p-books.com
Slavery and Four Years of War, Vol. 1-2
by Joseph Warren Keifer
Previous Part     1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15     Next Part
Home - Random Browse

Having with some particularity traced the main bodies composing Lee's army, as to time and routes, to the vicinity of Gettysburg, it remains to briefly follow the Army of the Potomac to the same place. While some of its corps moved earlier, the headquarters of that army did not leave Falmouth until the 14th of June, when it was established at Dumfries; on the next day at Fairfax Station, on the 18th at Fairfax Court-House, on the 26th at Poolesville, Maryland, and the next day at Frederick, Maryland, where Meade succeeded Hooker. Before the Army of the Potomac left Falmouth a division of the Sixth Corps had been thrown across the river to observe the enemy, but it did not attack him, and was withdrawn on the 13th.

Meade found his army, mainly, in the vicinity of Frederick, though some of his corps had passed northward and others were moving up by converging lines, the Sixth Corps having just arrived at Poolesville from Virginia. June 29th, Meade moved his headquarters from Frederick to Middleburg, the next day to Taneytown, Maryland, about fifteen miles south of Gettysburg.

The movements of the Army of the Potomac were such as to cover Washington and Baltimore, and at the same time bring, as soon as possible, the invading army to battle.

The First, Eleventh, and Third Corps, under Major-General John F. Reynolds, were in the advance on Gettysburg on July 1st, the First Corps leading, and preceded only by General John Buford's division of cavalry. Lee was then rapidly concentrating his army at Gettysburg. Reynolds found Buford fiercely engaging infantry of Hill's corps as they were debouching through the mountains on the Cashtown road. He promptly moved the First Corps to Buford's support, and it soon became hotly engaged. The Eleventh Corps, commanded by General Oliver O. Howard, was ordered to hasten to join in the battle. Howard arrived about 11.30 A.M., just as Reynolds fell mortally wounded, and the command of the field devolved on Howard. He pushed forward two divisions of the Eleventh to the support of the First Corps, then engaged on Seminary Hill, northeast of Gettysburg, and posted a third division on Cemetery Ridge, south of the town. The battle continued with great fierceness on the Cashtown road. For a time the Union success was considerable, and the Confederates were forced back, and numerous prisoners, including General Archer, were captured; but reinforcements from Cashtown and the unexpected arrival, at 1.30 P.M., over the York and Harrisburg roads, of Ewell's corps on Howard's right left him outnumbered and outflanked. He maintained the unequal contest until about 4 P.M., then ordered a withdrawal to Cemetery Ridge, which was accomplished with considerable loss, chiefly in prisoners taken in the streets of Gettysburg. Meade, learning of Reynolds' death, dispatched General W. S. Hancock to represent him on the field. Hancock arrived in time to aid Howard in posting the troops advantageously on the Ridge, where they handsomely repulsed an attack on the right flank. Slocum and Sickles' corps arrived about 7 P.M., and were posted on the right and left, respectively, of those in position. Hancock reported to Meade the position held was a strong one, and advised that the army be concentrated there for battle. At 10 P.M. Meade left Taneytown and reached the battle-field at 1 A.M. of the 2d of July, having, on the reports received, decided to stand and give general battle there.( 8) The Second and Fifth Corps and the rest of the Third arrived early on the 2nd. The Second and Third Corps went into position on the Union left on a continuation of the ridge towards Little Round Top Mountain. The Fifth was held in reserve until the arrival of the Sixth at 2 P.M., when it was moved to the extreme left, the Sixth taking its place in reserve owing to the exhaustion of its troops, they having just accomplished a thirty-two mile march from 9 P.M. of the day previous. The Third, under Sickles, was moved by him to a peach orchard about one half mile in advance, and out of line with the corps on its right and left. Here it received the shock of battle, precipitated about 3 P.M. by Longstreet's corps from the Confederate right. The Second and Fifth Corps were hastened to cover the flanks of the Third. The battle raged furiously for some hours and until night put an end to it. The Third was forced, after a desperate conflict, to retire on its proper line. Sickles was severely wounded, losing a leg. The Fifth, after a most heroic conflict, succeeded in gaining and holding Round Top (big) Mountain, the key to the position on the Union left, as were Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill, on its right. Longstreet, at nightfall, after suffering great loss, was forced to retire, having gained no substantial advantage. The Sixth and part of the First Corps, having been ordered to the left, participated in this battle and aided in Longstreet's repulse. Geary's division of the Twelfth, moving from the extreme right, had also reinforced the left. It was this withdrawal from the right which enabled Ewell's corps to capture and occupy a part of the Union line in the vicinity of Culp's Hill. An assault was made about 8 P.M. on the Eleventh Corps at Cemetery Hill, where the enemy penetrated to a battery, over which a melee took place, the Confederates, after a hand-to-hand fight, being driven from the hill and forced to retreat. Thus the second day's fighting at Gettysburg ended, neither side having gained any decisive advantage. Most of the Union Army had been, however, more or less engaged, while Longstreet's corps (save Pickett's division), and only portions of Ewell's corps of the Confederate Army, had been seriously in battle. There had been some spirited artillery duels, but these rarely contribute materially to important results.

The third day opened, at early dawn, by Geary's division (returned from the left) attacking, and after a lively battle retaking its former position on the right. A spirited contest also raged on the right at Culp's Hill and along Rock Creek all the morning, in which Wheaton's brigade of the Sixth Corps participated. With this exception, quiet reigned along the lines of the two great armies during the forenoon of the 3d.

Lee, flushed with some appearance of success on the first and second days, and over-confident of the fighting qualities of his splendid army, born of its defeats of the Army of the Potomac on the Rappahannock, decided to deliver offensive battle, though far from his natural base. Orders were accordingly given to Longstreet to mass a column of not less than 15,000 men for an assault, under cover of artillery, on the Union left centre, to be supported by simultaneous real or pretended attacks by other portions of the Confederate Army.

Longstreet did not believe in the success of the attack, and hence offered many objections to it, and predicted its failure. He advised swinging the Confederate Army by its right around the Union left, and thus compel Meade to withdraw from his naturally strong position.( 9) Lee would not listen to his great Lieutenant. Pickett's division of three brigades was assigned to the right of the column, and it became the division of direction. Kemper's division of four brigades from Hill's corps was formed on the left of Pickett, and Wilcox's brigade of Hill's corps was placed in echelon in support on Pickett's right, and the brigades of Scales and Lane of Hill's corps, under Trimble, were to move in support of Kemper's left. The whole column of ten brigades, composed of forty-six regiments, numbered about 20,000 men.

Generals Pendleton and Alexander, chiefs of artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia and of Longstreet's corps, respectively, massed 150 guns on a ridge extending generally parallel to the left of the Union Army and about one mile therefrom, and so as to be able to pour a converging fire on its left centre.(10) While this preparation for decisive battle went on in the Confederate lines, the Union Army stood at bay, in readiness for the battle-storm foreboded by the long lull and the active preparations observed in its front. At 1 P.M. Longstreet's batteries opened, and the superior guns of the Union Army, though not in position in such great number, promptly responded. This terrific duel lasted about two hours. Meade, recognizing the futility of his artillery fire, and in anticipation of the assault soon to come, ordered a large portion of his artillery withdrawn under cover, to give the guns time to cool and to be resupplied with ammunition. This led the enemy to believe he had silenced them effectively, and the assaulting column went forward.(11) The Union artillery, with fresh batteries added, was again quickly put in position for its real work. The close massed column of assault, well led, gallantly moved to the charge down the slope and across the open ground, directed against a portion of the Union line partially on Cemetery Ridge. The supporting Confederate batteries now almost ceased firing. As the assaulting column went forward the Union guns turned on it, cutting gaps in it at each discharge. These were generally closed from the support, but when the head of the column got well up to, and in one place into, the Union breastworks, the fire of the Union infantry became irresistible. Longstreet ordered the divisions of McLaws and Hood, holding his line on the right of the assaulting column, to advance to battle. Union forces moved out and attacked Pickett's supporting brigade on the right. Under the fierce fire of infantry and artillery the head of the great Confederate column fast melted away. Generals Garnett, Pender, Semmes, Armistead, and Barksdale were killed, Generals Kemper, Trimble, Pettigrew, and many other officers fell wounded, and many Confederate colors were shot down. The Confederates who penetrated the Union line were killed or captured. When success was demonstrated to be impossible, Pickett ordered a retreat, and such of his men as were not cut off by the fire that continued to sweep the field escaped to cover behind the batteries, leaving the broad track of the assaulting column strewn with dead, dying, and wounded. The great battle was now substantially ended. Meade did not draw out his army and pursue the broken Confederates, as their leaders expected him to do. Lee, while personally aiding in restoring the lines of his shattered troops, recognized the fearful consequences of Pickett's assault, and magnanimously said to an officer, "It is all my fault."

Generals Hancock and Gibbon and many important Union officers were wounded. This, together with other causes, prevented Meade from assuming the offensive. Two-thirds of the Confederate Army had not been engaged actively in the last struggle, and the day was too far spent for Meade to make the combinations indispensable to the success of an immediate attack.

Longstreet withdrew McLaws and Hood from their advance position. Kilpatrick moved his cavalry division to attack the Confederate right, and Farnsworth's cavalry brigade made a gallant charge on the rear of Longstreet's infantry, riding over detachments until the dashing leader lost his life and his command was cut to pieces by the terrific fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry. A great fight also ensued on the Union right near Rock Creek, between the Confederate cavalry under Stuart and the main body of the Union cavalry under General Alfred Pleasanton, in which our cavalry held the field and drove back Stuart from an attempt to penetrate behind the Union right. The infantry corps of the two armies were not again engaged at Gettysburg. Lee drew in his left to compact his army, holding his cavalry still on his left.

At nightfall, July 4th, Lee, having previously sent in advance his trains and ambulances filled with sick and wounded, commenced a retreat by the Fairfield and Emmittsburg roads through Hagerstown to the Potomac at Williamsport and Falling Waters, his cavalry covering his rear. The Sixth Corps and our cavalry followed in close pursuit on the morning of the 5th, but the main body of the Army of the Potomac marched on the Confederate flank, directed on Middletown, Maryland. French (left at Frederick) had pushed a column to Williamsport and Falling Waters, and destroyed a pontoon bridge and captured its guard and a wagon train. Buford's cavalry was sent by Meade to Williamsport, where it encountered Lee's advance, destroyed trains, and made many captures of guns and prisoners. Recent heavy rains had swollen the Potomac so that it could not be forded. Most of the Confederate sick and wounded were, with great effort, ferried over the swollen river in improvised boats, but not without several days' delay. Lee's army reached the Potomac on the 11th, having suffered considerable loss during its retreat in prisoners, arms, and trains. It took up a strong position, covering Williamsport and Falling Waters, and intrenched.

The Union Army, after reaching Middletown and being reinforced by French's command and somewhat reorganized, deployed on the 11th for battle, and on the 12th moved close up to the front of the Confederate Army. Orders were issued looking to an attack on the morning of the 13th, but the day was spent in reconnoissances and further preparations. On the following morning the enemy had succeeded in crossing the river, and only a rear-guard was taken.

Great disappointment was felt that Meade did not again force Lee to battle north of the Potomac. Certain it is that Lee's army was deficient in ammunition for all arms, and rations were scarce. Lee, in dispatches to Jefferson Davis, dated July 7th, 8th, and 10th, showed great apprehension as to the result of a battle if attacked in his then situation.(12)

Meade's army was also greatly impeded by circumstances beyond human control. When, on the 13th of July, a general attack was contemplated, rain fell in torrents, and the cultivated fields were so soft as to render the movement of artillery and troops almost impossible. The wheels of the gun-carriages sunk so deep in the soft earth as to forbid the guns being fired safely. Meade was urged, by dispatches from Halleck, and by one from President Lincoln, to attack Lee before he crossed the Potomac.(13) Meade was fully alive to the importance of doing this, but he displayed some timidity peculiar to his nature, and sought to have all the conditions in his favor before risking another battle. His combinations were made with too much precision for the time he had to do it in.

A less cautious commander might, during the first few days, have assailed Lee precipitately on his front or flank, or both simultaneously, relying on his not being able to concentrate his army to resist it. But after Lee had concentrated his forces and intrenched in a well selected position, covering Williamsport and Falling Waters, the result of an attack would have been doubtful, yet, in the light of what was later known, one should have been made. Meade, however, had done well under the circumstances at Gettysburg, and a two-weeks'-old independent commander, not yet accustomed to fighting a large army in aggressive battle, is entitled to considerate judgment.

The revised lists of losses in the battle and campaign of Gettysburg in the Army of the Potomac show 246 officers and 2909 enlisted men killed, 1145 officers and 13,384 enlisted men wounded, total 17,684; also 183 officers and 5182 enlisted men captured, grand total 23,049. The First and Eleventh Corps lost, chiefly on the first day, in captured, 3527.(14)

The imperfect lists of losses in the Army of Northern Virginia do not show the number of killed and wounded officers separately from enlisted men, and from some of the commands no reports are found, yet, so far as made, they show 2592 killed and 12,709 wounded, total 15,301, and 5150 captured, grand total 20,541.(15) The records of prisoners of war in the Adjutant-General's Office, U.S.A., give the names of 12,227 wounded and unwounded Confederates captured at Gettysburg, July 1st to 5th, inclusive.(15)

When the Gettysburg campaign ended I was fairly in the Army of the Potomac, destined to be with it and of it and to share its fortunes for two years and to the end of the war.

( 1) War Records, vol. xxvii., Part I., pp. 30-1.

( 2) Ibid., pp. 35, 39.

( 3) Ewell's Report, War Records, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 443.

( 4) Longstreet's Report, Ibid., 358.

( 5) Lee's Report, Ibid., 317.

( 6) War Records, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 316, 321-2.

( 7) Manassas to Appomattox, pp. 342-3, 351-9, 362.

( 8) Meade's Report, War Records, vol. xxvii., Part I., p. 115.

( 9) Manassas to Appomattox, pp. 386-7.

(10) Pendleton's Report, War Records., vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 352.

(11) Manassas to Appomattox, p. 392.

(12) War Records, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 299-302.

(13) Ibid., p. 82-3.

(14) Ibid., p. 187.

(15) War Records, vol. xxvii., Part II., 346.

CHAPTER III New York Riots, 1863—Pursuit of Lee's Army to the Rappahannock— Action of Wapping Heights, and Skirmishes—Western Troops Sent to New York to Enforce the Draft—Their Return—Incidents, etc.

During the Gettysburg campaign the organized militia of New York City and the volunteer and regular troops stationed there were sent to Pennsylvania to aid in repelling the invading army, thus leaving that city without its usual protection.

Horatio Seymour, Governor of the State of New York in 1863, was not, at all times, in harmony with President Lincoln and the War Department with respect to the conduct of the war, the necessity for raising troops, and the means by which they were obtained. His opposition to the draft was well understood, and gave encouragement to a turbulent population in New York City who were opposed to the war, and, consequently, to all radical measures to fill the city's quota. The poor believed they had a just ground of complaint. A clause in the Enrollment Act of Congress allowed a drafted man to be discharged upon the payment of three hundred dollars commutation. This gave the wealthier people a right the poor were not able to avail themselves of.

The city of New York had responded loyally with men and money in support of the Union at the breaking out of the war, but as the struggle progressed and the burdens of the city increased and many calls for men came, there occurred some reaction in public sentiment, especially among the masses, who imagined they were the greatest sufferers. Her Mayor, Fernando Wood, prior to the war (January 6, 1861), in a Message to her Common Council, denominated the Union as only a "confederacy" of which New York was the "Empire City"; and said further that dissolution of the Union was inevitable; that it was absolutely impossible to keep the States "together longer than they deemed themselves fairly treated"; that the Union could "not be preserved by coercion or held together by force"; that with the "aggrieved brethren of the slave States" the city had preserved "friendly relations and a common sympathy," and had not "participated in a warfare upon their constitutional rights or their domestic institutions," and, "therefore, New York has a right to expect, and should endeavor to preserve, a continuance of uninterrupted intercourse with every section." He denounced other parts of New York state as a "foreign power" seeking to legislate for the city's government; claimed that "much, no doubt," could "be said in favor of the justice and policy of a separation," and that the Pacific States and Western States as well as the Southern States would each soon set up an independent Republic. But Mayor Wood, not content with all this disunion nonsense, said further:

"Why should not New York City, instead of supporting by her contributions in revenue two thirds of the expenses of the United States, become also equally independent? As a free city, with but nominal duty on imports, her local government could be supported without taxation upon her people. Thus we could live free from taxes, and have cheap goods nearly duty free. In this she would have the whole and united support of the Southern states, as well as all the other States to whose interests and rights under the Constitution she has always been true; and when disunion has become a fixed and certain fact, why may not New York disrupt the bonds which bind her to a venal and corrupt master—to a people and party that have plundered her revenues, taken away the power of self- government and destroyed the Confederacy of which she was the proud Empire City? Amid the gloom which the present and prospective condition of things must cast over the country, New York, as a Free City, may shed the only light and hope of a future reconstruction of our once blessed Confederacy."( 1)

This most audacious communication ante-dated all Ordinances of Secession save that of South Carolina, and preceded President Lincoln's inauguration by about two months. The proposed secession of New York City involved disrupting the bonds which bound her to the State as well as the nation, and could not therefore possess even the shadow of excuse of separate sovereignty, such as was claimed for a State.

The dangerous doctrine of this Message and the suggestions for making New York a free city, and other like political teaching, bore fruit, and had much to do with building up a public sentiment which culminated in resistance to the draft and the monstrous, bloody, and destructive riots that ensued in New York City.

The significance of the defeat of the Confederate Army at Gettysburg and the capture of Vicksburg on the 4th of July, 1863, were not well understood in New York when, on Saturday, July 11, 1863, pursuant to instructions, Provost-Marshal Jenkins commenced the initial work on the corner of 46th Street and Third Avenue, by drawing from the wheel the names of those who must respond to the call of the Government or pay the commutation money.

The first day passed without any open violence, and with even some good-humored pleasantry on the part of the great crowd assembled. The draft was conducted openly and fairly, and the names of the conscripts were publicly announced and published by the press of Sunday morning. It appeared that the names of many men, too poor to pay the commutation, had been drawn from the wheel, and these would therefore have to go to the army in person regardless of inclination or ability to provide for their families in their absence. Others not drawn were apprehensive that their fate would be the same. On Sunday, therefore, in secret places, inhabitants of the district where the draft had commenced, met, and resolved to resist it even to bloodshed. The absence of the organized militia and other regular and volunteer soldiers was, by the leaders of the movement, widely proclaimed, to encourage the belief that resistance would be successful. The police, though efficient, were not much feared, as they would have to be widely scattered over the city to protect persons and property. In the promotion of the scheme of resistance to Federal authority, organized parties went early Monday morning to yard, factory, and shop, and compelled men to abandon their labor and join the procession wending its way to the corner of Third Avenue and 46th Street.

Captain Jenkins and his assistants, not apprehending any danger, recommenced the draft in the presence of a great multitude, many of whom had crowded into his office, and a few names had been called and registered when a paving-stone was hurled through a window, shivering the glass into a thousand pieces, knocking over some quiet observers in the room and startling the officials. This was the initial act of the celebrated New York riots. A second and a third stone now crashed through the broken window at the fated officers and reporters, and with frantic yells the crowd developed into a mob, and, breaking down the doors, rushed into the room, smashed the desks, tables, furniture, and destroyed whatever could be found. The wheel alone was carried upstairs and eventually saved. The Marshal escaped alive, but his deputy, Lieutenant Vanderpoel, was horribly beaten and taken home for dead. The building wherein the office was located was fired, and the hydrants were taken possession of by the mob to prevent the Fire Department from extinguishing the flames, and in two hours an entire block was burned down. Police Superintendent Kennedy was assailed by the rioters and left for dead. The most exaggerated rumors of the success of the mob spread through the city, and other anti-conscript bands were rapidly formed, especially in its southern parts.

While General Sanford of the State Militia, Mayor Opdyke of the city, and General John E. Wool were hastily consulting, and, in the absence of any military force adequate to suppress the already formidable riot, were trying to devise means for its suppression, the mob, joined by numerous gangs of thieves and thugs, grew to the size of a great army, and feeling possessed of an irresistible power, moved rapidly about the apparently doomed city, engaging in murder, pillage, and arson. Neither person nor property was regarded. Peaceful citizens were openly seized, maltreated, and robbed wherever found. Those who tried to resist were often dragged mercilessly about the streets, stamped upon, and left for dead. A brown-stone block on Lexington Avenue was destroyed. An armed detachment of marines, some fifty strong, was sent to quell the riot. At the corner of 43d Street these marines attempted to disperse the mob by firing on it with blank cartridges, but they were rushed upon with such fierce fury that they were broken and overpowered, their guns were taken from then, several of them killed, and all terribly beaten. A squad of the police attempted to arrest some of the leaders at this point, but it was defeated, badly beaten, and one of its number killed. Elated with these triumphs, and excited by the blood already spilled, the passion of the mob knew no bounds, and it proposed an immediate onslaught upon the principal streets, hotels, and public buildings. The city was filled with consternation; all business ceased, public conveyances stopped running, and terror seized the public authorities as well as the peaceful citizens.

The negroes seemed to be the first object of the mob's animosity; public places where they were employed were seized, and the colored servants there employed were maltreated, and in some instances killed. The Colored Half-Orphan Asylum, on Fifth Avenue, near 43d Street, the home for about 800 colored children, was visited, its attendants and inmates maltreated, the interior of the building sacked, and in spite of the personal efforts of Chief Decker, it was fired and burned. Robbery was freely indulged in, and many women who were of the rioters carried off booty.

The armory on Second Avenue, in which some arms and munitions were stored, although guarded by a squad of men, was soon taken possession of, its contents seized, and the building burned. This was not accomplished until at least five of the mob were killed and many more wounded by the police. In the lower part of the city the assaults of the rioters were mainly upon unoffending colored men.

At least one dozen were brutally murdered, while many more were beaten, and others driven into hiding or from the city. One colored man was caught, kicked, and mauled until life seemed extinct, and then his body was suspended from a tree and a fire kindled beneath it, the heat of which restored him to consciousness.

A demonstration was made against the Tribune newspaper office. The great mob from the vicinity of 46th Street reached the park near this office about five o'clock in the evening, and some of its leaders, breaking down the doors, rushed into the building and commenced destroying its contents, and preparing to burn it. A determined charge of the police, however, drove them out, and the building was saved.

The police, though heroic in their efforts to protect the city, were only partially successful. The draft was suspended. The building on Broadway near 28th Street, in part occupied as an office by Provost-Marshal Marriere, was fired, and the entire block burned. The Bull's Head Hotel on 44th Street was likewise burned to the ground because its proprietor declined to furnish liquor to the mob. The residences of Provost-Marshal Jenkins and Postmaster Wakeman and two brown-stone dwellings on Lexington Avenue were also destroyed by fire, and several members of the police and marines were stoned to death, and others fatally injured.

The Board of Aldermen met and adopted a resolution instructing a committee to report a plan whereby an appropriation could be made to pay the commutation ($300) of such of the poorest citizens as might be conscripted. General Wool, who commanded the Department, issued a call to the discharged returned soldiers to tender their services to the Mayor for the defence of the city. This call met with some response on the following morning, and General Harvey Brown assumed command of the troops in the city. The second day (14th) the riot was even more malignant than on the first. The mob had complete control of the city and spread terror wherever it moved.

Governor Horatio Seymour now reached the city, and promptly issued a proclamation, commanding the rioters to disperse to their homes under penalty of his using all power necessary to restore peace and order. The riot continuing, he, on the same day, issued another proclamation, declaring the city in a state of insurrection, and giving notice that all persons resisting any force called out to quell the insurrection would be liable to the penalties prescribed by law. These proclamations, however, had little effect. The second day was attended with still further atrocities upon negroes. The mob in its brutality regarded neither age, infirmity, nor sex. Whenever and wherever a colored population was found, death was their inexorable fate. Whole neighborhoods inhabited by them were burned out.

On several occasions the small military force collected on the second day met and turned back the rioters by firing ball cartridges. Lieutenant Wood, in command of 150 regular troops from Fort Lafayette, in dispersing about 2000 men assembled in the vicinity of Grand and Pitt Streets, was obliged to fire bullets into them, killing about a score, and wounding many, two children among the number. This mob was dispersed. Citizens organized to defend themselves and the city.

Governor Seymour spoke to an immense gathering from the City Hall steps, and counselled obedience to the law and the constituted authorities. He read a letter to show that he was trying to have the draft suspended, and announced that he had information that it was postponed in the city of New York. This announcement did something to allay the excitement and to prevent a spread of the riot.

Colonel O'Brien, with a detachment of troops, was ordered to disperse a mob in Third Avenue. He was successful in turning it back, but sprained his ankle during the excitement, and stopped in a drug store on 32d Street, while his command passed on. A body of rioters discovering him, surrounded the store and threatened its destruction. He stepped out, and was at once struck senseless, and the crowd fell upon his prostrate form, beating, stamping, and mutilating it. For hours his body was dragged up and down the pavement in the most inhuman manner, after which it was carried to the front of his residence, where, with shouts and jeers, the same treatment was repeated.

The absent militia were hurried home from Pennsylvania, and by the 15th the riot had so far spent itself that many of its leaders had fallen or were taken prisoners, and the mob was broken into fragments and more easily coped with. Mayor Opdyke, in announcing that the riot was substantially at an end, advised voluntary associations to be maintained to assure good order, and thereafter business was cautiously resumed.

Archbishop John Hughes caused to be posted about the city, on the 16th, a card inviting men "called in many of the papers rioters" to assemble the next day to hear a speech from him. At the appointed hour about 5000 persons met in front of his residence, when the Archbishop, clad in his purple robes and other insignia of his high sacerdotal function, spoke to them from his balcony. He appealed to their patriotism, and counselled obedience to the law as a tenet of their Catholic faith. He told them "no government can stand or protect itself unless it protects its citizens." He appealed to them to go to their homes and thereafter do no unlawful act of violence. This assembly dispersed peaceably, and the great riot was ended.

But the draft had been suspended for the time, and Governor Seymour had given some assurance it would not again be resumed in the city. The municipal authorities had passed a bill to pay the $300 commutation, or substitute money, to drafted men of the poorer classes.

The total killed and wounded during the riots is unknown. Governor Seymour, in a Message, said the "number of killed and wounded is estimated by the police to be at least one thousand." The rioters, as usual, suffered the most. Claims against the city for damages to property destroyed were presented, aggregating $2,500,000, and the city paid claimants about $1,500,000.

This brief summary of the great New York riot is given to explain movements of troops soon to be mentioned. But in order to afford the reader a fuller conception of the opposition encountered by Federal officers in the enforcement of the conscript laws, it should be said in this connection that draft riots, on a small scale, took place in Boston, Mass.; Troy, N. Y.; Portsmouth, N. H., and in Holmes County, Ohio, and at other places.

We left the Army of the Potomac in Maryland, at the close of the arduous Gettysburg campaign, watching the Army of the Northern Virginia, just escaped across the Potomac.

Harper's Ferry had been reoccupied by Union troops as early as July 6, 1863. Meade moved his army to that place, and promptly crossing the Potomac and the Shenandoah River near its mouth, took possession of the gaps of the Blue Ridge, and marched southward along its eastern slope. Passing through Upperville and Piedmont towards Manassas Gap and Front Royal, he threatened Lee's line of retreat to his old position behind the Rapidan, and thus compelled the Confederate Army to evacuate the Shenandoah Valley somewhat precipitately.

At Wapping Heights, near Manassas Gap, on the 23d of July, a somewhat lively action took place between portions of the two armies in which my troops were engaged and suffered a small loss. The enemy were driven back, and one corps of Lee's army was forced to retreat via routes higher up the valley. There were lively skirmishes between the 14th of July and August 1st, at Halltown, Shepherdstown, Snicker's Gap, Berry's Ferry, Ashby's Gap, Chester Gap, Battle Mountain, Kelly's Ford, and Brandy Station, but each and all of these were without material results. By the 26th of July the Army of the Potomac arrived in the vicinity of Warrenton, Virginia, and occupied the north bank of the Rappahannock, while the Army of Northern Virginia took position behind the Rapidan, covering its fords. Both of these great armies were now allowed by their commanders to remain quiet to recuperate. Occasional collisions occurred between picket posts and scouting detachments, but none worthy of special notice.

It having been determined by the War Department to enforce the draft in New York and Brooklyn, and a recurrence of the riots being again imminent, orders were issued to send veteran troops to New York harbor for such disposition and service as the exigencies might require. Western troops were mainly selected, and, with a view to sending me upon this service, I was ordered on the 14th of August to Alexandria with the 110th and 122d Ohio, the former in command of Lieutenant-Colonel Foster and the latter in that of Colonel Wm. H. Ball. On the 16th I embarked these regiments and the 3d Michigan on a transport ship at Alexandria, with instructions from Halleck to report on my arrival in New York Harbor to General E. R. S. Canby.( 2) On reaching our destination, my troops, with others from the Army of the Potomac, were distributed throughout both cities. My own headquarters were for a short time on Governor's Island, then more permanently at Carroll Park, Brooklyn.

The threatened riots and the incipient movements to again prevent the draft were easily averted, as it was evident that no unlawful assemblage of persons would be tolerated by the authorities when backed by veteran soldiers. This service proved to be a great picnic for the men. Officers and soldiers were received warmly everywhere in the cities, and socially feasted and flattered. It was evident, however, that the good people had not yet recovered from the terrors of the recent riots, and they manifested a painful apprehension that a recurrence of these would take place. The draft, however, went on peacefully, and when all danger seemed past the troops were ordered to return to their proper corps in the Army of the Potomac.

At a public breakfast given to the soldiers of the 110th Ohio in Carroll Park, Brooklyn, a very aged man appeared with a morning paper, and asked and was granted permission to read President Lincoln's memorable and characteristic letter of August 26, 1863, addressed to Hon. James C. Conkling, of Illinois, in response to an invitation to attend a mass-meeting at Springfield, "of unconditional Union men." The letter answered many objections urged against the President on account of the conduct of the war, his Emancipation Proclamation, and his purpose to enlist colored men as soldiers. For perspicuity, terseness, plainness, and conclusiveness of argument this letter stands among the best of all President Lincoln's writings. It came at an opportune time, and it did much to silence the caviler, to satisfy the doubter, and to reconcile honest people who sincerely desired the complete restoration of the Union. Its effect was especially salutary and satisfying to the soldiers in the field, who, somehow, felt that the burden of maintaining the Union rested unequally upon them.

Addressing those who were dissatisfied with him, and desired peace, he said:

"You desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it. But how can we attain it? There are but three conceivable ways. First, to suppress the rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do. Are you for it? If you are, so far we are agreed. If you are not for it, a second way is to give up the Union. I am against this, Are you for it? If you are, you should say so plainly. If you are not for force, nor yet for dissolution, there only remains some imaginable compromise. I do not believe that any compromise embracing a maintenance of the Union is now possible."

To those who opposed the Emancipation Proclamation, and desired its revocation, he said:

"You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think the Constitution invests its Commander-in-Chief with the law of war in the time of war. The most that can be said, if so much, is, that slaves are property. Is there, has there ever been, any question that by the laws of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed?"

And further:

"But the Proclamation, as law, either is valid or is not valid. If it is not valid it needs no retraction. If it is valid it cannot be retracted, any more than the dead can be brought to life."

And still further:

"You say that you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem willing to fight for you; but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively to save the Union. I issued the Proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. . . . I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union.

"The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea. Thanks to the great Northwest for it; nor yet wholly to them. Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a helping hand. On the spot, their part of the history was jotted down in black and white. The job was a great national one, and let none be slighted who bore an honorable part in it. And while those who have cleared the great river may well be proud, even that is not all. It is hard to say that anything has been more bravely and well done than at Antietam, Murfreesboro, Gettysburg, and on fields of less note. Nor must Uncle Sam's web feet be forgotten. At all the watery margins they have been present, not only on the deep sea, the broad bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou, and wherever the ground was a little damp they have been and made their tracks. Thanks to all."

During my stay in New York my wife visited me, and accompanied me with the troops to Alexandria.

On the 6th of September the Ohio troops of my command took ship, and when landed at Alexandria, Virginia, marched to Fox's Ford on the Rappahannock, and on the 14th rejoined the Third Corps, having been absent one month.

The next day the whole army moved across the river and encamped around Culpeper Court-House.

( 1) Hist. of Rebellion (McPherson), p. 42.

( 2) War Records, vol. xxix., Part II., pp. 46, 54.

CHAPTER IV Advance of Lee's Army, October, 1863 and Retreat of the Army of the Potomac to Centreville—Battle of Bristoe Station—Advance of the Union Army, November, 1863—Assault and Capture of Rappahannock Station, and Forcing the Fords—Affair near Brandy Station and Retreat of Confederate Army Behind the Rapidan—Incidents, etc.

Events occurred elsewhere that affected the aspect of affairs in Virginia.

General Rosecrans, early in September, commenced to move the Army of the Cumberland across the Tennessee River into Georgia, his objective being Chattanooga. Burnside at about the same time began a movement towards Knoxville, and on the way recaptured Cumberland Gap. The Confederate authorities, fearing Bragg was in danger, decided to send large reinforcements to his army, and, on September 9, 1863, Longstreet, with two divisions of his corps and a complement of artillery, was dispatched by rail from Lee to reinforce Bragg. The sanguinary battle of Chickamauga was fought on the 19th and 20th of September. It resulted in Rosecrans and his army gaining possession of Chattanooga, and Bragg and his army being left in possession of the battlefield. Rosecrans held Chattanooga in little less than a state of siege; his communications were in danger of being effectively cut off, and to aid his imperilled forces the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac were, on September 24th, ordered west, in command of General Joseph Hooker.

The loss of these corps reduced the relative strength of Meade's army to Lee's materially below what it was before Longstreet's two divisions were detached from the latter's army.

Elliott was relieved of the command of the Third Division, Third Corps of the Army of the Potomac, October 3, 1863, and ordered to report to Rosecrans. General Joseph B. Carr (Troy, N. Y.) succeeded him. Carr was a charming man socially, of fine appearance, amiable and lovable, but not strong as a soldier. He was understood to be a favorite of the President, who appointed him Brigadier-General September 7, 1862; the Senate, however, failing to confirm him, the President reappointed him in March, 1863, with rank from date of first appointment, thus giving him high rank in spite of the Senate. He was finally confirmed, on a third appointment in 1864, through some compromise, after a sharp controversy between the President and the Senate, but with junior rank, and then ordered to Butler's army.( 1)

For a time active operations were not contemplated by Meade. But Lee, about the 9th of October, crossed the Rapidan and commenced a movement around Meade's right, threatening his rear. This compelled Meade to retire across the Rappahannock, and by the 14th to Centreville and Union Mills, near the first Bull Run battle- field.

On the 13th, while my brigade, with a New York battery temporarily attached to it, was holding "Three Mile Station," near Warrenton, and skirmishing with the enemy, ballot-boxes were opened, and a regular election was held for the Ohio troops, both the boxes and ballots being carried to the voters along the battle-line so they might vote without breaking it.( 2)

The Third Corps was encamped that night at Greenwich. The next morning I was ordered with my brigade and Captain McKnight's battery (N. Y.) to cover, as a rear-guard, the retreat of the Third Corps to Manassas Heights via Bristoe Station. My orders were to avoid anything like a general engagement, but to beat back the advancing enemy whenever possible, prevent captures, and baffle him in his endeavors to delay or reach the main column. The successful conduct of a rear-guard of a retreating army, when pursued by an energetic foe, requires not only bravery but skill and tact. After the main body of my corps had left camp on its march towards Bristoe, and soon after daylight, the head of Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill's corps appeared from the direction of Warrenton. I displayed my troops with as much show of strength as possible, and with a few shots from the battery forced the enemy to halt his head of column and form line of battle. I thereupon retired by column quickly, and resumed the march until the enemy again pushed forward by the flank too near for my safety, when, in a chosen position, my troops were again speedily brought into line and a fire opened, which necessarily compelled him to halt and again make disposition for battle. This movement was frequently repeated. At each such halt the enemy necessarily consumed much time, thus giving the main body of the corps ample opportunity to proceed leisurely towards its destination. The weak or broken-down men of the rear-guard were not required to halt and fight, but were allowed to make such speed as they could. The day was almost spent when a courier reached me from French with the information that the corps had passed Bristoe Station, and was on the north side of Broad Run. Having now no further responsibility than for the safety of my own command, I moved more rapidly, and by 4 P.M. I had safely passed Bristoe Station to the high ground north of Broad Run, from whence I could, from a distance of less than a mile, see Bristoe, and, for a considerable distance, the line of railroad running, in general direction, north and south. The Third Corps had moved on out of sight towards the heights at Manassas. My command was much wearied, and I halted it for a short rest, but I soon ordered it forward where it took position in obedience to an order of General Meade to cover a blind road over which he feared the enemy might march to seize the heights.

General A. P. Hill, in his report of the day, says:

"From this point (Greenwich) to Bristoe we followed close upon the rear of the Third Corps, picking up about 150 [?] stragglers. Upon reaching the hills this side of Broad Run, and overlooking the plain on the north side, the Third Corps was discovered resting, a portion of it just commencing the march toward Manassas. I determined that no time must be lost, and hurried up Heth's division, forming it in line of battle along the crest of the hills and parallel to Broad Run. Poague's battalion was brought to the front and directed to open on the enemy. They were evidently taken by surprise, and retired in the utmost confusion [?]. Seeing this, General Heth was directed to advance his line until he reached the run, and then to move by the left flank, cross at the ford, and press the enemy. This order was being promptly obeyed, when I perceived the enemy's skirmishers making their appearance on this side of Broad Run, and on the right and rear of Heth's division. Word was sent to General Cooke, commanding the right brigade of Heth's division, to look out for his right flank, and he promptly changed front of one of his regiments and drove the enemy back. . . . In the meantime I sent back General Anderson to send McIntosh's battalion to the front, and to take two brigades to the position threatened and protect the right flank of Heth. . . . The three brigades advanced in beautiful order and quite steadily, Cooke's brigade, upon reaching the crest of the hill in their front, came within full view of the enemy's line of battle behind the railroad embankment (the Second Corps), and of whose presence I was unaware."( 3)

Hill was unexpectedly caught in a fatal trap. He was mistaken about seeing any considerable portion of the Third Corps north of Broad Run, or as to any of it being taken by surprise and retiring in confusion. But for my halting my command to rest he would have seen little of it. We had baffled the head of his column all day, and had passed beyond danger for the time, and, according to his report, we had killed and wounded many more than we had lost. The stragglers he reported captured could not have been of my command, as it left no men behind.

The fortuitous circumstance of Warren arriving at Bristoe with the head of the Second Corps moving on a road paralleling the railroad, just at the moment Hill was deploying his forces for an attack on the Third Corps, led to a serious and bloody battle. When the rear- guard of the Third Corps passed Bristoe Station, no part of the Second was in sight. I saw no part of it until after Hill commenced arraying his troops on the crest of the hills south of Broad Run. Seeing a battle was on, and my own command too far on its way and too much exhausted to be recalled in time to participate in it, I dismounted from a tired horse and, with a single staff officer, ate a lunch from my orderly's haversack ( 4) and watched the progress of the engagement. It is a rare occurrence that any person has an opportunity to quietly witness the whole of a considerable battle. From my position I could see between the lines of the opposing forces; I could note the manoeuvres of each separate organization; and I could almost anticipate to a certainty the result of the attacks and counter attacks. It was at first plainly evident that each commander knew little of what he had to meet. Lieutenant- General Hill's formation, as described by him in his report, was arranged with reference to a supposed force north of Broad Run, and was consequently very faulty. Warren had no notice of the presence of an enemy until Hill ran unexpectedly into his line of march. Hill seemed to be eager for a fight with the Third Corps, then far beyond his reach, and found one with the Second Corps, which was quietly marching to a concentration near Centreville. General Warren's command was strung out upon the road, and he had no order of battle. Hill, with two divisions, and others soon to arrive, was better prepared, though his formation was bad, to meet the Second Corps. Warren wisely used the slightly raised railroad bed for a breastwork, and promptly opened the battle without giving the enemy time for a change of position or for new formations. The battle was at first with musketry, but artillery soon arrived on both sides and opened fire at short range. Warren, in his report, after describing the preliminary movements of his command for position, says:

"A more inspiring scene could not be imagined. The enemy's line of battle boldly moving forward, one part of our own steadily awaiting it, and another moving against it at double-quick, while the artillery was taking up a position at a gallop and going into action. . . . Under our fire the repulse of the enemy soon became assured, and Arnold's battery arrived in time to help increase the demoralization and reach the fugitives.

"The enemy was gallantly led, as the wounding of three of his general officers in this attack shows, and even in retiring many retired but sullenly. An advance of a thin line along our front secured 450 prisoners, two stand of colors, and five field pieces."( 5)

The battle was of short duration, but owing to the exposed position of the Confederates their losses were great, and out of proportion to short engagements generally. General Warren and his officers justly won honors for meeting the emergency so handsomely.

Hill's command was so signally defeated that the Second Corps remained in possession of the field until 9 P.M., when it pursued its march unmolested to a junction with the main army. Hill reported his loss, killed, wounded, and missing, at 1378,( 6) but it was claimed on good authority to have been much larger. The loss in the Second Corps at Bristoe is not given separately, but its total losses in two engagements of the day, including Bristoe, were 546.( 6)

Hill's conduct was criticised, and his report bears, of dates in November, 1863, the following indorsements:

"General Hill explains how, in his haste to attack the Third Army Corps of the enemy, he overlooked the presence of the Second, which was the cause of the disaster that ensued.

"R. E. Lee, General."

"The disaster at Bristoe Station seems due to a gallant but over- hasty pressing on of the enemy.

"J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War."

"There was a want of vigilance, by reason of which it appears the Third Army Corps of the enemy got a position, giving great advantage to them.

"J. D." (Davis) ( 7)

The last two indorsements do not show that Seddon and Davis clearly comprehended the real situation.

Lee by continued flank movements indicated a purpose to force the Union Army back into its intrenchments at Alexandria, but this plan was abandoned after the disaster at Bristoe. Soon the Confederates commenced falling back towards the Rappahannock, destroying the railroad track and bridges, and Lee finally put his army into camp on the Botts plantation, near Brandy Station. He built winter quarters there, keeping possession of the fords of the Rappahannock, and strongly fortifying north of the river at Rappahannock Station.

The Union Army commenced a cautious forward movement on the 19th of October, keeping close to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. On the 21st I encamped on the battlefield of Bristoe, and we finished the burial of the dead. On the 26th, about 9 P.M., an order came advising me that General John Buford's cavalry division was threatened and in peril near Catlett's Station, and directing me to go to his relief. My brigade, with a battery attached, reached him about midnight, and under his direction formed line of battle, my left resting on the railroad, the cavalry on the flanks. He had been attacked at dark by what seemed to be an overwhelming force of infantry and cavalry, but he had stubbornly held his ground. Buford was an accomplished soldier and a hard fighter. He it was who opened the battle of Gettysburg on Seminary Hill.

When the best possible dispositions had been made for the expected attack of the morning, he invited me to an excuse for a headquarters, consisting of a tattered tent-fly. The night was dark and rainy, and everybody was wet and uncomfortable. The bronzed old soldier, from some hidden recess, had an orderly produce a bottle of whisky, the corkage of which was perfect, and, in the absence of a corkscrew, presented a problem. He said, "All right, you hold the candle." He then held the bottle in his left hand, and with his sword in the right struck the neck of it so skillfully as to cut it off smoothly. The problem was solved. Further details are unnecessary. I understood the art of making drinking-cups by cutting a bottle in two with a strong string, but this feat of Buford's was new to me.( 8)

John Buford died of disease, December 16, 1863, a Major-General of Volunteers. He had won great renown as an able, fighting soldier.

Lee was not to be allowed to rest in his chosen winter quarters. On the 7th of November the Army of the Potomac moved to the fords on the Rappahannock, and preparation was made to pass then, although they were strongly defended by the enemy. The Third Corps massed at Kelly's Ford, some five miles below Rappahannock Station. This corps forced a crossing about 5 P.M., and massed in battle order on the bluffs near the river. My command did no fighting this day. The Third Brigade, with some assistance from the Second Brigade of the First Division of the Sixth Corps, at dusk, under the leadership of the accomplished General David A. Russell, gallantly assaulted and carried the strongly fortified tete-de-pont on the north of the river at Rappahannock Station. The principal parts of Hoke's and Hays' brigades of Early's division of Ewell's corps were captured, numbering, including killed and wounded, 1630. Russell's loss in this affair, all told, was 327. He captured seven battle flags and Green's battery of four rifled guns.( 9) Lee had intended to hold this position as a centre, and then fall, alternately, on the divided portions of the Army of the Potomac after they crossed the river above and below it.(10) Its loss forced him to retire from the river and take position in front of Culpeper Court-House, with his right resting on Mount Pony.

The next day the principal part of Meade's army, having succeeded in crossing the river, was moved forward to tender battle. Late in the afternoon I was ordered to dislodge the enemy from a hill (Miller's) about two miles in front of Brandy Station. The place was held by artillery and infantry, flanked by cavalry. This was Lee's most advanced position, and it was held firmly as a point of observation. My command was disposed for the attack in the following order: The 138th Pennsylvania (Colonel McClennan) was moved on the left of the railroad to threaten the enemy on his right; the 122d Ohio (Colonel W. H. Ball) followed in support. The 110th Ohio (Lieutenant-Colonel Foster) was put on the right of the railroad, with orders to move directly on the height occupied by the enemy; the 6th Maryland (Colonel John W. Horn) in support, but some distance to the right. There was no artillery at hand, and the attack was ordered at once. The distance to the hill was about one half mile. The 138th drew the enemy's artillery fire, but continued its advance. The 6th pushed forward into a wood on the right to make a demonstration, and in person I led the 110th to the real work. Not a gun was fired by my men as they advanced to the charge. I made every exertion possible to hasten the troops, but when they reached the foot of the hill the enemy's artillery was withdrawn, and his infantry made a precipitate retreat. I was the first to gain the crest, being mounted, and with pistol fired on the retiring troops not two hundred feet away. A Confederate was reported wounded with a pistol ball at this place. This is the nearest I can come to having personally injured, in any way, any person in battle. We pushed on to Brandy Station without further orders, driving the enemy until we met a more formidable force, with several batteries of artillery, which compelled us to halt. Night came on, and the day's work ended by our going into bivouac at the Station. Captain Andress of the 138th was the only officer of my command killed, and my loss was otherwise light. We made the charge with the commanding General—Meade—and much of his army looking on. It was Meade's belief that behind the heights assaulted would be found Lee's army arrayed for battle.

Though Lee had selected a strong position (as already stated) in front of Culpeper Court-House, and fortified it somewhat, he decided it was not a good one, and therefore declined battle north of the Rapidan,(11) and, by the morning of the 9th of November, his army was south of this historic stream.

The Army of Northern Virginia never again crossed the Rapidan or Rappahannock. Henceforth it was to be confined to a narrower theatre of operations, and a closer defence of the capital of the Confederate States, but this defence was still to be most memorable and bloody, even in comparison with what had gone before.

( 1) War Records, vol. xxxvi., Part II., p. 34.

( 2) This was in the famous Brough-Vallandigham Ohio election for Governor.

( 3) War Records, vol. xxi., Part I., p. 426.

( 4) This lunch consisted of a box of sardines and "hardtack."

( 5) War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 242.

( 6) Ibid., pp. 250, 428.

( 7) War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 428.

( 8) A string tightly drawn around a bottle where the cut is desired to be made, and then rapidly drawn back and forth until the friction heats the glass, renders it easy to be separated by a sharp jar against the hand or some hard substance.

( 9) Three of these had belonged to Randolph's battery, lost at Winchester.—War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 626.

(10) Ibid., pp. 613-616.

(11) War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., pp. 611, 616 (Lee's Report).

CHAPTER V Mine Run Campaign and Battle of Orange Grove, November, 1863—Winter Cantonment (1863-64) of Army of the Potomac at Culpeper Court- House, and its Reorganization—Grant Assigned to Command the Union Armies, and Preparation for Aggressive War

Though the roads were bad from frequent rains and much use, and November winds warned that winter was at hand to stop further field campaigning on an extended scale, and though all attempts to cross the Rapidan in the fine weather of the spring and summer had failed, yet, when the Army of the Potomac was again bivouacked at Culpeper, the public cry was heard—"On to Richmond!"

Lee's last campaign was looked upon in high quarters as a big bluff that should have been "called" by Meade while the Army of Northern Virginia was north of the Rappahannock. Meade, however, acted persistently and conscientiously on his own judgment, formed in the light of the best knowledge he could obtain. He would not stand driving, and was something of a bulldozer himself, and sometimes—said to have been caused by fits of dyspepsia—was unreasonably irascible, and displayed a most violent temper towards superiors and inferiors. Notwithstanding this, he never lost his equipoise or acted upon impulse alone, and he never permitted mere appearances to move him. Nor could his superiors induce him to act against his judgment as to a particular military situation. It will be remembered that he was urged to fight Lee north of the Potomac after Gettysburg. He was urged to bring on a battle before the departure of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps for the West, and when Lee moved north on his flank his opportunity seemed to have come to fight a battle, but his fear of the same strategy displayed by the Confederate Army in the second Bull Run campaign against Pope induced him to be over-cautious, and to so concentrate his army as to avoid the possibility of its being beaten in detachments.

The next day (October 16th), after Meade reached Centreville, the President, in his anxiety that Lee should not again escape without a general battle, addressed this characteristic note to Halleck:

"If General Meade can now attack him (Lee) on a field no more than equal for us, and do so with all the skill and courage which he, his officers, and men possess, the honor will be his if he succeeds, and the blame may be mine if he fails.

"Yours truly, "A. Lincoln."

This note was forwarded to Meade.

To this he answered that it had been his intention to attack the enemy when his exact whereabouts was discovered; that lack of information as to Lee's position and intentions and the fear of jeopardizing his communications with Washington had prevented his doing so sooner. But the pressure continued. Halleck, the 18th, wired Meade:

"Lee is unquestionably bullying you. If you cannot ascertain his movements, I certainly cannot. If you pursue and fight him, I think you will find out where he is. I know of no other way."

This was too much for Meade's temper. He responded:

" . . . If you have any orders to give me I am prepared to receive and obey them, but I must insist on being spared the infliction of such truisms in the guise of opinion as you have recently honored me with, particularly as they have not been asked for. I take this occasion to repeat what I have before stated, that if my course, based on my own judgment, does not meet with approval, I ought to be, and I desire to be, relieved from command."

Although Halleck apologized "if he had unintentionally given offence," and Meade thanked him for the "explanation," these and other like occurrences had their influence on Meade's conduct.

As he had failed to bring Lee to bay at Culpeper, the only opportunity to do so must be sought south of the Rapidan. Meade was not averse to battle.

On November 26, 1863, Meade's army was put in motion with a view to a general concentration south of the Rapidan, at Robertson's Tavern on the turnpike road, by evening of that day. Lee's army of about 50,000 men was mainly massed and in winter quarters in front of Orange Court-House, with an intrenched line in its front across the plank road and turnpike, extending to the river.

Meade's design was, by a rapid movement, to carry this line before Lee had time to concentrate behind it.

The Fifth Corps (Sykes) was directed to cross the Rapidan at Culpeper Mine Ford, and thence move by the plank road to Parker's Store and the junction of the road to Robertson's Tavern; the First Corps (Newton), with two divisions, to follow the Fifth. The Second Corps (Warren) was to force a crossing at Germanna Ford, thence march directly to Robertson's Tavern, and there await the arrival of other corps.

The Third Corps (General William H. French), followed closely by the Sixth (Sedgwick), was directed to cross at Jacob's Ford (Mill), and continue the march, bearing to the left, to Robertson's Tavern. Jacob's Ford, with its steep banks, proved so difficult to pass that some delay occurred, and the artillery had to be sent around by Germanna Ford, and did not rejoin the corps until the morning of the 27th. Jacob's Ford was the highest up the river, and consequently brought French, on passing it, in close proximity to the enemy. Lee, by the evening of the 26th, had thrown forward cavalry and some infantry of Hill's corps to the vicinity of Robertson's Tavern, though not in sufficient force to prevent Warren taking his designated position. Nor was Sykes seriously interfered with. The cavalry crossed at Ely's and other fords. French, with the aid of pontoons, safely passed the river, but he did not advance on the 26th more than three miles beyond the crossing, time having been lost in hunting blind country roads, waiting for artillery to arrive, and reconnoitering. A force of the enemy showed itself on intersecting roads to his right, where were a number of such roads leading from Sisson, Witchell, Tobaccostick and Morton's Fords, and one which led from Raccoon Ford—still higher up the river—to an intersection at Jones' house, with the most direct road to the Tavern. The enemy's intrenchments covered a considerable part of this last road, from which he could easily debouch and attack the flank and rear or the trains of the marching columns.( 1) These conditions rendered French's situation perilous, and caused him to move with extreme caution, as the Sixth Corps could not arrive until he was out of the way. Notwithstanding French had some miles farther to march than Warren, and unusual difficulties to overcome or guard against, Meade dispatched him, as early as 1 P.M. of the 26th, that his delay was retarding the operations of Warren, and again at 3 P.M. he dispatched French:

"I would not move forward farther from the river than to clear the way for General Sedgwick, until he comes up and crosses."

The Second Division, General Henry Prince, with some cavalry, was in the advance; the Third, Carr's, and the First, General David B. Birney's, following in the order named. At the Widow Morris', a somewhat obscure road bore off abruptly to the left, but which, somewhat circuitously, led to Robertson's Tavern. The head of Prince's column, however, was on the more direct road to Tom Morris' house, with flankers and cavalry well to the right. These were soon attacked and driven in or recalled.

It seems Prince was led to believe he was in communication with Warren's left.( 2)

It soon became evident that the head of French's column was near the Raccoon Ford road, and the intrenchments held by at least two divisions of Ewell's corps of Lee's army, and there seemed to be no possible chance to extricate it without a battle.

At 11.45 A.M., on the 27th, Meade dispatched French:

"If you cannot unite with Warren by the route you are on, you must move through to him by the left."

At 1.45 P.M. Meade again dispatched French:

"Attack the enemy in your front immediately, throwing your left forward to connect with General Warren at Robertson's Tavern. The object of an attack is to form junction with General Warren, which must be effected immediately."

Prince had, by this time, formed line of battle and engaged the enemy. Carr's division was ordered forward to take position on Prince's left, and at 3 P.M. Birney's division was ordered to form in support of Carr.

Prince covered the road leading to a junction with the Raccoon Ford road. The First Brigade of Carr's division (General W. H. Morris) moved to the left of Prince, my brigade—the Second—was ordered to pass behind Morris, and take position on his left, and Colonel B. F. Smith's brigade—the Third—was sent to my left.

Morris became somewhat entangled in a ravine and in thick timber, and was slow in forming good line. In this position he was fired upon from a ridge not two hundred yards from his front, the bullets falling among my men as they passed his rear. I appealed to Morris to face to the front, charge, and take the ridge, but he declined to do so for want of orders.

As soon as I could get my two leading regiments, 110th and 122d Ohio, on Morris' left, I led them to the crest of the ridge, captured some prisoners, and posted the regiments in good position behind a fence on the summit. My other regiments, 6th Maryland and 138th Pennsylvania, successively, on their arrival, took position on the left of the Ohio troops. The ridge which extended to my right along Morris' front was still held by the enemy in strong force, and both my flanks were threatened. Through a misunderstanding of orders the Ohio regiments fell back a short distance, but soon retook the crest and were again fiercely engaged, though under an enfilading fire of artillery and a galling fire of musketry. The ground being somewhat open to the front, I could see the enemy massing for an attack. I again, but vainly, appealed to Morris to advance and close the gap, as otherwise his position in the ravine and thick woods could not be held. The assault came, and Morris was forced, in some confusion, to retire. By refusing my right somewhat, I maintained my isolated position and threatened the enemy's right. The First Brigade, though composed in part of regiments not before in strong battle, was quickly re-formed, and, under Carr's order, soon obtained full possession of the ridge by a splendid charge, and thus the gap was closed. The battle by this time raged furiously all along the front. Colonel Smith, passing too far to the rear, lost his way in the thickets, and failed to come up on my left. He did not rejoin the division until the battle was over. This misfortune was hard to account for, as Colonel Smith was an intelligent, brave, and skilled officer—a graduate of West Point. He met some scouting parties of the enemy, and, as directed, sought to find a connection with troops of Warren's corps. His failure caused my left to remain uncovered.

Two assaults were made upon my line by the enemy in columns not less than three lines deep. The first came in front of Horn's regiment, but was anticipated, and McClennan's regiment, moving into the open ground, struck the right flank of the enemy and (firing buck and ball from .69 calibre muskets) did great execution. McClennan was severely wounded, and in consequence was obliged to leave the field.

The battle raged with unabated fury until dark, and as late as 8 P.M. enfilading shells from heavy guns on our right screamed and crashed through the timber over our heads, bursting with loud noise, producing a most hideous and weird appearance, but really doing little damage.

As night approached, the ammunition of my regiments gave out, and all my command, save one regiment, was relieved by regiments of Birney's division.( 3)

The bravery and fighting skill of Colonels Ball, Horn, and McClennan, also of Lieutenant-Colonels M. M. Granger and W. N. Foster, and Major Otho H. Binkley, and others, was most conspicuous. Lieutenant James A. Fox of the 110th here lost his life. He had risen from the ranks, but was a proud-spirited and promising officer. We buried him at midnight, in full uniform, wrapped in his blanket, behind a near-by garden fence.

I wish to bear testimony also, at this late day, to the quiet gallantry and high soldierly qualities of the long-since-dead General David B. Birney.( 4) He did not obey orders to the letter only. His division being in reserve and support, he took position where he could watch the progress of the battle, and note in time when and where he was needed. He made no display on the field. When he noticed, by the slackening fire of my men, that their ammunition was about exhausted, he rode to my side and quietly suggested that he be allowed to order regiments from his own command to take their places. That there might not be, even momentarily, a break in the line, his regiments were moved up, and my men lay down while his stepped over them and opened fire. The relieved troops were then withdrawn and resupplied with ammunition.

While the battle was in progress, the Sixth Corps, still some distance to the rear, was directed by another road on Robertson's Tavern, and during the night the Third Corps was ordered to withdraw and follow the Sixth.

The enemy retired at the close of the battle, leaving in our possession his dead, unburied, and his wounded on the field and in hospitals. We fought a great part, if not all, of Ewell's corps.

Casualties were reported in thirteen Confederate brigades, in forty- four regiments, and in the artillery of Early, Johnson, and Rodes' divisions, total 601.( 5)

The losses in the Third Corps were 10 officers and 115 enlisted men killed, 28 officers and 719 enlisted men wounded, total 872.

The brigades of Morris and Keifer suffered the most severely, although Prince's division was first engaged. My own killed and wounded numbered 172, those of Prince's division 163. There were no captured or missing men of my command.

This engagement has been called by the Confederates the battle of Payne's Farm;( 5) but by the Union side it is generally known as the battle of Orange Grove; the place, however, is sometimes referred to as Locust Grove, and by both sides it is often mentioned as Mine Run, though in no proper sense did the contest occur on that stream.

The battle, fought by French under the circumstances narrated, gave rise to much crimination and recrimination between Generals Meade and French, and probably led to a reorganization of the Army of the Potomac four months later.

Meade attributed the miscarriage of the campaign to French's failure on the 26th, and his further failure on the 27th, to connect with Warren's left at Robertson's Tavern. He claimed that if such junction had been made he could have fallen on the portion of Lee's army on the turnpike and destroyed it, and that he would then have been able to seize the line behind Mine Run before Lee could occupy it with his united forces. Meade further contended that, on the 27th, French got on the wrong road, and, consequently, had to fight a fruitless battle alone, while the other corps of the army were standing idle, waiting for him. French stoutly insisted that his march, being on the extreme right and exposed flank, on the longest line, and via a difficult ford, without a good guide and over blind roads, with a doubt as to which one should be taken, warranted him in acting with caution, and in fighting where he did when he found his command attacked; and he further claimed that when he brought Ewell's corps to battle, Meade should have fallen on the enemy in Warren's front and overwhelmed it; that by fighting when and where he did, he was doing more than he otherwise could have done to prevent a concentration of the Confederate Army, especially in preventing it from massing in front of Robertson's Tavern. A considerable part of the Union Army sympathized with French, yet the fact remained that Meade's plan of concentration and of battle at the appointed time and place failed.

On the 28th the armies were brought face to face, the Confederate army in fortifications behind and along the high west bank of Mine Run, both armies extending from a short distance south of the plank road to the north of the turnpike, in the direction of the battle- field of the 27th.( 6) The Third Corps held the Union centre. Warren's corps, with a division of the Third Corps, was sent to reconnoitre for a point of attack on the Confederate right. Warren reported an attack there feasible. Other reconnoissances were made on the 29th, and Meade decided to assault from both flanks the next morning, the Sixth and Fifth Corps under Sedgwick on the enemy's left and the Second Corps and two divisions of the Third on his right. Carr's division of the Third marched at 4 A.M. two miles to the left and joined Warren's column. The night was cold and there was much suffering.

Warren had about 20,000 men in readiness, and was to attack at 8 A.M. at a signal from the batteries of the centre. Sedgwick was to attack an hour later. The signal batteries opened, and we stood, in grand array, soberly withing for the order to charge. The enemy's strong works, with guns bristling in the morning sun, were in our immediate front. Minutes of delay were as hours to the waiting troops. Many sent up silent prayers for safety, and not unfrequently through the column there could be seen on a soldier's breast a paper giving his name, company, regiment, and home address, so, if killed, his body could be identified. Warren hesitated, and just before 9 A.M. dispatched Meade, then four miles distant:

"The full light of sun shows me that I cannot succeed."

Meade suspended Sedgwick's attack, then in progress, and hastened to Warren. I saw the two men at a small, green, pine wood fire, earnestly discussing the critical situation. Meade seemed to be censuring Warren, yet the latter adhered to his view that the assault could not be successfully made, and Meade yielded. Somehow the troops of the great column, before the final decision was announced, came to believe the charge would not be made, and they cautiously commenced badgering each other, soldier like, over wasted prayers. The different commands were later ordered to their former positions.

French opposed an assault on the centre. The enemy's position, naturally a strong one, had been greatly strengthened by labor. The wisdom of not making any assault, in the light of all the facts, was, I think, generally recognized. The season was unfavorable; Meade was a long distance from his base; success could only have been temporary and could not have been followed up, and defeat under the circumstances would have been a fatal catastrophe. Even Grant, in 1864, was "all summer" in trying to gather fruits of what were called successes.

The 1st of December was spent by both armies in watching each other, and behaving as if they dared each other to attack.

"One was afraid and the other dare not"—but which?

The campaign had been delayed beyond all expectation; all hope of gaining an advantage by a surprise or otherwise was passed, food was becoming scarce, and hence Meade decided to retire his army to its base of supplies. At dusk of the 1st, therefore, the Union Army moved by different roads to various fords of the Rapidan, the Third Corps to Culpeper Mine Ford, the farthest down the river of any used, and by 8 A.M. of the coming morning all had recrossed, and on the 3d they were in their former camps at Brandy Station. The Army of the Potomac lost in this campaign, killed and wounded, 1272.( 7)

Thus ended the Mine Run campaign; not bloodless, yet disappointing, as were many others. In it Meade demonstrated his willingness to fight, and that his army was loyal to him. Another opportunity to fight a great battle in independent command on the field never came to him. His chief glory for all time must rest on Gettysburg.

Lee, the night of December 1st, feeling certain Meade would not assault him in his strong position, and knowing the latter was far from his base, in an unfamiliar country, encumbered with trains, determined to assume the offensive by throwing two of his divisions against Meade's left on the following morning. But Meade was safely away when morning came, and pursuit impossible.

Lee, it is said, was greatly chagrined over his lost opportunity, and exclaimed to his generals:

"I am too old to command this army; we should never have permitted these people to get away."( 8)

Before starting on this campaign Meade expressed a purpose to take position in front of Fredericksburg, but Halleck disapproved the plan.( 9)

The Army of the Potomac, having ended its historic work of the memorable year 1863, went into winter quarters around Culpeper Court-House, with Brandy Station for its base of supplies. My brigade occupied log huts on John Minor Botts' (10) farm, partly constructed by the Confederates prior to November 8th.

The caring, in winter, for a large army calls for great vigilance, skill, and energy. The season not permitting much opportunity for drill, discipline is hard to maintain. Sickness becomes prevalent, and there is much unrest, both of officers and soldiers.

Camp guards, however, had to be maintained; also grand-guards and pickets around the front and flanks of the whole army. The freezing and thawing and the constant moving of supply trains caused deep mud in the roads and camps. The brigade commanders of the Third Corps, and of other corps as well, were, alternately, detailed as corps officer-of-the-day, the duties of which lasted twenty-four hours, and required the officer to be with the advance-guard and on the corps' picket lines to see that vigilance was preserved; that orders were understood and obeyed, and to report any unusual occurrences. He was required to visit all guards and pickets, personally, at least once by day and once by night. The Third Corps' advance line was from Mt. Pony, its left, around the front of Culpeper Court-House, covering the Madison Court-House road; in length about five miles. This service was arduous, trying, and, by night, attended with danger.

During my service as corps officer-of-the-day, in March, 1864, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Townsend (106th N. Y.), in charge of the grand-guard on the Sperryville road, in violation of orders, admitted some refugee ladies, who presented a pass from an officer of an outer cavalry picket. The orders were to recognize no pass for a citizen not emanating from army headquarters. The Colonel reported the occurrence to me, and I disapproved his action, but made no report of it. The ladies, on some errand, reached headquarters, and told of their admittance on this road. Meade ordered me to report the delinquent officer, which I did, giving all excuses I could for him, but they were unavailing. I was ordered to prefer charges against Colonel Townsend, "for disobedience of orders." A general court-martial was called for his trial, of which General D. B. Birney was President, and, notwithstanding I had preferred the charges, I was made a member of it.

On the trial I protested my interest and asked the court to excuse me from sitting, but my request was refused. The court found Townsend guilty and sentenced him: "To be suspended from rank and pay for two months." This sentence was approved by General Meade, April 1st, but Townsend's suspension from rank was remitted, and he was ordered to duty. He was a gallant and accomplished officer, and, feeling keenly the disgrace, rushed to his death at Cold Harbor just after the sixty days' suspension of pay elapsed. The incident illustrates the severity of discipline and the fate of war.

The soldiers of the army, as far as possible, were kept active, but the cold winter, with frequent rains, caused much discomfort, and many were in hospital; few were furloughed. Many rude log chapels were erected and used, often alternately, for religious worship, lectures, concerts, readings, and dances. Civilian visitors were, at times, numerous. One most notable army ball was given at the headquarters of General Joseph B. Carr. This event took place January 25, 1864, and was attended generally by officers of the army, by some military officials from Washington and elsewhere, by officers' wives and their friends visiting the army, and by invited ladies and gentlemen from Washington, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore. Over four thousand attended. The ball was held in large communicating tents, erected for the purpose. Ample floors were laid for promenades and dancing. Dinner was provided, where everything obtainable from land or sea was served, with liquors and wines without stint. The night was entirely devoted to it. It was brilliant beyond descriptions. To hundreds it was their last ball, or appearance in social life.

Notwithstanding the necessarily promiscuous character of the participants, and though no scandal attended it, and all decorum usual on such occasions was observed, it was at the time the subject of much severe criticism through the press, from the pulpit, and by people generally. General Carr and his good wife were adepts in social affairs, and are entitled to the distinction of having assembled and directed the most numerously attended ball of its kind ever held in the United States.

Horse racing and other sports were indulged in, especially by the cavalry. But all these were mere diversions, and did not indicate that the army was not preparing for the bloody work yet ahead of it.

Grant, with the armies under General George H. Thomas, W. T. Sherman, and Joseph Hooker, November 25, 1863, drove Bragg from his perch on Missionary Ridge and to a precipitate retreat, and the Army of the Tennessee under Sherman subsequently relieved Burnside, besieged at Knoxville by Longstreet, thus closing the campaigns of 1863 in the West about the time they closed in the East. Soon thereafter rumors were current that Grant was to be promoted to chief command of all the Union armies. A law passed Congress February 29, 1864, reviving the grade of Lieutenant-General, and President Lincoln, the next day, appointed Ulysses S. Grant to the office, and the Senate, the succeeding day, confirmed the appointment. March 10, 1864, Halleck was relieved from duty as General-in-Chief, and became thereafter Chief of Staff of the Army. Grant was, the same day, assigned by the President, "pursuant to the act of Congress, to command the Armies of the United States," headquarters of the Army to be in Washington, and "with General Grant in the field." Grant established his field-headquarters at Culpeper Court-House, March 26, 1864, and remained with the Army of the Potomac until Appomattox came. Just prior to his joining the Army of the Potomac, March 23, 1864, it was reorganized, the First and Third Corps being broken up as separate organizations, and the troops composing them distributed to the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps, they retaining their former corps badges. Hancock resumed command of the Second Corps. Warren was assigned to command the Fifth. Carr was transferred to the Second. The Third Division, Third Corps, became the Third Division of the Sixth (Sedgwick's) Corps, the old Third Division of the Sixth being consolidated with its other divisions.

General H. Prince was assigned to command the Third Division of the Sixth. The Second Brigade (Keifer's) of this division, with the 126th Ohio (Colonel Smith) and the 67th Pennsylvania (Colonel Staunton) added, was placed under the command of General David A. Russell,(11) but he was soon transferred to another command, and Colonel B. F. Smith for a time succeeded him. Major-General James B. Ricketts, before April 30, 1864, relieved General Prince, and thereafter the Third Division of the Sixth Corps was known as "Ricketts' Division."

Much bad feeling existed on the part of Generals French, Sykes, Newton, and others over the breaking up of their commands and their being relieved from field duty. The consolidation of divisions and brigades in the corps retained, also caused much discontent, and excited jealousies towards the organizations from the disbanded corps which took their old designations. This was the second time troops I commanded had this experience. While in camp or on marches an officer may become disliked by his men, but a great battle in which he does his duty will always restore him to popularity. The Third Corps badge was a diamond; the Sixth a Greek cross. The Third Division for a time adhered to the diamond, but later, wore both proudly, and finally rejoiced alone under the Greek cross.

The Army of the Potomac was for the first time reduced to three corps. There was, however, belonging to this army, a large artillery reserve, not attached to any corps, but under a chief, General Henry J. Hunt; also a cavalry corps, consisting of three divisions and a reserve brigade, which Major-General Philip H. Sheridan was assigned (April 5, 1864) to command.(12) To each corps was attached an artillery brigade. This army, like any other well-appointed one, also had (each with a chief officer) its Commissary, Quartermaster, Ordnance, and Medical Departments; also a Provost-Guard, consisting of a brigade of infantry and a regiment of cavalry under a Provost Marshal-General;(13) also Signal and Engineer Corps, and other minor and somewhat independent organizations, such as body-guards to commanding generals, pioneers, pontoniers, etc.

The Army of the Potomac, thus organized, commanded, and appointed, with the new commander of all the armies of the Union with it, now awaited good weather to enter upon the bloodiest campaign civilized man has ever witnessed.

( 1) See sketch attached to Meade's report, War Records, vol. xxix, Part I., p. 19.

( 2) War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 738.

( 3) Birney's Report, War Records, vol. xxvii., Part I., p. 750.

( 4) He died of disease October 18, 1864.

( 5) War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., pp. 836-8.

( 6) War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 19. (Sketch).

( 7) War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 686.

( 8) Battles and Leaders, vol. iii., p. 241 (Col. Venable).

( 9) War Records, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 18.

(10) Botts was then on his farm—a Union man. He had been an old line Whig, and was personally hostile to Jeff. Davis.

(11) War Records, vol. xxxiii., pp. 717, 722, 732, 745.

(12) Ibid., 798, 806.

(13) A badge for each fighting corps of the Union Army was adopted (January, 1863), its color indicating the number of the division in a corps. Three divisions of three brigades each usually constituted a corps. Each officer and soldier wore on his hat or cap his proper corps badge; the first division being red, second white, and third blue. The badge appeared prominently in the centre of all headquarters flags. Division flags were square, brigade, tri-cornered, all of white ground save those of a second division which were blue; the flag of a second brigade had a red border next to the pole, and of a third brigade a red border on all sides.

CHAPTER VI Plans of Campaigns, Union and Confederate—Campaign and Battle of the Wilderness, May, 1864—Author Wounded, and Personal Matters— Movements of the Army to the James River, with Mention of Battles of Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Other Engagements, and Statement of Losses and Captures

A full detailed history of the great campaign of the Wilderness and of the many battles fought in the spring and summer of 1864 in Southeast Virginia and around Richmond and Petersburg will not here be attempted. I shall confine myself to a general story of the campaign, with dates, results of engagements and losses, and some details of the fighting participated in by troops I was immediately connected with or interested in.

General Grant (April 9, 1864), in a confidential communication to General Meade,( 1) outlined his plan for the early movements of all the principal Union armies. Texas was to be abandoned, save on the Rio Grande, and General Banks, then on Red River, was to concentrate a force, not less than 25,000 strong, at New Orleans to move on Mobile. Sherman was to leave Chattanooga at the same time Meade moved, "Joe Johnston's army being his objective point and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim"; if successful, Sherman was to "secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile, with the aid of Banks." General Franz Sigel (then in command of the Department of West Virginia ( 2)), was to start two columns, one from Beverly under General Ord, to endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad west of Lynchburg, and the other from Charleston, West Virginia, under General George Crook, to strike at Saltville and go thence eastward to join Ord. General Quincy A. Gilmore was to be transferred, with 10,000 men, from South Carolina to General B. F. Butler at Fortress Monroe, and the latter General was to organize a force of about 23,000 men, under the immediate command of General W. F. Smith, with which, and Gilmore's command, he should "seize City Point and operate against Richmond from the south side of the river," moving simultaneously with Meade's army. To Meade he said: "Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes there you will go also." General Burnside, then at Annapolis organizing the Ninth Army Corps, was to reinforce Meade with probably 25,000 men. There was to be naval co-operation on the James. Grant had not then determined on which flank to attack Lee, or whether he would cross the Rapidan above or below the Confederate Army.

Previous Part     1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15     Next Part
Home - Random Browse