"Captain J. P. Dudrow, 122d Ohio, and Lieutenant R. W. Wiley, 110th Ohio, were each slightly wounded while acting as A. D. C.'s upon my staff."

Colonel Ebright had a premonition of his death. A few moments before 12 M. he sought me, and coolly told me he would be killed before the battle ended. He insisted upon telling me that he wanted his remains and effects sent to this home in Lancaster, Ohio, and I was asked to write his wife as to some property in the West which he feared she did not know about. He was impatient when I tried to remove the thought of imminent death from his mind. A few moments later the time for another advance came, and the interview with Colonel Ebright closed. In less than ten minutes, while he was riding near me he fell dead from his horse, pierced in the breast by a rifle ball. His apprehension of death was not prompted by fear. He had been through the slaughters of the Wilderness and Cold Harbor; had fought his regiment in the dead angle of Spotsylvania, and led it at Monocacy. It is needless to say I complied with his request.

Incidents like this were not uncommon.

The battle was a bloody one.

The Union killed and wounded were:(14)

Killed. Wounded. Aggregate. Officers. Officers. Men. Men. Sixth Army Corps (Wright) 18 193 111 1331 1653 Nineteenth Army Corps (Emory) 22 292 104 1450 1868 Army of W. Va. 6 98 34 649 787 Cavalry 7 61 29 275 372 Totals 53 644 278 3705 4680

The casualties in my brigade were 4 officers and 46 men killed, 24 officers and 261 men wounded; aggregate, 335.(15) This was little less than the total loss in the three cavalry divisions.

There is no complete list of the Confederate losses so far as I can discover. Early reported his killed and wounded in this battle at 2141, and missing 1818, total, 3959.(16) Doubtless many of the missing were killed or wounded. General R. E. Rodes was killed in a charge with his division.(16) General Godwin and Colonel Patton were also killed; Generals Fitzhugh Lee and York were severely wounded.

This battle was inspiriting to the country. Lincoln, Stanton, and Grant each wired congratulations and thanks.(17)

Sheridan was now appointed a Brigadier-General in the regular army and assigned to the permanent command of the Middle Military District.

The Valley was soon to further reek with blood, and the torch of war was soon to consume it.

( 1) Sheridan was born March 6, 1831, and died August 5, 1888.

( 2) Mrs. Ricketts drove from Washington to Bull Run in her own carriage and besought Gen. J. E. Johnston to parole her husband, and allow her to take him to his home in Washington. This was refused, and her carriage was confiscated. In after years, when the Johnstons were in Washington, he holding high political positions, she refused to recognize them.

( 3) Members of his staff reported Sheridan as saying that the request for his personal body-guard was impudent, but could not be refused.

( 4) War Records, vol. xliii., Part I., 145.

( 5) Ibid., 45.

( 6) War Records, vol. xliii., Part I., pp. 107-112.

( 7) Ibid., p. 61.

( 8) Grant's Memoirs, vol. ii., p. 328.

( 9) Sheridan's Memoirs, vol. ii., pp. 4-7.

(10) War Records, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 46.

(11) Ibid., p. 555.

(12) Ibid., Part II., pp. 102-3.

(13) Colonel Horn survived the war, and died near Mitchellville, Md., October 4, 1897.

(14) War Records, vol. xliii., Part I., 118.

(15) Ibid., p. 113.

(16) Ibid., p. 555.

(17) Ibid., pp. 61-2.

CHAPTER IX Battle of Fisher's Hill—Pursuit of Early—Devastation of the Shenandoah Valley (1864)—Cavalry Battle at Tom's Brook, and Minor Events

We left Sheridan's victorious army south of Winchester, five miles from the battle-field. It had only such opportunity for rest as can be obtained on the night succeeding a long day's battle. Some of the officers and soldiers returned to the scene of the conflict through the gloom of night, to minister to the wounded and to find and identify the bodies of dead friends. It was, however, the duty of the surgeons, hospital attendants, ambulance corps, and stretcher- bearers to care for the wounded; and the dead of both armies could be buried later. The bodies of some of the dead of the successful army are always sent home for interment. Chaplains are often instrumental in doing the latter. Rations, forage, and ammunition had now to be brought up and distributed. No matter how well soldiers have been supplied, they generally come out of a great battle with little.

Early's army bivouacked at Newtown, and at 3 A.M. of the 20th of September continued its retreat to Fisher's Hill, about two miles south of Strasburg. Early placed his army in a strong defensive position on this hill, which is an abrupt bluff with a precipitous rocky face, and immediately south of Tumbling Run. His right rested on the Shenandoah River, and his left extended to the narrow Cedar Creek Valley at the foot of Little North Mountain. This naturally strong position was well fortified and impregnable against front attack.

Sheridan's army moved at day-dawn of the 20th in pursuit, Emory in the advance. Wright and Emory occupied the heights around Strasburg on the evening of that day, and Crook's corps was moved to their right and rear, north of Cedar Creek, where it was concealed in the dense timber. Sheridan determined to use Crook to turn the enemy's left, if possible. The Nineteenth and Sixth Corps during the night of the 20th took position in the order named, from left to right, in front of Fisher's Hill. This was not accomplished without some fierce conflicts, brought on in dislodging the enemy from strongly fortified heights which he held in advance of his main line. A portion of my brigade was engaged in these preliminary movements all the night.( 1) The Third—Ricketts' division—was again on the right of the Sixth Corps and of the army as formed on the 21st. Near the close of the day I was informed by a staff officer of General Ricketts that my command was to be held in reserve behind the right, and that I was not likely to be engaged in the coming battle if the plan of the commanding general was carried out. I was directed to get my regiments into as comfortable a situation as possible for rest, and hence selected a good place to bivouac, and was employed in riding through the troops and telling the officers of the prospect of freedom from severe work the coming day when a brisk engagement broke out in my immediate front. A portion of the Second Division of the Sixth Corps was repulsed in an attempt, just at nightfall, to carry a fortified hill in front of our right, which Sheridan and Wright had suddenly decided must be taken for the security of our army.( 2) Wright, seeing my command near at hand, ordered Ricketts to send to me for a regiment to reinforce the repulsed troops. I sent the 126th Ohio under Captain George W. Hoge, and it soon became seriously imperilled in a renewed attack. Discovering this, I followed it with the 6th Maryland under Major C. K. Prentiss, and, uniting the two with other troops, charged the heights just at dark and carried them. My two regiments occupied them for the night.( 3)

Sheridan, on the 21st, ordered Torbert with Merritt and Wilson's cavalry divisions (save Devin's brigade) to the Luray Valley, with instructions to drive out any force of the enemy he might encounter, and, if possible, cross over from that Valley to New Market, and intercept Early's retreat, should the latter be defeated in the impending battle. Averell's cavalry division was on the Back or Cedar Creek road, well advanced.

The Sixth and Nineteenth Corps held their positions of the previous evening, and threatened the enemy in front. Part of my brigade was continued on the advance line during the forenoon of the 22d, the remainder in reserve. The real attack was to be made by Crook, but this rendered it desirable to conceal his movements and deceive the vigilant enemy. While Crook remained in hiding in the timber, Sheridan decided to demonstrate against Early's left centre in such way as to lead him to expect a formidable assault there. Accordingly the whole of Ricketts' division with Averell's cavalry was, about 12 M., rather defiantly displayed and moved conspicuously to our right, and close upon the enemy's front. My position in partial reserve made my command the most available for this movement. I was therefore ordered to take the advance, followed by Colonel Emerson with the First Brigade. The movement was made in full sight of the enemy and under the fire of his guns. We gained, after some fighting, a ridge that extended near to Tumbling Run on the north of the enemy's fortifications. The enemy fought hard to hold possession of this ridge as a protection to his left and as a good lookout. Under Ricketts' orders I continued by repeated charges to push the enemy along this ridge for about three quarters of a mile until he was forced to abandon it, cross the Run, and take refuge within his works. Under such cover as we could get my men were now held within easy musket shot of the enemy. During this movement our guns in the rear tried to aid us, but it was hard to tell which we suffered from the most—our own shells or the enemy's fire. Averell's cavalry pushed back the enemy's skirmishers still farther to our right.

The enemy, from his signal station of Three-Top Mountain, took the movements of Ricketts and Averell to be a preparation for a real attack, designed to fall upon the front of Ramseur's division, and he prepared to meet it. While these operations were taking place, Crook moved his infantry under cover of the thick timber along the face of Little North Mountain, and by 4 P.M. reached a position with his two divisions full on Early's left flank. Crook at once crossed the narrow Valley and bore down on the enemy's extreme left, which at once gave way. Ramseur, in my front, had been attentively watching Ricketts, and now seeing the danger from Crook, commenced drawing his troops out of his breastworks and changing front to his left. I was near enough to discover this movement, and, to prevent its consummation, I ordered an immediate charge, which was executed on a run. Ramseur, discovering the new and seemingly more imminent danger, tried to reoccupy his works, but, simultaneously, Crook charged, and Ramseur's troops, caught in the mist of his movement, fell into confusion, became panic-stricken, and fled through the timber or were captured. This spread a panic to Early's entire army. The troops of my command did not halt to fire in the charge, but crossed the Run and struggled up the precipitous banks and over the breastworks, suffering little loss, and were soon in possession of eight of the enemy's guns and some prisoners. They met inside of the enemy's fortifications and commingled with Crook's men. When the charge was well under way, Colonel George A. (Sandy) Forsyth ( 4) of Sheridan's staff reached me on the gallop. He was the bearer of orders, but did not deliver them. He only exclaimed: "You are all right; you need no orders." He, later, explained that Sheridan had sent him to direct me to assault, if opportunity presented, in co-operation with Crook.

In passing on horseback around the right of the enemy's works to gain an entrance, and while going up a steep hill in the timber, I fell in with a mounted officer wearing a plain blouse and a slouch hat, but with no insignia of rank. We continued together for a short time, he inquiring of the progress of the battle as I had observed it. I asked him if he knew what General Crook was doing. He modestly laughed, and said Crook was just then engaged with me in gaining an entrance to the enemy's fortifications, and that he supposed his command was pursuing Early. Here began an acquaintance with the hero of this battle, that ripened into a friendship which ended only with his death.

Early could not rally his troops to a stand, and all his guns in position behind his works fell into our hands. Night only saved him and his demoralized army from capture. The other divisions of the Sixth and the Nineteenth Corps came up promptly, but the battle was over with the assault.

Captain Jed. Hotchkiss, of the Topographical Engineers serving in Early's army, describes the operations in his journal of the 22d, thus:

"The enemy at 1 P.M. advanced several lines of battle in front of Ramseur, but did not come far, and only drove in our skirmish line. At 4.30 P.M. they drove in the skirmishers in front of Gordon and opened a lively artillery duel. At the same time a flanking force that had come on our left, near the North Mountain, advanced and drove away the cavalry and moved on the left flank of our infantry —rather beyond it. The brigade there (Battle's) was ordered to move to the left, and the whole line was ordered to extend that way, moving along the line of the breastworks. But the enemy attacking just then (5.30 P.M.) the second brigade from the left, instead of marching by the line of works, was marched across an angle by its commander. The enemy seeing this movement rushed over the works, and the brigade fled in confusion, thus letting the enemy into the rear of Early's division, as well as of Gordon's and the rest of Rodes'; our whole line gave way towards the right, offering little or no resistance, and the enemy came on and occupied our line. General Early and staff were near by, and I with others went after Wharton (to the right), but it was too late."

At 4 A.M. next morning Early dispatched Lee:

"Late yesterday the enemy attacked my position at Fisher's Hill and succeeded in driving back the left of my line, which was defended by the cavalry, and throwing a force in the rear of the left of my infantry, when the whole of the troops gave way in a panic and could not be rallied. This resulted in the loss of twelve pieces of artillery, though my loss in men is not large."( 5)

He, later, reported his killed and wounded at Fisher's Hill at 240, missing 995; total, 1235.( 6) Many of his missing were doubtless killed or wounded.

The Union killed and wounded were:( 7)

Killed. Wounded. Aggregate. Sixth Army Corps 27 208 235 Nineteenth Army Corps 15 86 101 Army of W. Va. (Crook) 8 152 160 Cavalry 2 11 13 —- —- —- Totals 52 457 509

The killed and wounded in my brigade were 80, exactly one half the casualties in Crook's command, and above one third in the Sixth Corps.

The victory of Fisher's Hill, though comparatively bloodless, was one of the most complete of the war. But from the inability of Torbert to drive Fitz Lee's cavalry (then under Wickham in consequence of Fitz Lee being wounded at Opequon) from the Luray Valley and to gain a position in Early's rear, the latter's army would have been destroyed. Torbert encountered Wickham in a narrow gorge and was unable to dislodge him in time. Sheridan's infantry assembled on the Valley pike south of Fisher's Hill after dark, and continuing the pursuit all night, capturing many stragglers and two more guns, reached Woodstock twelve miles farther south at daybreak. Averell was ordered to push forward up the Cedar Creek road and debouch at Woodstock in rear of the retreating foe. This, for some reason, he did not do, but soon after dark went into camp and awaited daylight. He reached Woodstock after the infantry corps, too late to cut off or assail the enemy. For this and some other alleged delinquencies Sheridan relieved him from command of his division, and assigned Colonel William H. Powell to succeed him.

Early collected his broken forces and essayed to make a stand at Rude's Hill, east of the Shenandoah and south of Mount Jackson. As our troops advanced to attack him, however, he withdrew rapidly in the direction of Staunton. After passing New Market he took a road leading to Brown's Gap, where he was joined by his cavalry from the Luray Valley and Kershaw's division and Cutshaw's artillery, which had left him at Stephenson's Depot on the 15th.

Not until the 25th did Torbert with his cavalry reach Sheridan at New Market. Some of Sheridan's infantry advanced as far as Mount Crawford and Lacey Springs, while the main body of the cavalry pushed to Staunton and Waynesboro.

An incident occurred on the evening of the 3d of October that had something to do with the severity of the orders relating to the destruction of property in the Shenandoah valley. Lieutenant John R. Meigs, Sheridan's engineer officer, while returning from a topographical survey of the country near Dayton, accompanied by two assistants, fell in with three men in our uniform, and rode with them towards Sheridan's headquarters. Suddenly these men turned on Lieutenant Meigs and, though demanding his surrender, shot and killed him. One of his assistants was captured and one escaped and reported the event. Sheridan was much enraged, as the killing of the Lieutenant was little less than murder, occurring, as it did, within our lines. The three men were probably disguised Confederates operating near their homes. Sheridan ordered Custer, who had succeeded to the command of Wilson's cavalry division, to burn all houses within an area of five miles within the spot where Meigs was killed. The next morning Custer proceeded to execute this order. The designated area included the village of Dayton. When a few houses had been burned the order was suspended, and Custer was required instead to bring in all able-bodied men as prisoners.( 8)

General T. W. Rosser, with a cavalry brigade from Richmond, joined Early on the 5th of October, and the latter's army, being otherwise much strengthened, soon began again to show signs of activity.

As the Sixth Corps was expected to rejoin the Army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg, Sheridan decided to withdraw at least as far as Strasburg, and he determined also to lay waste the Valley, as it was a great magazine of supplies for the Confederate armies. He commenced to move on the 6th, the infantry taking the advance. The cavalry had begun the work of destruction at Waynesboro and Staunton. It usually remained quiet during the day, then at night, while moving, set fire to all grain stacks, barns, and mills, thus leaving behind it nothing but a waste. The fires lit up the Valley and the mountain sides, producing a picture of resplendent grandeur seldom witnessed. The flames lighted up the fertile Valley, casting a hideous glare, commingled with clouds of smoke, over the foot- hills and to the summits of the great mountain ranges on each side of the doomed Valley. The occasional discharge of artillery helped to make the panorama sublime. Fire and sword here literally combined in the real work of war. Of the necessity or wisdom of this destruction of property there may be doubts, yet the war had then progressed to an acute stage. All possible means to hasten its termination seemed justifiable. Chambersburg, Pa., had been wantonly burned July 30, 1864. It has been charged that Sheridan declared that he would so completely destroy everything in the Valley that a "crow would have to carry a haversack when he flew over it." The Confederates, with Rosser, their new cavalry leader, pursued and daily assaulted Sheridan's rear-guard. This continued until the evening of the 8th. Rosser's apparent success was heralded in an exaggerated way at Richmond. He was bulletined there as the "Savior of the Valley." He had recently before his advent in the Valley won reputation in a raid on which he had captured and driven off some cattle belonging to Grant's army. Torbert was ordered by Sheridan, on the night of the 8th, to whip Rosser the next morning or get whipped.

The infantry of the army was halted to await the issue of the cavalry battle. Sheridan informed Torbert that he would witness the fight from Round Top Mountain. Merritt's division was encamped on the Valley pike at the foot of this mountain, just north of Tom's Brook, and Custer's division about five miles farther north and west near Tumbling Run. Custer during the night moved southward by the Back road, which lay about three miles to the westward of the pike. At early daylight, Rosser, believing our army was still falling back, unexpectedly met and assailed Custer with three cavalry brigades, and almost simultaneously Merritt, in turn, assailed Lomax and Johnson's cavalry divisions on the valley pike. Merritt extended his right and Custer his left until the two divisions united, when, under Torbert, they charged upon and broke Rosser's lines all along Tom's Brook. The battle lasted about two hours, when Rosser's entire force fell into the wildest disorder, and in falling back degenerated into a rout. Torbert ( 9) pursued for twenty-five miles, capturing about three hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery with their caissons, and all Rosser's wagons and ambulances, including his headquarters wagons with his official papers. It was said that subsequent bulletins announcing Rosser's anticipated victories for the day were found. Rosser's fame as a soldier, earned by years of hard fighting, was lost at Tom's Brook in two hours.

Disasters had now become so frequent to the Confederates in the Valley that some wag at Richmond marked a fresh shipment of new guns destined for Early's army: "General Sheridan, care of Jubal A. Early."

Sheridan's army retired to the north of Cedar Creek. The Sixth Corps, having orders to rejoin the Army of the Potomac, continued its march eastward towards Front Royal, expecting to proceed to Piedmont and there take cars for Alexandria. It abandoned that route, however, on the 12th, and marched towards Ashby's Gap, with a view of passing through it to Washington, and going thence, by transports, to City Point.(10) When this corps was partly across the Shenandoah near Millwood, on the 13th, an order came from Sheridan for Wright to return with his corps to Cedar Creek. This order was given in consequence of Early's return to Fisher's Hill. The necessity of the Sixth Corps' action will soon be apparent. It reached Cedar Creek and went into camp at noon of the 14th.

I recall the incident of a red fox starting to run through the temporary bivouac of the corps at Millwood. The troops all turned out, about 10,000, formed a ring around it, while a few horsemen rode after it until it fell from fright and exhaustion. The officers and men of an army always enjoyed incidents of this character. There was, however, more serious diversion near at hand for these bronzed soldiers.

( 1) War Records, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 152.

( 2) Ibid., p. 152.

( 3) Ibid., p. 223 (Ricketts' Report).

( 4) Forsyth, precisely four years later, while in command of fifty picked scouts was surrounded on Beecher Island, on the Arickaree fork of the Republican River, by about nine hundred Indians, led by the celebrated chief, Roman Nose, and made the most desperate fight known in the annals of our Indian wars. Lieutenant Beecher, Surgeon Movers, and six of the scouts were killed and twenty others severely wounded. Forsyth was himself struck in the right thigh and his left leg was broken by rifle balls. He held out eight days; meantime two of his scouts succeeded in eluding the Indians, and, reaching Fort Wallace, 110 miles distant, returned with a relieving party.—Custer's Life on the Plains, 88-98.

( 5) War Records, vol. xliii., Part I., p. 557.

( 6) Ibid., p. 556.

( 7) Ibid., p. 124.

( 8) Memoirs of Sheridan, vol. ii., pp. 50-2.

( 9) General A. T. A. Torbert distinguished himself on many fields and survived the war. While making a voyage on the steamer Vera Cruz he was shipwrecked off the Florida coast, August 29, 1880. He heroically aided others to escape death, and with almost superhuman exertion kept himself afloat on a broken spar for twenty hours, and thus reached shore, only to sink down and die from exhaustion.

(10) Memoirs of Sheridan, vol. ii., p. 59.

CHAPTER X Battle of Cedar Creek, October 19, 1864, with Comments Thereon— Also Personal Mention and Incidents

General Early, upon his arrival at Fisher's Hill with his reorganized army, assumed, on the 13th of October, an aggressive attitude by pushing a division of infantry north of Strasburg and his cavalry along the Back road towards Cedar Creek. This brought on sharp engagements, in which Colonel Thoburn's division of Crook's corps and Custer's cavalry participated. Early seems to have acted in the belief that all but Crook's command had gone to Petersburg. This action resulted in bringing Wright back to Cedar Creek, as we have seen.

Secretary Stanton, by telegram on the 13th, summoned Sheridan to Washington for consultation as to the latter's future operations.

Early, having met unexpected resistance, withdrew his forces at night to Fisher's Hill, and quiet being restored, Sheridan started on the 16th to Washington, via Front Royal and Manassas Gap. He took with him as far as Front Royal his cavalry, under Torbert, intending to push them through Chester Gap to the Virginia Central Railroad at Charlottesville, to make an extensive raid east of the Blue Ridge.

Early had a signal station on Three Top Mountain in plain view of our signal officers, who knew the Confederate signal code. From this station there was flagged, on the 16th, this message:

"To Lieutenant-General Early:

"Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan.

"Longstreet, Lieutenant-General."

Wright, who was left in command of the army at Cedar Creek, forwarded this message to Sheridan, who received it when near Front Royal. Wright, also, in a communication accompanying the message, expressed fear of an attack in the absence of the cavalry. He anticipated that it would fall on his right. Sheridan, deeming it best to be on the safe side, abandoned the cavalry raid, and ordered Torbert to report back to Wright, cautioning the latter to be well on his guard, and expressing the opinion to Wright that if attacked he could beat the enemy.( 1) Sheridan with a cavalry escort proceeded to Rectortown, the terminus of the railroad; there took cars, and arrived in Washington the morning of the 17th. He held a consultation with Stanton and Halleck, and with certain members of his staff left Washington at 12 M. by rail, arriving the evening of the same day at Martinsburg. Here he was met by an escort of three hundred cavalry. He left Martinsburg the next morning (18th), and reached Winchester about 3 P.M., twenty-two miles distant. He tarried at the latter place over night, making some survey of the surrounding heights as to their utility for fortifications.

But to return to his army. Torbert reached Cedar Creek with the cavalry on the 17th. The Longstreet message was a ruse. Longstreet, though in Richmond, was not on duty, not having fully recovered from his wound received in the Wilderness.( 2)

The position of the opposing armies the night of the 18th of October can be briefly stated.

The Union Army was encamped on each side of the turnpike, facing southward, and north of Cedar Creek, a tributary of the Shenandoah, which, flowing in general direction from northwest to southeast, empties into the river about two miles west of Strasburg. The north branch of the Shenandoah flows northward to Fisher's Hill, thence bending to the eastward at the foot of and around the north end of Three Top (or Massanutten) Mountain, thence, forming a junction with the south branch, past Front Royal to the west and again northward, emptying into the Potomac at Harper's Ferry.

Crook's two divisions, Colonel Joseph Thoburn and Colonel Rutherford B. Hayes commanding, were wholly to the east of the pike; Thoburn's division well advanced, his front conforming to the course of the creek; the Nineteenth Corps (Emory's), two divisions, lay on each side of the pike, covering the bridge and ford in its immediate front, and the Sixth was on Emory's right. Ricketts, Wheaton, and Getty's divisions of the Sixth were encamped in the order named from left to right. Meadow Brook (sometimes called Marsh Run), a small stream, with rugged banks, flowing from north to south and emptying into Cedar Creek, separated the left of Ricketts' division from the right of the Nineteenth Corps. The Sixth Corps' front conformed to the line of Cedar Creek; Getty's division being retired, and consequently much nearer than the others to Middletown. My brigade was the left of the Sixth, and its left rested on Meadow Brook. Merritt's cavalry was in close proximity to Getty's right. Custer was about one and a half miles to Merritt's right, on the Back road beyond a range of hills and near the foot of Little North Mountain. The whole course of the Back road is through a rough country not adapted to cavalry operations. Powell's cavalry division was near Front Royal. Army headquarters were at the Belle Grove House on the heights west of the pike, immediately in rear of the right of the Nineteenth Corps. Wright's headquarters were a short distance to the rear of Sheridan's.

The supply and baggage trains of our army were about one mile behind its right centre and about the same distance from Middletown, a village twelve miles south of Winchester, and about two miles north of the Cedar Creek bridge. Getty and Merritt's camps were, in general, westward of Middletown. The front of our army covered about two miles; Custer's and Thoburn's divisions, on the right and left, being outside of this limit.

The Union Army was not intrenched, save a portion of the Nineteenth and Eighth Corps. Owing to reports that Early had withdrawn southward, Wright ordered a brigade of the Nineteenth Corps to start at daylight of the 19th to make a strong reconnoissance. The Union troops, except only the usual guards and pickets, quietly slept in their tents the night of the 18th of October.

The Confederate Army was encamped on Fisher's Hill, two miles south of Strasburg and about six miles from the centre of the Union Army, measured by the pike. Three Top Mountain was east and south of a bend of the Shenandoah; its north end abutting close up to the river. General J. B. Gordon and Captain Hotchkiss, from the Confederate signal station of Three Top, on the 18th, with field- glasses, marked the location of all the Union camps, and on their report Early decided to attack the next morning.( 3) Accordingly, Gordon, Ramseur, and Pegram's divisions and Payne's cavalry brigade were moved in the night across the river, thence along the foot of Three Top Mountain, and along its north end eastward to and again across the river at Bowman and McIntorf's Fords below the mouth of Cedar Creek, and thence, by 4 A.M., to a position east of the main camp of Crook's corps. These divisions were under Gordon. Kershaw and Wharton's divisions marched by the pike to the north of Strasburg, and there separated; the former moving to the eastward, accompanied by Early. Kershaw crossed Cedar Creek at Robert's Ford, about one and a half miles above its mouth, which brought him in front of Thoburn of Crook's corps. Wharton, followed by all of Early's artillery, continued on the pike and took position in advance of Hupp's Hill, less than a mile south of the bridge over Cedar Creek. He had orders to push across the bridge as soon as Gordon made an attack on the Union left and rear, and thus bring the artillery into action. Lomax's cavalry division, theretofore posted in Luray Valley, was ordered to elude Powell's cavalry, join the right of Gordon, and co-operate with him in the attack. Rosser's cavalry divisions were pushed up the night of the 18th close in front of Custer, with orders to attack simultaneously with Gordon. The enemy did not know Sheridan was absent from his army, and Payne's cavalry, which accompanied Gordon, was ordered to penetrate to the Belle Grove House and make him a prisoner.( 4)

Wright was in command of the army for all military operations, but otherwise it was commanded in Sheridan's name, during his absence, by his staff. Few of the army knew Sheridan was away when the battle opened.

At 4 A.M. the still sleeping Union Army was aroused by sharp firing far off on its right. Rosser had attacked Custer; but though there was some surprise, Custer held his ground. This was the initial attack, but almost at the moment Rosser's guns were heard came an assault on Thoburn by Kershaw, followed at once by Gordon with his three divisions and Payne's cavalry on Hayes' division of Crook's corps. Besides being surprised Crook's divisions were largely outnumbered, and, consequently, after a short and desperate resistance, both divisions were broken and somewhat dispersed. Thoburn was killed. The officers heroically did all in their power to rally the men, but some were captured, and seventeen pieces of artillery lost. Early soon joined Gordon with Kershaw, and together they fell on the left of the Nineteenth Corps, which was at the same time assailed in front by Wharton with all Early's artillery. The Nineteenth shared the fate of Crook's corps, and was soon broken and flying to the rear. This brought Early's five infantry divisions and his artillery together on the heights near the Belle Grove House, from whence they could operate against the Sixth Corps. Sheridan's headquarters were captured, his staff being forced to fly with such official papers as they could collect. Crook and Emory's commands were routed before it was fully day-dawn. The position of our cavalry was such that it could render no immediate aid against the main attack. Gordon prolonged his line towards Middletown, facing generally to the westward, and was joined on his right by some irregular cavalry, part of which appeared north of Middletown. These forces threatened our ammunition and other trains. A thick fog helped to conceal the enemy's movements. The disaster sustained must not be attributed to a want of skill and bravery on the part of the troops of the Eighth and Nineteenth. Crook, aided by such gallant officers as Colonels Thoburn, Thomas M. Harris, and Milton Wells of the First, and Colonels R. B. Hayes, H. F. Devol, James M. Comly, and B. F. Coates of his Second Division, and Emory, assisted by Generals McMillen and Dwight and Colonels Davis and Thomas of his First, and Generals Grover and Birge and Colonels Porter, Molineux, Dan. McCauley, and Shunk of his Second Division, did all possible under the circumstances to avert calamity. No braver or more skillful officers could be found. These corps were victims of a surprise. Their position was badly chosen, and not well protected by pickets and guards. There is no necessity to defend the good name of the officers and men who were so ingloriously routed. The battle, so successful thus far for Early, was, however, not over, nor was he to have continued good fortune. Wright had retained the active command of the Sixth Corps, though by virtue of seniority he was in command of the army. He, as soon as the attack was made, turned his corps over to Ricketts, who turned the command of his division (Third) over to me, and I turned my brigade over to Colonel Wm. H. Ball of the 122d Ohio. My division was the next to be struck by Early's troops. It had time, however, to break camp, form, and face about to the eastward. Before it was fairly daylight, my old brigade, under Colonel Ball, had crossed Meadow Brook by my order and was advancing up the heights near the Belle Grove House. Ball's brigade was run through by the broken troops of the Nineteenth, and it was feared for a time it could not be held steady. The enemy swung across the Valley pike to my left and rear, and thus completely isolated my division from other Union troops. Notwithstanding this situation the division firmly held its exposed position. To cover a wider front the brigades were fought and manoeuvred separately in single battle line, and often faced in different directions. I soon found I was able to drive or hold back any enemy in front of any part of my command. The fighting became general and furious and promised an early success to our arms. Wheaton, next on my right, and Getty next on his right as camped, likewise faced about and moved eastward towards the pike to meet the enemy already in possession of it immediately south of Middletown. Getty encountered some of Gordon's infantry and cavalry among our trains. Getty and Wheaton were soon widely separated from each other, and Wheaton, the nearest, was still not within a half mile of my division, which was the farthest south. The broken troops of the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps had retreated as far as Middletown, and some soon reached Newtown, pressing onward towards Winchester, carrying exaggerated reports of disaster to the whole army. Custer's cavalry was still held in Cedar Creek Valley by Rosser. Merritt came gallantly to the rescue, and by 7 A.M. the enemy were confronted at every point and held at bay. Getty met a strong force along Meadow Brook, near Middletown, but maintained himself, though his right flank was assailed by one of Gordon's divisions. Wheaton fought his division in the interval between Getty's and my divisions, he having frequently to change front, as had the other divisions, to meet flanking columns of the enemy. The complete isolation of the divisions of the Sixth Corps rendered it impossible for their commanders to know the real situation throughout the field, and neither of them had any assurance of co-operation or assistance from the others. My division, being the farthest south, was in great danger of being cut off. Each division maintained, from 6 A.M. until after 9 A.M., a battle of its own. Neither division was, during that time, driven from its position by any direct attack made on it, and every change of position by any considerable part of the Sixth Corps was deliberately made under orders and while not pressed by the enemy in front. Wright was with Getty or Wheaton until assured of their ability to cover the trains and to hold their ground. Ricketts, in command of the corps, after directing me to hold my position near Cedar Creek until further orders, left me, promising soon to return with assistance, but about 7 A.M. he fell pierced through the chest with a rifle ball, and was borne from the field.( 5) The command of the corps then devolved on Getty, and the command of his division of General L. A. Grant of Vermont.

About 8 A.M. Wright came to me with information of Getty and Wheaton's success. He said he would soon have cavalry on the enemy's right flank, and that he believed the battle could be won. He was tranquil, buoyant, and self-possessed. He did not seem to pay any attention to a wound under his chin, made by a passing bullet, though he was bleeding profusely. He had no staff officer with him, and was without escort.( 6) I ordered Captain Damon of my staff to report to him. Wright repeated Ricketts' order to hold my division behind Meadow Brook well down to Cedar Creek. This I had been enabled to do when not threatened on my left flank. It must be remembered that after 6 A.M. the divisions of the corps having been faced about, and the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps driven to the rear, Getty's division became the left, Wheaton's the centre, and my division the right of the army, the whole line facing, in general, eastward. In this position, isolated as before stated, the divisions maintained the battle. My greatest anxiety arose of the possibility of the ammunition of the men becoming exhausted. One officer conducted to us through the fog, smoke, and confusion a considerable supply of cartridges in boxes strapped on mules. Colonel Ball sent Captain R. W. Wiley of his staff to hasten forward another such mule-caravan. Owing to a change in the location of the brigade, he conducted it within the Confederate lines. Captain Wiley was the only officer of my division captured in the day's battle.

Getty, who had successfully fought with his division near Middletown, took up a position before 10 A.M. with the left of his division resting on the turnpike north of the town about three fourths of a mile.

My division was fiercely engaged all the morning. Colonel Tompkins, Chief of Artillery of the Sixth Corps, assembled a number of guns on the plateau to my left under Captains McKnight and Adams. They were unsupported by infantry. The enemy approached under cover of the smoke and fog and captured most of them. Under my direction, Colonel W. H. Henry and Captain C. K. Prentiss with the 10th Vermont and 6th Maryland changed front and retook them after a fierce struggle. The guns not disabled were drawn off by hand. My position was in open ground along the crest of a ridge, right resting near Cedar Creek, covering Marsh Run (or Meadow Brook). The enemy forced a crossing of the Run near its mouth, but soon were driven back; then a fierce attack came on my left from a large force. This too was repulsed. The battle raged with alternate assaults on the front and flanks of my division. They were each repulsed with considerable loss to the enemy. The situation grew so promising that about 9 A.M. I ordered a general charge along the whole line. This was promptly made, and the enemy were driven to the east of Marsh Run, and complete success seemed assured, when a large force of the enemy again appeared on my left in the direction of Middletown. The charge had to be suspended and combinations made to meet the new danger. The battle still raged with great fury, my line being frequently compelled to change front to meet the flank attacks. Sometimes a portion of it faced northward, another eastward, and another southward. The enemy was at no time able to drive us. All changes of position were made under my orders and after the enemy had been repulsed in his direct attacks. The importance of uniting the divisions of the Sixth Corps was kept in mind, and as the enemy was driven back on my left, my command slowly moved northward towards Getty and Wheaton's battles. My battle had been maintained, in general, a mile and more southwestward of Middletown and in the vicinity of our camps of the night before. Getty and Wheaton had thus far fought their divisions near Marsh Run to the south of Middletown. Before 10 A.M., I reached the Woollen Mill road that ran parallel to the general line my troops were then holding and almost at right angles to the turnpike, westward to Cedar Creek from the south end of Middletown. At this time the enemy was in my front, and our flanks were no longer threatened. He had suspended further attacks with his infantry, but concentrated on us a heavy artillery fire which our guns returned. We had lost few prisoners; even the wounded of the division had been brought off. The men were in compact order and no demoralization had taken place. The captured and missing from the division the entire day was two officers and thirty-four men.( 7) From this last position I leisurely moved the division to the left and rear over the Old Forge road (which extended west from the Valley pike at the north end of Middletown over Middle Marsh Brook and a ridge to the Creek), passing Wheaton's front, and united with Getty's right. Emerson's brigade of the division through a mistake temporarily moved a short distance north of the line designated, but the error was promptly corrected. Colonel Ball was then, by me, directed to cover the front of the entire division with a heavy line of skirmishers, and he accordingly deployed the 110th Ohio and 138th Pennsylvania under Lieutenant-Colonel Otho H. Binkley, and moved them about three hundred yards to the front along the outskirts of a woods, with orders to hold the enemy in check as long as possible if attacked. Orders were at once given to resupply the troops with ammunition. Wheaton's division soon formed on my right, and for the first time after the battle opened the Sixth Corps was united.

The enemy was now in possession of the camps (except of the cavalry) of our army, and was flushed with success. Wright had given orders for all the broken troops to be re-organized, and for Merritt and Custer's cavalry to move from the right to the left of the army,( 8) and the division commanders were told the enemy would be attacked about 12 M.

We left Sheridan at Winchester. He remained there the night of the 18th of October. Before rising in the morning an officer on picket duty in front of the city reported artillery firing in the direction of his army. Sheridan interpreted this as a strong reconnoissance in which the enemy was being felt. He had been notified the night before that Wright had ordered such a reconnoissance. Further reports of heavy firing having reached him, he, at 8.30 A.M. started to join his army. When he reached Mill Creek just south of Winchester, with his escort following, he distinctly heard the continuous roar of artillery, which satisfied him his army was engaged in strong battle. As he approached Kearnstown and came upon a high place in the road, he caught sight of some demoralized soldiers, camp followers, and baggage and sutler wagons, in great confusion, hurrying to the rear. There were in this mixed mass sutlers and their clerks, teamsters, bummers, cow-leaders, servants, and all manner of camp followers. The sight greatly disturbed Sheridan; it was almost appalling to him. Such a scene in greater or less degree may usually be witnessed in the rear of any great army in battle. The common false reports of the army being all overwhelmed and in retreat were proclaimed by these flying men as justification of their own disgraceful conduct. Sheridan, notwithstanding his experience as a soldier, was impressed with the belief that his whole army was defeated and in retreat.( 9) He formed, while riding through these people, erroneous impressions of what had taken place in the morning battle which were never removed from his mind. The steady roar of guns and rattle of musketry should have told him that some organized forces were, at least, baring their breasts bravely to the enemy and standing as food for shot and shell. Sheridan mistook the disorganized horde he passed through for substantial portions of a wholly routed army, and this mistake prevented him, even later, from clearly understanding the real situation.

He first met Torbert, his Chief of Cavalry, and from him only learned what had taken place to the left of and around Middletown. Torbert, who had not been to the right, where the battle with infantry had raged for hours, assumed that demoralization extended over that part of the field. Next Sheridan came to Getty's division (10.30 A.M.),(10) and finding it and its brave commander in unbroken line, facing the foe, assumed without further investigation that no other infantry troops were doing likewise. He justly gives Getty's division and the cavalry credit for being "in the presence of and resisting the enemy."(11) Getty, though theretofore in command of the Sixth Corps, did not pretend to know the position or the previous movements of the army. He had remained constantly with his division, and wisely held the turnpike, covering our left flank and trains. This, too, was according to Wright's order. When Sheridan arrived Getty was not actually engaged, but the enemy were, at long range, firing artillery. A shot passed close to Sheridan as he approached Getty. After the first salutation, Sheridan said to Getty: "Emory's corps is four miles to your rear, and Wheaton's division of your corps is two miles in your rear. I will form them on your division." Sheridan then said nothing of Crook's corps, or of the Third Division of the Sixth, which I commanded.(12)

Up to this time Sheridan had not met Wright, who was on the right of the army, nor could Sheridan see from the pike the troops of my division nor of Wheaton's, still to my right. My division was at no time as far to the rear as the left of Getty's line. Wright confirms my recollection of the position of my division at the time of Sheridan's arrival, but his recollection is that Wheaton had not completed a connection with my right.(13)

Colonel Ball, in his report dated the day after the battle, speaking of the final movement of the Second Brigade of my division to connect with Getty's division, correctly says: "We were ordered to move obliquely to the left and rear and connect with the right of the Second Division." Instead of having to advance to form line with Getty it was necessary to move obliquely to the rear. By about 10 A.M., the divisions of the Sixth Corps were united, the organized troops of our army were in line, and the enemy's flank movements were over. Thenceforth he had to meet us in front. Our trains were protected, and there was no thought of further retiring. The Sixth Corps had not lost any of its camp equipage, not a wagon, nor, permanently, a piece of artillery. Its organization was perfect, and there were no stragglers from its ranks. A strong line of skirmishers had been thrown forward and the men resupplied with ammunition.

An incident here occurred which came near causing my dismissal from the army. Colonel J. W. Snyder, of the 9th New York Heavy Artillery, on being ordered to hold his command ready for an early advance, notified me his men were practically out of ammunition, and that the ordnance officer reported there were no cartridges to be had of suitable size. This was the only regiment in the command armed with smooth-bore .69 calibre muskets. They required buck and ball. The other troops were armed with rifles, .58 calibre. I ordered the Colonel to instruct his men to throw away their muskets as fast as rifles could be found on the field to take their places. This his men eagerly did, and Colonel Snyder soon reported his regiment ready for action, with rifles in their hands and forty rounds of cartridges. This regiment, a very large and splendid one (three battalions, four companies each), was thus kept in line to participate in the impending conflict. After the incident had been almost forgotten a letter came through the army channels from the Chief of Ordnance at Washington, advising me that the captains of companies of the 9th New York had reported, severally, that their men had thrown away their muskets "October 19, 1864, by order of Colonel Keifer, division commander," and asking me for an explanation of the reprehensible order. I plead guilty and stated the circumstances giving rise to the unusual order, but soon received a further communication from the same officer informing me that my name had been sent to the President, through the Secretary of War, for dismissal. I was told some correspondence arose over the matter, in which Generals Sheridan and Wright approved my action fully. This incident serves now to enable me to remember that Wright proposed to attack Early at 12 M.

Two or three statements of Sheridan deserve special mention. Speaking of his appearance on the field, he says:

"When nearing the Valley pike, just south of Newtown, I saw about three fourths of a mile west of the pike a body of troops, which proved to be Ricketts and Wheaton's divisions of the Sixth Corps."

And speaking of a time after he had met Getty and Wright, he says:

"I ordered Custer's division back to the right flank, and returning to the place where my headquarters had been established, I met near them Ricketts' division under General Keifer and General Frank Wheaton's division, both marching to the front."(14)

The distance from Newtown to Middletown is five miles. My division was at no time on that day within four miles of Newtown. This is also true, I am sure, of Wheaton's division. Sheridan was deceived by false reports received before his arrival, and by the sight of magnified numbers of broken troops of other corps, who had continued to the rear. It was impossible for Sheridan to have met Wheaton and myself leading our divisions to the front; besides, our divisions were not at any time within a mile of his then headquarters. Wheaton's and the right of my division were farther advanced than any part of Getty's division. This is proved by the recollection of Wright, Getty, and others, also by the reports written soon after the battle by many officers.(15) Sheridan, when he wrote, must have remembered meeting Wheaton and myself when we, together, rode to him from the right to tell him of the position and situation of our respective commands, and to assure him we could hold our ground and advance as soon as ordered. This ride brought Wheaton and me nearer Newtown than we were at any other time that day. Sheridan was so impressed by the circumstances attending his coming to the field, and by his first meeting with Torbert and Getty, and the previous reports to him, that he assumed a condition of things which did not exist. It has been stated that my division joined Getty on his right. It, however, turned out that a portion of Hayes' division of Crook's corps had united with Getty's right, though not at first distinguished by me from the latter's troops.

Years after the battle, ex-President Hayes referred to some statements in Sheridan's Memoirs thus:

"In speaking of that fight he says that, passing up the pike, sometimes on one side, and sometimes on the other, coming to Cedar Creek, he struck the First Division of Getty, of the Sixth Corps; that he passed along that division a short distance, when there arose out of a hollow before him a line consisting entirely of officers of Crook's Army of West Virginia and of color-bearers. The army had been stampeded in the morning, but these people were not panic-stricken. They saluted him, but there was nothing now between the enemy and him and the fugitives but this division of Getty's. Said he: 'These officers seemed to rise right up from the ground.' This was twenty-four years afterward, but he recollects it perfectly well except names. Among them, however, he recollects seeing one, Colonel R. B. Hayes, since President of the United States, and drops the story there, leaving the impression that there were no men there—no privates, no army—simply some color- bearers and some officers.

"The fact is that in the hollow, just in the rear, was a line of men, a thousand or twelve hundred, probably, and they had thrown up a little barricade and were lying close behind it. He came up and saw these officers and did not see the men, or seems not to have seen them; but I had no idea at the time that he did not see the private soldiers in that line. He now tells that singular story of a line of officers, a line of color-bearers, and no force. The fact is that first came Getty's division, and then mine, and then came General Keifer's division, all lying down behind that barricade, but in good condition, except that there had been some losses in the morning. General Keifer was next to me, and then came the rest of the Sixth Corps, and farther down I have no doubt the Nineteenth Corps was in line. We had then been, I suppose, an hour or an hour and a half in that position."(16)

Passing from disputed, though important, points relating to the battle, all agree that when Sheridan reached his army a battle had been fought and lost to all appearance, and that the Union Army had been forced to retire to a new position. It should also be regarded beyond controversy that the Sixth Corps had been united before his arrival, that broken troops of other commands were being formed on the Sixth, and that the enemy also had been forced to change front, and was arrested in his advance.

Sheridan's presence went far towards giving confidence to his army, and to inspire the men with a spirit of success. While the army loved Wright, and believed in him, his temperament was not such as to cause him to work an army up to a high state of enthusiasm. A deep chagrin over the morning's disaster pervaded our army, and had much to do with the subsequent efforts to win a victory. Sheridan showed himself to the troops by riding along the front, and he was loudly cheered. He assured them of success before the day ended. During the lull in the day's battle some of the broken troops of the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps were reorganized.

Wright resumed command of his corps and Getty his division. Before Sheridan came Wright had instructed his division commanders that he would assume the offensive, and it was understood our army would advance about 12 M., as soon as an ample resupply of ammunition could be issued. Sheridan, however, postponed the time for assuming the offensive until 3 P.M. Early, still filled with high hopes of complete victory, about 1 P.M. pushed forward on our entire front. He did not drive in the strong line of skirmishers, and the attack was easily repulsed. It seemed to me then, as it did to Wright and others, that our whole army should have been thrown against the enemy on this repulse, and thus decided the day. Sheridan, however, adhered to his purpose to act on the defensive until later in the day. A false report that a Confederate column was moving towards Winchester on the Front Royal road caused Sheridan to delay his attack until about 4 P.M.

Early promptly realized that the conditions had changed, that the armies must meet face to face. It will be kept in mind that our army was now fronting southward instead of eastward, and Early's army was forced to face northward instead of westward, as in the morning's battle.

Early, hoping to hold the ground already won and thus reap some of the fruits of victory, retired, on his repulse, beyond the range of our guns, and took up a strong position, with his infantry and artillery, mainly on a natural amphitheatre of hills, centre a little retired, extending from a point north of Cedar Creek near Middle Marsh Brook on his left to and across the turnpike near Middletown, protecting his flanks west of this brook and east of the town with his cavalry and horse artillery. Early employed his men busily for the succeeding two hours in throwing up lunettes or redans to cover his field guns. His men were skillfully posted behind stone fences, common in the Valley, and on portions of his line behind temporary breastworks.

Early, before 12 P.M., wired Richmond he had won a complete victory, and would drive the Union Army across the Potomac. At 4 P.M. our army went forward in single line, with no considerable reserves, but in splendid style. Getty, with his left still on the turnpike, was the division of direction. My orders were to hold my left on Getty's right. Wheaton was to keep connection with my right, and the Nineteenth Corps with the right of the Sixth Corps; and the cavalry, Merritt east of Middletown and Custer on Cedar Creek, to cover the flanks. In verifying my position just before starting, I found troops of Hayes' command filling a space of two or three hundred yards between Getty's right and my left. I discovered Hayes temporarily resting on the ground a short distance in rear of his men, with his staff around him. From him I learned he had no orders to advance, whereupon I requested him to withdraw his men so I could close the interval before the movement commenced. He promptly rose, mounted his horse, and said: "If this army goes forward I will fill that gap, with or without orders." Unfortunately, orders came to him to withdraw, and with others of his corps (Eighth) form in reserve near the turnpike. His withdrawal left, at the last moment, a gap which could only be filled by obliqueing my division to the left as it was moving forward. This produced some unsteadiness in the line, and the right brigade (Emerson's) continued the movement too long, causing some massing of troops in the centre of the division, and some disorder resulted while they were under a severe infantry and artillery fire. This necessary movement also caused an interval between Wheaton's division and mine, thereby imperilling my right. Our attack, however, was not checked until we had gone forward about one mile. The enemy's centre was driven back upon his partially intrenched line on the heights mentioned. This brought my division under a most destructive fire of artillery and infantry from front and flanks. My right flank was especially exposed, as it had gone forward farther than the troops on the right.

The loss in the division was severe, and it became impossible to hold the exposed troops to the charge. They had not fired as they advanced. The division retired a short distance, where it was halted and promptly faced about. In less than five minutes it was again charging the Confederate left centre. The right of Getty's division and Wheaton's left went forward with the second charge, and an advance position in close rifle range of the enemy was gained and held. My division was partly protected by a stone fence located on the north of an open field, while the Confederates held the farther side of the field, about three hundred yards distant, and were also protected by a stone fence as well as by some temporary breastworks. The enemy occupied the higher ground, and the field was lower in the centre than on either side. The battle here was obstinate and, for a time, promised to extend into the night. Early's artillery in my front did little execution, as it was located on the crest of the hills behind his infantry line, and the gunners, when they undertook to work their guns, were exposed to our infantry fire. Wheaton's division and that part of the Nineteenth Corps to his right, though not keeping pace with the centre, steadily gained ground; likewise the cavalry. Getty, though under orders to hold his left on the pike, moved his division forward slowly, making a left half wheel. In this movement Getty's left reached Middletown, and his right swung somewhat past it on the west.

Merritt's cavalry pushed around east of Middletown. At this juncture, Kershaw's division and part of Gordon's division were in front of my right and part of Ramseur's in front of my left. Pegram's and Wharton's divisions were in front of Getty, Wharton being, in part, east of the pike confronting our cavalry. Early's left was held by Gordon's troops, including some of his cavalry.(17) Early now made heroic efforts to hold his position, hoping at night he could withdraw with some of the fruits of victory. Sheridan made every possible exertion to dislodge the enemy, and to accomplish this he was much engaged, personally, on the flanks with the cavalry. Wright, calm, confident, and unperturbed, gave close attention to his corps, and was constantly exposed. I frequently met him at this crisis. He ordered a further charge upon the enemy's centre. This seemed impossible with the tired troops. Preparation was, however, made to attempt it. The firing in this last position had continued for about an hour, during which both sides had suffered heavily. As the sun was going down behind the mountains that autumnal evening it became apparent something decisive must take place or night would end the day of blood leaving the enemy in possession of the principal part of the battle-field.

So confident was Early of final victory that, earlier, in the day, he ordered up his headquarters and supply trains, and by 4 P.M. they commenced to arrive on the field.

It must be remembered that the two armies had been manoeuvring and fighting for twelve hours, with little food or rest and an insufficient supply of water. Exhausted troops may be held in line, especially when under some cover, but it is difficult to move then in a charge with the spirit essential to success. There remained a considerable interval between Wheaton's left and my right. An illustrative incident again occurred here in resupplying our men with ammunition. Three mules loaded with boxes filled with cartridges were conducted by an ordnance sergeant through the interval on my right in open view of both armies, and with indifferent leisure to and behind the stone wall occupied by the Confederates. The sergeant and his party were not fired on. Word was passed along the line for my division to make a charge on a given signal, and all subordinate officers were instructed to use the utmost exertion to make it a success. The incident of the sergeant and his party going into the enemy's line served to suggest to me the possibility of penetrating it with a small body of our soldiers.

Before giving an order to charge, I instructed Colonel Emerson, commanding the First Brigade, to hastily form, under a competent staff officer, a small body of men, and direct them to advance rapidly along the west of a stone wall extending traversely from my right to the enemy's position, and to penetrate through a gap between two of the enemy's brigades, with instructions to open an enfilading fire on him as soon as his flank was reached. The gap was between two of Gordon's brigades. The order was promptly and handsomely executed, and its execution produced the desired effect. Captain H. W. Day (151st New York, Acting Brigade Inspector) was charged with the execution of this order.(18)

The party consisted of about 125 men, each of whom knew that if unsuccessful death or capture must follow. Colonel Moses H. Granger (122d Ohio) voluntarily aided, and, in some sense, directed the movement of this small party. The gap was penetrated on the run and a fire opened on the exposed flanks of the Confederates which started them from the cover of their works and the stone wall. At this juncture the division, as ordered, poured a destructive fire upon the now exposed Confederates, and at once charging across the field, drove the enemy in utter rout. A panic seized Gordon's troops, who were the first struck, then spread to Kershaw's and Ramseur's divisions, successively on Gordon's right.(19)

I quote from the report of Colonel Emerson, commanding my First Brigade, in which he describes the final battle, including the breaking of Early's line:

"The brigade lay here under a fire of shell until about 4 P.M., when Captain Smith came with an order to move forward connecting on the left with the Second Brigade. The brigade moved through the woods, when it received a very heavy fire on the right flank, under which it was broken, but soon reformed in its old position, and again moved forward to a stone fence, the enemy being behind another stone wall in front with a clear field intervening. There was a stone wall running from the right flank of the brigade to the wall behind which the enemy lay. Some of my men lay scattered along this last named wall. The First Division lay to the right and in advance, nearly parallel with the enemy. Everything appeared to be at a deadlock, with heavy firing of artillery and musketry. At this stage Colonel Keifer, commanding division, came to me and inquired what men were those lying along the wall running from our line to the enemy's, and ordered me to send them forward to flank the enemy and drive them from their position. The execution of the order was entrusted to Captain H. W. Day, Inspector of the [Second] Brigade, who proceeded along the wall, and getting on the enemy's flank dislodged them, when the brigade was moved rapidly forward, in connection with the Second Brigade, and did not stop until we arrived in the works of the Nineteenth Corps, when, in accordance with orders from Colonel Keifer, the brigade went into its position of the morning, got its breakfast, and encamped, satisfied that it had done a good day's work before breakfast."(20)

Also from a report of Colonel Ball, commanding Second Brigade:

"About 3 P.M. the whole army advanced in one line upon the enemy. Immediately before advancing the troops were withdrawn to the left, and my left connected with the Second Division, Sixth Army Corps, while my right connected with the First Brigade, Third Division. We advanced half a mile to the edge of the woods, when we were met by a well-directed fire from the right flank. This fire was returned with spirit some fifteen minutes, when the troops wavered and fell back a short distance in some disorder. The Second and Third Divisions gave way at the same time. The line was speedily reformed and moved forward and became engaged with the enemy again, each force occupying a stone wall. Advantage was taken of a wall or fence running perpendicular to and connecting with that occupied by the enemy. After the action had continued here about three quarters of an hour a heavy volley was fired at the enemy from the transverse wall. A hurried and general retreat of the enemy immediately followed, and our troops eagerly followed, firing upon the retreating army as it ran, and giving no opportunity to the enemy to reform or make a stand.

"Several efforts were made by the enemy during the pursuit to rally, but the enthusiastic pursuit foiled all such efforts. Our troops were subject to artillery fire of solid shot, shell, and grape during the pursuit, and we reached the intrenchments of the Nineteenth Army Corps (which were captured in the morning) as the sun set. Here the pursuit by the infantry was discontinued. The first and second, and probably the third colors planted on the recovered works of the Nineteenth Army Corps were of regiments composing this brigade."(21)

General Early tells the effect on his army of penetrating his line by the small body of our troops:

"A number of bold attempts were made during the subsequent part of the day, by the enemy's cavalry, to break our line on the right, but they were invariably repulsed. Late in the afternoon, the enemy's infantry advanced against Ramseur, Kershaw, and Gordon's lines, and the attack on Ramseur and Kershaw's front was handsomely repulsed in my view, and I hoped that the day was finally ours, but a portion of the enemy had penetrated an interval which was between Evans' brigade, on the extreme left, and the rest of the line, when that brigade gave way, and Gordon's other brigades soon followed. General Gordon made every possible effort to rally his men and lead them back against the enemy, but without avail. The information of this affair, with exaggerations, passed rapidly along Kershaw and Ramseur's lines, and their men, under the apprehension of being flanked, commenced falling back in disorder, though no enemy was pressing them, and this gave me the first intimation of Gordon's condition. At the same time the enemy's cavalry, observing the disorder on our ranks, made another charge on our right, but was again repulsed. Every effort was made to stop and rally Kershaw and Ramseur's men, but the mass of them resisted all appeals, and continued to go to the rear without waiting for any effort to retrieve the partial disaster."(22)

The charge of the division resulted in the total overthrow of Early's army. Pegram and Wharton's divisions on our extreme left near Middletown were soon involved in the disaster, and our whole army went forward, meeting little resistance, taking many prisoners and guns, only halting when Early's forces were either destroyed, captured, or driven in the wildest disorder beyond Cedar Creek.(23) Our cavalry under Merritt and Custer pursued until late in the night to Fisher's Hill, south of Strasburg, and made many captures.

It often has been claimed that the cavalry on the right is entitled to the credit of overthrowing Early's army. It is true Custer did make some attempts on Gordon's left and rear, but the appearance of Rosser's cavalry on Custer's right, north and east of Cedar Creek, called him off, and it was not until after Early's position had been penetrated and a general retreat had commenced that Custer again appeared on the enemy's flank and rear. His presence there had much to do with the wild retreat of Early's men. Custer, who claimed much for his cavalry, and insisted that it captured forty- five pieces of artillery, etc., did not in his report of the battle pretend that his division caused the final break in Early's forces. Speaking of his last charge on the left, Custer says:

"Seeing so large a force of cavalry bearing rapidly down upon an unprotected flank and their line of retreat in danger of being intercepted, the lines of the enemy, already broken, now gave way in the utmost confusion."(24)

Part of Early's artillery and caissons, with ammunition and supply trains, also ambulances and many battle flags, were captured north of Cedar Creek. The cavalry, however, seized, south of the Creek, other substantial fruits of the great victory, including many guns and headquarters baggage and other trains, and some prisoners. A panic seized teamsters on the turnpike; they cut out mules or horses to escape upon, leaving the teams to mingle in the greatest disorder. Drivers of ambulances filled with dead and wounded also fled, and the animals ran with them unguided over the field. The scene was of the wildest ruin. The gloom of night soon fell over the field to add to its appalling character.

The guns lost by the Eighth and Nineteenth Corps were taken in the morning to the public square of Strasburg and triumphantly parked on exhibition. Our cavalry found them there at night. Little that makes up an army was left to Early; the disaster reached every part of his army save, possibly, his cavalry which operated on the remote flanks. In a large sense, Rosser's cavalry, throughout the day, had been neutralized by a portion of Custer's, and Lomax had been held back by Powell on the Front Royal road. Dismay indescribable extended to the Confederate officers as well as the private soldiers. Among the former were some of the best and bravest the South produced. Early himself possessed the confidence of General Lee. Early had, as division commanders, General John B. Gordon (since in the United States Senate), Joseph B. Kershaw, Stephen D. Ramseur, John Pegram, and Gabriel C. Wharton, all of whom had won distinction. Ramseur fell mortally wounded in attempting a last stand near the Belle Grove House, and died there. Early fled from the field, surrounded by a few faithful followers, deeply chagrined and dejected, and filled with unjust censure of his own troops.(25) The next day found him still without an organized army.(26) He seems to have deserved a better fate. His star of military glory had set. It never rose again. A few months later he reached Richmond with a single attendant, having barely escaped capture shortly before by a detachment of Sheridan's cavalry. He finally returned to Southwest Virginia, where Lee relieved him of all command, March 30, 1865.

His misfortunes in the Valley, doubtless, had much to do with his continued implacable hatred to the Union. Sheridan was his nemesis. Just after Kirby Smith had surrendered in 1865 and Sheridan was on his way to the Rio Grande, the latter encountered Early escaping across the Mississippi in a small boat, with his horses swimming beside it. He got away, but his horses were captured.(27)

Sheridan, for his great skill and gallantry, justly won the plaudits of his country, and his fame as a soldier will be immortal, but not alone on account of his victory at Cedar Creek, nor on account of "Sheridan's Ride," as described by the poet Read.(28)

My division, at dark, resumed its camp of the night before, as did other divisions of the army.

When the fifteen hours of carnage had ceased, and the sun had gone down, spreading the gloom of a chilly October night over the wide extended field, there remained a scene more horrid than usual. The dead and dying of the two armies were commingled. Many of the wounded had dragged themselves to the streams in search of the first want of a wounded man—water. Many mangled and loosed horses were straggling over the field to add to the confusion. Wagons, gun-carriages, and caissons were strewn in disorder in the rear of the last stand of the Confederate Army. Abandoned ambulances, sometimes filled with dead and dying Confederates, were to be seen in large numbers, and loose teams dragged overturned vehicles over the hills and through the ravines. Dead and dying men were found in the darkness almost everywhere. Cries of agony from the suffering victims were heard in all directions, and the moans of wounded animals added much to the horrors of the night.

"Mercy abandons the arena of battle," but when the conflict is ended mercy again asserts itself. The disabled of both armies were cared for alike. Far into the night, with some all the long night, the heroes in the day's strife ministered to friend and foe alike, where but the night before our army had peacefully slumbered, little dreaming of the death struggle of the coming day. To an efficient medical corps, however, belong the chief credit for the good work done in caring for the unfortunate.

The loss in officers was unusually great. Besides Colonel Thoburn, killed in the opening of the battle, General D. D. Bidwell fell early in the day, and Colonel Charles R. Lowell, Jr., was killed near its close while leading a charge of his cavalry brigade. Eighty-six Union officers were killed or mortally wounded.

Many distinguished officers were wounded. Of the six officers belonging to my brigade staff who were turned over to Colonel Ball in the early morning, one only (Captain J. T. Rorer) remained uninjured at night. Two were dead.

All was peaceful enough on the 20th, though on every hand the evidence of the preceding day's struggle was to be seen. The dead of both armies were buried—the blue and the gray in separate trenches, to await the resurrection morn.

I have no purpose to speak of individual acts of bravery. The number of killed and wounded of each army was about the same. The casualties in my division, excluding 36 captured or missing, were, killed, 8 officers and 100 men; wounded, 34 officers and 528 men; total, 670. Wheaton lost, killed and wounded, 470; and Getty, 677. The killed and wounded in the Sixth Corps were 1926, including 109 of its artillery.

Much credit for the victory was given by Sheridan to the cavalry. Its total loss, in the three divisions under Torbert, was, killed, 2 officers and 27 men; wounded, 9 officers and 115 men; total, 153; not one fourth the number killed and wounded in my infantry division alone. The killed and wounded in my old brigade, under Colonel Ball, were 421.

The casualties of the Union Army are shown by the following official table:(29)

Killed. Wounded. Captured or Missing. Aggregate. Officers. Officers. Officers. Men. Men. Men. Sixth Army Corps 23 275 103 1525 6 194 2126 Nineteenth Army Corps 19 238 109 1127 14 776 2383 Army of West Virginia 7 41 17 253 10 530 858 Provisional Division 1 11 6 66 18 102 Cavalry 2 27 9 115 43 196 - - - - Grand total 52 529 244 3186 30 1561 5665

The table includes 156 of the artillery, killed or wounded.

The total Union killed and wounded was 4074.

The dead and wounded in the Sixth Corps, and in some other of the infantry divisions approximated twenty per cent. of those engaged. This was larger by six per cent. than similar losses in the French army at Marengo, where Napoleon won a victory which enabled him, later, to wear the iron crown of Charlemagne; by six per cent. than at Austerlitz, the battle of the "Three Emperors"; by eight per cent. than in Wellington's army at Waterloo, where Napoleon's star of glory set; or in either the German or French army at Gravelotte, or at Sedan, where Napoleon III. laid down his imperial crown; and larger by about fifteen per cent. than the average like losses in the Austrian and French armies at Hohenlinden.

"Where drums beat at dead of night, Commanding the fires of death to light."

The number killed and wounded in this battle is far below that in some other great battles of the Rebellion, yet the loss for the Union Army alone was only a little below the aggregate like losses in the American army from Lexington to Yorktown (1775-1781), and approximately the same as in the American army in the Mexican War, from Palo Alto to the City of Mexico (1846-1848).(30)

If either of two things had not occurred prior to the battle, the result of it might have been different. Had Early not precipitated an attack with an infantry division and Rosser's cavalry on the 13th of October, Wright, with the Sixth Corps, would have gone to Petersburg; and had the fake (Longstreet) dispatch of the 16th not been flagged from the Confederate signal station on Three Top Mountain, Torbert, with the cavalry, would have been east of the Blue Ridge on the intended raid. But for the Longstreet dispatch, Sheridan most likely would have tarried in Washington or delayed his movements on his return trip. Could the Sixth Corps, could the cavalry, or could Sheridan have been spared from the battle?

The principal peculiarities of the engagement were: (1) That an ably commanded army was surprised in its camp, and, in considerable part, driven from it at the opening of the battle; (2) that notwithstanding this, it won, at the close of the day, the most signal and complete field-victory of the war, with the possible exception of those won at Nashville and Sailor's Creek; (3) the Confederate Army was destroyed, so there was no battle for the morrow. In most instances during the Rebellion, it transpired that the defeated army sullenly retired only a short way in condition to renew the fight.

Cedar Creek, in some respects, bears a striking analogy to Marengo. Both were dual in character, each two battles in one day; the victors of the morning being the defeated and routed of the evening. Sheridan's victory over Early, like that of Napoleon over Marshal Melas, left no further fighting for the victors the next day. In one other respect, also, the comparison holds good. The commander of each of the finally routed armies sent a message about the middle of the day of battle announcing to his government a great victory, to be followed at sunset with the news of a most signal disaster.

In other respects, how dissimilar? Napoleon was, from the opening to the close of Marengo, on the field, commanding in person, sharing the defeat, then the victory. Sheridan was absent and did not participate in the discomfiture of his army, but was present at the final success. Napoleon, after his repulse, was reinforced by Desaix with 6000 men; but the Army of the Shenandoah, after the disaster of the morning, was reinforced only by its proper commander —Sheridan.

There was not a great disparity of numbers in the opposing armies at Cedar Creek. Probably 20,000 men of all arms were engaged on each side. Relative position and situation of troops must be taken into account, as well as numbers, in determining the strength of one army over another. Early has tried to excuse his defeat by claiming he had the smaller army. In response to this, Sheridan and his Provost-Marshal, Crowninshield, have tried to show that Early lost in captured more men than he claimed he had present for duty.(31) After Opequon and Fisher's Hill Early was reinforced by Kershaw's division of Longstreet's corps, Cutshaw's three batteries, and Rosser's division of cavalry with light artillery, together with many smaller detachments, all of which participated in Cedar Creek. Sheridan received no reinforcements, and Edwards' brigade of the First Division of the Sixth, Currie's of the Nineteenth, and Curtis' of the Eighth Corps were each detached, after Opequon, on other duties, and were not at Cedar Creek. The surprise and breaking up in the morning of the greater parts of Crook's and Emory's corps eliminated them, in large part, from the day's battle, and left the Sixth Corps and the cavalry to wage an unequal contest.