While the "Chesapeake" affair was still in its earlier stages of discussion, the passage of events in Europe was leading rapidly to the formulation of the extreme British measures of retaliation for the Berlin Decree. On June 14 Napoleon defeated the Russians at the battle of Friedland; and on June 22, the day the "Leopard" attacked the "Chesapeake," an armistice was signed between the contending parties. Upon this followed the Conventions of Tilsit, July 8, 1807, by which the Czar undertook to support the Continental system, and to close his ports to Great Britain. The deadly purpose of the commercial warfare thus reinforced was apparent; and upon the Emperor's return to Paris, soon afterwards, the Berlin Decree received an execution more consonant to its wording than was the construction hitherto given it by French officials. In May, an American ship, the "Horizon," bound from England to Peru, had been wrecked upon the coast of France. Her cargo consisted in part of goods of British origin. Up to that time, no decisions contrary to American neutral rights had been based upon the Decree by French courts; but final action in the case of the "Horizon" was not taken till some time after the Emperor's return. Meanwhile, on August 9, General Armstrong, the American minister, had asked that Spain, which had formally adopted the Berlin Decree as governing its own course, should be informed of the rulings of the French authorities; "for a letter from the charge des affaires of the United States at Madrid shows that the fate of sundry American vessels, captured by Spanish cruisers, will depend, not on the construction which might be given to the Spanish decree by Spanish tribunals, but on the practice which shall have been established in France."[203] This letter was referred in due course—August 21—to the Minister of Marine, and a reply promised when his answer should be received. Under Napoleon's eye, doubts not entertained in his absence seem to have occurred to the ministers concerned, and on September 24 Armstrong learned that the Emperor had been consulted, and had said that, as he had expressed no exceptions to the operation of his Decree, French armed vessels were authorized to seize goods of English origin on board neutral vessels. This decision, having the force of law, was communicated to the tribunals, and under it so much of the "Horizon's" cargo as answered to this description was condemned. The rest was liberated.[204]

When this decision became known, it was evident that within the range of Napoleon's power there would henceforth be no refuge for British manufactures, or the produce of British colonies; that neutral ownership or jurisdiction would be no protection against force. Even the pity commonly extended to the shipwrecked failed, if his property had been bought in England. Recognition of the increased danger was shown in the doubling and trebling of insurance. The geographical sweep intended to be given to the edict was manifested by the action of state after state whither arms had extended Napoleon's influence; or, as Armstrong phrased it, "having settled the business of belligerents, with the exception of England, very much to his own liking, he was now on the point of settling that of neutrals in the same way." In July, Denmark and Portugal, as yet at peace, had been notified that they must choose between France and England, and had been compelled to exclude English commerce. August 29, a French division entered Leghorn, belonging to the nominally independent Kingdom of Etruria, took possession of the harbor and forts, ordered the surrender of all British goods in the hands of the inhabitants, and laid a general embargo upon the shipping, among which were many Americans. In Lower Italy, the Papal States and Naples underwent the same restrictions. Prussia yielded under obvious constraint, and Austria acceded from motives of policy, distinguishable in form only from direct compulsion. Russia, as already said, had joined immediately after decisive defeat in the field. The co-operation of the United States, the second maritime nation in the world, was vital to the general plan. Could it be secured? Already, at an audience given to the diplomatic corps on August 2, the Danish minister had taken Armstrong aside and asked him whether any application had been made to him with regard to the projected union of all commercial states against Great Britain. Being answered in the negative, he said, "You are much favored, but it will not last."[205] Armstrong characterized this incident as not important; but in truth the words italicized defined exactly the menacing scheme already matured in the Emperor's mind, for the execution of which, as events already showed, and continued to prove, he relied upon the force of arms. To this the United States was not accessible; but to coerce or cajole her by other means became a prominent feature of French policy, which was powerfully abetted by the tone of Great Britain speaking through Canning.

To appreciate duly the impending measures of the British ministry, attention should fasten upon the single decisive fact that this vast combination was not the free act of the parties concerned, but a submission imposed by an external military power, which at the moment, and for five succeeding years, they were unable to resist. It is one thing to deny the right of any number of independent communities to join in a Customs Union; it is another to maintain the obligations upon third parties of such a convention, when extorted by external compulsion. Either action may be resisted, but means not permissible in the one case may be justified in the other. In the European situation the subjected states, by reason of their subjection, disappeared as factors in diplomatic consideration. There remained only their master Napoleon, with his momentary lieutenant the Czar, and opposed to them Great Britain. "It is obvious," said the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Champagny, to Armstrong, "that his Majesty cannot permit to his allies a commerce which he denies to himself. This would be at once to defeat his system and oppress his subjects."[206] A few days later he wrote formally, "His Majesty considered himself bound to order reprisals on American vessels not only in his territory, but likewise in the countries which are under his influence,—Holland, Spain, Italy, Naples."[207] The Emperor by strength of arms oppressed to their grievous injury those who could not escape him; what should be the course of those whom he could not reach, to whom was left the choice between actual resistance and virtual co-operation? The two really independent states were Great Britain and the United States. In the universal convulsion of civilization, the case of the several nations recalls the law of Solon, that in civil tumults the man who took neither side should be disfranchised.

The United States chose neutrality, and expected that it would be permitted her. She chose to overlook the interposition of Napoleon, and to regard the exclusion laws, forced by him upon other states, as instances of municipal regulation, incontestable when freely exercised. Not only would she not go behind the superficial form, but on technical grounds of international law she denied the right of another to do so. Great Britain had no choice. She was compelled to resistance; the question was as to methods. Direct military action was impossible. The weapon used against her was commercial prohibition, which meant eventual ruin, unless adequately parried by her own action. From Europe no help was to be expected. If the United States also decided so far to support Napoleon as to prosecute her trade subject to his measures, accepting as legal regulations extorted by him from other European countries, the trade of Europe would be transferred from Great Britain to America, and the revenues of France would expand in every way, while those of Great Britain shrank,—a result militarily fatal. In this the British Government would not acquiesce. It chose instead war with the United States, under the forms of peace.

That the tendency of the course pursued by the United States was to destroy British commerce, and that this tendency was successfully counteracted by the means framed by the British Government,—the Orders in Council,—admits of little doubt. When the American policy had worked out to its logical conclusion, in open trade with France, and complete interdict of importation from Great Britain, Joel Barlow, American Minister to France in 1811-12, and an intimate of Jefferson and Madison, wrote thus to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs: "In adopting the late arrangements with France the United States could not contemplate the deprivation of revenue. They really expected to draw from this country and from the rest of continental Europe the same species of manufactures, and to as great an amount as they were accustomed to do from England. They calculated with the more confidence on such a result as they saw how intimately it was combined with the great and essential interests of the Imperial Government. They perceived that it would promote in an unexpected degree the Continental system, which the Emperor has so much at heart.... The Emperor now commands nearly all the ports of continental Europe. The whole interior of the Continent must be supplied with American products. These must pass through French territory, French commercial houses, canals, and wagons. They must pay" toll to France in various ways, "and thus render these territories as tributary to France as if they were part of her own dominions."[208] But Napoleon replied that his system, as it stood, had greatly crippled British commerce, and that if he should admit American shipping freely to the Continent, trade could not be carried on, because the English under the Orders in Council would take it all, going or coming.[209]

"The peril of the moment is truly supposed to be great beyond all former example," wrote Pinkney, now American minister in London, when communicating to his Government the further Orders in Council adopted by Great Britain, in response to the attempted "union of all the commercial states" against her. As defined by Canning to Pinkney,[210] "the principle upon which the whole of this measure has been framed is that of refusing to the enemy those advantages of commerce which he has forbidden to this country. The simplest method of enforcing this system of retaliation would have been to follow the example of the enemy, by prohibiting altogether all commercial intercourse between him and other states." America then would not be allowed to trade with the countries under his Decrees. It was considered, however, more indulgent to neutrals—to the second parties in commercial intercourse with the enemy—to allow this intercourse subject to duties in transit to be paid in Great Britain. This would raise the cost to the continental consumer and pay revenue to Great Britain.

The Orders in Council of November 11, 1807, therefore forbade all entrance to ports of the countries which had embraced the Continental system. It was not pretended that they would be blockaded effectively. "All ports from which the British flag is excluded shall from henceforth be subject to the same restrictions, in point of trade and navigation, with the exceptions hereinafter mentioned, as if the same were actually blockaded in the most strict and rigorous manner by his Majesty's naval forces." The exception was merely that a vessel calling first at a British port would be allowed to proceed to one of those prohibited, after paying certain duties upon her cargo and obtaining a fresh clearance. This measure was instituted by the Executive, in pursuance of the custom of regulating trade with America by Orders in Council, prevalent since 1783; but it received legislative sanction by an Act of Parliament, March 28, 1808, which fixed the duties to be paid on the foreign goods thus passing through British custom-houses. Cotton, for instance, was to pay nine pence a pound, an amount intended to be prohibitory; tobacco, three halfpence. These were the two leading exports of United States domestic produce. In the United States this Act of Parliament was resented more violently, if possible, than the Order in Council itself. In the colonial period there had been less jealousy of the royal authority than of that of Parliament, and the feeling reappears in the discussion of the present measures. "This," said a Virginia senator,[211] "is the Act regulating our commerce, of which I complain. An export duty, which could not be laid in Charleston because forbidden by our Constitution, is laid in London, or in British ports." It was literally, and in no metaphorical sense, the reimposition of colonial regulation, to increase the revenues of Great Britain by reconstituting her the entrepot of commerce between America and Europe. "The Orders in Council," wrote John Quincy Adams in a public letter, "if submitted to, would have degraded us to the condition of colonists."[212]

This just appreciation preponderated over other feelings throughout the middle and southern states. Adams, a senator from Massachusetts, had separated himself in action and opinion from the mass of the people in New England, where, although the Orders were condemned, hatred of Napoleon and his methods overbore the sense of injury received from Great Britain. The indignation of the supporters of the Administration was intensified by the apparent purpose of the British Government to keep back information of the measure. Rose had sailed the day after its adoption, Monroe two days later, but neither brought any official intimation of its issuance, although that was announced in the papers of the day. "The Orders in Council," wrote Adams, "were not merely without official authenticity. Rumors had been for several weeks in circulation, derived from English prints and from private correspondence, that such Orders were to issue,[213] and no inconsiderable pains were taken to discredit the facts. Suspicions were lulled by declarations equivalent as nearly as possible to positive denial, and these opiates were continued for weeks after the embargo was laid, until Mr. Erskine received orders to make official communication of the Orders themselves, in proper form, to our Government."[214] This remissness, culpable as it certainly was in a matter of such importance, was freely attributed to the most sinister motives. "These Orders in Council were designedly concealed from Mr. Rose, although they had long been deliberated upon, and almost matured, before he left London. They were the besom which was intended to sweep, and would have swept, our commerce from the ocean. Great Britain in the most insidious manner had issued orders for the entire destruction of our commerce."[215]

The wrath was becoming, but in this particular the inference was exaggerated. The Orders, modelled on the general plan of blockades, provided for the warning of a vessel which had sailed before receiving notification; and not till after a first notice by a British cruiser was she liable to capture. Mention of such cases occurs in the journals of the day.[216] Some captains persisted, and, if successful in reaching a port under Napoleon's control, found themselves arrested under a new Decree,—that of Milan,—for having submitted to a visit they could not resist. Such were sequestered, subject to the decision of the United States to take active measures against Great Britain. "Arrived at New York, March 23, [1808], ship 'Eliza,' Captain Skiddy, 29 days from Bordeaux. All American vessels in France which had been boarded by British cruisers were under seizure. The opinion was, they would so remain till it was known whether the United States had adjusted its difficulties with Great Britain, in which case they would be immediately condemned. A letter from the Minister of Marine was published that the Decree of Milan must be executed severely, strictly, and literally."[217] Independent of a perpetual need to raise money, by methods more consonant to the Middle Ages than to the current period, Napoleon thus secured hostages for the action of the United States in its present dilemma.

The Orders in Council of November 11, having been announced in English papers of the 10th, 11th, and 12th, appeared in the Washington "National Intelligencer" of December 18.[218] The general facts were therefore known to the Executive and to the Legislature; and, though not officially adduced, could not but affect consideration, when the President, on December 18, 1807, sent a message to Congress recommending "an inhibition of the departure of our vessels from the ports of the United States." With his customary exaggerated expression of attendance upon instructions from Congress, he made no further definition of wishes which were completely understood by the party leaders. "The wisdom of Congress will also see the necessity of making every preparation for whatever events may grow out of the present crisis." Accompanying the message, as documents justificatory of the action to be taken, were four official papers. One was the formal communication to the French Council of Prizes of Napoleon's decision that goods of English origin were lawful prize on board neutral vessels; the second was the British proclamation directing the impressment of British seamen found on board neutral ships. These two were made public. Secrecy was imposed concerning the others, which were a letter of September 24, from Armstrong to the French Minister of Exterior Relations, and the reply, dated October 7. In this the minister, M. Champagny, affirmed the Emperor's decision, and added a sentence which, while susceptible of double meaning, certainly covertly suggested that the United States should join in supporting the Berlin Decree. "The decree of blockade has now been issued eleven months. The principal Powers of Europe, far from protesting against its provisions, have adopted them. They have perceived that its execution must be complete to render it more effectual, and it has seemed easy to reconcile these measures with the observance of treaties, especially at a time when the infractions by England of the rights of all maritime Powers render their interests common, and tend to unite them in support of the same cause."[219] This doubtless might be construed as applicable only to the European Powers; but as a foremost contention of Madison and Armstrong had been that the Berlin Decree contravened the treaty between France and the United States, the sentence lent itself readily to the interpretation, placed upon it by the Federalists, that the United States was invited to enforce in her own waters the continental system of exclusion, and so to help bring England to reason.

This the United States immediately proceeded to do. Though the motive differed somewhat, the action was precisely that suggested. On the same day that Jefferson's message was received, the Senate passed an Embargo Bill. This was sent at once to the House, returned with amendments, amendments concurred in, and bill passed and approved December 22. This rapidity of action—Sunday intervened—shows a purpose already decided in general principle; while the enactment of three supplementary measures, before the adjournment of Congress in April, indicates a precipitancy incompatible with proper weighing of details, and an avoidance of discussion, commendable only on the ground that no otherwise than by the promptest interception could American ships or merchandise be successfully jailed in port. The bill provided for the instant stoppage of all vessels in the ports of the United States, whether cleared or not cleared, if bound to any foreign port. Exception was made only in favor of foreign ships, which of course could not be held. They might depart with cargo already on board, or in ballast. Vessels cleared coastwise were to be deterred from turning foreign by bonds exacted in double the value of ship and cargo. American export and foreign navigation were thus completely stopped; and as the Non-Importation Act at last went into operation on December 14,[220] there was practical exclusion of all British vessels, for none could be expected to enter a port where she could neither land her cargo nor depart.

In communicating the embargo to Pinkney, for the information of the British Government,[221] Madison was careful to explain, as he had to the British minister at Washington, that it was a measure of precaution only; not to be considered as hostile in character. This was scarcely candid; coercion of Great Britain, to compel the withdrawal of her various maritime measures objectionable to the United States, was at least a silent partner in the scheme, as formulated to the consciousness of Jefferson and his followers.[222] The motive transpired, as such motives necessarily do; but, even had it not, the operation of the Act, under the conditions of the European war, was so plainly partial between the two belligerents, as to amount virtually to co-operation with Napoleon by the preponderance of injury done to Great Britain. It deprived her of cotton for raw material; of tobacco, which, imported in payment for British manufactures, formed a large element in her commerce with the Continent; of wheat and flour, which to some extent contributed to the support of her people, though in a much less degree than many supposed. It closed to her the American market at the moment that Napoleon and Alexander were actively closing the European; and it shut off from the West Indies American supplies known to be of the greatest importance, and fondly, but mistakenly, believed to be indispensable.

All this was well enough, if national policy required. Great Britain then was scarcely in a position to object seriously to retaliation by a nation thinking itself injured; but to define such a measure as not hostile was an insult to her common-sense. It was certainly hostile in nature, it was believed to be hostile in motive, and it intensified feelings already none too friendly. In France, although included in the embargo, and although her action was one of the reasons alleged for its institution, Napoleon expressed approval. It was injurious to England, and added little to the pressure upon France exerted by the Orders in Council through the British control of the ocean. Senator Smith of Maryland, a large shipping merchant, bore testimony to this. "It has been truly said by an eminent merchant of Salem, that not more than one vessel in eight that sailed for Europe within a short time before the embargo reached its destination. My own experience has taught me the truth of this; and as further proof I have in my hand a list of fifteen vessels which sailed for Europe between September 1 and December 23, 1807. Three arrived; two were captured by French and Spaniards; one was seized in Hamburg; and nine carried into England. But for the embargo, ships that would have sailed would have fared as ill, or worse. Not one in twenty would have arrived." Granting the truth of this anticipation, Great Britain might have claimed that, so far as evident danger was concerned, her blockades over long coast-lines were effective.

The question speedily arose,—If the object of embargo be precaution only, to save our vessels from condemnation under the sweeping edicts of France and Great Britain, and seamen from impressment on American decks, why object to exporting native produce in foreign bottoms, and to commerce across the Canada frontier? If, by keeping our vessels at home, we are to lose the profits upon sixty million dollars' worth of colonial produce which they have heretofore been carrying, with advantage to the national revenue, why also forbid the export of the forty to fifty million dollars' worth of domestic produce which foreign ship-owners would gladly take and safely carry? for such foreigners would be chiefly British, and would sail under British convoy, subject to small proportionate risk.[223] Why, also, to save seamen from impressment, deprive them of their living, and force them in search of occupation to fly our ports to British, where lower wages and more exposure to the pressgang await them? On the ground of precaution, there was no reply to these questions; unless, perhaps, that with open export of domestic produce the popular suffering would be too unequally distributed, falling almost wholly on New England shipping industries. Logically, however, if the precaution were necessary, the suffering must be accepted; its incidence was a detail only. The embargo was distinctly a hostile measure; and more and more, as people talked, in and out of Congress, was admitted to be simply an alternative for open war.

As such it failed. It entailed most of the miseries of war, without any of its compensations. It could not arouse the popular enthusiasm which elevates, nor command the popular support that strengthens. Hated and despised, it bred elusion, sneaking and demoralizing, and so debased public sentiment with reference to national objects, and individual self-sacrifice to national ends, that the conduct of the many who now evaded it was reproduced, during the War of 1812, in dealings with the enemy which even now may make an American's head hang for shame. Born of the Jeffersonian horror of war, its evil communication corrupted morals among those whose standards were conventional only; for public opinion failed to condemn breaches of embargo, and by a natural declension equally failed soon after to condemn aid to the enemy in an unpopular war. Was it wonderful that an Administration which bade the seamen and the ship-owners of the day to starve, that a foreign state might be injured, and at the same time refused to build national ships to protect them, fell into contempt? that men, so far as they might, simply refused to obey, and wholly departed from respect? "I have believed, and still do believe," wrote Mr. Adams, "that our internal resources are competent to establish and maintain a naval force, if not fully adequate to the protection and defence of our commerce, at least sufficient to induce a retreat from these hostilities, and to deter from the renewal of them by either of the harrying parties;" in short, to compel peace, the first object of military preparation. "I believed that a system to that effect might be formed, ultimately far more economical, and certainly more energetic than a three years' embargo. I did submit such a proposition to the Senate, and similar attempts had been made in the House of Representatives, but equally discountenanced."[224] This was precisely the effect of Jefferson's teaching, which then dominated his party, and controlled both houses. At this critical moment he wrote, "Believing, myself, that gunboats are the only water defence which can be useful to us, and protect us from the ruinous folly of a navy, I am pleased with everything which promises to improve them."[225]

Not thus was a nation to be united, nor foreign governments impressed. The panacea recommended was to abandon the sea; to yield practical submission to the Orders in Council, which forbade American ships to visit the Continent, and to the Decrees of Napoleon, which forbade them entrance to any dominion of Great Britain. By a curious mental process this was actually believed to be resistance. The American nation was to take as its model the farmer who lives on his own produce, sternly independent of his neighbor; whose sons delved, and wife span, all that the family needed. This programme, half sentiment, half philosophy, and not at all practical, or practicable, was the groundwork of Jefferson's thought. To it co-operated a dislike approaching detestation for the carrying trade; the very opposite, certainly, of the other ideal. American shipping was then handling sixty million dollars' worth of foreign produce, and rolling up the wealth which for some reason follows the trader more largely than the agriculturist, who observed with ill-concealed envy. "I trust," wrote Jefferson, "that the good sense of our country will see that its greatest prosperity depends on a due balance between agriculture, manufactures, and commerce, and not on this protuberant navigation, which has kept us in hot water from the commencement of our government. This drawback system enriches a few individuals, but lessens the stock of native productions, by withdrawing all the hands [seamen] thus employed. It is essentially necessary for us to have shipping and seamen enough to carry our surplus products to market, but beyond that I do not think we are bound to give it encouragement by drawbacks or other premiums." This meant that it was unjust to the rest of the community to allow the merchant to land his cargo, and send it abroad, without paying as much duty as if actually consumed in the country. "This exuberant commerce brings us into collision with other Powers in every sea, and will force us into every war with European Powers." "It is now engaging us in war."[226]

Whether for merchant ships or navies the sea was odious to Jefferson's conception of things. As a convenient medium for sending to market surplus cotton and tobacco, it might be tolerated; but for that ample use of it which had made the greatness of Holland and England, he had only aversion. This prepossession characterized the whole body of men, who willingly stripped the seaman and his employers of all their living, after refusing to provide them with an armed protection to which the resources of the state were equal. Up to the outbreak of the war not a ship was added to the navy. With this feeling, Great Britain, whose very being was maritime, not unnaturally became the object of a dislike so profound as unconsciously to affect action. Napoleon decreed, and embargoed, and sequestered, with little effect upon national sentiment outside of New England. "Certainly all the difficulties and the troubles of the Government during our time proceeded from England," wrote Jefferson soon after quitting office,[227] to Dearborn, his Secretary of War. "At least all others were trifling in comparison." Yet not to speak of the Berlin Decree, by which ships were captured for the mere offence of sailing for England,[228] Bonaparte, by the Bayonne Decree, April 17, 1808, nearly a year before Jefferson left office, pronounced the confiscation of all American vessels entering ports under his control, on the ground that under the existing embargo they could not lawfully have left their own country; a matter which was none of his business. Within a year were condemned one hundred and thirty-four ships and cargoes, worth $10,000,000.[229]

That Jefferson consciously leaned to France from any regard to Napoleon is incredible; the character and procedures of the French Emperor were repugnant to his deepest convictions; but that there was a still stronger bias against the English form of government, and the pursuit of the sea for which England especially stood, is equally clear. Opposition to England was to him a kind of mission. His best wish for her had been that she might be republicanized by a successful French invasion.[230] "I came into office," he wrote to a political disciple, "under circumstances calculated to generate peculiar acrimony. I found all the offices in the possession of a political sect, who wished to transform it ultimately into the shape of their darling model, the English government; and in the meantime to familiarize the public mind to the change, by administering it on English principles, and in English forms. The elective interposition of the people had blown all their designs, and they found themselves and their fortresses of power and profit put in a moment in the hand of other trustees."[231]

These words, written in the third of the fifteen embargo months, reveal an acrimony not wholly one-sided. It was perceived by the parties hardest hit by this essentially Jeffersonian scheme; by the people of New England and of Great Britain. In the old country it intensified bitterness. In the following summer, at a dinner given to representatives of the Spanish revolt against Napoleon, the toast to the President of the United States was received with hisses,[232] "and the marks of disapprobation continued till a new subject drew off the attention of the company." The embargo was not so much a definite cause of complaint, for at worst it was merely a retaliatory measure like the Orders in Council. Enmity was recognized, alike in the council boards and in the social gatherings of the two peoples; the spirit that leads to war was aroused. Nor could this hostile demonstration proceed from sympathy with the Spanish insurgents; for, except so far as might be inferred from the previous general course of the American Administration, there was no reason to believe that they would regard unfavorably the Spanish struggle for liberty. Yet they soon did, and could not but do so.

It is a coincidence too singular to go unnoticed, that the first strong measure of the American Government against Great Britain—Embargo—was followed by Napoleon's reverses in Spain, which, by opening much of that country and of her colonies to trade, at once in large measure relieved Great Britain from the pressure of the Continental system and the embargo; while the second, the last resort of nations, War, was declared shortly before the great Russian catastrophe, which, by rapidly contracting the sphere of the Emperor's control, both widened the area of British commerce and deprived the United States of a diversion of British effort, upon which calculation had rightly been based. It was impossible for the American Government not to wish well to Napoleon, when for it so much depended upon his success; and to wish him well was of course to wish ill to his opponents, even if fighting for freedom.

Congress adjourned April 25, having completed embargo legislation, as far as could then be seen necessary. On May 2 occurred the rising in Madrid, consequent upon Napoleon's removal of the Spanish Royal Family; and on July 21 followed the surrender of Dupont's corps at Baylen. Already, on July 4, the British Government had stopped all hostilities against Spain, and withdrawn the blockade of all Spanish ports, except such as might still be in French control. On August 30, by the Convention of Cintra, Portugal was evacuated by the French, and from that time forward the Peninsula kingdoms, though scourged by war, were in alliance with Great Britain; their ports and those of their colonies open to her trade.

This of itself was a severe blow to the embargo, which for coercive success depended upon the co-operation of the Continental system. It was further thwarted and weakened by extensive popular repudiation in the United States. The political conviction of the expediency, or probable efficacy, of the measure was largely sectional; and it is no serious imputation upon the honesty of its supporters to say that they mustered most strongly where interests were least immediately affected. Tobacco and cotton suffered less in keeping than flour and salt fish; and the deterioration of these was by no means so instant as the stoppage of a ship's sailing or loading. The farmer ideal is realizable on a farm; but it was not so for the men whose sole occupation was transporting that which the agriculturist did not need to markets now closed by law. Wherever employment depended upon commerce, distress was immediate. The seamen, improvident by habit, first felt the blow. "I cannot conceive," said Representative [afterwards Justice] Story, "why gentlemen should wish to paralyze the strength of the nation by keeping back our naval force, and particularly now, when many of our native seamen (and I am sorry to say from my own knowledge I speak it) are starving in our ports."[233] The Commandant of the New York Navy Yard undertook to employ, for rations only, not wages, three hundred of those adrift in the streets; the corporation of the city undertaking to pay for the food issued.[234] They moved off, as they could get opportunity, towards the British Provinces; and thus many got into the British service, by enlistment or impressment. "Had your frigate arrived here instead of the Chesapeake," wrote the British Consul General at New York, as early as February 15, 1808, "I have no doubt two or three hundred able British seamen would have entered on board her for his Majesty's service; and even now, was your station removed to this city, I feel confident, provided the embargo continues, you would more than complete your complement."[235] Six months later, "Is it not notorious that not a seaport in the United States can produce seamen enough to man three merchant ships?"[236] In moving the estimates for one hundred and thirty thousand seamen a year later (February, 1809), the Secretary of the Admiralty observed that Parliament would learn with satisfaction that the number of seamen now serving in the navy covered, if it did not exceed, the number here voted.[237] It had not been so once. Sir William Parker, an active frigate captain during ten years of this period, wrote in 1805, "I dread the discharge of our crew; for I do not think the miserable wretches with which the ships lately fitted out were manned are equal to fight their ships in the manner they are expected to do."[238] The high wages, which the profits of the American merchant service enabled it to pay, outbade all competition by the British navy. "Dollars for shillings," as the expression ran. The embargo stopped all this, and equivalent conditions did not return before the war. The American Minister to France in 1811 wrote: "We complain with justice of the English practice of pressing our seamen into their service. But the fact is, and there is no harm in saying it, there are at present more American seamen who seek that service than are forced into it."[239]

After the seamen followed the associated employments; those whose daily labor was expended in occupations connected with transportation, or who produced objects which men could not eat, or with which they could dispense. Before the end of the year testimony came from every quarter of the increase of suffering among the deserving poor; and not they only, but those somewhat above them as gainers of a comfortable living. They were for the most part helpless, except as helped by their richer neighbors. Work for them there was not, and they could not rebel. Not so with the seafarers, or the dwellers upon the frontiers. On the great scale, of course, a sure enforcement of the embargo was possible; the bulk of the shipping, especially the bigger, was corralled and idle. In the port of New York, February 17, 1808, lay 161 ships, 121 brigs, and 98 smaller sea-going vessels; in all 380 unoccupied, of which only 11 were foreign. In the much smaller port of Savannah, at this early period there were 50. In Philadelphia, a year later, 293, mostly of large tonnage for the period. "What is that huge forest of dry trees that spreads itself before the town?" asked a Boston journal. "You behold the masts of ships thrown out of employment by the embargo."[240] "Our dismantled, ark-roofed vessels are indeed decaying in safety at our wharves, forming a suitable monument to the memory of our departed commerce. But where are your seamen? Gone, sir! Driven into foreign exile in search of subsistence."[241] Yet not all; for illicit employment, for evading the Acts, enough remained to disconcert the Government, alike by their numbers and the boldness of their movements.

"This Embargo law," wrote Jefferson to Gallatin, August 11, 1808, "is certainly the most embarrassing we ever had to execute. I did not expect a crop of so sudden and rank growth of fraud, and open opposition by force, could have grown up within the United States."[242] Apostle of pure democracy as he was, he had forgotten to reckon with the people, and had mistaken the convictions of himself and a coterie for national sentiment. From all parts of the country men began silently and covertly to undermine the working of the system. Passamaquoddy Bay on the borders of New Brunswick, and St. Mary's on the confines of Florida, remote from ordinary commerce, became suddenly crowded with vessels.[243] Coasters, not from recalcitrant New England only, but from the Chesapeake and Southern waters, found it impossible to reach their ports of destination. Furious gales of wind drove them from their course; spars smitten with decay went overboard; butts of planking started, causing dangerous leaks. Safety could be found only by bearing up for some friendly foreign port, in Nova Scotia or the West Indies, where cargoes of flour and fish had to be sold for needed repairs, to enable the homeward voyage to be made. Not infrequently the vessel's name had been washed off the stern by the violence of the waves, and the captain could remember neither it nor his own. The New York and Vermont frontiers became the scene of widespread illegal trade, the shameful effects of which upon the patriotism of the inhabitants were conspicuous in the following war. A gentleman returning from Canada in January, 1809, reported that he had counted seven hundred sleighs, going and returning between Montreal and Vermont.[244] This on one line only. A letter received in New York stated that, during the embargo year, 1808, thirty thousand barrels of potash had been brought into Quebec.[245] "While our gunboats and cutters are watching the harbors and sounds of the Atlantic," said a senator from his place, "a strange inversion of business ensues, and by a retrograde motion of all the interior machinery of the country, potash and lumber are launched upon the lakes, and Ontario and Champlain feel the bustle of illicit traffic.... Violators of the laws are making fortunes, while the conscientious observers of them are suffering sad privations."[246] Not the conscientious only, but the unlucky. Unlike New York, North Carolina had not a friendly foreign boundary nigh to her naval stores.

Under these circumstances the blow glanced from the British dominions. At the first announcement of the embargo, prices of provisions and lumber rose heavily in the West Indies; but reaction set in, as the leaks in the dam became manifest and copious. The British Government fostered the rebellious evasions of American citizens by a proclamation, issued April 11, directing commanders of cruisers not to interrupt any neutral vessel laden with provisions or lumber, going to the West Indies; no matter to whom the property belonged, nor whether the vessel had any clearance, or papers of any kind. A principal method of eluding the embargo, Gallatin informed Jefferson, was by loading secretly and going off without clearing. "Evasions are chiefly effected by vessels going coastwise."[247] The two methods were not incompatible. Besides the sea-going vessels already mentioned as lying in New York alone, there were there over four hundred coasters. It was impossible to watch so many. The ridiculous gunboats, identified with this Administration, derisively nicknamed "Jeffs"[248] by the unbelieving, were called into service to arrest the evil; but neither their numbers nor their qualities fitted them to cope with the ubiquity and speed of their nimble opponents. "The larger part of our gunboats," wrote Commodore Shaw[249] from New Orleans, "are well known to be dull sailers." "For enforcing the embargo," said Secretary Gallatin, "gunboats are better calculated as a stationary force, and for the purpose of stopping vessels in certain places, than for pursuit."[250] A double bond was a mockery, when in West Indian ports the cargo was worth from four to eight times what it was at the place of loading. These were the palmier days of the embargo breakers; the ease and frequency with which they escaped soon brought prices down. Randolph, in the House, asserted that in the first four months of embargo one hundred thousand barrels of flour had been shipped from Baltimore alone; and the West India planters, besides opening new sources of supply, devoted part of their ground to raising food. They thus turned farmer, after the Jefferson ideal, supporting themselves off their own grounds; an economical error, for sugar was their better crop, but unavoidable in the circumstances. With all this, the difficulty in the way of exportation so cheapened articles in the United States as to maintain a considerable disproportion in prices there and abroad, which kept alive the spirit of speculation, and maintained the opportunity of large profits,[251] at the same time that it distressed the American grower.

Upon the whole, after making allowance for the boasts which succeeded the first fright in the West Indies, the indications seem to be that they escaped much better than had been expected, either by themselves or by the American Government. Just before adjourning, Congress had passed a supplementary measure, which, besides drawing restrictions tighter, authorized the President to license vessels to go abroad in ballast, in order to bring home property belonging to American citizens. These dispersed in various directions, and in very large numbers.[252] Many doubtless remained away; but those which returned brought constant confirmation of the numerous American shipping in the various ports of the West Indies, and the general abundance of American produce. A letter from Havana, September 12, said: "We have nearly one hundred American vessels in port. Three weeks ago there were but four or five. If the property, for which these vessels were ostensibly despatched, had been really here, why have they been so long delayed? The truth is, the property is not here. A host of people have been let loose, who could not possibly have had any other motive than procuring freight and passengers from merchants of this country, or from the French, who are supposed to be going off with their property [in consequence of the Spanish outbreak]. The vast number of evasions and smugglers which the embargo has created is surprising. For some days after the last influx of American vessels, the quays and custom-house were every morning covered with all kinds of provisions, which had been landed during the preceding night."[253]

To Quebec and Halifax the embargo was a positive boon, from the diversion upon them of smuggling enterprise, by the lakes and by land, or by coasters too small to make the direct voyage to the West Indies. In consequence of the embargo, these towns became an entrepot of commerce, such as the Orders in Council were designed to make the British Islands. There was, of course, a return trade, through them, of British manufactures smuggled into the United States. These imports seem to have exceeded the exports by the same route. A New Bedford town meeting, in August, affirmed that gold was already at a premium, from the facility with which it was transported through the country, and across the frontier, in payment of purchases.[254] At the end of the summer one hundred and fifty vessels were despatched from Quebec with full cargoes, and it may be believed they had not arrived empty. "From a Canada price current now before us, it will be seen that since the embargo was laid the single port of Quebec has done more foreign business than the whole United States. In less than eleven months there cleared thence three hundred and thirty-four vessels."[255] An American merchant visiting Halifax wrote home: "Our embargo is an excellent thing for this place. Every inhabitant of Nova Scotia is exceedingly desirous of its continuance, as it will be the making of their fortunes."[256] Independent of the entrepot profit, the British provinces themselves produced several of the articles which figured largely among the exports of the middle and eastern states; not to the extent imagined by Sheffield, sufficient to supply the West Indies, but, in the artificial scarcity caused by the embargo, the enhanced prices redounded directly to their advantage. Sir George Prevost, governor of Nova Scotia, summed up the experience of the year by saying that "the embargo has totally failed. New sources have been resorted to with success to supply deficiencies produced by so sudden an interruption of commerce, and the vast increase of export and import of this province proves that the embargo is a measure well adapted to promote the true interests of his Majesty's American colonies."[257]

Upon the British Islands themselves the injury was more appreciable and conspicuous. It was, moreover, in the direction expected by Jefferson and his supporters. The supply of cotton nearly ceased. Mr. Baring, March 6, 1809, said in the House of Commons that raw material had become so scarce and so high, that in many places it could not be procured. "In Manchester during the greatest part of the past year, only nine cotton mills were in full employment; about thirty-one at half work, and forty-four without any at all."[258] Flaxseed, essential to the Irish linen manufactures, and of which three fourths came from America, had risen from L2-1/2 to L23 the quarter.[259] The exports for the year 1808 had fallen fifteen per cent; the imports the same amount, involving a total diminution in trade of L14,000,000. An increase of distress was manifested in the poor rates. In Manchester they had risen from L24,000 to L49,000. On the other hand, the harvest for the year, contrary to first anticipation, had been very good; and, in part compensation for intercourse with the United States, there was the opening of Spain, Portugal, and their extensive colonies, the effect of which was scarcely yet fully felt.

There was, besides, the relief of American competition in the carrying trade. This was a singularly noteworthy effect of the embargo; for this industry was particularly adverse to United States navigation, and particularly benefited by the locking up of American shipping. On April 28, 1808, there was not in Liverpool a vessel from Boston or New York.[260] The year before, four hundred and eighty-nine had entered, paying a tonnage duty of L36,960.[261] In Bristol at the same time there were only ten Americans. In consequence of the loss of so much tonnage, "those who have anything to do with vessels for freight or charter are absolutely insolent in their demands. For a ship of 330 tons from this to St. Petersburg and back L3,300 have been paid; L2,000 for a ship of 199 tons to Lisbon and back."[262] At the end of August, in Liverpool, the value of British shipping had increased rapidly, and vessels which had long been laid up found profitable employment at enormous freights.[263]

Thus, while the effect of the embargo doubtless was to raise prices of American goods in England, it stopped American competition with the British carrying trade, especially in West India produce. This occurred also at the time when the revolt of Spain opened to British navigation the colonies from which Americans hitherto had been the chief carriers. The same event had further relieved British shipping by the almost total destruction of French privateering, thenceforth banished from its former ports of support in the Caribbean. From all these causes, the appreciation quoted from a London letter of September 5 seems probably accurate. "The continuance of the embargo is not as yet felt in any degree adequate to make a deep impression on the public mind.... Except with those directly interested [merchants in the American trade], the dispute with the United States seems almost forgotten, or remembered only to draw forth ironical gratitude, that the kind embargo leaves the golden harvest to be reaped by British enterprise alone."[264]

Upon the whole, through silent popular resistance, and the concurrence of the Spanish revolution, the United States by cutting its own throat underwent more distress than it inflicted upon the enemy. Besides the widespread individual suffering,[265] already mentioned, the national revenue, dependent almost wholly on customs, shrank with the imports. Despite the relief afforded by cargoes bound home when the embargo passed, and the permits issued to bring in American property abroad, the income from this source sank from over $16,000,000 to $8,400,000.[266] "However dissimilar in some respects," wrote Gallatin in a public report, "it is not believed that in their effect upon national wealth and public revenue war and embargo would be materially different. In case of war, some part of that revenue will remain; but if embargo and suspension of commerce continue, that which arises from commerce will entirely disappear."[267] Jefferson nevertheless clung to the system, even to the end of his life, with a conviction that defied demonstration. The fundamental error of conception, of course, was in considering embargo an efficient alternative for war. The difference between the two measures, regarded coercively, was that embargo inflicted upon his own people all the loss that war could, yet spared the opponent that which war might do to him. For the United States, war would have meant, and when it came did mean, embargo, and little more. To Great Britain it would have meant all that the American embargo could do, plus the additional effort, expense, and actual loss, attendant upon the increased exposure of her maritime commerce, and its protection against active and numerous foes, singularly well fitted for annoyance by their qualities and situation. War and embargo, combined, with Napoleon in the plenitude of his power, as he was in 1808, would sorely have tried the enemy; even when it came, amid the Emperor's falling fortunes, the strain was severe. But Jefferson's lack of appreciation for maritime matters, his dislike to the navy, and the weakness to which he had systematically reduced it, prevented his realizing the advantages of war over embargo, as a measure of coercion. To this contributed also his conviction of the exposure of Canada to offensive operations, which was just, though fatally vitiated by an unfounded confidence in untrained troops, or militia summoned from their farms. Neither was there among his advisers any to correct his views; rather they had imbibed their own from him, and their utterances in debate betray radical misapprehension of military considerations.

Among the incidents attendant upon the embargo was the continuance abroad of a number of American vessels, which were there at the passage of the Act. They remained, willing exiles, to share the constant employment and large freights which the sudden withdrawal of their compatriots had opened to British navigation. They were doubtless joined by many of those which received permission to sail in quest of American property. One flagrant instance of such abuse of privilege turned up at Leghorn, with a load of tropical produce;[268] and the comments above quoted from an Havana letter doubtless depended upon that current acquaintance with facts which men in the midst of affairs pick up. It was against this class of traders specifically that Napoleon launched the Bayonne Decree, April 17, 1808. Being abroad contrary to the law of the United States, he argued, was a clear indication that they were not American, but British in disguise. This they were not; but they were carrying on trade under the Orders in Council, and often under British convoy.[269] The fact was noteworthy, as bearing upon the contention of the United States Government soon after, that the Non-Intercourse Law was adequate security for the action of American merchant vessels; a grotesque absurdity, in view of the embargo experiences. That it is not consonant with national self-esteem to accept foreign assistance to carry out national laws is undeniable; but it is a step further to expect another nation to accept, as assured, the efficiency of an authority notoriously and continually violated by its own subjects.

Under the general conditions named, the year 1808 wore on to its close. Both the British Orders in Council and the Decrees of the French Emperor continued in force and received execution;[270] but so far as the United States was concerned their effect was much limited, the embargo retaining at home the greater part of the nation's shipping. The vessels which had remained abroad, and still more those which escaped by violation of the law, or abuse of the permission to sail unloaded to bring back American property, for the most part purchased immunity by acquiescence in the British Orders. They accepted British licenses, and British convoy also, where expedient. It was stated in Congress that, of those which went to sea under permission, comparatively few were interrupted by British cruisers.[271] Napoleon's condemnations went on apace, and in the matter of loss,—waiving questions of principle,—were at this moment a more serious grievance than the British Orders. Nor could it be said that the grounds upon which he based his action were less arbitrary or unjust. The Orders in Council condemned a vessel for sailing for an enemy's port, because constructively blockaded—a matter as to which at least choice was free; the Milan Decree condemned because visited by a British cruiser, to avoid which a merchant ship was powerless. The American brig "Vengeance" sailed from Norfolk before the embargo was laid, for Bilboa, then a port in alliance with France. On the passage the British frigate "Iris" boarded her, and indorsed on her papers that, in accordance with the orders of November 11, she must not proceed. That night the "Vengeance" gave the cruiser the slip, and pursued her course. She was captured off Bilboa by a French vessel, sent in as a prize, and condemned because of the frigate's visit.[272] This case is notable because of the pure application of a single principle, not obscured by other incidental circumstances, as often happens. The brig "George", equally bound to Bilboa, after visitation by a British vessel had been to Falmouth, and there received a British license to go to her destination. She was condemned for three offenses: the visit, the entrance to Falmouth, and the license.[272a] These cases were far from isolated, and quite as flagrant as anything done by Great Britain; but, while not overlooked, nor unresented, by the supporters of the embargo, there was not evident in the debates of Congress any such depth of feeling as was aroused by the British measures. As was said by Mr. Bayard, an Opposition Senator, "It may be from the habit of enduring, but we do not feel an aggression from France with the same quickness and sensibility that we do from England."[273]

Throughout the year 1808, the embargo was maintained by the Administration with as much vigor as was possible to the nature of the administrator, profoundly interested in the success of a favorite measure. Congress had supplemented the brief original Act by a prohibition of all intercourse with foreign territories by land, as well as by sea. This was levelled at the Florida and Canada frontiers. Authority had been given also for the absolute detention of all vessels bound coastwise, if with cargoes exciting suspicion of intention to evade the laws. Part of the small navy was sent to cruise off the coast, and the gunboats were distributed among the maritime districts, to intercept and to enforce submission. Steps were taken to build vessels on Lakes Ontario and Champlain; for, in the undeveloped condition of the road systems, these sheets of water were principal means of transportation, after snow left the ground. To the embargo the Navy owed the brig "Oneida", the most formidable vessel on Ontario when war came. All this restrictive service was of course extremely unpopular with the inhabitants; or at least with that active, assertive element, which is foremost in pushing local advantages, and directs popular sentiment. Nor did feeling in all cases refrain from action. April 19, the President had to issue a proclamation against combinations to defy the law in the country about Champlain. The collector at Passamaquoddy wrote that, with upwards of a hundred vessels in port, he was powerless; and the mob threatened to burn his house.[274] A Kennebec paper doubted whether civil society could hang together much longer. There were few places in the region where it was safe for civil officers to execute the laws.[274a] Troops and revenue vessels were despatched to the chief centres of disturbance; but, while occasional rencounters occurred, attended at times with bloodshed, and some captures of smuggled goods were effected, the weak arm of the Government was practically powerless against universal connivance in the disaffected districts. Smuggling still continued to a large extent, and was very profitable; while the determination of the smugglers assumed the character commonly styled desperate.

Such conditions, with a falling revenue, and an Opposition strong in sectional support, confronted the supporters of the Administration when Congress again met in November. Confident that embargo was an efficient coercive weapon, if relentlessly wielded, the President wished more searching enactments, and power for more extensive and vigorous enforcement. This Congress proceeded to grant. Additional revenue cutters were authorized; and after long debate was passed an Act for the Enforcement of the Embargo, approved January 9, 1809.[275] The details of this law were derived from a letter[276] addressed to a Committee of Congress by Gallatin, the Secretary of the Treasury, upon whom the administration of the embargo system chiefly fell. The two principal difficulties so far encountered were the evasions of vessels bound coastwise, and departure without clearance. "The infractions thus practised threaten to prostrate the law and the Government itself." Even to take cargo on board should not be permitted, without authorization from the collector of the district. "The great number of vessels now laden and in a state of readiness to depart shows the necessity of this provision."

It was therefore enacted that no vessel, coasting or registered, should load, without first having obtained permission from the custom-house, and given bond, in six times the value of the cargo, that she would not depart without a clearance, nor after clearing go to any foreign port, or transfer her lading to any other vessel. The loading was to be under the inspection of revenue officers. Ships already loaded, when notice of the Act was received, must unload or give bonds. Further to insure compliance, vessels bound coastwise must, within two months after sailing, deposit with the collector at the port of clearance a certificate from the collector at the port of destination, that they had arrived there. If going to New Orleans from the Atlantic coast, four months were allowed for this formality. Failing this, proof of total loss at sea would alone relieve the bond. "Neither capture, distress, nor any other accident, shall be pleaded or given in evidence." Collectors were empowered to take into custody specie and goods, whether on vessels or land vehicles, when there was reason to believe them intended for exportation; and authority was given to employ the army and navy, and the militia, for carrying out this and the other embargo legislation. A further provision of thirty armed vessels, to stop trade, was made by this Congress; which otherwise, like its predecessors and successors, was perfectly faithful to the party tradition not to protect trade, or seek peace, by providing a navy.

All this was sitting on the safety valve. However unflattering to national self-esteem it might be to see national legislation universally disregarded, the leakage of steam by evasion had made the tension bearable. The Act also opened to a number of subaltern executive officers, of uncertain discretion, an opportunity for arbitrary and capricious action, to which the people of the United States were unaccustomed. Already a justice of a circuit court had decided in opposition to instructions issued by the President himself. The new legislation was followed by an explosion of popular wrath and street demonstrations. These were most marked in the Eastern states, where the opposition party and the shipping interest were strongest. Feeling was the more bitter, because the revolt of Spain, and the deliverance of Portugal, had exempted those nations and their extensive colonies from the operation of the British Orders in Council, had paralyzed in many of their ports the edicts of Napoleon, and so had extended widely the field safe for neutral commerce. It was evident also that, while the peninsula everywhere was the scene of war, it could not feed itself; nor could supplies for the population, or for the British armies there, come from England, often narrowly pressed herself for grain. Cadiz was open on August 26; all neutrals admitted, and the British blockade raised. Through that portal and Lisbon might flow a golden tide for American farmers and shipmen. The town meetings of New England again displayed the power for prompt political agitation which so impressed the imagination of Jefferson. The Governor of Connecticut refused, on constitutional grounds, to comply with the President's request to detail officers of militia, to whom collectors could apply when needing assistance to enforce the laws. The attitude of the Eastern people generally was that of mutiny; and it became evident that it could only be repressed by violence, and with danger to the Union.

Congress was not prepared to run this risk. On February 8, less than a month after the Enforcement Act became law, its principal supporter in the Senate[277] introduced a resolution for the partial repeal of the Embargo Act. "This is not of my choice," he said, "nor is the step one by which I could wish that my responsibility should be tested. It is the offspring of conciliation, and of great concession on my part. On one point we are agreed,—resistance to foreign aggressions. The points of difficulty to be adjusted,—and compromised,—relate to the extent of that resistance and the mode of its application. In my judgment, if public sentiment could be brought to support them, wisdom would dictate the combined measures of embargo, non-intercourse, and war. Sir, when the love of peace degenerates into fear of war, it becomes of all passions the most despicable." It was not the first time the word "War" had been spoken, but the occasion made it doubly significant and ominous; for it was the requiem of the measure upon which the dominant party had staked all to avoid war, and the elections had already declared that power should remain in the same hands for at least two years to come. Within four weeks Madison was to succeed his leader, Jefferson; with a Congressional majority, reduced indeed, but still adequate.

The debate over the new measure, known as the Non-Intercourse Act, was prolonged and heated, abounding in recriminations, ranging over the whole gamut of foreign injuries and domestic misdoings, whether by Government policy or rebellious action; but clearer and clearer the demand for war was heard, through and above the din. "When the late intelligence from the northeast reached us," said an emotional follower of the Administration,[278] "it bore a character most distressful to every man who valued the integrity of the Government. Choosing not to enforce the law with the bayonet, I thought proper to acknowledge to the House that I was ready to abandon the embargo.... The excitement in the East renders it necessary that we should enforce it by the bayonet, or repeal. I will repeal, and could weep over it more than over a lost child." There was, he said, nothing now but war. "The very men who now set your laws at defiance," cried another, "will be against you if you go to war;" but he added, "I will never let go the embargo, unless on the very same day on which we let it go, we draw the sword."[279]

Josiah Quincy, an extremist on the other side, gave a definition of the position of Massachusetts, which from his ability, and his known previous course on national questions, is particularly valuable. In the light of the past, and of what was then future, it may be considered to embody the most accurate summary of the views prevailing in New England, from the time of the "Chesapeake" affair to the war. He "wished a negotiation to be opened, unshackled with the impedimenta which now exist. As long as they remained, people in the part of the country whence he came would not deem an unsuccessful attempt at negotiation cause for war. If they were removed, and an earnest attempt at negotiation made, unimpeded by these restrictions, and should not meet with success, they would join heartily in a war. They would not, however, go to war to contest the right of Great Britain to search American vessels for British seamen; for it was the general opinion with them that, if American seamen were encouraged, there would be no need for the employment of foreign seamen."[280] Quincy therefore condemned the retaliatory temper of the Administration, as shown in the "Chesapeake" incident by the proclamation excluding British ships of war, and in the embargo as a reply to the Orders in Council. The oppression of American trade, culminating in the Orders, was a just cause of war; but war was not expedient before a further attempt at negotiation, favored by a withdrawal of all retaliatory acts. He was willing to concede the exercise of British authority on board American merchantmen on the high seas.

In the main these were the coincident opinions of Monroe, although a Virginian and identified with the opposite party. At this time he wrote to Jefferson privately, urging a special mission, for which he offered his services. "Our affairs are evidently at a pause, and the next step to be taken, without an unexpected change, seems likely to be the commencement of war with both France and Great Britain, unless some expedient consistent with the honor of the Government and Country is adopted to prevent it." To Jefferson's rejection of the proposition he replied: "I have not the hope you seem still to entertain that our differences with either Power will be accommodated under existing arrangements. The embargo was not likely to accomplish the desired effect, if it did not produce it under the first impression.... Without evidence of firm and strong union at home, nothing favorable to us can be expected abroad, and from the symptoms in the Eastern states there is much cause to fear that tranquillity cannot be secured at present by adherence only to the measures which have heretofore been pursued."[281] Monroe had already[282] expressed the opinion—not to Jefferson, who had refused to ratify, but to a common intimate—that had the treaty of December 31, 1806, signed by himself and Pinkney, been accepted by the Administration, none of the subsequent troubles with France and Great Britain would have ensued; that not till the failure of accommodation with Great Britain became known abroad was there placed upon the Berlin Decree that stricter interpretation which elicited the Orders in Council, whence in due sequence the embargo, the Eastern commotions, and the present alarming outlook. In principle, Quincy and Monroe differed on the impressment question, but in practical adjustment there was no serious divergence. In other points they stood substantially together.

Under the combined influences indicated by the expressions quoted, Congress receded rapidly from the extreme measures of domestic regulation embodied in the various Embargo Acts and culminating in that of January 9. The substitute adopted was pronouncedly of the character of foreign policy, and assumed distinctly and unequivocally the hostile form of retaliation upon the two countries under the decrees of which American commerce was suffering. It foreshadowed the general line of action followed by the approaching new Administration, with whose views and purposes it doubtless coincided. Passed in the House on February 27, 1809, it was to go into effect May 20, after which date the ports of the United States were forbidden to the ships of war of both France and Great Britain, except in cases of distress, or of vessels bearing despatches. Merchant vessels of the two countries were similarly excluded, with a provision for seizure, if entering. Importation from any part of the dominions of those states was prohibited, as also that of any merchandise therein produced. Under these conditions, and with these exceptions, the embargo was to stand repealed from March 15 following; but American and other merchant vessels, sailing after the Act went into operation, were to be under bonds not to proceed to any port of Great Britain or France, nor during absence to engage in any trade, direct or indirect, with such port. From the general character of these interdictions, stopping both navigation and commerce between the United States and the countries proscribed, this measure was commonly called the Non-Intercourse Act. Its stormy passage through the House was marked by a number of amendments and proposed substitutes, noticeable principally as indicative of the growth of warlike temper among Southern members. There were embodied with the bill the administrative and police clauses necessary for its enforcement. Finally, as a weapon of negotiation in the hands of the Government, there was a provision, corresponding to one in the original Embargo Act, that in case either France or Great Britain should so modify its measures as to cease to violate the neutral commerce of the United States, the President was authorized to proclaim the fact, after which trade with that country might be renewed. In this shape the bill was returned to the Senate, which concurred February 28. Next day it became law, by the President's signature.

The Enforcement Act and the Non-Intercourse Act, taken together and in their rapid sequence, symbolize the death struggle between Jefferson's ideal of peaceful commercial restriction, unmitigated and protracted, in the power of which he had absolute faith, and the views of those to whom it was simply a means of diplomatic pressure, temporary, and antecedent to war. Napoleon himself was not more ruthless than Jefferson in his desired application of commercial prohibition. Not so his party, in its entirety. The leading provisions of the Non-Intercourse Act, by partially opening the door and so facilitating abundant evasion, traversed Jefferson's plan. It was antecedently notorious that their effect, as regarded Great Britain, would be to renew trade with her by means of intermediary ports. Yet that they were features in the policy of the men about to become prominent under the coming Administration was known to Canning some time before the resolution was introduced by Giles; before the Enforcement Act even could reach England. Though hastened by the outburst in New England, the policy of the Non-Intercourse Act was conceived before the collapse of Jefferson's own measure was seen to be imminent.

On January 18 and 22 Canning, in informal conversations with Pinkney, had expressed his satisfaction at proceedings in Congress, recently become known, looking to the exclusion of French ships equally with British, and to the extension of non-importation legislation to France as well as Great Britain.[283] He thought that such measures might open the way to a withdrawal of the Orders in Council, by enabling the British Government to entertain the overture, made by Pinkney August 23, under instructions, that the President would suspend the embargo, if the British Government would repeal its orders. This he conceived could not be done, consistently with self-respect, so long as there was inequality of treatment. In these anticipations he was encouraged by representations concerning the attitude of Madison and some intended members of his Cabinet, made to him by Erskine, the British Minister in Washington, who throughout seems to have cherished an ardent desire to reconcile differences which interfered with his just appreciation even of written words,—much more of spoken.

In the interview of the 22d Pinkney confined himself to saying everything "which I thought consistent with candor and discretion to confirm him in his dispositions." He suggested that the whole matter ought to be settled at Washington, and "that it would be well (in case a special mission did not meet their approbation) that the necessary powers should be sent to Mr. Erskine."[284] He added, "I offered my intervention for the purpose of guarding them against deficiencies in these powers."[285] The remark is noteworthy, for it shows Pinkney's sense that Erskine's mere letter of credence as Minister Resident, not supplemented by full powers for the special transaction, was inadequate to a binding settlement of such important matters. In the sequel the American Administration did not demand of Erskine the production either of special powers or of the text of his instructions; a routine formality which would have forestalled the mortifying error into which it was betrayed by precipitancy, and which became the occasion of a breach with Erskine's successor.

The day after his interview with Pinkney, Canning sent Erskine instructions,[286] the starting-point of which was that the Orders in Council must be maintained, unless their object could be otherwise accomplished. Assuming, as an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation, that equality of treatment between British and French ships and merchandise would have been established, he said he understood further from Erskine's reports of conversations that the leading men in the new Administration would be prepared to agree to three conditions: 1. That, contemporaneously with the withdrawal of the Orders of January 7 and November 11, there would be a removal of the restrictions upon British ships and merchandise, leaving in force those against French. 2. The claim, to carry on with enemies' colonies a trade not permitted in peace, would be abandoned for this war. 3. Great Britain should be at liberty to secure the operation of the Non-Intercourse measures, still in effect against France, by the action of the British Navy, which should be authorized to capture American vessels seeking to enter ports forbidden them by the Non-Intercourse Act. Canning justly remarked that otherwise Non-Intercourse would be nugatory; there would be nothing to prevent Americans from clearing for England or Spain and going to Holland or France. This was perfectly true. Not only had a year's experience of the embargo so demonstrated, but a twelvemonth later[287] Gallatin had to admit that "the summary of destinations of these exports, being grounded on clearances, cannot be relied on under existing circumstances. Thus, all the vessels actually destined for the dominions of Great Britain, which left the United States between April 19 and June 10, 1809, cleared for other ports; principally, it is believed, for Sweden." Nevertheless, the proposition that a foreign state should enforce national laws, because the United States herself could not, was saved from being an insult only by the belief, extracted by Canning from Erskine's report of conversations, that Madison, or his associates, had committed themselves to such an arrangement. He added that Pinkney "recently (but for the first time)" had expressed an opinion to the same effect.

The British Government would consent to withdraw the Orders in Council on the conditions cited; and for the purpose of obtaining a distinct and official recognition of them, Canning authorized Erskine to read his letter in extenso to the American Government. Had this been done, as the three concessions were a sine qua non, the misunderstanding on which the despatch was based would have been at once exposed; and while its assumptions and tone could scarcely have failed to give offence, there would have been saved the successive emotions of satisfaction and disappointment which swept over the United States, leaving bitterness worse than before. Instead of communicating Canning's letter, Erskine, after ascertaining that the conditions would not be accepted, sent in a paraphrase of his own, dated April 18,[288] in which he made no mention of the three stipulations, but announced that, in consequence of the impartial attitude resulting from the Non-Intercourse Act, his Majesty would send a special envoy to conclude a treaty on all points of the relations between the two countries, and meanwhile would be willing to withdraw the Orders of January 7 and November 11, so far as affecting the United States, in the persuasion that the President would issue the proclamation restoring intercourse. This advance was welcomed, the assurance of revocation given, and the next day Erskine wrote that he was "authorized to declare that the Orders will have been withdrawn as respects the United States on the 10th day of June next." The same day, by apparent preconcertment, in accordance with Canning's requirement that the two acts should be coincident, Madison issued his proclamation, announcing the fact of the future withdrawal, and that trade between the United States and Great Britain might be renewed on June 10.

Erskine's proceeding was disavowed instantly by the British Government, and himself recalled. A series of unpleasant explanations followed between him and the members of the American Government,[289] astonished by the interpretation placed upon their words, as shown in Canning's despatch. Canning also had to admit that he had strained Erskine's words, in reaching his conclusions as to the willingness of Madison and his advisers to allow the enforcement of the Non-Intercourse Act by British cruisers;[290] while Pinkney entirely disclaimed intending any such opinion as Canning imagined him to have expressed.[291] The British Secretary was further irritated by the tone of the American replies to Erskine's notes; but he "forbore to trouble"[292] Pinkney with any comment upon them. That would be made through Erskine's successor; an unhappy decision, as it proved. No explanation of the disavowal was given; but the instructions sent were read to Pinkney by Canning, and a letter followed saying that Erskine's action had been in direct contradiction to them. Things thus returned to the momentarily interrupted condition of American Non-Intercourse and British Orders in Council; the British Government issuing a temporary order for the protection of American vessels which might have started for the ports of Holland in reliance upon Erskine's assurances. From America there had been numerous clearances for England; and it may be believed that there would have been many more if the transient nature of the opportunity had been foreseen. August 9, Madison issued another proclamation, annulling the former.

While Erskine was conducting his side negotiation, the British Government had largely modified the scope of the restrictions laid upon neutral trade. In consequence of the various events which had altered its relations with European states and their dependencies, the Orders of November, 1807, were revoked; and for them was substituted a new one, dated April 26, 1809,[293] similar in principle but much curtailed in extent. Only the coasts of France itself, of Holland to its boundary, the River Ems, and those of Italy falling under Napoleon's own dominion, from Orbitello to Pesaro, were thenceforth to be subject to "the same restrictions as if actually blockaded." Further, no permission was given, as in the former Orders, to communicate with the forbidden ports by first entering one of Great Britain, paying a transit duty, and obtaining a permit to proceed. In terms, prohibition was now unqualified; and although it was known that licenses for intercourse with interdicted harbors were freely issued, the overt offence of prescribing British channels to neutral navigation was avoided. Within the area of restriction, "No trade save through England" was thus converted, in form, to no trade at all. This narrowing of the constructive blockade system, combined with the relaxations effected by the Non-Intercourse Act, and with the food requirements of the Spanish peninsula, did much to revive American commerce; which, however, did not again before the war regain the fair proportions of the years preceding the embargo. The discrepancy was most marked in the re-exportation of foreign tropical produce, sugar and coffee, a trade dependent wholly upon war conditions, and affecting chiefly the shipping interest engaged in carrying it. For this falling off there were several causes. After 1809 the Continental system was more than ever remorselessly enforced, and it was to the Continent almost wholly that Americans had carried these articles. The Spanish colonies were now open to British as well as American customers; and the last of the French West Indies having passed into British possession, trade with them was denied to foreigners by the Navigation Act. In 1807 the value of the colonial produce re-exported from the United States was $59,643,558; in 1811, $16,022,790. The exports of domestic productions in the same years were: 1807, $48,699,592; in 1811, $45,294,043. In connection with these figures, as significant of political conditions, it is interesting to note that of the latter sum $18,266,466 went to Spain and Portugal, chiefly to supply demands created by war. So with tropical produce; out of the total of $16,022,790, $5,772,572 went to the Peninsula, and an equal amount to the Baltic, that having become the centre of accumulation, from which subsequent distribution was made to the Continent in elusion of the Continental System. The increasing poverty of the Continent, also, under Napoleon's merciless suppression of foreign commerce, greatly lessened the purchasing power of the inhabitants. The great colonial trade had wasted under the combined action of British Orders and French Decrees, supplemented by changes in political relations. The remote extremities of the Baltic lands and the Spanish peninsula now alone sustained its drooping life.

Coincident with Erskine's recall had been the appointment of his successor, Mr. Francis J. Jackson, who took with him not only the usual credentials, but also full powers for concluding a treaty or convention.[294] He departed for his post under the impulse of the emotions and comments excited by the manner and terms in which Erskine's advances had been met, with which Canning had forborne to trouble Pinkney. Upon his arrival in Washington, disappointment was expressed that he had no authority to give any explanations of the reasons why his Government had disavowed arrangements, entered into by Erskine, concerning not only the withdrawal of the Orders in Council,—as touching the United States,—but also the reparation for the "Chesapeake" business. This Erskine had offered and concluded, coincidently with the revocation of the Orders, though not in connection with it; but in both instances his action was disapproved by his Government. After two verbal conferences, held within a week of Jackson's arrival, the Secretary of State, Mr. Robert Smith, notified him on October 9 that it was thought expedient, for the present occasion, that further communication on this matter should be in writing. There followed an exchange of letters, which in such circumstances passed necessarily under the eyes of President Madison, who for the eight preceding years had held Smith's present office.

This correspondence[295] presents an interesting exhibition of diplomatic fencing; but beyond the discussion, pro and con, of the matters in original and continuous dispute between the two countries, the issue turned upon the question whether the United States had received the explanation due to it,—in right and courtesy,—of the reasons for disavowing Erskine's agreements. Smith maintained it had not. Jackson rejoined that sufficient explanation had been given by the terms of Canning's letter of May 27 to Pinkney, announcing that Erskine had been recalled because he had acted in direct contradiction to his instructions; an allegation sustained by reading to the American minister the instructions themselves. In advancing this argument, Jackson stated also that Canning's three conditions had been made known by Erskine to the American Government, which, in declining to admit them, had suggested substitutes finally accepted by Erskine; so that the United States understood that the arrangement was reached on another basis than that laid down by Canning. This assertion he drew from the expressions of Erskine in a letter to Canning, after the disavowal. Smith replied that Erskine, while not showing the despatch, had stated the three stipulations; that they had been rejected; and that the subsequent arrangement had been understood to be with a minister fully competent to recede from his first demand and to accept other conditions. Distinctly he affirmed, that the United States Government did not know, at any time during the discussion preceding the agreement, that Erskine's powers were limited by the conditions in the text of his instructions, afterwards published. That he had no others, "is now for the first time made known to this Government," by Jackson's declaration.



Jackson had come prepared to maintain, not only the British contention, but the note set by Canning for British diplomatic correspondence. He was conscious too of opposing material force to argument, and had but recently been amid the scenes at Copenhagen, which had illustrated Nelson's maxim that a fleet of ships of the line were the best negotiators in Europe. The position has its advantages, but also its dangers, when the field of warfare is that of words, not deeds; and in Madison, who superintended the American case, he was unequally matched with an adversary whose natural dialectical ability had been tempered and sharpened in many campaigns. There is noticeable, too, on the American side, a labored effort at acuteness of discrimination, an adroitness to exaggerate shades of difference practically imperceptible, and an aptitude to give and take offence, not so evident under the preceding Administration. These suggest irresistibly the absence, over Madison the President, of a moderating hand, which had been held over Madison the Secretary of State. It may be due also to the fact that both the President and his Cabinet were somewhat less indisposed to war than his predecessor had been.

In his answer to Smith Jackson reiterated, what Smith had admitted, that Erskine had made known the three conditions. He added, "No stronger illustration of the deviation from them which occurred can be given than by a reference to the terms of the agreement." As an incidental comment, supporting the contention that Erskine's departure from his sole authority was so decisive as to be a sufficient explanation for the disavowal of his procedure, the words were admissible; so much so as to invite the suspicion that the opponent, who had complained of the want of such explanation, felt the touch of the foil, and somewhat lost temper. Whatever impression of an insinuation the phrase may have conveyed should have been wholly removed by the further expression, in close sequence, "You are already acquainted with the instruction given; and I have had[296] the honor of informing you it was the only one." Smith's knowledge that Erskine's powers were limited to the one document is here attributed explicitly to Jackson. The Secretary (or President) saw fit not to recognize this, but took occasion to administer a severe rebuke, which doubtless the general tone of Jackson's letter tended to provoke. "I abstain, sir, from making any particular animadversions on several irrelevant and improper allusions in your letter.... But it would be improper to conclude the few observations to which I purposely limit myself, without adverting to your repetition of a language implying a knowledge, on the part of this Government, that the instructions of your predecessor did not authorize the arrangement formed by him. After the explicit and peremptory asseveration that this Government had no such knowledge, and that with such a knowledge no such arrangement would have been entered into, the view which you have again presented of the subject makes it my duty to apprise you that such insinuations are inadmissible in the intercourse of a foreign minister with a Government that understands what it owes to itself."

Whatever may be thought of the construction placed upon Jackson's words by his opponent, this thrust should have made him look to his footing; but arrogance and temper carried the day, and laid him open to the fatal return which he received. By drawing attention to the qualifying phrase, he could have shown that he had been misunderstood, but he practically accepted the interpretation; for, instead of repelling it, he replied: "In my correspondence with you I have carefully avoided drawing conclusions that did not necessarily follow from the premises advanced by me, and least of all should I think of uttering an insinuation where I was unable to substantiate a fact. To facts, such as I have become acquainted with them, I have scrupulously adhered, and in so doing I must continue, whenever the good faith of his Majesty's Government is called in question," etc. To this outburst the reply was: "You have used language which cannot but be understood as reiterating, and even aggravating, the same gross insinuation. It only remains, in order to preclude opportunities which are thus abused, to inform you that no further communications will be received from you, and that the necessity for this determination will, without delay, be made known to your Government." Jackson thereupon quitted Washington for New York, leaving a charge d'affaires for transacting current business.

Before leaving the city, however, Jackson, through the channel of the charge, made a statement to the Secretary of State. In this he alleged that the facts which he considered it his duty to state, and to the assertion of which, as facts, exception was taken, and his dismissal attributed, were two. One was, that the three conditions had been submitted by Mr. Erskine to the Secretary of State. This the Secretary had admitted. "The other, namely: that that instruction is the only one, in which the conditions were prescribed to Mr. Erskine, for the conclusion of an arrangement on the matter to which it related, is known to Mr. Jackson by the instructions which he has himself received." This he had said in his second letter; if somewhat obscurely, still not so much so but that careful reading, and indisposition to take offence, could have detected his meaning, and afforded him the opportunity to be as explicit as in this final paper. If Madison, who is understood to have given special supervision to this correspondence,[297] meant the severe rebuke conveyed by his reply as a feint, to lead the British minister incautiously to expose himself to a punishment which his general bearing and that of his Government deserved, he assuredly succeeded; yet it may be questioned who really came best out of the encounter. Jackson had blundered in words; the American Administration had needlessly intensified international bitterness.

Prepossession in reading, and proneness to angry misconception, must be inferred in the conduct of the American side of this discussion; for another notable and even graver instance occurs in the despatch[298] communicating Jackson's dismissal to Pinkney, beyond whose notice it probably was not allowed to go. Canning, in his third rejected condition, had written:

Great Britain, for the purpose of securing the operation of the embargo, and of the bona fide intention of America to prevent her citizens from trading with France, and the Powers adopting and acting under the French decrees, is to be considered as being at liberty to capture all such American vessels as shall be found attempting to trade with the ports of such Powers;[299]