acquire something from the enemy; whereas diversions have a negative object, i.e., they aim at preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. Eccentric attacks are usually made in greater force than diversions.

Examples.—Diversion.—Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force, about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instruction, "a diversion on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the army employed in the defence of Canada"; i.e., the intention was negative—preventive—defensive. Eccentric Attack.—Operations against New Orleans in 1815. Intended force, 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to obtain command of the embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; i.e., the intention was positive—to acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) with those against Martinique and Belleisle (eccentric attacks) in the Seven Years' War.

This distinction gives a threefold classification of combined expeditions, as used by Elizabethan strategists, viz., raids, incursions, and invasions. These correspond respectively with our modern diversions, eccentric attacks, and true direct offensive.

LIMITED AND UNLIMITED WARS

From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification of wars, according to whether such object is limited or unlimited.

(1) War with limited object ("limited war") is where the object is merely to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions or interests; e.g., Spanish-American War, where the object was the liberation of Cuba.

(2) War with an unlimited object is where the object is to overthrow the enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must agree to do our will (become subservient); e.g., Franco-German War.

PLANS OF WAR

System of Operations

Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object (i.e., whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or unlimited), Strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of the war."

Apart from the means at our disposal a plan of war depends mainly upon—

(1) The theatre of the war. (2) The various theatres of operation available within it.

1. Theatre of the War.—Usually defined as "All the territory upon which the hostile parties may assail each other." This is insufficient. For an Island Power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. Truer definition: "Geographical areas within which must lie the operations necessary for the attainment of the ulterior objects of the war and of the subordinate objects that lead up to them."

A "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations."

2. Theatre of Operations.—Is generally used of the operations of one belligerent only.

An "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking.

A "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory we seek to take possession of or to defend.

A truer definition is: "The area, whether of sea or land or both, within which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the particular operation."

Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another.

Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or movements may be offensive.

As the plan of war determines the theatres of operation in the theatre of war, so in each theatre of operation it determines the lines of operation and the objectives.

Objective

An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is directed." Thus, where the object in any theatre of operation is to get command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet will usually be the objective.

"Objective" in ordinary use is frequently confused with "object." For purposes of strategical discussion it is desirable to keep them sharply distinguished. Objective is the end of some particular movement or operation, and is the special concern of the officer in command. Object is the end of a system of operations and is the special concern of the general staff or director of the war. An objective is some definite point which we wish to get from the enemy or prevent his occupying, or some part of his strength which we wish to destroy. It is incorrect to use the term of anything we already possess. Thus, Vladivostock is often said to have been Rojesvensky's objective. It was, strictly speaking, only his destination. To reach it and concentrate with the units already there was the primary object of the operations entrusted to him. He had no true objective before him except Togo's fleet.

An objective is always subordinate to some object. It is a step to the attainment of that object.

Lines of Operation

A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate from our base or starting point to reach our objectives."

Lines of operation may be exterior or interior. We are said to hold the interior lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. Such a position is called an interior position. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior Positions" are the converse of these.

Lines of Communication

This expression is used of three different things:—

(1) Lines of supply, running from the base of operations to the point which the operating force has reached.

(2) Lines of lateral communication by which several forces engaged in one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to each other's support.

(3) Lines of retreat, which are usually lines of supply reversed, i.e., leading back to the base.

For naval purposes these three ideas are best described by the term "lines of passage and communication," which were in use at the end of the 18th century, and they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to be supplied.

Maritime Communications

The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet may have to operate are:—

(1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond to the communications of armies operating ashore). These have greatly increased in importance strategically with the increased dependence of modern fleets on a regular supply of coals, stores, ammunition, &c.

(2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea base, that is, communication between the advanced and the main base.

(3) Trade Routes, that is, the communications upon which depend the national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the "lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of belligerents' possessions.

In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on communications, but probably it does so, as will appear from a consideration of Maritime Communications, and the extent to which they are the main preoccupation of naval operations; that is to say, all problems of Naval Strategy can be reduced to terms of "passage and communication," and this is probably the best method of solving them.

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PART TWO

NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A QUESTION OF PASSAGE AND COMMUNICATION

NAVAL STRATEGY DEFINED

By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the major operations of the fleet. Such operations have for their object "passage and communication"; that is, the fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing those of the enemy.

We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of the sea. This means something quite different from the military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. The value of the sea in the political system of the world is as a means of communication between States and parts of States. Therefore the "command of the sea" means the control of communications in which the belligerents are adversely concerned. The command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime war, as were approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular operations.

History shows that the actual functions of the fleet (except in purely maritime wars) have been threefold:—

1. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore.

2. The protection or destruction of commerce.

3. The prevention or securing of alliances (i.e., deterring or persuading neutrals as to participating in the war).

EXAMPLES.—The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the Kingdom of Naples.

In the first case, there came a crisis when it was more important to demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining Louis XIV, than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.

In this way we get a Definition of the Aim of Naval Strategy, expressed in terms of the actual functions of the fleet. For practical purposes it will be found the most useful definition as emphasising the intimate connection of Naval Strategy with the diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of Major Strategy.

These functions of the fleet may be discharged in two ways:—

(1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed (bombardment, landings, raiding parties, &c.).

(2) By getting command of the sea, i.e., establishing ourselves in such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against the enemy's territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.

The power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of all proportion to that of the first—direct attack. Indeed, the first can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is mainly a question of communications.

But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the fleet must discharge part of its function by direct action against territory before there is time to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and military considerations may deflect the normal operation of Naval Strategy.)

EXAMPLES.—Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the unshaken Toulon Fleet. Holmes's capture of Emden in 1758.

Still, the fact remains that the key to the effective performance of the fleet's duties is almost always to secure communications as soon as possible by battle.

COMMAND OF THE SEA

Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we have adequate naval positions, and an adequate fleet to secure the command when war breaks out.

Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do absolutely nothing, but that he cannot seriously interfere with the undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war and to force our will upon him.

Various Conditions of Command

1. It may be (a) general; (b) local.

(a) General command is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to use or defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.

This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send squadrons to sea.

(b) Local command implies a state of things in which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in one or more theatres of operation.

2. Both general and local command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent.

(a) Temporary command is when we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in all or some theatres of operation during the period required for gaining the object in view (i.e., the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign). This condition existed after Togo's first action. It was also that at which Napoleon aimed in his instructions to Villeneuve in 1805.

(b) Permanent command is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the situation, i.e., when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. This condition existed after Tsushima.

Command in Dispute

The state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and frequently all through it.

The state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, i.e., till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea.

It is to the advantage of the preponderating Navy to end the state of dispute by seeking a decision. Hence the French tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at war with England.

It must be remembered that general command of the sea is not essential to all oversea operations.

In a state of dispute the preponderating Power may concentrate or be induced to concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in view, while the weaker Power takes advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere.

Thus in a state of dispute, although the weaker Power may not be able to obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to defend its own.

EXAMPLES.—This condition of dispute existed during the first three years of the Seven Years' War, until Hawke and Boscawen obtained a decision by defeating Conflans and De la Clue; also in the Great War up to Trafalgar.

When the preponderating Power fails or neglects to get command (i.e., leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out counter operations elsewhere.

METHODS OF SECURING CONTROL.

1. Permanent general control can only be secured by the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions.

2. Local and temporary control may be secured by—

(a) An action not necessarily entirely successful (containing).

(b) Inducing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion).

(c) Superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing).

(d) Blockade.

Action of a Fleet off an Enemy's Port

A belligerent fleet off an enemy's port may carry out three different operations, for certain purposes; each quite separate from the others, and intended to obtain an entirely different result:—

(1) Close Blockade.—This is to prevent the enemy's fighting ships from putting to sea. In this case the object is to secure local control for some purpose that is not purely naval, such as was carried out by the Japanese off Port Arthur in 1904, so as to enable their transports to cross the Yellow Sea without fear of molestation from any of the Russian ships in Port Arthur. Since the cruisers in Vladivostok were able to emerge (that port not being blockaded), the operation was not complete, and a danger of interference always existed.

This method of blockade is far more difficult to carry out in the present day, than formerly; owing to the existence of submarines and torpedo craft, the blockading ships have to remain further away from the port; there have to be inner lines of cruisers, scouts and destroyers; and quick concentration takes longer owing to the greater space covered by the blockading force, and more ships of all natures are required for the same reason.

Greater and more vigilance are required than in former days, because the enemy's ships can come out regardless of weather (thick weather would be their opportunity), and it is most important that not a single craft, from a battleship to a torpedo boat, be allowed to escape.

This method of blockade includes the commercial blockade, and all countries would be informed of its having been established.

(2) Commercial Blockade.—To prevent floating commerce from entering or leaving the blockaded harbour. The blockading force would not be powerful enough to prevent a squadron of battleships or cruisers from entering or leaving the port blockaded; and it would not be instituted outside a fortified military port, or one containing a strong naval force. But it would be able to stop scouts and torpedo craft from entering or emerging, unless in very great numbers; and if unable to stop them from emerging, would give warning of their escape and the direction in which they are going.

In both these forms of blockade it is usual, as a matter of courtesy, to allow neutral armed ships belonging to foreign navies to enter and leave for their own purposes, presumably connected with the subjects of their own country who are in the blockaded port. This, however, is not a right, and the country to which the blockading ships belong has a right to refuse it, and to back her refusal by force.

All countries must be notified of a properly instituted commercial blockade, in accordance with International Agreement.

(3) Observing a Port.—This, with its subsidiary operations, should be conducted in such a way as to induce the enemy to put to sea, the object of observing the port being primarily a naval one, viz., to bring him to decisive action.

The principal observing force (consisting of battleships and cruisers) would be either in one squadron, or more, provided that they were in supporting reach of each other, and so placed as to be able to cut off the enemy's fleet on emerging from the port observed before it can get dangerously near its probable objective, and yet sufficiently far out to ensure a battle before it can regain the shelter of its own ports. It is also worth noting that the battle should, if possible, be fought so as to make it difficult for the enemy's damaged ships to obtain the shelter of a friendly neutral's harbours before being captured.

The observed port must be watched closely, so that immediate notice of the enemy's exit may be given; and this would be done by small cruisers, scouts and destroyers, which should be strong and numerous enough to attack any torpedo craft trying to get to sea.

In order to induce the enemy's main force to put to sea it is important that every means be used to prevent his knowing that our fleet is observing the port, or if that be impossible, to do nothing which will lead him to suppose that his port is being observed.

This operation is not a blockade.

Subsidiary operations to induce the enemy's fleet to put to sea, may take the form of a diversion on the enemy's coast, or against some important part of his sea-borne trade, either by the observing fleet or by a force affiliated to it, or by any oversea movements calculated to interfere seriously with the enemy's war plan.

Concentration

The guiding feature of modern preparation for war is to be ready for rapid action. It is true at sea, more even than on land, that upon the first movements depend the initiative, the power of controlling the enemy's strategy, and of making him conform to our movements. This readiness for rapid action will depend on a proper distribution of the fleet so as to meet all the requirements.

The distribution of the fleet should be dominated by the idea of concentration, but it must be understood clearly what concentration means. Clausewitz says:—"The best strategy is always to be sufficiently strong, at first generally, then at the decisive point. There is therefore no higher or simpler law for strategy than this—keep your forces together."

The maxim "Keep your forces together" does not, however, necessarily mean keeping them all concentrated in one mass, but rather keeping them so disposed that they can unite readily at will. At sea it is more difficult than on land to foretell where the decisive point will be; but since it is quicker and easier at sea to concentrate forces at any particular point than on land, in applying this maxim for our purposes, the rule should be to dispose the forces at sea so as to be able to concentrate them in time at the decisive point so soon as this point is determined, and also so as to conceal from the enemy what it is intended to make the decisive point.

If the forces are rightly disposed within due limits, adequate control of all the lines of passage and communication can be assured, and if the enemy undertakes any operations it should be possible to ensure that sufficient forces can be concentrated in time to defeat his object. On the other hand, if the forces are concentrated in one mass, there can be little chance of deceiving or confusing the enemy, while it gives him an opportunity of successfully carrying out some operation by evasion.

THE PECULIARITY OF MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS

Since the whole idea of command of the sea rests on the control of communications, it cannot be fully apprehended without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime communications.

Ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend as a rule to run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they meet in the theatre of operations or the objective point.

At sea, the reverse is frequently the case; for in maritime warfare the great lines of communications of either belligerent often tend to run approximately parallel if, indeed, they are not identical.

Thus, in the case of a war with Germany, the object of which lay in the Eastern Mediterranean, or in America, or South Africa, our respective lines of communication would be identical.

This was also the case in all our imperial wars with France.

This peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare. Nearly all our current maxims of Naval Strategy can be traced to the pressure it exerts on naval thought.

It is at the root of the fundamental difference between Military and Naval Strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and confusion which have arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the communications and the operations against them in each case.

On land, the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's communications at once is that, as a rule, we cannot do so without exposing our own. At sea, on the contrary, when the great lines are common to both, we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's.

Therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get our fleet into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded. This was usually done in our old wars with France, by our attempting to get a fleet off Brest before the French could sail.

Hence the maxims "That the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's coast," "The enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like.

But these maxims are not universally true; witness Togo's strategy against Rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast.

Take, again, the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it. Here, again, Togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim.

The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them unsafe it must be put out of action."

The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always.

EXAMPLE.—Opening of the War of the Spanish Succession. The operations of 1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own lines of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. In 1703, the chief operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and particularly of Portugal. Rooke's official instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened the common communications.

RESULT.—By 1704 we had gained a naval position from which France could not eject us, and she abandoned the struggle for sea communications.

But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable—

(a) Because for us general permanent command is usually essential to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the enemy's fleet.

(b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt to dispute the control of the common communications.

(c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex (i.e., the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a blow which will solve all the difficulties; e.g., Sir. Palmes Fairborne's solution of the problem in 1703.

Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (i.e., forcing an action on him) is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of campaign.

This was what happened in 1704. Rooke was unable to seek out the Toulon Fleet, but by seizing Gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, but by the operation of strategical law).

Practically all great naval actions have been brought about in this way, that is, they have been the outcome of an effort to clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet; e.g., Gravelines, La Hogue, Quiberon, Trafalgar, Tsushima.

Similarly the great actions of the old Dutch wars were brought about because our geographical position placed us astride the Dutch trade communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet.

In applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne in mind that if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably find it in a place where you cannot destroy it, except at very heavy cost. It is far better to make it come to you, and this has often been done by merely sitting on the common communications.

Again, if you seek out the enemy's fleet without being certain of getting contact, you may merely assist it in evading you, and enable it to get into a position on your own communications, from which it may be very costly to dislodge it. It was for this reason that the Elizabethan Government kept the fleet in home waters in 1588. Sampson, in the Spanish-American War, was actually permitted to make this mistake. By going to seek out Cervera without being sure of contact, he left him a clear run into Cienfuegos or even Havana, which it was the main function of the fleet to prevent. Captain Mahan has since modified this maxim as follows:—"Seek out the enemy's fleet, if you are sure of getting contact." A truer maxim would seem to be "Seek contact with the enemy's fleet in the most certain and favourable manner that is open to you." To seek out the enemy's fleet is only one way of doing this, and not always the best way. It must be remembered that other conditions being equal, it is an obvious advantage to fight in your own waters rather than in those of the enemy, and more likely to ensure that a defeat of the enemy will be decisive.

RN WAR COLLEGE PORTSMOUTH JANUARY 1909

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INDEX

Abercromby, General Sir Ralph, 290, 296 Absolute War, 25, 42-44 Alexandria, 289 Alsace-Lorraine, 51-52, 55 Ambleteuse, 251 Amherst, General Lord, 285 Anglo-Japanese Treaty, 79 Anson, Admiral Lord, 110-12, 118, 189, 290 Antwerp, 69 Armada, Spanish, 159-60, 172-74, 227, 243, 245, 255 Articles of War, 176 Austerlitz Campaign, 21, 53

Bacon, Sir Francis, 58 Baltic Fleet, 81, 170, 285, 327 Baltic trade, 263 Barcelona, 286 Barham, Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, 118, 142-44, 151, 162-63, 183, 199, 207, 254, 297 Barraille, Admiral, 249-51 Barrington, Admiral Samuel, 146-47 Batz, Isle de, 179, 290 Beachy Head, 218 Belgium, 50-52, 55 Belleisle, Marechal de, 295, 332 Belleisle, 312 Berry, Captain Sir Edward, 238 Biscay, Bay of, 139, 142, 263 Black Sea, 285 Blake, Colonel Robert, 176 Blockade, method of, 102, 121, 183-86, 235, 244, 252, 256-58, 260-62, 269, 272, 284, 341; ethics of, 39; tactical and strategic, 97; insecurity of, 119; close and open, 97, 184, 187-91, 193-94, 197-201, 205, 207-208, 240, 250, 292, 295-97, 321, 340; theory of, 142, 163, 169, 175, 202-204, 242, 287-88, 322 Bluecher, Field Marshal Gebhard von, 23 Boscawen, Admiral Edward, 189, 252, 320, 328, 339 Boulogne, 251 Brest, 141, 145, 147-48, 162, 179, 189, 193-97, 201-202, 208, 235-36, 248-49, 252-53, 290, 296, 323 Bruix, Admiral, 140 Byng, Admiral Sir George, 163

Cadiz, 134-40, 143, 146, 148, 179, 186, 213, 227, 264, 323 Caemmerer, General von, 76-77 Calder, Admiral Sir Robert, 163, 183 Canada, 54, 56-57, 81, 189, 210, 312, 328, 332 Cape Clear, 272 Caribbean Sea, 144 Carkett, Captain Robert, 4 Cartagena, 264 Channel Islands, 140, 253 Charles II of England, 179 Charles of Austria, 21, 54, 69 Chateaurenault, Admiral Comte de, 213-14 Chatham, 177, 215, 227 Cherbourg, 253 Christian, Admiral Sir Hugh, 296 Cienfuegos, 169, 344 Clausewitz, General Karl von, 79-80, 85, 330-31; theory, 25, 27-29, 41-46, 51-56, 60-61, 73-74, 76-77, 311, 341; his service, 23-24; On War, 24, 44; his war plans, 44 Colpoys, Admiral Sir John, 196 Command at sea, theory of, 91-106, 165-66 Commerce prevention, 95 Communications, maritime, 94, 165, 315-16, 335; common theory of, 100-102, 118 Conflans, Admiral Comte de, 192, 252-53, 320, 339 Copenhagen, 68 Cornwallis, Admiral Sir William, 143, 162, 181, 183, 197-200 Coruna, 173 Cotton, Admiral Sir Charles, 181 Covering squadron, 283, 286-88, 291 Craig's expedition, 67 Crimea, 57, 62, 81, 258, 285-87, 300 Cromwell, 20, 22, 157, 163, 176 Cuba, 57, 103, 168, 313, 332 Curieux, 182

Dalny, 229 Dardanelles, 68, 139 Davout, Louis-Nicolas, 23 Deane, Colonel Richard, 176 Declaration of Paris, 96, 267 Dettingen, 246 Dogger Bank, 158 Downs, the, 139-40, 146, 176, 198, 214, 249-50, 253, 263 Drake, Sir Francis, 39, 159-60, 171, 173-74, 227, 244, 291, 301 Dumouriez, General, 254, 257 Dundas, Admiral Sir James, 286, 291 Dungeness, 176, 199 Dunkirk, 225, 237, 244, 246-50, 252-53 Duquesne, Admiral Abraham, 121

Egypt, 237-38, 240 Elliot Islands, 37

Ferrol, 139, 141, 266, 323 Finisterre, Cape, 101, 106, 139-40, 253, 256, 272 Flanders, 171, 246 Frederick the Great, 21-22, 36, 46, 54-55, 63-64, 66-67, 80, 157, 327

Gallipoli, 285 Ganteaume, Admiral Comte, 191, 197-98, 202, 236 Gardner, Admiral Lord, 197-98 Gibraltar, 34, 105, 139, 141, 145-46, 213, 264, 272, 318, 323, 337, 344 Gneisenau, Field Marshal August von, 23 Goltz, General von der, 75, 97 Guichen, Admiral Comte de, 146, 223

Hanover, 64, 246 Hardy, Admiral Sir Charles, 253-57 Havana, 57, 169 Havre, 252-53, 263 Hawke, Admiral Sir Edward, 104, 189-90, 192, 196, 235, 252-53, 320, 339 Henry VIII, 108-110 Holland, 65, 195 Howe, Admiral Earl, 144, 147-50, 190-191, 194, 204, 206-207 Howard of Effingham, Admiral Lord, 171, 173-74, 244

Iberian Peninsula, 56, 61-62, 64, 69-71, 105 India, 101 Ireland, 194, 196, 213, 215, 225-26, 240, 253, 255, 257, 263, 282

Jamaica, 142, 144, 149, 182, 207 Jervis, Sir John, 223, 296 Jomini, General Baron de, 28-30, 42, 45-47, 51-52, 56, 60, 74, 85

Kamimura, Admiral, 170 Keith, Admiral Lord, 236, 289 Kempenfelt, Admiral Richard, 137, 146-48, 150, 192-94, 196, 206, 220, 222-24, 227, 254, 257, 260 Killigrew, Admiral Henry, 213-15, 219, 224 Korea, 34, 57, 79-80, 82-85 Kraft zu Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Prince, 75 Kuantung Peninsula, 290

Lagos, 252 La Hogue, 180, 324, 344 Langara, Admiral Don Juan, 148-49 Leghorn, 264 Leith, 263 Liaotung Peninsula, 37, 73, 287, 292 Liao-yang, 82, 85 Light squadrons, 125 Ligonier, General Lord, 70 Limited War, 41, 46, 51-59, 72-87, 313 Lisbon, 68, 173 Lissa, 36, 179, 293 Lizard, the, 150, 256 Louisburg, 285, 287 Lyons, Admiral Sir Edmund, 285-86

Mack, General, 21 Mahan, Admiral, 131n, 169, 344 Maitland, General, 295 Malta, 139, 264 Manchuria, 79, 82, 258, 290, 313, 318, 329 Maria Theresa, 246 Marlborough, John, Duke of, 64 Maxims: "Conquest of water territory," 93; "Enemy's coast our frontier," 93; "Eyes of the fleet," 112, 117, 120-21; "Fleet in being," 224, 231; "The sea is all one," 103; "Seeking out the enemy's fleet," 102, 156, 161, 164, 167-68, 170-71, 174, 180, 203, 324, 344-45 Medina-Sidonia, Duke of, 244, 249 Mediterranean, 95, 101, 108, 113-14, 119, 125, 139-40, 143, 179, 182, 198, 207, 218, 223, 247, 252, 264, 285, 322, 337 Medway, 38, 217 Melville, Lord, 199-200 Middleton. See Barham Minorca, 34, 145, 330 Moltke, General von, 27, 51, 55, 73-74 Monk, George, Duke of Albemarle, 135-37, 157, 176-77 Montecuculi, Prince, 24 Montcalm, General Marquis de, 302 Morbihan, 235, 252-53 Mukden, 83

Napoleon, 43-44, 54, 68, 77, 79, 85, 98, 251, 257-58, 338; methods, 19-23, 25, 27-28, 46-48, 65, 141, 144, 157, 183, 210, 237-38, 240-41; views on naval warfare, 56, 143, 179, 181, 191, 236; his Russian campaign, 47, 52; on "pygmy combinations," 67; his conversion, 68-70 Narrow seas, 127, 202 Nelson, Admiral Lord, 119, 125-26, 226, 317, 322, 336; his influence, 161-63, 217; his use of cruisers, 113-15, 117; on defensive fleet operations, 223-24, 227; on blockade, 184, 186, 198-99, 208; his strategy, 136, 139, 141-42, 199, 238, 281 New Model Army, 157, 176 Ney, Marshal Michael, 29 Nile, 180 Norris, Admiral Sir John, 237-38, 246, 249, 253, 281 North Sea, 69, 127, 139, 145, 150, 179, 195-96, 199, 207, 225, 263 Nottingham, Daniel Finch, Earl of, 216-17

Observation squadrons, 125 Offence, theory of, 31-36, 39-40 Orde, Admiral Sir John, 223 Orvilliers, Admiral Comte de, 256

Palermo, 121 Paris, Declaration of, 96, 267 Parma, Prince Alexander Farnese, Duke of, 171-73, 241, 243-44 Pe-chi-li, Gulf of, 73, 302 Persano, Admiral, 293-94 Philip II, 239 Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 63-64, 84, 300, 327 Plymouth, 171, 173, 190, 214, 220, 248, 256 Pola, 293-94 Port Arthur, 80, 82-85, 170, 202, 204-205, 227-31, 290-92, 322, 340 Portsmouth, 195, 214, 224, 248-49, 253 Portugal, 65, 80, 195, 317, 323, 336 Privateering, 266-68 Prussia, 23, 49-50, 64 Puerto Rico, 168

Quebec, 285, 289, 301-302 Quiberon, 105, 180, 192, 253, 324

Raglan, General Lord, 301 "Real War," 25 Revolution, French, 19, 65 Rochefort, 139, 141, 182, 235, 250, 300, 312, 332 Rodney, Admiral Sir George B., 5, 144, 194 Roquefeuille, Admiral Marquis de, 247-51 Ross, Admiral John, 147, 149 Rupert, Prince, 135-36, 157 Russell, Admiral Edward, 225 Ruyter, Admiral de, 135-37

St. Helena, 277 St. James's fight, 177-78 St. Vincent, Admiral Sir John, 179, 194, 196, 272, 288, 290, 296 St. Vincent, Cape, 139, 182 San Domingo, 291, 301 Santa Cruz, Marquess of, 239 Santiago, 169, 322 Sampson, Admiral, 168, 322, 344 Sandwich, Admiral, the Earl of, 121 Sardinia, 139, 207 Saunders, Admiral Sir Charles, 289, 301 Saxe, Marshal, 247-50 Saxony, 54-55, 80 Scilly, 39, 149-50, 255 Sebastopol, 80, 285, 291 Seoul, 82, 85, 290, 303 Sharnhorst, General Gerhard von, 23 Shovel, Admiral Sir Cloudesley, 213-14, 224, 286 Sicily, 65, 207 Silesia, 46, 55 Skelligs, the, 150 Smyrna convoy, 225 Sole Bay, 38 Spanish Armada, 159-60, 172-74, 227, 243, 245, 255 Spithead, 135, 146, 192, 248 Stakelberg, General, 302-303 Strachan, Admiral Sir Richard, 125-26 Strategy, naval and maritime, 15; major and minor, 308-309, 327-28

Tegetthoff, Admiral, 36, 293-94 Texel, the, 139, 146-47, 150, 197 Thames, the, 135-38, 214, 217, 247-48, 268 Theory of war, 15-30, 107-52 Tilbury, 247 Togo, Admiral, 84, 170, 202, 207, 290, 292, 303, 319, 322-24, 338 Torbay, 189-90, 192-93, 207 Torres Vedras, 36, 83 Torrington, Admiral Lord, 214-18, 220, 224, 226 Toulon, 69, 135, 139, 184, 198, 207-208, 213-14, 264, 266, 286, 296, 317-18, 322, 324, 337, 344 Tourville, Admiral Comte de, 213-14, 217, 219-20, 224-26 Trafalgar, 68, 118, 199, 266, 320, 324, 339 Trieste, 139 Tromp, Admiral Martin H., 175-76 Tsushima, 83, 319, 324, 338

Unlimited War, 40-51, 60-71 Ushant, 142-43, 147, 181-82, 192, 223-25, 258, 272 Utrecht, 246 Villeneuve, Admiral, 140, 142-43, 179, 182-83, 186, 197, 206, 223, 266, 338 Vladivostock, 340

Walcheren, 68-69 Warren, Commodore Sir John B., 235 Wars: Anglo-American (1812), 119, 276; Anglo-Dutch, 109; Anglo-Spanish (1588), 109; American Independence, 92, 118, 190, 193, 210, 221, 226; Austro-Italian (1866), 36, 179, 293; Crimean, 258, 285-88; Franco-German (1870), 71, 79, 333; Franco-Russian (1812), 47, 49, 51-52; Russo-Japanese, 34, 38, 44, 51, 78-79, 84, 168, 170, 205, 303, 328-29; Seven Years', 51, 54, 57, 63, 66, 111, 179, 189-90, 197-98, 209, 312, 320, 327-28, 332, 339; Spanish-American, 57, 168-69, 313, 332, 344; Spanish Succession, 34, 317, 323, 336 Wellington, Duke of, 36, 56, 61, 65, 83, 105 West Indies, 95, 140, 142-43, 182, 189-90, 197, 210, 222-23, 225, 247, 252, 255, 266-67, 285, 296 Western Squadron, 42, 181, 193, 252, 263, 266 Wight, Isle of, 136, 214, 249, 253, 257 Wolfe, General, 70, 200, 285, 301-302

Yalu, 85 Yarmouth, 263 Yellow Sea, 340

THE END