On assuming command, I called the officers of the regiment together and explained to them their duties as well as my own, and especially informed each company commander that he would be required to qualify himself to command his company, and that all times he would be held responsible for its soldierly conduct. A school of officers was established, and the whole camp soon wore a military aspect. The work thus commenced in time transformed these raw volunteers into officers and soldiers as good as ever fought in any war or country.( 1)

The environments of Camp Piqua were not favorable to discipline, but on October 19, 1862, the regiment took cars and proceeded via Columbus to Zanesville, thence by water to Marietta, and from the latter place on foot to Parkersburg, West Virginia, where it first occupied and camped in what was called the enemy's country. An early but severe snow-storm came during the first night of our encampment, and suggested the hardship and suffering which were not to cease until the final victory at Appomattox. Drill and discipline went on satisfactorily. New troops will bravely stand to their work in battle if they can be manoeuvred successfully, and also know how to use their arms. General J. D. Cox, in command of the District of West Virginia, with his uniform courtesy welcomed me by telegraph to my new field of operations. In a few days I was ordered to Clarksburg and to a section familiar to me when serving under McClellan.

At Parkersburg I first me the 122d Ohio Infantry, commanded by Col. Wm. H. Ball. He was my junior in date of muster eight days and, consequently, in more than two years our regiments served together, I generally commanded him. He was not an educated soldier, and did not aspire to become one, nor did he take pains to appear well on drill or on parade, yet he was a most valuable officer, loyal and intelligently brave, possessing enough mental capacity to successfully fill any position. He did not aspire to high command, but at all times faithfully performed his duty in camp and on the battle-field. His loyalty to me, while my senior in years, still claims my gratitude.

His regiment, like the volunteer regiments generally, had in it many men who became prominent in the war, and, still later, in peace. Lieutenant-Colonel Moses M. Granger was a most accomplished officer, and deserved a higher rank. In addition to the distinction won by him as a soldier he has attained a high reputation as a citizen, lawyer, and jurist.

The first surgeon (Thaddeus A. Reamy) of the 122d, though not long in the field, has taken a first place in his profession, as has also its next surgeon, Wm. M. Houston, and its assistant surgeon, Wilson G. Bryant. Its chaplain, Charles C. McCabe, was one of the best and most efficient in the war. His zeal in the performance, under all circumstances, of the high duties of his office, and his cheerful disposition, aided in trying times to keep up the spirits and courage of the soldiers. He ministered to the wounded and the dying on the battlefield, and to the sick and disabled in hospital. He was famed throughout the armies he served with for singing at appropriate times, with a strong, melodious voice, patriotic and religious songs, in which, often even on the march, a large part of the army would join.

He has since achieved success in the Methodist Episcopal Church, in which he is now a bishop. William T. Meloy, D. D., of the United Presbyterian Church—now in Chicago—was a lieutenant in this regiment. He has become eminent for his learning and high character. Those named of these companion regiments are examples only of others who voluntarily and heroically endured the trying ordeal of war.

A false report that Stonewall Jackson was threatening a raid on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad at New Creek (now Keyser), West Virginia, caused a precipitate transfer by rail of my command to that place. There I came first under the direct command of Major- General Robert H. Milroy, then distinguished for his zeal for the Union and for personal bravery. He was tall and of commanding presence. His head of white, shocky, stiff hair led his soldiers to dub him the "Gray Eagle." He had much military learning, and had fought in many of the bloodiest battles of the war, notably at the second Bull Run under Pope. He had seen service also in the Mexican War. Notwithstanding his excessive impetuosity, he was a just, generous, kind-hearted man, and possessed the confidence of his troops to a high degree. He incurred the ill-will of Secretary of War Stanton, and, regarding himself as unjustly treated, more than reciprocated the Secretary's dislike. He ardently admired President Lincoln, and only criticised him for delay in emancipating the slaves. He believed the slaves of those in rebellion should have been given their freedom from the beginning of the war. He was so bitterly hostile to slavery and to individual Secessionists, and so radical in his methods, that Jefferson Davis, by proclamation, excepted him and his officers from being treated, if captured, as prisoners of war. He was charged with making assessments on inhabitants and of requiring them to take an oath to support the Constitution and the Union. He also had the distinction of being mentioned by Davis in a Message to the Confederate Congress, January 12, 1863. There was much correspondence between the opposing authorities on the subject of his mode of conducting the war,( 2) and it seems General Halleck disavowed and condemned Milroy's alleged acts. Much charged against Milroy was false, though it was true he believed in prosecuting the war with an iron hand. He regarded the Confederate soldier in the field with more favor than the Confederate stay-at-home who acted as a spy, or who, as a guerilla, engaged in shooting from ambush passing soldiers or teamsters and cutting telegraph wires. He did require certain influential persons who resided within his lines to take an oath of allegiance to the United States and to West Virginia or to forfeit all right to the protection of his division. Further than this he did not go.

At New Creek I first met G. P. Cluseret, a French soldier of fortune, but recently appointed a Brigadier-General. He held a command under Milroy in the Cheat Mountain Division. He assumed much military and other learning, was imperious and overbearing by nature, spoke English imperfectly, and did not seem to desire to get in touch with volunteers. With him I had my only personal difficulty of a serious nature during the war.

At New Creek a constant drill was kept up. To avoid surprises by sudden dashes, the companies as well as the battalion were taught to form squares quickly and to guard against cavalry. Early in December Milroy marched to Little Petersburg, on the South Branch of the Potomac, and I was assigned to command a post at Moorefield to include Hardy County, West Virginia, Milroy's headquarters being ten miles distant. General Lee ordered General W. E. Jones, then temporarily in command in the Shenandoah Valley, to retake the county we occupied. A feeble effort to do this failed. We were kept constantly on the alert, however, by annoying attacks of Captain McNeil's irregular cavalry or guerillas. Late in December, 1862, it was decided to make a raid into the lower Shenandoah Valley, and, if found practicable, occupy it permanently. I was designated to lead the raid with about two thousand infantry, cavalry, and artillery. This made it necessary for me to be relieved of the command of the post. Cluseret was therefore ordered from Petersburg to relieve me. He arrived late in the evening with his staff and escort, showed his orders, and I suggested that he assume the command at once. This he declined to do until he ascertained the position of the troops, roads, etc. I provided him comfortable quarters, and everything would have gone along pleasantly but for an unexpected incident.

Before Cluseret's arrival, a lieutenant-colonel of a West Virginia regiment applied for leave to go to Petersburg to visit a lady friend. This I refused, and he undertook to go without leave. After he had proceeded along the river road by moonlight about three miles, he was halted by a man who, from behind a tree, pointed a musket at him and demanded his surrender and that he deliver up his sword, pistols, overcoat, horse, and trappings, all of which he did promptly, and accepted a parole. The man who made the capture claimed to be a regular Confederate soldier returning from a furlough to his command. With the colonel's property and on the horse he proceeded by a mountain path on his journey. The colonel walked back to Moorefield and related his adventure. I at once ordered Captain Rowan with a small number of his West Virginia cavalry to pursue the Confederate. As there was snow on the ground, his pursuit was easy, and before midnight the Captain had captured him and all the colonel's property was returned to Moorefield. When the man was brought before me, I made some examination of him and then ordered him taken to the guard-house. At this time Cluseret appeared on the scene, and in an excited way demanded that I should order the prisoner to be shot forthwith. This being declined, he again produced his order to supersede me, and declared he would at once take command and himself order the man shot that night. I could not deny his right to assume command notwithstanding what had taken place, but I strongly denied his authority to shoot the captive, and insisted that there was no cause for shooting him summarily; that only through a court-martial or military commission could he be condemned, and a sentence to death would, to carry it out, require the approval of the President. (It was not until later in the war that department, district, or army commanders could approve a capital sentence.) Cluseret vehemently denounced the authorities, including the President, for their mild way of carrying on the war, and talked himself into a frenzy. As he was preparing an order to require the Provost-Marshal to shoot the man without trial, I repaired to the telegraph office and made Milroy acquainted with the situation, whereupon he ordered me to retain command of the post until further orders. Milroy, on coming to Moorefield the next day, sustained me, and the soldier was treated as an ordinary prisoner of war. Cluseret pretended to be satisfied, and later succeeded in getting himself assigned to command the expedition to the Shenandoah Valley—not a very desirable one in mid-winter. He reached Strasburg, and moved through the Valley northward to Winchester, but was pursued by a small force under Jones. This made it necessary to reinforce him, and I started under orders for that place via Romney and Blue's Gap, and was joined on the way by Milroy with the body of his division. On leaving Moorefield, on the 30th of December, I with two orderlies rode ahead about a mile to the South Branch of the Potomac to examine the ford, as we had no pontoons, and, having crossed the river, awaited the approach of the wagon train and its guard, which was to take the advance, as no enemy was known to be in that direction. As the head of the train reached the ford Captain J. H. McNeil (whose home was near by), with about fifty of his guerilla band, attacked it by emerging from ambush on the Moorefield side of the river. A short fight ensued, during which I recrossed the river and joined in it. McNeil was driven off with little loss, but for a brief time I was in much danger of capture, at least.

On this day a colored boy, an escaped slave, whom we named Andrew Jackson, joined me. He became my servant to the end of the war. He was always faithful, honest, good-natured, and brave. He was a full-blood African, and during a battle would voluntarily take a soldier's arms and fight with the advance lines. He became widely known throughout the Army of the Potomac and other armies in which I served, and was kindly treated and welcomed wherever he went. He resided after the war in Springfield, Ohio, and died there (1895) of an injury resulting from the kick of a horse.

On the night of December 31, 1862, the command bivouacked on the western slope of the Alleghany Mountains in a fierce snow-storm, and early the next morning my troops led the way in the continuing storm over the summit. Shortly after the head of the column commenced the eastern descent, and when the chilling winter blasts had caused the lowest ebb of human enthusiasm to be reached, shouts were heard by me, at first indistinctly, then nearer and louder. This was so unusual and unexpected under the depressing circumstances that I ordered the column to halt until I could go back and ascertain the cause. My first impression was that a sudden attack had been made on the rear of the troops, but as the shouts came nearer I took them to be for a great victory, news of which had just arrived. When I reached the crest of the mountain I descried, through the flying snow, General Milroy riding along the line of troops and halting at intervals as though to briefly address the men. I awaited his approach, and on his arrival accosted him with the inquiry, "What is the matter, General?" He had his hat and sword in his right hand, and with the other guided his horse at a reckless gallop through the snow, his tall form, shocky white hair fluttering in the storm, and evident agitation making a figure most picturesque and striking. He pulled up his horse abruptly to answer my question. A natural impediment in his speech, affecting him most when excited, caused some delay in his first vehement utterance. He said:

"Colonel, don't you know that this is Emancipation Day, when all slaves will be made free?"

He then turned to the halted troops and again broke forth:

"This day President Lincoln will proclaim the freedom of four millions of human slaves, the most important event in the history of the world since Christ was born. Our boast that this is a land of liberty has been a flaunting lie. Henceforth it will be a veritable reality. The defeats of our armies in the past we have deserved, because we waged a war to protect and perpetuate and to rivet firmer the chains of slavery. Hereafter we shall prosecute the war to establish and perpetuate liberty for all mankind beneath the flag; and the Lord God Almighty will fight on our side, and he is a host, and the Union armies will triumph."

This is the character of speech that aroused the soldiers to voiceful demonstrations on the summit of the Appalachian chain on this cold and stormy mid-winter morning. The sequel shows how Milroy's prophecy was fulfilled; but not always did victory come to the Union arms. As in the days of the Crusades, when the Lord was supposed to battle on the side of the Crusaders, victory was not uniformly with them. Charles Martel, believing in prayer for divine aid on going into battle, yet testified that the "Lord always fights on the side of the heaviest battalions"; which was only another way of saying, "The Lord helps those who help themselves."

Milroy's command debouched into the Valley of the Shenandoah, already memorable for its many bloody conflicts, and destined to become yet more memorable by reason of still other and far bloodier battles.

This war-stricken valley, from Staunton to the Potomac, was beautiful and rich, and its inhabitants were, prior to the war, proud and boastful; they possessed many slaves to till the soil and for personal servants. It was also a breeding-ground for slaves which, in a more southern market, brought great profit to their owners. Winchester was the home of the Masons and others, distinguished as statesmen and soldiers through all the history of Virginia.

But not all the inhabitants of the Shenandoah valley were disloyal. A majority of its voting population was, before the war actually commenced, in favor of the Union, and its Representatives voted against an Ordinance of Secession. I have seen an address of Philip Williams, Esq., an old, respected, and distinguished lawyer of Winchester, made when the question of Secession was pending, in which he attempted to depict the horrors of the war that would follow an attempt to set up an independent government. He prophesied that the valley would be a battle-ground for the contending hosts; that the fields would be overrun, the crops destroyed, grain and stock confiscated; and the slaves carried off and set free. His address brought him for a time into ridicule. He lived to see his word-picture appear as only a vain, faint representation of the reality. When the war came, and his sons and friends joined the Confederate Army, his sympathies were with the South. He often recurred, however, to his more than fulfilled prophecy. He lived to see the valley for ninety or more miles of its length reek with blood; the houses, whether in city or village, turned into hospitals, and the war-lit fires of burning mills, barns, and grain stacks illuminate the valley and the mountain slopes to the summits of the Blue Ridge and the Alleghanies on its east and west. Pen cannot adequately describe the hell of agony, desolation, and despair witnessed in this fertile region in the four years of war; and long before the conflict ended not a human slave was held therein. It, however, has long since, under a new civilization, recovered its wonted prosperity, and no inhabitant thereof, though many are the sons and daughters of slaveholders, desires to again hold slaves. Not all the affluent ante-bellum inhabitants of this valley owned slaves or believed in slavery. Many were Quakers, others Dunkards (or Tunkers), all of whom were, by religious training and conviction, opposed to human slavery, hence opposed to Secession and a slave power. Some of the younger men of Quaker or Dunkard families through compulsion joined the Confederate Army, but the number was small. Though opposed to war, no more loyal Union people could be found anywhere. Their Secession neighbors called them "Tories," and the Quakers descendants of Tories of the Revolution. It was common to hear related the story of the imprisonment at Winchester, under General Washington's order, of certain Quakers of Philadelphia, claimed to have been Tories, who were given a twenty-mile prison- bound limit, and who, when peace came, coveting the rich lands of the valley, and being humiliated over their imprisonment, sent for their families and settled there permanently. Whether or not this story gives the true reason for the early settlement of the Quakers in Virginia, certain it is that they were loyal to the Union that Washington helped to found and opposed to human bondage.

Milroy's enthusiasm over Emancipation was put in practice when he entered Winchester. Without seeing the Proclamation of the President, and without knowing certainly it was issued and made applicable to the Shenandoah Valley district, Milroy issued a proclamation headed, "Freedom to Slaves." This had the effect of causing those within the lines of his command at once to leave their masters. Though the slaves could not read, not one failed during the succeeding night to hear that liberty had been proclaimed, and all, even to the most trusted and faithful personal or house servant, regardless of age, sex, or previous kind treatment, so far as known, asserted their freedom. In some way it had been inculcated into the minds of these people that if they, by word or act, however simple or unimportant it might be, after the Proclamation acquiesced in their previous condition they would again for life become slaves. They probably derived this notion from the Bible story of Hebrew slavery, wherein it is said that after six years' service the slave should become free, save when, preferring slavery, he voluntarily permitted his former master to bore his ears with an awl at the door-post and thus consecrate himself to slavery forever.( 3)

So it turned out that many aristocratic matrons and maidens, reared in luxury and accustomed to the personal service of servants, had to cook their own breakfasts or go hungry, as no amount of persuasion, kind treatment, or promises would induce the former slave to do the least act that by possibility could be construed to be an acquiescence in a previous condition of servitude. Even the assurance of a Union officer could not shake their position. The "Year of Jubilee," of which they had sung in their hearts, had been long coming for them, and there was no use for awls and door-posts for their ears, nor were they going to take chances. Many of them, though offered food for their own use by their masters, would not cook it, lest it might be construed as a recognition of a master's continuing authority over them. Most of them gathered up their little property with marvellous dispatch and presented themselves ready to emigrate. General Milroy used the otherwise empty trains going north for supplies to carry these freed people from the land of their birth to where a slave condition could not overtake them. Most of the knew the story of John Brown, and many of them had, in some way, been supplied with cheap wood-cut pictures of this early champion of their liberty. In some way they had learned also to sing songs of John Brown, and other songs of liberty. When the trains proceeded towards the Potomac freighted with these people they commingled songs of freedom and the religious hymns peculiar to their race with the universal but more cheerful music of the fiddle and banjo.

They were light-hearted and free from care, though abandoning all of home they had ever known, and going whither, for home and protection, they knew not,—all was compensated for with them, if only they were forever free. The prompt emancipation of slaves was exceptional in the Shenandoah Valley, especially at Winchester. Most of these freed people soon found homes and employment, some of the younger men with the army, later as soldiers, and others on farms, or as house servants North, where the war had called away the able-bodied men. It was not until after the war that the great trials of the freedmen came.

It must not be assumed that the slave owners in the Valley were, in war times at least, cruel to their slaves; on the contrary, kindness and indulgence were the rule. This was probably true in ante-war days, save when members of families were sold and separated to be transported to distant parts. I recall no word of censure to the blacks for accepting freedom. Pity was in some cases expressed. Tokens of remembrance were offered and accepted with emotion. Those who had been house or personal servants often evinced feelings of compassion for the pitiable and helpless condition of those whom they had so long served. It must be remembered that, regardless of estates once owned, the war had impoverished the people of this Valley, and but few of them could, even with money, secure enough food, clothing, and help to enable them to live in anything approaching comfort. And the future then had no promise of relief.

The plight of some of the affluent people might well excite sympathy. I remember an excellent Winchester family of four ladies, a mother and three grown daughters, who were educated and accomplished, unused to work, and thus far wholly dependent on their slaves. White or black servants could not, after the Proclamation, be procured for money. These ladies therefore held a consultation to determine what could be done. The mother would not attempt to do what she deemed menial service. The daughters at length decided to work "week about," and in this way each could be a lady two weeks out of three. This plan seemed to operate well, and they soon became quite cheerful over it, and boastful of domestic accomplishments.

Cluseret while on his raid into the Valley brooded over the incident which resulted in his being prevented from taking command of the post at Moorefield, and pretended to believe that I had wronged him. He went so far as to talk freely to officers about the incident, and to declare that if he should meet me again he would shoot me unless I made amends. These threats came to me on my arrival at Winchester, and my friends seemed to apprehend serious consequences. As I always deprecated personal conflicts, and was careful to avoid them, I was somewhat annoyed. I knew little of Cluseret or his character, except that he was an adventurer or soldier of fortune. I announced nothing as to what I should do if he attempted to assault me, but I took pains to carry a revolver with which I purposed, if attacked, to kill him if possible before I received any serious injury. I soon met, saluted, and passed him without receiving and recognition in return except a fierce, vicious stare. After this, on several occasions, I passed him about the camps or on the roads without noticing him, and although his threats were repeated I was not molested by him. Soon the incident and his subsequent conduct led to some trouble between him and Milroy. Milroy placed him in arrest, and he was later ordered from the command. On March 2, 1863, he was permitted to resign, having served as a Brigadier-General of Volunteers from October 11, 1862, and having previously, from March 10, 1862, been a Colonel and acting aide-de-camp. He repaired to New York, and there did some newspaper work in which he assailed President Lincoln and the conduct of the war, and subsequently disappeared. Afterwards he became the Secretary of War of the Commune in Paris, near the close of the Franco-Prussian War. He escaped from Paris at its close, and years later, being pardoned, he returned to France, and is now, I am informed, a Socialist member of the Chamber of Deputies.

There were many such adventurers as Cluseret from foreign countries who received commissions in our volunteer army on account of their supposed military knowledge or experience, who almost without exception proved failures or worse. They were generally domineering, and of a temperament not suited to command the American volunteer soldier. They had, in fact, no affinity with him, and did not gain his confidence. This was not true, however, of General John B. Turchin, the Russian, and perhaps a very few others.

Milroy's command during the winter was chiefly engaged in holding the Valley and in protecting the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from the raids of small bodies of Confederates. In this it was successful. We were now in the Middle Department, commanded by General Robert C. Schenck, whose headquarters were at Baltimore. Schenck was appointed a Brigadier-General of Volunteers May 17, 1861, and a Major-General August 30, 1862. Prior to his assignment to this department he served with distinction in the Eastern army, and was elected to Congress in 1862, but retained his commission until Congress met, December 5, 1863. Schenck, though without military education or experience, was a man of military instincts and possessed many of the high qualities of a soldier. He was a trained statesman, lawyer, and thinker, and an earnest, energetic, forceful, successful man.

For the most part, while at Winchester I commanded a brigade composed of infantry and artillery, located on the heights, but I was for a time under Brigadier-General Washington L. Elliott, a regular officer, who was amiable and capable in all that pertained to military discipline, but timid and unenterprising. He performed all duty faithfully to orders, but little further. Milroy, on the other hand, was restless and constantly on the alert, eager to achieve all it was possible for his command to accomplish, hence we were frequently sent on raids up the Valley to Staunton, Front Royal, and through the mountains. Colonel Mosby's guerillas infested the country east of the Valley, and frequently dashed into it through the gaps of the Blue Ridge and attacked our supply trains and small scouting parties and pickets, accomplishing little save to keep us on the alert.

Imboden and Jenkins' cavalry held the upper valley in the neighborhood of Mount Jackson and New Market, but generally retired without fighting when an expedition moved against them. As we were in the enemy's country, our movements were generally made known promptly to the Confederates, and our expeditions usually proved fruitless of substantial results. I led a force of about one thousand men in January, 1863, to Front Royal, then held by a small cavalry force which I hoped to surprise and capture, but I succeeded in doing nothing more than take a few prisoners and drive the enemy from the place, with little fighting. We took Front Royal late in the evening of a very cold night, and decided to hold it until the next day. Not being sure of our strength, and to avoid a surprise, I was obliged to keep my men on duty throughout the night. A feeble attack only was made on us at daybreak.

Illustrating the way Union officers were regarded and treated by the Secession inhabitants, I recall an incident which occurred at Front Royal. A member of my staff arranged for supper at the house of Colonel Bacon, an old man and Secessionist. The Colonel treated us politely, but while we were eating a number of ladies of the town assembled in an adjoining parlor in which there was a piano, threw the communicating door open, and proceeded to sing such Confederate war-songs as Stonewall Jackson's Away and My Maryland. We of course accepted good humoredly this concert for our benefit, but when we had finished supper, uninvited, Chaplain McCabe—now Bishop McCabe—and I stepped into the parlor. We were not even offered a seat, and in a short time the music ceased and the lady at the piano left it. Chaplain McCabe at once seated himself at the piano, and, to the amazement of the ladies, commenced singing, with his extraordinarily strong, sonorous voice, "We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more." The ladies stood their ground courageously for a time, but while the Chaplain, playing his own accompaniment, was singing My Maryland, with words descriptive of Lee's invasion and retreat from Maryland, including the words, "And they left Antietam in their track, in their track," the ladies threw open the front door and rushed precipitately to the street and thence to their homes. It was afterwards said that we were ungallant to these ladies.

While at Winchester, besides the usual camp duty and participation in an occasional raid, I was President of a Military Commission composed of three officers, with an officer for recorder. It was modelled on the military commission first established, I believe, by General Scott in Mexico for the trial of citizens for offences not punishable under the Articles of War. There was a necessity for some authority to take jurisdiction of common law crimes, as all courts in the valley were suspended. Besides citizens charged with such crimes, there were referred to the commission for trial citizens charged with offences against the Union Army, such as shooting soldiers from ambush, etc. The constitutionality of the commission was questioned, yet it tried on only formal charges citizens charged with murder, larceny, burglary, arson, and breaches of the peace. Generally its findings and sentences were approved by the War Department or the President, even when the accused was sentenced to imprisonment in a Northern penitentiary. There were one or two cases where the accused were sentenced to be shot, but in no case did the President allow such a sentence to be carried out. During the trial for murder of an old man by the name of Buffenbarger, I learned that he had, at Sharpsburg, Maryland, been a friend of my father when both were young men.( 4) It turned out that Buffenbarger had killed a young and powerful man who had assaulted him violently without good cause. A majority of the commission found him guilty of manslaughter, and the commission gave him the lightest sentence—one year in a penitentiary. His early friendship for my father perhaps caused me to find grounds on which to favor his acquittal. Counsel were allowed in all cases; generally Philip Williams, Esq., an old and distinguished lawyer of Winchester, represented the accused, and Captain Zebulon Baird, Judge-Advocate on Milroy's staff (an able Indiana lawyer), appeared for the prosecution.

( 1) For special mention of the officers of this regiment, see Appendix B.

( 2) War Records, vol. xxi., p. 1054.

( 3) Ex. xxi., 6; Deut. xv., 17.

( 4) My father, Joseph Keifer, was born at Sharpsburg, February 28, 1784.

SLAVERY AND FOUR YEARS OF WAR

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES

TOGETHER WITH A NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGNS AND BATTLES OF THE CIVIL WAR IN WHICH THE AUTHOR TOOK PART: 1861-1865

BY JOSEPH WARREN KEIFER BREVET MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS; EX-SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U. S. A.; AND MAJOR-GENERAL OF VOLUNTEERS, SPANISH WAR.

ILLUSTRATED

VOLUME II. 1863-1865

G. P. Putnam's Sons New York and London The Knickerbocker Press 1900

Copyright, 1900

BY JOSEPH WARREN KEIFER

The Knickerbocker Press, New York

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I General Observations on Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville —Battles at Winchester under General Milroy—His Defeat and Retreat to Harper's Ferry—With Incidents

CHAPTER II Invasion of Pennsylvania—Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg—Lee's Retreat Across the Potomac, and Losses on Both Sides

CHAPTER III New York Riots, 1863—Pursuit of Lee's Army to the Rappahannock—Action of Wapping Heights, and Skirmishes—Western Troops Sent to New York to Enforce the Draft—Their Return—Incidents, etc.

CHAPTER IV Advance of Lee's Army, October, 1863, and Retreat of the Army of the Potomac to Centreville—Battle of Bristoe Station—Advance of the Union Army, November, 1863—Assault and Capture of Rappahannock Station, and Forcing the Fords—Affair Near Brandy Station, and Retreat of Confederate Army Behind the Rapidan—Incidents, etc.

CHAPTER V Mine Run Campaign and Battle of Orange Grove, November, 1863—Winter Cantonment (1863-4) of Army of the Potomac at Culpeper Court-House, and its Reorganization—Grant Assigned to Command the Union Armies, and Preparation for Aggressive War

CHAPTER VI Plans of Campaigns, Union and Confederate—Campaign and Battle of the Wilderness, May, 1864—Author Wounded, and Personal Matters— Movements of the Army to the James River, with Mention of Battles of Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, and Other Engagements, and Statement of Losses and Captures

CHAPTER VII Campaign South of James River and Petersburg—Hunter's Raid—Battle of Monocacy—Early's Advance on Washington (1864)—Sheridan's Movements in Shenandoah Valley, and Other Events

CHAPTER VIII Personal Mention of Generals Sheridan, Wright, and Ricketts, and Mrs. Ricketts; also Generals Crook and Hayes—Battle of Opequon, under Sheridan, September 1864, and Incidents

CHAPTER IX Battle of Fisher's Hill—Pursuit of Early—Devastation of the Shenandoah Valley (1864)—Cavalry Battle at Tom's Brook, and Minor Events

CHAPTER X Battle of Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864, with Comments thereon— also Personal Mention and Incidents

CHAPTER XI Peace Negotiations—Lee's Suggestion to Jefferson Davis, 1862— Fernando Wood's Correspondence with Mr. Lincoln, 1862—Mr. Stephens at Fortress Monroe, 1863—Horace Greeley, Niagara Falls Conference, 1864—Jacquess-Gilmore's Visits to Richmond, 1863-4—F. P. Blair, Sen., Conferences with Mr. Davis, 1865—Hampton Roads Conference, Mr. Lincoln and Seward and Stephens and Others, 1865—Ord-Longstreet, Lee and Grant, Correspondence, 1865; and Lew Wallace and General Slaughter, Point Isabel Conference, 1865

CHAPTER XII Siege of Richmond and Petersburg—Capture and Recapture of Fort Stedman, and Capture of Part of Enemy's First Line in Front of Petersburg by Keifer's Brigade, March 25, 1865—Battle of Five Forks, April 1st—Assault and Taking of Confederate Works on the Union Left, April 2d—Surrender of Richmond and Petersburg, April 3d—President Lincoln's Visit to Petersburg and Richmond, and His Death

CHAPTER XIII Battle of Sailor's Creek, April 6th—Capitulation of General Robert E. Lee's Army at Appomattox Court-House, April 9, 1865—Surrender of Other Confederate Armies, and End of the War of The Rebellion

APPENDICES

A General Keifer Ancestry and Life before the Civil War Public Services in Civil Life Service in Spanish War

B Mention of Officers of the 110th Ohio Volunteer Infantry

C Farewell Order of General Keifer in Civil War Casualties in Keifer's Brigade

D Correspondence between Generals Wright and Keifer Relating to Battle of Sailor's Creek

E Letter of General Keifer to General Corbin on Cuba

F List of Officers who Served on General Keifer's Staff in Spanish War

G Farewell Order of General Keifer in Spanish War

ILLUSTRATIONS

Major-General George Gordon Meade, U.S.A., August 18, 1864

Brigadier-General Wesley Merritt [From a photograph taken 1864.]

Major-General Robert C. Schenck [From a photograph taken 1863.]

Major-General Frank Wheaton [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Brevet Brigadier-General J. Warren Keifer [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Major-General William H. French [From a photograph taken 1863.]

Map of Orange Grove Battle-Field, Mine Run, Va. [November 27, 1863.]

Brevet Brigadier-General John W. Horn, Sixth Maryland Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1864.]

Brevet Brigadier-General M. R. McClennan, 138th Pennsylvania Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1864.]

Brigadier-General Joseph B. Carr [From a photograph taken since the war.]

Colonel James W. Snyder, Ninth New York Heavy Artillery [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Major Wm. S. McElwain, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1863.]

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Aaron Spangler, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1863.]

Major-General Horatio G. Wright [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Major-General James B. Ricketts [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Fanny Ricketts [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Captain Wm. A. Hathaway, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1863.]

Brevet Major Jonathan T. Rorer, 138th Pennsylvania Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1865.]

General Philip H. Sheridan, U.S.A. [From a photograph taken 1885.]

Battle-Field of Opequon, Va. [September 19, 1864. From the official map, 1873.]

Brevet Major-General Rutherford B. Hayes [From a photograph taken from a painting.]

Brevet Colonel Moses M. Granger, 122d Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1864.]

Lieutenant-Colonel Aarom W. Ebright, 126th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1864.]

Battle-Field of Fisher's Hill, Va. [September, 1864. From the official map.]

Major-General George Crook, U.S.A. [From a photograph taken 1888.]

Major-General Geo. W. Getty [From a photograph taken 1864.]

Brigadier-General Wm. H. Seward [From a photograph taken 1864.]

Map of Cedar Creek Battle-Field, Va. [October 19, 1864.]

Captain J. C. Ullery, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Brevet Colonel Otho H. Binkley, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Petersburg, Va., Fortifications, 1865

Brevet Colonel Clifton K. Prentiss, Sixth Maryland Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1865.]

Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. N. Foster, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1863.]

John W. Warrington, Private, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1899.]

John B. Elam, Private, 110th Ohio Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1899.]

Brevet Major-General J. Warren Keifer and Staff, 1865, Third Division, Sixth Army Corps

J. Warren Keifer, Major-General of Volunteers [From a photograph taken 1898.]

President McKinley and Major-Generals Keifer, Shafter, Lawton, and Wheeler [From a photograph taken on ship-deck at Savannah, Ga., December 17, 1898.]

SLAVERY AND FOUR YEARS OF WAR

CHAPTER I General Observations on Antietam, Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville —Battles at Winchester under General Milroy—His Defeat and Retreat to Harper's Ferry—With Incidents

The Confederate Army, under Lee, invaded Maryland in 1862, and after the drawn battle of Antietam, September 17th, it retired through the Shenandoah Valley and the mountain gaps behind the Rappahannock.

McClellan had failed to take Richmond, and although his army had fought hard battles on the Chickahominy and at Malvern Hill, it won no victories that bore fruits save in lists of dead and wounded, and his army, on being withdrawn from the James in August, 1862, did not effectively sustain General John Pope at the Second Bull Run. On being given command of the combined Union forces at and about Washington, McClellan again had a large and splendidly equipped army under him. He at first exhibited some energy in moving it into Maryland after Lee, but by his extreme caution and delays suffered Harper's Ferry to be taken (September 15, 1862), with 10,000 men and an immense supply of arms and stores, and finally, when fortune smiled on his army at Antietam, he allowed it to lay quietly on its arms a whole day and long enough to enable Lee to retreat across the Potomac, where he was permitted to leisurely withdraw, practically unmolested, southward. The critical student of the battle of Antietam will learn of much desperate fighting on both sides, with no clearly defined general plan of conducting the battle on either side. As Lee fought on the defensive, he could content himself with conforming the movements of his forces to those of the Union Army. Stonewall Jackson, after maintaining a short, spirited battle against Hooker's corps, withdrew his corps from the engagement at seven o'clock in the morning and did not return to the field until 4 P.M.( 1)

Generally the Union Army was fought by divisions, and seldom more than two were engaged at the same time, often only one. In this way some of the divisions, for want of proper supports, were cut to pieces, and others were not engaged at all. Acting on interior lines, Lee was enabled to concentrate against the Union attacks and finally to repulse them. Notwithstanding this mode of conducting the battle, the Confederate Army was roughly handled and lost heavily.

General Ambrose E. Burnside late in the day succeeded in crossing Antietam Creek at the Stone Bridge and planting himself well on the Confederate right flank. McClellan also had, at night, many fresh troops ready and eager for the next day's battle. Considerable parts of his army had not been engaged, and reinforcements came. The two armies confronted each other all day on the 18th, being partly engaged in burying the dead, as though a truce existed, and at night Lee withdrew his army into Virginia.( 2)

Indecisive as this battle was, it is ever to be memorable as, on its issue, President Lincoln kept a promise to "himself and his Maker."( 3) On September 22, 1862, five days later, he issued a preliminary proclamation announcing his purpose to promulgate, January 1, 1863, a war measure, declaring free the slaves in all States or parts of States remaining at that time in rebellion. He had long before the battle of Antietam contemplated taking this action, and hence had prepared this proclamation, and promised himself to issue it on the Union Army winning a victory. The driving of Lee's army out of Maryland, and thus relieving Washington from further menace, was accepted by him as a fulfilment of the self-imposed condition.

McClellan was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac while at Orleans, Virginia, November 7, 1862, and Burnside became his successor. McClellan never again held any command.

Burnside moved the army to Falmouth, Virginia, opposite Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock. Though only urged to prepare for the offensive, he precipitated an attack on the Confederate Army, then strongly intrenched on the heights of Fredericksburg. He suffered a disastrous repulse (December 14, 1862) and next day withdrew his army across the Rappahannock to his camps.

Burnside was relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac January 25, 1863, and Major-General Joseph Hooker succeeded him.

The battle of Chancellorsville was fought, May 1 to 5, 1863, in the Wilderness country, south of the Rapidan, and resulted in the defeat of the Union Army and its falling back to its former position at Falmouth.

The defeats at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville led to a general belief that another invasion of the North would be made by Lee's army. Such an invasion involved Milroy's command at Winchester, then in the Middle Department, commanded by Major-General Robert C. Schenck, whose headquarters were at Baltimore.

This much in retrospect seems necessary to give a better understanding of the events soon to be mentioned.

Soon after Chancellorsville, the Confederate forces in the upper Shenandoah Valley became more active, and frequent indecisive conflicts between them and our scouting parties took place. Our regular scouts, who generally travelled by night in Confederate dress, brought in rumors almost every day of an intended attack on Winchester by troops from Lee's army. In May I was given special charge of these scouts. So uniform were their reports as to the proposed attacks that I gave credence to them, and advised Milroy that unless he was soon to be largely reinforced it would be well to retire from his exposed position. He refused to believe that anything more than a cavalry raid into the Valley or against him would be made, and he felt strong enough to defeat it. He argued that Lee would not dare to detach any part of his infantry force from the front of the Army of the Potomac. But in addition to the reports referred to, I learned as early as the 1st of June, through correspondence secretly brought within our lines from an officer of Lee's army to which I gained access, that Lee contemplated a grand movement North, and that his army would reach Winchester on June 10, 1863. The Secessionists of Winchester generally believed we would be attacked on that day. I gave this information to Milroy, but he still persisted in believing the whole story was gotten up to cause him to disgracefully abandon the Valley.( 4)

The 10th of June came, and the Confederate Army failed to appear. This confirmed Milroy in his disbelief in a contemplated attack with a strong force, and my credulity was ridiculed. As early, however, as June 8th, Milroy wired Schenck at Baltimore that he had information that Lee had mounted an infantry division to join Stuart's cavalry at Culpeper; that the cavalry force there was "probably more than twice 12,000," and that there was "doubtless a mighty raid on foot."( 5) Colonel Don Piatt, Schenck's chief of staff, visited and inspected the post at Winchester on the 10th and 11th, and when he reached Martinsburg, Va., on his return on the 11th, he dispatched Milroy to immediately take steps to remove his command to Harper's Ferry, leaving at Winchester only a lookout which could readily fall back to Harper's Ferry.( 6) This order was sent in the light of what Piatt deemed the proper construction of a dispatch of that date from Halleck to Schenck, and from the latter to him. Milroy at once wired Schenck of the receipt of the Piatt dispatch, saying:

"I have sufficient force to hold the place safely, but if any force is withdrawn the balance will be captured in twenty-four hours. All should go, or none."

This brought, June 12th, a dispatch from Schenck to Milroy in this language:

"Lt.-Col. Piatt has . . . misunderstood me, and somewhat exceeded his instructions. You will make all the required preparations for withdrawing, but will hold your position in the meantime."

On the 12th Milroy reported skirmishes with Confederate cavalry on the Front Royal and Strasburg roads, adding:

"I am perfectly certain of my ability to hold this place. Nothing but cavalry appears yet. Let them come."

As late as the 13th, Halleck telegraphed Schenck, in answer to an inquiry, that he had no reliable information as to rebel infantry being in the Valley, and the same day Schenck wired his chief of staff at Harper's Ferry to "Instruct General Milroy to use great caution, risking nothing unnecessarily, and be prepared for falling back in good order if overmatched."

Milroy advised Schenck of fighting at Winchester on the 13th, and from General Kelley, on the same day, Schenck learned for the first time that General Lee was on his way to drive Milroy out of Winchester. Schenck at once attempted to telegraph Milroy to "fall back, fighting, if necessary, and to keep the road to Harper's Ferry."

Halleck wired Schenck on the 14th: "It is reported that Longstreet and Ewell's corps have passed through Culpeper to Sperryville, towards the Valley."( 7)

This was the first intimation that came from Halleck or Hooker that Lee's army contemplated moving in the direction of the Valley, or that there was any apprehension that it might escape the vigilance of the Army of the Potomac, supposed to be confronting it or at least watching its movements. Another dispatch came on the 14th to General Schenck as follows:

"Get Milroy from Winchester to Harper's Ferry if possible. He will be 'gobbled up' if he remains, if he is not already past salvation.

"A. Lincoln, "President United States."

It remains to narrate what did take place at Winchester, and then, in the full light of the facts, to decided upon whom censure or credit should fall.

When, on the 14th, Halleck announced that Longstreet and Ewell's corps "have passed through Culpeper to Sperryville towards the Valley," we had been fighting Ewell's corps, or parts of it, for two days at Winchester, three days' march from Culpeper, and other portions of Lee's army had reached the Valley and Martinsburg. The report that Winchester was to have been attacked on June 10th was true, but the advance of the Union cavalry south of the Rappahannock, and its battle on the 9th at Brandy Station, north of Culpeper Court House (Lee's then headquarters), so disorganized the Confederate cavalry as to cause a delay in the movement of Ewell's corps into the Valley, then proceeding via Front Royal.

On the night of the 12th of June my scouts found it impossible to advance more than four or five miles on the Front Royal, Strasburg, and Cedar Creek roads before encountering Confederate cavalry pickets. This indicated, as was the fact, that close behind them were heavy bodies of infantry which it was desired to closely mask. At midnight I had an interview at my own solicitation with Milroy at his headquarters, when the whole subject of our situation was discussed. I was not advised of the orders or dispatches he had received, nor of his dispatches to Schenck expressing confidence in his ability to hold Winchester. Milroy persisted in the notion that only cavalry were before him, and he was anxious to fight them and especially averse to retreating under circumstances that might subject him to the charge of cowardice. He also sincerely desired to hold the Valley and protect the Union residents. He reminded me fiercely that I had believed in the attack coming on the 10th, and it had turned out that I was mistaken. I could make no answer to this save to suggest that the cavalry battle at Brandy Station had operated to postpone the attack.

During my acquaintance with Milroy he had evinced confidence in and friendship for me; now he manifested much annoyance over my persistence in urging him to order a retreat at once, and finally he dismissed me rather summarily.( 8)

Early the next morning I received an order to report with my regiment near Union Mills on the Strasburg pike, and to move upon the Cedar Creek road, located west of and extending, in general, parallel with the Strasburg pike. It was soon ascertained that the enemy had massed a heavy force upon that road about three miles south of Winchester. A section of Carlin's battery under Lieutenant Theaker reported to me, and with it my regiment moved about a mile southward, keeping well on the ridge between the pike and the Cedar Creek road. The enemy kept under cover, and not having orders to bring on an engagement I retired the troops to the junction of the two roads. About 2 P.M. I was informed that Milroy desired me to make a strong reconnoissance and develop the strength and position of the enemy. To strengthen my forces, the 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Moss, and a squadron of the 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry, were assigned to me. I moved forward promptly with the 12th on the left on the plain, the infantry and artillery in the centre covering the Strasburg pike, and the squadron on the ridge to my right, which extended parallel with the pike. We proceeded in this order about a mile, when my skirmishers became closely engaged with those of the enemy. It was soon apparent to me that the enemy extended along a wide front, has advance being only a thin cover. But as my orders were to develop the enemy, I brought my whole command into action, drove in his advance line and with the artillery shelled the woods behind this line. We suffered some loss, but pressed forward until the enemy fell back to the woods on the left of Kearnstown. My artillery opened with canister, and for a few moments our front seemed to be cleared. But my flankers now reported the enemy turning my right with at least a brigade of infantry. I therefore withdrew slowly and in good order, embracing every possible opportunity to halt and open fire. Reinforcements were reported on the way. I directed that they should, on their arrival, be posted on the high ground to the right of the pike in front of the bridge at Union (or Barton's) Mills to cover our retreat, which must be made with the artillery and infantry over this bridge.

Colonel Moss, not believing he could cross the tail-race with its embankments and the stream below the Mills, commenced moving his cavalry towards the bridge. I turned him back with imperative orders to cover the left flank as long as necessary or possible, then find a crossing below the Mills. Unfortunately, when the artillery reached the bridge in readiness to cross, it was found occupied by the 123d Ohio, Colonel T. W. Wilson commanding, marching by the flank to my relief under the guidance of Captain W. L. Shaw, a staff officer of General Elliott. This regiment was directed, as soon as it cleared the bridge, to deploy to the right, advance upon the high ground, and engage the enemy then pressing forward in great numbers. Before Colonel Wilson could get his regiment into battle-line it was under a destructive fire and lost heavily. Nevertheless, though the regiment was a comparatively new one, it soon successfully engaged the enemy, and drove back his advance. A more gallant fight, under all the circumstances, was never made. It enabled me to take the artillery over the bridge, and to withdraw to a new position from which we could cover the bridge with our artillery and easily repulse the enemy. Colonels Wilson and Moss were each withdrawn in good order, the former above and the latter below the bridge. Gordon's brigade of Early's division, in an attempt to cross the bridge, was driven back with considerable loss, and night came to end this opening battle of Winchester. A Confederate prisoner was taken to General Milroy (who, with General Elliott, joined me at nightfall), who frankly said he was of Hays' Louisiana brigade, Early's division, Ewell's corps; that Ewell was on the field commanding in person. Milroy until then was unwilling to believe that troops other than cavalry were in his front.

Besides Early's division of Ewell's corps, we fought Maryland troops which had long been operating in the upper Valley, consisting of a battalion of infantry (Colonel Herbert), a battalion of cavalry (Major W. W. Goldsborough), and a battery of artillery.( 9) I was not forced to order a retreat until the object of the advance had been fully attained, and then only when Hays' Louisiana brigade appeared on my right flank, and the cavalry there were broken and driven back. General John B. Gordon (10) (since Senator from Georgia), who confronted me with five infantry regiments, reports of this battle:

"About 4 o'clock in the afternoon I deployed a line of skirmishers, and moved forward to the attack, holding two regiments in reserve. After advancing several hundred yards, I found it necessary to bring into line these two regiments on the right and on the left. The enemy's skirmishers retreated on his battle-line, a portion of which occupied a strong position behind a stone wall, but from which he was driven. A battery which I had hoped to capture was rapidly withdrawn. In this charge my brigade lost seventy-five men, including some efficient officers."(11)

The total loss of the enemy in this engagement must have been at least as many more. The Union loss, of all arms, was not more than one hundred. It was now obvious Milroy's command could not hold Winchester. I assumed a retreat would be undertaken in the night, but in a brief interview with Milroy at the close of the battle he said nothing on the subject, and the reproof of the night before warned me to make no further suggestions to him with respect to his duty in this emergency.

General Elliott, my immediate superior, informed me, as I rode late at night through Winchester to my camp on the heights northwest of the city, that he thought it was too late to retreat on Harper's Ferry. I suggested that the Romney, Pughtown, and Apple-Pie Ridge, or Back Creek roads were open, and that we could safely retire over one or more of them. He said he would call Milroy's attention to my suggestion and recommend these lines of retreat, but if he did the suggestion was not favorably considered. At daybreak on the 14th of June I received a written order to take the 110th Ohio Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. N. Foster, one company of the 116th Ohio Infantry, commanded by Captain Arkenoe, and L Company of the 5th Regular Battery, six guns, commanded by Lieutenant Wallace F. Randolph, and occupy an open, isolated earthwork located three fourths of a mile west of the fortifications on the heights between the Romney and Pughtown roads, but in sight of the main works. The earthwork was barely sufficient for one regiment. The troops assigned me were soon in position, and quiet reigned in my front. The enemy appeared to be inactive. Milroy advised me that the Pughtown and Romney roads were picketed and patrolled by cavalry, and I was not, therefore, charged with the duty of watching them. About 3 P.M. I rode to the main fort, and directed my horse to be unsaddled and fed while I sought an interview with Milroy. I found him in high spirits. He complimented me on the strong fight I put up the previous day, and declared his belief that the enemy were only trying to scare him out of the Valley. He referred to the quiet of the day as evidence that they had no purpose to assail him in his works. He said the cavalry had just reported no enemy in my front on any of the roads.

About 4 P.M. I started leisurely to get my horse to return to the earthwork, when, from the face of Round Mountain, about one mile to the southwest of my command, not less than twenty guns opened fire on it. I dismounted a passing wagon-master, and on his horse in less than five minutes reached the foot of the hill on which the earthwork was situated, and then, hastening on foot through a storm of shot and exploding shell, I was soon in it. Lieutenant Randolph with his six rifle guns replied to the enemy as long as possible, but his battery was soon largely disabled, the horses mostly killed, and most of the ammunition chests exploded. Two of his guns only could be kept in position for the anticipated assault. About 6 P.M., under cover of the cannonade, and protected by some timber and the nature of the ground, Hays' Louisiana brigade of five regiments, supported by Smith and Hoke's brigades, advanced to the assault. My men stood well to their work, and the two guns fired canister into the enemy. Many Confederate officers and men were seen to fall, and the head of the column wavered, but there were no trenches or abattis to obstruct the enemy's advance. There was stubborn fighting over the low breastworks, and some fighting inside of them, but not until our exposed flanks were attacked did I order a retreat. The battery was lost, but most of the command reached the main fortification safely, though exposed to the fire of the enemy for most of the distance. Captain Arkenoe was killed, and Lieutenant Paris Horney of the 110th Ohio was captured. Our loss in killed, wounded, and captured was small. General Milroy, from an observation-stand on a flag-staff at the main fort, witnessed this affair. In his report of it he says:

"The enemy opened upon me with at least four full batteries, some of his guns being of his longest range, under cover of which fire he precipitated a column at least ten thousand strong upon the outer work held by Colonel Keifer, which, after a stubborn resistance, he carried."(12)

General Early, in his report, says twenty guns under Colonel Jones opened fire on this position. General Hays reports his loss, 14 killed, 78 wounded, 13 missing.

Part of the guns left in the earthworks we had abandoned, and the artillery of Colonel Jones now opened on our fortifications. An artillery duel ensued which was maintained until after dark. No other hard fighting occurred on this day, only some slight skirmishing took place with Gordon's brigade south and with portions of Johnson's division east of Winchester.

The most notable event of the day was the opening fire of a score of artillery pieces in broad daylight from a quarter where no enemy was known to be. Captain Morgan (13th Pennsylvania Cavalry), who was charged with the duty of patrolling the Romney and Pughtown roads, was censured for failing to discover and report the presence of the enemy. In a large sense this censure was unjust. His report, made about 2 P.M., that no enemy was found on these roads or near them, was doubtless then true, yet an hour later Early with three of his brigades reached them about one mile in front of the earthwork occupied by me. At that time Captain Morgan had finished his reconnoissance and returned to camp. There was, however, a lack of vigilance on the part of somebody; possibly General Milroy was not altogether blameless.

As has already been stated, I was not charged with the duty of ascertaining the movements of the enemy; on the contrary, I had been informed that pickets and scouts covered my front. It is the only instance, perhaps, in the war of such a surprise.

The situation of Milroy's command was now critical. He had about 7000 men able for duty, more troops than could be used in the forts or protected by them. Colonel A. T. McReynolds, of the 1st New York Cavalry, who commanded Milroy's Third Brigade at Berryville, some ten miles eastward of us, was attacked on the 13th, and, pursuant to orders, retired, reaching Winchester at 9 P.M. It was certainly known on the 14th that Ewell had at least 20,000 men of all arms, and it was clear that while we might stand an assault, our artillery ammunition would soon be exhausted, and the surrender of the entire command, if it remained, become inevitable. About 11 A.M. I was present in the principal fort at what was called a council of war, but my opinion was not asked or expressed as to the propriety of undertaking to escape. I ventured, however, to suggest that if a surrender were contemplated, I could take my infantry command out that night, with perhaps others, by the Back Creek or Apple-Pie Ridge road without encountering the enemy, and could safely reach Pennsylvania by keeping well to the west of Martinsburg. It was decided about midnight, however, to spike the guns, abandon all wagons, and all sick and wounded and stores of all kinds, and evacuate Winchester. The teamsters, artillerists, and camp followers were to ride and lead the horses and mules, following closely the armed troops, who were to move at 1 A.M. on the Martinsburg road. If the enemy were encountered, we were to attack him, and, if possible, cut through. The movement did not commence until 2 A.M., and the night was dark. The great body of horses and mules, being ridden by undisciplined men and unused to riders, fell into great confusion as they crowded on the pike close on the heels of the infantry. The mules brayed a chorus seldom heard, and as if prompted by a malicious desire to notify the enemy of our departure. My regiment was in the advance on the turnpike. Milroy did not accompany the head of the column. Elliott was, however, with it a portion of the time. When we had proceeded about three miles the familiar chuck of the hubs of artillery wheels was heard to the eastward, and it soon became apparent the enemy was moving towards the pike, intending to strike it on our front. Some of our troops were then moving on a line parallel with the pike, eastward of it. When the head of the column had proceeded about four miles, and as it approached Stephenson's Depot (located a short distance east of the Martinsburg pike), firing in a desultory way commenced on my right and soon extended along a line obliquely towards one front. The column was moved by the flank to the left, at right angles with the road, my regiment being followed by the 122d Ohio Regiment. A line of battle was formed with these regiments in the darkness, and skirmishers thrown forward. The line advanced northward, feeling for the enemy, but it was soon halted, and the troops were again moved by the flank. My regiment, being on the left, again took the advance, keeping about one hundred yards westward of the pike. I had been informed that the whole army was to follow and share our fate. When about five miles from Winchester, and when the head of the column was about west of the Depot named, some straggling shots notified us that the enemy were on the pike near us. I halted and faced the men in line of battle towards the pike, and, though still dark, a personal investigation revealed the fact that the Confederates were in confusion, and the commands they were giving indicated also that they were greatly excited. I found Elliott some distance in the rear, and obtained his consent to charge them. Colonel Wm. H. Ball, with the 122d Ohio, was requested to support me on the right. My command charged rapidly across the road without firing. It fortunately struck the enemy's flank. We took a few prisoners and drove the enemy's right through the woods for about two hundred yards and upon his approaching artillery. Our line then halted and opened fire into the enemy's ranks, causing great confusion and killing and wounding large numbers. A battery now opened upon us, but this we soon silenced by killing or driving away its gunners. The enemy retreated for protection to a railroad cut,(13) and the woods were cleared in my front, but my right was unprotected, and at this juncture a considerable force of infantry and two pieces of artillery threatened that flank. I withdrew a short distance, changed direction to the right, and again advanced. Colonel Ball came up gallantly with his regiment on my right, and in twenty minutes our front was cleared, the enemy's guns silenced, the gunners shot down or driven away, and the artillery horses killed. We were only prevented from taking possession of the guns by the appearance of another and larger body of the enemy on our right. Daylight was now approaching. Without waiting the enemy's fire, I ordered both my regiments withdrawn, which was effected in good order, to the west of the pike. The enemy at once reoccupied the woods in our front in superior force, but obviously without a good battle-line. Again I ordered the two regiments to a charge, which was splendidly responded to, although a promised attack in our support was not made. Elliott I did not see or receive any order from after the battle began. Milroy was trying to maintain the fight nearer Winchester, to the east of the pike, and he gave no order that reached me.

After a conflict in which the two lines were engaged in places not twenty feet apart, the enemy gave way, and our line advanced to his artillery, shooting and driving the gunners from their pieces and completely silencing them, the Confederates again taking refuge in the railroad cut. I could learn nothing of the progress of the fight at other points, and could hear no firing, save occasional shots in the direction of Winchester. I concluded the object of the attack was accomplished so far as possible, and that the non- combatants had had time to escape. It was now day-dawn, and we could not hope to further surprise the enemy or long operate on his flank. About 5 A.M., therefore, I ordered the whole line withdrawn from the woods, and resumed the march northward along the Martinsburg road. I was soon joined by Generals Milroy and Elliott and by members of their staffs, but with few men. Milroy had personally led a charge with the 87th Pennsylvania and had a horse shot under him, but there was no concert of action in the conduct of the battle. Colonel Wm. G. Ely and a part of the brigade he commanded were captured between Stephenson's Depot and Winchester, having done little fighting, and a portion of McReynolds' brigade shared the same fate.

The cavalry became panic-stricken and, commingling with the mules and horses on which teamsters and others were mounted, all in great disorder took wildly to the hills and mountains to the northwest, followed by infantry in somewhat better order; the mules brayed, the horses neighed, the teamsters and riders indulged in much vigorous profanity, but the most of the retreating mass reached Bloody Run, Pennsylvania, marching via Sir John's Run, Hancock, and Bath. Citizens on Apple-Pie Ridge who witnessed the wild scene describe it as a veritable bedlam.(14)

Captain Z. Baird, of Milroy's staff, who joined me while engaged in the night fight in the woods, but who was under the erroneous impression Elliott had ordered the attack, in his testimony before the Milroy Court of Inquiry, gives this account of the engagement:

"General Elliott ordered Colonel Keifer with the 110th Ohio to proceed into the woods. The order was promptly obeyed. As soon as the regiment reached the woods, a severe firing of musketry occurred. General Elliott remarked to me that the enemy must be there in force, and that the 110th should be immediately supported by the 122d Ohio. I volunteered to deliver the order to Colonel Ball of the 122d Ohio, and to guide him to the woods, so as to place him on the right flank of the 110th Ohio, and to avoid shooting our own men by mistake. The 122d Ohio arrived on the right flank of the 110th in tolerably good order, and immediately commenced firing. Both regiments then advanced, and drove the enemy out of the woods. There were indications of a surprise to the enemy by the suddenness of their attack. They took one of their caissons or passed it. We could look into their camp and see that their artillery horses were ungovernable. We were so close that we could hear the orders given by their officers in endeavoring to restore order. The fire of the enemy, though rapid, went over us, both of small arms and artillery. As we progressed, we saw evidences from the wounded and slain of the enemy that our fire had been efficient. After this contest had lasted perhaps an hour Colonel Keifer requested me to return to the rear and learn what dispositions were going on on the right to sustain Colonel Ball and himself. I complied with his order. When I arrived at the rear, I noticed the 87th Pennsylvania, the 18th Connecticut, and the 123d Ohio advancing on the right in line of battle, under the immediate command of Colonel Ely of the 18th Connecticut. General Milroy was also present, but dismounted, his horse being, as I supposed, disabled. He was engaged in changing horses. Without reporting to General Milroy, as I now recollect, I returned with all possible expedition to Colonel Keifer, to notify him of the support which he was about to have on the right. I supposed at the time that from the effect of the fire of the 110th and 122d Ohio, that when Colonel Ely with his force attacked on the right we would rout them. I met, however, the 110th and 122d Ohio falling back. The officers were so busy in preserving order that I could not communicate with them. After we had fallen back to the Martinsburg road, I saw Generals Milroy and Elliott. I was informed by the former that the retreat was again in progress."(15)

Colonel Wm. H. Ball (122d Ohio), in his official report speaks of the fight thus:

"I was ordered to follow the 110th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, which had been moved off the field some time before, and was out of sight. The regiments being so separated, I did not engage the enemy as soon as the 110th. I formed on the right of the 110th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, and the two regiments advanced within the skirt of the woods and engaged the enemy, who occupied the woods with infantry and artillery. After a sharp action, the line was advanced at least 100 yards and to within twenty paces of the enemy's artillery, where a terrible fire was maintained for fifteen or twenty minutes by both parties. The artillery was driven back over 100 yards, and for a time silenced by the fire of our rifles. By order of Colonel Keifer the two regiments then retreated beyond the range of the enemy's infantry, reformed, and again advanced within the woods, and, after a sharp engagement, retreated, by order of Colonel Keifer, the enemy then moving on our flank."

The contemplated attack by Colonel Ely and others was not made.

We marched via Smithfield (Wizzard's Clip), Charlestown, and Halltown, and reached Harper's Ferry about 3 P.M., having marched thirty-five miles and fought two hours on the way.

Berryville, held by McReynolds' brigade of Milroy's command, was taken by Rodes' division of five brigades on the 13th of June; Bunker Hill, on the direct road to Martinsburg from Winchester, was occupied by the enemy early the morning of the 14th; and Martinsburg was taken (all by the same division) the evening of that day. General Daniel Tyler and Colonel B. F. Smith (126th Ohio), with a small command of infantry and cavalry and one battery, made a gallant stand for a few hours, to enable their baggage and supply trains, escorted by a small number of cavalry, to escape via Williamsport. A portion of the battery was captured, but Tyler and Smith's troops retreated on Shepherdstown, thence to Harper's Ferry.

We pursued, in the retreat from Stephenson's Depot, the only possible route then open to us to Harper's Ferry. About 2000 men of all arms reached Harper's Ferry with us, and others straggled in later. But much the larger part of Milroy's command escaped with the animals to Pennsylvania; 2700 soldiers assembled at Bloody Run alone. The losses in captured, including the sick and wounded left in hospital, and the wounded left on the field, were about 3000. The losses in my command, considering the desperate nature of the fighting, were small, and but few of my officers and soldiers, fit for duty and not wounded in battle, were captured. Lieutenants T. J. Weakley and C. M. Gross, through neglect of the officer of the day, were left on picket near Winchester, with 60 men of the 110th Ohio, and, consequently captured. The surgeons, with their assistants, were left at the hospital and on the field in charge of the sick and wounded. Chaplain McCabe remained to assist in the care of the wounded left on the battle-field. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded much exceeded the Union loss on each of the three days' fighting. I was bruised by a spent ball on the 13th, and slightly wounded by a musket fired by a soldier not ten feet from me near the close of the fight at the earthwork on the 14th, and my horse was shot under me in the night engagement at Stephenson's Depot. We fought the best of the troops of Lee's army. General Edward Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, in the night engagement, consisted of Stewart, Nicholl, and Walker's (Stonewall) brigades. Johnson was censured for not having reached and covered the Martinsburg road earlier in the night of the 14th of June. He reported his command in a critical situation for a time after our attack upon it; that "two sets of cannoniers (13 out of 16) were killed or disabled."(16)

The war furnishes no parallel to the fighting at Winchester, and there is no instance of the war where a comparatively small force, after being practically surrounded by a greatly superior one, cut its way out.

Johnson's division was so roughly handled on the morning of the 15th that it did not pursue us, nor was it ordered to march again until some time the next day. The plan of Lee was for Ewell's corps to push forward rapidly into Pennsylvania. His delay at Winchester postponed Lee's giving the order to Ewell "to take Harrisburg" until June 21st.(17) The loss of three or more days at Winchester most likely saved Pennsylvania's capital from capture.

The disaster to the Union arms at Winchester was, by General Halleck, charged upon General Milroy, and General Schneck was ordered by Halleck to place Milroy in arrest. In August, 1863, a Court of Inquiry convened at Washington to investigate and report upon Milroy's conduct and the evacuation of Winchester. Schenck's action in relation to the matter was also drawn in question. The court was in session twenty-seven days, heard many witnesses, including Generals Schenck and Milroy, and had before it a mass of orders and dispatches. I was a known friend of Milroy, hence was not called against him, and he did not have me summoned because I had differed so radically with him as to the necessity of evacuating Winchester. The testimony, while doing me ample justice, did not disclose much of the information communicated by me to Milroy, nor my views with respect to the judgment displayed by him in a great emergency. Milroy and his friends maintained, with much force, that his holding Winchester for about three days delayed, for that time or longer, Lee's advance into Pennsylvania, and thus saved Harrisburg from capture, and gave the Army of the Potomac time to reach Gettysburg, and there force Lee to concentrate his army and fight an unsuccessful battle. The Court of Inquiry made no formal report, but Judge-Advocate-General Holt reviewed the testimony, and reached conclusions generally exonerating Milroy from the charge of disobedience of orders and misconduct during the evacuation, but reflecting somewhat on Schenck for not positively ordering the place evacuated. President Lincoln made a characteristic indorsement on this record, not unfavorable to either Schenck or Milroy, concluding with this paragraph:

"Serious blame is not necessarily due to any serious disaster, and I cannot say that in this case any of the officers are deserving of serious blame. No court-martial is deemed necessary or proper in this case."(18)

Halleck did not, however, cease in his hostility to Milroy, and not until in the last months of the war did the "Gray Eagle" have another command in the field. He was a rashly-brave and patriotic man, and his whole heart was in the Union cause. In battle he risked his own person unnecessarily and without exercising a proper supervision over his entire command. He died at Olympia, Washington, March 29, 1890, when seventy-five years of age. The colored people of America should erect a monument to his memory. He was their friend when to be so drew upon him much adverse criticism.

( 1) Manassas to Appomattox (Longstreet), pp. 242, 257, 401.

( 2) Ibid., 263.

( 3) Abraham Lincoln (Nicolay and Hay), vol. vi., p. 159.

( 4) In letters, dated in May, 1863, to Col. Wm. S. Furay (then a correspondent (Y. S.) of the Cincinnati Gazette with Rosecrans' army in Tennessee, I detailed the general plan of Lee's advance northward, and gave the date when the movement would commence.

( 5) War Records, vol. xxvii., Part III., p. 36.

( 6) War Records, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 125. Piatt, June 11th, wired Schenck from Winchester, after inspecting the place, that Milroy "can whip anything the rebels can fetch here."—Ibid., p. 161.

( 7) War Records, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 130-7, 159-81.

( 8) A few days before this event I peremptorily ordered all officers' wives and citizens visiting in my command to go North, but the ladies held an indignation meeting and waited on General Milroy, with the request that he countermand my order, which he did, at the same time saying something about my being too apprehensive of danger. I had the pleasure of meeting and greeting these same ladies in Washington, July 5th, on their arrival from Winchester via Staunton, Richmond, Castle-Thunder, the James and Potomac Rivers.

( 9) War Records, Early's Rep., vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 460.

(10) His son, Major Hugh H. Gordon, served efficiently on my staff in Florida, Georgia, and Cuba (Spanish War), as did Captain J. E. B. Stuart, son of the great Confederate cavalry General; also Major John Gary Evans (ex-Governor South Carolina), and others closely related to distinguished Confederate officers. See Appendix F.

(11) War Records, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 491.

(12) War Records, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 46.

(13) General Johnson's Report (Confederate), War Records, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 501.

(14) An orderly who attempted to carry on horseback a valise containing papers, etc., of mine, threw it way in a field as he rode into the mountains. A Quakeress, Miss Mary Lupton, witnessed the act from her home, and found the valise and returned it to me with all its contents, after the battle of Opequon, Sept. 19, 1864.

(15) War Records, vol. xxvii., Part II., p. 136.

(16) War Records, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 501-2.

(17) Ibid., p. 443.

(18) War Records, vol. xxvii., Part II., pp. 88-197.

CHAPTER II Invasion of Pennsylvania—Campaign and Battle of Gettysburg—Lee's Retreat Across the Potomac, and Losses in Both Armies

At Harper's Ferry, June 16th, I was assigned to command a brigade under General W. H. French, a regular officer. General Joseph Hooker, in command of the Army of the Potomac, June 25th, ordered French to be ready to march at a moment's notice. French took position on Maryland Heights, where, June 27th, Hooker visited him and gave him orders to prepare to evacuate both the Heights and Harper's Ferry. French had under him there about 10,000 effective men. Halleck, on being notified of Hooker's purpose to evacuate these places and to unite French's command with the Army of the Potomac for the impending battle, countermanded Hooker's order; thereupon the latter, by telegram from Sandy Hook, requested to be relieved from the command of that army. His request being persisted in, he was, on June 28th, relieved, and Major-General George G. Meade was, by the President, assigned to succeed him. Meade, also feeling in need of reinforcements, on the same day asked permission to order French, with his forces, to join him. Halleck, though placing French under Meade's command, did not consent to this. French, however, with all his troops (save my brigade), under orders from Washington, abandoned Harper's Ferry and Maryland Heights, and became a corps of observation to operate in the vicinity of Frederick, Maryland, in the rear of the Army of the Potomac. And though no enemy was threatening, nor likely to do so soon, I was ordered to dismantle the fortified heights, load the guns and stores on Chesapeake and Ohio Canal boats, and escort them to Washington, repairing the canal and locks on the way. This work was done thoroughly, and we arrived with a fleet of twenty-six boats in Washington shortly after midnight, July 4, 1863. It was my first visit to that city.

Under orders from Halleck, I started on the 6th, by rail, to reoccupy Harper's Ferry, but was stopped by Meade at Frederick, and there again reported to French. French had been assigned to command the Third Army Corps (to succeed General Daniel E. Sickles, wounded at Gettysburg), and his late command became the Third Division of that corps, under Elliott; my brigade, consisting of the 110th and 122d Ohio, 6th Maryland, and 138th Pennsylvania Infantry regiments, became the Second Brigade of this division. This brigade (with, later, three regiments added) was not broken up during the war, and was generally known as "Keifer's Brigade."

It is not my purpose to attempt to write the full story of the battle of Gettysburg, the greatest, measured by the results, of the many great battles of the war. Gettysburg marks the high tide of the Rebellion. From it dates the certain downfall of the Confederacy, though nearly two years of war followed, and more blood was spilled after Lee sullenly commenced his retreat from the heights of Gettysburg than before.

About this stage of the war, President Lincoln took an active interest in the movements of the armies, although he generally refrained from absolutely directing them in the field. It was not unusual for army commanders to appeal to him for opinions as to military movements, and he was free in making suggestions, volunteering to take the responsibility if they were adopted and his plans miscarried. Hooker, in an elaborate dispatch (June 15th) relating to the anticipated movements of Lee's army from the Rappahannock to the northward, said:

"I am of opinion that it is my duty to pitch into his rear, although in so doing the head of his column may reach Warrenton before I can return."

The President, answering, said:

"I have but one idea which I think worth suggesting to you, and that is, in case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock, I would by no means cross to the south of it. If he should leave a rear force at Fredericksburg, tempting you to fall upon it, it would fight in intrenchments and have you at disadvantage, and so, man for man, worst you at that point, while his main force would in some way be getting the advantage of you northward. In one word, I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over the fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other."( 1)

The President, answering another dispatch from Hooker, June 10th, said:

"I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your objective point. If he comes towards the upper Potomac, follow him on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens him. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him."( 2)

When deeply concerned about the fate of Winchester (June 14th), this dispatch was sent:

"Major General Hooker:

"So far as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded at Winchester and Tyler at Martinsburg. If they could hold out a few days, could you help them? If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?"

"A. Lincoln."( 2)

Hooker did not cross the river and attack the rear of Lee's army, nor did he "fret" Lee's army, nor "break" it, however "slim" "the animal" must have been, and hence Milroy was sacrificed, and the rich towns, cities, and districts of Maryland and Pennsylvania were overrun by a hungry and devastating foe; but Gettysburg came; the Union hosts there being successfully led by another commander —Meade!

George Gordon Meade came to the command of the Army of the Potomac under the most trying circumstances. The situation of that army and the country was critical. He had been distinguished as a brigade, division, and corps commander under McClellan, Burnside, and Hooker; in brief, he had won laurels on many fields, especially at Fredericksburg, where he broke through the enemy's right and reached his reserves, yet he never had held an independent command. He was of Revolutionary stock (Pennsylvania), though born in Cadiz, Spain, December 31, 1815, where his parents then resided, his father being a merchant and shipowner there. He was graduated at West Point; was a modest, truthful, industrious, studious man, with the instincts of a soldier. He was wounded at New Market, or Glendale, in the Peninsula campaign (1862). He was commanding in person, and ambitious to succeed, prudent, yet obstinate, and when aroused showed a fierce temper; yet he was, in general, just. On the third day after he assumed command of the army its advance corps opened the battle of Gettysburg. What great soldier ever before took an army and moved it into battle against a formidable adversary in so short a time? It must also be remembered that the troops composing his army were not used to material success. They had never been led to a decisive victory. Some of them had been defeated at Bull Run; some of them on the Peninsula; some of them at the Second Bull Run; some of them were in the drawn battle of Antietam; some of them had suffered repulse at Fredericksburg, and defeat at Chancellorsville, and the army in general had experienced more of defeat than success, although composed of officers and soldiers equal to the best ever called to battle. When Meade assumed command, Lee's army was, in the main, far up the Cumberland Valley, and pressing on; Ewell had orders to take Harrisburg, and was then, with most of his corps, at Carlisle, Pennsylvania. York and Wrightsville, Pa., were taken on the 28th by Gordon of Early's division. On the 29th Ewell ordered his engineer, with Jenkins' cavalry, to reconnoitre the defences of Harrisburg, and he was starting for that place himself on the same day when Lee recalled him and his corps to join the main army at Cashtown, or Gettysburg.( 3)

Longstreet's corps marched from Fredericksburg, June 3d, via Culpeper Court-House, thence up the Rappahannock and along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge; on the 19th occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, leading to the Valley; on the 23d marched via Martinsburg and Williamsport into Maryland, reaching Chambersburg on the 27th; thence marched on the 30th to Greenwood, and the next day to Marsh Creek, four miles from Gettysburg, Pickett's division and Hood's brigade being left, respectively, at Chambersburg and New Guilford.( 4)

A. P. Hill's corps did not leave Fredericksburg until the 14th of June, just after Hooker put the Army of the Potomac in motion to the northward. Hill marched into the Valley and joined Longstreet at Berryville, and from there preceded him to Chambersburg, and by one day to Cashtown and Gettysburg.( 5)

General J. E. B. Stuart, in command of the Confederate cavalry, crossed the upper Rappahannock, June 16th, and moved east of the Blue Ridge on Longstreet's right flank, leaving only a small body of cavalry on the Rappahannock, in observation, with instructions to follow on the right flank of Hill's corps. Severe cavalry engagements took place at Aldie, the 17th, and at Middleburg, Uppeville, and Snicker's Gap, without decisive results, both sides claiming victories. On the 24th Stuart, with the main body of his cavalry, succeeded in eluding the Union cavalry and Hooker's army (then feeling its way north), and passed east of Centreville, thence via Fairfax Court-House and Dranesville, and crossed, July 27th, the Potomac at Rowser's Ford, and captured a large supply train between Washington and Rockville. Stuart's cavalry caused some damage in the rear and east of the Army of the Potomac, but, on the whole, this bold movement contributed little, if any, towards success in Lee's campaign. Stuart's advance reached the Confederate left via Dover and Carlisle, Pennsylvania, late on the afternoon of the second day of the battle, his troopers and horses in a somewhat exhausted condition. The consensus of opinion among military critics was then, and since is, that Lee committed a great strategic error in authorizing his main cavalry force to be separated from close contact with the right of his moving army. General Lee seems to have come to this conclusion himself, as frequently, in his official reports of the campaign, he deplores the absence of his cavalry and his consequent inability to obtain reliable information of the movements of the Army of the Potomac.( 6) Longstreet severely criticises Stuart's raid, and attributes to the absence of the cavalry, in large part, the failure of the Gettysburg campaign.( 7) Cavalry, under an energetic commander, are the eyes and ears of a large army, especially when it is on an active campaign against a vigilant enemy.