My Lords, I cannot trust myself with the expression of the feelings which are roused by the whole of the papers, to which I have only referred occasionally; they are the feelings with which all men of sound principles and calm judgement will read them all over Europe. I will refer to them no further than to read the indignant denial which the veteran General Filangieri, Prince of Satriano, gives to the charge of cruelty brought against his gallant and loyal army by our envoys and our consuls, and, I grieve to add, our naval commanders. (Lord Brougham here read the vehement, and even impassioned, terms in which the General refutes these foul calumnies, charging him, an officer of above half a century's service, with suffering his troops to commit enormities which no military man, of however little experience in his profession, could have permitted.)

Rely upon it, my Lords, that if anything can make more offensive the conduct of our agents in fostering revolt, and injuring the lawful government of our allies, it is the adding foul slander to gross indiscretion, revenging themselves on those whose valour and conduct has frustrated their designs, by blackening their characters, and committing that last act of cruel injustice, calumniating those you have injured, through your hatred of those to whom you have given good cause to hate you.

There is, my Lords, but one course for this country to pursue in its dealings with other States; she must abstain from all interference, all mischievous meddling with their domestic concerns, and leave them to support, or to destroy, or to amend their own institutions in their own way. Let us cherish our own Government, keeping our own institutions for our own use, but never attempt to force them upon the rest of the world. We have no such vocation, we have no such duty, no such right. Above all, we have no right to interfere between sovereigns and subjects, encouraging them to revolt, and urging them to revolution, in the vain hope that we may thus better their condition. Then, in negotiation, let us avoid the same meddling policy—shall I falsely call it?—the same restless disposition to serve one State at another's expense; showing favour and dislike capriciously and alternately, guided by mere individual and personal feelings, whether towards States or statesmen, displaying groundless likings for some and groundless hatred for others; one day supporting this Power in its aggression upon that, and when defeated, justly and signally defeated, like Sardinia, clinging to the wish that it should obtain from the victorious party an indemnity for its own foul but failing aggression. Most of all let us abide by the established policy of the country towards our old and faithful friends, not Naples merely, but Austria, whose friendship has been, in all the best times of our most eminent statesmen, deemed the very corner-stone of our foreign policy, ever since the era of 1688; above all, since King William and the Ministers and Government of his successor laid the foundations of that system. But now I can see in every act done, almost in every little matter, a rooted prejudice against Austria, and the interspersing of a few set phrases does little to prevent any reader from arriving at the same conclusion. 'Our feelings are friendly towards Austria,' and 'God forbid they should be otherwise!' I say Amen to that prayer, but when I read the dispatches with the light shed on them by the acts of our Government, and of all their agents and Ministers, when by these acts I interpret the fair words used, I perceive the latter to mean exactly nothing, and that those expressions which perpetually recur of an opposite kind speak the true sense of our rulers. But this policy is opposed to the uniform authority of our greatest statesmen. Even Mr. Fox, who was sometimes believed to have a leaning towards Russia, from the accidental transactions of 1791, when charged with undervaluing the Austrian alliance in comparison, took immediate opportunity earnestly to disavow any such opinion, and declared that our friendship with Austria was the grand element of our European system.

My Lords, I have detained you longer than I could have desired; but I felt it absolutely necessary to give your Lordships an opportunity of fully considering this momentous subject. That such things as have been done by the Government in Italy and elsewhere during the last twelve months, should pass without awakening your attention, and that your examination of the details should not call down a censure, if for no other purpose than to warn the Ministers against persisting in fatal errors, appears to me hardly within the bounds of possibility. I have, therefore, deemed it my duty to give you an opportunity of expressing the opinion which I believe a majority of this House holds, and which I know is that of all well-informed and impartial persons in every part of the world.



EARL RUSSELL JUNE 27, 1864 DENMARK AND GERMANY

My Lords, I have to lay upon your table, by command of Her Majesty, the Protocols of the proceedings of the Conference upon the affairs of Denmark and Germany, which has just been brought to a close. In laying these papers upon your Lordships' table I propose to follow the course which was pursued by the Earl of Liverpool in 1823, and I am confident that in following that example I am pursuing a course which is perfectly fair to this House and to the country. In that case the English Government had been carrying on negotiations first at Verona, the Conference at which place was attended by the Duke of Wellington, and afterwards at Paris, on the subject of the invasion of Spain. The Government of that day declared that the invasion of Spain was contrary to all the principles of English policy, and that it was an interference which was entirely opposed not only to the sentiments of this country, but to the settlement of Europe which had been come to some years before. They, therefore, protested against it, while at the same time they thought it advisable to preserve peace and declare a neutrality between this country and France. Upon the present occasion I have to discuss a question which is of a very intricate nature, and which for a long time was considered to be one that might go on for many many years without raising any exciting interest, and which was almost too complicated and too wearisome to engage much of the public attention. For the last, year, however, that question has been in a very different condition.

My Lords, before I refer to the proceedings of the Conference it is necessary to take some notice of those engagements which have been the origin of these disputes, though they were intended to put an end to all differences between Germany and Denmark. Your Lordships are well aware that in these times it is necessary that a treaty should not only have the signatures of envoys and the ratifications of Sovereigns, but that in its working it should be made to accord with the sentiments and wishes of the people who are to be governed under it. A remarkable instance of difference in this respect has occurred with regard to the operation of the Treaty of Vienna of 1815 with respect to Lombardy, and the operation of the same treaty with reference to Genoa. Your Lordships are aware that for many years great discontent prevailed in Lombardy, which was only removed by the separation of that province from Austria. On the other hand, in Genoa, by the wise and patriotic conduct of the Kings of Sardinia, all the objections, all the repugnance, which originally existed in Genoa against their rule have been finally overcome and removed, and Piedmont and Genoa are now in perfect harmony. Unfortunately the Treaty of 1852 in regard to Denmark, and the engagements which were entered into in the previous year, 1851, with respect to an arrangement between Germany and Denmark, were in their operation exceedingly unsatisfactory. It was declared, and has lately been repeated in the Conference, that an attempt was made by the King of Denmark, contrary to the engagements of 1852, and contrary also to all sound policy, to make the people of Schleswig change their national character, and so to interfere with their churches and schools as to keep up a perpetual irritation, thereby violating the spirit of the engagements between Denmark and Germany. How far those accusations were true as regards the exact letter of those engagements I will not stop to inquire; but it is quite certain that there was prevailing in Schleswig great dissatisfaction at the manner in which the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were governed, and that great complaints were made on that account against the Danish Government. It was for a long time the public opinion in this country that Germany had no reason to complain of Denmark as violating her engagements; but I am afraid that, by an impolitic course at all events, the Danish Government produced the feeling in Germany that the subjects of the King of Denmark of the German race were not fairly governed. Oppression there could not be said to be. The Government was a free Government, and, generally speaking, the people living under it were prosperous; but there was in the two Duchies much of that irritation which prevailed in Belgium previous to its separation from Holland. On the other side, it must be said that the German Governments, instead of asking that which might fairly have been demanded—instead of asking that the engagements should be kept in their spirit, and that arrangements should be made (which could easily have been devised) to give satisfaction to the people of the Duchies—made proposals inconsistent, as it appeared to me, with their engagements, pushing beyond their legitimate sense the words of those engagements, and suggested arrangements which, if they had come into operation, would have made Denmark completely subject to Germany. Among other proposals—indeed, one of the chief—was that the 900,000 people who were said to be of German race, and even the 50,000 of the Duchy of Lauenburg, should have a representation equal to that of the 1,600,000 inhabitants of the kingdom of Denmark. This was evidently so unfair and calculated to be so destructive of Danish independence and nationality, that Denmark refused to accede to it. It was, in fact such a proposal as if Scotland and Ireland were to demand each an equal number of representatives with England in the Imperial Parliament. The consequence of these disputes, unfortunately, was, that instead of the treaty taking root and fully satisfying the wishes of the people of the Duchies, there was a kind of never-ceasing irritation which burst forth as occasion arose; and, as Germany was greatly more powerful than Denmark, it was but too probable that the latter would have to suffer one day on account of the complaints which were made by the Germans. It was impossible not to foresee that such would probably be the consequence, and that the irritation to which I allude would not go on for ever without exciting great dissension and perhaps war. Therefore, in September, 1862, when I was at Brussels in attendance on Her Majesty, I explained to Sir Augustus Paget, who was shortly about to return to Denmark, a plan of pacification which it appeared to me would keep the Duchies under the rule of the King of Denmark; which would be satisfactory to themselves; which would give them a Minister for Schleswig and a body of representatives; a Minister for Holstein and a body of representatives, and would thus put an end for ever to the demand that at Copenhagen there should sit a majority of representatives for the Duchies. The Danish Government—as I think unfortunately—utterly rejected that proposal, and matters went on in the same unsatisfactory state. The diplomatic correspondence which the British Government proposed should take place did take place between Germany and Denmark, but it only produced increased bitterness and further irritation. At length in October, 1863, the German Governments at Frankfort declared that they must proceed to Federal Execution. If, my Lords, that Federal Execution had been founded on any infringement of the rights of Holstein—if it had been founded solely upon the misgovernment of Holstein, or on any violation of the rights of the Confederation, no Power would, I think, be entitled to complain of it. It embraced, however, a point which had nothing to do with Federal rule—the point of an equal representation at Copenhagen. It was then that the British Government declared that that could not be a matter of indifference, because it aimed, in fact, not only at the integrity, but at the independence, of Denmark. Things remained in this state until the death of the King of Denmark, which produced an entire alteration in the state of affairs. It was then contended on behalf of Germany that, after looking closely into some very intricate questions of representative and hereditary succession, they were bound to declare that the King of Denmark had no right to succeed to the Duchies, but that by the law of the Confederation the Prince of Augustenburg was the proper heir to the throne. This declaration, adopted almost throughout the whole of Germany, was received with applause not only by the popular, but by the Conservative party: by persons of the highest rank as well as by the general mass of the community; and every Government that pretended to adhere to the Treaty of 1852 was denounced as recreant to the cause of Germany. In this state of affairs the Governments of Austria and of Prussia took a somewhat singular and not very defensible course. In the beginning they declared in the Diet that, having a majority in favour of this declaration, they would proceed to Federal Execution—thereby, to all appearance, making the present King of Denmark responsible for that which was done by the late King, and to all intents and purposes, as it would seem, acknowledging his sovereignty over Holstein. They, at the same time, however, somewhat privately and without the general knowledge of Europe, declared that they reserved the question of the succession. It did not appear to the Danish Government, nor did it appear to Her Majesty's Government, that Federal Execution could be resisted without increasing the complications of the position. But, immediately after that took place, Austria and Prussia declared that they must occupy the Duchy of Schleswig in order to obtain the fulfilment of the engagements of 1852. Your Lordships are well aware that shortly before that declaration the Government of Denmark announced that they were ready to repeal the Constitution of November, 1863, which was the apparent ground of the proposed Federal Execution. Unfortunately, they had not acceded to that proposal when Lord Wodehouse went to Copenhagen, and when the concession might have been effectual. The German Governments, in their hurry to go to war, and being evidently determined on going to war—in the first place in order to gratify the German sentiment on the subject—took no heed of the proposal which was made by the British Government, and which was supported by France and Russia, that a protocol should be signed by the different Governments, binding Denmark to a repeal of the Constitution of November, and the German troops of Austria and Prussia entered Schleswig. I think it was impossible for the British Government to give any advice on this occasion. It was evidently the invasion of a territory which did not in any way belong to Germany, and a territory to which according to our view the King of Denmark had the fullest right. It was said that it was to be occupied as 'a material guarantee'; but no country is, I conceive, obliged to submit to an occupation of its territory which it believes it has the power and right to resist. Your Lordships are fully aware of the events of the war which subsequently took place. It resulted, as must naturally be expected, in the defeat of the Danes and the occupation of the Duchies by an overwhelming force of Austrian and Prussian troops. That being so, and the Austrian Government having always said that they were ready to agree to a Conference, and Prussia assenting to that proposal, Her Majesty's Government proposed that a Conference should be held. The Danish Government refused an armistice, but declared themselves ready to enter into a Conference. The Austrian and Prussian as well as the French Government expressed a wish that it should be attended by a Plenipotentiary of the German Confederation, and after some delay one was sent. The Conference was not assembled regularly until the 25th of April, and some delay then took place with a view of obtaining, if not an armistice, at least a suspension of arms for a considerable period. The Danish Government would not agree to an armistice; but a suspension of arms they did agree to, which was only to last for the period of four weeks. My Lords, it was difficult in matters so intricate, and on which passions had been so much roused, to come to any agreement beforehand; but Her Majesty's Government thought it their duty to proceed to the Conference, in the interests of peace, even without any such agreement. On the 12th of May, after the suspension of arms had been agreed to, I asked the Austrian and Prussian Governments to declare what it was they asked for in the interests of peace. Now, be it observed that although the Prussian Government, and the Austrian Government likewise, had continually declared that they had certain engagements to insist upon which had not been fulfilled, they never yet had agreed to specify what these engagements were which would secure peace, and by which they would be bound. When Lord Wodehouse went to Berlin on his way to Copenhagen he endeavoured, according to the instructions he had received, to obtain some explanations from the Prussian Government on this point. The Prussian Government replied, 'Let the Danish Government first repeal the Constitution of November, and we will afterwards see what arrangement they propose to put in the place of that; we will judge of that proposal and give our opinion upon it.' Nothing, I must say, could be less explicit, or a less justification for the course they were pursuing; because at the same time they were ready to carry on war to the extremity, to use all their means to invade Schleswig with all the dreadful consequences, without making a distinct declaration of their terms. When, however, the Powers were assembled in Conference, and the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia were obliged to meet the Plenipotentiaries of Russia, France, and Sweden as well as of Great Britain, they found themselves compelled to make some statement of the terms which they would require. Be it observed that throughout—even up to the 31st of January—the two German Governments had declared that they adhered to the Treaty of London, and the execution and occupation were proofs that they still adhered to the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, had no reason to suppose that their proposal would be of a different character. We were told, however, upon authority so high as to be almost official, that there was an intention on their part to propose what was called a personal union; and that personal union was to be of this nature—that the whole Duchy of Holstein and the whole Duchy of Schleswig were to be united; they were to have a separate army and navy from those of Denmark; that they were to have complete self-government; and, in fact, that the King of Denmark was to have scarcely any influence over the two Duchies. In one of the last meetings of the Conference, M. Quaade, one of the Danish Plenipotentiaries, declared that if that personal union had ever been proposed, it would have been impossible for the Danes to agree to it. Indeed, it was likely that, with the disposition which prevailed in Germany, German agitation would have produced a declaration of separation on the part of the two Duchies, and German arms would then have supported the Duchies in that wish for separation. Therefore, though nominally maintaining the integrity of Denmark, and though nominally adhering to the Treaty of 1852, the proposition of a personal union would have been, in fact, a separation of the Duchies from Denmark under a very thin transparent disguise. That, however, was not the exact proposal of the German Plenipotentiaries. In the meeting of the 17th of May the first Plenipotentiary of Prussia declared that—

What the Austrian and Prussian Governments wished was a pacification which would assure to the Duchies absolute guarantees against the recurrence of any foreign oppression, and which, by thus excluding for the future any subject of dispute, of revolution, and of war, would guarantee to Germany that security in the North which she requires in order not to fall again periodically into the state of affairs which brought on the present war. These guarantees can only be found in the complete political independence of the Duchies and their close connexion by means of common institutions.—Protocol, No. 5.

Now, this declaration on the part of the two Powers is not a little remarkable. Your Lordships will observe the phrase, 'guarantee against foreign oppression.' That oppression meant the oppression of the Government of the King of Denmark. But he was Duke of Holstein de facto and de jure, his title had never been disputed, and his government, if it was oppressive, could only be a domestic oppression. The two Powers, therefore, of Austria and Prussia, to whom Europe had a right to look for respect for the faith of treaties, declared at once that the government of the Danish Duchies was of the nature of a foreign oppression. At the same time, the declaration 'for a security against any subject of dispute, war, and revolution', was so ambiguous that none of the Plenipotentiaries could tell what its meaning was. The Russian Plenipotentiary said he was quite at a loss to know what it meant. The French Plenipotentiary followed in the same tone; and for a long period we were quite unable in the Conference to say what was really the intention of the two Powers. We asked who was to be the Sovereign of these two Duchies which were to be thus governed? The answer of the German Plenipotentiary was that that was a question to be decided by the Diet. Austria and Prussia, but more especially Austria, had declared hitherto that the Treaty of 1852 was a question that was decided—that the late King of Denmark had a right to settle the succession, and that his decision in favour of Prince Christian, the present King of Denmark, would be respected by those Powers. It was equally notorious that the Diet, if it met, would, by a considerable majority, declare against the title of the King of Denmark. Count Bernstorff did not deny that, and the Plenipotentiary of the German Diet declared at once that the majority of the Diet would never consent to an arrangement which even in an eventual or conditional form, would sanction a union between the Duchies and Denmark. Thus, while the two Powers, Austria and Prussia, were in appearance consenting to the maintenance of the Treaty of 1852, telling us that the Diet might ultimately decide in favour of the King of Denmark as the legitimate heir, the German Plenipotentiary, who, in fact, had greater power than either the Plenipotentiaries of Austria or Prussia, because they never at any time ventured to oppose that which he declared to be the will of Germany, declared that Germany would never consent to the restoration of the Duchies to Denmark.

My Lords, at the next meeting of the Conference, which took place on the 17th of May, there was a more positive declaration. Austria and Prussia then declared that they could no longer acknowledge the King of Denmark as Sovereign of the Duchies; that the whole of the two Duchies ought to be separated from Denmark and placed under the sovereignty of the Prince of Augustenburg; that he should be declared the rightful possessor of the throne of these Duchies, and that that was a declaration which would be hailed throughout Germany and would meet the wishes of the German people. Before this declaration was made, in preparation for such an event, the Plenipotentiaries of the neutral Powers had met to consider the situation. The Government of France had had some communication with the Government of this country. The French Government had declared that they thought the personal union could not be the foundation of a lasting peace, and that the only mode of obtaining such a peace would be to separate the Danish nationalities in the Duchies from the German nationalities. After these communications I consulted the other neutral Plenipotentiaries, who met at my private house for the purpose of considering the matter. We came to the conclusion that it was useless to propose that the two Duchies should remain under the King of Denmark. It was quite obvious that unless we had been prepared—I should say all of us prepared—to carry on a great war for the purpose, after the hostilities which had taken place, after the declarations which had been made by the German Powers, if anything like a personal union had been established there would at once have been a declaration on the part of the Duchies and on the part of the German Confederation, supported by Austria and Prussia, that the Prince of Augustenburg was entitled to hold the Duchies, and that he was the rightful Sovereign; and that if the Danish troops entered to dispute possession of the Duchies, they would be opposed by Austria, Prussia, and the whole Confederation. We had therefore to consider what we could propose which would be most favourable to Denmark under the circumstances which I have stated to your Lordships. Of course we could only propose something of a diplomatic nature, which we thought likely to be accepted. We accordingly prepared a proposition, which I as President of the Conference was to submit, and which I was assured would be supported by the Plenipotentiaries of France and Sweden, and as far as possible by the Russian Plenipotentiary, though he had not then received definite instructions. What we proposed was that the King of Denmark should yield to Germany the Duchy of Holstein and the Southern portion of the Duchy of Schleswig—that the boundary should be drawn as far as the Schlei, and should go along by the Dannewerke: that there should be no menacing fortresses on the boundary; that the German Powers should not interfere any further or any more in the internal affairs of Denmark; and that a general guarantee should be given by the European Powers for the rest of the Danish possessions. With regard to this proposal, the Danish Plenipotentiaries made a declaration which I think did that Government the highest honour. They declared that the King of Denmark had accepted the Crown of that country according to the Treaty of 1852, thinking that his doing so would tend to the peace of Europe and to preserve the balance of power; but, as the surrender of a great part of his territory was now demanded, he was ready to make that concession, provided that entire independence and self-government were left to the remainder of his dominions. The King of Denmark declared he was ready to accept the line of the Schlei as proposed: and without defining it he declared it was necessary there should be a military and commercial line drawn for the sake of the independence of Denmark; and he declared moreover that there should be an European guarantee for the possession of the remainder of his territory. The German Governments, while they accepted the proposal for the partition of Schleswig—while they no longer demanded the whole of that Duchy—declared that, according to their views, the line of demarcation must go much further north. They said that the line must be from Apenrade to Tondern; and that they could not assent to the line proposed on the part of the neutral Plenipotentiaries. They declared, at the same time, they were perfectly ready to agree that, with regard to the territory to be left to the King of Denmark, there should be no right of interference and no interference whatever with the independence of Denmark. I confess, my Lords, it appeared to me that the proposal we submitted was the best arrangement that could be made. It was not to be expected that those Duchies could be retained under the nominal sovereignty of the King of Denmark without giving rise to fresh disputes and fresh complications. It was obvious, also, that if that sovereignty had been admitted to be vested in the King of Denmark, there would be constant interference on the part of Germany, and that interference, which has gone on for the last twelve years, giving rise to continual disputes, would cause constant contentions in future. It would be far better that Denmark should have a restricted territory, with the understanding that in her restricted territory her own Government should have absolute control, than that she should be subject to perpetual interference and control on the part of the German Powers. The French Government more especially took that view. The French Plenipotentiary declared it had always been the opinion of his Government that the division of the nationalities was the cause of all the complications which had taken place, and that nothing could be settled satisfactorily until there had been a separation of the nationalities; but he declared in the name of the Emperor, at the same time, that it was necessary great forbearance should be shown towards Denmark as the weaker Power; that the part evidently and confessedly German should be given to the Duchy of Holstein; and with regard to the mixed districts, as well as the Danish part, they should be left to Denmark as a means of preserving her independence, and giving her a mercantile and military line. Unhappily, my Lords, upon this occasion, as throughout those questions, the German Powers, instead of taking those views of generosity and forbearance which were urged so well by the Emperor of the French, determined to insist on what, undoubtedly, was their right if the right of conquest was the only one to be considered. They stood on the right of conquest: they stood on the victory they had gained on the disputed territory; but with respect to generosity and forbearance towards a Power so disproportionate to themselves—with respect to a due consideration for the peace of Europe—with respect to the absence of a desire to rush again into war in order to retain that which by right of conquest they might say they had acquired—I should not be treating your Lordships with sincerity if I said there was any such forbearance, any such generosity, any such regard for the peace of Europe, manifested on the part of Austria, Prussia, and the German Confederation. I must say likewise, my Lords, that there was an assumption which was not justifiable on the part of Denmark, and in reference to which my noble friend Lord Clarendon made a clear and pointed statement at a subsequent meeting of the Conference. The Danish Government considered that the line which we had proposed in the name of the neutral Powers, and after consulting the neutral Powers, as a basis of pacification, was an English proposal—an English proposal by which England was bound to abide, and which she was bound to maintain at all hazards. Nothing of the kind, however, was ever stated by the British Plenipotentiaries; nothing of the kind had Denmark a right to expect. I did inform the Danish Plenipotentiary, when there was a question of continuing the Armistice, that I should not propose nor support any division but the line of the Schlei without the consent of Denmark; but I never gave him to understand that England would support that line otherwise than by urging its adoption in conjunction with the other neutral Powers at the meetings of the Conference. The last suspension of arms was only for a fortnight, and it remained for us to consider what should be done—the two parties being obstinately bent on the maintenance of their different rights—the Germans insisting on the line from Apenrade to Tondern, and the Danes insisting first upon a line extending more to the south than that which the British Plenipotentiary had proposed in the Conference, and afterwards agreeing to that line, but declaring that they would make no further concessions. What could be done to bring about an amicable understanding? In this situation of affairs, knowing that Denmark would not consent to any other line—indeed, not knowing whether the German Powers would concede any other line—the Prussian Plenipotentiary said that he was ready to recommend to his Government a line which should proceed from the north of Flensburg to Tondern, but that he was not authorized to propose that line in the name of his Government. The Austrian Plenipotentiary did not accede at first, but afterwards said that he would recommend it to the consideration of his Government. But the Danes at once refused it, and the proposal fell to the ground. It then remained to be considered whether, without proposing any other line, some means could not be found by which peace might still be preserved. We considered that question very anxiously, and it came to be a subject of reflection whether we could not, even at the last moment, propose something which might bring the two Powers to an agreement. It was obvious that many and great difficulties had to be removed. The King of Denmark was ready to yield a part of his dominions of which he had been deprived by war. The German Plenipotentiaries were ready to say that a part of the Duchy of Schleswig should remain under the rule of the King of Denmark. Both Powers were ready to accept the proposal that there should be no interference in future in the internal government of Denmark; and all the Powers, I think, would have been ready, if there had been an agreement on other points, to give a guarantee—a European guarantee—to Denmark, which would have left that Power, indeed, without any sovereignty over the German population, but still possessed of an independent territory, and still possessed of a free and happy Government, not subject to foreign interference. Well, the question was, whether, there remaining only this line of frontier to be decided, it could not be arranged in some way to which both Powers would agree. We thought it possible that in that case the spirit of the Protocol of Paris might be adopted. The Protocol of Paris said, that when serious differences arose between any Powers, and there was danger of those differences being carried to hostilities, the good offices of a friendly Power might be resorted to, and it appeared to us that if this principle could be brought into action, the continuance of the war might be obviated. It was stated at the same time by the French Plenipotentiary at Paris, and by others, that where the honour or the essential interests of a country were mainly concerned, it could not be expected that such differences should be submitted to a friendly Power. But, in our opinion, this was not such a case. It appeared to us that sooner than rush into war—sooner, above all, than expose Denmark again to such an unequal contest—it was possible to propose the good offices of a friendly Power, with this condition—that both Powers should submit to the decision respecting the line of frontier offered by the arbitrator to whom the matter might be referred. In fact it was to be an arbitration rather than good offices. Now, I cannot but believe that any impartial arbitrator would have fixed upon a line far more favourable to Denmark than that which the German Powers had proposed. A Power which was impartial and without passion would probably have given, not the line as far as the north of Flensburg, but a line to the south of Flensburg, whereby that important town might have been preserved to Denmark, and that Power would have had a port in the Northern Sea by which her independence might have been maintained. It was, however, entirely a question for the two Powers to accept or to refuse that arbitration. I may say further that my noble friend (the Earl of Clarendon) and myself, who were the British Plenipotentiaries at the Conference, thought that after the fairness and the impartiality which the Emperor of the French had shown throughout this question, his friendliness, and at the same time his wish for the maintenance of peace, the two Powers might well have accepted his good offices. The opinion was, however, expressed by one of the Plenipotentiaries—an opinion afterwards confirmed by an official declaration—that no Power represented at the Conference, and therefore committed to a certain degree as to the questions before the Conference, could properly be accepted as the arbitrating Power. It then appeared to us, and we so informed the Plenipotentiaries, that in our opinion the King of the Belgians, whose impartiality is likewise well known, and whose long experience of European affairs makes him most desirous to preserve the peace of Europe, might perform these functions to the satisfaction of the Powers concerned. But the question of who should be the arbitrator never arose, Austria and Prussia said that they could accept the good offices of a friendly Power in accordance with the Treaty of Paris, but that they could not accept the decision of that friendly Power as final; and in the meantime they asked for a long armistice. Now, my Lords, it appeared to us that if that proposal were accepted, then, after a period of two or three months of armistice, during which the naval operations of Denmark would be suspended, a decision would have been announced which, if it in any way displeased the German Powers—if it did not go to the full extent of all their demands—would have been refused by them. The Plenipotentiary of the German Confederation completely confirmed our view of this question by declaring that in his opinion this territory of Schleswig belonged altogether to the Prince of Augustenburg, or rather belonged to the competency of the German Confederation; that they could therefore accept no arbitration, and could not be bound by anything that was decided. They evidently meant that every foot of territory in Schleswig might, if they chose it, be demanded at the end of the good offices by the German Confederation. Thus, according to what I am sorry to say has been the usual manner of the German Powers, their refusal was not a direct and straightforward one. It is somewhat like their declaration at the beginning, that they went into Holstein for the purpose of Federal Execution, that they went into Schleswig for the purpose of material occupation, and that they wished the question of the sovereignty of Holstein and Schleswig to be decided in the German Confederation, knowing perfectly well how that decision would be made; and then, lastly, they wished to have the appearance of accepting the good offices of an arbitrator without really intending to accept them. The Danish Plenipotentiaries, most unfortunately in my opinion—most imprudently in my opinion—gave a decided refusal to the proposal. Of course, it was for them to judge as to the security of their own country and the prospects of war; but I certainly regret deeply that they should have rejected the arbitration. The proposal that I made certainly did not exactly agree with the line of the Schlei, but it was a proposal which we, the British Plenipotentiaries, thought was for the benefit of Denmark, and was most likely to obtain for the Danes a peace which would have been satisfactory to them. And now, my Lords, all other means having failed, one other proposal was made on the part of France by the French Plenipotentiary, who was directed to make this proposal—that, leaving the Danish part of Schleswig to the Danes, and the German part to the Germans, the line to be drawn in the disputed district should be decided by a vote of the population, to be taken in some fair manner, the details of which might be considered afterwards. [The Earl of Clarendon: The votes were to be taken in each commune.] Yes, and these votes were to decide the line to be drawn and the district which was to belong to Germany and to Denmark respectively.

The Earl of Derby: May I ask the noble Earl if that decision was to be taken during the occupation of the province by the German troops?

Earl Russell: No; the French proposition was clearly that the Prussian troops should evacuate the district before the vote was taken by means of Commissioners. At the same time, it was the opinion of the Danes—and I believe that opinion to have been well founded—that although the people of Schleswig generally were perfectly satisfied to remain united to Denmark, such had been the effects of the occupation, such had been the agitation on the part of Germany, the political societies in Germany having sent persons to agitate all over the country, that the decisions would through that influence have become corrupted, and the plan of the Emperor, which otherwise might have been successful, would have been rendered unjust. The proposition was accordingly refused. My Lords, it was with great regret that the Plenipotentiaries of the neutral Powers received this decision.

My Lords, I must say that my noble friend (the Earl of Clarendon) and I have received from France and from the other neutral Powers the firmest support during the continuance of the Conference. We held frequent private meetings with the neutral Powers, in which we discussed the proposals to be made. There was nothing exhibited in those meetings but the most earnest desire to provide for the safety and independence of Denmark, and I must say that the utmost harmony prevailed on all sides; and the French, Russian, and Swedish Plenipotentiaries alike did all in their power to contribute towards the success of the proposals we made. We shall, therefore, leave the Conference with a strong sense of our obligations for the support which we received from them. After this decision there remained nothing more for the Conference but to accept the declaration which was made at the last meeting—and which has been repeated to me to-day by the Austrian Ambassador—it is simply that the two Powers, Austria and Prussia, have no intention of carrying on hostilities with the view of obtaining possession of any territory beyond the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and that they have no intention of making any conquest of any portion of the Danish territory on the continent or of the Danish islands. That declaration is purely voluntary, and is not in any way extorted as to the manner in which these Powers propose to act. At the same time it comes rather late—though they make the declaration I suppose they cannot intend us to accept it—and we certainly cannot accept it as one upon which we can implicitly rely. After that which has happened with respect to the Treaty of 1852, and after that which has happened with respect to the treatment of the Danes after the pledges given, but more as I am afraid owing to German popular opinion, which Austria is desirous to conciliate, which Prussia is desirous to conciliate, which the German Confederation, above all, is anxious to conciliate, I am sorry to say that, greatly as I have respected Austria, greatly as I have respected Prussia, we can no longer rely, as we have done, upon their declarations.

Well, my Lords, but the question comes as to what, at the end of the Conference, is our position, and what will be our course? And without intending, or being able to pledge, the Government in case of contingencies which have not arisen, I think it is due to Parliament and to the country—especially at this period of the Session—to declare what is the view which the Government take of the position, the duty, the interests, and the future policy of England. My Lords, with regard to our honour, I conceive that in honour we are in no way engaged to take part in the present war. Although it has been stated to the contrary on the part of Denmark more than once, there has been at no time any pledge given on the part of this country or Her Majesty's Government promising material assistance to Denmark in this contest. Three times Her Majesty's Government during the period I have held the seals of the Foreign Office have endeavoured to induce Denmark to accept propositions which we regarded as favourable to her interests. In 1862 I made propositions to her, but those propositions were rejected. When Lord Wodehouse went to Denmark, he and the Russian Plenipotentiary proposed that Denmark should repeal the Constitution which she had concurred in but a few days before; but she would not at that time receive the proposal. We believe that, if she had consented to the arbitration which we proposed in the Conference, the result would have been as favourable to her as, under the circumstances in which she was placed, she could have expected. My Lords, I do not blame Denmark for the course she has thought fit to pursue. She has a right—I should be sorry to reproach her in any way in her present state of weakness—she has an undoubted right to refuse our propositions, but we on our side have also a right to take into consideration the duty, honour, and interests of this country, and not to make that duty, that honour, and those interests subordinate to the interests of any foreign Power whatever. My Lords, our honour not being engaged, we have to consider what we might be led to do for the interests of other Powers, and for the sake of that balance of power which in 1852 was declared by general consent to be connected with the integrity of Denmark. My Lords, I cannot but believe that the Treaty of 1852 having been entered into, if there had been at an early period—say in December or January last—if France, Great Britain, and Russia, supported by the assistance which they might have counted upon receiving from Sweden, had declared for the maintenance of the Treaty of 1852—the succession of the King of Denmark might have been established without difficulty, and might have been peaceably maintained, and that the King and his Government would have remedied all the grievances of which his German subjects complained. I believe the King of Denmark would have found it to his advantage to grant to his German subjects that freedom, those privileges, and that self-government in their internal and domestic matters which they had demanded, and that they would thus have become quite contented as subjects to the King of Denmark. That desirable result, however, could not be brought about. In reference to the Treaty of 1852, I have to repeat what I stated on a previous occasion—that it was not a treaty of guarantee, that the Governments of France and Russia were competent to acknowledge the treaty, but that they had not pledged themselves to maintain the connexion of Schleswig and Denmark, that not being a question of the general balance of power in Europe. Well, the French Government have frequently declared and have repeated to us only within the last twenty-four hours, that the Emperor does not consider it essential to the interest of France to support the line of the Schlei. He declares he does not think that France would be inclined to go to war for such an object. He urges that a war with Germany would be a most serious thing to France, that our armies would not be marshalled to oppose the invasion of Denmark, and that such a war would consequently be attended with great cost and great risk. I think that if that war were successful, France would expect some compensation on account of her participation, and that compensation could hardly be granted without exciting general jealousy among the other nations of Europe, and thus disturbing the balance of power which now exists. I cannot deny that if the Emperor of the French puts forward these considerations—if he declares that for these reasons, though he would give us moral support, he would afford us no material assistance in such war—I must say I think he is justified in that refusal, and in adopting such a line of conduct. I cannot but admit that if a great war with Germany arose, whatever might be the issue, it might reproduce those great contests which took place in 1814, and which led to such unsatisfactory results. The Emperor of the French is a Sovereign singularly wise and sagacious, and I will say valuing, as he has proved that he values, the peace of Europe, I am not in a position to find fault, nor can Her Majesty's Government find any fault with the decision to which the Emperor has come. But the Emperor of the French having thus declared his policy, and the Emperor of Russia having constantly refused to join with us in affording material support to Denmark, our position, of course, must be greatly influenced by those decisions. In the first place, is it the duty of this country—if we are to undertake the preservation of the balance of power in Europe as it was recognized in 1852—is it a duty incumbent on us alone? The French Government sees very clearly the dangers to which France might be exposed by interfering, but it says at the same time that it would be an easy operation for England; that England, with her naval power, might add most materially to the strength of Denmark and assist in bringing the war to a conclusion. My Lords, I must say there are many considerations which induce me to arrive at a different conclusion. I cannot but think, in the first place, that we should suffer perhaps considerably if our commercial marine was exposed to depredations such as might take place in the event of our being at war with Germany. That is one consideration which ought not to be overlooked. But there are other considerations of still greater moment. One is—Would our interference bring this war to a conclusion? Without giving military aid could you recover Schleswig and Holstein, and even Jutland from the Austrian and Prussian forces? Well, my Lords, we have for a long time in our conduct of foreign affairs shown great forbearance and patience. I think we were right in being forbearing, and think we were justified in being patient. But if our honour or our interests or the great interests of Europe should call upon us to interfere, I think such interference ought to be clearly effectual, as nothing would more tend to diminish the influence of this country than a course of action which would show that while we were predominant at sea, and that no Austrian or Prussian ships of war could venture to leave port, yet at the same time our interference could not ensure, as we hoped it would, the safety of Denmark, nor lead to a speedy termination of the war. But, my Lords, the whole position and influence of this country with regard to foreign countries ought to be fully considered by Parliament and by the country; for we have great interests with multiplied complications arising from various connexions and various treaties with every part of the world. It is no longer a question with reference to the balance of power in Europe. There are other parts of the world in which our interests may be as deeply involved, and in which we may some day or other find it necessary to maintain the honour and interests of this country. The civil war now raging in America, ending how it may—whether by the establishment of an independent republic in the South, or whether it ends most unexpectedly, as it would be to me, I confess, by restoring the Union—still the United States of America or the Northern States, or whatever they may be called, will then be in a totally different position to that which they were in a few years ago. A great army will then be maintained by the United States. A formidable navy will also be kept up. Our relations with that Power are liable at any moment to interruption. I hope and trust that our friendly relations may continue uninterrupted; still, those relations must be considered and kept in view as well as our interest in the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. My Lords, let us look at other parts of the world. Look at the great commerce which has grown up in China, where it is necessary for us always to maintain a considerable naval force to protect it. Look at our immense possessions in India and see how necessary it is that they should be considered at all times. In any question, therefore, of peace or war—while it is very probable that this country with allies could carry on a war successfully—yet when it comes to be a war to be carried on by England alone, there are other contingencies to be looked at, and the position of this country is to be considered with reference not to Europe alone, but with reference to our interests in every quarter of the world. My Lords, these are considerations to be borne in mind with respect to this question of Denmark. It may be said that other combinations might be made—that although we could not ourselves attack the German Powers with any great amount of success, yet there are vulnerable points upon which they, and especially Austria, may be open to attack; that those doctrines and theories which Austria and Prussia have put forward, with regard to foreign nationalities, may be retorted upon them, and especially upon Austria with effect—they may be applied to other parts of Europe than Schleswig and Holstein; that the German nationality is not the only nationality in Europe; that the Italian nationality has as much right to be considered as the Germans; and that if we were to enter upon a course of supporting nationalities, we should be perfectly justified by the doctrines and conduct of Austria. This, no doubt, would be sufficient if the object were merely to show to Austria and Prussia that they are vulnerable on their own ground. But, my Lords, I think it is the duty of England to show a greater attachment to peace than Austria and Prussia have shown, and not, if possible, to light a flame which might extend to every part of Europe, but rather to endeavour to confine the war within the narrowest limits possible. Therefore, my Lords, with regard to this question, it is the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that we should maintain the position which we have occupied, and that we should be neutral in this war. I do not mean to say that contingencies may not arise in which our position might become different, and in which our conduct might be altered. It may be said, 'Will you allow these German Powers to act as they please? If, contrary to their professions and promises, they should decide upon sending a combined Austrian and Prussian force to Copenhagen with the declared object of making Denmark assent to terms which would be destructive of her independence—will you then remain entirely indifferent to such proceedings?' My Lords, I can only say in answer to such a question, that every Government in this country must retain to itself a certain liberty—as long as it possesses the confidence of Parliament—a certain liberty of decision upon such points. All I can now say is, that if the Government should think it necessary to come to any fresh decision—if the war should assume a new character—if circumstances should arise which might require us to make another decision, it would be our duty, if Parliament were sitting, immediately to apply to Parliament upon the subject; and if Parliament should not be sitting, then at once to call Parliament together in order that it may judge the conduct which Her Majesty's Government should pursue.

In the meantime, my Lords, I have given you an outline of the course of these negotiations. I have given you an account of the efforts we have made for peace, which, like the efforts made in 1823 by the Governments of Lord Liverpool and Mr. Canning, have been unfortunately unsuccessful. I say that our policy at the present time is to maintain peace. If there is any party in Parliament—if there is any individual in Parliament—who thinks as Lord Grey thought in 1823 that we ought to go to war, it will be competent for them to ask Her Majesty to interfere materially in the contest. If they think that in any respect we have failed in our duty, it is competent for them to take any line of conduct they may think proper. But, for ourselves, I say with confidence that we have maintained the honour of the country, that we have done everything in our power to preserve the peace of Europe, and that, those efforts having failed, we can rest satisfied that nothing has been wanting on our parts which was needed by the honour or the interests of this country—that nothing has been left undone which it was our duty to do.



LORD STANLEY JULY 20, 1866 AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA

Sir, this debate has lasted for some time, and, as was to be expected, many and various opinions have been expressed by those hon. gentlemen who have taken part in it. I hope it will not be supposed that, on the one hand, I necessarily agree or acquiesce in those opinions which I do not expressly mention for the purpose of saying I differ from them, or, on the other hand, that I differ from those opinions in which I do not go out of my way to express agreement. I think that in the actual state of Europe the House will hold me justified if I do not think it expedient to go into a general detailed discussion of the political situation, and the more so as that situation is changing not merely from week to week, but from day to day, and I may say, from the telegrams received, almost from hour to hour. I shall confine myself, therefore, as closely as I can, to the questions which have been put to me in the course of this discussion. First of all comes the question of the hon. member for Wick (Mr. Laing). He wants some guarantee that no intervention is contemplated on our part. He wants some assurance that this country will not be dragged into a war as it was in the Crimean case. He admits the policy of the Government is intended to be that of non-intervention; but he fears that it may be possible to drift into a quarrel without intending it. But I suppose when the hon. member speaks of intervention he means either armed intervention or intervention of such a nature as, though not immediately, yet in ultimate result might lead to an appeal to physical force. If that is what he refers to, all I can say is that if the speech which Lord Derby about a week ago delivered in another place—if the opinions which I myself have invariably expressed on that subject, not merely when occupying the position I now hold, but for many years past when these questions were under discussion—if, what is infinitely more important, the unanimous feeling (for I believe it to amount to unanimity both of Parliament and the people out of doors)—the feeling that we ought not to be dragged into these Continental wars—if all these things, taken together, do not constitute a guarantee that ours will be a pacific policy, a policy of observation rather than of action—then I am unable to understand in what language a stronger guarantee can be given. But if what is meant is intervention of a different character—intervention in the shape of friendly advice tendered by a neutral Power, then I think the question whether intervention of that kind is under particular circumstances desirable or not is a question which must necessarily be left to the discretion of the executive Government. I am not personally very fond of the system of giving advice to foreign countries. I entirely agree with what has been said by the right hon. gentleman opposite upon the subject, when he said that you are never more likely to lessen the influence of England than when you are constantly endeavouring to increase it by giving advice. I think that the right of giving advice has of late years been largely used; and that it has sometimes been not only used, but abused. Still, there is truth in the proverb which says that lookers-on see more of the game than the players; and cases do occur when warning given by a friendly and neutral Power—by a Power which is well known to have no interest of its own to serve, by a Power desiring nothing more than the restoration of peace, and that that peace shall be permanent—may do something to shorten the duration and limit the extent of a war that might otherwise spread over the greater part of Europe. As to the state of affairs at the present moment—for that, I apprehend, is the practical question on which the House wishes an answer from me, I wish distinctly to assure hon. gentlemen and the country that the British Government stand, as regards the European controversy, free, unpledged, and uncommitted to any policy whatever. The sole diplomatic act which the present Government have taken—and it was almost the first act of any kind they had to perform—was that of supporting in general terms at Florence and Berlin the proposition made by the French Government for a temporary cessation of hostilities. It seemed to us that to support that proposition was on our part simply an act of humanity and common sense. The House will recollect what were the circumstances of the case. Venice had been ceded, not indeed to Italy, but ceded by Austria. A great battle had been fought, a decisive victory had been gained, Austria had invoked the mediation of France. France had accepted the post of mediator. She asked us to support, not the terms of peace—that would have been premature—but merely the general proposition for an armistice in order that the belligerent parties might have time to consider whether, under the totally altered state of circumstances, it would not be possible to substitute negotiations for further bloodshed, and to obtain the results of the war without continuing the war itself. We did not feel it in our power to refuse our assent to that principle. But, while in general terms we have supported the proposition of an armistice, we have pledged ourselves to no terms or conditions of peace whatever. We have pledged ourselves to nothing beyond the general advice that an armistice should take place. The circumstances under which that advice was given have passed. Our mediation and our advice have not been officially asked by the combatants, and we have abstained from giving it. That is the present state of the matter. The right hon. gentleman the member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman) has asked me whether there is any expectation of an armed mediation on the part of the French Government. Well, it is not my duty, nor is it in my power, to answer for other Governments, but only for our own. All I can say is, I have not the slightest reason to believe that any step of that kind is in contemplation, and I have strong reasons to believe that no such step is contemplated. [Mr. Horsman: I did not ask that question. It was another hon. member.] Then the question was asked by the hon. member for Wick (Mr. Laing). Then these two questions were put to me—first, whether the British Government has been invited by that of France to address joint communications to all or any of the belligerent Powers? The French Government have taken up the matter, and it now rests with that Government. The French Government may or may not ask us to join in that work of mediation; but, should they do so, I do not think it would be the duty of the British Government to join in any such mediation, unless we have a distinct understanding as to the terms the French Government will propose. The second question of the right hon. gentleman is, whether the British Government has expressed its readiness to concur with the Government of France in recommending Austria to terminate the war, by accepting the two conditions proposed by Prussia and Italy as to her surrender of Venetia, and ceasing to be a member of the German Confederation? Now, Sir, as to that, Venetia has been, I understand, ceded by Austria, and whether or not any questions will arise as to that settlement being absolute or conditional, I do not know; still I apprehend that none of us can entertain a doubt that the final result will be that Venetia must pass from Austria. Venetia has been, in effect, conquered not by Italy but for Italy; Venetia has been conquered in Germany. Whatever the manner of the transfer may be—whatever may be the precise nature of the measures adopted by France—I do not think any reasonable man can entertain a doubt that Venetia, at no distant period, will belong to Italy. Then, with regard to the question as to whether we have recommended Austria to terminate the war by assenting to the proposal of ceasing to be a member of the German Confederation, I must remind the right hon. gentleman that that proposal has never been made, so far as I am aware, as the sole condition of peace, that Austria should cease to be a member of the German Confederation. No doubt various preliminaries have been discussed between the two Governments. If the question were narrowed to the issue whether Austria would conclude peace by ceding Venetia and by consenting to quit the Confederation, that, no doubt, would be a question upon which we should be in a position to give an opinion; but since we have no reason to think that the acceding to those two conditions by Austria would terminate the war, and since we do not know accurately and precisely what are the terms which would be likely to be accepted by one or other of the belligerent parties, it would be clearly premature on our part to express an opinion on the abstract question as to what conditions might or might not be accepted. With regard to the general policy of the Government I have only one remark to make. I think there never was a great European war in which the direct national interests of England were less concerned. We all, I suppose, have our individual sympathies in the matter. The Italian question I look upon as not being very distant from a fair settlement; and with regard to the other possible results of the war, and especially as to the establishment of a strong North German Power—of a strong, compact empire, extending over North Germany—I cannot see that, if the war ends, as it very possibly may, in the establishment of such an empire—I cannot see that the existence of such a Power would be to us any injury, any menace, or any detriment. It might be conceivable enough that the growth of such a Power might indeed awaken the jealousy of other Continental States, who may fear a rival in such a Power. That is a natural feeling in their position. That position, however, is not ours, and if North Germany is to become a single great Power, I do not see that any English interest is in the least degree affected. I think, Sir, I have now answered as explicitly as I can the various questions which have been put to me. I think, in the first place, I may assure the hon. member for Wick that there is no danger, as far as human foresight can go, of Continental complications involving this country in war. I think, in the next place, that if we do not intend to take an active part in the quarrel, we ought to be exceedingly cautious how we use menacing language or hold out illusory hopes. If our advice is solicited, and if there is any likelihood that that advice will be of practical use, I do not think we ought to hesitate to give the best advice in our power; but while giving it under a deep sense of moral responsibility, as being in our judgement the best, we ought carefully to avoid involving ourselves or the country in any responsibility for the results of following that advice in a matter where no English interest is concerned. I do not think we ought to put ourselves in such a position that any Power could say to us, 'We have acted upon your advice, and we have suffered for it. You have brought us into this difficulty, and therefore you are bound to get us out of it.' We ought not, I say, to place ourselves in a position of that kind. And now, Sir, I have stated all, I think, that it is possible for me to state at this time, and it remains for me only to assure the House—knowing, as I do, how utterly impossible it is for any member of the Executive to carry on his work effectively without the support of public opinion—it only remains for me to say that, as far as the nature of the case allows, I shall always be anxious that the House shall be conversant with everything that is done.



JOHN BRIGHT October 29, 1858 PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN POLICY

The frequent and far too complimentary manner in which my name has been mentioned to-night, and the most kind way in which you have received me, have placed me in a position somewhat humiliating, and really painful; for to receive laudation which one feels one cannot possibly have merited, is much more painful than to be passed by in a distribution of commendation to which possibly one might lay some claim. If one twentieth part of what has been said is true, if I am entitled to any measure of your approbation, I may begin to think that my public career and my opinions are not so un-English and so anti-national as some of those who profess to be the best of our public instructors have sometimes assumed. How, indeed, can I, any more than any of you, be un-English and anti-national? Was I not born upon the same soil? Do I not come of the same English stock? Are not my family committed irrevocably to the fortunes of this country? Is not whatever property I may have depending as much as yours is depending upon the good government of our common fatherland? Then how shall any man dare to say to any one of his countrymen, because he happen to hold a different opinion on questions of great public policy, that therefore he is un-English, and is to be condemned as anti-national? There are those who would assume that between my countrymen and me, and between my constituents and me, there has been, and there is now, a great gulf fixed, and that if I cannot pass over to them and to you, they and you can by no possibility pass over to me.

Now I take the liberty here, in the presence of an audience as intelligent as can be collected within the limits of this island, and of those who have the strongest claim to know what opinions I do entertain relative to certain great questions of public policy, to assert that I hold no views, that I have never promulgated any views on those controverted questions with respect to which I cannot bring as witnesses in my favour, and as fellow believers with myself, some of the best and most revered names in the history of English statesmanship. About 120 years ago, the Government of this country was directed by Sir Robert Walpole, a great Minister, who for a long period preserved the country in peace, and whose pride it was that during those years he had done so. Unfortunately, towards the close of his career, he was driven by faction into a policy which was the ruin of his political position. Sir Robert Walpole declared, when speaking of the question of war as affecting this country, that nothing could be so foolish, nothing so mad as a policy of war for a trading nation. And he went so far as to say, that any peace was better than the most successful war. I do not give you the precise language made use of by the Minister, for I speak only from memory; but I am satisfied I am not misrepresenting him in what I have now stated.

Come down fifty years nearer to our own time, and you find a statesman, not long in office, but still strong in the affections of all persons of Liberal principles in this country, and in his time representing fully the sentiments of the Liberal party—Charles James Fox. Mr. Fox, referring to the policy of the Government of his time, which was one of constant interference in the affairs of Europe, and by which the country was continually involved in the calamities of war, said that although he would not assert or maintain the principle, that under no circumstances could England have any cause of interference with the affairs of the continent of Europe, yet he would prefer the policy of positive non-interference and of perfect isolation rather than the constant intermeddling to which our recent policy had subjected us, and which brought so much trouble and suffering upon the country. In this case also I am not prepared to give you his exact words, but I am sure that I fairly describe the sentiments which he expressed.

Come down fifty years later, and to a time within the recollection of most of us, and you find another statesman, once the most popular man in England, and still remembered in this town and elsewhere with respect and affection. I allude to Earl Grey. When Earl Grey came into office for the purpose of carrying the question of Parliamentary Reform, he unfurled the banner of 'Peace, retrenchment, and reform', and that sentiment was received in every part of the United Kingdom, by every man who was or had been in favour of Liberal principles, as predicting the advent of a new era which should save his country from many of the calamities of the past.

Come down still nearer, and to a time that seems but the other day, and you find another Minister, second to none of those whom I have mentioned—the late Sir Robert Peel. I had the opportunity of observing the conduct of Sir Robert Peel from the time when he took office in 1841. I watched his proceedings particularly from the year 1843, when I entered Parliament, up to the time of his lamented death; and during the whole of that period, I venture to say, his principles, if they were to be discovered from his conduct and his speeches, were precisely those which I have held, and which I have always endeavoured to press upon the attention of my countrymen. If you have any doubt upon that point I would refer you to that last, that beautiful, that most solemn speech which he delivered with an earnestness and a sense of responsibility as if he had known he was leaving a legacy to his country. If you refer to that speech, delivered on the morning of the very day on which occurred the accident which terminated his life, you will find that its whole tenor is in conformity with all the doctrines that I have urged upon my countrymen for years past with respect to our policy in foreign affairs. When Sir Robert Peel went home, just before the dawn of day, upon the last occasion that he passed from the House of Commons, the scene of so many of his triumphs, I have heard, from what I think a good authority, that after he entered his own house, he expressed the exceeding relief which he experienced at having delivered himself of a speech which he had been reluctantly obliged to make against a Ministry which he was anxious to support, and he added, if I am not mistaken, 'I have made a speech of peace.'

Well, if this be so, if I can give you four names like these—if there were time I could make a longer list of still eminent if inferior men—I should like to know why I, as one of a small party, am to be set down as teaching some new doctrine which it is not fit for my countrymen to hear, and why I am to be assailed in every form of language, as if there was one great department of governmental affairs in which I was incompetent to offer any opinion to my countrymen. But leaving the opinions of individuals, I appeal to this audience, to every man who knows anything of the views and policy of the Liberal party in past years, whether it is not the fact that up to 1832 and indeed to a much later period, probably to the year 1850, those sentiments of Sir Robert Walpole, of Mr. Fox, of Earl Grey, and of Sir Robert Peel, the sentiments which I in humbler mode have propounded, were not received unanimously by the Liberal party as their fixed and unchangeable creed? And why should they not? Are they not founded upon reason? Do not all statesmen know, as you know, that upon peace, and peace alone, can be based the successful industry of a nation, and that by successful industry alone can be created that wealth which, permeating all classes of the people, not confined to great proprietors, great merchants, and great speculators, not running in a stream merely down your principal streets, but turning fertilizing rivulets into every by-lane and every alley, tends so powerfully to promote the comfort, happiness, and contentment of a nation? Do you not know that all progress comes from successful and peaceful industry, and that upon it is based your superstructure of education, of morals, of self-respect among your people, as well as every measure for extending and consolidating freedom in your public institutions? I am not afraid to acknowledge that I do oppose—that I do utterly condemn and denounce—a great part of the foreign policy which is practised and adhered to by the Government of this country.

You know, of course, that about 170 years ago there happened in this country what we have always been accustomed to call 'a glorious revolution', a revolution which had this effect: that it put a bit into the mouth of the monarch so that he was not able of his own free-will to do, and he dared no longer attempt to do, the things which his predecessors had done without fear. But if at the Revolution the monarchy of England was bridled and bitted, at the same time the great territorial families of England were enthroned; and from that period, until the year 1831 or 1832—until the time when Birmingham politically became famous—those territorial families reigned with an almost undisputed sway over the destinies and the industry of the people of these Kingdoms. If you turn to the history of England, from the period of the Revolution to the present, you will find that an entirely new policy was adopted, and that while we had endeavoured in former times to keep ourselves free from European complications, we now began to act upon a system of constant entanglement in the affairs of foreign countries, as if there were neither property nor honours, not anything worth striving for, to be acquired in any other field. The language coined and used then, has continued to our day. Lord Somers, in writing for William III, speaks of the endless and sanguinary wars of that period as wars 'to maintain the liberties of Europe'. There were wars to 'support the Protestant interest', and there were many wars to preserve our old friend 'the balance of power'.

We have been at war since that time, I believe, with, for, and against every considerable nation in Europe. We fought to put down a pretended French supremacy under Louis XIV. We fought to prevent France and Spain coming under the sceptre of one monarch, although, if we had not fought, it would have been impossible in the course of things that they should have become so united. We fought to maintain the Italian provinces in connexion with the House of Austria. We fought to put down the supremacy of Napoleon Bonaparte, and the Minister who was employed by this country at Vienna, after the Great War, when it was determined that no Bonaparte should ever again sit on the throne of France, was the very man to make an alliance with another Bonaparte for the purpose of carrying on a war to prevent the supremacy of the late Emperor of Russia. So that we have been all round Europe and across it over and over again, and after a policy so distinguished, so pre-eminent, so long-continued, and so costly, I think we have a fair right—I have, at least—to ask those who are in favour of it to show us its visible result. Europe is not at this moment, so far as I know, speaking of it broadly, and making allowance for certain improvements in its general civilization, more free politically than it was before. The balance of power is like perpetual motion, or any of those impossible things which some men are always racking their brains and spending their time and money to accomplish.

We all know and deplore that at the present moment a larger number of the grown men of Europe are employed, and a larger portion of the industry of Europe is absorbed, to provide for, and maintain, the enormous armaments which are now on foot in every considerable Continental State. Assuming, then, that Europe is not much better in consequence of the sacrifices we have made, let us inquire what has been the result in England, because, after all, that is the question which becomes us most to consider. I believe that I understate the sum when I say that, in pursuit of this will-of-the-wisp (the liberties of Europe and the balance of power), there has been extracted from the industry of the people of this small island no less an amount than L2,000,000,000 sterling. I cannot imagine how much L2,000,000,000 is, and therefore I shall not attempt to make you comprehend it. I presume it is something like those vast and incomprehensible astronomical distances with which we have been lately made familiar, but, however familiar, we feel that we do not know one bit more about them than we did before. When I try to think of that sum of L2,000,000,000 there is a sort of vision passes before my mind's eye. I see your peasant labourer delve and plough, sow and reap, sweat beneath the summer's sun, or grow prematurely old before the winter's blast. I see your noble mechanic, with his manly countenance and his matchless skill, toiling at his bench or his forge. I see one of the workers in our factories in the north, a woman—a girl it may be—gentle and good, as many of them are, as your sisters and daughters are—I see her intent upon the spindle, whose revolutions are so rapid that the eye fails altogether to detect them, or watching the alternating flight of the unresting shuttle. I turn again to another portion of your population, which, 'plunged in mines, forgets a sun was made', and I see the man who brings up from the secret chambers of the earth the elements of the riches and greatness of his country. When I see all this I have before me a mass of produce and of wealth which I am no more able to comprehend than I am that L2,000,000,000 of which I have spoken, but I behold in its full proportion the hideous error of your Governments, whose fatal policy consumes in some cases a half, never less than a third, of all the results of that industry which God intended should fertilize and bless every home in England, but the fruits of which are squandered in every part of the surface of the globe, without producing the smallest good to the people of England.

We have, it is true, some visible results that are of a more positive character. We have that which some people call a great advantage—the National Debt—a debt which is now so large that the most prudent, the most economical, and the most honest have given up all hope, not of its being paid off, but of its being diminished in amount. We have, too, taxes which have been during many years so onerous that there have been times when the patient beast of burden threatened to revolt, so onerous that it has been utterly impossible to levy them with any kind of honest equality, according to the means of the people to pay them. We have that, moreover, which is a standing wonder to all foreigners who consider our condition, an amount of apparently immovable pauperism, which to strangers is wholly irreconcilable with the fact that we, as a nation, produce more of what should make us all comfortable than is produced by any other nation of similar numbers on the face of the globe. Let us likewise remember that during the period of those great and so-called glorious contests on the continent of Europe, every description of home reform was not only delayed, but actually crushed out of the minds of the great bulk of the people. There can be no doubt whatever that in 1793 England was about to realize political changes and reforms, such as did not appear again until 1830; and during the period of that war, which now almost all men agree to have been wholly unnecessary, we were passing through a period which may be described as the dark age of English politics; when there was no more freedom to write or speak or politically to act, than there is now in the most despotic country of Europe.

But it may be asked, did nobody gain? If Europe is no better, and the people of England have been so much worse, who has benefited by the new system of foreign policy? What has been the fate of those who were enthroned at the Revolution, and whose supremacy has been for so long a period undisputed among us? Mr. Kinglake, the author of an interesting book on Eastern Travel, describing the habits of some acquaintances that he made in the Sahara deserts, says, that the jackals of the desert follow their prey in families like the place-hunters of Europe. I will reverse, if you like, the comparison, and say that the great territorial families of England, which were enthroned at the Revolution, have followed their prey like the jackals of the desert. Do you not observe, at a glance, that, from the time of William III, by reason of the foreign policy which I denounce, wars have been multiplied, taxes increased, loans made, and the sums of money which every year the Government has to expend augmented, and that so the patronage at the disposal of Ministers must have increased also, and the families who were enthroned and made powerful in the legislation and administration of the country must have had the first pull at, and the largest profit out of, that patronage? There is no actuary in existence who can calculate how much of the wealth, of the Strength, of the supremacy of the territorial families of England has been derived from an unholy participation in the fruits of the industry of the people, which have been wrested from them by every device of taxation, and squandered in every conceivable crime of which a Government could possibly be guilty.

The more you examine this matter the more you will come to the conclusion which I have arrived at, that this foreign policy, this regard for 'the liberties of Europe', this care at one time for 'the Protestant interests', this excessive love for 'the balance of power', is neither more nor less than a gigantic system of out-door relief for the aristocracy of Great Britain. (Great laughter.) I observe that you receive that declaration as if it were some new and important discovery. In 1815, when the great war with France was ended, every Liberal in England whose politics, whose hopes, and whose faith had not been crushed out of him by the tyranny of the time of that war, was fully aware of this, and openly admitted it, and up to 1832, and for some years afterwards, it was the fixed and undoubted creed of the great Liberal party. But somehow all is changed. We who stand upon the old landmarks, who walk in the old paths, who would conserve what is wise and prudent, are hustled and shoved about as if we were come to turn the world upside down. The change which has taken place seems to confirm the opinion of a lamented friend of mine, who, not having succeeded in all his hopes, thought that men made no progress whatever, but went round and round like, a squirrel in a cage. The idea is now so general that it is our duty to meddle everywhere, that it really seems as if we had pushed the Tories from the field, expelling them by our competition.