This system of extortion and tyranny usually continued until the Porte could no longer refuse to listen to the call for redress, and in such cases intriguers for the succession were only too ready to take up the cry, and even to exaggerate the crimes of the reigning prince. The result was that one by one they were deposed, and often recalled to Constantinople, only to be disgraced, exiled, or executed. According to the historical records, there were eleven distinct hospodars in each principality between 1716 and 1768; in Wallachia the government was changed twenty-one, and in Moldavia seventeen times. In one year (1731) Constantine Mavrocordato ruled twice, and Michael Racovica once; the former is noted as having reigned six times; the latter was re-elected in 1741, and was eventually exiled to Mitylene. Charles Ghika (1758) was exiled to Cyprus; Stephen Racovica (1765) was strangled by order of the Porte; and so on.

But although the rulers were changed so frequently, the system not only continued, but became more and more demoralising to the whole nation. For a time the clergy were content to bleed without drawing blood in their turn, but at length they, too, began to extort money from rich and poor alike, in order to meet the demands upon them, and prostituted the sacred offices of religion to gain their ends. Another terrible result of the Phanariote rule was the seizure by the officials of the Porte of Roumanian men and women, the former to replace those who had fallen in the wars between the Turks and Russians; and the best blood of the country was sacrificed in a cause in which it had no interest. The moral degradation of the boyards also became deeper and deeper. Many turned renegades, and adopted the Mussulman faith, partly from servility, often to save themselves from being condemned to death. Others pursued that course that they might not be harassed by the Turkish officials, and others again because the oriental dress pleased them, and they desired to indulge in the practice of polygamy. Fathers educated their sons in every kind of deceit and hypocrisy to minister to their advancement in life, teaching them how to approach the dominant seigneurs and ingratiate themselves in their favour, whilst, in the eyes of the common people, the boyards had sunk so low that they had earned for themselves the name of 'sleeping dogs.' The women were even worse than the men. The height of their ambition was to form advantageous alliances without reference to their happiness in after life; the marriage tie was treated with the utmost indifference, and the clergy were often compelled, much against their will, to grant divorces in order to retain their offices and influence.[161]

So much for the dark side of the Phanariote rule; and it is much to be regretted that all modern historians have contented themselves with looking at its unfavourable aspect, and have sought to shift all the sins and errors of the period upon the shoulders of the Greek princes. It is not our intention to follow their example, for we believe that the government of the Greek hospodars was by no means an unmixed evil. The modern descendants of those men still occupy honourable positions in Roumania, but these have little to say in their defence; indeed we have heard Greeks express the opinion that it would be more creditable to them if they were to lay bare the exaggerations of evil, and bring into prominence the better traits in the character of their ancestry.[162] That they were not all tyrants and extortioners is certain, although many, especially the earlier ones, were only too faithful servants of the Porte who may have played their part con amore in remembrance of the massacre of their ancestors, and in conformity with the customs of the period. But amongst them were brave, religious, charitable, and learned men, who contributed to raise the Roumanians from a condition of barbarism to one of comparative civilisation. Of this we have evidence in the law reforms, imperfect as they were, introduced by Constantine Mavrocordato; in the buildings and charitable foundations of Ypsilanti and Gregory Ghika in both Principalities (between 1768-1778); in the courage of the latter, who paid with his life the penalty of serving his adopted country; and of Nicholas Mavrojeni (1786-1790), whose boyards were too cowardly to follow him in the defence of their country against a Russian invasion.

The last-named is rather a notorious incident in Roumanian history, and some writers have devoted pages to the narrative. It appears that Nicholas had received instructions from the Porte to raise a force and set himself in motion against the combined Russians and Austrians who menaced Wallachia. He thereupon assembled the boyards and called upon them to take up arms. Too cowardly, in the opinion of certain writers, or distrusting the prince, according to others, each excused himself on some flimsy pretext, whereupon Nicholas, indignant and furious, called upon one of his attendants to bring forth thirty horses, which were soon standing caparisoned in the court-yard. The prince invited his boyards to descend, and when they were arrived below, 'Now,' he cried, 'to horse!' They maintained a sullen silence, however, and no one moved. Casting a look of contempt upon them, he turned round to the horses, and, addressing one after the other, he cried, 'I make you Ban; you, Grand Vornic; you, Grand Logothet;' and so on, until he had exhausted all the offices of the State. Then, turning again to his cowardly boyards, he reminded them of the deeds of their ancestors, of Mircea, Vlad, and Michael, and denounced them as women, puppets, worse than eunuchs. Several he ordered into exile; while others, stung with shame by his taunts, mounted and followed him to victory.

This is the story of how Nicholas Mavrojeni is said to have ennobled his horses; but, if the reader wishes to hear how, after disputing every yard of ground with the invaders, he was rewarded by the Porte with an ignominious death, we must refer him to the pages of the historian.

[Footnote 159: Vaillant, at vol. ii, pp. 219-220 and 224-226, gives some interesting details of receipts and expenditure. In one place (p. 225) he gives a list of 'presents paid by the principality of Moldavia.' The amounts arc stated in piastres, which he says were then worth 2 fr. 50 c. One item is 'secret presents at Constantinople 250,000 piastres,' whereas the tribute was only 65,000! The list appears to include the whole expenses of the prince and princess and some military and State expenditure, the total being 1,162,267 piastres, or, according to Vaillant, about 116,200l., an enormous sum in those days (1769).]

[Footnote 160: In Vaillant's list referred to, the charge for the dresses of the princess is put down at 22,908 piastres, or 2,290l., against 36,000 piastres, or 3,600l., the entire expenses of the palace. The list shows that the prince kept many Turkish soldiers, musicians, &c., in his service, and had borrowed large sums in Constantinople before acquiring the hospodarship, as there is an item of 68,620 piastres for interest thereon.]

[Footnote 161: This phase in the Phanariote rule still rests as a blight upon Roumanian society, and the causes of the laxity of the marriage tie and of divorces are to a large extent the same as formerly. Young men of the upper classes who have been nurtured in affluence find themselves unable to indulge in the luxuries to which they have been accustomed upon their limited incomes. They therefore frequently marry women who are much older than themselves, but are possessed of large pecuniary means. Neither cares for the other; they go their own ways, with the usual unfortunate results. If the reader refers to the statistics of the country, he will find that in 1880 there were 3,891 divorce causes set down for trial, and that the number of divorces legally granted or judged for the six years previously varied from 760 to 929 annually.]

[Footnote 162: Zallony tells us that amongst the modern Greek families the Mavrocordatos and Mavrojeni originally came from the Isle of Miconos (Archipelago); Ghika is of Albanian origin; Racovica and Manolvoda, Asia Minor; Ypsilanti and Morousy, Trebizonde; Soutzo, Bulgaria; Caragia, Ragusa Canzerli, Constantinople, &c.]

VI.

Nothing can be more dreary and wearisome than to wade through an account of the wars between Russia and the Sublime Porte from the accession of the Phanariote rulers down to the Crimean campaign of 1853-6, and yet, for any but Roumanian readers, the history of the country contains little else of interest during that period. There are two aspects of these struggles, however, which devastated the unfortunate Principalities almost as much as the incursions of the barbarians, that are well worthy of our consideration. The first is the tenacity and perseverance with which the Czars, one after the other, sought to tighten their grasp upon the Principalities, with ultimate aims upon Constantinople; the second, the occasional efforts which were made by a few patriots, backed up not so much by the boyards as by the common people, to relieve the country from foreign domination, whether Mussulman, Russian, or Austrian—for the last-named nation also sought to gain a foothold in the land.

Let us briefly review the leading events of the period referred to, and consider their bearing upon Roumania of to-day. After the unsuccessful campaign of Peter the Great in which the voivodes, Cantemir and Brancovano, were enlisted on the side of the Russians, the latter made no serious attempt to interfere with the government of the Principalities until about the year 1735, when, under the Empress Anne, and in alliance with the German Emperor Charles VI., they endeavoured to expel the Turks, and partially succeeded in doing so. After two campaigns, however, the allies were ingloriously defeated at Belgrade; and by the treaty of that name (1739 A.D.) they were not only compelled to restore all their conquests, but even to relinquish some of the territory of which the Porte had been deprived in the seventeenth century. The hospodars who ruled at that time in Wallachia and Moldavia were Constantine Mavrocordato and Gregory Ghika.[163]

About twenty-five years later the Russians returned to the charge under Catherine IV., and this time with better success. Their operations extended over about six years, and the war commenced in 1768 by an act of hostility on the part of the Sultan, provoked by a Russian propaganda. In 1769-70 the Muscovites overran Moldavia and Wallachia; the former, it is said by some, with the connivance of the reigning prince, Constantine Mavrocordato III.; and, having defeated the Turks in several pitched battles, and even penetrated into Bulgaria, they actually ruled in the country until 1774 A.D., and introduced many useful reforms. Then, however, owing to the interference of Maria Theresa, Empress of Germany, who, as Queen of Hungary, herself claimed rights of suzerainty over Wallachia, and largely also in consequence of the passive resistance of the Porte, the Czarina agreed to the Treaty of Kainardji, by which, under conditions favourable to the Principalities, they were once more restored to the Porte. Amongst the conditions were a complete amnesty; the restitution of lands and goods to their rightful owners; freedom of worship for Christians, and liberty to build or restore places of worship; the privilege of sending two charges d'affaires (one from each principality) to Constantinople; and the right on the part of the Court of St. Petersburg to speak in favour of the Principalities in cases of complaint, with the further provision that such remonstrances should be treated with the respect due from one friendly power to another.

In 1777 the Porte ceded Bucovine to Austria. The signature of the ruling Hospodar of Moldavia, Gregory Ghika, was necessary to validate the cession, but that patriotic 'Phanariote' refused to append it, whereupon he was deposed and cruelly murdered by the creatures of the Porte. We have already referred to his patriotism and its results.

In 1781-2, by an arrangement with the Porte, Catherine II. secured the right to send consuls to Bucarest and Jassy, who were maintained and served in great state at the cost and provision of the Principalities, and were authorised to exercise a certain control over their public income and expenditure for the protection of the inhabitants. This new influence was secured by Russia through the complaints of the Roumanians in regard to the rapacity of the Turkish rulers; through her growing influence; and, last but not least, her threatening attitude on the Turkish frontiers. In 1788 an alliance was again formed between Russia and Austria, having for its object the dispossession of the Porte in the Principalities. This was the occasion on which Nicholas Mavrojeni is said to have ennobled his horses. He was afterwards defeated at Calafat, and after several reverses the Porte was glad to conclude treaties of peace, first with the Austrians and then (1792) with Russia at Jassy. By this treaty the Russians gained territory and secured the promise from the Porte of a more merciful government in Moldo-Wallachia, the condition of which at that time is represented to have been desperate, owing to the Phanariote exactions and the frequent change of hospodars.

Consequent upon the bitter complaints of the inhabitants the Russians again interfered in 1802, forcing the Porte to extend the duration of the rulership to seven years and to repress other abuses. About this time the first English Consul was appointed. Vaillant refers to him as 'Sir Francis,' and charges the English Government with having sent him to co-operate with Russia against Turkey.[164] A French diplomatist also appeared at Bucarest, and, whatever part these representatives may have played in the matter, it is certain that in 1806 another Russo-Turkish war broke out. The Russians under General Michaelson overran the Principalities, held possession of the country until 1812, and then only restored it after the peace of Bucarest, by which the Russians gained the whole of Bessarabia (the river Pruth being fixed as the boundary), with the ports of Ismail, Khilia, and other places at the embouchure of the Danube.

[Footnote 163: This is not the Gregory Ghika already referred to. Members of the different families were distinguished by the affix I. II. III. &c.]

[Footnote 164: Who this 'Sir Francis' was, we have not been able to ascertain.]

VII.

Shortly after this time, the Hellenic regeneration, or the Hetaerie as it was called, commenced in the south-east of Europe. This movement, which liberated Greece from the Ottoman yoke, brought much misery but ultimate gain to Roumania. In 1821 there reigned in Wallachia Alexander Soutzo III., and in Moldavia Michael Soutzo III., two Phanariotes who, true to their traditions, had pressed upon the people with their exactions until they were ripe for a revolt. This took place in Wallachia under Theodor (or, as he is sometimes called, Tudor) Vladimiresco, an ex-officer in the Russian army (indeed, Russia is said to have fomented the Greek revolt everywhere); whilst in Moldavia a Greek called Alexander Ypsilanti joined with the reigning hospodar to drive the Turks out of that principality. Vladimiresco soon succeeded in establishing himself in Bucarest, where he ruled supreme for a short time, and whence he sent representations to the Porte complaining of the conduct of the Phanariotes, requiring their recall and the reinstatement of the native hospodars, as well as a restitution of the rights of the people under the old 'capitulations.' The reply to this was the entrance into Wallachia of a considerable army under the Pasha of Silistria, whereupon Vladimiresco withdrew towards the mountains and stationed himself at Pitesti. Ypsilanti, meanwhile, had also approached Bucarest with his forces, but was unable to come to an understanding with his companion in revolt. When he heard of the withdrawal of Vladimiresco and the march of the Turkish Pasha, he believed, or professed to believe, that the former was about to betray him, and the scene of Basta and Michael was acted over again. Ypsilanti sent one of his lieutenants with a strong escort who decoyed Vladimiresco out of his tent by vain promises, carried him off by force, and then murdered him with great barbarity.

After the assassination of his rival, Ypsilanti, who claimed to represent the movement for Greek regeneration, found himself face to face with a well-organised Turkish army, whilst his own, consisting of enthusiastic Greeks and volunteers from various countries, was inferior in numbers and comparatively undisciplined. Holding discretion to be the better part of valour, he retired before the enemy, who, however, brought him to bay and offered him battle at Dragosani on the river Oltu. Here enthusiasm and devotion to their cause inspired the 'sacred battalion,' as the Greeks called themselves, with unwonted courage, and at first the Turks were unable to resist their impetuous charge with the bayonet. Ypsilanti was, however, no general, and, failing to profit by the bravery of his troops, the advantage was lost; the Turks rallied, a rout ensued, and Ypsilanti fled, leaving his lieutenants to resist for a time and then to die gloriously in defence of their liberties. He escaped across the Carpathians into Austria, was seized by order of the Government, imprisoned in the fortress of Munkacs, and some writers say he was afterwards executed.

VIII.

Two important results for Roumania resulted from the Greek rising. The first was the termination of the Phanariote rule and the restoration of the native princes, Gregory Ghika being appointed Prince of Wallachia, and John Stourdza of Moldavia. The reason of this change was that the Greek hospodars had made common cause with the insurgents; and we cannot do better than close this eventful period in the history of the country than by summarising the Phanariote rule in the words of Consul Wilkinson, who says: 'From the period at which this system was introduced to the beginning of the present century, being a space of ninety years, Wallachia alone has passed through the hands of forty different princes independently of the time when it was occupied by the Russians from 1770 to 1774, by the Austrians and Russians from 1789 to 1792, and by the Russians again from 1806 to 1812.' 'Few of them died of natural death, and the Turkish scimetar was perhaps frequently employed with justice amongst them. In a political point of view, the short reigns of most of these princes offer nothing of importance or interest to deserve a place in history.'[165] From this brief judgment of one who lived at the time of their extinction, our readers will see that we have not dealt uncharitably with the regime of the Phanariotes.

Another of the results of the Greek insurrection was the inevitable Russo-Turkish war. Then followed the occupation of the country by the Russians; what Carlyle might have called the hand-shaking of incompatible tyrannies; and eventually the Peace of Adrianople, to which city the Russian arms had penetrated (1829). The stipulations of that treaty may be summed up in a few words. A large indemnity to Russia, with continued occupation until it should be liquidated, and a Muscovite protectorate of the Principalities; the suzerainty and an annual tribute for the Porte, and complete autonomy with the appointment of life-long hospodars for the Principalities. By a subsequent ukase known as the 'Reglement Organique,' the Court of St. Petersburg further expressed its wishes in regard to the internal government of the Principalities; and this document having been confirmed by the Porte after great procrastination, the Russian forces were withdrawn from the Principalities in 1834, and two princes of the houses of Stourdza and Ghika were again appointed hospodars.

[Footnote 165: P. 44.]

IX.

We have said that two phases in the history of this period are interesting to the historian—the gradual encroachments of Russia on the one hand, and on the other the patriotic efforts of the nationalists to secure independence. With the Greek rising of 1821-2, and the prospect of complete liberty, a new spirit was awakened, which took the form first of a national intellectual regeneration, and then of what proved to be an unsuccessful struggle for independence. With both these movements the name of John Heliad Radulesco (known in history as Heliade or Eliad) is inseparably connected as litterateur and patriot. His name first appears conspicuously about the year 1826, when, in conjunction with Constantine Golesco, a returned exile and friend of the unfortunate Vladimiresco, and with the concurrence and support of the reigning hospodar, Gregory Ghika, he endeavoured to revive the national language, which had been displaced by Greek in consequence of the long-continued Phanariote rule. He was himself a poet of no mean order, and by his national songs he stirred the hearts of the people. But poetry did not absorb his whole attention. An able man of science, for that day, he himself imparted instruction in geography, logic, and mathematics, in the colleges of which he promoted the establishment.[166] Of these one was founded on the remains of an ancient convent at St. Sava, the other at Craiova, and concurrently with this effort, to promote collegiate education primary and normal schools were also established. But the march of enlightenment did not end here; national journals and a national theatre were included in the scheme of the patriots. The hospodars, too, performed their share of the general advancement. They founded hospitals, promoted agriculture, welcomed back those who had emigrated before the scourge of war, and sought by every means in their power to give security to the national industry.

But the unfortunate geographical position of the Principalities, which made them the battle-field of the two contending powers of the Orient, still militated against the complete liberation of Roumania, and her efforts at regeneration were watched with jealousy by both her powerful semi-barbarous neighbours. The period soon arrived, however, when, for a time at least, the intrigues of emperors, sultans, and courts were unavailing, and when crowns were at a decided discount—the great European convulsion of 1848. Then, when the French monarchy fell and the rulers of other European States fled from their dominions into a more or less abiding exile, the awakening of nationalities extended to Moldo-Wallachia, and caused a patriotic rising far more hopeful and for a time more successful than the revolt of 1821; and the Principalities would no doubt have been permanently freed from foreign domination had not disunion amongst the national leaders once more prevented such a desirable issue. In the year of revolution, Nicholas I. being the Czar, and Abdul Medjid (the 'Sick Man') Sultan, simultaneous risings took place in the Principalities. The one in Moldavia was headed by a number of leading boyards, who at first contented themselves with petitioning for the restoration of their liberties. They were seized by order of the hospodar, Michael Stourdza, and sent into confinement, but most of them escaped and returned to reorganise the revolt. In the same year, however, as we shall hear presently, the Russians invaded the principality, entered Jassy, and quelled the revolution.

In Wallachia the rising assumed more serious proportions. It was led by Heliad and the brothers Golesco, George Maghiero, a Greek by descent, Tell, Chapka, a priest, and by three young men, two of whom will hereafter be spoken of in connection with the Roumania, of to-day—Demetrius and John Bratiano and C. Rosetti. Although all these men were united in the desire to liberate their fatherland from the heavy burdens with which it was oppressed, they disagreed as to the best mode of proceeding. Long experience had taught them that between the two fires of St. Petersburg and Constantinople there was little hope of escape, and some leaned to the former, others to the latter power, whilst the younger men, the Bratianos and Rosetti, looked anxiously to Western Europe and its advanced civilisation for succour. The hospodar Bibesco soon yielded before the storm, and fled to Kronstadt in Transylvania. A provisional government was formed, dissolved, and formed again.[167] Great assemblages of the people took place at Bucarest; proclamations were issued and oaths administered and taken; but the whole thing eventually resolved itself into a 'Princely Lieutenancy,' under the suzerainty of the Porte. This was at first recognised by the Turkish general, Suleiman Pasha, who along with Omar Pasha had entered Wallachia with Turkish armies; for it suited the policy of the Porte to look favourably upon a rising which was chiefly directed against Russian influence in the Principalities. But the Muscovite Cabinet was not easily outwitted. Nicholas witnessed the rising with equal satisfaction, for it justified a new intervention in the affairs of Moldo-Wallachia. He issued a proclamation, calling the revolution the work of a turbulent minority whose ideas of government were plagiarised from the socialistic and democratic propaganda of Europe. This proclamation was followed by a march of the Russians into the disturbed provinces as 'liberators.' The nationalist leaders were glad to escape to France, Omar Pasha having occupied and plundered Bucarest on the Russian approach, and a convention—that of Balta-Liman—was entered into between Russia and Turkey, which deprived the Principalities of all their electoral rights, substituted a divan, or council of ministers, and reserved to the two contracting powers the nomination of hospodars. Russia, however, managed to get the lion's share even in this negotiation, for, contrary to the understanding, she succeeded in appointing both hospodars, Stirbei in Wallachia, and Alexander Ghika in Moldavia, thus largely increasing her influence in both Principalities.

[Footnote 166: Neigebaur (pp. 327 et seq.) gives a long list of important works published in the Principalities up to his time (1854), and amongst them will be found a large number either composed or published by Heliad on various subjects in theology, philology, grammar, history, mathematics, and medicine, besides original poems, translations, and dramas.]

[Footnote 167: Regnault says (p. 437): 'Twice in three weeks the provisional government had fallen, first through an audacious coup de main, then through a spontaneous act of weakness. Twice the people had reinstated it, setting a resolute example for the conduct of their leaders. It is worth noting that this nation, new to political life of which the birth is manifested by courage and wisdom, retired before its leaders when they triumphed, raised them when they fell, giving alternate evidences of energy and moderation.']

X.

Much has been said here, and a great deal more in the works of those French writers who were unfriendly towards Russia, concerning her intrigues and encroachments in the Principalities, but it is only fair to admit that her interference invariably resulted in the ameliorating of their condition. This the French writers sometimes grudgingly admit, and the facts of history clearly prove. In nearly every instance Russian interference meant relief to the peasantry and enforced moderation in the rulers. In 1710, when Cantemir III. of Moldavia sought the aid of Peter the Great, it was 'to put an end to the spoliations of the Porte.' In 1769 Constantine Mavrocordato entered into secret relations with Catherine II., and after the Russian invasion the Porte was compelled by the Treaty of Kainardji to grant autonomy to the Principalities, and to diminish its exactions; in 1802, through Russian remonstrances, abuses were suppressed and the evil-doers punished. In 1812 the chicanery of the rulers and the exactions of the Porte had brought the people to the brink of starvation; the Russians interfered, and put a limit to the demands of the Porte; but after their departure, we are told, the current value of agricultural produce again fell so low that it was impossible for the cultivator to live, and this circumstance, along with the renewed exactions of the rulers and officials, once more brought ruin upon the peasantry. In 1820 Wilkinson, who, it must be remembered, was Consul at Bucarest, and who was far from being enamoured of Russia, says: 'During my residence in the Principalities several instances have occurred within my observation of very active exertion on the part of Russia to keep the accustomed system of extortion in restraint, and to relieve the inhabitants from oppression, and such exertion has certainly on many occasions prevented the condition of the inhabitants from becoming worse.'[168]

But that the ultimate design of Russia was to secure and incorporate the Principalities as part of her general scheme of aggression, there can be no doubt in the mind of anyone who has followed her operations previous to the Crimean campaign. That and subsequent events may be said to belong to contemporary history; but we must briefly refer to such incidents of the war as affected the Danubian Principalities and laid the foundation of Roumanian freedom. The Emperor Nicholas had picked a wolf-and-lamb quarrel with the Porte, of which the ostensible ground was the protection of subjects professing the Greek Catholic faith in the 'holy places;' and little expecting, perhaps little caring, that he would arouse the jealousy of France and England, he had sent an ultimatum to the Porte, demanding the right of intervention in conformity with the Treaty of Kainardji, threatening the invasion and occupation of the Danubian Principalities in default of immediate acquiescence. Not having received the satisfaction he required, he ordered General Gortschakoff to cross the Pruth and to take possession of and hold the Principalities. This was done in the month of July 1853. In September the Turkish Commander-in-Chief on the Danube demanded an immediate evacuation of those territories, and, failing compliance, war was declared. For some time the Russians, fearing the enmity of Austria, which had massed troops on the Wallachian frontier, remained on the defensive, but in October Omar Pasha assumed the aggressive, sending a small force across the Danube at Vidin, and it was thought that the straggle between the contending forces would take place in 'Lesser Wallachia.' Omar Pasha, however, either intended this as a feint, or changed his plan, for he soon afterwards occupied strong positions on the Danube at Turtukai and Oltenitza, between Silistria and Rustchuk, and was there attacked by a Russian force, which he succeeded in repulsing. No results followed this encounter; the Russians retreated towards Bucarest, and the Turks fell back across the Danube into Bulgaria.

In February 1854 the French and English Governments sent an ultimatum to Russia, requiring her to evacuate the Principalities, and in March they declared war against her. In June Austria followed suit, so far as demanding the evacuation of Moldo-Wallachia, and received permission from the Porte to drive the Russians out of the Principalities, and occupy them with her troops. She, however, contented herself during the continuance of the war with accumulating forces on her frontiers, and no doubt it was this threatening attitude which at length compelled Russia to evacuate them. Meanwhile active hostilities were proceeding between Omar Pasha and Gortschakoff. In the early part of 1854, the Russians having met with a reverse at Cetate, near Calafat, the Russian army was ordered to invade Turkey, and, having succeeded in crossing into the Dobrudscha at Galatz, Braila, and Ismail, it was deemed necessary to capture Silistria as a strategic post, in order to ensure the safety of the advancing army. In May 1854 the Russians attacked that fortress unsuccessfully, and after they had attempted to storm it four times, the Turks (in June) assumed the offensive, and made a sally, during which one of the Russian generals was slain. In the same month Nicholas, finding himself threatened by the Western allies in the Black Sea, and fearing to make an open enemy of Austria, whose forces were constantly increasing on her frontier, gave orders for raising the siege of Silistria, and subsequently for the entire withdrawal of his troops from the Principalities. This was not, however, effected until July, nor before the Russians had sustained another defeat from the Turks at Giurgevo.

Then it was that the army was completely withdrawn, the Turkish vanguard entered Bucarest, and, says one of the historians of the war, 'the Wallachian nobles celebrated a Te Deum in the metropolitan church to commemorate the restoration of Turkish supremacy—the same boyards who, in 1829, kissed the hands of the Russians who had freed them from the Turkish yoke.'

As for the hospodars. Stirbei of Wallachia, and Alexander Ghika of Moldavia, they had retired for safety to Vienna shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, and remained there until September, when the Austrians occupied the country with the approval of the Porte. They then returned for a short period, but Stirbei again abdicated permanently a month afterwards. The Roumanians wore compelled by the Russians to serve in their armies as long as they occupied the country, but a Turkish amnesty relieved them from the consequences of this procedure.

The military operations of the contending Powers external to the Principalities have an interest for us only in their results. After the termination of the Crimean campaign, when Russia was compelled to sue for peace, the Treaty of Paris was concluded, and it contained stipulations of vital consequence to Moldo-Wallachia.

These stipulations may be summarised as follows:—The neutralisation of the navigation of the Danube, which was placed under the control of a European Commission; the cession by Russia to Turkey (and thus to Moldavia) of a portion of Bessarabia at the embouchure of the Danube; and the re-organisation, on an entirely autonomic basis, but still under the suzerainty of the Porte, of the Danubian Principalities. In the year 1857, before the deliberations of the European Powers had given permanent effect to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, a movement was actively proceeding in both Principalities, the object of which was to effect their union under one governing head.

The exiles of 1848, who had fled to Paris, and there endeavoured by their published works to keep alive the spirit of independence in Roumania, now returned to their native country and renewed an active agitation at home. Amongst those who then and thereafter strove for the liberties of their country were John Bratiano, C.A. Rosetti, two members of the family of Ghika, Demetrius Stourdza, John Cantacuzene, and other laymen, and Golesco and others of the military profession. These so far attained their end that, after a great deal of idle intervention on the part of Turkey and the other European Powers, most of whom were intriguing for their own hands rather than for the welfare of the Principalities, they succeeded in obtaining from a conference of the Powers at Paris, in 1858, a kind of agreement, which, whilst it insisted upon the retention in each Principality of a separate prince or hospodar, gave to each an elective parliament, and admitted of a partial fusion, under a kind of central commission, for the 'united Principalities.' This was a species of compromise which was no doubt satisfactory to the guaranteeing Powers, with their conflicting interests, but was not at all to the taste of the young nation struggling for union and independence. By a clever and perfectly justifiable manoeuvre the people of Moldavia and Wallachia proceeded to supplement the deliberations and decisions of the Powers, by each choosing the same ruler, Captain John Couza, and, in spite of protestations from the Porte, which refused to recognise this as a lawful proceeding, Couza, under the title of Alexander John I., mounted the united throne as Prince of Roumania. In 1861, chiefly in consequence of the recommendation of the guaranteeing Powers, the Porte assented to the union.

[Footnote 168: P. 183.]

XI.

Prince Couza was born at Galatz in 1820. He was of an old boyard family, and was educated at Jassy, Athens, and Paris. In 1845 he married Helena, the daughter of another boyard, Rosetti, and subsequently held high offices in the State. His princess was a patriotic lady who founded and supported many charitable institutions, amongst others the orphan asylum known as the Asyle Helene, of which we have already spoken; and had her husband recognised her virtues, and remembered his own obligations to her; he would probably have still sat upon the throne of Roumania. For there is no doubt that during the earlier part of his reign, which lasted from 1859 to 1866, he enjoyed the cordial support of all parties in the State; but he soon endeavoured to render himself absolute, and in 1864 he effected a coup d'etat, very similar to the one which has recently been perpetrated by the Prince of Bulgaria, in all probability under the same tutelage. In his case, however, the nation refused to submit to such an arbitrary proceeding, and although it succeeded for a time, that, coupled with his avarice, gross immorality, and general misgovernment, led to his ultimate downfall. In 1864 the monasteries were secularised, that is to say, they were claimed as State property, a proceeding which was sanctioned by the guaranteeing Powers against payment of an indemnity. In 1865 a complete reform took place in the relations between the landed proprietors and the peasantry, who were freed from feudal obligations and became part owners of the soil. Of this reform we have already spoken at length. As we have said, however, the personal actions of the Prince, who enriched himself at the expense of a still suffering country, sought by every means in his power to obtain absolute rule, and led an openly immoral life, against which his advisers protested and warned him in vain, led to what some have called a conspiracy, but which was an uprising of all the leading representatives of the people, lay and military, who united to drive him from the throne.

The so-called abdication, but really the deposition, of Prince Couza, as it was narrated at the time, was effected as follows. The conspiracy being ripe, on February 11 [23], 1866, a sufficiently strong body of military, acting under the orders of General Golesco and others, surrounded the palace in which the Prince was lodged, and a number of officers then forced their way inside. On entering the palace they proceeded to the room of the Prince, arresting on their way thither M. L——[169] and two officers of the body-guard. Before they forced the door the Prince, it seems, had a presentiment of some danger, and cried from within, 'Don't enter, for I shall fire.' Before the sentence was finished, however, the door was burst open, and he saw before him the conspirators with revolvers in their hands. He was cowardly enough (says the narrative) not to fire once. It is possible that if he had known that they had an order not to fire, whatever might happen, he would have killed one or other of them.[170] Or, perhaps, the presence of Madame ——[171] prevented him from offering resistance, for she was there undressed.

'What do you want?' he asked, trembling.

'We have brought your Highness's abdication,' said Captain C——. 'Will you sign it?'

'I have neither pen nor ink,' he answered.

'We thought of that,' said one of the conspirators.

'I have no table.'

'For this once, I offer myself as such,' said Captain P——.

Having no alternative, the Prince then signed the following act of abdication, as it lay on the shoulders of the stooping officer who had condescended to serve as a desk for the occasion.

'We, Alexander, according to the will of the whole nation, and the oath we took on ascending the throne, this day, February 11 [23], 1866, lay down the reins of government and relegate the same to a princely locum-tenens and to the ministry chosen by the people.

(Signed) 'ALEXANDER JOHN.'

'This has been my wish for a long time,' said the Prince after having signed; 'but circumstances not dependent upon myself have caused me to postpone. Spite of all this, I was willing to do it in May.'

* * * * *

After he had signed the act of abdication the conspirators made him dress, and led him to a carriage where Ch——, in the dress of a coachman, received him and drove him to the house of M. Ciocarlanu. Madame ——, on the other hand, was taken home to her own house after she had habited herself. Immediately after Couza's arrest the bells rang out a merry peal, a band of music struck up before the theatre, and masses of people collected before the palace where the Provisional Government had installed itself, and shortly afterwards issued the following proclamation:—

'Roumanians,

During seven years you have shown Europe what can be effected by patriotism and civic virtue. Unhappily you were mistaken in your selection of the prince whom you called to lead the nation. Anarchy and corruption, violation of the laws, squandering of the national finances, degradation of the country at home and abroad, these have characterised the conduct of this culpable Government. Roumanians, the princely locum-tenens will maintain the constitutional government in its integrity. It will uphold public order, and remove personal ambition from the altar of the Fatherland.

'Roumanians, by the election of a foreigner as Prince of Roumania, the votes of the Divan will become an accomplished fact.'

Let us add a few words concerning this proceeding. We have heard blame attributed to the revolutionists, who, as already stated, comprised the leading statesmen of the country, for using force in order to ensure Couza's abdication, and so far as the mere legality of the document is concerned, his signature, thus obtained, was of course valueless. But in order to be able to form a correct opinion on the crisis and the acts of the revolutionists, it would be necessary to understand not only the character of the prince (which would alone have justified extreme measures, if one half be true that has been written concerning him), but also to estimate the effect of any delay that might have arisen from a more pacific and deliberate course of action. The popular leaders had not forgotten the lessons of 1848, and it was not likely they would be so insensate as to give time for Russian or Turkish intrigues once more to break down the barriers of their hardly-won liberties. That the nation was satisfied is proved by the sequel. No one troubled himself about Couza, who was allowed to withdraw from Roumania laden with the spoils of his reign; and when afterwards the name of the present ruler was placed before the people it was accepted with joy and acclamation.

But we have had another reason for dwelling at greater length than has been customary with historians upon this incident in Roumanian annals. It was to show the kind of example in morality, or rather immorality and faithlessness, which was set by one of the princes of the country so recently as fifteen or sixteen years since. Such conduct may be treated with contempt in countries having a well-established and settled constitution, but in a new-born nationality it could not fail to work great mischief, which has not yet been fully remedied despite the example of an unblemished Court.

[Footnote 169: As the event is comparatively recent, we have considered it desirable to suppress two or three names of persons who may be still living, and whose connection with the revolution is of no moment.]

[Footnote 170: That would have been cowardly.—AUTHOR.]

[Footnote 171: One of his mistresses, who was with him.]



CHAPTER XIV.

FROM THE DEPOSITION OF PRINCE COUZA (1866) TO THE CORONATION OF KING CHARLES (1881).

Accession of Prince Charles of Hohenzollern—Signs the Constitution—Former differences between the Prince and the Parliament—(Note: State of parties with leaders in 1881)—Action of Russia prior to the war of 1877—Turkish incapacity and obstinacy—Perplexing position of Roumania—Reluctance of the nation to interfere—First attitude of neutrality—The Porte declares the Prince an enemy—The Prince and army organisation—Value of Roumanian co-operation to Russia—The Russian army of operations—Crosses the Danube and occupies Sistova and the Shipka Pass—Repeated defeats at Plevna and elsewhere—Gloomy outlook for the Russians—The Roumanians cross the Danube—First estimates of them—Contemptuous criticisms and anecdotes—Changing views regarding them—Prince Charles appointed Commander-in-Chief of the allies before Plevna—Defences of Plevna—The Grivitza redoubt—Strength and composition of the armies—Commencement of the attack (August 31, 1877)—Capture of Loftcha by Skobeleff—Russian operations against Plevna—Great assault of September 11—Defeat of the Russians—Ineffectual bravery of Skobeleff—His appearance after the repulse—The Roumanians—The 'indomitable' Grivitza redoubt—Roumanian approaches (September 7 to 10)—Assaults and final capture and retention of the redoubt by the Roumanians (11th)—Carnage in the redoubt—Unsuccessful attempt to capture a second redoubt—Flattering criticisms upon their bravery—Further Roumanian victories and services in the war—Failure of Osman Pasha to break the lines of the allies—His submission—Interview between Osman, the Grand Duke, and Prince Charles—Russian ingratitude to Roumania—'Exchange' of Bessarabia for the Dobrudscha—Treaty of San Stephano and Berlin Conference—Roumania independent—Coronation of the King and Queen—Conclusion of historical review.

I.

After the fall of Couza the two Chambers elected the Count of Flanders, a younger brother of the King of Belgium, as his successor, but, owing probably to the threatening attitude of the Porte, that Prince declined the honour. Their choice then fell upon the reigning sovereign, Prince Charles of Hohenzollern (son of Prince Charles Anton, of Hohenzollern-Siegmaringen), who accepted the nomination, and was proclaimed Prince of Roumania on the anniversary of his birthday, April 20, 1866, and was received with great joy on his arrival at the capital. The Sublime Porte protested as usual, but this time the Roumanians threatened—at least, they determined to uphold their choice, and collected a strong force with that object. After vainly endeavouring to enlist the Powers on his side, the Sultan gave his assent to the nomination, and the Prince was invested with the sovereignty for himself and his heirs.

Meanwhile the national leaders had prepared the draft of the constitution under which Roumania is now governed, of which the leading stipulations, along with the names of its framers, will be found in the Appendix (III.), and on June 30 [July 12] it was approved and signed by the Prince, who at the same time took the qualifying oath, first at Bucarest, and shortly afterwards at Jassy, where he was received with equal enthusiasm by the Moldavians.

Few rulers have had the obstacles to contend with that greeted Prince Charles on his accession to the throne of Roumania, and few indeed have managed so completely to overcome their difficulties and to win the affections of their subjects—a task which has, however, been materially lightened in his case by the co-operation of his talented consort, whom, as Princess Elizabeth of Wied, he espoused in November 1869. The liberties of Roumania had not been of slow growth, and the people who for sixteen centuries had been the downtrodden vassals, first of this and then of that dominant race of barbarians, were naturally, a little awkward when they were called upon to assume the responsibilities, as well as to enjoy the privileges, of emancipation. We will not dwell upon the party dissensions which for a series of years militated against the smooth working of the new Constitution, nor upon the known fact that the Prince well-nigh relinquished the reins of power in consequence of the repeated changes of ministry and the unworthy jealousies of those who, having first selected him as a foreigner, subsequently charged this against him as a disqualification. Nor must we examine too narrowly all the causes of this restlessness in the people. They had been so often betrayed by their rulers, and were so jealous of their newly-won liberties, that, it may be, the acts of a prince of the house of Hohenzollern were not always in accord with the tastes of a semi-republican legislature. This friction, through the devotion of the ruler and the good sense and patriotism of his advisers, has ceased to exist; and, far from there being now a bitter strife of parties, one of the Roumanian leaders deplores that there is not a more active and powerful opposition to the ministry, which was last elected in 1875, and has for more than six years guided the destinies of the nation.[172]

[Footnote 172: The Conservatives were overthrown in 1875, and although there are at present nominally three parties in the State there can hardly be said to be an opposition. When the author was in Roumania, in the autumn of 1881, the two Liberal chiefs were John Bratiano, President of the Council, and C.A. Rosetti, who has held more than one portfolio. We shall speak of these statesmen in the sequel. The Liberal party in the Chamber of Deputies numbers about one hundred and twenty; whilst the Conservatives, led by MM. Catargi, Labovari, and Maiorescu, and the Radicals, with MM. Vernesco and Nicolas Jonesco, number together only about thirty-five members. In the Senate, out of seventy-six members only about sixteen or eighteen are in opposition. This is not altogether to be regretted; such disparities do not last long, and whilst on the one hand criticism of the mistakes or misconduct of Government officials (and more particularly against sub-officials, who are often charged with grave offences) is now confined chiefly to the press, on the other hand a little constitutional despotism is very much needed, not only to correct such abuses promptly, but also to hasten the necessary reforms and to ameliorate the condition of the country. This is the result of personal observation and contact with official life, and not a mere speculative opinion.]

II.

Let us now consider the circumstances which lately enabled Roumania to throw off the last traces of her vassalage, and to take her place in the comity of European nations; and with a brief narrative of those events we must bring this imperfect outline of her past history to a close. The story of the last Russo-Turkish war must be within the memory of all our readers who take the slightest interest in Oriental politics. How Russia, chafing under the restrictions which had been put upon her by the Treaty of Paris, had succeeded in obtaining a modification of that treaty, which gave her once more the right of entrance into the Black Sea; how, resuming her favourite role of protectress of the Christian inhabitants of Turkey, she intervened in the affairs of those nations who stood between her and Constantinople; how the Servians and Montenegrins, incited by her, rose in revolt, and the Bulgarians followed suit; how the European Powers, sympathising with Turkey on the one hand, in consequence of the renewed machinations and transparent designs of her powerful northern enemy, and on the other despairing of her on account of the barbarities with which she endeavoured to quell the rising in her vassal provinces, the inherent weakness of her rule, and the bankrupt condition of her finances, they were compelled at length to leave her at the mercy of her foe. To repeat the narrative of these would be telling an oft-told tale. But when, after the final break-up of the Conference of Constantinople in January 1877, the Cross and the Crescent were once more opposed to each other, and when the Russian forces were massed on the eastern bank of the Pruth, then came the moment at which it behoved the newly-liberated nation, which had so often been the victim of the 'holy' strife, to decide on which side it would array itself. Indeed, Roumania had little choice in the matter; the critics who have censured her policy, and have charged her with breach of faith towards her suzerain the Porte (and we know there are many such in this country), cannot have carefully considered her past history; nor have reflected upon the position in which she was placed.[173] As a matter of preference, the young nation which was about being dragged into this ruthless strife could have none, and might with justice have exclaimed, 'A plague on both your houses!' What cared they, on the one hand (and this was the popular sentiment), for the hypocritical crusade undertaken for purposes of aggrandisement; or, on the other, what sympathy could they have with the moribund State which had ever been to them as the daughters of the horseleech, and whose atrocities were identical with those that were perpetrated in the days when Huns and Vandals devastated their own fair plains? If Roumania in her then condition (now it would be different) had opposed the passage of the Russian forces, they would have entered her territory as enemies, the war would have been carried on once more within her borders, and, beggared and prostrate, she might at best have reckoned upon retaining her political independence through the intervention of the European Powers; though, looking at the fact that these had recognised Russia as their executioner in Turkey, it is very questionable whether they would have interfered for the protection of Roumania, and whether she would not have fallen to Russia along with Bessarabia. On the other hand, if she had actively sided with either Power, her national independence and the happiness of her people would have been staked upon the result. She chose the wise, and indeed the only course, namely, that of allowing her powerful neighbour to pass through her dominions, stipulating that, so far as Russia could help it, she should be spared the desolation and horrors of war within her frontiers. But what course did the Porte adopt? Not recognising the force majeure which had driven Roumania to this decision, she was suicidal enough to declare her an enemy, and to threaten to depose the Prince, thus giving to her bitterest foe an ally who, at a critical period, in self-defence, turned the scale against her, and caused her to lose some of her fairest provinces. For the Roumanians well knew, after the declared enmity of the Porte, that the defeat of the Russians and their withdrawal into their own territories would at once have been followed by all the incidents of Turkish rule, of which for centuries they had had such a bitter experience.

Amongst the valuable services which Prince Charles had rendered to his adopted country before the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war was the organisation of a national army on the German model. Under Prince Couza the whole standing army of the two Principalities was at first 8,400 men, but he raised it to 25,000 strong, and officered it on the French system. When Prince Charles received the investiture at the hands of the Sultan in 1867, the army was limited to 30,000 men of all ranks; but he substituted German for French officers, and sent young Roumanians to Germany to study military tactics. In 1874 the standing army numbered 18,542 men of all arms, and the territorial forces 43,744, making a total of 62,286 men and 14,353 horses; these were armed with 52 steel Krupp guns, besides about 200 of an inferior description; 25,000 Peabody rifles, and 20,000 Prussian needle-guns, raised in 1875 to 100,000 rifles of the best description.[174] The sanitary services and the military hospitals had been organised by General Dr. Davila, a French physician, of whom we have frequently spoken elsewhere, and who still occupies the post of Director of Hospitals, &c., and of the Medical School at Bucarest.[175]

[Footnote 173: The critics of her conduct during and immediately after the close of the war were more bitter than at the present day, charging her with perfidy of the worst kind, and predicting that she would become a vassal state of Russia. See, amongst others, Ollier, History of Russo-Turkish War, vol. i. p. 537.]

[Footnote 174: These details are from Von Wittinghausen's work on Roumania, from a military point of view (Vienna: Carl Gerold's Sohn).]

[Footnote 175: The army organization has progressed rapidly since the war of complete liberation, and it is estimated that in 1884 the total forces of Roumania, regular militia, and Landsturm, will exceed 215,000 men. Full information will be found in Von Wittinghausen, Obedenare and in the Gotha Almanack, 1881, p. 903, where the present state of the forces is given in detail.]

III.

With an army thus constituted and disciplined, Prince Charles went into the Russo-Turkish war as an ally of the Russians, although, at first, not as an active one; and as the success of that terrible war relieved Roumania from the last vestiges of her dependence upon Turkey, we will endeavour to collect within as narrow limits as possible a few of the leading events wherein she participated, and which affected her claim to European attention.

That the Roumanians rendered valuable services to the Russians before they co-operated actively in arms is well known, and also that the latter had pressing need for such assistance. In May 1877 every facility was given for the passage of troops over the Roumanian railways, hospital equipments taking the precedence, and the Roumanian civil and military hospitals opened their doors to receive the Russian sick; in fact, disastrous as were the Russian reverses throughout the war, they would have entailed far greater misery upon their wounded soldiers if it had not been for the systematic aid which they received from the Roumanians. Then, in preparing for the defence of their own bank of the Danube, the latter were diverting the attention of the Turks, whose gunboats amused themselves in making harmless excursions up and down the river, pretty much as our fleet did between Besika Bay and the Dardanelles, and they were making a line of defence for the Russians in case they should have been obliged to recross tho Danube. Here it is that we first make the acquaintance of Prince Charles, who travelled from post to post on the river inspecting the defences. 'Born a Hohenzollern, and reared an officer in the Prussian army,' says a writer who accompanied him on this tour, 'it is little wonder that Prince Charles of Roumania is above all things a soldier. Since his election to the headship of the Principalities he has sedulously devoted a large share of his energies to the improvement, or rather, in the first instance, to the creation of a Roumanian army, and that his labour has not been lost is apparent to any man having any conversance with military matters, who has spent the last few weeks in the territory over which Prince Charles holds sway.'[176] The prince had at his disposal two army corps, each numbering 28,000 men, fully equipped, whilst the militia, whose strength was about 100,000, was ready for mobilisation at the shortest notice. As to the fighting qualities of these troops writers differ, and we shall refer presently to the changes that took place in the estimation in which they were held as the war progressed; but even at the commencement there were those who lauded their coolness, and said that they did not exhibit any of that tremor under fire which is not wholly unnatural in young soldiers.

Before these men were called into action, however, their powerful allies had suffered terrible defeats at the hands of the enemy. Dealing only with that division of the Russian army which was engaged in Bulgaria, we have to note the following events. On June 27, 1877, the main body of Russians, or the 'army of operations,' as it was called, which was under the command of the Grand Duke Nicholas, crossed the Danube in floating ferries from Simnitza to Sistova, feints having been made to concentrate and pass over in other places at the same time, so as to mislead the Turks as to the intended point of crossing. Although some efforts were made by the latter to prevent the landing on the Bulgarian shore, which resulted in many being killed and wounded on either side, the Russians effected the passage in safety and occupied Sistova, where they found all the houses of the inhabitants sacked and plundered by the Turks, who had beaten a retreat. The Emperor and the Grand Duke Nicholas were either on the spot or in the immediate vicinity at the time of the crossing, the headquarters being then at Ploiesti, on the Bucarest and Orsova, railway, and from that time forward they sustained a series of terrible reverses.[177]

As soon as a sufficient force was landed, they divided the army into three sections, one of which, under General Ghourko, pressed on to the famous Shipka Pass in the Balkans, where he encountered the brave enemy; he occupied the pass on July 19. Another section under the Grand Duke himself—part of the 9th Army Corps—marched onwards to the equally well-known position of Plevna, where Osman Pasha was in command of the Turkish forces, and where the Russians met with their first check. General Kruedener, who commanded the attacking force, was not only repulsed, but, being assailed in his turn by the Turks, he was badly beaten. Two days afterwards, having been reinforced, he, in conjunction with General Schahofskoy, commanding a force of 32,000 men, made a second assault on Plevna, but they were again defeated with terrible loss. On July 31 Ghourko met with a still more serious defeat. He had penetrated with a Russo-Bulgarian force as far as Eski-Zagra (or Zara), where he met the Turks under Suleiman Pasha, and, after a sanguinary encounter, he was not only repulsed, but compelled to withdraw to the Shipka Pass. Suleiman Pasha followed him and succeeded in occupying the village of Shipka, but his attempts to drive the Russians from the pass were unsuccessful, and on August 27 he discontinued his operations and telegraphed for reinforcements, the Russians having in the meantime also received theirs. Suleiman Pasha did not renew the attempt until September 17; and, although at one time he had so far discounted his success as to telegraph a victory to Constantinople, he was finally repulsed.[178]

Added to these and other reverses in Europe, there came tale after tale of disaster in Asia. Kars, which had been besieged by the Russians, was successfully relieved by the Turks under Muktar Pasha, just as, a few months later, Erzeroum was twice attacked by the Russians, who were as many times repulsed. Then it was, when the skies were lowering on all sides, that the Russian emperor and his princes and generals began to look eagerly for aid from their ally north of the Danube; and then, for the safety of his own country, Prince Charles entered the field with his brave little army of Roumanians, and, recalling the days of Stephen and of Michael, and emulating the prowess of the field of Kalugereni, he succeeded in turning the tide of victory, and in saving the honour of that ally, from whom lie subsequently received such poor acknowledgment.

[Footnote 176: Daily News War Correspondence, vol. i. p. 73.]

[Footnote 177: There are two monuments, one at Simnitza and the other at Sistova, which are visible to the traveller as he passes up or down the river. The first indicates the spot where the Russians embarked, whilst the last is a handsome memorial to the slain.]

[Footnote 178: These operations are graphically described in the interesting work of Col. Fife Cookson, With the Armies of the Balkans, Cassell, 1880; in the Daily News War Correspondence, Macmillan, 1878; and in Ollier's History of the Russo-Turkish War, Cassell.]

IV.

Up to August 25 we hear little or nothing of the movements of the Roumanians, and in every case the fighting was done by the Russians, either alone or in conjunction with their ruthless allies the Bulgarians,[179] the operations being then spoken of as those of the 'Russo-Bulgarian' forces; but on the date named, or thereabouts, the main portion of the Roumanian army crossed the Danube, and thenceforward the Bulgarians are seldom mentioned, and the contest is prosecuted by the 'allies,' or the 'Russo-Roumanian' army. At first the Roumanian soldiers receive scant regard at the hands of the chroniclers: indeed, on one or two occasions they are referred to with marked contempt. Writing from Giurgevo on June 5 (that was before the Russians had crossed the Danube at Simnitza), one of the correspondents says:—'Whilst eating and talking, I heard one or two curious incidents that occurred here when the Cossacks first came. In the course of reconnoitring the country, five Cossacks, with an under-officer, came upon a post of twenty Roumanian soldiers, likewise under the command of an under-officer. The five Cossacks immediately arrested the twenty Roumanians, brought them in to headquarters, and reported them to General Skobeleff as prisoners of some unknown army. The Cossacks were not quite sure, apparently, whether they were Turks or not, so they thought that they had better bring them in, an operation to which the Roumanians, although vastly superior in numbers, consented with not a little murmuring.'[180]

This anecdote, it must be understood, was told by a party of Russian officers, and is unworthy of critical examination, but it shows in what estimation they held the men who were afterwards to be their indispensable helpmates, and in a sense their leaders and preservers. Other writers represented the Roumanian soldiers in a more favourable light from the beginning of the war. Their coolness under fire has already been mentioned, and the same correspondent, in describing the defensive operations at Kalafat, says: 'I was struck with the admirable conduct at this time of the Roumanian gunners, who never flinched in the slightest degree under the trying ordeal.'[181] After their defeats before Plevna and elsewhere, the Russians, too, began to estimate their allies at something nearer their real value.

'The Russian authorities,' writes the same correspondent in the month of August, 'are greatly pleased with the appearance and apparent efficiency of the Roumanian artillery. Indeed, the Roumanian troops are everywhere now spoken of with a consideration not previously evinced.'[182]

No more talk now of five Russians running in twenty Roumanians; and we shall hear quite a different story presently. And not alone had the soldiers risen in Muscovite esteem, but the Russians were beginning to understand that there might be some virtue in the commanders also; for about September 1, or a day or two previously, they so far admitted their superiority as to invite Prince Charles to take the command-in-chief of the whole Russo-Roumanian army before Plevna, which he did, with the Russian general Zotoff as chief of his staff and second in command.

On this occasion he issued an address to the Roumanian soldiers, reminding them that success for the Turks would mean pillage and desolation in their fatherland, assuring them that, although their numbers were few, he had confidence in their courage, and in their ability to retain for Roumania the good opinion which she deserved and enjoyed amongst the nations of Europe. He concluded by announcing, in modest terms, his own appointment as Commander-in-chief of the allied armies.

[Footnote 179: According to Col. Fife Cookson the Bulgarians, during this war, were guilty of atrocities as deep-dyed as any that had previously caused such indignation in Europe; but he also says (p. 23), 'In this war armed Bulgarians resisting the Turks were looked upon as rebels, and received no quarter.']

[Footnote 180: War Correspondence, vol. i. pp. 131-132.]

[Footnote 181: War Correspondence, p. 82.]

[Footnote 182: Ibid. p. 390.]

V.

On August 31, Osman Pasha had made a sortie against the besiegers, in which he was eventually repulsed with heavy loss, and then it was that under the new command a fresh attack on Plevna was decided upon. In order, however, to understand the events which followed, and the part taken therein by the Roumanians, it is necessary that we should briefly describe the position and constitution of the forces engaged, and refer to the operations which preceded the assault.



The scene of the long-continued struggle is an undulating country, and Plevna, the centre of attack and defence, is in the hollow of a valley running in a northerly and southerly direction. The ground adjacent to this valley was described by one of the war correspondents as consisting of great solid waves with their faces set edgeways to the valley of Plevna. To describe it in detail here would be impossible, but the positions of the attacking and defending armies were very simple. The Turkish positions were, roughly speaking, 'a horseshoe, with its convexity pointing east, and the town of Plevna standing about the centre of the base.' Another writer compares it to 'a reaping-hook, with the point opposite Bukova, the middle of the curve opposite Grivica, the junction of the handle close on to Plevna, and the end of the handle at Krishine.'

The Russians had been surrounding this horseshoe, leaving the base open, and the form of their attack on this occasion was in the line of their environment straight to their front. The main point of interest in the struggle, so far as we are concerned, is the Turkish redoubt of Grivica or Grivitza, the strongest of all the positions of defence: this was situated on the toe, if we may so call it, of the horseshoe, and directly opposite was the Russo-Roumanian centre.

The Russo-Roumanian army numbered about 80,000 infantry, of whom 28,000 were Roumanians, in two corps, under Colonels George and Alexander Angelescu, and 10,000 cavalry, whereof 4,000 were Roumanians. The whole Roumanian division was commanded by General Cernat; the Russians by Baron Kruedener, General Kriloff, Prince Meretinsky, and the brave but erratic General Skobeleff; and this army of 90,000 men was provided with 250 field and 20 siege guns. The number of the defenders under Osman Pasha is estimated at about 70,000 men.

Here is a concise account of the attack. After the unsuccessful sortie of Osman Pasha on August 31, in which the Russians recovered all the positions temporarily occupied by the enemy, there was a partial cessation of hostilities before Plevna until September 6. Meanwhile, on the 3rd, a force of 22,000 Russians under Meretinsky, including a brigade of Cossacks commanded by Skobeleff, succeeded, after a sanguinary conflict, in driving 7,000 Turks from the village of Loftcha and a defensive position west of it, which they permanently occupied.[183] This operation had the effect of cutting off the supplies of Osman Pasha from the south. An artillery duel then followed between the whole of the attacking and defending armies, which lasted until the 11th, and, judging from the long and careful accounts of the correspondents, the firing seems to have had little effect on either side. In the interim the Roumanians were posted opposite the Grivitza Redoubt, which, as we have already said, was the most formidable of all the Turkish defences. Meretinsky and Skobeleff were in the vicinity of the Loftcha road; and Kriloff and Kruedener were moving about in co-operation, the former having posted himself on the Radisovo height with the forces under his command.[184] Of the Grivitza and the Roumanian operations we shall speak more fully hereafter. At the other points of attack nothing serious happened until the 11th, when, a general assault being ordered, the attack of Kriloff and Kruedener was directed against a position known as the 'Mamelon,' south of Plevna, whilst Skobeleff made a vigorous assault upon a double redoubt on the south-east, the object being to carry these positions which were believed to be the most vulnerable, whilst the Roumanians were 'holding' the Turks at their strongest redoubt—the Grivitza. Supported by Roumanian artillery, Kriloff attacked the 'Mamelon' three times during the day, each time with fresh forces; but he was as often repulsed with terrible loss, the third attack and defeat lasting only twenty minutes. In fact, Kriloff and Kruedener were repulsed all along the line. Skobeleff was somewhat more fortunate, having begun his attack after Kriloff's second reverse. With a loss of 2,000 men he succeeded in carrying the Turkish position; and at a further sacrifice of 3,000 he held it for a time only, for it was commanded by the Krishine redoubt (which was the ultimate object of his operations) on his left, and by Plevna on the north. The Turks attempted in vain five times to dislodge him. Skobeleff supplicated time after time for support, but it only arrived when, after the sixth Turkish attack—this time successful—he had been forced to withdraw, and was retreating to his old ground. The closing scene of his day's operations has been frequently described, but as his recent escapade gives fresh interest to anything concerning him, it will lose nothing by repetition: 'It was just after this that I met General Skobeleff the first time that day. He was in a fearful state of excitement and fury. His uniform was covered with mud and filth, his sword broken, his cross of St. George twisted round on his shoulder, his face black with powder and smoke, his eyes haggard and bloodshot, and his voice quite gone. He spoke in a, hoarse whisper. I never before saw such a picture of battle as he presented. I saw him again in his tent at night. He was quite calm and collected. He said, "I have done my best. I could do no more. My detachment is half destroyed; my regiments do not exist. I have no officers left. They sent me no reinforcements, and I have lost three guns." They were three of the four guns which he placed in the redoubt upon taking it, only one of which his retreating troops had been able to carry off. "Why did they refuse you reinforcements?" I asked. "Who was to blame?" "I blame nobody," he replied; "it is the will of God!"'[185]

[Footnote 183: War Correspondence, vol. i. pp. 441-442. Cassell (Ollier), pp. 404-405, where a plan of the Loftcha struggle is given.]

[Footnote 184: It is not clear what these were; probably the tenth and thirtieth divisions, composing the fourth corps. Compare Daily News War Correspondence, vol. i. pp. 443 and 444.]

[Footnote 185: War Correspondence, vol. i. pp. 482-483.]

VI.

We have thus loosely described how the Turks had effectually disposed of the whole Russian attack excepting that of the Roumanians, and now we must turn for a moment to enquire what was occurring at Grivitza. This redoubt is constantly referred to by the correspondents as the most formidable of all the Turkish positions. It is called 'the indomitable Grivica redoubt;' 'the dreaded redoubt;' 'they' (the Russians) 'may bombard it for a week, sacrifice a brigade of infantry, and not succeed in taking it.' 'The Turkish positions,' says one writer, 'opposite to the Roumanian section, are the stronger both by nature and art. But there are but 28,000 Roumanians to 50,000 Russians. It seems logically to follow that the function of the Roumanians is intended to be chiefly of a demonstrative character.'[186] How 'demonstrative' it was we shall see presently.

Already on the 7th and 8th, the Russian siege guns had been pushed forward in closer proximity to the Grivitza, and on the 9th the Roumanians worked their batteries nearer to it; whilst on the 10th their infantry occupied a natural shelter-trench, from which they were picking off the Turkish gunners in the redoubt. On the same day a couple of companies of Russians, thinking the redoubt was evacuated, made an attempt to take it, but when a small party of advancing skirmishers arrived within a hundred yards of the foot of the glacis, they were confronted by a row of rifle muzzles and Turkish heads, and thought it more prudent to retire.

On the 11th, however, the Roumanians, with whom were three battalions of Russians, made their 'demonstration' against the Grivitza simultaneously with the Russian attacks on the other redoubts. Little attention appears to have been paid to them in the slaughter of that terrible day, but on the following the correspondents narrated the result of their operations, and as those not only substantiated the title of the young army to elan and bravery, but really constituted the turning point in the war, we will endeavour to follow their brief descriptions of the events.

'It appears,' writes one of the chroniclers, 'that at half-past two p.m. the redoubt was attacked by two Roumanian brigades each consisting of four battalions, and three battalions of Russians. The Roumanians attacked from the east and south-east, the Russians from the south and south-west. The attack was made in the following manner:—First a lino of skirmishers with men carrying scaling ladders, gabions, and fascines among them. The latter had their rifles slung on their backs, and were ordered in no case to fire but merely to run forward, fill up the ditch, and place their ladders behind. Then followed the second line in company column formation for the attack, followed by the third line to support the assault. At half-past two p.m. the attack was made by the Roumanians, and it is said that by some mistake the Russians arrived half an hour too late. Be that as it may, the assault was repulsed, and all retired except two companies of infantry, which rallied, and, keeping under cover, maintained a brisk fire against the work.

'At half-past five the attack was renewed by a battalion of the Roumanian militia, followed by two Russian battalions of the 17th and 18th regiments. The redoubt was then carried, and the Turks withdrew to the other redoubt a little to the north of the captured work. But it was soon apparent that the redoubt could not be held without reinforcements, and three Roumanian battalions with a battery of artillery were ordered forward. They lost their way, however, in the fog, and were thus precluded from rendering the required assistance; consequently, when the Turks returned to the attack, the allies were driven out.

'The third assault soon followed, and the work was finally captured at seven p.m. Four guns and a standard were the trophies of the feat of arms. More than once during the night did the Turks advance with shouts of "Allah," but no serious attack was made. Thus, to my surprise, when I reached the Plevna valley this morning, I beheld a flagstaff up defiantly exposing the Roumanian flag in that hitherto dreaded Grivica Redoubt.'[187]

How sanguinary had been the struggle which is here described in a few commonplace sentences is manifest from the subsequent appearance of the captured redoubt.

'The interior of this large work was piled up not only with dead but with wounded, forming one ghastly undistinguishable mass of dead and living bodies, the wounded being as little heeded as the dead. The fire had hindered the doctors from coming up to attend to the wounded, and the same cause had kept back the wounded-bearers. There were not even comrades to moisten the lips of their wretched fellow-soldiers, or give them a word of consolation. There they lie, writhing and groaning. I think some attempt might have been made, at whatever risk, to aid these poor fellows, for they were gallant men, who, twenty-four hours before, had so valiantly and successfully struggled for the conquest of that long-uncaptured redoubt; and it was sad now to see them dying without any attempt being made to attend to them. I could fill pages with a description of this harrowing scene and others near it, which I witnessed, but the task would be equally a strain on my own nerves and on those of your readers.'[188]

But the Roumanians were not contented with holding their position. Within 250 yards of the Grivitza was another Turkish redoubt whose fire commanded the former, and that they attempted in vain to take on the 11th. Nothing daunted, however, they held their ground day after day, and on the 18th they made another gallant but futile attempt to expel the enemy from his position. 'It is said they will renew it,' writes one of the spectators, 'and there is plenty of fight in Prince Charles's gallant young army, but, in my opinion, there is little chance of success unless they work up to the hostile redoubt by sap.'[189] On September 24 they were progressing by trenches, and were only 80 yards from the second Grivitza redoubt. 'Their fighting spirit and cheerful endurance of hardships are admirable,' we hear. And again, on the 26th: 'The Roumanians are pushing forward their works against the second redoubt with a perseverance and pluck worthy all praise, and which is the more remarkable as the Russians are doing absolutely nothing on their side.'[190] This contrast comes from the pen of the chronicler who told the story of the twenty Roumanians being taken prisoners by five Russians, and whose views of the relative merits of the combatants had evidently undergone considerable modification; for he now says of the Russians: 'They are waiting for reinforcements, which are arriving slowly, and which, when they are here, will hardly more than cover the losses by battle and by sickness during the last two months. I think history offers no such example of a splendid army in such an utterly helpless condition. The Roumanian generals are showing far more pluck and energy.'[191]



The Roumanians were unable to capture the second redoubt, but they managed not only to hold their advanced position before Plevna, but to give material assistance elsewhere in turning the siege into an investment. On November 21 they captured Rahova, on the Danube, which greatly facilitated operations against the doomed fortress and aided to make the works of the allies impregnable. In the closing incidents of the investment of Plevna the Roumanians took little or no part in consequence of the position which they occupied. On the morning of December 10, Osman Pasha made his brave but unsuccessful attempt to break through the Russian lines, a struggle in which both sides performed prodigies of valour. One whole Russian regiment was annihilated in the effort to check the enemy, whose general was himself wounded; and after having kept the Russo-Roumanian army at bay with an inferior force for more than four months, he was at length obliged to surrender with his whole army. Here is a glimpse of the final scene, as the wounded hero met his conquerors:—

'The Grand Duke rode up to the carriage, and for some seconds the two chiefs gazed into each other's faces without the utterance of a word. Then the Grand Duke stretched out his hand and shook the hand of Osman Pasha heartily and said: "I compliment you on your defence of Plevna; it is one of the most splendid military feats in history." Osman Pasha smiled sadly, rose painfully to his feet in spite of his wound, said something which I could not hear, and then reseated himself. The Russian officers all cried "Bravo! bravo!" repeatedly, and all saluted respectfully. There was not one among them who did not gaze on the hero of Plevna with the greatest admiration and sympathy. Prince Charles, who had arrived, rode up, and repeated unwittingly almost every word of the Grand Duke, and likewise shook hands. Osman Pasha again rose and bowed, this time in grim silence.'[192]

[Footnote 186: Ibid. p. 444.]

[Footnote 187: Daily War Correspondence, vol. i. p. 485.]

[Footnote 188: Ibid. p. 487.]

[Footnote 189: Daily News War Correspondence, vol. i. p. 491.]

[Footnote 190: Ibid. p. 495.]

[Footnote 191: Ibid. p. 496.]

[Footnote 192: Daily News Correspondence, vol. ii. p. 153.]

VI.

How easy it is to be magnanimous to a fallen foe; how difficult, with some people, to be honourable in their dealings with an ally, especially if he has been successful where they failed! The first is a claim of superiority, and the higher the meed of praise awarded by us to the vanquished the greater appears our victory; but the less we admit to be due to our comrade in arms, the greater credit is left for ourselves. And yet what will be the judgment of posterity upon the conduct of Russia towards her brave ally who had saved her honour, if not the integrity of her empire? Whatever she may think, the joy-bells would have rung throughout a great portion of Europe, and certainly the party then dominant in England would have rejoiced exceedingly, if she had been driven back over the Pruth, and had been compelled to busy herself with much-needed reforms in her own country instead of meddling with the affairs of her neighbours and seeking to extend her already overgrown possessions.

The war was never popular with the masses in Roumania, and although, at the opening of the Chambers in November 1877, the royal speech predicted that the fall of Plevna would mean a complete emancipation for Roumania, much uneasiness prevailed concerning the designs of Russia—uneasiness which was justified by subsequent events. On December 17, a load having been lifted from the mind of the nation by the surrender of Osman Pasha, there was great rejoicing at Bucarest on the occasion of the Czar's visit. He was on his way to St. Petersburg to receive the congratulations of his subjects, having left Plevna behind him, 'full of horrors.' He is dead now, but his son and all princes who live by the sword would do well to peruse and reperuse the accounts of the tragical scenes that the victors left upon the battle-field when they departed to receive the ovations of the fickle populace. The Roumanians feted their victorious allies, to whom it must be admitted that we have here done ample justice in all their proceedings. But they were the same Russians who, under Peter the Great, were reported to have stolen the boots from the feet of their sleeping hosts; the same whose hands the Roumanians had kissed when in 1829 they had released them from the Turkish yoke; who it 1853 overran the Principalities with a view to their permanent occupation, and who a few months after the events above recorded betrayed their allies, and, for the risk they had run of once more sacrificing their national existence, deprived them of Southern Bessarabia, a province inhabited almost entirely by Roumanians.

Still the war brought its compensating advantages. The Dobrudscha which the Roumanians received in exchange for Bessarabia, is proving a more valuable acquisition both for trade and for strategical purposes than was at first anticipated.

The Treaty of San Stephano, which was executed between Russia and Turkey on February 19 [March 3], 1878, and was practically confirmed by the Berlin Conference, contained amongst its other provisions this one (part of Article V.): 'The Sublime Porte recognises the independence of Roumania, which will establish its right to an indemnity to be discussed between the two countries;' and (part of Article XII.): 'All the Danubian strongholds shall be razed. There shall be no strongholds in future on the banks of this river, nor any men-of-war in the waters of the Principalities of Roumania, Servia, and Bulgaria, except the usual stationnaires and the small vessels intended for river police and custom-house purposes.' And Article XIX. gave to Russia that part of Turkey bordering on the Danube, known as the Dobrudscha, which Russia 'reserves the right of exchanging for the part of Bessarabia detached from her by the treaty of 1856,' and which, to the great indignation of the Roumanians, she subsequently forced them to relinquish in 'exchange' for her newly acquired territory.

But n'importe. Roumania was free; and this time she had fought for and won her complete independence.

VII.

There is something unsettled in the nature of an independent principality. The title fails to convey the idea of a free and sovereign people, and we are always disposed to regard it as the possible province of some annexing neighbour. So thought a writer on Roumania four years ago, at the close of the war of liberation. 'Situated as it is, as an independent State, it must sooner or later fall to Russia or Austria, more probably to the former.'[193] So, in all probability, thought the Russian diplomatists when they created a number of weak principalities south of the Danube to serve them as stepping-stones to Constantinople. And so, too, thought the Roumanians themselves. They knew that a name is 'neither hand, nor foot, nor arm, nor face, nor any other part belonging to a man,' and so they 'doffed the name,' and on May 23, 1881, with the concurrence of the great Powers of Europe, they invested their prince and princess with the royal dignity, placing upon their sovereign's head a crown made from the very guns which he had captured whilst he was fighting for their liberties.

The poetic sentiment which attaches to this last act of the people of Roumania brings vividly before our mind's eye the dramatic character of her whole national career. Twice have we found the course of her history lost in darkness—first in the clouds of antiquity by which the early life of every nation is obscured; then in the still impenetrable gloom of the so-called dark ages, which continued to hang over the Danubian plains long after it was lifted from every other part of Europe. Conquered first, and civilised by one who ranks amongst the greatest heroes of the Roman Empire, she has inherited a high antiquity of which she may be justly proud, remembering, however, that honourable ancestry alone is not the measure of a nation's greatness. But then, for ages we might almost say, the blast which swept across her plains with all the fury of a tempest, but, as it travelled westward, broke and moderated under the influence of the older civilisation, caused a second blank in her existence; and when she once more rose from her prostration, she found herself whole centuries behind the western peoples. But hardly had she time to breathe again, and ere the wounds inflicted on her by the Goths, and Huns, and Avars were yet fully healed, another ruthless conqueror had laid hands upon her; and spite of all her efforts to regain her liberty he held her fast, and sent her taskmasters as cruel and exacting as the leaders of barbarian hordes had been before. And yet her spirit was indomitable; bowed but not broken she continued to live on, and ever strove for freedom. Mircea, Stephen, Michael, those are the names which vindicate her claim to courage, and which shield her from the charge of cowardly submission. And next she is the object of contention between two neighbouring despots, the one endeavouring to hold, the other to annex her. It is a marvelt hat between them she was not dismembered limb from limb.