On August 29, four days after Prevost's divisions were expected to be assembled at their designated rendezvous, Izard, in the face of the storm gathering before him, started with his four thousand men from Plattsburg for Sackett's Harbor, in obedience to the intimation of the War Department, which he accepted as orders. Brigadier-General Macomb was left to hold the works about Plattsburg with a force which he stated did not exceed fifteen hundred effectives.[412] His own brigade having been broken up to strengthen Izard's division, none of this force was organized, except four companies of one regiment. The remainder were convalescents, or recruits of new regiments; soldiers as yet only in name, and without the constituted regimental framework, incorporation into which so much facilitates the transition from the recruit to the veteran. On September 4 seven hundred militia from the neighborhood joined, in response to a call from Macomb; and before the final action of the 11th other militia from New York, and volunteers from Vermont, across the lake, kept pouring in from all quarters, in encouraging contrast to their fellow citizens who were making money by abetting the enemy.

Prevost's army, which had been assembled along the frontier of Lower Canada, from the Richelieu River to the St. Lawrence, began its forward march August 31; the leading brigade entering the State of New York, and encamping that night at Champlain Town, a short distance south of the boundary. By September 4 the whole body had reached to the village of Chazy, twenty-five miles from Plattsburg. Thus far, to the mouth of the Little Chazy River, where the supplies of the army were to be landed, no opposition was experienced. The American squadron waiting on the defensive at Plattsburg, the left flank of the British received constant support from their flotilla of gunboats and galleys under the command of Captain Pring, who seized also the American Island La Motte, in the narrows of the lake, abreast the Little Chazy. The following day, September 5, delays began to be met through the trees felled and bridges broken by Macomb's orders. On the 6th there was some skirmishing between the advanced guards; but the American militia "could not be prevailed on to stand, notwithstanding the exertions of their officers, although the fields were divided by strong stone walls, and they were told that the enemy could not possibly cut them off."[413] Deprived of this support, the small body of regulars could do little, and the British Peninsulars pushed on contemptuously, and almost silently. "They never deployed in their whole march," reported Macomb, "always pressing on in column." That evening they entered Plattsburg. Macomb retreated across the Saranac, which divided the town. He removed from the bridges their planking, which was used to form breastworks to dispute any attempt to force a passage, and then retired to the works previously prepared by Izard. These were on the bluffs on the south side of the Saranac, overlooking the bay, and covering the peninsula embraced between the lake and the river.

From the 7th to the 11th, the day of the battle, the British were employed in preparations for battering the forts, preliminary to an assault, and there was constant skirmishing at the bridges and fords. Macomb utilized the same time to strengthen his works, aided by the numbers of militia continually arriving, who labored night and day with great spirit. Prevost's purposes and actions were dominated by the urgency of haste, owing to the lateness of the season; and this motive co-operated with a certain captiousness of temper to precipitate him now into a grave error of judgment and of conduct. At Plattsburg he found the small American army intrenched behind a fordable river, the bridges of which had been made useless; and in the bay lay the American squadron, anchored with a view to defence. The two were not strictly in co-operation, in their present position. Tactically, they for the moment contributed little to each other's support; for the reason that the position chosen judiciously by Macdonough for the defence of the bay was too far from the works of the army to receive—or to give—assistance with the guns of that day. The squadron was a little over a mile from the army. It could not remain there, if the British got possession of the works, for it would be within range of injury at long shot; but in an engagement between the hostile fleets the bluffs could have no share, no matter which party held them, for the fire would be as dangerous to friend as to foe.

The question of probability, that the American squadron was within long gunshot of the shore batteries, is crucial, for upon it would depend the ultimate military judgment upon the management of Sir George Prevost. That he felt this is evident by letters addressed on his behalf to Macdonough; by A.W. Cochran, a lawyer of Quebec, to whom Prevost, after his recall to England for trial, left the charge of collecting testimony, and by Cadwalader Colden of New York.[414] Both inquire specifically as to this distance, Colden particularizing that "it would be all important to learn that the American squadron were during the engagement beyond the effectual range of the batteries." To Colden, Macdonough replied guardedly, "It is my opinion that our squadron was anchored one mile and a half from the batteries." The answer to Cochran has not been found; but on the back of the letter from him the Commodore sketched his recollection of the situation, which is here reproduced. Without insisting unduly on the precision of such a piece, it seems clear that he thought his squadron but little more than half way towards the other side of the bay. Cumberland Head being by survey two miles from the batteries, it would follow that the vessels were a little over a mile from them. This inference is adopted as more dependable than the estimate, "a mile and a half." Such eye reckoning is notoriously uncertain; and this seemingly was made by recollection, not contemporaneously.[415]

The 24- and 32-pounder long gun of that day ranged a sea mile and a half, with an elevation of less than fifteen degrees.[416] They could therefore annoy a squadron at or within that distance. The question is not of best fighting range. It is whether a number of light built and light draught vessels could hold their ground under such a cannonade, knowing that a hostile squadron awaited them without. Even at such random range, a disabling shot in hull or spars must be expected. At whatever risk, departure is enforced.



To a similar letter from Colden, General Macomb replied that he did not think the squadron within range. There is also a statement in Niles' Register[417] that several British officers visited Macomb at Plattsburg, and at their request experiments were made, presumably trial shots, to ascertain whether the guns of the forts could have annoyed the American squadron. It was found they could not. Macomb's opinion may have rested upon this, and the conclusion may be just; but it is open to remark that, as the squadron was not then there, its assumed position depended upon memory,—like Macdonough's sketch. Macomb said further, that "a fruitless attempt was made during the action to elevate the guns so as to bear on the enemy; but none were fired, all being convinced that the vessels were beyond their reach." The worth of this conviction is shown by the next remark, which he repeated under date of August 1, 1815.[418] "This opinion was strengthened by observations on the actual range of the guns of the 'Confiance'—her heaviest metal [24-pounders] falling upwards of five hundred yards short of the shore." The "Confiance" was five hundred yards further off than the American squadron, and to reach it her guns would be elevated for that distance only. Because under such condition they dropped their shot five hundred yards short of three thousand five hundred yards, it is scarcely legitimate to infer that guns elevated for three thousand could not carry so far.

The arguments having been stated, it is to be remarked that, whatever the truth, it is knowledge after the fact as far as Prevost was concerned. In his report dated September 11, 1814, the day of the action, he speaks of the difficulties which had been before him; among them "blockhouses armed with heavy ordnance." This he then believed; and whether this ordnance could reach the squadron he could only know by trying. It was urgently proper, in view of his large land force, and of the expectations of his Government, which had made such great exertions for an attainable and important object, that he should storm the works and try. After a careful estimate of the strength of the two squadrons, I think that a seaman would certainly say that in the open the British was superior; but decidedly inferior for an attack upon the American at anchor. This was the opinion of the surviving British officers, under oath, and of Downie. General Izard, who had been in command at Plattsburg up to a fortnight before the attack, wrote afterwards to the Secretary of War, "I may venture to assert that without the works, Fort Moreau and its dependencies, Captain Macdonough would not have ventured to await the enemy's attack in Plattsburg Bay, but would have retired to the upper part of Lake Champlain."[419] The whole campaign turning upon naval control, the situation was eminently one that called upon the army to drive the enemy from his anchorage. The judgment of the author endorses the words of Sir James Yeo: "There was not the least necessity for our squadron giving the enemy such decided advantages by going into their bay to engage them. Even had they been successful, it could not in the least have assisted the troops in storming the batteries; whereas, had our troops taken their batteries first, it would have obliged the enemy's squadron to quit the bay and given ours a fair chance."[420] At the Court Martial two witnesses, Lieutenant Drew of the "Linnet," and Brydone, master of the "Confiance," swore that after the action Macdonough removed his squadron to Crab Island, out of range of the batteries. Macdonough in his report does not mention this; nor was it necessary that he should.

In short, though apparently so near, the two fractions of the American force, the army and the navy, were actually in the dangerous military condition of being exposed to be beaten in detail; and the destruction of either would probably be fatal to the other. The largest two British vessels, "Confiance" and "Linnet," were slightly inferior to the American "Saratoga" and "Eagle" in aggregate weight of broadside; but, like the "General Pike" on Ontario in 1813, the superiority of the "Confiance" in long guns, and under one captain, would on the open lake have made her practically equal to cope with the whole American squadron, and still more with the "Saratoga" alone, assuming that the "Linnet" gave the "Eagle" some occupation.

It would seem clear, therefore, that the true combination for the British general would have been to use his military superiority, vast in quality as in numbers, to reduce the works and garrison at Plattsburg. That accomplished, the squadron would be driven to the open lake, where the "Confiance" could bring into play her real superiority, instead of being compelled to sacrifice it by attacking vessels in a carefully chosen position, ranged with a seaman's eye for defence, and prepared with a seaman's foresight for every contingency. Prevost, however, became possessed with the idea that a joint attack was indispensable,[421] and in communicating his purpose to the commander of the squadron, Captain Downie, he used language indefensible in itself, tending to goad a sensitive man into action contrary to his better judgment; and he clenched this injudicious proceeding with words which certainly implied an assurance of assault by the army on the works, simultaneous with that of the navy on the squadron.

Captain Downie had taken command of the Champlain fleet only on September 2. He was next in rank to Yeo on the lakes, a circumstance that warranted his orders; the immediate reason for which, however, as explained by Yeo to the Admiralty, was that his predecessor's temper had shown him unfit for chief command. He had quarrelled with Pring, and Yeo felt the change essential. Downie, upon arrival, found the "Confiance" in a very incomplete state, for which he at least was in no wise responsible. He had brought with him a first lieutenant in whom he had merited confidence, and the two worked diligently to get her into shape. The crew had been assembled hurriedly by draughts from several ships at Quebec, from the 39th regiment, and from the marine artillery. The last detachment came on board the night but one before the battle. They thus were unknown by face to their officers, and largely to one another. Launched August 25, the ship hauled from the wharf into the stream September 7, and the same day started for the front, being towed by boats against a head wind and downward current. Behind her dragged a batteau carrying her powder, while her magazine was being finished.

The next day a similar painful advance was made, and the crew then were stationed at the guns, while the mechanics labored at their fittings. That night she anchored off Chazy, where the whole squadron was now gathered. The 9th was spent at anchor, exercising the guns; the mechanics still at work. In fact, the hammering and driving continued until two hours before the ship came under fire, when the last gang shoved off, leaving her still unfinished. "This day"—the 9th—wrote the first lieutenant, Robertson, "employed setting-up rigging, scraping decks, manning and arranging the gunboats. Exercised at great guns. Artificers employed fitting beds, coins, belaying pins, etc;"[422]—essentials for fighting the guns and working the sails. It scarcely needs the habit of a naval seaman to recognize that even three or four days' grace for preparation would immensely increase efficiency. Nevertheless, such was the pressure from without that the order was given for the squadron to go into action next day; and this was prevented only by a strong head wind, against which there was not channel space to beat.

As long as Prevost was contending with the difficulties of his own advance he seems not to have worried Downie; but as soon as fairly before the works of Plattsburg he initiated a correspondence, which on his part became increasingly peremptory. It will be remembered that he not only was much the senior in rank,—as in years,—but also Governor-General of Canada. Nor should it be forgotten that he had known and written a month before that the "Confiance" could not be ready before September 15. He knew, as his subsequent action showed, that if the British fleet were disabled his own progress was hopeless; and, if he could not understand that to a ship so lately afloat a day was worth a week of ordinary conditions, he should at least have realized that the naval captain could judge better than he when she was ready for battle. On September 7 he wrote to urge Downie, who replied the same day with assurances of every exertion to hasten matters. The 8th he sent information of Macdonough's arrangements by an aid, who carried also a letter saying that "it is of the highest importance that the ships, vessels, and gunboats, under your command, should combine a co-operation with the division of the army under my command. I only wait for your arrival to proceed against General Macomb's last position on the south bank of the Saranac." On the 9th he wrote, "In consequence of your communication of yesterday I have postponed action until your squadron is prepared to co-operate. I need not dwell with you on the evils resulting to both services from delay." He inclosed reports received from deserters that the American fleet was insufficiently manned; and that when the "Eagle" arrived, a few days before, they had swept the guard houses of prisoners to complete her crew. A postscript conveyed a scarcely veiled intimation that an eye was kept on his proceedings. "Captain Watson of the provincial cavalry is directed to remain at Little Chazy until you are preparing to get underway, when he is instructed to return to this place with the intelligence."[423]

Thus pressed, Downie, as has been said, gave orders to sail at midnight, with the expectation of rounding into Plattsburg Bay about dawn, and proceeding to an immediate attack. This purpose was communicated formally to Prevost. The preventing cause, the head wind, was obvious enough, and spoke for itself; but the check drew from Prevost words which stung Downie to the quick. "In consequence of your letter the troops have been held in readiness, since six o'clock this morning, to storm the enemy's works at nearly the same moment as the naval action begins in the bay. I ascribe the disappointment I have experienced to the unfortunate change of wind, and shall rejoice to learn that my reasonable expectations have been frustrated by no other cause." The letter was sent by the aid, Major Coore, who had carried the others; and both he and Pring, who were present, testified to the effect upon Downie. Coore, in a vindication of Prevost, wrote, "After perusing it, Captain Downie said with some warmth, 'I am surprised Sir George Prevost should think necessary to urge me upon this subject. He must feel I am as desirous of proceeding to active operations as he can be; but I am responsible for the squadron, and no man shall make me lead it into action before I consider it in fit condition.'"[424] Nevertheless, the effect was produced; for he remarked afterward to Pring, "This letter does not deserve an answer, but I will convince him that the naval force will not be backward in their share of the attack."[425]

It was arranged that the approach of the squadron should be signalled by scaling the guns,—firing cartridges without shot; and Downie certainty understood, and informed his officers generally, that the army would assault in co-operation with the attack of the fleet. The precise nature of his expectation was clearly conveyed to Pring, who had represented the gravity of this undertaking. "When the batteries are stormed and taken possession of by the British land forces, which the commander of the land forces has promised to do at the moment the naval action commences, the enemy will be obliged to quit their position, whereby we shall obtain decided advantage over them during their confusion. I would otherwise prefer fighting them on the lake, and would wait until our force is in an efficient state; but I fear they would take shelter up the lake and would not meet me on equal terms."[426] The following morning, September 11, the wind being fair from northeast, the British fleet weighed before daylight and stood up the narrows for the open lake and Plattsburg Bay. About five o'clock the agreed signal was given by scaling the guns, the reports of which it was presumed must certainly be heard by the army at the then distance of six or seven miles, with the favorable air blowing. At 7.30, near Cumberland Head, the squadron hove-to, and Captain Downie went ahead in a boat to reconnoitre the American position.

For defence against the hostile squadron, Macdonough had had to rely solely on his own force, and its wise disposition by him. On shore, a defensive position is determined by the circumstances of the ground selected, improved by fortification; all which gives strength additional to the number of men. A sailing squadron anchored for defence similarly gained force by adapting its formation to the circumstances of the anchorage, and to known wind conditions, with careful preparations to turn the guns in any direction; deliberate precautions, not possible to the same extent to the assailant anchoring under fire. To this is to be added the release of the crew from working sails to manning the guns.

Plattsburg Bay, in which the United States squadron was anchored, is two miles wide, and two long. It lies north and south, open to the southward. Its eastern boundary is called Cumberland Head. The British vessels, starting from below, in a channel too narrow to beat, must come up with a north wind. To insure that this should be ahead, or bring them close on the wind, after rounding the Head,—a condition unfavorable for attack,—Macdonough fixed the head of his line as far north as was safe; having in mind that the enemy might bring guns to the shore north of the Saranac. His order thence extended southward, abreast of the American works, and somewhat nearer the Cumberland than the Plattsburg side. The wind conditions further made it expedient to put the strongest vessels to the northward,—to windward,—whence they would best be able to manoeuvre as circumstances might require. The order from north to south therefore was: the brig "Eagle," twenty guns; the ship "Saratoga," twenty-six; the "Ticonderoga" schooner, seven, and the sloop "Preble," seven.

Macdonough's dispositions being perfectly under observation, Captain Downie framed his plan accordingly.[427] The "Confiance" should engage the "Saratoga;" but, before doing so, would pass along the "Eagle," from north to south, give her a broadside, and then anchor head and stern across the bows of the "Saratoga." After this, the "Linnet," supported by the "Chub," would become the opponent of the "Eagle," reduced more nearly to equality by the punishment already received. Three British vessels would thus grapple the two strongest enemies. The "Finch" was to attack the American rear, supported by all the British gunboats—eleven in number. There were American gunboats, or galleys, as well, which Macdonough distributed in groups, inshore of his order; but, as was almost invariably the case, these light vessels exerted no influence on the result.

This being the plan, when the wind came northeast on the morning of September 11, the British stood up the lake in column, as follows: "Finch," "Confiance," "Linnet," "Chub." Thus, when they rounded Cumberland Head, and simultaneously changed course towards the American line, they would be properly disposed to reach the several places assigned. As the vessels came round the Head, to Downie's dismay no co-operation by the army was visible. He was fairly committed to his movement, however, and could only persist. As the initial act was to be the attack upon the "Eagle" by the "Confiance," she led in advance of her consorts, which caused a concentration of the hostile guns upon her; the result being that she was unable to carry out her part. The wind also failed, and she eventually anchored five hundred yards from the American line. Her first broadside is said to have struck down forty, or one fifth of the "Saratoga's" crew. As in the case of the "Chesapeake," this shows men of naval training, accustomed to guns; but, as with the "Chesapeake," lack of organization, of the habit of working together, officers and men, was to tell ere the end. Fifteen minutes after the action began Captain Downie was killed, leaving in command Lieutenant Robertson.



The "Linnet" reached her berth and engaged the "Eagle" closely; but the "Chub," which was to support her, received much damage to her sails and rigging, and the lieutenant in charge was nervously prostrated by a not very severe wound. Instead of anchoring, she was permitted to drift helplessly, and so passed through the American order, where she hauled down her colors. Though thus disappointed of the assistance intended for her, the "Linnet" continued to fight manfully and successfully, her opponent finally quitting the line; a result to which the forward battery of the "Confiance" in large measure contributed.[428] The "Finch," by an error of judgment on the part of her commander, did not keep near enough to the wind. She therefore failed to reach her position, near the "Ticonderoga;" and the breeze afterwards falling, she could not retrieve her error. Ultimately, she went ashore on Crab Island, a mile to the southward. This remoteness enabled her to keep her flag flying till her consorts had surrendered; but the credit of being last to strike belongs really to the "Linnet," Captain Pring. By the failure of the "Finch," the "Ticonderoga" underwent no attack except by the British gunboats. Whatever might possibly have come of this was frustrated by the misbehavior of most of them. Four fought with great gallantry and persistence, eliciting much admiration from their opponents; but the remainder kept at distance, the commander of the whole actually running away, and absconding afterwards to avoid trial. The "Ticonderoga" maintained her position to the end; but the weak "Preble" was forced from her anchors, and ran ashore under the Plattsburg batteries.

The fight thus resolved itself into a contest between the "Saratoga" and "Eagle," on one side, the "Confiance" and "Linnet" on the other. The wind being north-northeast, the ships at their anchors headed so that the forward third of the "Confiance's" battery bore upon the "Eagle," and only the remaining two thirds upon the "Saratoga." This much equalized conditions all round. It was nine o'clock when she anchored. At 10.30 the "Eagle," having many of her guns on the engaged side disabled, cut her cable, ran down the line, and placed herself south of the "Saratoga," anchoring by the stern. This had the effect of turning towards the enemy her other side, the guns of which were still uninjured. "In this new position," wrote Lieutenant Robertson, "she kept up a destructive fire on the "Confiance," without being exposed to a shot from that ship or the "Linnet." On the other hand, Macdonough found the "Saratoga" suffer from the "Linnet," now relieved of her immediate opponent."[429]

By this time the fire of both the "Saratoga" and "Confiance" had materially slackened, owing to the havoc among guns and men. Nearly the whole battery on the starboard side of the United States ship was dismounted, or otherwise unserviceable. The only resource was to bring the uninjured side towards the enemy, as the "Eagle" had just done; but to use the same method, getting under way, would be to abandon the fight, for there was not astern another position of usefulness for the "Saratoga." There was nothing for it but to "wind"[430] the ship—turn her round where she was. Then appeared the advantage attendant upon the defensive, if deliberately utilized. The "Confiance" standing in had had shot away, one after another, the anchors and ropes upon which she depended for such a manoeuvre.[431] The "Saratoga's" resources were unimpaired. A stern anchor was let go, the bow cable cut, and the ship winded, either by force of the wind, or by the use of "springs"[432] before prepared, presenting to the "Confiance" her uninjured broadside—for fighting purposes a new vessel. The British ship, having now but four guns that could be used on the side engaged,[433] must do the like, or be hopelessly overmatched. The stern anchor prepared having been shot away, an effort was made to swing her by a new spring on the bow cable; but while this slow process was carrying on, and the ship so far turned as to be at right angles with the American line, a raking shot entered, killing and wounding several of the crew. Then, reported Lieutenant Robertson, the surviving officer in command, "the ship's company declared they would stand no longer to their quarters, nor could the officers with their utmost exertions rally them." The vessel was in a sinking condition, kept afloat by giving her a marked heel to starboard, by running in the guns on the port side, so as to bring the shot holes out of water.[434] The wounded on the deck below had to be continually moved, lest they should be drowned where they lay. She drew but eight and a half feet of water. Her colors were struck at about 11 A.M.; the "Linnet's" fifteen minutes later. By Macdonough's report, the action had lasted two hours and twenty minutes, without intermission.



Few combats have been more resolutely contested. The "Saratoga" had fifty-five round shot in her hull; the "Confiance," one hundred and five.[435] Of the American crew of two hundred and ten men, twenty-eight were killed and twenty-nine wounded. The British loss is not known exactly. Robertson reported that there were thirty-eight bodies sent ashore for interment, besides those thrown overboard in action. This points to a loss of about fifty killed, and James states the wounded at about sixty; the total was certainly more than one hundred in a ship's company of two hundred and seventy.

There was reason for obstinacy, additional to the natural resolution of the parties engaged. The battle of Lake Champlain, more nearly than any other incident of the War of 1812, merits the epithet "decisive." The moment the issue was known, Prevost retreated into Canada; entirely properly, as indicated by the Duke of Wellington's words before and after. His previous conduct was open to censure, for he had used towards Captain Downie urgency of pressure which induced that officer to engage prematurely; "goaded" into action, as Yeo wrote. Before the usual naval Court Martial, the officers sworn testified that Downie had been led to expect co-operation, which in their judgment would have reversed the issue; but that no proper assault was made. Charges were preferred, and Prevost was summoned home; but he died before trial. There remains therefore no sworn testimony on his side, nor was there any adequate cross-examination of the naval witnesses. In the judgment of the writer, it was incumbent upon Prevost to assault the works when Downie was known to be approaching, with a fair wind, in the hope of driving the American squadron from its anchors to the open lake, where the real superiority of the British could assert itself.[436]

Castlereagh's "chances of the campaign" had gone so decidedly against the British that no ground was left to claim territorial adjustments. To effect these the war must be continued; and for this Great Britain was not prepared, nor could she afford the necessary detachment of force. In the completeness of Napoleon's downfall, we now are prone to forget that remaining political conditions in Europe still required all the Great Powers to keep their arms at hand.

* * * * *

The war was practically ended by Prevost's retreat. What remained was purely episodical in character, and should be so regarded. Nevertheless, although without effect upon the issue, and indeed in great part transacted after peace had been actually signed, it is so directly consecutive with the war as to require united treatment.

Very soon after reaching Bermuda, Vice-Admiral Cochrane, in pursuance of the "confidential communications with which he was charged," the character of which, he intimated to Warren,[437] was a reason for expediting the transfer of the command, despatched the frigate "Orpheus" to the Appalachicola River to negotiate with the Creek and other Indians. The object was to rouse and arm "our Indian allies in the Southern States," and to arrange with them a system of training by British officers, and a general plan of action; by which, "supporting the Indian tribes situated on the confines of Florida, and in the back parts of Georgia, it would be easy to reduce New Orleans, and to distress the enemy very seriously in the neighboring provinces."[438]

The "Orpheus" arrived at the mouth of the Appalachicola May 10, 1814, and on the 20th her captain, Pigot, had an interview with the principal Creek chiefs. He found[439] that the feeling of their people was very strong against the Americans; and from the best attainable information he estimated that twenty-eight hundred warriors were ready to take up arms with the British. There were said to be as many more Choctaws thus disposed; and perhaps a thousand other Indians, then dispersed and unarmed, could be collected. The negroes of Georgia would probably also come over in crowds, once the movement started. With a suitable number of British subalterns and drill sergeants, the savages could be fitted to act in concert with British troops in eight or ten weeks; for they were already familiar with the use of fire-arms, and were moreover good horsemen. The season of the year being still so early, there was ample time for the necessary training. With these preparations, and adequate supplies of arms and military stores, Pigot thought that a handful of British troops, co-operating with the Creeks and Choctaws, could get possession of Baton Rouge, from which New Orleans and the lower Mississippi would be an easy conquest. Between Pensacola, still in the possession of Spain, and New Orleans, Mobile was the only post held by the United States. In its fort were two hundred troops, and in those up country not more than seven hundred.

When transmitting this letter, which, with his own of June 20, was received at the Admiralty August 8, Cochrane endorsed most of Pigot's recommendations. He gave as his own estimate, that to drive the Americans entirely out of Louisiana and the Floridas would require not more than three thousand British troops; to be landed at Mobile, where they would be joined by all the Indians and the disaffected French and Spaniards.[440] In this calculation reappears the perennial error of relying upon disaffected inhabitants, as well as savages. Disaffection must be supported by intolerable conditions, before inhabitants will stake all; not merely the chance of life, but the certainty of losing property, if unsuccessful. Cochrane took the further practical step of sending at once such arms and ammunition as the fleet could spare, together with four officers and one hundred and eight non-commissioned officers and privates of the marine corps, to train the Indians. These were all under the command of Major Nicholls, who for this service was given the local rank of Colonel. The whole were despatched July 23, in the naval vessels "Hermes" and "Carron," for the Appalachicola. The Admiral, while contemplating evidently a progress towards Baton Rouge, looked also to coastwise operations; for he asked the Government to furnish him vessels of light draught, to carry heavy guns into Lake Ponchartrain, and to navigate the shoal water between it and Mobile, now called Mississippi Sound.

The Admiralty in reply[441] reminded Cochrane of the former purpose of the Government to direct operations against New Orleans, with a very large force under Lord Hill, Wellington's second in the Peninsular War. Circumstances had made it inexpedient to send so many troops from Europe at this moment; but, in view of the Admiral's recommendation, General Ross would be directed to co-operate in the intended movement at the proper season, and his corps would be raised to six thousand men, independent of such help in seamen and marines as the fleet might afford. The re-enforcements would be sent to Negril Bay, at the west end of Jamaica, which was made the general rendezvous; and there Cochrane and Ross were directed to join not later than November 20. The purpose of the Government in attempting the enterprise was stated to be twofold. "First, to obtain command of the embouchure of the Mississippi, so as to deprive the back settlements of America of their communication with the sea; and, secondly, to occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of peace might be improved, or which we might be entitled to exact the cession of, as the price of peace." Entire discretion was left with the two commanders as to the method of proceeding, whether directly against New Orleans, by water, or to its rear, by land, through the country of the Creeks; and they were at liberty to abandon the undertaking in favor of some other, should that course seem more suitable. When news of the capture of Washington was received, two thousand additional troops were sent to Bermuda, under the impression that the General might desire to push his success on the Atlantic coast. These ultimately joined the expedition two days before the attack on Jackson's lines. Upon the death of General Ross, Sir Edward Pakenham was ordered to replace him; but he did not arrive until after the landing, and had therefore no voice in determining the general line of operations adopted.

These were the military instructions. To them were added certain others, political in character, dictated mainly by the disturbed state of Europe, and with an eye to appease the jealousies existing among the Powers, which extended to American conditions, colonial and commercial. While united against Napoleon, they viewed with distrust the aggrandizement of Great Britain. Ross was ordered, therefore, to discountenance any overture of the inhabitants to place themselves under British dominion; but should he find a general and decided disposition to withdraw from their recent connection with the United States, with the view of establishing themselves as an independent people, or of returning under the dominion of Spain, from which they then had been separated less than twenty years, he was to give them every support in his power. He must make them clearly understand, however, that in the peace with the United States neither independence nor restoration to Spain could be made a sine qua non;[442] there being about that a finality, of which the Government had already been warned in the then current negotiations with the American commissioners. These instructions to Ross were communicated to Lord Castlereagh at Vienna, to use as might be expedient in the discussions of the Conference.

No serious attempt was made in the direction of Baton Rouge, through the back countries of Georgia and Florida; nor does there appear any result of consequence from the mission of Colonel Nicholls. On September 17 the "Hermes" and "Carron," supported by two brigs of war, made an attack upon Fort Bowyer, a work of logs and sand commanding the entrance to Mobile Bay. After a severe cannonade, lasting between two and three hours, they were repulsed; and the "Hermes," running aground, was set on fire by her captain to prevent her falling into the hands of the enemy. Mobile was thus preserved from becoming the starting point of the expedition, as suggested by Cochrane; and that this object underlay the attempt may be inferred from the finding of the Court Martial upon Captain Percy of the "Hermes," which decided that the attack was perfectly justified by the circumstances stated at the trial.[443]

In October, 1810, by executive proclamation of President Madison, the United States had taken possession of the region between Louisiana and the River Perdido,[444] being the greater part of what was then known as West Florida. The Spanish troops occupying Mobile, however, were not then disturbed;[445] nor was there a military occupation, except of one almost uninhabited spot near Bay St. Louis.[446] This intervention was justified on the ground of a claim to the territory, asserted to be valid; and occasion for it was found in the danger of a foreign interference, resulting from the subversion of Spanish authority by a revolutionary movement. By Great Britain it was regarded as a usurpation, to effect which advantage had been taken of the embarrassment of the Spaniards when struggling against Napoleon for national existence. On May 14, 1812, being then on the verge of war with Great Britain, the ally of Spain, an Act of Congress declared the whole country annexed, and extended over it the jurisdiction of the United States. Mobile was occupied April 15, 1813. Pensacola, east of the Perdido, but close to it, remained in the hands of Spain, and was used as a base of operations by the British fleet, both before and after the attack of the "Hermes" and her consorts upon Fort Bowyer. From there Nicholls announced that he had arrived in the Floridas for the purpose of annoying "the only enemy Great Britain has in the world"[447]; and Captain Percy thence invited the pirates of Barataria to join the British cause. Cochrane also informed the Admiralty that for quicker communication, while operating in the Gulf, he intended to establish a system of couriers through Florida, between Amelia Island and Pensacola, both under Spanish jurisdiction.[448] On the score of neutrality, therefore, fault can scarcely be found with General Jackson for assaulting the latter, which surrendered to him November 7. The British vessels departed, and the works were blown up; after which the place was restored to the Spaniards.

In acknowledging the Admiralty's letter of August 10, Cochrane said that the diminution of numbers from those intended for Lord Hill would not affect his plans; that, unless the United States had sent very great re-enforcements to Louisiana, the troops now to be employed were perfectly adequate, even without the marines. These he intended to send under Rear-Admiral Cockburn, to effect a diversion by occupying Cumberland Island, off the south coast of Georgia, about November 10, whence the operations would be extended to the mainland. It was hoped this would draw to the coast the American force employed against the Indians, and so favor the movements in Louisiana.[449] While not expressly stated, the inference seems probable that Cochrane still—October 3—expected to land at Mobile. For some reason Cockburn's attack on Cumberland Island did not occur until January 12, when the New Orleans business was already concluded; so that, although successful, and prosecuted further to the seacoast, it had no influence upon the general issues.

Cochrane, with the division from the Atlantic coast, joined the re-enforcements from England in Negril Bay, and thence proceeded to Mississippi Sound; anchoring off Ship Island, December 8. On the 2d General Jackson had arrived in New Orleans, whither had been ordered a large part of the troops heretofore acting against the Creeks. The British commanders had now determined definitely to attack the city from the side of the sea. As there could be little hope for vessels dependent upon sails to pass the forts on the lower Mississippi, against the strong current, as was done by Farragut's steamers fifty years later, it was decided to reach the river far above those works, passing the army through some of the numerous bayous which intersect the swampy delta to the eastward. From Ship Island this desired approach could be made through Lake Borgne.

For the defence of these waters there were stationed five American gunboats and two or three smaller craft, the whole under command of Lieutenant Thomas ap Catesby Jones. As even the lighter British ships of war could not here navigate, on account of the shoalness, and the troops, to reach the place of debarkation, the Bayou des Pecheurs, at the head of Lake Borgne, must go sixty miles in open boats, the hostile gun vessels had first to be disposed of. Jones, who from an advanced position had been watching the enemy's proceedings in Mississippi Sound, decided December 12 that their numbers had so increased as to make remaining hazardous. He therefore retired, both to secure his retreat and to cause the boats of the fleet a longer and more harassing pull to overtake him. The movement was none too soon, for that night the British barges and armed boats left the fleet in pursuit. Jones was not able to get as far as he wished, on account of failure of wind; but nevertheless on the 13th the enemy did not come up with him. During the night he made an attempt at further withdrawal; but calm continuing, and a strong ebb-tide running, he was compelled again to anchor at 1 A.M. of the 14th, and prepared for battle. His five gunboats, with one light schooner, were ranged in line across the channel way, taking the usual precautions of springs on their cables and boarding nettings triced up. Unluckily for the solidity of his order, the current set two of the gunboats, one being his own, some distance to the eastward,—in advance of the others.

At daylight the British flotilla was seen nine miles distant, at anchor. By Jones' count it comprised forty-two launches and three light gigs.[450] They soon after weighed and pulled towards the gunboats. At ten, being within long gunshot, they again anchored for breakfast; after which they once more took to the oars. An hour later they closed with their opponents. The British commander, Captain Lockyer, threw his own boat, together with a half-dozen others, upon Jones' vessel, "Number 156,"[451] and carried her after a sharp struggle of about twenty minutes, during which both Lockyer and Jones were severely wounded. Her guns were then turned against her late comrades, in support of the British boarders, and at the end of another half-hour, at 12.40 P.M., the last of them surrendered.

That this affair was very gallantly contested on both sides is sufficiently shown by the extent of the British loss—seventeen killed and seventy-seven wounded.[452] They were of course in much larger numbers than the Americans. No such attempt should be made except with this advantage, and the superiority should be as great as is permitted by the force at the disposal of the assailant.

This obstacle to the movement of the troops being removed, debarkation began at the mouth of the Bayou des Pecheurs;[453] whence the British, undiscovered during their progress, succeeded in penetrating by the Bayou Bienvenu and its tributaries to a point on the Mississippi eight miles below New Orleans. The advance corps, sixteen hundred strong, arrived there at noon, December 23, accompanied by Major-General Keane, as yet in command of the whole army. The news reached Jackson two hours later.

Fresh from the experiences of Washington and Baltimore, the British troops flattered themselves with the certainty of a quiet night. The Americans, they said to each other, have never dared to attack. At 7.30, however, a vessel dropped her anchor abreast them, and a voice was heard, "Give them this for the honor of America!" The words were followed by the discharge of her battery, which swept through the camp. Without artillery to reply, having but two light field guns, while the assailant—the naval schooner "Caroline," Lieut. J.D. Henley—had anchored out of musket range, the invaders, suffering heavily, were driven to seek shelter behind the levee, where they lay for nearly an hour.[454] At the end of this, a dropping fire was heard from above and inland. Jackson, with sound judgment and characteristic energy, had decided to attack at once, although, by his own report, he could as yet muster only fifteen hundred men, of whom but six hundred were regulars. A confused and desperate night action followed, the men on both sides fighting singly or in groups, ignorant often whether those before them were friends or foes. The Americans eventually withdrew, carrying with them sixty-six prisoners. Their loss in killed and wounded was one hundred and thirty-nine; that of the British, two hundred and thirteen.

The noise of this rencounter hastened the remainder of the British army, and by the night of December 24 the whole were on the ground. Meantime, the "Caroline" had been joined by the ship "Louisiana," which anchored nearly a mile above her. In her came Commodore Patterson, in chief naval command. The presence of the two impelled the enemy to a slight retrograde movement, out of range of their artillery. The next morning, Christmas, Sir Edward Pakenham arrived from England. A personal examination satisfied him that only by a reconnaissance in force could he ascertain the American strength and preparations, and that, as a preliminary to such attempt, the vessels whose guns swept the line of advance must be driven off. On the 26th the "Caroline" tried to get up stream to Jackson's camp, but could not against a strong head wind; and on the 27th the British were able to burn her with hot shot. The "Louisiana" succeeded in shifting her place, and thenceforth lay on the west bank of the stream, abreast of and flanking the entrenchments behind which Jackson was established.

These obstacles gone, Pakenham made his reconnaissance. As described by a participant,[455] the British advanced four or five miles on December 28, quite unaware what awaited them, till a turn in the road brought them face to face with Jackson's entrenchments. These covered a front of three fourths of a mile, and neither flank could be turned, because resting either on the river or the swamp. They were not yet complete, but afforded good shelter for riflemen, and had already several cannon in position, while the "Louisiana's" broadside also swept the ground in front. A hot artillery fire opened at once from both ship and works, and when the British infantry advanced they were met equally with musketry. The day's results convinced Pakenham that he must resort to the erection of batteries before attempting an assault; an unfortunate necessity, as the delay not only encouraged the defenders, but allowed time for re-enforcement, and for further development of their preparations. While the British siege pieces were being brought forward, largely from the fleet, a distance of seventy miles, the American Navy was transferring guns from the "Louisiana" to a work on the opposite side of the river, which would flank the enemies' batteries, as well as their columns in case of an attempt to storm.



When the guns had arrived, the British on the night of December 31 threw up entrenchments, finding convenient material in the sugar hogsheads of the plantations. On the morning of January 1 they opened with thirty pieces at a distance of five hundred yards; but it was soon found that in such a duel they were hopelessly overmatched, a result to which contributed the enfilading position of the naval battery. "To the well-directed exertions from the other side of the river," wrote Jackson to Patterson, after the close of the operations, "must be ascribed in great measure that harassment of the enemy which led to his ignominious flight." The British guns were silenced, and for the moment abandoned; but during the night they were either withdrawn or destroyed. It was thus demonstrated that no adequate antecedent impression could be made on the American lines by cannonade; and, as neither flank could be turned, no resource remained, on the east shore at least, but direct frontal assault.

But while Jackson's main position was thus secure, he ran great risk that the enemy, by crossing the river, and successful advance there, might establish themselves in rear of his works; which, if effected, would put him at the same disadvantage that the naval battery now imposed upon his opponents. His lines would be untenable if his antagonist commanded the water, or gained the naval battery on his flank, to which the crew of the "Louisiana" and her long guns had now been transferred. This the British also perceived, and began to improve a narrow canal which then led from the head of the bayou to the levee, but was passable by canoes only. They expected ultimately to pierce the levee, and launch barges upon the river; but the work was impeded by the nature of the soil, the river fell, and some of the heavier boats grounding delayed the others, so that, at the moment of final assault, only five hundred men had been transported instead of thrice that number, as intended.[456] What these few effected showed how real and great was the danger.

The canal was completed on the evening of January 6, on which day the last re-enforcements from England, sixteen hundred men under Major-General Lambert, reached the front. Daylight of January 8 was appointed for the general assault; the intervening day and night being allowed for preparations, and for dragging forward the boats into the river. It was expected that the whole crossing party of fifteen hundred, under Colonel Thornton, would be on the west bank, ready to move forward at the same moment as the principal assault, which was also to be supported by all the available artillery, playing upon the naval battery to keep down its fire. There was therefore no lack of ordinary military prevision; but after waiting until approaching daylight began to throw more light than was wished upon the advance of the columns, Pakenham gave the concerted signal. Owing to the causes mentioned, Thornton had but just landed with his first detachment of five hundred. Eager to seize the battery, from which was to be feared so much destructive effect on the storming columns on the east bank, he pushed forward at once with the men he had, his flank towards the river covered by a division of naval armed boats; "but the ensemble of the general movement," wrote the British general, Lambert, who succeeded Pakenham in command, "was thus lost, and in a point which was of the last importance to the [main] attack on the left bank of the river."

Not only was Thornton too weak, but he was eight hours[457] late, though not by his own fault. Commodore Patterson, whose duties kept him on the west bank, reported that the naval battery was actively and effectively employed upon the flank of the storming columns, and it was not until some time after the engagement opened that he was informed of the near approach of the British detachment on that side. In prevision of such an attempt, a line of works had been thrown up at the lower end of the naval battery, at right angles to it, to cover its flank. This was weak, however, at the extremity farthest from the river, and thither the British directed their attack. The defenders there, some very newly joined Kentucky militia, broke and fled, and their flight carried with them all the other infantry. The seamen of the battery, deprived of their supports, retreated after spiking their guns, which fell into the enemy's hands; and Thornton, who was severely wounded, was able to date his report of success from the "Redoubt on the right bank of the Mississippi."[458] He advanced actually, and without serious opposition, a mile above—that is, in rear of—Jackson's lines and the "Louisiana's" anchorage. "This important rout," wrote Jackson, "had totally changed the aspect of affairs. The enemy now occupied a position from which they might annoy us without hazard, and by means of which they might have been enabled to defeat, in a great measure, the effects of our success on this side of the river. It became, therefore, an object of the first consequence to dislodge him as soon as possible."

Jackson himself attributed his success in this desirable object as much to negotiation as to the force he would be able to apply. The story of the main assault and its disastrous repulse is familiar. In itself, it was but an instance of a truth conspicuously illustrated, before and after, on many fields, of the desperate character of a frontal attack upon protected men accustomed to the use of fire-arms—even though they be irregulars. Could Thornton's movement have been made in full force assigned, and at the moment intended,—so that most of the advance on both sides the river could have been consummated before dawn,—a successful flanking operation would have been effected; and it is far from improbable that Jackson, finding the naval guns turned against him, would have been driven out of his lines. With raw troops under his command, and six thousand veterans upon his heels, no stand could have been made short of the town, nor in it.

As it was, the failure of the two parts of the British to act coincidently caused them to be beaten in detail: for the disastrous and bloody repulse of the columns on the east bank led to the withdrawal of the tiny body on the west.[459] No further attempt was made. On the 18th of January the British withdrew. In pursuance of the full discretionary power given by their orders as to any further employment upon the American coast of the forces under their command, General Lambert and the Admiral then concerted an attack upon Fort Bowyer, at the entrance to Mobile Bay. This surrendered February 11, the day that the news of the Peace reached New York.

* * * * *

The ocean as well as the land had its episodes of fighting after peace had been signed. The United States frigate "President," which during the first two years of the war had been commanded continuously by Commodore John Rodgers, was in May, 1814, transferred to Decatur, who took to her with him the crew of his old ship, the "United States," irretrievably shut up in New London. The "President" remained in New York throughout the year, narrowly watched by the enemy. In a letter of August 10, Decatur speaks of the unfavorable conditions of the season for sailing; that four British ships kept close to Sandy Hook, at times even anchored. He then mentions also "the great apprehension and danger" which New York was undergoing, in common with the entire seaboard, and the wish of the city government that the crew of the ship should remain for defence of the port.[460] It will be remembered that this was in the anxious period preceding the development of the British menace to the coast, which issued in the capture of Washington and Alexandria, and the attack on Baltimore. Philadelphia also trembled; and Decatur received an order to carry the "President's" crew to her protection, if threatened.[461]

On New Year Day, 1815, the "President" was still in the bay, awaiting a chance to sail. She was deeply laden for a long absence, and was to be accompanied by a merchant brig, the "Macedonian," carrying further stores. The sloops "Hornet" and "Peacock," and brig "Tom Bowline," were likewise watching to slip out. On the night of January 14, 1815, in a heavy northwester, the "President's" attempt was made; the pilots for the occasion having undertaken to mark the channel by boats suitably stationed. Despite these precautions the ship grounded, and beat heavily on the bottom for an hour and a half. By this she was seriously injured, and would have gone back had the wind permitted. As it was, she had to be forced over, and at 10 P.M. went clear; but with loss of a large part of that speed for which she was known, and which had been among Decatur's chief reasons for preferring her to the new "Guerriere."[462] The "Macedonian" was in company.

The British blockading division was under the command of Captain John Hayes, of the razee[463] "Majestic," and consisted, besides that ship, of the forty-gun 24-pounder frigate "Endymion," and the thirty-eight-gun 18-pounder frigates "Pomone" and "Tenedos"; the latter of which had joined on the 13th. The vessels were driven off shore by the violence of the gale; but Hayes, reasoning as a seaman, anticipated both Decatur's sailing that night and his probable course. After clearing the bar, the "President" steered nearly due east, along the south shore of Long Island, for fifty miles, when she headed off, southeast by east, for the open sea. At 5 A.M. three of the British squadron were seen ahead on the new course; the fourth, the "Tenedos," being then out of sight to the southward, either detached for a wider sweep of watchfulness, or separated by the gale.

The "President," on seeing the enemy, hauled up again along shore, and a stern chase began, which lasted till near nightfall of the 15th; the "Endymion" leading the British squadron. The "Tenedos" being sighted soon after daybreak, Hayes detached the "Pomone" to ascertain what ship it was; a step which for the time threw the "Pomone," as well as the "Tenedos," out of the running. At 5 P.M. the "Endymion" had got well within point-blank shot of the "President." It must be appreciated that, with the whole hostile squadron at her heels, the American frigate could not delay, or turn her side with its battery towards an assailant behind; for to do so enabled the others to gain on her. On the other hand, the pursuer could so deflect—yaw—at frequent intervals, and having the greater speed could continually recover the ground thus lost. This was what Captain Hope of the "Endymion" did, with sound judgment. He took a position on the off-shore quarter of the "President," where neither her broadside nor stern guns could bear upon him, so long as she held her course. Thence, yawing continually, the "Endymion" poured in her successive broadsides, practically unopposed, mistress of the situation.

Decatur endured this for a time; but it was the military merit of his antagonist's conduct that it must eventually force him to turn aside, and so convert the stern chase of the British squadron to the more hopeful attempt to cut him off on a new course. After half an hour the "President's" helm was put to port, and the ship headed abruptly south, threatening to cross the "Endymion's" bow, and rake. The British frigate had to follow this movement of her opponent, and the two ran off on parallel lines, exchanging broadsides. The object of Decatur was to dismantle this enemy, strip him of his motive power, and so increase his own chance of escape. In this he was successful. After two hours and a half, between 8 and 8.30 P.M., the "Endymion's" sails were stripped from the yards. She dropped astern, and the "President" again steered east, bringing the other enemy's ships once more in her wake,—a stern chase.

At 11 P.M. the "Pomone" and "Tenedos" overtook her. These were of the class of the "Guerriere," "Macedonian," and "Shannon," very much lighter, singly, than the "President," which had a heavier battery than the "Constitution." Had the American ship retained her normal speed, she probably would have escaped; but the "Pomone," the first to arrive, outsailed her without using studdingsails, which the "President" was still able to carry alow and aloft, despite her engagement with the "Endymion." This fresh British ship luffed to port, and fired her starboard broadside. The "President" imitated the manoeuvre, heading up to north; but she did not fire. At this point the historian is met by a direct contradiction of evidence. Decatur says that the "Pomone" was now on the port bow, within musket-shot,[464] the "Tenedos" five hundred yards astern, "taking up a raking position on our quarter, and the rest (with the exception of the 'Endymion') within gunshot."[465] These statements are confirmed by the sworn testimony before the American Court of Inquiry. The log of the "Pomone," published with intention, reads that the "Tenedos" was not more than three miles off,—a distance to which no gun on shipboard of that day could carry,—and the "Endymion" and "Majestic" so far away that they did not come on the scene until 12.45 and 3 A.M., respectively, of the 16th. The "Pomone" fired a second broadside, and hauling still further to port was about to discharge a third, from a raking position ahead, when the "President" struck. She had not fired a gun at either the "Pomone" or the "Tenedos." The log of the "Pomone" is clear on this point, and Decatur's elaborate report makes no mention of having done so. The witnesses before the Court of Inquiry are equally silent.

Between the "Endymion" and the "President," in point of battery, the proportion of force was as four to three, in favor of the American ship. Against that must fairly be weighed the power of the "Endymion" to maintain for half an hour a quartering and raking position, owing to the necessity to escape laid on the "President." A quantitative estimate of this advantage would be largely guess; but it may safely be said that the disproportion of killed and wounded[466] can probably be laid to this, coupled with the very proper endeavor of Decatur to throw off his immediate enemy by aiming at her spars. After two and a half hours' fighting, the sails of the "Endymion" were "stripped from the yards," Captain Hayes reported; while the "President," by the "Pomone's" log, "continued to stand east under a press of sail," all studdingsails set, from lower to royal. This result accounts for where the "President's" shot went, and under the circumstances should have gone, and for why the "Endymion" lost fewer men; and it was not the sole reason for the last. There is, in the writer's judgment, no ground whatever for the assumption that the "Endymion" did, or singly would, have beaten the "President." The disparity of material force was counterbalanced by the circumstance that the "President" had the other vessels to take into account. From the legal point of view ships merely in sight contribute, and are therefore entitled to prize money. In the present instance they necessarily affected the manoeuvring and gunnery of the "President."

There is a good deal of human nature, and some food for quiet entertainment, in the British accounts. There were several to share, and apparently the glory was not quite enough to go round. With Admiral Hotham, not present in the action, but in immediate command of the station during Cochrane's absence at New Orleans and Cockburn's in Georgia, it was "the force which I had collected off the bar of New York." Captain Hayes had much to say on his calculations of the enemy's movements: "What is a little singular, at the very instant of arriving at the point of the supposed track of the enemy, Sandy Hook west-northwest fifteen leagues, we were made happy by the sight of a ship and a brig, not more than two miles on the weather bow." The published report of Captain Hope, of the "Endymion," is simple and modest; but some of his followers apparently would have all the glory. The "Endymion" had done the whole business. This drew forth the publication of the "Pomone's" log, concerning which the Naval Chronicle remarks, "It appears that some differences have taken place between the British frigates engaged, as to the honor of having captured the 'President.'"[467]

Had Decatur appreciated at the moment that his speedy surrender to the "Pomone" would be attributed to the subjection to which the "Endymion" was supposed to have reduced his ship, he very probably would have made a second fight of it. But he was convinced that ultimate escape was impossible. "Two fresh," though much weaker, ships of the enemy at hand, his own having fought for two hours and a half; "about one fifth of my crew killed and wounded, my ship crippled, and a more than fourfold force opposed to me, without a chance of escape left, I deemed it my duty to surrender." Physical and mental fatigue, the moral discomfiture of a hopeless situation, are all fairly to be taken into account; nor should resistance be protracted where it means merely loss of life. Yet it may be questioned whether the moral tone of a military service, which is its breath of life, does not suffer when the attempt is made to invest with a halo of extraordinary heroism such a resistance as Decatur made, by his own showing. Unless the "President" was really thrashed out by the "Endymion," which was the British assertion,[468] she might have put one of his Majesty's thirty-eight-gun frigates, the "Pomone," out of commission for a long time; and that, in addition to the "Endymion,"—the two fastest British vessels,—would have been no light matter in the then state of the New York blockade. If the finding of the American Court of Inquiry,[469] that "the 'Endymion' was conquered, while the 'President' in the contest with her had sustained but little injury," be admitted, there seems no reply to the comment that the "President" surrendered within musket-shot of a thirty-eight-gun frigate which with three or four broadsides she should have nearly annihilated. She was out to destroy commerce and enemy's cruisers, and she struck before her powers in that respect—by the Court's finding—were exhausted. Escape was impossible; one object of her cruise—the enemy's commerce—had become impracticable; was it justifiable to neglect the last opportunity for the other? Decatur's personal gallantry is beyond question; but, if the defence of the "President" is to be considered "glorious," and "heroic," it is difficult to know what term can be applied to that of the "Essex." War is violence, wounds, and death. Needless bloodshed is to be avoided; but even more, at the present day, is to be deprecated the view that the objects of a war are to be sacrificed to the preservation of life.

After a long detention, through the closeness of the Boston blockade, the "Constitution," still commanded by Captain Charles Stewart, effected her escape to sea towards the end of December. On February 20, 1815, two hundred miles east-northeast from Madeira, she fell in with two British ships of war, the "Cyane," and the "Levant," then on their way from Gibraltar to the Azores, and thence to the American coast. The "Cyane," a frigate-built ship, carried a battery of carronades: thirty 32-pounders, two 18-pounders. She had also two long 9-pounders; making a total of thirty-four guns, throwing a broadside weight of five hundred and seven pounds.[470] The "Levant" was a sloop of war, of the American "Hornet" class, carrying eighteen 32-pounder carronades and two long 9-pounders; giving two hundred and ninety-seven as her broadside weight. Between the two they therefore threw eight hundred and four pounds of metal. The "Constitution's" broadside was seven hundred and four pounds; but of this three hundred and eighty-four were in long 24-pounders. Supposing both parties willing to fight under such circumstances, the game would be all in the "Constitution's" hands. Her problem rather was so to conduct the contest that neither enemy should escape. Captain Stewart, in reporting his success, dwelt upon the advantages derived by the enemy "from a divided and more active force, as also their superiority in the weight and numbers of guns." One cannot but feel the utmost diffidence in differing from a seaman of the time, and one so skilful as Stewart; but the advantage of a divided force is as difficult to see as the superiority in battery power.

Though consorts, the enemy when first seen were separated by a distance of ten miles; and were sighted successively between 1 and 2 P.M. The wind was easterly and light. The "Constitution" was unable to prevent their junction, which was effected at 5.45. They then formed in line on the starboard tack, the "Levant" leading; with an interval between them of three hundred feet. At six the "Constitution" drew up on the weather side of the "Cyane," and five minutes later the action began at a distance of three hundred yards. After a quarter of an hour, noting the enemy's fire to slacken, Stewart stopped his own, to allow the smoke to lift. When he could see, he found the "Constitution" abreast the "Levant," with the "Cyane" astern, luffing up for his port quarter. He gave his port broadside to the "Levant," then braced aback his after-sails, and so went astern towards the "Cyane," bringing her abeam under cover of the renewed cannonade. At 6.35—about ten minutes later—the enemy's fire again weakened, and the "Levant" was seen to be bearing up before the wind. Stewart made sail ahead, raked her twice from astern with the port guns, and then saw the "Cyane" also wearing. The "Constitution" immediately wore short round, and caught this opponent before she had completed her manoeuvre, so that she raked her also from astern with the starboard battery. The "Cyane" then came to the wind on the port tack, and fired that broadside, to which the "Constitution," having reloaded after raking, was about to reply, when, at 6.50 this enemy struck, and fired a lee gun,—the signal of submission. A prize crew, with a party of marines to guard prisoners, was hastily thrown on board, and at eight the "Constitution" made sail again after the "Levant." At 8.30 this plucky little ship was met returning to the conflict. At 8.50 the two passed on opposite tacks, and exchanged broadsides, after which the "Constitution" kept away under the enemy's stern and raked again. The "Levant" could now run with a clear conscience. Whatever argument can be based on the united batteries of the two British ships, and the advantage of divided force, eighteen 32-pounder carronades were no match for the "Constitution." The "Levant" took to her heels, but at 10 P.M. was overtaken and surrendered.[471]

The losses as reported by Stewart were: "Constitution," killed three; wounded twelve; "Cyane," killed twelve; wounded twenty-six; "Levant," killed twenty-three; wounded sixteen. Captain Stewart's management of his vessel was strikingly clever and prompt. The advantages which he attributed to the enemy, an aggregate of guns, slightly superior in total weight, divided between two smaller ships, the author has never been able to recognize.[472]

The sloops of war "Hornet," Commander James Biddle, and "Peacock," Commander Lewis Warrington, and the brig "Tom Bowline," which were waiting their opportunity in the lower bay of New York when the "President" sailed, got to sea five days after her, January 20. When two days out, the "Hornet" separated in chase. The vessels had a rendezvous at the lonely island of Tristan d'Acunha, in the South Atlantic, some fifteen hundred miles west of the Cape of Good Hope. The "Hornet" arrived first, and was about to anchor, at 10.30 in the morning of March 23, when a sail was seen to the southeast, steering west. As it soon passed behind the island, the "Hornet" made sail to the westward, and the two shortly came within sight. The stranger was the British sloop of war "Penguin," Captain Dickinson. By the report of Captain Biddle, based on examination after the action, she carried sixteen 32-pounder carronades, two long 12-pounders in broadside, and one long twelve on a pivot, fighting either side. The "Hornet" had eighteen 32-pounder carronades, and two long twelves.

The wind being south-southwest, the "Penguin" was to windward, and bore up to close. At 1.40 P.M., being nearly within musket-shot, she hauled to the wind on the starboard tack, a movement which the "Hornet" at once imitated, and the battle began; the "Hornet" to leeward, the two running on parallel courses,—an artillery duel. The "Penguin" drew gradually nearer, and at 1.55 put her helm hard up, to run her antagonist on board. The American crew were called to repel boarders, and so were on hand when the enemy's bowsprit came in between the main and mizzen rigging; but, while ready to resist an attempt to board, the course of the action had so satisfied Biddle of the superiority of his ship's gunnery that he would not throw his men away in a hand-to-hand contest upon the enemy's decks. The small arms men and marines, however, distributed along the "Hornet's" side kept up a lively musketry fire, which the British endured at great disadvantage, crowded upon the narrow front presented by a ship's forecastle. The "Penguin" finally wrenched clear with the loss of her foremast and bowsprit, and in this crippled state surrendered immediately. From the first gun to hauling down the flag was twenty-two minutes. The British ship had lost fourteen killed and twenty-eight wounded, her captain being among the slain. The "Hornet" had one killed and ten wounded. The comparative efficiency of the two vessels is best indicated by the fact that the "Hornet" had not a single cannon-ball in her hull, nor any serious injury even to her lower masts; yet that her rigging and sails were very much cut proves that her opponent's guns were active. By the ready skill of the seamen of that day she was completely ready for any service forty-eight hours later. The "Penguin" was scuttled.

The action between the "Hornet" and "Penguin" was the last naval combat of the War of 1812. The day after it, March 24, the "Peacock" and "Tom Bowline" arrived, in time to see the "Penguin" before her captor sunk her. The brig "Macedonian," which had sailed in company with the "President," but escaped her fate, also came to Tristan d'Acunha, which would seem to have been intended as a fresh starting point for some enterprise in common.

FOOTNOTES:

[394] Memoirs and Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh. Series iii. vol. ii. pp. 86-91.

[395] Castlereagh Memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. pp. 86-91.

[396] Castlereagh to Liverpool (Prime Minister), Aug. 28, 1814. Ibid., pp. 100-102.

[397] Wellington to Liverpool, Nov. 9, 1814. Castlereagh Memoirs, series iii. vol. ii. pp. 186-189.

[398] Canadian Archives, C. 680, p. 46. The date is Sept. 10, 1813.

[399] Letter of Captain Evans, commanding N.Y. Navy Yard, Aug. 6, 1813.

[400] Canadian Archives, C. 679, pp. 348, 362.

[401] Izard says two. Official Correspondence of the Department of War with Major-General Izard, 1814 and 1815, p. 7.

[402] British Court Martial Record.

[403] Confidence.

[404] Account of the Public Life of Sir George Prevost, p. 136.

[405] Prevost to Bathurst, July 12, 1814. Report on Canadian Archives, 1896. Lower Canada, p. 31.

[406] Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 5, 1814. Ibid., p. 35.

[407] Prevost to Bathurst, Aug. 27.

[408] Official Correspondence of General Izard with the Department of War, pp. 56, 57. Philadelphia, 1816.

[409] Ridout, Ten Years in Upper Canada, p. 282.

[410] Niles' Register, vol. vi. p. 357.

[411] June 8, 1814. Navy Department MSS.

[412] Macomb's Report, Brannan's Military and Naval Letters, p. 415. Izard (Correspondence, p. 98) says, "There were at or about the works at Plattsburg not less than three thousand regulars, of whom fifteen hundred were fit for duty in the field. In the number were three companies of artillery."

[413] General Benjamin Mooers, who was in command of the New York State militia during these operations, in a letter to Governor Tompkins, dated Sept. 16, 1814 (Gov. Tompkins MSS. vol. ix. pp. 212-217, State Library, Albany, N.Y.), claims that Macomb was here less than just to the militia, "many of whom stood their ground as long as it was tenable" during the first day. In a general order issued by him Sept. 8 (Niles' Register, vol. vii. p. 70), he spoke of some "who fled at the first approach of the enemy, and afterwards basely disbanded themselves, and returned home." Macomb himself wrote that after the first day, when the army had retired to the works, "the militia behaved with great spirit."

[414] For copies of these letters, and of Macdonough's reply and endorsement, I am indebted to Mr. Rodney Macdonough, the Commodore's grandson. Cochran's is dated March 22, and Colden's June 26, 1815; Macdonough's reply July 3. It is well to note that all these preceded the British naval court martial, held in Portsmouth, Aug. 18-21, 1815, where the testimony that the squadron was within range was unanimous and accepted by the Court.

[415] The first lieutenant of the "Confiance" in his evidence said that it was not more than ten minutes after the ship rounded Cumberland Head that the enemy began firing at her, and that the shot at first fell short. As far as it goes, this would show that the American squadron was over a mile from the Head; and, if so, scarcely more than a mile from the batteries.

[416] For information as to ranges, the author applied to Professor Philip R. Alger, U.S. Navy, whose intimate acquaintance with questions of ordnance and gunnery is known throughout his service.

[417] Vol. viii. p. 70, April 1, 1815.

[418] These two letters of Macomb are given in the "Account of the Public Life of Sir George Prevost," p. 165.

[419] Izard's Correspondence, p. 98.

[420] Yeo to the Admiralty, Sept. 24, 1814. From a copy in the Court Martial Record.

[421] In his Narrative, submitted to the Court Martial, Captain Pring stated that Prevost wished a joint attack, because, in the advance along the head of Cumberland Bay, the left flank of the army, when crossing Dead Creek, had been much annoyed by the American gunboats. He feared the same in crossing the Saranac to the assault of the works, and wanted the navy to draw off the gunboats.

[422] Robertson's Narrative before the Court Martial.

[423] The correspondence between Prevost and Downie, Sept. 7-10, is in the Canadian Archives, M. 389.6. pp. 176-183.

[424] This letter of Major Coore, published in a Canadian paper, Feb. 26, 1815, is to be found in the Canadian Archives MSS., M. 389.6. p. 287.

[425] Court Martial Evidence.

[426] Evidence of Pring, and of Brydone, master of the "Confiance," before the Court Martial. Robertson in his narrative is equally positive and explicit on this point.

[427] Robertson's Narrative.

[428] Robertson's Narrative.

[429] Macdonough's Report.

[430] Pronounced "wynd."

[431] Robertson's Narrative.

[432] A spring is a rope taken from the stern of a ship to the anchor, by hauling on which the ship is turned in the direction desired.

[433] Brydone's Evidence.

[434] Evidence of Sailing Master Brydone.

[435] Macdonough's Report.

[436] For the battle of Lake Champlain much the most complete and satisfactory evidence is the Record of the British Court Martial. There having been no dispute on the American side, as between Perry and Elliott at Lake Erie, there has not been the same output of conflicting statements, tending to elucidate as well as to confuse. Commander Henley of the "Eagle" was apparently dissatisfied with Macdonough's report, as the Commodore (apparently) was with his action. This drew from him a special report. Navy Department MSS. Niles' Register, vol. vii. Supplement, p. 135, contains this letter with many verbal changes, which do not materially affect its purport.

[437] Cochrane arrived at Bermuda March 6; but, despite his urgency and evident annoyance, Warren, who was senior, and had had ample notice of his supersession, took his own leisurely time about giving over the command, which he did not do till April 1, sailing for England April 8.

[438] Bathurst to Ross, Sept. 6, 1814. War Office, Entry Book.

[439] Pigot's Report to Cochrane, June 8, 1814. Admiralty In-Letters MSS.

[440] Cochrane to the Admiralty, June 20, 1814. Admiralty In-Letters MSS.

[441] Admiralty to Cochrane, Aug. 10, 1814. The reference in the text depends upon a long paper near the end of vol. 39, British War Office Records, which appears to the writer to have been drawn up for the use of the ministry in parliamentary debate. It gives step by step the procedure of the Government in entering on the New Orleans undertaking.

[442] Bathurst to Ross, Sept. 6, 1814. British War Office Records.

[443] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. 429.

[444] American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iii. p. 397.

[445] Ibid., p. 572.

[446] Niles' Register, vol. iii. p. 182.

[447] Ibid., vol. vii. pp. 133-135.

[448] Cochrane to the Admiralty, Oct. 3, 1814. Admiralty In-Letters.

[449] Ibid.

[450] Neither Cochrane nor Lockyer gives the number of the British boats; but as there were three divisions, drawn from five ships of the line and three or four frigates, besides smaller vessels, Jones' count was probably accurate. He had ample time to observe.

[451] The gunboats of Jefferson's building had no names, and were distinguished by number only.

[452] Jones' Report of this affair is found in Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 126; those of Cochrane and Lockyer in the Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxiii. pp. 337-341.

[453] So styled in Cochrane's Report, which also speaks of it as Bayou Catalan. The name does not appear on the map of Major Latour, chief of engineers to Jackson, who in his report calls the whole bayou Bienvenu.

[454] Gleig, Narrative of the Campaign of Washington, Baltimore, and New Orleans, pp. 282-288.

[455] Gleig, pp. 308-309.

[456] Gleig's Narrative, p. 321. Cochrane's Report, Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. 341. Report of Major C.R. Forrest, British Assistant Quarter-master-General, War Office Records.

[457] Thornton's Report. James' Military Occurrences of the War of 1812, vol. ii., p. 547.

[458] James' Military Occurrences, vol. ii. p. 547.

[459] Niles' Register, vols. vii. and viii., gives a large number of the official reports, as well British as American, concerning the New Orleans Expedition. So also does James in his "Military Occurrences" and "Naval Occurrences" of the War of 1812. Regarded in outline, as is attempted in the text, the operations are of a simple character, presenting no difficulties.

[460] Captains' Letters. Navy Department MSS.

[461] Ibid., Sept. 26, 1814.

[462] Decatur to Navy Department, April 9, 1814. Captains' Letters.

[463] A razee is a ship cut down, and reduced from her original rate. The "Majestic" had been a seventy-four, and probably was the same vessel which under that name and rate took part in the battle of the Nile. The expedient of razeeing had been adopted by the British Government, in order rapidly to prepare vessels superior to the American forty-fours, yet less costly in crews than ships of the line. These razees were rated as carrying fifty-six guns.

[464] Deposition of Commodore Decatur at Bermuda. Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. 371.

[465] Decatur's Report. Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 8. In his deposition Decatur says "the 'Tenedos' did not fire at the time of such surrender."

[466] The loss of the "President" was twenty-four killed, fifty-five wounded. (Decatur's Report.) That of the "Endymion," eleven killed and fourteen wounded. (Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. 262.)

[467] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. 370.

[468] Captain Hayes' Report. Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 175. Naval Chronicle, vol. xxxiii. p. 261.

[469] Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 147.

[470] The armament of the "Cyane" is that reported by Lieut. Hoffman, U.S. Navy, who brought her to the United States. Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 134.

[471] The "Cyane" reached a United States port, but the "Levant" was recaptured by a British squadron. Both names remained in the United States Navy till the Civil War. A "Levant," built in succession to the one captured, was lost at sea in 1860—never heard from.

[472] The account given in the text depends upon Stewart's "minutes of the action" (Niles' Register, vol. viii. p. 219), compared with the "Constitution's" log (Navy Department MSS.), of which the minutes are a development.



CHAPTER XVIII

THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

The Government of the United States had been honestly loath to declare war in 1812, and had signalized its reluctance by immediate advances looking to a restoration of peace. These were made through Jonathan Russell, the charge d'affaires in London when hostilities began. To use the expression of Monroe, then Secretary of State, "At the moment of the declaration of war, the President, regretting the necessity which produced it, looked to its termination, and provided for it."[473] The two concessions required as indispensable, in the overture thus referred to, dated June 26, 1812, were the revocation of the Orders in Council, and the abandonment of the practice of impressing from American merchant ships. Should these preliminary conditions be obtained, Russell was authorized to stipulate an armistice, during which the two countries should enter upon negotiations, to be conducted either at Washington or in London, for the settlement of all points of difference.

Russell made this communication to Castlereagh August 24, 1812. Before this date Admiral Warren had sailed from England for the American command, carrying with him the propositions of the British Government for a suspension of hostilities, consequent upon the repeal of the Orders in Council.[474] In view of Warren's mission, and of the fact that Russell had no powers to negotiate, but merely to conclude an arrangement upon terms which he could not alter, and which his Government had laid down in ignorance of the revocation of the Orders, Castlereagh declined to discuss with him the American requirements. "I cannot, however," he wrote, "refrain on one single point from expressing my surprise, namely, that as a condition preliminary even to a suspension of hostilities, the Government of the United States should have thought fit to demand that the British Government should desist from its ancient and accustomed practice of impressing British seamen from the merchant ships of a foreign state, simply on the assurance that a law shall hereafter be passed to prohibit the employment of British seamen in the public or commercial service of that state."[475] "The Government could not consent to suspend the exercise of a right upon which the naval strength of the empire mainly depends," until fully convinced that the object would be assured by other means. To a subsequent modification of the American propositions, in form, though not in tenor, the British minister replied in the same spirit, throwing the weight of his objections upon the question of impressment, which indeed remained alone of the two causes of rupture.[476]

Commendable as was its desire for peace, the American Government had made the mistake of being unwilling to insure it by due and timely preparation for war. In these advances, therefore, its adversary naturally saw not magnanimity, but apprehension. Russell, in reporting his final interview, wrote, "Lord Castlereagh once observed somewhat loftily, that if the American Government was so anxious to get rid of the war,[477] it would have an opportunity of doing so on learning the revocation of the Orders in Council." The American representative rejoined with proper spirit; but the remark betrayed the impression produced by this speedy offer, joined to the notorious military unreadiness of the United States. Such things do not make for peace. The British ministry, like a large part of the American people, saw in the declaration of war a mere variation upon the intermittent policy of commercial restrictions of the past five years; an attempt to frighten by bluster. In such spirit Monroe, in this very letter of June 26 to Russell, had dwelt upon the many advantages to be derived from peace with the United States; adding, "not to mention the injuries which cannot fail to result from a prosecution of the war." In transcribing his instructions, Russell discreetly omitted the latter phrase; but the omission, like the words themselves, betrays consciousness that the Administration was faithful to the tradition of its party, dealing in threats rather than in deeds. Through great part of the final negotiations the impression thus made remained with the British ministers.

On September 20, 1812, the Chancellor of the Russian Empire requested a visit from the American minister resident at St. Petersburg, Mr. John Quincy Adams. In the consequent interview, the next evening, the Chancellor said that the Czar, having recently made peace and re-established commercial intercourse with Great Britain, was much concerned that war should have arisen almost immediately between her and the United States. Hostilities between the two nations, which together nearly monopolized the carrying trade of the world, would prevent the economical benefits to Russia expected from the recent change in her political relations. The question was then asked, whether a proffer of Russian mediation would be regarded favorably by the United States. Adams had not yet received official intelligence even of the declaration of war, and was without information as to the views of his Government on the point suggested; but he expressed certainty that such an advance would be cordially met, and he could foresee no obstacle to its entertainment. The proposal was accordingly made to the President, through the customary channels, and on March 11, 1813, was formally accepted by him. James A. Bayard and Albert Gallatin were nominated commissioners, conjointly with Mr. Adams, to act for the United States in forming a treaty of peace under the mediation of the Czar. They sailed soon afterwards.

The American acceptance reached St. Petersburg about June 15; but on that day Adams was informed by the Chancellor that his despatches from London signified the rejection of the Russian proposition by the British Government, on the ground that the differences with the United States involved principles of the internal government of Great Britain, which could not be submitted to the discussion of any mediation.[478] As the Russian Court was then in campaign, at the headquarters of the allied armies, in the tremendous operations of the summer of 1813 against Napoleon, much delay necessarily ensued. On September 1, however, the British ambassador, who was accompanying the Court in the field, presented a formal letter reaffirming the unwillingness of his Government to treat under mediation, but offering through the Czar, whose mediatorial advance was so far recognized, to nominate plenipotentiaries to meet those of the United States in direct consultation. In the backward and forward going of despatches in that preoccupied and unsettled moment, it was not till near November 1 that the British Foreign Office heard from the ambassador that the American commissioners were willing so to treat, and desirous to keep their business separate from that of the continent of Europe; but that their powers were limited to action through the mediation of Russia. Castlereagh then, on November 4, addressed a note to the United States Government, offering a direct negotiation. This was accepted formally, January 5, 1814;[479] and Henry Clay with Jonathan Russell were added to the commission already constituted, raising the number of members to five. The representatives of Great Britain were three: Admiral Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, and William Adams. Ghent was fixed upon for the place of meeting.

The instructions issued to the American commissioners were voluminous. They contained not only the requirements of the Government, but arguments from every point of view, and alternatives of several descriptions, to meet anticipated objections. Such elaboration was perhaps necessary when negotiation was to take place so remote from communication with home. On one point, however, as originally issued in contemplation of Russian mediation, demand was peremptory. Impressment must cease, by stipulation. "If this encroachment of Great Britain is not provided against, the United States have appealed to arms in vain." At that moment, April 15, 1813,[480] the flush of expectation was still strong. "Should improper impressions have been taken of the probable consequences of the war, you will have ample means to remove them. It is certain that from its prosecution Great Britain can promise to herself no advantage, while she exposes herself to great expenses and to the danger of still greater losses." Nine months later, looking to direct negotiation, the same confident tone is maintained. "On impressment, the sentiments of the President have undergone no change. This degrading practice must cease.... No concession is contemplated on any point in controversy;"[481] and three weeks afterwards, February 14, 1814, "Should peace be made in Europe, it is presumed that the British Government would have less objection to forbear impressment for a specified term, than it would have should the war continue. In concluding a peace, even in case of a previous general peace in Europe, it is important to obtain such a stipulation."[482] On June 27, the note was lowered. "If found indispensably necessary to terminate the war, you may omit any stipulation on the subject of impressment." This was in pursuance of the Cabinet determination of June 27, already quoted.[483] It abandoned the only ground for war that had existed since August, 1812, when the Orders in Council were known to have been repealed. The commissioners were indeed to do their best to obtain from the British Government the demanded concessions, not in the matter of impressment only, but on the whole subject of irregular blockades, which underlay the Orders in Council, as well as on other maritime questions in dispute; but in pressing such demands they were under orders to fall back before resistance. From the opening of the colloquy they were on the defensive.

Quite different was the position assumed at first by the British Government and people. The events of the critical year 1813, both in Europe and America, had changed the entire outlook. Alexander Baring, whose general attitude towards the United States was friendly, wrote to Gallatin, October 12, 1813, "We wish for peace, but the pressure of the war upon our commerce and manufactures is over. They have ample relief in other quarters; indeed, the dependence of the two countries on each other was overrated." He was positive that there would be no concession on impressment. Again, on December 14, "The pressure of the war is diminished. Commerce is now abundantly prosperous."[484] Gallatin himself had occasion to spend some time in London during the succeeding spring,—1814. Quotation from his observations has been made already.[485] In a letter of April 21,—after Napoleon's abdication,—"The prosecution of war with the United States would afford a convenient pretext for preserving a more considerable standing force."[486] This would be a useful element in the troublesome diplomacy to be foreseen, in settling the disturbed affairs of Europe; and the Government stood in need of reasons for maintaining the pressure of taxation, which was already eliciting, and later in the year still more elicited, symptoms of great discontent and dangerous Parliamentary opposition. Yet in its conduct towards America the Cabinet had the people behind it. Two months later, Gallatin wrote to the Secretary of State, "You may rest assured of the general hostile spirit of this nation, and of its wish to inflict serious injury on the United States; that no assistance can be expected from Europe; and that no better terms will be obtained than the status ante bellum."[487]

At the time of this writing, June 13, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, returned from Paris, where he had been spending the two months succeeding the first abdication of Napoleon. During this period formal peace with France had been established, and the Bourbons reseated on her throne. His instructions to the British commissioners at Ghent, issued July 28, were framed on lines which showed consciousness of mastery.[488] The question of abandoning the practice of impressment would not be so much as entertained. The Rule of 1756 should "rest on its own clear and well established authority."[489] The commissioners were not even to discuss it. Equally decisive was the position taken with regard to questions of irregular blockades, and of compensation for seizures under the Orders in Council. When these were presented by the American commissioners, the first was waived aside, as one on which there was no difference of abstract principle; while as to the second, "you cannot be too peremptory in discouraging, at the outset, the smallest expectation of any restitution of captures made under the Orders in Council."[490]