The size of the national legislature of Santo Domingo has fluctuated considerably. Under the 1896 constitution the Congress consisted of a single house of twenty-four members, two from each of the then existing six provinces and six districts. The increase of the national income permitting greater expenditures, the constitution of 1908 provided for two houses, one called the Senate, the other the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate is composed of twelve members, one from each province, elected by the same electoral colleges that elect the president and holding office for six years. One-third of the Senate is renewed every two years. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputies is supposed to be in proportion to the number of inhabitants of the various provinces, but as there has been no census the number is provisionally fixed at twenty-four, two from each province. The members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected for a term of four years, also by the electoral colleges, which at the same time designate alternates for the several members.

Congress meets each year in regular session on the anniversary of Dominican independence, February 27, and its session is limited to ninety days, which may, however, be extended sixty days more. Since there are no provincial legislatures the powers of the Congress, set forth in the Constitution, are sweeping. They include the right to legislate in general for every part of the Republic, to approve or reject treaties and to try the president, cabinet members and supreme court judges on impeachment charges.

In practice the elections for deputies have been as perfunctory as those for president, though there were occasional contests. The character and attitude of Congress has varied with the character and condition of the presidents. During the incumbency of strong leaders, such as Santana, Baez and Heureaux, the Congress was little more than the tool of the executive, but when the personality of the president was not so overwhelming or when many of the deputies were followers of a rival chieftain, as in the administrations of Jimenez and Morales, an independent and sometimes a nagging spirit has been manifested.

Under the American occupation the Congress was by decree of January 2, 1917, declared in abeyance and all executive and legislative powers are temporarily exercised by the commander of the American forces. The heads of executive departments are officers of the American navy or marine corps. Otherwise the general structure of the government remains as before. The theory that Santo Domingo is an independent, sovereign country is carefully followed, though at times it leads to anomalous situations, as when the American military governor issues exequaturs to American consuls in Santo Domingo "by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution of the Dominican Republic," or when the American minister, Hon. W. W. Russell, representing the United States and receiving his instructions from the United States State Department, calls on Admiral H. S. Knapp, chief executive of Santo Domingo, who takes his orders from the United States Navy Department.

For administrative purposes the Republic is divided into twelve provinces; Azua, Barahona, Espaillat, La Vega, Macoris, Monte Cristi, Pacificador, Puerto Plata, Samana, Santiago, Santo Domingo and Seibo. Formerly six were known as provinces and six as maritime districts, though there was in practice no distinction between them. The provinces are subdivided into communes and cantons—a canton being a commune in embryo—and these in turn are subdivided into sections. Congress is empowered to create new provinces, communes and cantons.

In the twelve provinces there are now sixty-five communes, several comprising cantons. The provinces bear the names of their capital towns, except Espaillat and Pacificador, the former of which is called after Ulises F. Espaillat who took a prominent part in the War of Restoration and was president in 1876, and the latter in honor of President Heureaux, on whom a fawning Congress conferred the title of Pacificador de la Patria, but these also are sometimes known by the names of their capitals, Moca and San Francisco de Macoris. The communes bear the names of their urban centers. Towns with long names are usually referred to by part of the name only, thus Santa Cruz del Seibo is known simply as El Seibo, Santa Barbara de Samana either as Santa Barbara or as Samana, etc.

At the head of each province is an official who bears the title of governor. He acts as the direct agent of the president and is chief of the government police and commander of the military forces of the district. In civil matter he is dependent upon the department of the interior and police, in military affairs he is under the department of war and the navy. The governors are appointed by the president of the Republic and their salaries are paid from the national treasury. Under the present American occupation the various provinces still have their governors, but the real governors are the American officers locally in command of the occupation forces.

In each commune and canton there is a communal or cantonal chief who represents the governor of the province. He is paid by the national government and is charged with the preservation of the peace in his jurisdiction. Again in each section there is a sectional chief, a local police officer who depends on the communal chief.

The system of local chieftains of gradually diminishing category has brought Santo Domingo to resemble in some administrations a feudal monarchy rather than a constitutional republic. As governor the president usually chose prominent men of the locality, either friends whom he wished to reward or opponents or rivals whom he was obliged to placate. The communal chiefs were also appointed by the president, though the governor's wishes were respected to a large extent, and here too men of influence were selected, such influence usually being reckoned by the possession of a devoted following. The section chiefs were chosen under similar considerations.

Though the law prescribes the duties of the governors, their local prestige, their authority as commanders of the military, and their activities in revolutionary times, have so exalted their position as to convert them into something like satraps and make them powerful supporters or dangerous rivals of the president. Many insurrections have been inaugurated by disaffected governors. At times provinces have remained practically independent for many months, ruled merely by the governor and a coterie of his friends, while the president, in the impossibility of imposing his authority, was obliged to acquiesce. A conspicuous example of such a peculiar state of affairs was furnished by the district of Monte Cristi, during the presidency of Morales. In December, 1903, the formidable insurrection of Jimenez against Provisional President Morales originated in Monte Cristi and though the government gradually regained the remainder of the country it was unable to subjugate this district, where the entire population was Jimenista and the character of the country rendered campaigning very difficult. Finally in the spring of 1904 a formal treaty was signed by which the insurgents agreed to lay down their arms upon the government's promise not to interfere in their district, where all executive appointments were thereafter to be made as recommended by the local authorities. Though constitutional forms were still observed a few military chiefs thus assumed the direction of affairs. Whenever any executive appointment was to be made, the name of the nominee was certified to the capital to be ratified as a matter of course; when orders came from Santo Domingo City, whether in civil or military affairs, they were obeyed or ignored as convenience dictated; the entire amount of the revenues collected in the Monte Cristi custom-house was retained in the district. In order to stimulate imports and increase the customs collections the local authorities even conceded a secret discount from the general tariff. With the enforcement of the San Domingo Improvement Company's arbitral award and the inauguration of the receivership for Santo Domingo the control of the custom-house passed out of the hands of the local chieftains, who sullenly protested as against an invasion of their treaty rights. In other matters the autonomy of the district remained unimpaired until the beginning of 1906 when upon the fall of Morales the government troops, in suppressing the revolution in the north, overran Monte Cristi province and restored its dependency upon the central government.

The healthiest and most important political subdivisions in Santo Domingo are the communal governments, and whatever progress has been made in the Republic has been due largely to their initiative. They correspond to the Spanish "municipios" and the French "communes." In Santo Domingo the French name was introduced during Haitian occupation. The various towns constitute the centers of government, their jurisdiction extends over the surrounding rural districts, and the affairs of the whole are administered by a municipal council. The powers of such councils are manifold and far-reaching and their importance has been accentuated by the chronic impotency of the central government to foster public improvements. The councils exercise all the faculties commonly pertaining to city councils elsewhere and have control of education, sanitation, streets and roads in their respective districts. They also act as election boards.

When an outlying hamlet of the rural belt has grown to sufficient size it is erected into a municipal district or canton and accorded a justice of the peace and a cantonal chief and governing board. It remains subject, however, to the municipal council of the commune of which it formed a part until further development warrants its segregation as an independent commune with its own council. The cantons, as well as some of the sections, are also provided with a cemetery and a small church or chapel.

From among their number the municipal councilmen select a president who is regarded as mayor of the commune, though many of the duties elsewhere pertaining to mayors are discharged by an official called the syndic. The councilmen are supposed to be elected for a term of two years, but the oft repeated revolutions have interfered as seriously with their terms of office as with everything else. The average Dominican seems to manifest little interest in his municipal elections; my question as to when the last local election was held would generally be answered with uncertainty: "Last January, no, last April, no, I believe it was in November." After all, the elections have usually been mere ratifications of slates prepared beforehand. In the time of Heureaux the lists of new councilmen were often arranged in the capital and a few days before election remitted to the various towns, even with a designation of the person whom the council was later to choose as its president.

The results of such a method of selection of councilmen has not been as unfavorable as might be expected. The position of councilman pays no salary and is not of sufficient importance to appeal to the politician, so that under the present system the principal merchants and other prominent men are frequently designated. The law does not prohibit foreigners from forming part of the municipal councils and they have frequently been chosen, especially in Puerto Plata.



CHAPTER XIX

POLITICS AND REVOLUTIONS

Political parties.—Elections.—Relation between politics and revolutions.—Conduct of revolutions.—Casualties.—Number of revolutions.—Effect of revolutions.

The characteristic features of Dominican politics are the violence of political antagonism and the absence of differences of principle between the political parties. None of the three parties existing to-day has a platform, and the distinction between them is entirely a matter of the personality of the leaders. Each party alleges that it has the best people and the purest motives and views with alarm the government of the country by any other party. In practice therefore, politics follows the rule only too common in the Spanish-American countries, of resolving itself into a personal struggle between the "ins" and the "outs."

In the early days of the Republic different policies were occasionally seriously considered. It was then held by some that independence should be preserved at any cost while others contended that in view of the constant, civil wars the country should seek peace and progress under the protection of some foreign power. Although the annexationists were at first called conservatives and their opponents liberals, these divergent views were not the exclusive property of any designated group of men, but the annexation idea was generally espoused by the party that happened to be in power, which thus hoped both to save the country and perpetuate its own rule, while independence was invariably supported by the opposition, which bristled with patriotic indignation and the fear that it might be permanently excluded from the banquet-table. Thus Santana obtained a return to Spanish rule in 1861 and Cabral a few years later agitated the question of American annexation and their action was denounced by Baez; yet shortly after Baez almost succeeded in securing annexation to the United States and was stigmatized as a traitor by Cabral.

Another issue which existed for a few years after the separation from Haiti in 1844 was the division between clericals on the one hand and liberals on the other, a party division that has created havoc in other parts of Spanish America. The very indefinite claims on each side and the practical unanimity of the country in its attitude towards the church caused this issue to disappear.

The real parties that kept see-sawing in and out of power from the early days of the Republic down to the time of Heureaux were those founded by General Pedro Santana and General Buenaventura Baez. Intimate friends in the struggles with Haiti which followed Santo Domingo's declaration of independence, their ambitious and domineering natures soon clashed, and each collected a group of friends and incessantly conspired against the other. The partisans of Baez, or Baecistas, adopted red for the color of the cockades and ribbons which distinguished them in the civil wars, and came to be known as the "Reds," while the followers of Santana, or Santanistas, adopted blue and were known as the "Blues."

On the death of Santana in 1863, Luperon and Cabral became the leaders of the Blue party, and for several years after the expulsion of the Spaniards in 1865 the Reds and Blues took turns in setting up governments and having them overthrown. In 1873 General Ignacio Maria Gonzalez, a former adherent of Baez, assembled a following from both factions and formed a Green party with which he ousted the Reds who were then in power. In the next six years the Reds and Greens alternated in control, but in 1879 the Greens were driven out and definitely scattered by the Blues, who thereby gained a foothold which they did not lose for years. The death of Baez in 1884 threw the Reds into confusion and their constant persecution by the "blue" President Ulises Heureaux effectually crushed them. Ulises Heureaux with Blues, Reds and Greens built up his own party of "Lilicistas" which remained in power until his death in 1899. In the later years of Heureaux's rule the distinguishing color used by his troops was white.

On the death of Heureaux, Juan Isidro Jimenez, as president, and Horacio Vasquez, as vice-president, came into power. The rivalry between Jimenez and Vasquez caused a division between their respective followers, who called themselves Jimenistas and Horacistas, thus forming the principal parties which continue to the present time. The old Reds and Blues had disappeared and their survivors aligned themselves with Jimenez and Vasquez indiscriminately; members of the Baez family joined old Blues to follow Jimenez, while other old Reds and Blues as well as the Lilicistas seemed to prefer Vasquez. In 1901 an attempt was made to form a party known as the Republican Party, which it was intended to endow with a platform, but being composed largely of Jimenez' friends, it was viewed with suspicion and fell with him.

In 1902 the Horacistas revolted and obtained the government, only to be overthrown in 1903 by followers of Jimenez. The new administration proving odious to both parties they combined to drive it out in the fall of 1903. The Horacistas gained the upper hand in the succeeding government and remained in power until 1912, though a serious division developed in the party, to the extent that the nominal leader, Horacio Vasquez, himself joined in conspiracies and uprisings against the administration. His efforts, combined with those of the Jimenistas, led to the choice of Archbishop Nouel as compromise candidate for president in 1912. Monsignor Nouel unsuccessfully attempted to govern with both parties and on his resignation in 1913 another Horacista became president. Again there was opposition from Horacistas as well as Jimenistas and in 1914 a Jimenista became provisional president.

At about this time a small third party appeared, led by Federico Velazquez, a former Horacista. His followers are known as Velazquistas, though the party has adopted the official name of Progresista. In the elections of 1914 he joined forces with Jimenez, who thus secured the presidency. The government, or what remains of it under the present military occupation, is still constituted largely by followers of Jimenez and Velazquez.

Though both Jimenistas and Horacistas claim to have the larger following in the country in general, it is probable that they are about equally matched, the Velazquistas holding the balance of power.

The Jimenistas are often vulgarly called "bolos" or bob-tailed cocks, and the Horacistas "rabudos" or "coludos," meaning bushy-tailed or long-tailed cocks. In the fighting on the Monte Cristi plains the Jimenistas would often attack, but retire as soon as their opponents showed fight, and as such tactics reminded the Dominicans of the habits of bob-tailed fighting cocks, the nicknames were imposed.

The men who attain prominence in politics range all the way from rude ignorant military chiefs to polished members of the aristocracy. In looking over the annals of Dominican history the same family names constantly recur and it may be affirmed that the government of the country has during the time of independence been in the hands of some twenty families, the members of which have swayed its councils and led its revolutions. They have tasted the sweets of power but also the bitterness of defeat, alternately occupying high positions in the government and pining in prison or exile. Almost all the chiefs of state since 1899 would have done honor to any country, but all have been obliged by the exigencies of politics to give places in their entourage to men of low standing, whose deeds or misdeeds when in power and whose unbridled ambition, have been a factor in the civil wars. At the present moment perhaps the most prominent political figure is Federico Velazquez, a man of unusual force of character, who as minister of finance under Caceres, enforced the settlement of the Dominican debt and gave what was probably the most honest administration of public revenues in the Republic's history. He is one of the few men having the moral courage openly to advocate American cooperation in the government of the country. He is about forty-seven years old, was born in Tamboril, near Santiago, and advanced through the stages of schoolmaster, shopkeeper, secretary to Vasquez and Caceres, and cabinet minister, to the position of a political leader.

The ill-feeling akin to hatred between many members of the political parties is incredible to one not accustomed to Latin-American politics. They will have nothing in common, neither will acknowledge the existence of any good in the other, they endeavor to keep apart in the clubs, they do not care to buy in each other's stores. Even the women enter into this bitterness and engagements have been broken because the bridegroom was discovered to favor one party while the bride or her family sympathized with the other.

The parties are not unalterably composed of the same individuals. On the contrary a great number of the leaders and of the rank and file are continually drifting from one party to another, evincing particular anxiety to "get on the band-wagon." These changelings, while they belong to any one party, affect to be its most ardent supporters in order to avert any suspicion of insincerity. Much of the disorder which has sapped the life-blood of the Republic has been due to disappointed office-seekers who suddenly veered about and joined the opposing party.

Not only to personal ambitions and corruption of the persons in power, but also to the perfunctory mode in which elections have been conducted the many revolutions are to be ascribed. The municipal councils in the communes and the justices of the peace and two residents in the cantons form the election board before which the voters of the respective commune or canton are supposed to appear to deposit their votes. It is evident that if anything more than a small proportion of the qualified voters appeared, such election boards would be swamped, yet no difficulty has ever been registered. The election of the presidential candidate supported by the government was generally so certain that all other aspirants realized the futility of launching their candidacy, and their followers either voted for the official candidate or refrained from voting. In this connection I am reminded of the convincing political speeches attributed to one of the foremost men of La Vega during the farcical campaigns preceding the elections of Heureaux. He is quoted as saying: "My friends, this Republic is founded on the free and unrestricted suffrage of its citizens. It is the proud boast of the Dominican that under the constitution he may vote as he pleases. You are therefore free to cast your vote for whomsoever you prefer. I would not be your friend, however, if I did not advise you that whoever does not vote for Heureaux might as well leave the country." In elections for municipal councilmen and members of Congress there was occasionally an exception to the rule of having a cut and dried program and contests sometimes arose for a seat.

The real campaigns and expressions of the people's will have therefore been the revolutions, and politics and revolutions have thus come to be regarded as going hand in hand. In a town of the Cibao an expression of the garrulous landlady of the inn attracted my attention. The old lady, after regaling me with the local gossip, started with her own troubles. "Two revolutions ago," she said—and her mode of measuring time struck me as peculiar—"my eldest son took a gun and went into politics." "Cojio un fusil y se metio en la politica"—"took a gun and went into politics," the phrase is sadly expressive.

Such campaigns were only too easily begun. When a new president entered upon office on the crest of a successful revolution, apparently with the whole country behind him and his adversaries silenced or scattered, his popularity generally lasted until the spoils were distributed. ("To the victors belong the spoils" was the policy of the past; the American military authorities are making an important innovation by the introduction of civil service principles for selecting public employees.) The disappointed spirits immediately entered into the plots which the vanquished opponents were not slow in fomenting. The leader of the adverse party or one of his trusted lieutenants raised the standard of revolt and issued manifestoes which echoed with patriotic sentiments and decried the faults of the administration. He was joined by a number of disgruntled "generals" and their followers. The telegraph wires were cut and the revolution had begun.

Before 1905 the seizure of a custom-house was invariably the next step, which would at the same time provide the insurgents with the sinews of war and make it impossible for the government to pay its employees in that province. The custom-houses were eliminated as pawns in the revolutionary game by the fiscal treaty with the United States, according to which the customs receipts were paid over to an American receiver-general. Revolutions for a short time became more difficult, but where there's a will there's a way, and under a new routine the necessary funds were derived from the government's internal revenues and from levies on private citizens.

The first two or three weeks of a revolt constituted its critical period, for the government at once poured troops into the district in order to suppress the insurrection, while the rebels sought to obtain as many strategical points as possible. Both sides lived on the country while roaming about in pursuit of each other. If the government was victorious the leaders of the revolt would usually scramble across the border into Haitian territory, or leave the country by boat, or otherwise make themselves inconspicuous until the time was ripe for another rebellion. When the government was unready or unsuccessful, the insurrection spread with great rapidity from town to town until it arrived before the walls of Santo Domingo City. There was more or less of a siege and when the president capitulated he was permitted to board a vessel and go into exile. The head of the new revolution then assumed charge of the government and had himself elected president and the game began all over again.

The personal property of the fallen adversaries was respected and there was no confiscation, such as has occasionally been witnessed in certain other Latin republics. When Baez was overthrown in 1858 there was an exception to the rule, his properties being seized by the Santana government on the ground that he was a traitor ready to deliver the country over to the Haitians and was guilty of other high crimes and misdemeanors. But when the wheel of fortune again brought Baez to the top he promptly reentered upon his lands.

During the uprisings there has rarely been wanton destruction of property, the property of foreigners being especially respected. The owner of a plantation near Macoris told me that on one occasion the general of an insurgent force even halted at his gates and sent him a polite request for permission to cross the property. Such consideration was not universal, however, and large sums have been paid to foreigners for damages inflicted during revolutions. A serious inconvenience was caused farmers by revolutions as many laborers were enrolled in one army or the other, either voluntarily or by impressment.

In the course of the insurrection there were numerous encounters between the rebels and the government troops, most of them being mere skirmishes. There is hardly a town where there are not houses which show the marks of bullets. The walls and gates of Santo Domingo City and the houses in the vicinity are full of such marks, though generally painted over now. In 1904 and 1905 one of the sights of the city was a beautiful villa opposite the Puerta del Conde, which had served as target for the government forces while occupied by the insurgents and was so peppered by shot and shell as to look like a sieve. The sieges of Santo Domingo City sometimes lasted for many months. At such times almost every citizen took part in the excitement, barricades were erected at every street opening and the rattle of musketry was heard at all hours.

The proportion of shots fired to casualties inflicted is known to be enormous in all wars and in Santo Domingo it is almost incredible. Battles have been fought lasting for hours with thousands of shots fired, yet with not one man lost. There have been revolutionary uprisings lasting for months with not a man wounded. In Puerto Plata it is said that when the government troops attacked the city in 1904 a fierce battle ensued which continued from morning till the town was taken by storm in the evening; yet only one man was killed and his death was due to his own carelessness, for he appeared not far from where soldiers of the other side were training a cannon and refused to obey their warning to get out of the way, whereupon the cannon was discharged and his arm shot off, causing a mortal wound.

At other times, however, the results have been far more serious, as many a maimed soldier and bereaved family can testify. The graves of victims of the revolutions are scattered all over the Republic. How many have fallen in the disturbances of the past fifteen years it is impossible to determine; I have heard estimates ranging from 1000 up to 15,000. Nor is revolutionizing a pleasant business when continued for any length of time. When the men entered a town contributions could be levied on the merchants, but when they were harassed and forced to retreat to the mountains they roamed for weeks half nude, bare-headed, barefooted, exposed to the weather, living on what bananas and wild fruits they could find or occasional wild hogs they were able to kill, undermining their constitutions and brutalizing their natures. The landlady whose son sought political distinction with a gun told me amid sobs that her boys were dutiful, industrious lads before being caught in the revolutionary torrent, but that in the woods they lost all inclination for work and returned home completely demoralized. From grieving relatives of victims I have heard many another story of ruined lives and early deaths. It is saddening to reflect on the tears which have been shed and the misery which has been caused by this long continued civil strife.

While women have been heavy sufferers from the revolutions they have not hesitated to take sides and contribute their mite. Many are the stories current in Santo Domingo of women who smilingly passed through the enemy's ranks and carried ammunition and supplies concealed beneath their garments to their friends in the woods.

Excluding the revolution by which the Haitian yoke was thrown off in 1844 and that of 1863-65, which expelled the Spaniards, there have occurred in the seventy years of Dominican independence no less than twenty-three successful revolutions. One occurred in each of the years 1848, 1844, 1849, 1857 and 1864, three in 1865, one each in 1866, 1867 and 1873, three in 1876, one each in 1877, 1878, 1879, 1899 and 1902, two in 1903 and one each in 1912 and 1914. At times hardly had a revolution proved successful when a counter-revolution broke out and secured the victory. The longest intermissions were from 1879 to 1899 when the party of the dictator Heureaux was in power, and from 1903 to 1912, when the indirect protection of the United States was sufficient to sustain the government.

These were the successful revolutions; the unsuccessful insurrections are innumerable. It has been unfortunate for the credit of Santo Domingo that almost every little shooting affray is classed as an insurrection or revolution. Most of these unsuccessful uprisings have been unimportant excursions into the country by some disaffected local chief and a handful of followers, the band being promptly rounded up or scattered by government forces or induced to come in by promise of a job or some other consideration.

The circumstance that the provincial governors found it to their advantage to have disturbances in their district explains many of the smaller commotions. Upon the outbreak of an insurrection or before the threat of an outbreak the authorities in the capital would authorize the provincial governor to recruit troops and draw funds for their payment. The governor would do so, but if two or three thousand men had been authorized he would raise only two or three hundred and forget to account for the balance of the money. The suppression of the "revolution" would thus benefit both his military reputation and his pocketbook. Governors were therefore prone to exaggerate rumors of insurrection and sometimes themselves sent out men to fire a few shots in the woods and create alarm.

Other insurrections have been fierce and formidable and some administrations were obliged to engage in constant warfare in order to maintain themselves. A serious unsuccessful insurrection was that led by Gen. Casimiro de Moya against Heureaux in 1886, which lasted six months. The most widespread was that of Jimenez against the Morales government, lasting from December, 1903, to May, 1904, and during which the insurgents gained possession of practically the entire Republic. Other serious outbreaks occurred in 1904, 1905, 1906, 1909, 1911, 1913 and 1916. The fires smouldered constantly, especially in the Cibao, which raises the largest crops of everything, including revolutions.

The effect of such continuous commotion has been most disastrous to the country and the people at large. This is all the more saddening when it is considered that, less than ten per cent of the people took part in the disturbances. Revolutions, successful and unsuccessful, have been fought to a finish with less than a thousand men on either side. Ninety per cent of the population are law-abiding citizens who would like nothing better than to be let alone and permitted to pursue their vocations in peace. The other ten per cent were not entirely to blame: they have been the victims of their environment.

Not only have the revolutionary disturbances caused enormous indirect loss to the country through paralyzation of agriculture, arrest of development and loss of credit, but they have also been a large direct expense. A considerable portion of every budget was devoted to appropriations for the purchase of war material and the maintenance of the military and naval establishment. When uprisings occurred the additional amounts necessary for their suppression have been taken from other appropriations, those for public works usually being the first to be cancelled. If the uprisings became serious the other appropriations of the budget were reduced by fifty or even seventy-five per cent until all the available cash was devoted to war purposes. In 1903 military and naval expenditures absorbed 71.7 per cent of the Republic's disbursements, and in 1904 72.6 per cent. At such times the government was reduced to a desperate struggle for existence; the loss of the custom-houses in power of the insurgents made its position still more precarious; it contracted loans on ruinous terms; it neglected its foreign obligations and paid its employees in promissory notes and even in postage stamps, which they would then peddle about the streets. Under such conditions it is natural that nothing was left for public improvements. Even under the peaceful administration of Heureaux a disproportionate part of the national funds was expended for military purposes and three gunboats were acquired and maintained, but not a single mile of improved road was laid out.

With the American military occupation political conditions in the Dominican Republic have radically changed. The system of waging political campaigns by force of arms has stopped abruptly and absolutely. Revolutions have become a matter of history. Ballots will hereafter take the place of bullets, and politics will be conducted in the same manner as in other orderly countries. Evolution, not revolution, will be the characteristic of the future.



CHAPTER XX

LAW AND JUSTICE

Audiencia of Santo Domingo.—Legal system.—Judicial organization.—Observance of laws.—Prisons.—Character of offenses.

In the year 1510 the Spanish government established in Santo Domingo the first of the famous colonial audiencias, or royal high courts, the list of which appears like a roll call of Spain's former glories. Others were added later in Mexico, Guatemala, Guadalajara, Panama, Lima, Santa Fe de Bogota, Quito, Manila, Santiago de Chile, Charcas (now Sucre), and Buenos Aires. The audiencia of Santo Domingo at first had jurisdiction over all the territory under Spanish dominion in the new world, but upon the establishment, of the audiencia of Mexico and others its jurisdiction was confined to the West India Islands, and the north coast of South America. Its functions were both judicial and administrative, including the power to hear appeals from the judges of the district and from certain administrative authorities, and to intervene in certain matters of government, in the finances of the territory and in behalf of the public peace. The governor and captain-general of Santo Domingo was president of the royal audiencia, though not acting when it sat as a law court, and at times the audiencia alone temporarily carried on the government of one or more of the territories under its jurisdiction. It applied the law as expressed in the codification of the "Laws of the Indies," and the Spanish "Partidas." It sat in the building still called the old palace of government. During the dark days which fell upon the island in the seventeenth century, the presence of the audiencia helped to save the colony from being completely forgotten. It continued in its functions until the country was ceded to France, whereupon in 1799, it was removed to the city of Puerto Principe, in Cuba. Could its records but have been preserved a great many gaps in the history of Santo Domingo, Cuba, Porto Rico and Venezuela would be filled. It seems that the first records were destroyed by Drake in 1583, and almost all the later ones succumbed to the negligence of man and the voracity of the tropical insects. When the government of Cuba in 1906 honored the request of the government of the Dominican Republic for the return of such of the records of the audiencia of Santo Domingo as were still extant, it could find in its national archives and turn over but a score of bundles of documents, mostly records of suits regarding land boundaries in the eighteenth century, of little historic value. These and several small mahogany bookcases still preserved in the present audiencia of Havana, are the only tangible remains of this noted court.

When Santo Domingo again came under Spanish rule in 1809, the colony was included in the territorial jurisdiction of the audiencia of Caracas. Upon the beginning of Haitian rule in 1822, when most of the distinguished citizens, including judges and lawyers, left the country, they took with them the ancient legal system. The Haitians imposed their laws, namely, the Code Napoleon and other French codes. These took such deep root that on the expulsion of the Haitians no attempt was made to return to the Spanish laws, which also at that time were still under the disadvantage of not having been revised and codified in accordance with modern needs. In 1845 the laws of France were expressly adopted by the Dominican Republic. During the troublous times following little attention was given to the legal system, and there was not even a Spanish translation of the codes. After annexation to Spain in 1861 the Spanish authorities attempted to clarify the situation by introducing the Spanish penal code and law of criminal procedure and by appointing a commission to translate the civil code, in which they made several changes, but upon the reestablishment of the Republic in 1865 everything done in this respect by the Spaniards was annulled. Several efforts were later made to secure a translation of the codes, though laws were not often invoked amid so much civil unrest. As late as 1871 the American commission which visited the island reported that the administration of justice had practically fallen into disuse. The local military chiefs and the parish priests decided the questions that arose.

As the country progressed in spite of itself, and there were periods of peace, the need of an official Spanish text of the laws became more pressing, and at length in 1882 a commission was appointed to translate and adapt the French codes. On the report of the commission a civil code, a code of civil procedure, a code of commerce, a penal code, a code of criminal procedure and a military code were approved in the year 1884. They are literal translations of the French codes with a few modifications to adapt them to local conditions. The penal codes are such close translations that several paragraphs relating to juries were retained, although the institution does not exist in Santo Domingo. It was tried in 1857, but discontinued in the following year. The Dominican Congress made but few changes in these important laws, which have therefore been more permanent than the constitution. The need for a further revision of the Dominican codes became urgent, however, and such revision has very recently been concluded by a commission which sat for that purpose; it is now being considered with a view to an early promulgation of the codes in amended form.

Santo Domingo, the first Spanish colony, thus has no Spanish laws. It is the only Spanish country which has adopted French legislation so completely, and which looks so largely to France for its jurisprudence.

The laws of Congress, and the decrees of the Executive relating to concessions, naturalization, pardons, and other matters, and, at present, the "executive orders" and decrees of the military government, are published in the Official Gazette, a government newspaper appearing almost daily. In addition to the calendar date, official papers are dated from the declaration of independence in 1844 and the restoration of the Republic in 1863, somewhat as follows: "Given in the National Palace of Santo Domingo, Capital of the Republic, on the 3rd day of March, 1916, the 73rd year of Independence and the 53rd of the Restoration." In Haiti it was formerly the custom, after a successful revolution, to count dates not only from the declaration of independence but also from the proclamation of the latest revolution, the latter period being denominated the "regeneration," thus: In the 40th year of independence and the 3rd of the regeneration. In the Dominican Republic Baez introduced this rule in his presidency of 1868-1873, during which period decrees were dated in the following manner: "On the 3rd day of March, 1871, the 28th year of Independence, the 8th of the Restoration, and the 3rd of the Regeneration." The revolution of December, 1873, ended this regeneration, and the official references thereto.

At the present time the judicial power is vested in a supreme court, sitting in the capital of the Republic, three courts of appeals, one in Santo Domingo, one in Santiago and one in La Vega; twelve courts of first instance, one in each province; and 70 alcaldias or justice of the peace courts, in the several communes and cantons. The supreme court is constituted by a presiding justice and six associate justices, who are elected by the Senate for terms of four years. It exercises original jurisdiction in cases against diplomatic functionaries and judges of courts of appeals, sits as a court of cassation in appeals from, the courts of appeals, finally decides admiralty cases and has certain other functions assigned to it by law.

The three courts of appeals each have a presiding justice and four associate justices, all elected by the Senate for four year terms. They exercise appellate jurisdiction over cases adjudged by courts of first instance and courts-martial, and original jurisdiction in admiralty cases and in the prosecution of certain judicial and administrative officials. Prior to 1908 there was one supreme court, with five members, and no court of appeals. When the income of the country grew, the new constitution provided that the supreme court have at least seven members, and that at least two courts of appeals be established, with their necessary judges and clerks. The system is now costly and topheavy.

The twelve district courts each have a judge of first instance and a judge of instruction, elected by the Senate for terms of four years. The judge of instruction is not, strictly speaking, a part of the court, his duty being to investigate the more serious criminal offenses, commit the offenders for the action of the court and report the result of his investigation to the prosecuting attorney. The courts of first instance have original jurisdiction in all criminal matters except the minor police offenses and in all civil matters except those expressly assigned to the justices of the peace. They hear appeals from the justices of the peace in civil and criminal cases.

The local justices of the peace are called "alcaldes." The alcalde, in Spanish times, was an officer exercising both administrative and judicial functions, the name being derived from the Arabic "al cadi," the judge, and whereas in Spain and most of the former Spanish colonies the alcalde has now only administrative duties and his office is equivalent to that of mayor, in Santo Domingo he now exercises solely judicial authority. (The office of "alcalde pedaneo," which may be roughly translated as deputy mayor, exists in Santo Domingo, however, this title being given to the municipal executive's agent in each section.) The alcalde's jurisdiction comprises the smaller police offenses and, in civil cases, matters involving less than $100, as well as certain cases, such as suits between innkeepers and guests, where the limit of his authority is raised to $300, and other cases, such as ejectment suits, where his jurisdiction attaches on account of the subject-matter. The alcaldes are appointed by the president of the Republic.

In general the system works smoothly. The alcaldes are often ignorant men, but even in the United States the country magistrates are not always founts of wisdom. The judges of first instance and district attorneys are almost without exception respected in the community, and the present judges of the supreme court and of the courts of appeals enjoy a good reputation. Not infrequently political considerations have given rise to poor appointments, such as occurred in Barahona some years ago when the judge-elect telegraphed an indignant protest to the capital to the effect that he was unacquainted even with the rudiments of the law. The administration had not taken the trouble to ascertain whether he was a lawyer, but knowing he sought a position, had given him the first one at hand. This was rather an oversight, as the law requires such appointees to be members of the bar. On another occasion the legal requisite was filled by first declaring the aspirant a lawyer and then designating him for the post. These cases are exceptions, however. The integrity of the judges is not often questioned, but the alcaldes do not enjoy so good a reputation.

At the present time there are also American provost courts which take cognizance of "offenses against the military government." This designation is broad enough to include anything the military authorities choose to include. Apart from a few cases of regrettable harshness these courts have done fairly well.

While the various constitutions have expressly declared the independence of the judicial power, the authority of the courts has heretofore been rather relative, and they have studiously avoided conflicts with the other branches of the government. There is no case on record where they have declared a law unconstitutional. The supreme court when driven into a corner in 1904 even declared that it had not the authority to make such a declaration. The constitution of 1908 modified the decision by expressly providing that the supreme court may decide as to the constitutionality of laws.

This decision of the supreme court made little impression in the country, due probably in part to the ease with which the various administrations have disregarded the constitution when it suited their convenience. The little value of the constitution between friends has constantly been demonstrated. Certain provisions have been systematically violated, even by the best of administrations. Principal among them is the provision that no one be arrested without a warrant setting forth the offense, unless caught in flagranti, and the provision that every person imprisoned be informed of the cause of his imprisonment and submitted to examination within forty-eight hours after arrest, and not be detained for a longer time than permitted by law. These provisions have been dead letters as far as political prisoners are concerned. When a person was suspected of being involved in a conspiracy against the government he was liable at any moment to be seized and conducted to prison, where he might be detained indefinitely, until the danger was over, or he was considered innocuous. The ancient fortress at the river mouth in Santo Domingo, known as La Torre del Homenaje, bears over its entrance the sign, "Political Prison," and rarely has it been without tenants, even when the country was at peace and the constitutional guarantees were supposed to be in force. On one occasion when I heard a Dominican lawyer lament that a friend of his had thus been incarcerated for several months without a hearing, I inquired why he did not apply to a court and invoke the constitutional provision. The reply was, "The judge who signed an order to set the prisoner free would probably join him in jail before many hours had passed."

Such ignoring of the written law was a relic of the days when the will of the military was the only law respected. Reminders of the old state of affairs continued to crop out, though the people and government were rapidly adopting other customs. An instance occurred in Sanchez during the presidency of Morales. A younger brother of the president was customs collector at that port and was accused by public rumor of irregularities in office. A customs employee having been discharged for spreading the rumor, called on the collector and invited him to a meeting outside; and the two adjourned to the bush, where shots were exchanged and young Morales was wounded in the leg. The aggressor was immediately seized by the general commanding the military forces in Sanchez and carried to the town cemetery, a grave was dug, and the general prepared to have him summarily shot. The town authorities interceded, but in vain, and the execution was about to take place when the ladies of the town succeeded in moving the commandant by their pleadings. The prisoner was remanded to the jail in Samana and was later tried by the court of first instance and acquitted. Much more recently the leader of the band that assassinated President Caceres was killed without trial.

Some of the surviving military leaders of the old school find difficulty in adjusting themselves to the new conditions. Among them was General Cirilo de los Santos, better known by his nickname "Guayubin" (the name of the town where he was born) who took an active part in the political disturbances of the Republic for many years. When I traveled through the country with Prof. Hollander on his financial investigation we were guests of this hero of a hundred revolutions, who was then Governor of La Vega. In the course of conversation Prof. Hollander expressed gratification at the cessation of the custom of shooting political prisoners. The governor was at that time engaged in the persecution of one Perico Lasala, a perpetual revolutionist who was infesting the nearby hills and who has since done his country a favor by being killed in an incursion on the coast. The idea of not shooting this notorious character as soon as he was apprehended seemed grotesque to Guayubin—and perhaps not without reason. He cried, "If you were in my place and caught Perico Lasala, wouldn't you shoot even him?" "Why, no," was the answer. Guayubin's face fell and he became thoughtful. For the rest of the day he was strangely silent and he continued so on the morrow, when he accompanied us for several miles out of town. When bidding goodbye, he broke out: "I wish to ask your advice. If I should catch Perico Lasala, what would you advise me to do with him?" Dr. Hollander asked: "What do you do with persons who steal or commit similar violations of the law?" "We put them in jail." "Why, then, put Perico Lasala in jail." A look of inexpressible relief came over the face of the old warrior. "Of course!" he said, "I never thought of that."

Not long after this incident General Guayubin met a political opponent against whom he harbored resentment. He immediately drew his revolver and began to shoot, and the object of his wrath escaped only by dexterous sprinting. At a session of Congress there was some criticism of his action and Guayubin resigned his office in disgust. The death of this fighter was as stern as his life. He attended a christening party at a house where there was a forgotten powder-cask; a spark fell into the powder and in the ensuing explosion Guayubin's eyesight was destroyed. Grimly refusing to take food or drink, he pined away.

Prior to the American occupation, the Dominican penal establishments were as a rule in very bad condition. There is no penitentiary and portions of the forts or government houses are used as jails. The prisoners were herded together with little thought of cleanliness. The stench in some of the jail yards was at times almost unbearable. In justice it should be stated that the Dominican authorities frequently called the attention of their Congress to this condition of affairs. The prisons at Santo Domingo City and Santiago were exceptions to the rule; they were improved even to the extent of being endowed with a prison school.

The political prisoners were generally given better accommodations, if there were any at hand, and had the privilege of securing their meals from the outside instead of being limited to the scant and repugnant prison food. During revolutions, however, when the prisons were overcrowded, the political prisoners were kept in irons and supervision was rigid. According to law the functionaries of each court of first instance were supposed to visit and examine the jails once a month, but as the date of their visit was known beforehand the inspection was little more than perfunctory. Not very long ago it was whispered in the Cibao that a judge in inspecting a jail accidentally passed through a door to a room he was evidently not expected to enter, and there to his own embarrassment and that of the warden found a score of prisoners whose names were not on the prison rolls.

The more serious offenders were kept in irons. The Dominican authorities, realizing that they had no reason to be proud of their prisons, were loath to permit foreigners to visit the jails. When I called at the government building at Sanchez on one occasion, however, the commandant was absent and an indiscreet sergeant offered to show me the two rooms used for prison purposes. The building was a wooden one and one of the rooms, though heavily barred, did not seem unfitted except in case of overcrowding, which I was told sometimes occurred. The other room was extremely repulsive. It was dark and a foul odor rising from a hole in the wooden floor demonstrated the truth of the guide's remark that there was no outhouse for the use of the prisoners. Along one side of this room lay two long square-cut beams, one on the other, scalloped out so as to form a number of round holes along their juncture. It was evident they were used as stocks and my guide stated that he had seen a whole row of men sitting along the log with their feet thus confined. One or two of the holes were a little larger and it was explained that they were for the purpose of confining not the feet but the neck of the delinquent, and that this punishment was much worse, producing especial pain in the case of short-necked persons. The severest pain was produced, so the guide stated, when the delinquent was seated on the beam and his feet placed crosswise through the holes: he could bear the agony of this position for only a short time.

The American authorities have made great improvements in the prisons and prison discipline. The jails are now so clean that they are almost show places.

The revolutionary disturbances have seriously interfered with the proper execution of the sentences of the courts. It was a usual procedure for revolutionary forces, upon entering a town, to free the prisoners—either as a slap at the government or in order thereby to augment their own strength. In Puerto Plata, a few years ago, a merchant was convicted of fraudulent bankruptcy and sentenced to three years in jail; soon afterwards a revolutionary force took possession of the town and freed the prisoners; and a few hours later the townspeople were amused to see the lawyer who had been instrumental in securing the conviction himself led to prison at the instigation of the culprit.

In March, 1903, when the political prisoners in the Santo Domingo prison broke out, they released the convicts, some of whom retained their gyves during the fighting which followed, until the revolution was successful several days later.

The undeveloped state of the country has offered difficulties to the apprehension of criminals, and the proper enforcement of the law. Could a criminal but reach the mountains of the interior, which are almost entirely uninhabited, he would be safe from pursuit and might either wait to join the next uprising or proceed to a different part of the country, where he was unknown and where, owing to the difficulty of intercourse, detection would be unlikely. Instances have occurred more than once where an escaped malefactor has become a "general" of other outlaws and by threatening to raise an insurrection has induced the government to pardon him and his associates.

In several regions there were up to the time of the American occupation local caciques who were almost absolute monarchs in their district. They and their followers considered themselves above the law and their power and influence were such that the government in the capital preferred to let them alone so long as they kept within bounds. Such gentlemen can hardly be expected to favor the American administration for they have been made to understand that their rights and remedies are no more than those of other citizens.

In view of such conditions so favorable to wrongdoers, the low criminal record of Santo Domingo is all the more remarkable and speaks highly for the character of the population. Crimes evincing malice and a depraved disposition are exceedingly rare. The Dominican boasts that it is possible to travel without fear from one end of the Republic to the other, though unarmed and carrying large sums of money. The few attacks on travelers which are on record have generally been due to revenge or some other personal motive. There is petty thievery, but no more than anywhere else. A friend of mine used to remark that he had never seen so many chickens in a community where there were so many negroes. No criminal is so greatly despised as a thief, and to accuse a person of being "mean enough to steal a pig" is a mortal insult. A distinction is made, however, between public honesty and private honesty, and the impression has been only too general that stealing from the state is not stealing.

The most common serious offenses are homicide and assaults committed in sudden quarrel or due to jealousy. Not a little mischief was caused by the unfortunate habit of going armed.

The attractions of the fair sex give rise not only to crimes of jealous passion, but also to other missteps, such as seduction and similar offenses. The average of these is not greater, however, than in other southern countries.



CHAPTER XXI

THE DOMINICAN DEBT AND THE FISCAL TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES

Financial situation in 1905.—Causes of debt.—Amount of debt.—Bonded debt.—Liquidated debt.—Floating debt.—Declared claims.—Undeclared claims.—Surrender of Puerto Plata custom-house.—Fiscal convention of 1905.—Modus vivendi.—Negotiations for adjustment of debt.—New bond issue.—Fiscal treaty of 1907.—Adjustment with creditors.—1912 loan.—Present financial situation.

Rarely have the fiscal affairs of a country experienced so rapid and radical a change for the better as those of Santo Domingo since 1904, and rarely has a financial measure so quickly proved its efficacy as the fiscal convention between the United States and Santo Domingo. In the beginning of the year 1905 Santo Domingo had fallen to the lowest depths of bankruptcy and financial discredit. After decades of civil disturbance, misrule and reckless debt contraction, the deluge had come. The substance of the country had been wasted in military expenditures; agriculture and commerce were stagnant; a debt of over $30,000,000 had been contracted with nothing to show for it but forty-two miles of narrow-gauge railroad and two small gunboats; the government obligations were chronically in default and interest charges were piling up at ruinous rates; every port of the Republic was pledged to foreign creditors who were clamoring for payment; one port had already been seized and the occupation of the others by foreign powers was imminent. At this juncture the Dominican government applied to the United States for assistance and the custom-houses of the Republic were placed in charge of an American general receiver, with the obligation of reserving a specified portion of the customs income for the creditors and turning the remainder over to the Dominican government. The situation immediately changed as if by magic. The imports and exports, and with them the income of the government, quickly reached higher figures than the country had ever seen, the national debt was scaled down by almost one-half and the new Dominican bonds issued in 1907 to convert the old debt went nearly to par in the markets of the world.

(a) Periodic accumulation of floating debt, owing to: 1. Political instability, requiring large outlays for soldiery, for bribery of potential revolutionists, and for suppression of actual revolutions. 2. Corruption of officials. 3. "Asignaciones" or pensions to mollify enemies and to reward friends of the existing regime. (b) Usurious interest computations, on account of: 1. "Bonus" in principal, 2. Extravagant interest rates. (c) Interest default and compounding accumulations. (d) Recognition and liquidation of excessive or illegal claims as a condition of further advances.

In order to obtain more positive information with reference to outstanding Dominican indebtedness, for use in connection with the pending fiscal treaty, the American government in the early part of 1905 commissioned a financial expert, Prof. Jacob H. Hollander, of Johns Hopkins University, to proceed to Santo Domingo and make an investigation of financial conditions. Prof. Hollander, in an elaborate report, found the amount of the claims pending against the Dominican Republic on June I, 1905, to be $40,269,404.38, distributed as follows:

Bonded debt........................ $17,670,312.75 Liquidated debt...................... 9,595,530.40 Floating debt........................ 1,553,507.79 Declared claims...................... 7,450,053.89 Undeclared claims.................... 4,000,000.00 ——————— Total indebtedness................. $40,269,404.38

The bonded debt, as above designated, comprised the public indebtedness represented by outstanding bonds; the liquidated debt consisted of items secured by international protocols or by formal contracts; the floating debt consisted of admitted indebtedness, neither funded nor secured, but evidenced by public obligations; the declared claims were claims presented for reimbursement or indemnity but not expressly recognized by the government; and the undeclared claims were claims of the same nature not yet formally presented. A brief description of each of these items will afford an idea of the general character, of Dominican financiering and a better understanding of Dominican history.

Bonded Debt. The bonded debt held by Belgians and French and amounting to $17,670,312.75, was the final outcome of eight consecutive bond issues floated by the Republic, as follows:

Interest per Term Date Amount cent years Name_

1869 L 757,700 6 25 Hartmont loan 1888 L 770,000 6 30 Westendorp loan 1890 L 900,000 6 56 Railway loan 1893 L2,035,000 4 66 4 per cent consolidated gold bonds 1893 $1,250,000 4 66 4 per cent gold debentures 1894 $1,250,000 4 66 French-American reclamation consols 1895 $1,750,000 4 66 1897 L1,736,750 2-3/4 102 Obligations or de Saint Domingue L1,500,000 4 83 Dominican unified debt 4 per cent bonds

In making its very first loan, in 1869, the Dominican government fell into the hands of sharpers and was mercilessly fleeced. The bargain, even if it had been honestly carried out, was improvident enough. Reduced to American money the nominal amount of the loan was $3,788,500; of this amount the Republic was to receive but $1,600,000; yet it contracted to pay as interest and sinking fund in twenty-five years a sum amounting to $7,362,500. The contractors for the loan, Hartmont & Co., of London, were authorized to retain $500,000 as their commission. In fact, however, no more than $190,455 was ever paid to the Dominican government. The brokers claimed that they tendered a further sum of $1,055,500, though after the expiration of the time limited in their contract, and that the tender was refused because of negotiations then under way for the annexation of the Republic to the United States, but such tender is denied on the Dominican side. At all events, the loan contract was cancelled by the Dominican senate in 1870 on the ground of non-compliance of the brokers with its conditions and the government made no payments for interest or sinking fund. The brokers nevertheless continued to sell bonds in London and pay the current interest with the proceeds. Incidentally in addition to collecting their commission, they turned a penny for themselves by taking the bonds with their friends at 50 and selling them to the public at 70. When the Dominican repudiation of the bond issue was published in England in 1872 a cash balance of $466,500 still remained to the credit of the Dominican government, but it was coolly pocketed by the principal agent, who claimed it as a set-off against alleged damages in connection with a concession he had near Samana. In the ten years of anarchy that followed in Santo Domingo no attempt was made to straighten out the matter. The bonds having gone into default in 1872 dropped lower and lower until they reached 3 per cent in 1878.

The setback received by the credit of the Republic by reason of the defaulted Hartmont bonds made further bond issues impossible for a number of years. Finally an Amsterdam banking house, Westendorp & Co., was interested and in 1888 and 1890 floated the second and third bond issues for L770,000 and L900,000 respectively. The object of the second issue was to retire the Hartmont bonds at 20 per cent, to pay a number of floating interior debts the owners of which were harassing the government, and to provide cash for the treasury, principally for military and naval expenditures, while the third issue was designed to secure funds for the construction of a railroad between Puerto Plata and Santiago. For the purpose of providing for the service of the loan a collection office known as the "caisse de la regie," or simply "regie," under the management of Westendorp, took charge of the customhouses with the obligation of paying a certain amount to the government monthly and devoting the remainder to payment of interest and sinking fund of the loans. The arrangement was thus similar to the later receivership plan, but its vulnerable point was that it was operated by a private concern.

The first instalments of interest and sinking fund on these two bond issues were paid from the proceeds of the bonds, then for several months the "regie" supplied funds, and then came the first crash. The government was ever in need of money and to secure the same violated its agreements by seizing certain revenues to pledge them to local merchants for advances, and by conniving at customs irregularities. As a result, after paying the sums for the budget, the "regie" had nothing left for the service of the bonds and they went into default in 1892.

Westendorp was almost ruined by this occurrence and became anxious to draw out of his Dominican entanglements. He applied to Smith M. Weed and Brown and Wells, New York attorneys, to negotiate a sale of his bonds to the United States government, transferring also his right to collect the Dominican customs. The United States government declined, whereupon Weed, Wells and Brown organized the famous San Domingo Improvement Company under the laws of New Jersey, the claim of which was later the prime factor in bringing about American intervention in Santo Domingo. Subsequently two other companies, the San Domingo Finance Company and the Company of the Central Dominican Railway, were incorporated, also under the laws of New Jersey, as auxiliaries of the Improvement Company, but they were all managed by the same persons. The San Domingo Improvement Company took over Westendorp's holdings and was placed in control of the "regie." A fourth bond issue, of L2,035,000 was floated through the agency of the Improvement Company in 1893 for the conversion of the outstanding government bonds. The Improvement Company also completed the railroad from Puerto Plata to Santiago, which was the only improvement it ever effected in the Republic and this it did with Dominican money. It further took from the Republic at rates very favorable to the Company a fifth, sixth and seventh bond issue, in 1893, 1894 and 1895 respectively, aggregating $4,250,000, for the payment of government indebtedness. The obligations paid by the first two of these issues were in considerable part inflated claims against the government, capitalized at excessive interest rates, those satisfied by the 1895 issue arose principally out of indemnity claims made by France for mistreatment of French citizens and for debts due them.

The Dominican government took no warning from previous disasters but continued in its course of reckless debt contraction. In order to equip warships and arsenals it borrowed money right and left at rates of interest which ranged anywhere from 18 to 30 per cent per annum. The loans were guaranteed by customs revenues which the creditors were authorized to collect direct from the importer. Thus the amount collected by the "regie" was not sufficient to provide for the service of the ever increasing bonded debt and in 1897 there was another default.

The old remedy of a new bond issue was to be tried again. The San Domingo Improvement Company undertook to float the eighth bond issue of L2,736,750 in bonds at 2-3/4 per cent and L1,500,000 in bonds at four per cent. With these bonds it contracted to convert all previous bonds then outstanding, to pay overdue interest and to secure for the government over $1,000,000 in cash. President Heureaux issued drafts on this presumption, but it soon became evident that it would be impossible for the Improvement Company to carry out the contract. The company blamed the government and the government the company. The situation quickly became chaotic. Eventually the conversion of the older bond issues was completed, though at enormous cost. Bonds to the value of L600,000 were absorbed during the transaction with at most a cash payment of $250,000 to the Dominican fiscal agent in Europe. In the meantime the government tried the experiment of a large emission of paper money in which the customs dues were partly payable. The paper depreciated as fast as it was issued, the revenues were again insufficient and the new bond issue suffered default in April, 1899.

While plans for further action were under consideration, President Heureaux was shot in July, 1899, and the revolution which followed his death made Jimenez president. The new administration in 1900 entered into a contract with the San Domingo Improvement Company for a different distribution of the customs revenues, but a condition was introduced that the consent of the majority of bondholders be obtained for the funding of interest up to 1903. A large number of Belgian and French bondholders had become dissatisfied with the Improvement Company, however, and repudiated the contract and all connection with the Company. In Santo Domingo, too, there was general hostility towards the Improvement Company which was regarded as an associate of President Heureaux and an incubus on the development of the country. The Company claimed it had secured the consent of a majority of bondholders but the government decided it had not and in January, 1901, President Jimenez issued a decree excluding the Improvement Company from the custom-houses.

The government now made a new contract with the Franco-Belgian bondholders, and for the payment of its obligations pledged its customs revenues, and specifically the income of the ports of Santo Domingo City and San Pedro de Macoris. But if there had been default before, in time of peace, with the "regie" in charge of the custom-houses, there was still less money available for the creditors now, with no control by creditors over collections and the government harassed by constant revolutionary uprisings. Small partial payments were made for two years and then ceased. As the Improvement Company's bond holdings became the subject of a special arrangement, the bonded debt of the Republic was considered to be that held by the French and Belgian creditors. However unsavory the debts which gave origin to the bond issues, and however imprudent most of the bond issues themselves, the great majority of bonds had passed into the hands of small holders, innocent third parties who sustained great loss by the continued suspension of payments.

Liquidated Debt. The liquidated debt, secured by international protocol or formal contract, Prof. Hollander found to be as follows on June 1, 1905:

San Domingo Improvement Company (American and British)................. $4,403,532.71 Consolidated internal debt (chiefly Spanish, German and American).. 1,737.151.35 Internal debt held by Vicini heirs (Italian)............................... 1,598,876.04 Old foreign debt (chiefly Italian and Dutch)............... 365,183.20 Sala claim (American)....................... 356,314.20 Vicini heirs (Italian)...................... 242,716.32 Italian protocol............................ 186,750.36 Spanish-German protocol..................... 100,034.00 B. Bancalari (Italian)...................... 175,000.00 J. B. Vicini Burgos (Italian)................ 55,500.00 Ros claim (American)......................... 39,967.78 Two cacao contracts (chiefly Dominican and German)............... 68,296.16 Bancalari, Lample & Co. (Italian)............ 16,733.19 Twenty-eight minor contracts (chiefly Spanish, American)............... 249,475.19 —————— Total.................................... $9,595,530.40

The claim of the San Domingo Improvement Company was secured by a protocol between the American and Dominican governments. When the San Domingo Improvement Company was ousted from the custom-houses in 1901, it immediately appealed to the State Department in Washington. The State Department counselled a private settlement and negotiations with the Dominican government dragged on for almost two years. The Improvement Company claimed no less than $11,000,000 for the bonds it held or controlled, for its interest in the railroad from Puerto Plata to Santiago, for its shares of the extinct National Bank of Santo Domingo which it had purchased at the government's request, and for the settlement of a long list of minor claims. Arbitration was suggested by the Company, but the Dominican government finally offered a round sum of $4,500,000 and the offer was accepted. It is probable that the Republic fared better under this compromise than if the case had been submitted to arbitration, for though the Improvement Company's demands were greatly exaggerated, its position toward the government was that of a careful creditor who has kept minute account of all transactions as against a spendthrift debtor who has squandered his property with little or no record of his expenditures.

By a protocol signed January 31, 1903, the Dominican government formally agreed to pay the sum of $4,500,000, leaving details to be settled by a board of arbitrators to be designated by the American and Dominican governments. The board met in Washington and rendered its award under date of July 14, 1904. It fixed the interest on the debt at four per cent per annum and designated the custom-houses of Puerto Plata, Sanchez, Samana and Monte Cristi as security for the debt. In the event of failure by the Dominican government to pay any of the monthly instalments specified, a financial agent, appointed by the United States, was authorized to enter into possession of the Puerto Plata custom-house, and if its revenues proved insufficient to take possession also of the other custom-houses designated. The Dominican government never made any payments and the financial agent took possession of the Puerto Plata custom-house in October, 1904. Most of the other claims comprised in the liquidated debt had their origin in advances made to the government—often bearing interest at two or three per cent a month, or even more—and in indemnity claims for revolutionary damages. In making the liquidations, musty credits and a generous amount of compound interest were generally included and it was usually provided that the sums so agreed upon were themselves to bear interest. The greater portion of these claims was held by foreigners, Italian, German, Spanish and American holdings predominating. Payments, more or less feeble, were made in many cases on account of principal or interest up to 1903, but in that year, when the government was reduced to desperate straits in combatting insurrections, practically every item of the debt went into permanent default.

The principal Italian claimants were the heirs of an Italian merchant, J.B. Vicini, and an Italian in business at Samana, Bartolo Bancalari by name, who with other Italian subjects became loud in their complaints at the non-payment of their claims. The Italian government began to do a little sword-clanking, the Italian minister came from Havana in a warship, and the upshot was the signing in 1904 of three protocols admitting most of these claims and solemnly promising to pay them. Payment of the internal debt held by the Vicini heirs and of the Italian revolutionary claims was guaranteed by five per cent of all the customs receipts of the Republic, the revenues of Santo Domingo City, Macoris, Sanchez and Puerto Plata being specifically pledged. The Bancalari debt was guaranteed by part of the customs revenues of Samana. Notwithstanding the protocols, no payments were made by the Dominican government.

Floating Debt. The floating debt, consisting of admitted indebtedness, neither funded nor liquidated, but evidenced by some kind of public obligation, was found to be as follows:

Registered deferred debt................... $587,710.24 Registered floating debt.................... 140,850.27 Privileged revolutionary debt................ 79,812.12 Certificates of comptroller's office........ 633,124.60 Certificates of treasury offices............. 31,771.07 Open unsecured accounts...................... 80,239.49 ————— Total.................................... $1,553.507.79

By the year 1902, a large number of small claims—many of them for supplies furnished and services rendered—had accumulated, the justice of which the government admitted but of which owing to the deficiencies in its books it had no record. Notices were accordingly published calling on holders of such lawful credits to present the same for registration. This was the origin of the so-called registered debts. The largest item was constituted by what was very aptly denominated the "deferred" debt, created in 1888. Prior to that time the government had covered its military deficits with money obtained from loan associations known as "credit companies," which flourished in the larger towns and which did business at an interest rate that fluctuated between five and ten per cent a month. When a settlement was finally made, part of the amount due these companies was paid in certificates of indebtedness, the law directing with subtle humor that they be paid from the annual surplus in the budget. There never was a surplus, nothing was ever paid, and the market value of these certificates fell to three per cent of their nominal value.

The revolutionary debt above referred to, consisting of claims arising in the revolutions which brought Jimenez into power, was called "privileged" because it was assigned interest. To some extent it was, indeed, privileged, for partial payments were made until the middle of 1903. The government certificates forming part of the floating debt, were acknowledgments of indebtedness issued by the government when it was pressed for ready money. Many bore no interest, others bore interest as high as two per cent a month. In view of the great uncertainty of payment the amount of indebtedness was generally either frankly or disguisedly inflated before being expressed in the certificate. Such certificates were sometimes admitted in part payment of customs dues.

Declared Claims Besides the admitted indebtedness, there were many claims for indemnity and reimbursement which had not been acknowledged by the government in contract form. Some had been formally filed with the government for the payment of specific amounts, while others were still general demands. The declared claims were as follows:

Internal revolutionary claims................... $ 885,258.10 American revolutionary claims................... 71,000.00 Spanish revolutionary claims.................... 40,000.00 French revolutionary claims..................... 190,000.00 Italian revolutionary claims.................... 40,000.00 German revolutionary claims..................... 10,000.00 British revolutionary claims.................... 5,000.00 Cuban revolutionary claims...................... 35,000.00 Font claim (Spanish)............................ 186,643.00 Heureaux estate claim (Dominican)............... 3,100,000.00 National bank notes............................. 1,574,647.00 Lluberes contract (Dominican)................... 250,000.00 West India Public Works Company claim (British). 250,000.00 Vicini heirs claim (Italian).................... 812,505.00 ___ Total...........................................$7,450,053.89

Most of the older claims of indemnity for damages suffered during revolutions crystallized into bonded indebtedness, were recognized in government contracts or protocols, drifted into the old foreign debt, or were represented by certificates of indebtedness. Some remained, however, and their number was greatly increased by the disturbances between 1899 and 1905. How exaggerated many such claims were, is illustrated by a story told by the Danish consul in Santo Domingo. A Danish subject came to him and complained that government soldiers had invaded his store and carried off merchandise. He begged the consul to present a damage claim of $10,000 gold, which was equivalent to $50,000 silver. The consul listened to his story and said: "You are asking for a large sum, I cannot get you that. I doubt whether I can get you more than $40, silver." "Make it gold, consul," was the immediate reply. Many other claims would not have suffered by a similar scaling down. Most claims were for houses burned, cattle killed, horses commandeered and fences and other property destroyed by government forces or revolutionists.

The other declared claims arose principally out of alleged violations of concessions or other contractual obligations. The Heureaux estate claim, advanced by creditors of the Heureaux estate and based on the practical identity of the accounts of Heureaux and those of the government was later rejected by the Dominican courts. The outstanding national bank notes were those issued by the defunct Banque Nationale de Saint Domingue.

Undeclared Claims. The undeclared claims, such as had not been formally presented, were estimated as follows:—

American claims......................... L1,000,000 British claims.......................... 50,000 Italian claims.......................... 200,000 Spanish and German claims............... 200,000 Other foreign claims.................... 50,000 Dominican claims........................ 2,500,000 ————— Total............................ L4,000,000

The foreign claims were principally for damages during revolutions, violations of contract, failure of justice, false imprisonment, etc. The principal one was an American claim, that of Wm. P. Clyde & Co., of New York, of over $600,000 and was based on the failure of the Dominican government regularly to enforce certain high port dues against all vessels, save those of the Clyde line, as agreed in the Clyde concession. The Dominican claims were mostly old claims for unpaid salaries, revolutionary losses, merchandise furnished the government, etc.

The situation towards the latter part of 1904 appeared hopeless. Every item of the enormous debt had been in default for many months and interest was accruing at such rate that the whole income of the country would hardly have been sufficient for the payment of interest alone. Commerce was handicapped by high wharf and harbor charges collected by private individuals under their concessions from the government, and by prohibitive port dues imposed on foreign vessels in accordance with the concession of the Clyde line. More than three-fourths of the debt was held by foreigners who were clamoring for payment. The general revenues of the country and every important custom-house had been mortgaged to these foreign creditors. In general terms it may be said that the ports of the northern coast were pledged primarily to Americans and secondarily to Italians, those of Samana Bay primarily to Italians and secondarily to Americans, and those of the southern coast primarily to French and Belgians and secondarily to Italians.