And what is the obligation of this alliance? To defend Portugal—to assist her, if necessary, with all our forces, in case of an unprovoked attack upon her territory. This, however, does not give to Portugal any right to call on us, if she were attacked in consequence of her voluntarily declaring war against another Power. By engaging in the cause of Spain, without any direct provocation from France, she would unquestionably lose all claim upon our assistance. The rendering that assistance would then become a question of policy, not of duty. Surely my honourable and learned friend (Sir James Mackintosh), who has declaimed so loudly on this subject, knows as well as any man, that the course which we are bound to follow, in any case affecting Portugal, is marked out in our treaties with that Crown, with singular accuracy and circumspection. In case of the suspicion of any design being entertained against Portugal by another Power, our first duty is to call on such Power for explanation: in case of such interposition failing, we are to support Portugal by arms; first with a limited force, and afterwards with all our might. This treaty we have fulfilled to the letter, in the present instance. We long ago reminded France, of our engagements with Portugal; and we have received repeated assurances that it is the determination of France rigidly to respect the independence of that kingdom. Portugal certainly did show some jealousy (as has been asserted) with respect to the Congress of Verona; and she applied to this Government to know whether her affairs had been brought before the Congress. I was half afraid of giving offence when I said 'the name of Portugal was never mentioned'. 'What, not mentioned? not a word about the new institutions?' 'No, not one. If mentioned at all, it was only with reference to the slave trade.' In truth, from the beginning to the close of the proceedings of the Congress, not the most distant intimation was given of any unfriendly design against Portugal.

Now, before I quit the Peninsula, a single word more to the honourable member for Westminster and his constituents. Have they estimated the burdens of a Peninsular War? God forbid that, if honour, or good faith, or national interest required it, we should decline the path of duty because it is encompassed with difficulties; but at least we ought to keep some consideration of these difficulties in our minds. We have experience to teach us, with something like accuracy, what are the pecuniary demands of the contest for which we must be prepared, if we enter into a war in the Peninsula. To take only two years and a half of the last Peninsular War of which I happen to have the accounts at hand, from the beginning of 1812 to the glorious conclusion of the campaign of 1814, the expense incurred in Spain and Portugal was about L33,000,000. Is that an expense to be incurred again, without some peremptory and unavoidable call of duty, of honour, or of interest?

Such a call we are at all times ready to answer, come (to use the expression so much decried), come what may. But there is surely sufficient ground for pausing, before we acquiesce in the short and flippant deduction of a rash consequence from false premises, which has been so glibly echoed from one quarter to another, during the last four months. 'Oh! we must go to war with France, for we are bound to go to war in defence of Portugal. Portugal will certainly join Spain against France; France will then attack Portugal; and then our defensive obligation comes into play.' Sir, it does no such thing. If Portugal is attacked by France, or by any other Power, without provocation, Great Britain is indeed bound to defend her: but if Portugal wilfully seeks the hostility of France, by joining against France in a foreign quarrel, there is no such obligation on Great Britain. The letter of treaties is as clear as the law of nations is precise upon this point: and as I believe no British statesman ever lived, so I hope none ever will live, unwise enough to bind his country by so preposterous an obligation, as that she should go to war, not merely in defence of an ally, but at the will and beck of that ally, whenever ambition, or false policy, or a predominant faction, may plunge that ally into wars of her own seeking and contriving.

On the other hand, would it have been advisable for us to precipitate Portugal into the war? Undoubtedly we might have done so. For by declaring war against France, on behalf of Spain, we should have invited France (and there was perhaps a party in Portugal ready enough to second the invitation) to extend her hostilities to the whole of the Peninsula. But was it an object of sound policy to bring a war upon our hands, of which it was clear that we must bear all the burden? And was not the situation of Portugal, then, so far from being a reason for war, that it added the third motive, and one of the greatest weight, to our preference for a pacific policy?

Fourthly.—As to our Continental allies. There was surely nothing in their situation to induce Great Britain to take a part in the war. Their Ministers have indeed been withdrawn from Madrid; but no alarm has been excited, by that act, in Spain. No case has occurred which gives to France a right to call for the assistance of the allies. But had the British Government taken a decided part in support of the Spaniards, a material change might have been produced in the aspect of affairs. Spain, who has now to contend with France alone, might in that case have had to contend with other and more overwhelming forces. Without pushing these considerations farther, enough surely has been said to indicate the expediency of adhering to that line of policy which we successfully pursued at Verona; and of endeavouring, by our example as well as by our influence, to prevent the complication and circumscribe the range of hostilities. Let it be considered how much the duration and the disasters of a war may depend upon the multitude or the fewness of its elements; and how much the accession of any new party, or parties, to a war must add to the difficulties of pacification.

I come next to consider the situation of this country. And first, as to our ability for the undertaking of a war. I have already said, that the country is yet rich enough in resources, in means, in strength, to engage in any contest to which national honour may call her; but I must at the same time be allowed to say, that her strength has very recently been strained to the utmost; that her means are at that precise stage of recovery which makes it most desirable that the progress of that recovery should not be interrupted; that her resources, now in a course of rapid reproduction, would, by any sudden check, be thrown into a disorder more deep and difficult of cure. It is in reference to this particular condition of the country, that I said on a former evening, what the honourable member for Surrey (Mr. Holme Sumner) has since done me the honour to repeat, 'If we are to be driven into war, sooner or later, let it be later': let it be after we have had time to turn, as it were, the corner of our difficulties— after we shall have retrieved a little more, effectively our exhausted resources, and have assured ourselves of means and strength, not only to begin, but to keep up the conflict, if necessary, for an indefinite period of time.

For let no man flatter himself that a war now entered upon would be a short one. Have we so soon forgotten the course and progress of the last war? For my part, I remember well the anticipations with which it began. I remember hearing a man, who will be allowed to have been distinguished by as great sagacity as ever belonged to the most consummate statesman—I remember hearing Mr. Pitt, not, in his place in Parliament (where it might have been his object and his duty to animate zeal and to encourage hope), but in the privacy of his domestic circle, among the friends in whom he confided—I remember well hearing him say, in 1793, that he expected that war to be of very short duration. That duration ran out to a period beyond the life of him who made the prediction. It outlived his successor, and the successors of that successor, and at length came suddenly and unexpectedly to an end, through a combination of miraculous events, such as the most sanguine imagination could not have anticipated. With that example full in my recollection, I could not act upon the presumption that a new war, once begun, would be speedily ended. Let no such expectation induce us to enter a path, which, however plain and clear it may appear at the outset of the journey, we should presently see branching into intricacies, and becoming encumbered with obstructions, until we were involved in a labyrinth from which not we ourselves only, but the generation to come, might in vain endeavour to find the means of extrication.

For the confirmation of these observations I appeal to that which I have stated as the last of the considerations in reference to which the policy of the British Government was calculated—mean, to the present state of the world. No man can witness with more delight than I do the widening diffusion of political liberty. Acknowledging all the blessings which we have long derived from liberty ourselves, I do not grudge to others a participation in them. I would not prohibit other nations from kindling their torches at the flame of British freedom. But let us not deceive ourselves. The general acquisition of free institutions is not necessarily a security for general peace. I am obliged to confess that its immediate tendency is the other way. Take an example from France herself. The Representative Chamber of France has undoubtedly been the source of those hostilities, which I should not have despaired of seeing averted through the pacific disposition of the French King. Look at the democracies of the ancient world. Their existence, I may say, was in war. Look at the petty republics of Italy in more modern times. In truth, long intervals of profound peace are much more readily to be found under settlements of a monarchical form. Did the Republic of Rome, in the whole career of her existence, enjoy an interval of peace of as long duration as that which this country enjoyed under the administration of Sir Robert Walpole?—and that interval, be it remembered, was broken short through the instigation of popular feeling. I am not saying that this is right or wrong—but that it is so. It is in the very nature of free governments—and more especially, perhaps, of governments newly free. The principle which for centuries has given ascendancy to Great Britain is that she was the single, free State in Europe. The spread of the representative system destroys that singularity, and must (however little we may like it) proportionally enfeeble our preponderating influence—unless we measure our steps cautiously and accommodate our conduct to the times. Let it not be supposed that I would disparage the progress of freedom, that I wish checks to be applied to it, or that I am pleased at the sight of obstacles thrown in its way. Far, very far from it. I am only desiring it to be observed, that we cannot expect to enjoy at the same time incompatible advantages. Freedom must ever be the greatest of blessings; but it ceases to be a distinction, in proportion as other nations become free.

But, Sir, this is only a partial view of the subject; and one to which I have been led by the unreasonable expectations of those who, while they make loud complaints of the diplomacy of England, as less commanding than heretofore, unconsciously specify the very causes which necessarily diminish and counteract its efficacy.

There are, however, other considerations to which I beg leave to turn the attention of the House.

It is perfectly true, as has been argued by more than one honourable member in this debate, that there is a contest going on in the world, between the spirit of unlimited monarchy, and the spirit of unlimited democracy. Between these two spirits, it may be said that strife is either openly in action or covertly at work, throughout the greater portion of Europe. It is true, as has also been argued, that in no former period in history is there so close a resemblance to the present, as in that of the Reformation. So far my honourable and learned friend (Sir J. Mackintosh) and the honourable baronet (Sir F. Burdett) were justified in holding up Queen Elizabeth's reign as an example for our study. The honourable member for Westminster, too, has observed that, in imitation of Queen Elizabeth's policy, the proper place for this country, in the present state of the world, is at the head of free nations struggling against arbitrary power. Sir, undoubtedly there is, as I have admitted, a general resemblance between the two periods; forasmuch as in both we see a conflict of opinions, and in both a bond of union growing out of those opinions, which establishes, between parts and classes of different nations, a stricter communion than belongs to community of country. It is true—it is, I own I think, a formidable truth—that in this respect the two periods do resemble each other. But though there is this general similarity, there is one circumstance which mainly distinguishes the present time from the reign of Elizabeth; and which, though by no means unimportant in itself, has been overlooked by all those to whose arguments I am now referring. Elizabeth was herself amongst the revolters against the authority of the Church of Rome; but we are not amongst those who are engaged in a struggle against the spirit of unlimited monarchy. We have fought that fight. We have taken our station. We have long ago assumed a character differing altogether from that of those around us. It may have been the duty and the interest of Queen Elizabeth to make common cause with—to put herself at the head of—those who supported the Reformation: but can it be either our interest or our duty to ally ourselves with revolution? Let us be ready to afford refuge to the sufferers of either extreme party: but it is not surely our policy to become the associate of either. Our situation now is rather what that of Elizabeth would have been, if the Church of England had been, in her time, already completely established, in uncontested supremacy; acknowledged as a legitimate settlement, unassailed and unassailable by papal power. Does my honourable and learned friend believe that the policy of Elizabeth would in that case have been the same?

Now, our complex constitution is established with so happy a mixture of its elements—its tempered monarchy and its regulated freedom—that we have nothing to fear from foreign despotism, nothing at home but from capricious change. We have nothing to fear, unless, distasteful of the blessings which we have earned, and of the calm which we enjoy, we let loose again, with rash hand, the elements of our constitution, and set them once more to fight against each other. In this enviable situation, what have we in common with the struggles which are going on in other countries, for the attainment of objects of which we have been long in undisputed possession? We look down upon those struggles from the point to which we have happily attained, not with the cruel delight which is described by the poet, as arising from the contemplation of agitations in which the spectator is not exposed to share; but with an anxious desire to mitigate, to enlighten, to reconcile, to save—by our example in all cases, by our exertions where we can usefully interpose.

Our station, then, is essentially neutral: neutral not only between contending nations, but between conflicting principles. The object of the Government has been to preserve that station; and for the purpose of preserving it, to maintain peace. By remaining at peace ourselves, we best secure Portugal; by remaining at peace, we take the best chance of circumscribing the range and shortening the duration of the war, which we could not prevent from breaking out between France and Spain. By remaining at peace, we shall best enable ourselves to take an effectual and decisive part in any contest into which we may be hereafter forced against our will.

The papers on the table, the last paper at least (I mean the dispatch of the 31st of March, in which is stated what we expect from France), ought, I think, to have satisfied the honourable baronet, who said that, provided the Government was firm in purpose, he should not be disposed to find fault with their having acted suaviter in modo . In that dispatch our neutrality is qualified with certain specified conditions. To those conditions France has given her consent. When we say in that dispatch, we are 'satisfied' that those conditions will be observed, is it not obvious that we use a language of courtesy, which is always most becomingly employed between independent Powers? Who does not know that, in diplomatic correspondence, under that suavity of expression is implied an 'or', which imports another alternative?

So far, then, as the interests and honour of Great Britain are concerned, those interests and that honour have, been scrupulously maintained. Great Britain has come out of the, negotiations, claiming all the respect that is due to her; and, in a tone not to be mistaken, enforcing all her rights. It is true that her policy has not been violent or precipitate. She has not sprung forth armed, from the impulse of a sudden indignation; she has looked before and after; she has reflected on all the circumstances which beset, and on all the consequences which may follow, so awful a decision as war; and instead of descending into the arena, as party in a quarrel not her own, she has assumed the attitude and the attributes of justice, holding high the balance, and grasping but not unsheathing the sword.

Sir, I will now trouble the House no further than to call its attention to the precise nature of the motion which it has to dispose of this night. Sir, the result of the negotiations, as I have before stated, rendered it unnecessary and irregular for the Government to call for the expression of a parliamentary opinion upon them. It was, however, competent for any honourable member to suggest to the House the expression of such opinion; which, if expressed at all, it will readily be admitted ought to be expressed intelligibly. Now, what is the Address which, after a fortnight's notice, and after the menaces with which it has been announced and ushered in, the House has been desired to adopt? The honourable gentleman's Address first proposes to 'represent to His Majesty, that the disappointment of His Majesty's benevolent solicitude to preserve general peace appears to this House to have, in a great measure, arisen from the failure of his Ministers to make the most earnest, vigorous, and solemn protest against the pretended right of the Sovereigns assembled at Verona, to make war on Spain in order to compel alterations in her political institutions'. I must take the liberty to say that this is not a true description. The war I have shown to be a French war, not arising from anything done, or omitted to be done, at Verona. But to finish the sentence:—'as well as against the subsequent pretension of the French Government, that nations cannot lawfully enjoy any civil privileges but from the spontaneous grant of their kings.' I must here again take the liberty to say that the averment is not correct. Whatever the misconduct of Government in these negotiations may have been, it is plain matter-of-fact, that they protested in the strongest manner against the pretension put forward in the speech of the King of France, that the liberties and franchises of a nation should be derived exclusively from the throne. It is on record, in this very Address, that the honourable gentlemen themselves could not have protested more strongly than the Government; since, in the next sentence to that which I have just read, in order to deliver themselves with the utmost force, they have condescended to borrow my words. For the Address goes on: '... principles destructive of the rights of all independent States, which strike at the root of the British Constitution, and are subversive of His Majesty's legitimate title to the throne.' Now by far the strongest expression in this sentence—the metaphor (such as it is) about 'striking at the root of the British Constitution '—is mine. It is in my dispatch to Sir Charles Stuart of the 4th of February, I claim it with the pride and fondness of an author: when I see it plagiarized by those who condemn me for not using sufficiently forcible language, and who yet, in the very breath, in which they pronounce that condemnation, are driven to borrow my very words to exemplify the omission which they impute.

So much for the justice of the Address: now for its usefulness and efficacy.

What is the full and sufficient declaration of the sense of the House on this most-momentous crisis, which is contained in this monitory expostulation to the throne? It proceeds: 'Further to declare to His Majesty the surprise and sorrow with which this House has observed that His Majesty's Ministers should have advised the Spanish Government, while so unwarrantably menaced'—(this 'so' must refer to something out of doors, for there is not a word in the previous part of this precious composition to which it can be grammatically applied)—'to alter their constitution, in the hope of averting invasion; a concession which alone would have involved the total sacrifice of national independence, and which was not even palliated by an assurance from France, that on receiving so dishonourable a submission, she would desist from her unprovoked aggression.' (I deny this statement, by the way; it is a complete misrepresentation.) 'Finally to represent to His Majesty that, in the judgement of this House, a tone of more dignified remonstrance would have been better calculated to preserve the peace of the Continent, and thereby to secure this nation more effectually from the hazard of being involved in the calamities of war.' And there it ends!—with a mere conjecture of what 'would have been'!

Is this an Address for a British Parliament, carrying up a complaint that the nation is on the eve of war, but conveying not a word of advice as to the course to be followed at such a moment? I, for my own part, beg the House not to agree to such an Address—for this reason, amongst others, that as it will be my duty to tender my humble advice to His Majesty as to the answer to be given to it, I am sure I shall not know what to advise His Majesty to say: the only answer which occurs to me as suitable to the occasion is, 'Indeed! I am very sorry for it.'

This, then, is the upshot of a motion which was to show that the present Ministers are unfit to carry on war or to maintain peace; and, by implication, that there are those who know better how such matters should be managed. This is the upshot of the motion, which was to dislodge us from our seats, and to supply our places with the honourable gentlemen opposite. It is affirmed that we are now on the eve of war, the peace which we have maintained being insecure. If we are on the eve of war, will not this be the first time that a British House of Parliament has approached the throne, on such an occasion, without even a conditional pledge of support? If war is a matter even of possible contemplation, it surely becomes this House either to concur in an Address for the removal of the Ministers, who have needlessly incurred that danger; or, as the amendment moved by the honourable member for Yorkshire proposes, to tender to His Majesty a cordial assurance that this House will stand by His Majesty in sustaining the dignity of his crown, and the rights and interests of his people. I trust, therefore, Sir, that by rejecting this most incorrect and inadequate Address—as unworthy of the House as it is of the occasion; an Address contradictory in some parts to itself: in more, to the established facts of the case; and in all to the ascertained sense of the country; and by adopting, in its room, the amendment moved by the honourable member for Yorkshire, and seconded by the member for London, the House will stamp the policy which the King's Ministers have pursued—feebly perhaps, perhaps erroneously, but at all events from pure motives, in the sincerity of their hearts, and as conducive, in their judgement, to the tranquillity, welfare, and happiness, not of this country only, but of the world—with that highest of all sanctions, the deliberate approbation of the House of Commons.



SIR ROBERT PEEL JUNE 1, 1829 PORTUGAL—DON MIGUEL

On the motion of Sir J. Mackintosh, the passages in His Majesty's speech at the commencement and termination of the last and at the commencement of the present session were read. Sir J. Mackintosh then delivered a long and powerful speech, relating to the affairs of Portugal, concluding, amidst loud cheers, with moving for copies and extracts of communications concerning the relations between this country and the Queen of Portugal, illustrative of the several topics alluded to in his speech.

Mr. Secretary Peel said, that the right hon. gentleman who had just made an able and eloquent speech to the House had reserved for the closing part an affecting address to their feelings. The right hon. gentleman had detailed the extreme severities alleged to have been committed upon certain residents in the city of Oporto. He was confident, however, that no sympathy towards the sufferings of individuals, and no indignation against injustice, would withdraw the House from the calm and dispassionate consideration of those principles on which the public policy of this country had been founded with regard to the kingdom of Portugal. He could not but express his cordial concurrence in the hope that this country, through the forbearance, wisdom, and virtue of its constitutional counsellors, would continue to enjoy the tranquillity and harmony which, for the last fifteen years, it had happily experienced. He trusted that efforts would be made to advance general instruction and civilization, and increased commercial intercourse between the nations, until the character of merely military conquerors was reduced to its proper dimensions, and until society was impressed with just notions of moral obligations and the blessings of peace. He hoped he should not be misconstrued, as a Minister of this country, in using this language. It proceeded from no unwillingness to enter upon war, if the cause were just and necessary—from no diffidence in the resources of the country—from no fear of the, ability of bringing such a contest to a, successful issue; but no man interested in the general improvement and happiness of mankind, and charged with the superintendence of the concerns of a great nation, could be accounted as acting an unworthy part in wishing for the continuance of peace. He indulged the hope of being able to satisfy the House that the course pursued with respect to Portugal had not only been in conformity to the strict principle of engagements—not only in conformity to the moral responsibility which England had incurred—but that it was better calculated to provide for the continuance of tranquillity than that which, judging by his arguments and observations, the right hon. gentleman would have been disposed to recommend with regard to the kingdom of Portugal. He admitted with the right hon. gentleman the antiquity of the relations subsisting between this country and Portugal. He admitted that they had continued almost without interruption for four hundred and fifty years; and although the right hon. gentleman said, that on three occasions Portugal was subjected to invasion in consequence of its adherence to England, yet he begged to remind the House that England had not been backward in advancing to the succour of Portugal; and that the history of no country exhibited more proofs of the part taken by a powerful state to protect any kingdom in its interests and independence. The Portuguese were well entitled to the name of ancient allies: the inhabitants of the respective countries had united their arms in many fields, and almost always in fields of victory. The question now to be considered was, whether treaties existed imposing on Great Britain any obligation which of late had not been fulfilled; or whether any obligation imposed on her a duty to be fulfilled when called on by an appeal for further interference.

If the House would permit him, he would notice in detail the several observations of the right hon. gentleman; and, in the first place, those made rather with a view of provoking explanation than of criminating or accusing the advisers of the Crown. The right hon. gentleman had stated that, by a series of treaties, England was bound to protect the integrity and independence of the Portuguese territories. That statement was correct; but he denied that, either in the letter or in the spirit of those treaties, or in any engagement or obligation entered into by Great Britain, there was conveyed a guarantee of the succession of any particular individual, or a guarantee of the existence of any political institution in Portugal. No request for such a guarantee had ever been preferred before the year 1820. In consequence of the unfortunate dissensions since that time, frequent applications had been made to England by different parties, either for the guarantee of certain institutions, or the security of existing forms of government; but the uniform answer was, that the guarantee to Portugal was against foreign invasion, and not on behalf of particular institutions, and that the general rule of England was not to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. In 1822, his right hon. friend, Mr. Canning, being reappointed to the office of Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was appealed to by the democratic Government of Portugal for a guarantee of its political institutions. His right hon. friend referred the deputation to the declaration made by Lord Castlereagh at the Congress of Laybach, as the Minister of England, that her rule was not to interfere in the affairs of other countries, and distinctly notified to the Secretary of State of Portugal that the general principles of Lord Castlereagh's declaration applied to the institutions of Portugal. He held in his hand an extract from the note written by Mr. Ward under the direction of Mr. Canning. It stated that, in reply to the doubts of Mr. Oliveira, he referred to the declaration of 1821, laying it down as His Britannic Majesty's principles, with respect to foreign states, to abstain from interference in their domestic affairs; a principle which applied to all independent states, and was the more binding as depending on the law of nations. He referred, he said, to this note to show that the present policy was not a line of conduct adopted for one occasion, but a principle expressly laid down both by Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning, and which, notwithstanding our peculiar relations with Portugal, in consequence of treaties existing for four hundred years, was yet not considered applicable to Portugal more than to any other state. In 1822, when Brazil and England were engaged in negotiations consequent upon the declaration of the independence of the Crown of Portugal, the principle was also considered applicable, and was observed throughout; and, in acknowledging the independence of Brazil, it was understood that it should not preclude an amicable arrangement between the two countries. The course adopted by Mr. Canning not only was sanctioned by sound policy and justice, but was the principle that had always guided England when called on to interfere in the civil concerns of Portugal. It was quite true that, in 1826, England sent an army to Portugal, and he thought then, and thought now, that in doing so she not only acted in conformity with the spirit of ancient treaties, but of wisdom and sound policy. Nothing could be more express than the disclaimer by Mr. Canning, that the army was not sent out for the purpose of supporting political institutions, but at the express instance of the de facto Government of Portugal, craving the assistance of England as a protection from foreign invasion. The principle of non-interference was distinctly recognized in sending out that army, and every instruction to the officer in command was to forbear mingling in civil dissensions, but to protect the kingdom from foreign invasion.

He brought forward these statements to show that England had throughout declined giving a guarantee for any political institutions, or interfering in civil dissensions. That being the general rule, was there any peculiarity in the usurpation of Don Miguel, or in the claims of Donna Maria, to impose upon England the necessity of departing from her usual course? He was prepared to contend, in opposition to the inferences that might be drawn from the arguments of the right hon. gentleman, that there was no special case calling for a departure from our general system of policy. The first proof given by the right hon. gentleman of the duty of a qualified interference was drawn from the fact, that Don Miguel's accession or usurpation was in 1825, at the time when the treaty of separation between Brazil and Portugal had been entered into, and when the constitution had been sent from Brazil, through the agency of Sir Charles Stuart, a British subject. The right hon. gentleman had stated that this circumstance must have led the people of Portugal to believe that England was a party to the grant of the constitution, and as such bound to aid and support it. The answer to that point was quite conclusive. The affairs of Portugal would be so familiar to the House that they would recollect that Don John, its late monarch, died in 1826, and that Don Pedro, his son, having effected the separation of Brazil and Portugal by treaty, was styled Emperor of Brazil. Don John died, and the treaty was ratified; but no provision had been made for the succession to the crown of Portugal. Don Pedro claimed the crown as king by succession, and determined on transferring it to his daughter, with the grant of a constitution. Now the fact was that England was not in any way responsible for that constitution. Don John died in 1826, and Sir Charles Stuart brought the constitution to Portugal on May 11 in the same year; and, by the dates of the different events, it was physically impossible that England should have organized the charter. Sir Charles Stuart was not only the plenipotentiary of England to Brazil, but was also employed in a similar capacity in adjusting certain differences between Brazil and Portugal; and, having discharged his duties as a British subject, he had remained at Rio de Janeiro in the latter character. Sir Charles did not act by the advice of the British Government, but was the mere bearer of the charter; and Mr. Canning, fearing that his residence at Lisbon might create an impression that this country was responsible for the charter, sent a circular to every court in Europe, disclaiming on the part of the British Government, any part in, or even knowledge of, the transaction; and he moreover ordered Sir Charles Stuart forthwith to leave Lisbon, lest his presence should be misconstrued into a countenancing of Don Pedro's constitution. The right hon. gentleman had inferred that England had contracted to support the constitutional charter. Now it so happened that all delusion upon that point had been effectually prevented by the language of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who declared in Parliament that he had declined advising the King to interfere in the affairs of Portugal. Nothing could be more explicit than the declaration of Mr. Canning. As the subject was important, he trusted the House would allow him to refer to the words of Mr. Canning. On December 12, 1826, in the celebrated speech which he delivered on bringing down the King's message respecting the affairs of Portugal, Mr. Canning expressed himself as follows: 'It has been surmised that this measure (the grant of a constitutional charter to Portugal), as well as the abdication with which it was accompanied, was the offspring of our advice. No such thing. Great Britain did not suggest this measure. It is not her duty, nor her practice, to offer suggestions for the internal regulation of foreign states. She neither approved nor disapproved of the grant of a constitutional charter to Portugal; her opinion upon that grant was never required. True it is that the instrument of the constitutional charter was brought to Europe by a gentleman of high trust in the service of the British Government. Sir Charles Stuart had gone to Brazil to negotiate the separation between that country and Portugal. In addition to his character of plenipotentiary of Great Britain as the mediating Power, he had also been invested by the King of Portugal with the character of His Most Faithful Majesty's plenipotentiary for the negotiation with Brazil. That negotiation had been brought to a happy conclusion; and therewith the British part of Sir C. Stuart's commission had terminated. But Sir C. Stuart was still resident at Rio de Janeiro as the plenipotentiary of the King of Portugal, for negotiating commercial arrangements between Portugal and Brazil. In this latter character it was that Sir C. Stuart, on his return to Europe, was requested by the Emperor of Brazil to be the bearer to Portugal of the new constitutional charter. His Majesty's Government found no fault with Sir C. Stuart for executing this commission; but it was immediately felt that, if Sir C. Stuart were allowed to remain at Lisbon, it might appear in the eyes of Europe that England was the contriver and imposer of the Portuguese constitution. Sir C. Stuart was therefore directed to return home forthwith, in order that the constitution, if carried into effect there, might plainly appear to be adopted by the Portuguese nation itself—not forced upon them by English interference.' On the part of the Government of England, it was evident, therefore, that no advice had been given on the subject of this charter, and that England was in no way responsible for it. Mr. Canning publicly avowed this fact; therefore there could have been no deception practised upon Portugal, nor could she have placed any reliance upon the participation of England in the transaction.

The right hon. gentleman, in the second part of his speech, had adverted to the discussions at London and Vienna, respecting the acceptance of the regency by Don Miguel, as involving a necessity to support the claims of the young queen. But surely it was too much to contend that, if England and Austria had taken certain measures respecting the appointment of Don Miguel to the regency, with the sanction of Don Pedro, they thereby became the guarantees of the Queen's rights. It was true that the King of Great Britain and the Emperor of Austria took certain measures to induce Don Miguel to comply with the engagements; and it was true that the engagements he contracted with Don Pedro were not fulfilled. That circumstance might impair the individual character and conduct of Don Miguel, in any discussion regarding his private crimes and vices; but he would remind the right hon. gentleman that the vices and the crimes of this individual were matter of consideration for the inhabitants of Portugal; and if ever we undertook to govern our public policy by considerations arising from the private acts of individuals, he feared that that influence, which he rejoiced to hear we were admitted to possess, would not long continue. These were considerations which ought not to influence the public policy of other nations. Then the question came to this—Was England to undertake the conquest of Portugal for Donna Maria or not? That was the whole question. The right hon. gentleman said that England and Austria ought to have compelled Don Miguel to have executed his office of Regent of Portugal. By what means? There was only one of two courses of action—either complete neutrality, or the conquest of Portugal for the Queen. To give advice to Don Miguel, without intending to follow up that advice by force, if necessary, would be very likely to disappoint its effect: to threaten, without executing the threat, would be very inconsistent with the dignity of the Crown of England. To enter into any alliance with Brazil, with regard to the succession of the young Queen, would for various reasons, besides our proximity to Portugal, make England the principal in the war, and Brazil an inadequate sharer. It would be difficult to contend that there was anything in ancient treaties, or any part of our stipulations, which strengthened the claim on England to advance the interests of Donna Maria by arms, or to force upon a reluctant people a Sovereign they were not willing to accept. The right hon. gentleman had said that at Vienna it had been intimated to Don Miguel, by the Courts of Austria and England, that if he did not accept the regency on the conditions upon which it was offered to him, he should be detained at Vienna until instructions could be received from Don Pedro. He (Mr. Peel) did not recollect that any such intimation had been conveyed to Don Miguel. He had no recollection as to any intention of forcibly detaining him; and he could assert that England was no party to any such forcible detention. England was merely present by her ambassador. It was, no doubt, an indignity to England that Don Miguel did not fulfil his stipulations, which had been entered into in the presence of her ambassador. But the question was, whether it was just or politic to make this a ground of war? He deplored, as much as the right hon. gentleman, Don Miguel's non-observance of those stipulations, and his want of faith; but he only contended that there was no ground for the interference of England by force, still less for adopting a principle of interference which might lead to serious consequences.

Another subject to which the right hon. gentleman had referred was the blockade of Terceira; and, without entering into all the particulars of that blockade, he should be able to justify the course pursued by Government. The right hon. gentleman had lamented that England had respected a blockade established by a de facto Government. He would merely adduce—as a proof that there was no partiality to Portugal in recognizing the blockade—the fact that when Don Pedro disunited the Portuguese Empire, and declared Brazil independent, in defiance of his father, he established a blockade. England, upon that occasion, pursued the same course as she had now done. Without pronouncing upon the legality of the Government, she respected this act. So, in the present case, without pronouncing on the legality of Don Miguel's government, finding a blockade established, we had respected it, as we had done in Greece and in South America when a blockade was established by a competent force. Then the right hon. gentleman had contended that there was a want of courtesy in not admitting the claims of the respective Ministers of Portugal and Brazil. Now, there were three individuals in this country who had taken part in some diplomatic relations—the Marquis Palmella, the Marquis Barbacena, and Count Itabayana. But when the Marquis Palmella was applied to respecting the affairs of Portugal, he declared his functions to be at an end. Surely England could not be expected to recognize a Minister who, when he was addressed upon public matters, declared that his functions as a Minister were at an end! With regard to the Marquis Barbacena, he arrived here in charge of the Queen of Portugal, quite unexpectedly. The Queen had been sent from the Brazils to Vienna, in order to be placed under her relation the Emperor of Austria. No notification had been transmitted to this country of his intention to send her here. Letters were actually received from Mr. Gordon, our Minister at the Brazils, dated three weeks after the Queen of Portugal had sailed, which mentioned no intention of the Queen coming to England. It was not until the arrival of the Marquis Barbacena at Gibraltar, that he determined to convey her hither; and it was not too much for the Government to ask the marquis, 'In what character do you appear?' Still it was intimated to him that, notwithstanding the want of courtesy displayed in not notifying the intention of Her Majesty, this would not affect the conduct of the Government, or cause the disrespectful reception of the Queen. But this showed the absolute necessity of ascertaining the character and powers of the marquis. Therefore, he could not think that his noble friend at the head of the Foreign Department, having to do with three Ministers of one state, was in fault if he desired to know their powers before he treated with them.

He would again remind the hon. gentleman that, if Don Miguel did sway the destinies of Portugal, this was not owing to foreign influence; it was owing to the Portuguese themselves. He had been proclaimed King by the Cortes of the kingdom. An insurrection had indeed sprung up, but it had failed. The right hon. gentleman said that it failed through some mistake, and that if the insurgents had pressed forward to Lisbon, Don Miguel and his mother would have been forced to emigrate. But he (Mr. Peel) held it to be quite unnecessary to discuss these points, or to inquire into the popularity of the King, or the consequences which might have happened if the insurgent general had advanced. Don Miguel was the person administering, de facto, the government of Portugal, and he could not think it prudent on the part of England to undertake to displace him, and to dictate to the Portuguese who should be their ruler.

The only other transaction to which the right hon. gentleman had referred in the second part of his speech was that of Terceira. He would attempt to explain, with as much clearness as possible, the course which the Government had pursued in this affair. It was the determination of the English Government to maintain a strict and undeviating neutrality in regard to the dissensions of Portugal; and they resolved not to be induced, by any appeal to their feelings, to depart from it. They considered that there had been no sufficient case made out for forcible interference, and they resolved not to interfere. When the insurgents in the north of Portugal were driven to take refuge in Spain, Spain objected to receive them, and England did interfere to procure them a milder treatment. They, however, determined to repair to England, and applied for leave, which was granted: and a body of from three thousand to four thousand men were received at Plymouth, and continued there for a considerable time. The right hon. gentleman said that a notification was conveyed to them in November that the officers were to be separated from the men; that, in consequence, the Marquis Palmella informed the Duke of Wellington of their wish to retire to Brazil, and that on December 23 they applied to go to Terceira. The right hon. gentleman's version of this transaction was somewhat different from his. On December 23, an intimation had been given to Marquis Palmella that England would not permit them to go on a hostile expedition to any part of the Portuguese dominions. But the right hon. gentleman had not stated that, on October 15, two months before the period before mentioned, the Marquis Barbacena had written to the Duke of Wellington to inform him that the Government of the Azores had made preparations for the reception of the Portuguese refugees, and that the marquis applied for a conveyance of the troops to Terceira, the largest island of the Azores. The other islands had acknowledged Don Miguel; in Terceira the garrison was in favour of Don Miguel, but there was a strong party in the island in favour of the Queen. The answer of the Duke of Wellington, on October 18, was that England was determined to maintain a neutrality in the civil dissensions of Portugal, and that the King, with that determination, could not permit the ports and arsenals of England to be made places of equipment for hostile armaments. It was intimated to the Marquis Palmella that, although the Government were willing to give shelter to the troops, it was improper that they should continue to occupy Plymouth as a military body, and that they should distribute themselves in the adjoining villages. The answer to this intimation was that their separation as a military body would relieve the Portuguese Government of its apprehensions. Was it to be tolerated that a Power not at war with us should see a force collected in England sufficient to excite apprehensions? The Marquis Palmella was told that the troops must give up their military character and become individuals. The answer was that, rather than separate, and destroy their military character, they would prefer going to Brazil. The reply to this was, that we did not wish them to go to Brazil, but we would not obstruct them; and in order to protect them from Portuguese cruisers, a British convoy was offered and declined. The right hon. gentleman said that application was made for permission for a body of unarmed men to go to Terceira. But it was necessary that the House should know certain facts relating to the export of arms in that island which, if permitted, every object they had in view would have been attained. He was sorry to be obliged to state these facts; but it was necessary to the vindication of the Government, and those who were implicated in those transactions must suffer. At an earlier period than that mentioned by the right hon. gentleman—namely, August 15, 1828—Count Itabayana had applied to Lord Aberdeen for permission to export one hundred and fifty barrels of gunpowder and a quantity of muskets to Brazil. Lord Aberdeen replied that he would grant that permission provided the arms and powder were not intended to be employed in the civil dissensions of Portugal; that if the Emperor of Brazil had determined to attempt to conquer Portugal, England would not interfere; and he therefore required a bona fide declaration as to the manner in which the arms and powder were to be employed. Count Itabayana's answer was, that he did not hesitate to give a clear and precise reply, and that there was no intention of so employing them. In consequence of this answer, Lord Aberdeen gave the permission desired: but the arms and powder were, notwithstanding this declaration, instantly transported to Terceira. Therefore when application was made to the Government for permission for the troops to leave this country for Terceira, they said, 'We have been already deceived; you profess to sail as unarmed men, but you will find arms on your arrival at Terceira.' They did, however, sail, and the right hon. gentleman had asked what right we had to stop them on the high seas? He would tell the House that they sailed with false clearances, which were obtained at the Custom-house as for Gibraltar, for Virginia, and other places; but the vessels really went to Terceira. Now, he begged the House to consider, and to decide on this statement of the case, and he would ask, whether it were consistent with the character of England to permit a military body thus to wage war from our ports with a Power with which we were not at war? We did not recognize Don Miguel, it was true; but we were not at war with Portugal. We still maintained commercial relations with that country, and had a consul there. It was too much for Brazil to desire to place us in a different situation with Portugal from that in which she was herself placed with that country; for she also had a consul there. We had no reason to believe that Don Pedro meditated a conquest of any part of the Portuguese dominions, and the question was, whether private individuals were to be permitted to carry on hostilities with Portugal from Plymouth. The duty of neutrality was as strong in respect to a de facto government as to one de jure. It was inconsistent with neutrality to permit an armed force to remain in this country. In addition to the Portuguese troops at Plymouth, three hundred Germans were enlisted in the north of Europe to reinforce them. Was this to be tolerated? When the Portuguese refugees went to Spain, we required that the officers should be separated from the men, and because Spain refused we prepared to go to war, and actually sent five thousand men to enforce our demand. Was it the policy of England to prevent the dismemberment of the Portuguese Empire? In 1825 we stipulated that Portugal should be separated from Brazil; so that motives of policy as well as neutrality called upon us to discourage these attempts, and above all to prevent this country from being made the arena for the designs of other Powers. What was to prevent Russia and France from making a similar use of our ports?

He would now leave the House to decide whether the Government of England was not right in preventing its manifest intention being defeated by false clearances and false assurances. These were the facts of the case, and he was satisfied that the character of England had been vindicated by not allowing its ports to be made subservient to such designs. These were the principles upon which the Government had acted. The officer who had been entrusted with the naval expedition to Terceira, had acted with the utmost forbearance. He gave ample warning; and it was not until a passage was attempted to be forced that he reluctantly fired a shot, which killed one man and wounded another. Having now given the explanations which the right hon. gentleman required, he came to his motion. It was impossible not to acknowledge the forbearance of the House with regard to the discussion of foreign affairs—a forbearance dictated by a sense of the delicacy of interfering with pending negotiations, and pre-judging measures; yet he had no hesitation in saying, that he was perfectly prepared to acquiesce in the motion of the right hon. gentleman, and probably the right hon. gentleman, instead of confining it to a call for certain papers, would allow his motion to stand as it appeared in the notice paper—'for copies or extracts of communications concerning the relations between this country and Her Most Faithful Majesty the Queen of Portugal'; and he assured him that every paper connected with the Queen of Portugal, which it was consistent with the duty of Ministers to produce, should be most readily given.

At a subsequent period of the debate, Mr. Peel said that the British Government had not recently made any proposition for the completion of the marriage between Don Miguel and Donna Maria, nor had it ever made any such proposition at any time except with the cordial concurrence of the Emperor of Brazil. The moment the Emperor intimated an objection to the marriage, all communication on the subject on the part of the British Government ceased. No proposition for the renewal of the proceedings would be made unless with the entire concurrence of the Emperor of Brazil.



SIR ROBERT PEEL JULY 16, 1832 BELGIUM

The noble lord said that the payment to Russia was made for services done and performed by Russia, which were notorious, and which required no explanation. But did the House remember the pathetic appeal of the Solicitor-General? 'Oh!' said the Solicitor-General, 'if you had seen what I have seen, if you had had access to the pile of documents I have waded through, you would have no hesitation in granting the money.' When the House asked for a sight of these convincing documents, the noble lord got up and quoted to them Hansard's Parliamentary Debates and the Reports of Lord Castlereagh's and Lord Liverpool's speeches. He never could believe that the documents so pathetically alluded to by the Solicitor-General were two speeches of Lord Liverpool and Lord Londonderry to which every human being had access in that most excellent work. If the noble lords wished to convince the House that they had acted correctly in this transaction, let them produce the official document on which their judgement professed to be founded. It was vain for them to rely upon a majority of forty-six, vain for them to call a motion for information factious. The only sufficient answer would be the production of the documents. But the noble lord said it was extremely clear that the money was to be paid to Russia for past services performed; why, then, did the noble lord require a new convention? The preamble of the second convention certainly referred to the first, and it expressly recited it, but nothing whatever could be found in it about the past services of Russia. It stated the consideration to be the adhesion of Russia to the general arrangements of the Congress of Vienna. If it were true that the original payment to Russia was made on account of services rendered to the general cause of Europe and sacrifices made by Russia, why did the second convention allege that the equivalent which England was to receive from Russia in return for the continued payments was this, that Russia would not contract any new engagement respecting Belgium, without a previous agreement with His Britannic Majesty, and his formal assent? Where, then, was the justification of the assertion that the two treaties were founded upon the same consideration? The Government gave to the House conflicting documents. The one corresponded not with the other. The noble lord contended that the money was due to Russia for old services. Then why the new condition in the second convention? The preamble bound Russia, in consideration of the continuance of the payment, to identify her policy with that of England with respect to Holland. That, he contended, was entirely a new condition, and how could it be maintained that, if the money was fairly due to Russia for former services performed, it was now just to impose upon Russia, as a condition of payment, that she should change her policy with regard to Holland so often as the policy of this country was changed? The question has been repeatedly asked, was this money to be ultimately paid or not? He would say this: unquestionably it was to be paid, if the country was bound to its payment by good faith. He would not tarnish the fair fame of the country for any sum whatever, upon any occasion, but more especially upon an occasion on which England had received a valuable consideration. When we incurred this responsibility on the behalf of Holland, we received from that country the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice; we still retained those colonies, they were valuable possessions, and therefore we were the more strictly bound not to shrink from any equitable obligation we had incurred. He agreed with his hon. friends that the money might be due from England; but to whom ought it to be paid? He could by no means admit that the first convention justified the second as a matter of course; but still there might be circumstances, not at present known to the House, which would still call for the continued payment to Russia, and authorize the new convention: but what those circumstances were, the House had a right to know before it was called upon to ratify the convention. The noble lord said, this country was bound to continue the payment to Russia by the good faith that Power had evinced. It appeared that, when the separation was about to take place between Holland and Belgium, Russia said, 'I am ready to fulfil the treaty; my troops shall march upon Belgium, to continue the incorporation.' 'Oh! no,' said England, 'our policy is altered; we wish the separation to take place.' 'Very well,' was the reply of Russia, 'continue to me the payment, and I am ready to subscribe to your policy with respect to Holland and Belgium.' Such might be the fact; but, if it were, it ought to be established. The documents proving that to be the case ought to be in the possession of the House before it was called upon to ratify the treaty. The King might make a new treaty under a new system of policy, but it was for the House to say, in a case in which the payment of money was concerned, whether it would enable the King to execute such a treaty. If it were proved that this country had induced Russia, by a promise of the continuance of the payment, to act in the manner she had done, that gave rise to a new case, and a new convention was necessary, the policy of which depended upon many mixed considerations. He had said, he was not free from doubts as to whom the money ought to be paid. An hon. member (Mr. Gisborne), who had argued the question ably, had said that Holland was badly used; but the same hon. member contended that England was exonerated from making the payment to Holland on account of the unjust and impolitic conduct of that country to Belgium. That argument appeared to him most unsatisfactory. The hon. member admitted that Holland had a right to refuse to pay her part of the loan to Russia. Let him suppose that the whole of the loan had been payable by Holland, and that that country had retained possession of the colonies she had given up to this country; how then would the case stand? If Holland was justified in refusing to pay a portion of the loan, surely she would, in the case he was supposing, be equally justified in refusing to pay the whole; and, therefore, if this country had not been put in possession of the Dutch colonies, Holland would have retained her colonies and would have no debt to pay. But England had the colonies, and to what Power then, according to the reasoning of the hon. member, ought England to make the payment of her portion of the loan? Surely to Holland. It might be very convenient, for ensuring Russian acquiescence, to make the payment to Russia, but certainly, according to the reasoning of the hon. member (Mr. Gisborne), it was anything but just. But he never would admit that Holland had behaved with harshness or injustice to Belgium, or that the revolt was justifiable by the conduct of Holland. The revolution in Belgium followed as a consequence from the revolution in France. If the French Revolution had not occurred, they would have heard nothing of the separation of Belgium from Holland; and we had no pretext in the misconduct of Holland for exonerating ourselves from our pecuniary obligations to that country. He wished not to enter upon the question of the policy pursued by His Majesty's Government with respect to Belgium; but he could not help smiling when he heard an hon. member contend that to place Prince Leopold on the throne of Belgium was a matter of great advantage to this country; because, forsooth, that prince had formerly been allied to a daughter of the King of England. What did the hon. member think of the alliance which the King of Belgium was now about to form? If a matrimonial alliance, that had now ceased fifteen years, was to have so powerful an influence over King Leopold's politics, what did the hon. member think would be the effect of a marriage with one of the daughters of the King of the French? If the former connexion had made Leopold an English prince, would not the new connexion make him a French prince, and would not all the advantages of placing him on the throne, which were expected to belong to England, in reality belong to France? He implored the Government not to drive the House to a premature discussion of those matters. The payment could not rest upon the old convention, but must depend upon the new, mixed up with considerations arising out of the old. The Government had been rescued from a vote of censure, and might, therefore, without difficulty, consent to a postponement of the question. He asked not for an indefinite postponement, but as long a one as the duration of the session would authorize. A premature discussion on Belgian affairs was open to great objection. It was true that the five Powers had agreed to the separation, and had recognized King Leopold, but it was also true that none of the necessary arrangements were yet completed. The last article of the convention clearly proved that the period for decision on the merits of that convention had not yet arrived. It assigned, as the reason of the convention, the preservation of the peace of Europe. How did they know the peace of Europe would be preserved? He hoped to God it might, but, under the present circumstances, it was utterly impossible to affirm that it would. He wished not to enter upon that question; he wished not to say a word upon the conduct of this country with respect to Belgium. On the contrary, he, and those who acted with him, had carefully, upon all occasions, abstained from provoking debate on the question of Belgium. He had strong feelings upon the subject, but he had been unwilling to enter into a premature discussion. These negotiations were drawing to their close, and whether they would end for good or evil the march of time would soon disclose. Holland had been told that by July 20 she must concur in the treaty, or force would be employed to compel her assent; and with such a declaration was it decent or wise to call upon the Parliament to ratify the convention now before the House? He had no doubt as to what the conduct of Russia would be; he had no doubt that she would keep her engagements to England respecting Belgium: but why should they be called upon to sanction the new convention until the negotiations now pending, as to the future relations between Holland and Belgium, were brought to a close. There were rumours that a French and English fleet were to be united for the purpose of constraining Holland to submit to the treaty. He trusted such was not the case; but, if it were, it was most unfair, in such a state of affairs, to compel a decision by the House of Commons as to the policy of a new pecuniary engagement to Russia. With respect to the alleged conduct of Russia to Poland, he was glad to find that all agreed in thinking that that subject had no connexion with the present. He had heard some statements in the House respecting the conduct of Russia to the Poles, and he believed many of them to be unfounded in fact. It had been stated that thousands of children had been torn from their parents, and banished into Siberia; he had expressed his disbelief of that assertion, and he had since been informed, on good authority, that those children were orphans—made orphans, he regretted to say, by the calamities of war—and that they had been placed in Russian schools, not for the purpose of separating them from their parents, for they had none, but for the purpose of providing for them in their helplessness, and giving them education. So viewed, that which, under another aspect, appeared an act of gross cruelty, might be a humane proceeding. He was thankful to the House for the attention with which it had heard him, at so late an hour, and concluded by entreating the Government not to drive the House to a division. If it obtained another small majority, that majority would not convince the country that the conduct of Ministers had been justifiable.



SIR ROBERT PEEL JULY 20, 1832 RUSSIAN DUTCH LOAN

The right hon. gentleman stated that the present Government had found themselves bound hand and foot by the engagements of their predecessors, who consented to guarantee a loan of L800,000 in aid of Prince Leopold, on his election to the throne of Greece. The right hon. gentleman had no right to say that the hands of himself and coadjutors were tied by the last Ministers. They were no parties to the original Treaty of 1827; but when they came into office they found themselves compelled to fulfil the treaties made by their predecessors. The Duke of Wellington, in 1830, three years after the treaty had been made, and not very long after he came into power, was engaged in the consideration of the Greek question. Prince Otho of Bavaria was then proposed as the Sovereign of Greece, and the Duke of Wellington objected to the appointment of that prince on account of his youth, he being then not more than fourteen. After considerable discussion, the Powers parties to the treaty agreed to the nomination of Prince Leopold, and the question of pecuniary aid was proposed. The Duke of Wellington said the Government of England had never given pecuniary aid in such a case, and refused to accede to the proposition. Prince Leopold then applied to the three sovereigns and declared he would not accept the throne of Greece unless the money were advanced. The Government of the Duke of Wellington, being anxious to establish a sovereign on the throne of Greece, did, at last, reluctantly concur with Russia and France, rather than, by withholding their consent from the proposed arrangement, deprive Greece of the services of Prince Leopold and separate the policy of this country from that of France and Russia. The right hon. Secretary might have contended that the present Government found themselves bound to guarantee a loan to Prince Leopold; but he was not warranted in saying that they were pledged by the acts of a former Government to guarantee a loan to any other prince. To come to the question immediately before the committee, he admitted that it was a case involved in considerable difficulty. He could conceive that circumstances might be established which would compel him to acquiesce in the payment of the money to Russia. He had some doubts as to whom the money was payable, and as to the justice of the arrangements into which this country was about to enter. These doubts might, however, be removed by explanation; and he must say, that while England retained possession of the colonies wrested from Holland she ought not to be very astute in finding reasons for excepting herself from the terms of her contract. With the information at present before the House, he was not prepared to state whether the payments were due to Holland or to Russia, but to one or other they were, in his opinion, due. If his vote were to imply a decided opinion that the money was not due to Russia, he would not give it. The right hon. gentleman assented—and it was an important admission—to the opinion he had formerly expressed, that the obligation of this country arose out of mixed considerations. His impression was, that there was a doubtful claim on this country, arising out of the convention of 1815; but he had admitted that there might be other considerations, independently of the convention, which would justify Ministers in promising to pay the money to Russia; that if they could show him that the payment of this money would enable them to maintain the peace of Europe, and to bring the pending negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion, he was prepared to give them his support. But why did the Ministers press a vote, when they were unable to give the House satisfaction upon these points? It was clear, from the right hon. gentleman's admission, that this question depended on mixed considerations; but he objected to being called upon to confirm the arrangement until he was satisfied, by the production of documents, of the extent of each of these mixed considerations. The negotiations were not complete, and they were, perhaps, the most important for the honour of England, for the independence of small states, and for the general tranquillity of Europe, in which this country was ever engaged. The right hon. gentleman said that the Government which preceded the present determined on the separation of Belgium from Holland. Here again he was incorrect. The former Ministers were called upon to interfere as mediators. In compliance with the Treaty of 1815, the King of Holland applied to the great Powers for counsel. England at once told him that she was not prepared to assist him in re-establishing by force his authority over Belgium; but when the late Ministers left office it had never been decided that Belgium must, of necessity, be transferred from the dominion of the House of Nassau. He had even some recollection that the present Prime Minister had been taunted in the Belgic Chamber of Deputies for having expressed a hope which pervaded almost every British mind, that Belgium might be established as a separate kingdom under the authority of a prince of that illustrious family. That alone was sufficient to prove that the complete independence of Belgium of the House of Orange was not decided upon when the present Ministers entered office. But further, at the very time when he and his colleagues resigned office, an hon. gentleman (Sir J. C. Hobhouse) had a notice of a motion in the book, the object of which was to compel the Government to explain their supposed conduct in favouring, not the separation of Belgium from Holland, but the King of Holland against his revolted subjects. But to return to the ground on which he objected to being pledged to the arrangement now proposed—namely, that he was in possession of no information respecting the negotiations which were now being carried on. What course had the Government pursued with respect to Greece? The loan to Prince Otho had been guaranteed for a considerable time, and yet the House had not been called upon to ratify the treaty; and the reason assigned by the noble lord for this delay was, that Government wished first to lay upon the table of the House every protocol connected with the negotiations. If Ministers pursued this conduct with respect to the Greek loan, why did they call upon the House to sanction the proposed arrangement with respect to Russia, without information? It might be said that the money was now due, but it had been due in July, and was not then paid. No further payment would be due until January, by which time, in all probability, pending negotiations would be brought to a close. Why, then, force the House now to express an opinion? He could not conceive what answer could be made to this question, in a parliamentary point of view. Was there ever an instance in which Parliament had been called upon to vote public money, arising out of negotiations, whilst they were yet pending? During the time these negotiations had been carried on, he and his friends had abstained from expressing any opinion concerning them, and had brought forward no motion calculated to embarrass the Government. And yet, before the negotiations were concluded, the Government called upon the House to vote the money. He made no objection to the amount. He did not deny that his impression was that there might be good and sufficient reason for the payment of this money, although it was not to be found on the face of the treaty; but he contended that it was contrary to all parliamentary custom to call upon the House to pronounce an opinion on the subject before it was put into possession of any information. The object of the arrangement professedly was, to induce Russia to unite her policy with ours, to preserve the balance of power and the peace of Europe. He asked whether the measures which Ministers were pursuing were likely to preserve the peace of Europe? In the second article of the treaty, now upon the table, Russia engaged, if the arrangements at present agreed upon should be endangered, not to enter into other arrangements without the concurrence of England. The arrangements were in danger at the present moment. Negotiations, it might be said, were yet pending; but, if that were a complete answer against the giving of information, it was also complete against calling upon the House to vote the money. Had the ratifications of the treaties of 1831 been accompanied by any reserve? If so, ought this important point to be concealed? In the whole of Europe the English House of Commons was the only place where no information was to be obtained on these points. Communications had been made to the Chambers of Holland and Belgium; every foreign newspaper had contained authentic copies of documents which were most important in explaining the policy pursued at different periods of the negotiations; the House of Commons, however, possessed not a tittle of information on the subject. This course was according to precedent, because the negotiations were pending; but it was equally in conformity with precedent that, under these circumstances, the House ought not to be called upon to pledge itself to the payment of the money. It had been stated in an official newspaper, published in Holland, that Russia accompanied the ratification with an important reserve. The treaty before the House contained twenty-four articles, the execution of which was guaranteed by the contracting parties; but those articles, as far as the distribution of territory was concerned, could not be acted upon until Holland and Belgium should sign and ratify another treaty. The first question, then, was, Had Belgium and Holland signed the treaty on which the execution of the other depends? The answer was, No; they had not. Under these circumstances it was practising a delusion on Parliament to talk of the treaty being ratified. It was well known that Holland insisted on the modification of three articles contained in this treaty. She insisted on not being compelled to abandon Luxembourg—on not being compelled to permit the free access of Belgic navigation to artificial canals—and on not being compelled to permit the Belgians to make the military roads through the new territories assigned to them. It was premature to enter into the question whether Holland was right or wrong in insisting on these points; but it was a notorious fact that Russia had accompanied her ratification of the treaty with this reserve—that Holland shall not be compelled to consent to the articles which she objected to. This, he might remark, was a proof that the policy of Russia was not concurrent with ours. It was evident that, if this reservation of Russia were insisted upon, it would be fatal to the treaty, and therefore it was not treating the House fairly to make the dry statement that Russia had ratified the treaty, without informing it whether her ratification was accompanied with such a reservation. The House ought, also, to be made acquainted with the reasons why the treaty was not ratified at the appointed time. It was stipulated that the ratifications should be exchanged within six weeks after the signing of the convention. The signatures were affixed to the convention on November 16; but, from a paper signed by Mr. Pemberton, by order of the Lords of the Treasury, it appeared that the ratifications were not received on June 4. That was an additional proof that the policy of Russia was not concurrent with our own. Was it so, when Russia ratified with a reservation? Did that reservation still exist? If so, was it consistent with our policy? It was a mere mockery of the functions of the House of Commons to require it to fulfil the conditions of this convention whilst Ministers were unable to explain the state in which the negotiations stood at the present moment. It had been justly observed by his hon. friend the member for the University of Oxford, that it was a critical day. July 20 was the day by which it had been intimated to Holland by France and England that the treaty must be signed. This, at least, was understood to be the case. Documents had been published which contained a threat that force would be applied to compel Holland to give her consent to the treaty. Holland said that she would ratify the treaty provided the articles to which she objected were altered. The conference replied, 'You shall ratify first, and try to get the articles altered afterwards.' Holland very naturally objected to this arrangement, because she thought that, when she applied to Belgium to alter the objectionable articles, Belgium would reply that the treaty had been ratified, and Holland must be bound by it. This was the state of the case; and the House of Commons ought to have been consulted before any naval armament was undertaken, or any demonstration of a warlike nature made. The House of Commons had a right to know the causes of war, if war were intended: and he considered a hostile attack upon Holland, by whatever name qualified, substantially the same as war. The right hon. Secretary for Ireland had taken a rather sanguine view of our domestic affairs, and plumed himself particularly on the improved conditions of Ireland at present, as compared with that of 1830. He should not envy him the merit of any success which might have attended his efforts to ameliorate the condition of that country, if he could bring himself to believe that it had taken place; but, from all the information which he had the means of procuring with regard to the state of Ireland, he was induced to think, that that country was never in a situation calculated to excite greater alarm than at the present moment. But with respect to foreign affairs, with respect to those countries which were the immediate subject of consideration, we could not long be kept in suspense. Peace or war had arrived, which must, within a very short time, terminate either in peace or in an interruption of peace. Again, then, he said, let them consider well the ground of war; if war they were about to have with Holland—war to compel her, against her will, to do something inconsistent with her honour, or with her independence. Beware of that; England had before been in alliance with France against Holland. Remember the relation in which she had stood towards that country—remember the period—that disgraceful period—in the reign of Charles II, from the year 1670 to the Peace of Nimeguen in 1678; look to the alliance between England and France at that disgraceful period, remember the terms of that alliance, and the relations in which we had stood towards France, and towards the House of Nassau. He remembered the indignant terms in which Mr. Fox spoke of the disgraceful and unnatural alliances which this country entered into with France at that period. He said that his blood boiled at the contemplation of the disgraceful policy which was pursued by this country. He conjured the Ministers to satisfy the House, if they were about to enter into alliance with any Power to coerce a third, of the justice of that alliance. Let them bear in mind what could be done by a gallant people attached to freedom, who now seemed to rally round their Sovereign with the unanimous determination to encounter every extremity rather than submit to injustice or disgrace. Remember the siege of Haarlem—remember the exploits that had been achieved on that and numberless other occasions by the same gallant nation. Before Ministers asked the House to sanction a new crusade against Holland, implying approbation of their policy, let them accede at least to this reasonable request, that they would either afford the House information respecting the nature of our foreign relations, or postpone this vote. These were the grounds upon which he protested against being made a judge in the question at present before the House. He had not the necessary information to enable him to give a vote upon it. The present agony and crisis of Holland was not the time for calling upon the House for a ratification of this treaty. Let it be remembered, that this vote was for the postponement of the question, and not for its rejection. The course which he, for one, should pursue, should the House determine to ratify this treaty, would be to vote a negative, and leave the responsibility of the transaction upon those who proposed it; but with a solemn protest, on his part, against the unfairness and injustice of the proceeding.



LORD JOHN RUSSELL MARCH 4, 1847 THE ANNEXATION OF CRACOW

The hon. member for Montrose (Mr. Joseph Hume) having made his motion, I shall, without entering on the general argument which has been stated by him and by my noble friend opposite, shortly state to the House the view which I take of the motion which he has made. With respect to the argument which has been stated, that the three Powers were not justified by the Treaty of Vienna in concluding for themselves the consideration, whether the free state of Cracow should be maintained or extinguished—with respect to that argument I cannot but concur with my hon. friend who made the motion, and my noble friend who seconded it. I think it is clear from the words of the Treaty of Vienna, and from the prominence which the arrangement respecting Poland took, both in the conferences which preceded that treaty and in the articles of the treaty itself, that these articles were not immaterial parts of the treaty, but did form one of the principal stipulations upon which the great Powers of Europe agreed at the termination of a bloody and destructive war. Nor can I think that, while the arrangement which placed the Duchy of Warsaw under the dominion of the Emperor of Russia formed the subject of many discussions and a long correspondence, not only between the Ministers of the different Courts, but also of a singular correspondence between the Minister for Foreign Affairs in this country and the Emperor of Russia himself—I say I cannot think that, while that arrangement formed a principal part of the treaty, the arrangement which left one small portion, 'a mere atom,' as the allied Powers called it, free and independent, was an immaterial, or an insignificant part of it. It cannot but appear, I think, however small the territory—however small the population of that state—that yet the treaty formed, first between the three Powers and then by all the Powers who were the concurring parties in the Treaty of Vienna, meant that freedom and independence should leave to Poland—should leave to some part of the Polish nation—a separate existence; and that, giving up much, admitting much, to the Emperor of Russia, it was still consecrated, as a principle, that some part of the Polish nation should retain an independent and separate existence. For this reason, therefore, I consider the existence of Cracow as a state, having been thus secured by general treaty—whatever the complaints the three Powers had made that Cracow was the focus of disturbances; that revolutionary intrigues there found a centre and a means of organization; that there arose from that small state insurrection against the three surrounding Powers; that it was impossible to preserve those Powers from this insurrection: that if these reasons were good and valid—if they were felt to be strong—they should have been stated to England and to France; that England and France should have been invited to a congress, or some species of conference, in which their consent should have been asked to put an end to a state of things which those Powers declared to be intolerable, and which they could no longer permit with safety to themselves. So much, I think, is clear from the papers which record the general transaction of the Treaty of Vienna; and so much also, I think, is clear from the passage which my noble friend opposite (Lord Sandon) has read from the statement of the Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he, in words, admits that if the arrangement of the Treaty of Vienna were to be altered and set aside, agreement and concurrence with England and France would previously have been necessary. In the next place, with regard to the reasons which are given by the three Great Powers, and which are stated more especially by Prince Metternich, on the part of the Court of Austria, those reasons appear to me insufficient for the violent proceeding which has taken place. I cannot myself imagine that there could not have been precautions taken, which, however they limited the action of the free and independent state of Cracow, would yet have been a security that its name and its independence would have been maintained; while all danger from refugees, from its being made a place where strangers from all parts of the Continent came and planned conspiracy, might have been encountered and prevented. It does seem to me most extraordinary that, with this little state—this mere atom, surrounded by Russia, by Austria, and by Prussia—these three great and mighty monarchies, with such vast military forces, with such unbounded means, having command of all the roads which lead to Cracow, having the power of marching their troops at any moment into the city of Cracow, having certain rights which were constituted and assigned to them in the Treaty of Vienna—should have found themselves so powerless as to be unable to prevent Cracow becoming dangerous to their peace and welfare. I cannot, indeed, but suspect, especially looking at the latter part of this transaction, when government was dissolved in Cracow—when disorganization took place—that it was not unwelcome, or altogether unpalatable to those three Powers, to be enabled to say, 'All means of government are gone; Cracow is a scene of anarchy and disorder, and no remedy remains but the total abolition of the existence of that republic.' Therefore, Sir, both on the grounds of the Treaty of Vienna, the distinctness of the stipulations referring to Cracow, and with regard to the reasons which were urged for its extinction, I think, in the first place, there was a manifest violation of the Treaty of Vienna; and I believe, in the second, that, if the question had been discussed in a congress or conference among the Powers, there is no sufficient proof, so far as we have hitherto seen, that the three Powers would have been in a position to show good cause for the course they have adopted. Neither, Sir, am I convinced by the instances that are furnished by the Minister of Austria, as to various stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna, which have been altered by uncontested agreement between Powers who were concerned, and whose territories were affected, such as small parts of principalities given by the Duke of Coburg, or others, transferred in consideration of some equivalents to other princes, for the mutual convenience of their respective territories, for the purpose of giving a fair equivalent to each, and of sometimes making a more satisfactory arrangement for all. These are, naturally and obviously, alterations of the Treaty of Vienna, which might take place without any general appeal to all the Powers who have signed that treaty. Such alterations bear, in my mind, no resemblance to an infraction of one of those great and leading and master stipulations in which all the Powers of Europe are deeply interested. Supposing that some arrangement were made between Austria and Prussia for the extinction of Saxony, and that the Great Powers were to ask how they, only two of the parties to the Treaty of Vienna, could agree to extinguish Saxony, what answer would it be—that some little bit of territory had before been exchanged between some of the minor princes, and that then we made no protest? And, as I consider it, the extinction of this free state is an alteration of one of the main and leading provisions of the treaty. But my hon. friend, Sir, not satisfied with the protest which my noble friend the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has directed to be delivered at the Courts of the three Powers principally concerned, wishes this House to agree to certain resolutions. With respect to the first of these resolutions, my noble friend opposite (Lord Sandon), who seconds the motion, is in complete accordance. With regard to the last he is not so far agreed, and he doubts whether the House ought to affirm it. As to the first of these resolutions, 'That this House views with alarm and indignation the incorporation of the free state of Cracow into the dominions of the Emperor of Austria, in manifest violation of the Treaty of Vienna,' I should beg the House to consider that there is a very great difference between that which has been done by my noble friend (Lord Palmerston) in obedience to Her Majesty's commands, and that which it is proposed to this House to do. It is the prerogative of the Crown to make treaties, to carry on the correspondence and relations of this country with foreign Powers. Every public and every personal communication is agreed on in the name of the Sovereign, and by the command of the Sovereign. If a treaty has been signed and ratified, as this Treaty of Vienna was signed and ratified, by the Minister of England in the name of George III, and of the Prince Regent of England; and if any violation or contravention of that treaty takes place, the person to whom it devolves to make any representation, is obviously, again, the Minister of the Sovereign—the Minister of the Sovereign of England, who has made the original treaty. But with regard to the functions of this House, they are of a very different nature. When there is a treaty made, or a correspondence takes place, upon which it is thought necessary that the opinion and concurrence of this House should be taken, it is usual then for the Ministers of the Crown to ask for that general concurrence. If a treaty of commerce or a treaty of subsidy is signed, that requires the intervention of Parliament, it is usual for the Minister of the Crown to ask for the sanction or concurrence of Parliament to that treaty. But to affirm a resolution which is not thus brought by necessity before the House of Commons—to affirm a resolution merely declaratory of an opinion, that is not the correct nor the regular course of proceeding in this House. For my own part it appears to me, that while it is obviously incumbent on the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and on the advisers of Her Majesty, to declare their sense of any violation of treaty, or of any matter which concerns the foreign relations of this country with other countries, it is not advisable that the House of Commons should affirm resolutions with respect to the conduct of those foreign Powers, unless it be intended to follow up those resolutions by some measures or actions on the part of the Executive Government. For my part I have never admired—and I have always declared in this House that I never admired in this respect—the conduct of the French Chambers with regard to Poland. It has been the custom of the Chamber of Deputies in France annually to protest at the commencement of the Session against the acts of the Emperor Nicholas, and to make a declaration in favour of the nationality of Poland. I think that such annual declarations are illusive; for while they have been made in this manner, they have been followed up by no measures; they are made by a representative assembly, without any action following on that declaration. Be it observed how great is the difference between that and a protest on the part of a Sovereign. The Sovereign, by prerogative, entrusted with this power of making treaties, is forced of necessity to some opinion or other—of tacit acquiescence, of favourable and applauding concurrence, or one involving remonstrance and reproach—some course or other is forced upon the Executive Government of the country. But with regard to the House of Commons, it is not necessary, in the ordinary course of foreign affairs, that this House should at all interfere or declare its opinion on these subjects. I can see no advantage in altering that usual course. I do not think there would be any advantage in bringing these subjects frequently or constantly before the House, with a view to a declaration of opinion—I think the House would gain no respect by a deviation from its usual custom. That is my reason, therefore, while I could have no objections to urge in opinion against this resolution—for I have already declared what is my opinion with regard to the extinction of the free state of Cracow—why I object to its being made a resolution of the House of Commons; and on that point I should be disposed to move the previous question. With regard to the other resolution, I should act in like manner. That resolution says that—