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And if man wins a glorious personality, he may gain immortality too. Unfortunately, Eucken has not yet dealt fully with this question, but he is evidently of the opinion that the spiritual personalities are immortal. As concentration points or foci of the spiritual life, he believes that the developed personalities are at present and in prospect possessors of a spiritual realm. But there will be no essential or sudden change at death. That which is immortal is involved in our present experience. Those who have developed into spiritual personalities, who have worked in fellowship with the great Universal Life, and become centre-points of spirituality, have thus risen supreme over time and pass to their inheritance. Those who have not done so, but have lived their lives on the plane of nature, will have nothing that can persist.
Hence it is that the negative movement leads to freedom, personality, and immortality; the neglect to make the movement consigns the individual to slavery, makes a real "self" impossible, and at death he has nought that a spiritual realm can claim. The choice is an all-important one; for, as a recent writer puts it, "In this choice, the personality chooses or rejects itself, takes itself for its life-task, or dies of inanition and inertia."
CHAPTER VII
THE PERSONAL AND THE UNIVERSAL
In the last chapter the ascent of the human being from serfdom to freedom and personality was traced. In doing so it was necessary to make frequent reference to the Universal Spiritual Life.
When we turn to consider the characteristics of the Universal Spiritual Life, many problems present themselves. How can we reconcile freedom and personality with the existence of an Absolute? What is the nature of this Absolute, and in what way is the human related to it? What place should religion play in the life of the spiritual personality? These are, of course, some of the greatest and most difficult problems that ever perplexed the mind of man, and we can only deal briefly with Eucken's contribution to their solution.
Can a man choose the highest? This is the form in which Eucken would state the problem of freedom. His answer, as already seen, is an affirmative one. The personality chooses the spiritual life, and continually reaffirms the decision. This being so, it is now no longer possible to consider the human and the divine to be entirely in opposition. And the more the spiritual personality develops, so much the less does the opposition obtain, until a state of spirituality is arrived at when all opposition of will ceases—then we attain perfect freedom. "We are most free, when we are most deeply pledged—pledged irrevocably to the spiritual presence, with which our own being is so radically and so finally implicated." Thus freedom is obtained in a sense through self-surrender, but it is through this same self-surrender that we realise spiritual absoluteness. Hence it is that perfect freedom carries with it the strongest consciousness of dependence, and human freedom is only made possible through the absoluteness of the spiritual life in whom it finds its being.
English philosophers have dealt at length with the question of the possibility of reconciling the independence of personality and the existence of an Absolute. From Eucken's point of view the difficulty is not so serious. When he speaks of personality he does not mean the mere subjective individual in all his selfishness. Eucken has no sympathy with the emphasis that is often placed on the individual in the low subjective sense, and is averse from the glorification of the individual of which some writers are fond. Indeed, he would prefer a naturalistic explanation of man rather than one framed as a result of man's individualistic egoism. The former explanation admits that man is entirely a thing of nature; the latter, from a selfish and proud standpoint, claims for man a place in a higher world. There is nothing that is worthy and high in the low desires of Mr. Smith—the mere subjective Mr. Smith. But if through the mind and body of Mr. Smith the Absolute Spirit is realising itself in personality—then there is something of eternal worth—there is spiritual personality. There will be opposition between the sordidness of the mere individual will and the divine will, but that is because the spiritual life has not been gained. When the highest state of spiritual personality has been reached, then man is an expression—a personal realisation of the Absolute, is in entire accord with the absolute, indeed becomes himself divine.
This does not rob the term personality of its meaning, for each personality does, in some way, after all, exist for itself. Each individual consciousness has a sanctity of its own. But the being-for-self develops more and more by coming into direct contact with the Universal Spiritual Life.
Here, then, we arrive at something that appears to be a paradox. We have the phenomenon of a being that is free and existing for itself, yet in some way dependent upon an absolute spiritual life. We have, too, the phenomenon of a human being becoming divine. How is it really possible that self-activity can arise out of dependence? Eucken does not attempt to explain, but contends that an explanation cannot be arrived at through reasoning. We are forced to the conclusion, we realise through our life and action that this is the real state of affairs, and in this case the reality proves the possibility. "This primal phenomenon," he says, "overflows all explanation. It has, as the fundamental condition of all spiritual life, a universal axiomatic character." Again he says, "The wonder of wonders is the human made divine, through God's superior power." "The problem surpasses the capacity of the human reason." For taking up this position, Eucken is sharply criticised by some writers.
When we approach the problem of the nature of the Absolute in itself, the main difficulty that arises is whether God is a personal being. God, says Eucken, is "an Absolute Spiritual Life in all its grandeur, above all the limitations of man and the world of experience—a Spiritual Life that has attained to a complete subsistence in itself, and at the same time to an encompassing of all reality." The divine is for Eucken the ultimate spirituality that inspires the work of all spiritual personalities. When in our life of fight and action we need inspiration, we find "in the very depths of our own nature a reawakening, which is not a mere product of our activity, but a salvation straight from God." God, then, is the ultimate spirituality which inspires the struggling personality, and gives to it a sense of unity and confidence. Eucken does not admit that God is a personality in the sense that we are, and deprecates all anthropomorphic conceptions of God as a personal being. Indeed, to avoid the tendency to such conceptions he would prefer the term "Godhead" to "God." Further considerations of the nature of God can only lead to intellectual speculations. For an activistic philosophy, such as Eucken's philosophy is, it would seem sufficient for life and action to know that all attempts at the ideal in life, originate in, and are inspired by, the Absolute Spiritual Life, that is by God.
We cannot discuss fully the relation of human and divine without, too, dealing with the ever urgent problem of religion. This is a problem in which Eucken is deeply interested, and concerning which he has written one of his greatest works—The Truth of Religion—a work that has been described as one of the greatest apologies for religion ever written.
What is religion? Most people perhaps would apply the term to a system of belief concerning the Eternal, usually resting upon a historical or traditional basis. Others would include in the term the reverence felt for the Absolute by the contemplative mind, even though that mind did not believe in any of the traditional systems. Some would emphasise the fact that religion should concern itself with the establishment of a relationship between the human and the Divine.
But Eucken does not find religion to consist in belief, nor in a mere attitude towards the mysteries of an overworld. In keeping with the activistic tone of his whole philosophy he finds religion to be rooted in life, and would define religion as an action by which the human being appropriates the spiritual life.
The first great concern of religion must be the conservation—not of man, as mere man, but of the spiritual life in the human being, and it means "a mighty concentration of the spiritual life in man." The essential basis that makes religion possible is the presence of a Divine life in man—"it unfolds itself through the seizure of this life as one's own nature." Religion must be a form of activity, which brings about the concentration of the spiritual life in the human soul, and sets forth this spiritual life as a shield against unworthy elements that attempt to enter and to govern man.
The essential characteristic of religion must be the demand for a new world. "Religion is not a communication of overworld secrets, but the inauguration of an overworld life." Religion must depend upon the contradiction and opposition that exists in human life, and upon the clear recognition of the distinction between the "high" and the "low" in life. It must point to a means of attaining freedom and redemption from the old world of sin and sense, and to the possibility of being elevated into a new and higher world. It must, too, fight against the extremes of optimism and pessimism, for while it will acknowledge the presence of wrong, it will call attention to the possibility of deliverance. It must bring about a change of life, without denying the dark side of life; it must show "the Divine in the things nearest at hand, without idealising falsely the ordinary situation of life."
The great practical effect of religion, then, must be to create a demand for a new and higher world in opposition to the world of nature. For this new life religion must provide an ultimate standard. "Religion must at all times assert its right to prove and to winnow, for it is religion—the power which draws upon the deepest source of life—which takes to itself the whole of man, and offers a fixed standard for all his undertakings." Religion must provide a standard for the whole of life, for it places all human life "under the eternity." It is not the function of religion to set up a special province over against the other aspects of his life—it must transform life in its entirety, and affect all the subsidiary aspects.
But religion is not gained, any more than human freedom, once for all time—it must be gained continually afresh, and sought ever anew. Thus the fact of religion becomes a perpetual task, and leads to the highest activity.
Eucken speaks of two types of religion—Universal and Characteristic Religion. The line of division between them is not easy to draw, but the distinction gives an opportunity for emphasising again the essential elements of true religion.
Universal Religion is a more or less vague appreciation of the Spiritual, which results in a diffused, indefinite spiritual life. The personality has appreciated to some extent the opposition between the natural and the spiritual, and has chosen the spiritual. He adopts a new attitude or mood, towards the world in consequence, and that is an attitude of fight against the world of nature. But everything is vague; the individual has not yet appreciated the spiritual world as his own, and feels that he is a stranger in the higher world, rather than an ordinary fully privileged citizen. He has not yet associated himself closely enough with the Universal Spirit, everything is superficial, there is hunger and thirst for the higher things in life, but these have not yet been satiated.
Some people never get beyond this vague appreciation of the spiritual until perhaps some great trial or temptation, a long illness or sad bereavement falls to their lot. Then they feel the need for a religion that is more satisfying than the Universal Religion with which they have in the past been content. They want to get nearer to God; they feel the need of a personal God who is interested in their trials and troubles. They are no longer satisfied with the conception of a God that is far away, they thirst for His presence. This feeling leads the individual to search for a more definite form of religion, in which the God is regarded as supremely real, and reigns on the throne of love. The personality enters into the greater depths of religion, and it becomes a much more real and powerful influence in his life. He has no longer a mere indefinite conception of a Deity, but he thinks of God as real and personal. Instead of adopting a changed attitude towards the world of nature, he comes to demand a new world. He is now a denizen of the spiritual world, and there results "a life of pure inwardness," which draws its power and inspiration from the infinite resources of the Universal Spiritual Life in which he finds his being. This type of religion Eucken calls Characteristic Religion.
The historical religions would seem to represent, to some extent, the attempts of humankind to arrive at a religion of this kind. A further distinction arises between the historical forms of religion, of which one at most, if any, can express the final truth, and the Absolute form of religion, which if not yet conceived, must ultimately express the truth in the matter of religion.
Eucken is never more brilliant than he is in the examination he makes of the historical forms of religion, for the purpose of formulating the Absolute and final form; some account of this must be given in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VIII
RELIGION: HISTORICAL AND ABSOLUTE
In examining the various historical forms of religion, Eucken, as we should expect, is governed by the conclusions he has arrived at concerning the solution of the great problem of life, and especially of the place of religion in life.
A religion which emphasised the need for a break with the world, and of fight and action for spiritual progress, the possibility of a new higher life of freedom and of personality, and the superiority of the spiritual over the material, and which presented God as the ultimate spiritual life, in which the human personality found its real self, would thus meet with highest favour, while a form of religion that failed to do so would necessarily fail to satisfy the tests that he would apply.
He does not spend time discussing various religions in detail, but deals with them briefly in general, in order to show that the Christian religion is far superior to all other religions, then he makes a critical and very able examination of the Christian position. He considers it necessary to discuss in detail only that form of religion that is undoubtedly the highest.
The historical religions he finds to be of two types—religions of law and religions of redemption. The religions of law portray God as a being outside the world, and distinct from man, One who rules the world by law, and who decrees that man shall obey certain laws of conduct that He lays down. Failure to obey these laws brings its punishment in the present or in a future life, while implicit obedience brings the highest rewards. To such a God is often attributed all the weaknesses of the human being, sometimes in a much exaggerated form—hence His reign becomes one of fear to His subjects.
A religion of law assumes that man is capable of himself of obeying the law, and is responsible for his mode of life; it assumes that man is capable through his own energy of conquering the world of sin, and of leading the higher life.
Religions of this type possess of course the merit of simplicity, transparency, and finality. The decrees, the punishments and rewards are given with some clearness and are easily understood; there is no appeal and little equivocation. They served a useful purpose in the earlier ages of civilisation, but cannot solve the problem for the complex civilisation and advanced culture of the present age. They place God too far from man, and attribute to man powers which he cannot of himself possess. The conceptions of the Deity involved in them are too anthropomorphic in character—too much coloured by human frailties.
The religions of law have had to give place to those of a superior type—the religions of redemption. These religions appreciate the difficulty there exists for humankind of itself to transcend the world of sin, and are of two types—one type expressing a merely negative element, the other a negative and positive element.
The typical negative redemptive religion is that of Buddhism. Buddhism teaches us that the world is a sham and an evil; and the duty of man is to appreciate this fact, and to deny the world, but here the matter ends—it ends with world-renunciation and self-renunciation. There is only a negative element in such a religion, no inspiration to live and fight for gaining a higher world. This, of course, cannot provide a satisfactory solution to the problem, for no new life with new values is presented to us. It is a religion devoid of hope, for it does not point to a higher life. "A wisdom of world-denial, a calm composure of the nature, an entire serenity in the midst of the changing scenes of life, constitute the summit of life."
Christianity teaches us that the world is full of misery and suffering, but the world in itself is really a perfect work of Divine wisdom and goodness. "The root of evil is not in the nature of the world, but in moral wrong—in a desertion from God." Sin and wickedness arise from the misuse and perversion of things which are not in themselves evil. Christianity calls for a break from the wickedness of the world. It calls upon man to give up his sin, to deny, or break with, the evil of which he is guilty. But it does not expect man to do this in his own strength alone—God Himself comes to his rescue. Unlike Buddhism, it does not stay at the denial of the world, but calls upon man to become a citizen of a higher world. This gives a new impetus to the higher life; man finds a great task—he has to build a kingdom of God upon the earth. This demands the highest efforts—he must fight to gain the new world, and must keep up the struggle to retain what he has gained. The inferiority of Buddhism as contrasted with Christianity is well described by Eucken in the following words: "In the former an emancipation from semblance becomes necessary; in the latter an overcoming of evil is the one thing needful. In the former the very basis of the world seems evil; in the latter it is the perversion of this basis which seems evil. In the former, the impulses of life are to be entirely eradicated; in the latter, on the contrary, they are to be ennobled, or rather to be transformed. In the former, no higher world of a positive kind dawns on man, so that life finally reaches a seemingly valid point of rest, whilst upon Christian ground life ever anew ascends beyond itself."
From such considerations as these, Eucken comes to the conclusion that of the redemptive religions, which are themselves the highest type, Christianity is the highest and noblest form, hence his main criticism is concerned with the Christian religion. This does not mean that he finds neither value nor truth in any other form of religion. His general conclusion with regard to the historical religions is that they "contain too much that is merely human to be valued as a pure work of God, and yet too much that is spiritual and divine to be considered as a mere product of man." He finds in them all some kernel of truth, or at least a pathway to some part of truth, but contends that no religion contains the whole truth and nothing but the truth. "As certainly," he says, "as there is only one sole truth, there can be only one absolute religion, and this religion coincides entirely in no way with any one of the historical religions."
Eucken's great endeavour in his discussion of the Christian religion is to bring out the distinction between the eternal substance that resides in it and the human additions that have been made to it in different ages, between the elements in Christianity that are essentially divine and those essentially human. Divested of its human colourings and accretions, Christianity presents a basis of Divine and eternal truth, and this regarded in itself, can well claim to be the final and absolute religion.
The conclusion he has come to with regard to the eternal truth as contrasted with the temporary colourings of Christianity, with the essential as contrasted with the inessential, can best be outlined by taking in turn some of the main tenets and characteristics of the Christian faith.
Eucken's conception of the negative movement is very much akin to the Christian idea of conversion. The first stage is merely a movement away from the world, but after a time, in the continuous process of negation, the negative movement attains a positive significance; when this stage is arrived at Eucken would apply the term conversion. He would not limit the negative movement to one act or to one point in time; the movement towards a higher world must be maintained—the sustaining of the negative movement being a test of the reality of conversion. The process of conversion is not a process to be passively undergone, or to originate from without, but is a movement starting in the depths of one's own being.
As already pointed out, Eucken believes in redemption. The past is capable of reinterpretation and transformation, because we can view our past actions in a new light and so change the whole, since the past is not a closed thing, definite in itself, but a part of an incomplete whole. He considers, however, that the Christian doctrine of redemption makes it too much a matter of God's mercy, instead of placing stress upon the part that man himself must play. The possibility of redemption in his view follows from the presence and movement of the spiritual life in man, not merely from an act of the founder of Christianity, and he avers that while traditional Christianity emphasises the need for redemption from evil, it does not emphasise sufficiently the necessary elevation to the good life that must result.
Closely bound up with the Christian doctrine of redemption is that of mediation. Eucken believes that the Christian conception of mediation resulted from the feeling of worthlessness and impotence of man, and the aspirations which yet burned within him after union with the Divine. The idea of mediation bridges the gulf, "a mid-link is forged between the Divine and the human, and half of it belongs to each side; both sides are brought into a definite connection which could be found in no other way." Eucken acknowledges that such a mediation seems to make access to the Divine easier, gives intimacy to the idea of redemption, and offers support for human frailty. But he points out that there is an intolerable anthropomorphism involved in the idea, that it removes the Divine farther away from man, and that the union of Divine and human is held to obtain in one special case only—that of Christ. He urges that in a religion of mediation, one or other, God or Christ, must be chosen as the centre. "Concerning the decision there cannot be the least doubt; the fact is clear in the soul-struggles of the great religious personalities, that in a decisive act of the soul the doctrinal idea of mediation recedes into the background, and a direct relationship with God becomes a fact of immediacy and intimacy."
So Eucken will have nothing to do with the idea of mediation in its doctrinal significance—pointing out that "the idea of mediation glides easily into a further mediation." "Has not the figure of Christ receded in Catholicism, and does not the figure of Mary constitute the centre of the religious emotional life?"
He does, however, lay great store by the help that a man may be to other men in their upward path: "The human, personality who first and foremost brought eternal truth to the plane of time, and through this inaugurated a new epoch, remains permanently present in the picture of the spiritual world, and is able permanently to exercise a mighty power upon the soul ... but all this is far removed from any idea of mediation."
Eucken believes in revelation, but through action, and not through contemplation. To the personality struggling upward, with its aims set towards the highest in life, the spiritual life reveals itself. He does not confine revelation to certain periods in time, and believes that such revelation comes to all spiritual personalities.
He holds, too, that the spiritual personalities are themselves revelations of the Universal Spiritual Life, and that the Spiritual Life does reveal itself most clearly in personalities.
How the revelation comes he does not discuss in any detail, but he is very certain that it comes through action and fight for the highest.
It is perhaps largely due to his activistic standpoint that Eucken does not deal with prayer. In the Truth of Religion, which deals very fully with most aspects of religion, and purports to be a complete discussion of religion, no treatment of prayer is given. He speaks of the developing personality as drawing upon the resources of the Universal Spiritual Life, but this appears to be in action, and not in prayer or communion.
He is ever suspicious of intellectual contemplation, and this leads him to attribute less importance than perhaps he should to mysticism, to prayer, adoration, and worship. He admits that mysticism contains a truth that is vital to religion, but complains that it becomes for many the whole of religion. Its proper function is to liberate the human mind from the narrowly human, and to emphasise a total-life, the great Whole. It fails, however, "because it turns this necessary portion of religion into the sole content. To it, religion is nothing other than an absorption into the infinite and eternal Being—an extinguishing of all particularity, and the gaining of a complete calm through the suspension of all the wear and tear of life."
Eucken's discussion of faith and doubt is very illuminating. He protests against the conception of faith which concerns itself merely with the intellectual acceptance of this or that doctrine. This narrows and weakens its power, confining it to one department of life; whereas faith is concerned with the whole of life.
Faith is for Eucken "a conviction of an axiomatic character, which refuses to be analysed into reasons, and which, indeed, precedes all reasons ... the recognition of the inner presence of an infinite energy."
If faith concerns itself with, and proceeds from the whole of life, it will then take account of the work of thought, and will not set itself in opposition to reason. But it will lead where reason fails. It is not limited by intellectual limitations, though it does not underrate or neglect the achievements of the intellect. Faith enables life to "maintain itself against a hostile or indifferent world; ... it holds itself fast to invisible facts against the hard opposition of visible existence."
The vital importance of such faith to religion is clearly evident; and bound up with this is the significance of doubt. Doubt, too, becomes now, not an intellectual matter, but a matter for the whole of life. "If faith carries within itself so much movement and struggle, it is not surprising ... if faith and doubt set themselves against each other, and if the soul is set in a painful dilemma." Eucken considers it to be an inevitable, and indeed a necessary accompaniment of religious experience, and his own words on the point are forcible and clear. "Doubt ... does not appear as something monstrous and atrocious, though it would appear so if a perfect circle of ideas presented itself to man and demanded his assent as a bounden duty. For where it is necessary to lay hold on a new life, and to bring to consummation an inward transformation, then a personal experience and testing are needed. But no proof is definite which clings from the beginning to the final result, and places on one side all possibility of an antithesis. The opposite possibility must be thought out and lived through if the Yea is to possess full energy and genuineness. Thus doubt becomes a necessary, if also an uncomfortable, companion of religion; it is indispensable for the conservation of the full freshness and originality of religion—for the freeing of religion from conventional forms and phrases."
Eucken's views on immortality have already been dealt with. He does not accept the Christian conception of it, for he seems to limit the possibility to those in whom spiritual personalities have been developed, and he evidently does not believe that the "natural individuality with all its egoism and limitations" is going to persist.
In discussing the question of miracle, Eucken weighs the fact that a conviction of the possibility of miracle has been held by millions in various religions, and particularly in Christianity. He considers that the question of miracle is of more importance in the Christian religion than in any other, one miracle—the Resurrection—having been taken right into the heart of Christian doctrine. He finds, however, that the miracle is entirely inconsistent with an exact scientific conception of nature, and means "an overthrow of the total order of nature as this has been set forth through the fundamental work of modern investigation." He does not consider such a position can be held without overwhelming evidence, and does not feel the traditional fact to have this degree of certainty, or to be inexplicable in another way. He considers that the explanation of the miracle probably lies in the psychic state of the witnesses.
Eucken shows in general extreme reluctance to make a historical event a foundation of belief, and this no doubt accounts to some extent for his attitude with regard to miracles. He points out that "the founders of religion have themselves protested against a craving after sensuous signs," and that this protest "is no other than the sign of spiritual power and of a Divine message and greatness." He considers that the belief in, and craving for, sensuous miracle is an outcome of a "mid-level of religion," where belief is waning and spirituality declining. While, thus, he does not believe in sensuous miracle, he acknowledges and lays the greatest stress on one miracle—the presence of the Spiritual Life in man. It is, indeed, this miracle that renders others unnecessary.
In discussing the doctrine of the Incarnation, Eucken attempts to get at the inner meaning—the truth which the doctrine endeavours to express, and he finds this to consist in the fact of the ultimate union of the human and Divine, and this truth is one that we dare not renounce. He criticises the attempt that is made in Christianity to show that such union only obtained once in the course of history. Incarnation is not one historical event, but a spiritual process; not an article of belief, but a living experience of each spiritual personality.
He considers as injurious to religion in general the Christian conception of the Atonement. He believes that the idea that is to be expressed is that of the nearness of God to man in guilt and in suffering. In endeavouring to express this close intimacy the idea of suffering was transferred to God himself. The anthropomorphic idea of reconciliation and substitution thus arose, and this Eucken considers to have done harm. "The notion that God does not help us through His own will and power, but requires first of all His own feeling of pity to be roused, is an outrage on God and a darkening of the foundation of religion." So Eucken objects to the attempt to formulate the mystery into dogma. "All dogmatic formulation of such fundamental truths of religion becomes inevitably a rationalism and a treatment of the problem by means of human relationships, and according to human standards." "It is sufficient for the religious conviction to experience the nearness of God in human suffering, and His help in the raising of life out of suffering into a new life beyond all the insufficiency of reason. Indeed, the more intuitively this necessary truth is grasped, the less does it combine into a dogmatic speculation and the purer and more energetically is it able to work."
The conception of the Trinity is again an attempt to express the union of Divine and human, "the inauguration of the Divine Nature within human life." The dogma, however, involves ideas of a particular generation, and so threatens to become, and has indeed become, burdensome to a later age which no longer holds these ideas. Further, the doctrine of the Trinity has mixed up a fundamental truth of religion with abstruse philosophical speculations, and this has provided a stumbling-block rather than a help.
At the same time, Eucken lays the greatest stress on the personality of Jesus. He considers the personality of Jesus to be of more importance to Christianity than is the personality of its founder to any other religion. "Such a personality as Jesus is not the mere bearer of doctrines, or of a special frame of mind, but is a convincing fact, and proof of the Divine life, a proof at which new life can be kindled over anew." And again: "It is from this source that a great yearning has been implanted within the human breast ... a longing for a new life of love and peace, of purity and simplicity. Such a life, with its incomparable nature and its mysterious depths, does not exhaust itself through historical effects, but humanity can from hence ever return afresh to its inmost essence, and can strengthen itself ever anew through the certainty of a new, pure, and spiritual world over against the meaningless aspects of nature and over against the vulgar mechanism of a culture merely human." But while he would appreciate the depth and richness of the personality of Jesus, he protests against the worship of Jesus as divine, and the making of Him the centre of religion. The greatness of Christ is confined to the realm of humanity, and there is in all men a possibility of attaining similar heights.
Christianity is, in Eucken's view, much more closely bound up with historical events than any other religion, and it thus suffers more severe treatment at the hands of historical criticism than any other religion. Eucken considers such historical criticism to be of great value. In Christianity as in other religions we find the eternal not in its pure form, but mixed with the temporal and variable, and historical criticism will help in the separation of the temporal from the eternal elements. In so doing it does an immense service, for it frees religion from fixation to one special point of time, and enables us to regard it as ever developing and progressing to greater depths.
Eucken emphasises that the historical basis of Christianity is not Christianity itself, is not essentially religious; and he quotes Lessing, Kant, and Fichte to support him in his contention that a belief in such a historical basis is not necessary to religion, and may even prove harmful to it. The historical basis is, of course, useful as bringing out into clear relief the personality of Jesus, and the other great spiritual personalities associated in His work, and Eucken lays stress upon the use that history can be to Christianity in giving records of the experiences of great spiritual personalities in all ages, but it is important that the history is here a means to an end, and not an end in itself, and that the importance lies in the spiritual experience and not in the historical facts.
When one considers how little Eucken has to say concerning worship, and how little emphasis he places upon historical and doctrinal forms in religion, one wonders how it is he attaches so much importance to the functions of the Church. He points out that a Church is necessary to religion, that it seems to be the only way of making religion real and effective for man. "The Church seems indispensable in order to introduce and to hold at hand the new world and the new life to man in the midst of his ordinary existence; it is indispensable in order to fortify the conviction and to strengthen the energy in the midst of all the opposite collisions; it is indispensable in order to uphold an eternal truth and a universal problem in the midst of the fleetingness of the moment." In the past, however, much harm has been done to religion by the Church. This has arisen from several reasons. To begin with, it tends to narrow religion, which is concerned with life, to the realm of ideas, and to tie down religion by connecting it with a thought-system of a particular age. Further, the necessary mechanical routine, and the appointment of special persons to carry out this routine, tends to elevate the routine and these special persons to a far higher place than they should occupy. Again, spiritual things have been dragged into the service of personal ambition, and bound up with human interests. The most serious danger, however, is that religion, from being an inward matter, tends to become externalised.
Despite this, an organised Church cannot be dispensed with, and Eucken points out what changes are necessary to make the Church effective. One important point he makes clear, namely, that as the Church must speak to all, and every day, and not only to spiritually distinguished souls, and in moments of elevated feeling, then the teaching of the Church will always lag behind religion itself, and must be considered as an inadequate expression of it.
It is necessary that there should be no coercion with regard to men's attitude towards the Church, and men should be free to join this or that Church, or no Church at all.
Then there must be more freedom, movement, and individuality within the Church. What the Church holds as a final result of the experience of life cannot be expected as the confession of all, especially of the young. "How can every man and every child feel what such a mightily contrasted nature as Luther's with all its convulsive experiences felt?"
Then the Church must not so much teach this or that doctrine as point to the Spiritual Life, set forth the conditions of its development, and be the representative of the higher world. Thus, and thus only, Eucken thinks that the Church can fulfil its proper function, and avoid being a danger to religion.
Eucken's appreciation of Christianity is sincere. Viewing it from the standpoint of the Spiritual Life, he finds that it fulfils the conditions that religion should fulfil. It is based on freedom, and on the presence of the Divine in humanity, even to the extent of a complete union between them. The ideal of the Christian life is a personal life of pure inwardness, and of an ethical character. He speaks of the "flow of inner life by means of which Christianity far surpasses all other religions," and of the "unfathomable depth and immeasurable hope which are contained in the Christian faith."
In Christianity the life of Christ has a value transcending all time, and is a standard by which to judge all other lives. There is, too, in Christianity a complete transformation or break, which must take place before any progress or development can take place.
"There is no need of a breach with Christianity; it can be to us what a historical religion pre-eminently is meant to be—a sure pathway to truth, an awakener of immediate and intimate life, a vivid representation and realisation of an Eternal Order which all the changes of time cannot possess or destroy."
At the same time, there are changes necessary in the form of Christianity, if it is to answer to the demands of the age, and be the Absolute Religion. It must be shorn of temporary accretions, and must cast aside the ideas of any one particular age which have now been superseded. No longer can it retain the primitive view of nature and the world which formerly obtained, no longer must it take up a somewhat negative and passive attitude, but, realising that religion is a matter of the whole life, must energetically work itself out through all departments of life. It must remedy wrong, not merely endure it. It must proceed from a narrow and subjective point of view to a cosmic one, without at the same time losing sight of the fact that religion is an inward and personal matter. It must take account to the full of the value of man as man, and of the possibilities latent in him, and take account of his own activity in his salvation.
The Christian ideal of life must be a more joyous one, of greater spiritual power, and the idea of redemption must not stop short at redemption from evil, but must progress to a restoration to free and self-determining activity. Since an absolute religion is based on the spiritual life, the form in which it is clothed must not be too rigid—life cannot be bound within a rigid creed. With its form modified in this way, Eucken considers that Christianity may well be the Absolute Religion, and that not only we can be, but we must be Christians if life is to have for us the highest meaning and value.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION: CRITICISM AND APPRECIATION
We have attempted to enunciate the special problem with which Eucken deals, and to follow him in his masterly criticisms of the solutions that have been offered, in his further search for the reality in life, in his arguments and statement of the philosophy of the spiritual life, and finally in his profound and able investigation into the eternal truth that is to be found in religion. In doing so, we have only been able in a few cases to suggest points of criticism, and sometimes to emphasise the special merits of the work. It was necessary to choose between making a critical examination of a few points, and setting forth in outline his philosophy as a whole. It was felt that it would be more profitable for the average reader if the latter course were adopted. Thousands who have heard the name of Eucken and have read frequent references to him are asking, "What has Eucken really to say?" and we have attempted to give a systematic, if brief, answer to the question. Having done this it will be well to mention some of the main points of criticism that have been made, and to call attention again to some of the remarkable aspects of the contributions he has made to philosophy and religion.
Several critics complain of the obscurity of his writings, of his loose use of terms, and of his tendency to use freely such indefinite and abstruse terms as "The Whole," "The All," &c., and of his tendency to repeat himself. Of course, if he is guilty of these faults, and he certainly is to some extent, they are merely faults of style, and do not necessarily affect the truth or otherwise of his opinions. In the matter of clarity he is very variable; occasional sentences are brilliantly clear, others present considerable difficulty to the practised student. His more popular works, however, are much clearer and easier to understand than the two standard treatises on The Truth of Religion and Life's Basis and Life's Ideal. His tendency to repetition is by no means an unmixed evil, for even when he appears to be repeating himself, he is very often in reality expressing new shades of meaning, which help towards the better understanding of the first statements.
The slight looseness in the use of terms, and a certain inexactness of expression that is sometimes apparent, must of course not be exaggerated; it is by no means serious enough to invalidate his main argument. It gives an opportunity for a great deal of superficial criticism on the part of unsympathetic writers, which, however, can do little harm to Eucken's position. One has to remember that it is difficult to combine the fervour of a prophet with pedantic exactness, and that an inspired and profound philosopher cannot be expected to spend much time over verbal niceties.
Of course one would prefer absolute clarity and exactness, but we must guard against allowing the absence of these things to prejudice us against the profound truths of a philosophical position, which are not vitally affected by that absence.
Frequent criticism is directed towards the incompleteness of Eucken's philosophy. He does not introduce his philosophy with a systematic discussion of the great epistemological and ontological problems. Philosophers have often introduced their work in this way, and it has been customary to expect an introduction of the kind. To do so, however, would be quite out of keeping with Eucken's activistic position, as it would necessarily involve much intellectual speculation, and he does not believe that the problem of life can be solved by such speculation. It is unfortunate that he has so little to say concerning the world of matter. Beyond insisting upon the superiority of the spiritual life, which he calls the "substantial," over matter, which he calls the merely "existential," he tells us very little about the material world. Rightly or wrongly, thinkers are deeply interested in the merely existential, in the periphery of life, in the material world, but for the solution of this problem Eucken contributes little or nothing. His sole concern is the spiritual world, and although we should like an elaboration of his views on the mere periphery of life, we must not let the fact that he does not give it, lead us to undervalue his real contributions. Another serious incompleteness lies in the fact that he pays little attention to the psychological implications of his theories. Until he does this, his philosophy cannot be regarded as complete. Eucken, however, would be the last to claim that his solution is a finished or final one; he is content if his work is a substantial contribution to the final solution.
Objection has been taken to the fact that he starts upon his task with a definite bias in a certain direction. He candidly admits from the outset that his aim is to find a meaning for life, and in doing this he of course tacitly assumes that life has a deep and profound meaning. Strict scientists aver that the investigator must set out without prejudice, to examine the phenomena he observes; and Eucken's initial bias may form a fatal stumbling-block to the acceptance of his philosophy by these, or indeed, by any who are not disposed to accept this fundamental position. If we deny that life has a meaning, then Eucken has little for us; but if we are merely doubtful on the matter, the reading of Eucken will probably bring conviction.
Many critics point to the far-reaching assumptions he makes. He assumes as axiomatic certainties and insoluble mysteries the existence of the spiritual life in man, the union of the human and divine, and the freedom of the spiritual personalities, though in a sense dependent upon the Universal Spiritual Life. This of course does not mean that he is in the habit of making unjustifiable assumptions. This is far from being the case; on the contrary, he takes the greatest care in the matter of his speculative bases. There are some fundamental facts of life, however, which according to Eucken are proved to us by life itself; we feel they must be true, but they are not truths that can be reasoned about, nor proved by the intellect alone. These are the three great facts mentioned above, which, while not admitting of proof, must be regarded as certainties.
His contention that they cannot be reasoned about has led to the further charge of irrationalism. The question that has to be decided is, whether Eucken in emphasising the fact that great truths must be solved by life and action, is underestimating the part that intellect must play in life. The decision must be largely one of individual opinion. Many critics are of the opinion that he does lay too little stress upon the intellectual factor in life. In actual fact, however, the fault is more apparent than real, for Eucken does in fact reason and argue closely concerning the facts of life. The charge, too, is to some extent due to the fact that he continually attacks the over-emphasis on the intellectual that the people of his own race—the Germans—are apt to place. With the glorification of the intellect he has no sympathy, for he feels there is something higher and more valuable in life than thought—and that is action.
These are the main points of criticism that have been raised—the reader must judge for himself how seriously they should be regarded. But before arriving at a final opinion he must think again of the contributions Eucken has indubitably made to philosophy and religion, of which we shall again in brief remind him.
He has given us a striking examination of the various theories of life, and has ably demonstrated their inadequacy. He has displayed great scholarship in his search for the ultimate reality. He has found this reality in the universal life, and has urged the need for a break with the natural world in order to enter upon a higher life. He has traced the progress of the spiritual life, and has given us ultimately a bold vindication of human personality and of the freedom of the spiritual being.
He has raised philosophy from being mere discussions concerning abstract theories to a discussion of life itself. In this way philosophy becomes not merely a theory concerning the universe, nor merely a theory of life, but a real factor in life itself—indeed it becomes itself a life. Thus has he given to philosophy a higher ideal, a new urgency—by his continued emphasis upon the spiritual he has given to philosophy a nobler and a higher mission. He has placed the emphasis in general upon life, and has pointed out the inability of the intellect to solve all life's problems. He has given to idealistic philosophies a possible rallying-point, where theories differing in detail can meet on common ground. As one eminent writer says: "The depth and inclusiveness of Eucken's philosophy, the comprehensiveness of its substructure and its stimulating personal quality, mark it out as the right rallying-point for the idealistic endeavour of to-day."
And what does he give to religion? Many will reply that he has given us nothing that is not already in the Christian religion. Therein lies the value and strength of Eucken's contributions. He has given a striking vindication of the spiritual content of Christianity as against the effects of time changes. He has attempted to bring out the contrast between what is really vital, and what are merely temporary colourings and accretions. He makes many of the main elements of Christianity acceptable without the need of a historical basis or proof. Not only does he present the Christian position as a reasonable view of the problem of life, but as the only solution that can really solve the final problem. He has cleared the decks of all superfluous baggage, and has laid bare a firm basis for a practical, constructive endeavour.
He has given us in himself a profound believer in the inward and higher nature of man, and in the existence of the spiritual life. As one critic says: "The earnestness, depth and grandeur, humility and conscious choice of high ideals, have raised his work far above mere intellectual acuteness and minuteness."
In Eucken we have one of the greatest thinkers of the age—some would say the greatest—setting his life upon emphasising the spiritual at a time when the tendency is strongly in materialistic directions. He has gathered around him a number of able and whole-hearted disciples in various countries, and future ages may find in Eucken the greatest force in the revulsion of the twentieth century (that is already making itself felt) from the extreme materialistic position, to take religion up again, and particularly the Christian religion, as the only satisfying solution of humanity's most urgent problem.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
The English reader should first read:
The Meaning and Value of Life (A. & C. Black), which is a good introduction to Eucken's philosophy; and The Life of the Spirit (Williams & Norgate).
He can then proceed to study Eucken's three comprehensive and important works:
Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, in which he gives a detailed presentation of his philosophy (A. & C. Black). The Truth of Religion, in which he gives his ideas on religion (Williams & Norgate). The Problem of Human Life, in which he makes a searching analysis of the philosophies of the past (Fisher Unwin).
The student will be much helped in his study by the following books:
Eucken and Bergson, by E. Hermann (James Clark & Co.). Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life, by Professor W.R. Boyce Gibson (A. & C. Black).
When he has studied these he will probably be anxious to read other works of Eucken's, of which translations have already appeared, or are soon to appear.
INDEX
Absolute, the, 63 —— Freedom and the, 61, 62 —— Personality and the, 62, 63 —— and historical religion, chap. viii. —— religion, Christianity as the, 72
Activism, 41, 42
Atonement, the, 79
Bergson, 39
Buddhism, 70, 71
Characteristic Religion, 66, 67
Characteristics of a satisfactory solution of life, 16
Christ, as mediator, 74 —— Personality of, 80 —— Value of life of, 83
Christian Church, 81, 82
Christianity, and historical bases, 80, 81 —— Appreciation of, 83 —— as absolute religion, 72 —— highest form of religion, 71, 72
Conversion, 57, 73
Doubt, 76
Empiricism, 36, 37
Eternal and transient in religion and Christianity, 72, 73 —— truth contrasted with its temporary expression, 44, 45
Eucken, assumptions made by, 88 —— bias, 87 —— charge of irrationalism, 88, 89 —— contributions to philosophy and religion, 90, 91 —— faults of style, 86 —— Incompleteness of philosophy of, 87 —— Special excellences of philosophy of, 89
Evil, 51
Faith, 76
Freedom, ascent to, 59 —— and the absolute, 61, 62 —— and naturalism, 26
God, is God a person? 63, 64 —— Nature of, 63, 64
Historical and absolute religion, chap. viii. —— bases of Christianity, 80, 81
History and philosophy, 43-49 —— and religion, 17, 18
Idealistic presuppositions of socialism and individualism, 31, 48
Ideas, power of, 46
Immanent idealism as a solution of the problem of life, 19-22
Immediacy, the new, 58
Immortality, 60, 77
Incarnation, 78
Independence of the spiritual life, 52, 53
Individualism, and personality, 59, 62 —— as a solution of the problem of life, 26-32 —— idealistic presuppositions of, 31, 48
Irrationalism, charge of, 88, 89
James, William, 39, 40
Law, religions of, 69, 70
Life, independence of the spiritual, 52 —— spiritual, relation of, to natural life, 52-54 —— —— superiority over natural life, 52-54 —— The spiritual, 14 —— The universal spiritual, 44, 49, chaps. v., vi., vii. (vii. especially).
Maeterlinck, 44
Man, natural and spiritual, 53, 54 —— transcending the material, 46
Mediation, 74
Mediator, Christ as, 74
Methods of Eucken, 14, 15
Mind, limits of, 52
Miracle, 77
Mysticism, 75
Naturalism and freedom, 26 —— as a solution of the problem of life, 22-26 —— its own disproof, 25
Natural life, relation to spiritual life, 52-54 —— —— Superiority of spiritual over, 52-54 —— man and spiritual man, 53, 54
Nature, limits of, 52 —— of God, 63, 64
Negative movement, the, 57, 73
New immediacy, the, 58
Noeological position, the, 50
Pantheism, 20, 51, 56
Past, the, not irrevocable, 44, 73
Personality and individualism, 59, 62 —— and the absolute, 62, 63 —— gaining of, 54, 59 —— of Christ, 80 —— of God, 63, 64
Philosophy and history, 43-49 —— of life, 13 —— problems of, 10, 11
Pragmatism, 40, 41
Prayer, 75
Problem, Eucken's special, 12-14
Problems of philosophy, 10, 11
Purpose of Eucken's investigation, 13 —— of religion, 65, 66
Rationalism, 37-39
Redemption, 73
Religion and history, 17, 18 —— and human activity, 18 —— and science, 19 —— as solution of problem of life, 16, 19 —— Characteristic, 66, 67 —— Christianity as highest form of, 71, 72 —— Christianity as the absolute, 72 —— Essential characteristics of, 65, 66 —— Eternal and transient in, 72, 73 —— Eucken's contributions to, 90, 91 —— Historical and absolute, chap. viii. —— of law, 69, 70 —— of redemption, 69, 70 —— Purpose of, 65, 66 —— Universal, 66 —— what is it? 64, 65
Resurrection, the, 77
Revelation, 75
Science, and religion, 17
Socialism, as a solution of the problem of life, 26-32 —— idealistic presuppositions of, 31, 48
Spiritual life, 14 —— —— Independence of the, 52 —— —— Relation of, to natural life, 52-54 —— —— Superiority of, over material and mental, 52-54 —— —— The universal, 47-49, and chaps. v., vi., and vii. (vii. especially)
Spiritual man and natural man, 53, 54
Trinity, the, 79
Truth, 44, 45 —— another search for, chap. iii.
Universal Religion, 66 —— spiritual life, 47-49, and chaps, v., vi., and vii. (vii. especially)
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