We have no means of forming an opinion of Mr. Stewart's capacity for administrative work, and I do not indulge in any conjectures. His nomination was acceptable to the leading business interests of the country, and in the city of New York it was supported generally. He was a successful man of business and an accumulator of wealth, and at that time General Grant placed a high estimate upon the presence of talents by which men acquire wealth.

Following these events, there were early indications that Mr. Stewart's interest in the President had been diminished, and gradually he took on a dislike to me. When I knew of his nomination, or when I knew it was to be made, I met him in Washington and assured him of my disposition to give my support to his administration. On two occasions when I was in New York I made calls of civility upon him, but, as he made no recognition in return, my efforts in that direction came to an end.

At a dinner given by merchants and bankers in the early part of September, 1869, at which I was a guest, Mr. Stewart made a speech in which he criticized my administration of the Treasury. In the canvass of 1872 the rumor went abroad that Mr. Stewart had given $25,000 to the Greeley campaign fund. In the month of October of that year, the twenty-eighth day, perhaps, I spoke at the Cooper Union. Upon my arrival in New York, I received a call from a friend who came with a message from Mr. Stewart. Mr. Stewart would not be at the meeting, although except for the false rumor in regard to his subscription to the Greeley fund, he should have taken pleasure in being present. As General Grant was to be elected, his attendance at the meeting might be treated by the public as an attempt to curry favor with General Grant and the incoming Administration.

As I was passing to the hall, a paper was placed into my hands by a person who gave no other means of recognizing his presence. When I reached the hall and opened the paper, I found that it was a summons to appear as a defendant in an action brought by a man named Galvin, who claimed damages in the sum of $3,000,000. At the close of the meeting and when the fact became known one gentleman said to me: "I do not see how you could have spoken after such a summons."

I said in reply: "If the suit had been for $3,000 only, it might have given me some uneasiness, as a recovery would have involved payment. A judgment of $3,000,000 implies impossibility of payment."

I had no knowledge of Galvin, but his letters of advice were found on the files of the Treasury. Even after the suit, I did not examine them for the purpose of forming an opinion of their value or want of value. Galvin alleged in his declaration that he had furnished the financial policy that I had adopted, that it had benefitted the country to the amount of $300,000,000 and more, and that a claim of $3,000,000 was a moderate claim. Under the statute, the Department of Justice assumed the defence. The case lingered, Galvin died, and the case followed.

At the election of 1872, I voted at Groton in the morning, and in the afternoon I went to New York, to find that General Grant had been re-elected by a sufficient majority. On the morning of the next day, I left the hotel with time for a call upon General Dix, who had been elected Governor, and for a call upon Thurlow Weed. General Dix was not at home. Notwithstanding the criticisms of Thurlow Weed as a manager of political affairs in the State of New York and in the country, I had reasons for regarding him with favor, although I had never favored the aspirations of Mr. Seward, his chief. When I was organizing the Internal Revenue Office in 1862-1863, Mr. Weed gave me information in regard to candidates for office in the State of New York, including their relations to the factions that existed—usually Seward and anti-Seward—and with as much fairness as he could have commanded if he had had no relation to either faction.

As I had time remaining at the end of my call upon Mr. Weed, and as I had in mind Mr. Stewart's message at the Cooper Union meeting, I drove to his down-town store, where I found him. He received me with cordiality, but in respect to his health he seemed to be already a doomed man. He was anxious chiefly to give me an opportunity to comprehend the nature and magnitude of his business. As I was about to leave, he took hold of my coat button and said: "When you see the President, you give my love to him, and say to him that I am for him and that I always have been for him." Still holding me by the button, he said: "Who buys the carpets for the Treasury?"

I said: "Mr. Saville is the chief clerk, and he buys the carpets."

Mr. Stewart said: "Tell him to come to me; I will sell him carpets as cheap as anybody."

When I repeated Mr. Stewart's message to the President he made no reply, and he gave no indication that he was hearing what I was saying.

In regard to Judge Hoar's relations to President Grant, the public has been invited to accept several errors, the appointment to the bench of the Supreme Court of Justices Bradley and Strong, by whose votes the first decision of the court in the Legal Tender cases was overruled, and the circumstances which led to the retirement of Judge Hoar from the Cabinet. First of all I may say that President Grant was attached to Judge Hoar, and, as far as I know, his attachment never underwent any abatement. Whatever bond there may be in the smoking habit, it was formed without delay at the beginning of their acquaintance. While General Grant was not a teller of stories, he enjoyed listening to good ones, and of these Judge Hoar had a large stock always at command. General Grant enjoyed the society of intellectual men, and Judge Hoar was far up in that class. General Grant had regrets for the retirement of Judge Hoar from his Cabinet, and for the circumstances which led to his retirement. His appointment of Judge Hoar upon the Joint High Commission and the nomination of Judge Hoar to a seat upon the bench of the Supreme Court may be accepted as evidence of General Grant's continuing friendship, and of his disposition to recognize it, notwithstanding the break in official relations.

Judge Hoar's professional life had been passed in Massachusetts, and he had no personal acquaintance with the lawyers of the circuit from which Justices Strong and Bradley were appointed. Strong and Bradley were at the head of the profession in the States of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and in truth there was no debate as to the fitness of their appointment. Judge Hoar was not responsible for their appointment, and I am of the opinion that the nomination would have been made even against his advice, which assuredly was not so given. Judge Strong, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, had sustained the constitutionality of the Legal Tender Act, and it was understood that Bradley was of the same opinion. As the President and Cabinet were of a like opinion, it may be said that there could have been no "packing" of the Supreme Court except by the exclusion of the two most prominent lawyers in the circuit and the appointment of men whose opinions upon a vital question were not in harmony with the opinion of the person making the appointment.

As to myself, I had never accepted the original decision as sound law under the Constitution, nor as a wise public policy, if there had been no Constitution. By the decision the Government was shorn of a part of its financial means of defence in an exigency. When the Supreme Court had reached a conclusion, Chief Justice Chase called upon me and informed me of that fact, about two weeks in advance of the delivery of the opinion. He gave as a reason his apprehension of serious financial difficulties due to a demand for gold by the creditor class. Not sharing in that apprehension, I said: "The business men are all debtors as well as creditors, and they cannot engage in a struggle over gold payments, and the small class of creditors who are not also debtors will not venture upon a policy in which they must suffer ultimately." The decision did not cause a ripple in the finances of the country.

Pursuing the conversation, I asked the Chief Justice where he found authority in the Constitution for the issue of non-legal-tender currency. He answered in the power to borrow money and in the power given to Congress to provide for the "general welfare of the United States." I then said, having in mind the opinion in the case of MacCulloch and Maryland, in which the court held that where a power was given to Congress, its exercise was a matter of discretion unless a limitation could be found in the Constitution: "Where do you find a limitation to the power to borrow money by any means that to Congress may appear wise?" The Chief Justice was unable to specify a limitation, and the question remains unanswered to this day.

When the case of Hepburn and Griswold was overruled in the Legal Tender cases, the Chief Justice was very much disturbed, and with the exhibition of considerable feeling, he said: "Why did you consent to the appointment of judges to overrule me?" I assured him that there was no personal feeling on the part of the President, and that as to my own unimportant part in the business, he had known from the time of our interview in regard to the former action of the court that I entertained the opinion that the decision operated as a limitation of the constitutional powers of Congress and that its full and final recognition might prove injurious to the country whenever all its resources should be required. At the time of the reversal, the Chief Justice did not conceal his dissatisfaction with his life and labors on the bench, and at the interview last mentioned he said that he should be glad to exchange positions with me, if it were possible to make the exchange.

Various reasons have been assigned for the step which was taken by President Grant in asking Judge Hoar to retire from the Cabinet. Some have assumed that the President was no longer willing to tolerate the presence of two members from the same State. That consideration had been passed upon by the President at the outset, and he had overruled it or set it aside. In my interview with Mr. Washburne the Sunday before my nomination, I had said to him that Judge Hoar and I were not only from the same State, but that we were residents of the same county, and within twenty miles of each other. Moreover, any public dissatisfaction which had existed at the beginning had disappeared. In the meantime the President had become attached to Judge Hoar. Nor is there any justifying foundation for the conjecture that a vacancy was created for the purpose of giving a place in the Cabinet to another person, or to another section of the country. General Grant's attachment to his friends was near to a weakness, and the suggestion that he sacrificed Judge Hoar to the low purpose of giving a place to some other person is far away from any true view of his character.

Judge Hoar had had no administrative experience on the political side of the government, and he underestimated the claims, and he undervalued the rights, of members of Congress. As individuals the members of Congress are of the Government, and in a final test the two Houses may become the Government. More than elsewhere the seat of power is in the Senate, and the Senate and Senators are careful to exact a recognition of their rights. They claim, what from the beginning they have enjoyed, the right to be heard by the President and the heads of departments in their respective States. They do not claim to speak authoritatively, but as members of the Government having a right to advise, and under a certain responsibility to the people for what may be done.

It was claimed by Senators that the Attorney-General seemed not to admit their right to speak in regard to appointments, and that appointments were made of which they had no knowledge, and of which neither they nor their constituents could approve. These differences reached a crisis when Senators (I use the word in the plural) notified the President that they should not visit the Department of Justice while Judge Hoar was Attorney-General. Thus was a disagreeable alternative presented to the President, and a first impression would lead to the conclusion that he ought to have sustained the Attorney- General. Assuming that the complaints were well founded, it followed that the Attorney-General was denying to Senators the consideration which the President himself was recognizing daily.

President Grant looked upon members of his Cabinet as his family for the management of civil affairs, as he had looked upon his staff as his military family for the conduct of the army, and he regarded a recommendation for a Cabinet appointment as an interference. His first Cabinet was organized upon that theory somewhat modified by a reference to locality. Mr. Borie who became Secretary of the Navy was a most excellent man, but he had had no preparation either by training or experience for the duties of a department. Of this he was quite conscious, and he never attempted to conceal the fact. He often said:

"The department is managed by Admiral Porter, I am only a figure-head."

In a few months he resigned. His associates were much attached to him. He was a benevolent, genial, well informed man. His successor, Mr. Robeson, was a man of singular ability, lacking only the habit of careful, continuous industry. This failing contributed to his misfortunes in administration and consequently he was the subject of many attacks in the newspapers and in Congress. After his retirement he became a member of the House of Representatives, and it was a noticeable fact, that from that day the attacks in Congress ceased. As a debater he was well equipped, and in reference to his administration of the Navy Department, he was always prepared with an answer or an explanation in every exigency.

The appointment of Governor Fish to the Department of State, gave rise to considerable adverse comment. The chief grounds of complaint were that he was no longer young and that recently he had not been active in political contests. He had been a Whig when there was a Whig Party, and he became a Republican when the Republican Party was formed. As a Whig he had been a member of the House of Representatives and of the Senate of the United States, but he had not held office as a Republican, nor was he known generally as a speaker or writer in support of the policies or principles of the party. His age, then about sixty, was urged as a reason against his appointment. His selection as Secretary was extremely fortunate for General Grant and his administration. Governor Fish was painstaking in his office, exacting in his demands upon subordinates, without being harsh or unjust, diligent in his duties, and fully informed as to the traditions and usages of his department. Beyond these administrative qualities he had the capacity to place every question of a diplomatic character upon a foundation at once reasonable and legal. If the failure of Mr. Stewart led to the appointment of Governor Fish the change was fortunate for General Grant and the country. After the failure of Mr. Stewart, Mr. Washburne spoke of his appointment to the State Department, as only temporary, but for a few days he acted as though he expected to remain permanently. If his transfer to France was an afterthought, he and the President very carefully concealed that fact. It is not probable that the President at the outset designed to take the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury from New York City. Hence I infer that the failure of Mr. Stewart worked a change in the headship of the State Department, and hence I am of the opinion that the failure of Mr. Stewart was of great advantage to the administration and to the country, and that without considering whether there was a gain or loss in the Treasury Department. There can be no doubt that Governor Fish was a much wiser man than Mr. Washburne for the management of foreign affairs and there can be as little doubt that Mr. Washburne could not have been excelled as Minister to Paris in the troublous period of the years 1870 and 1871.

Mr. Fish had no ambitions beyond the proper and successful administration of his own department. He did not aspire to the Presidency, and he remained in the State Department during General Grant's second term, at the special request of the President.

Mr. Sumner's removal from the chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Relations was due to the fact that a time came when he did not recognize the President, and when he declined to have any intercourse with the Secretary of State outside of official business. Such a condition of affairs is always a hindrance in the way of good government, and it may become an obstacle to success. Good government can be secured only through conferences with those who are responsible, by conciliation, and not infrequently by concessions to the holders of adverse opinions. The time came when such a condition was no longer possible between Mr. Sumner and the Secretary of State.

The President and his Cabinet were in accord in regard to the controversy with Great Britain as to the Alabama Claims. Mr. Sumner advocated a more exacting policy. Mr. Motley appeared to be following Mr. Sumner's lead, and the opposition to Mr. Sumner extended to Mr. Motley. It had happened that the President had taken on a prejudice to Mr. Motley at their first interview. This I learned when I said something to the President in the line of conciliation. The President said: "Such was my impression of Motley when I saw him that I should have withheld his appointment if I had not made a promise to Sumner." My acquaintance with Mr. Motley began in the year 1849, when we were members of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and I had a high regard for him, although it had been charged that I had had some part in driving him from politics into literature.

When we consider the natures and the training of the two men, it is not easy to imagine agreeable co-operation in public affairs by Mr. Sumner and General Grant. Mr. Sumner never believed in General Grant's fitness for the office of President, and General Grant did not recognize in Mr. Sumner a wise and safe leader in the business of government. General Grant's notion of Mr. Sumner, on one side of his character, may be inferred from his answer when, being asked if he had heard Mr. Sumner converse, he said: "No, but I have heard him lecture."

As I am to speak of Mr. Sumner in our personal relations, which for thirteen years before his death were intimate, I shall use some words of preface. Never on more than two occasions did we have differences that caused any feeling on either side. Mr. Sumner was chairman in the Senate of the Committee on the Freedmen's Bureau, and Mr. Eliot was chairman of the Committee of the House. A report was made in each House, and each bill contained not less than twenty sections. Each House passed its own bill. A committee of conference was appointed. Its report was rejected. I was appointed a member of the second committee.

I examined the bills, and I marked out every section that was not essential to the working of the measure. Four sections remained. I then added a section which provided for the lease and ultimate sale of the confiscated lands to the freedmen and refugees. President Johnson's restoration of those lands made that section non-operative. The committee, upon the motion of General Schenck, transferred the jurisdiction of the Bureau from the Treasury to the War Department. The bill was accepted by the committee, and passed by the two Houses.

When within a few days I was in the Senate Chamber, Mr. Sumner came to me, and said in substance: "The Freedmen's Bureau Bill as it passed is of no value. I have spent six months upon the bill, and my work has gone for nothing. You and General Schenck cannot pretend to know as much as I know about the measure."

With some feeling, which was not justifiable, I said: "I have not spent six hours upon the measure, but after what you have said I will say that the fifth section is of more value than all the sections which you have written." I did not wait for a reply. The subject was not again mentioned; our friendly relations were not disturbed, and it is to Mr. Sumner's credit on the score of toleration that he passed over my rough remarks, even though he had given some reason for a retort.

My next difference from Mr. Sumner was a more serious difference, but it passed without any break in our relations. He had not acquired the church-going habit, or he had renounced it, and my church-going was spasmodic rather than systematic. Thus it became possible and agreeable for me to spend some small portion of each Sunday in his rooms. The controversy over Mr. Motley and his removal from the post of minister to Great Britain excited Mr. Sumner to a point far beyond any excitement to which he yielded, arising from his own troubles or from the misfortunes of the country. To him it was the topic of conversation at all times and in all places. That habit I accepted at his house with as much complacency as I could command. Indeed, I was not much disturbed by what he said to me in private, and certainly not by what he said in his own house, where I went from choice, and without any obligation to remain resting upon me. In all his conversation he made General Grant responsible for the removal of Motley, accompanied, usually, with language of censure and condemnation. On two occasions that were in a measure public, one of which was at a dinner given to me by Mr. Franklin Haven, a personal friend of twenty years' standing, when he insisted upon holding the Motley incident as the topic of conversation. On one of these occasions, and in excitement, he turned to me and said: "Boutwell, you ought to have resigned when Motley was removed."

I said only in reply: "I am the custodian of my own duty."

This was the only personal remark that I ever made to Mr. Sumner in connection with the removal of Motley. The removal was the only reasonable solution of the difficulty in which Motley was involved; but I sympathized with him in the disaster which had overtaken him, and I was not disposed to discuss the subject. The incident at the dinner led me to make a resolution. I called upon Mr. Sumner, and without accepting a seat, I said: "Senator, if you ever mention General Grant's name in my presence, I will never again cross your threshold."

Without the delay of half a minute he said: "Agreed."

There the matter ended, and the promise was kept. In 1872, and not many days before he left for Europe, he said: "I want to ask you a question about General Grant."

I said: "You know that that is a forbidden topic."

"Yes, but I am not going to speak controversially."

I said: "Say on."

He said: "What do you think of Grant's election?"

I said: "I think he will be elected."

He held up his hands, and in a tone of grief said: "You and Wilson are the only ones who tell me that he has any chance."

Upon his return from Europe it was apparent that his feelings in regard to the Republican Party, and especially in regard to General Grant, had undergone a great change. Our conversations concerning General Grant were resumed free from all restrictions, and without any disturbance of feeling on my part. Not many months before his death Mr. Sumner made a speech in executive session that was conciliatory and just in a marked degree. I urged him to repeat it in public session. He seemed to regard the suggestion with favor, but the speech was not made.

For many years Mr. Sumner had been borne down under the resolutions of censure passed by the State of Massachusetts in disapproval of his position in regard to the return of Confederate flags. That resolution was rescinded at the winter session of 1874. The act brought to Mr. Sumner the highest degree of satisfaction that it was possible for him to realize. Above all things else of a public nature, he cherished the good name of the commonwealth, and for himself there was nothing more precious than her approval. The blow was unexpected, its weight was great, and its weight was never lessened until it was wholly removed. The rescinding resolutions came to me the Saturday next preceding the Wednesday when Mr. Sumner died. I was then in ill health, so ill that my attendance at the Senate did not exceed one half of each day's session through many weeks. Mr. Sumner called upon me to inquire, and anxious to know, whether I could attend the session of Monday and present the resolutions. I gave him the best assurance that my condition permitted. When the resolutions had been presented, and when I was leaving the chamber, Mr. Sumner came to me, and, putting his arm over my shoulder, he walked with me into the lobby, where, after many thanks by him, and with good wishes for my health, we parted, without a thought by me that he had not before him many years of rugged life. For several years previous to 1874, Mr. Sumner had been accustomed to speak of himself as an old man, and on more than one occasion he spoke of life as a burden. To these utterances I gave but little heed.

The chief assurance for any considerable well-doing in the world is to be found in good purposes and in fixedness of purpose when a purpose has been formed. These characteristics were Mr. Sumner's possession, but in him they were subject to very important limitations as powers in practical affairs. He did not exhibit respect or deference for the opinions of others even when the parties were upon a plane of equality, as is the usual situation in legislative bodies. He could not concede small points for the sake of a great result. Hence it was that measures in which he had an interest took on a form at the end that was not agreeable to him. Hence it is that he has left only one piece of legislation that is distinctly the work of his hand. When the bill was under consideration which denied to colored persons the privilege of naturalization in the United States, he secured an amendment by which the exclusion was limited to the Mongolian race. His declaration as to the status of the States that had been in rebellion was not far away from the policy that was adopted finally, but he did not accept as wise and necessary measures the amendments to the Constitution which were designed to make that policy permanent. Indeed, it was his opinion, at one period of the controversy over the question of negro suffrage, that a legislative declaration would be sufficient. The field of his success is to be found in the argumentative power that he possessed and in its use for the overthrow of slavery. Of the anti-slavery advocates who entered the Senate previous to the opening of the war, he was the best equipped in learning, and his influence in the country was not surpassed by the influence of any one of his associates. In his knowledge of diplomacy, he had the first rank in the Senate for the larger part of his career. His influence in the Senate was measured, however, by his influence in the country. His speeches, especially in the period of national controversy, were addressed to the country. He relied upon authorities and precedents. His powers as a debater were limited, and it followed inevitably that in purely parliamentary contests he was not a match for such masters as Fessenden and Conkling, who in learning were his inferiors.

My means for information are so limited that I do not express an opinion upon the question whether Mr. Sumner's ambitions in public life were or were not gratified. On one or two occasions he let fall remarks which indicated a willingness to be transferred to the Department of State. Major Ben. Perley Poore had received the impression that there was a time when Mr. Sumner looked to the Presidency as a possibility. At an accidental meeting with Major Poore, he said to me: "I have dined with Sumner, and he gave me an account of the conversation he had with you this morning, in which you consoled him for not gaining the Presidency."

I recalled the conversation. It was a Sunday-morning talk, and there was no special purpose on my part, however my remarks may have been received by Mr. Sumner. He spoke of the opportunity furnished to Mr. Jefferson for the exposition of his views in his first inaugural address. I then proceeded to say that, omitting the incumbent of the office, of whom nothing could then be said, not more than three or four men had gained in standing by their elevation to the Presidency, beyond the fact that their names were upon the roll. The exceptions were, first of all, Lincoln, who had gained most. Then Jackson, who had gained something—indeed, a good deal by his defence of the Union when compared with what he might have lost by neglect of duty in the days of nullification. Washington had gained much by demonstrating his capacity for civil affairs, by the legacy of his farewell address, and by the shaping of the new government under the Constitution in a manner calculated to strengthen the quality of perpetuity. At the end, I claimed that the other occupants of the Presidential office had not gained appreciably by their promotion.

In two important particulars, Samuel Adams and Charles Sumner are parallel characters in American history. Mr. Adams was a leader in the contest that the colonies carried on against Great Britain. Our legal standing in the controversy with the mother country has never elsewhere been presented as forcibly and logically as it was stated by Mr. Adams in his letters to the royal governors in the name of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, between the years 1764 and 1775. When the contest of words and of arms was over he was not only not an aid in the organization of the new Government, but he was an obstacle to its success. He accepted the Constitution with hesitation and under constraint. After the overthrow of slavery and the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Mr. Sumner gave no wise aid to the work of reconstructing the government upon the basis of the new conditions that had been created by the war and by the abolition of slavery. As every guarantee for freedom contains some element of enslavement over or against some who are not within the guarantee, men sometimes hesitate as to the wisdom of accepting guarantees of rights in one direction which work a limitation of rights or privileges in other directions. The Constitution of the United States, while it gave power to the body of States and guaranteed security to each yet deprived the individual States of many of the privileges and powers that they had enjoyed as colonies. Every amendment to the Constitution, from the first to the last, has limited the application of the doctrine of home rule in government.

Upon the election of Mr. Wilson to the office of Vice-President, I was chosen by the Legislature of Massachusetts as his successor in the Senate. I left the Treasury and General Grant's Cabinet with reluctance, but my experience in both branches of the government had led me to prefer the legislative branch, where there is at least more freedom of action than can be had in the executive department. This opinion is in no sense due to the nature of my relations with General Grant. His military habits led him to put responsibility upon subordinates and this habit he carried into civil affairs.

Moreover, in my own case, he recognized that fact that I had accepted the place upon his urgent request, command indeed, and not to gratify any ambition of my own. And further, I think I may assume, that his confidence was such that he was content to leave the department in my hands. During my time he put only one person—General Pleasanton— into the department, and he never commanded or required the removal of any one. On a few occasions he named persons whom he said he would be glad to have employed if places could be found. They were always soldiers, or widows or children of soldiers, and he never forgot his suggestions, nor allowed the passage of time to diminish his interest in such cases.

The important places in New York, Chicago, St. Louis, Cincinnati, New Orleans and Philadelphia were filled by him, usually upon consultation, but upon his judgment. He gave very little attention to others beyond signing the commissions. I often called his attention to the more important ones, but it was his practice to send applicants and their friends to me with the remark that the business was in my hands.

By this course the President avoided much labor, and escaped some responsibility. The disappointed ones charged their misfortunes to the Secretary, and the President was able to say that he knew nothing of the case, etc., etc.

I have reason to believe that the President did not exhibit equal confidence in my successors, especially in Mr. Bristow. The President received the impression very early, that Bristow was engaged in a scheme to secure the nomination by an alliance with the enemies of General Grant. In my time three Secretaries of the Treasury attempted in turn to secure a nomination for the Presidency through the influence and patronage of that department. All were failures, and failures well deserved.

Such a policy breeds corruption inevitably. Venal men aspiring to place, avow themselves the friends of the Secretary, and if through such avowals they secure appointments, the offices will be used for improper purposes.

My successor, Judge Richardson, had been Assistant Secretary for three years and more, and no one could have surpassed him in industry, fidelity and knowledge of the business. I recommended his appointment. The President hesitated, but he finally nominated him to the Senate, and the nomination was confirmed.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL GRANT UPON MY RESIGNATION OF THE OFFICE OF SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

WASHINGTON, March 17, 1873.

SIR: Having been elected to the Senate of the United States by the Legislature of Massachusetts, I tender my resignation of the office of Secretary of the Treasury.

In severing my official relations with you it is a great satisfaction to me that on all occasions you have given me full confidence and support in the discharge of my public duties.

In these four years my earlier acquaintance with you has ripened into earnest personal friendship, which, I am confident, will remain unbroken. I am Yours very truly, GEO. S. BOUTWELL. TO THE PRESIDENT.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, March 17, 1873.

HON. GEO. S. BOUTWELL, Dear Sir:— In accepting your resignation of the office of Secretary of the Treasury, an office which you have filled for four years with such satisfaction to the country, allow me to express the regret I feel at severing official relations which have been at all times so agreeable to me, and,—as I am assured by your letter of resignation,—to you also. Your administration of the important trust confided to you four years since, has been so admirably conducted as to give the greatest satisfaction to me because as I read public judgment and opinion it has been satisfactory to the country. The policy pursued in the office of Secretary of the Treasury by your successor I hope may be as successful as yours has been, and that no departure from it will be made except such as experience and change of circumstances may make necessary.

Among your new official associates I trust you will find the same warm friends and co-workers that you leave in the Executive branch of the government.

You take with you my most sincere well wishes for your success as a legislator and as a citizen, and the assurance of my desire to continue the warm personal relations that have existed between us during the whole of our official connection. Very truly yours, U. S. GRANT.

XXXVIII GENERAL GRANT AS A STATESMAN*

General Grant's father was a Whig and an admirer and supporter of Mr. Clay. The public policy of Mr. Clay embraced three great measures: First, a national bank, or a fiscal agency as an aid to the Treasury in the collection and disbursement of the public revenues; secondly, a system of internal improvements to be created at the public expense and controlled by the National Government; and, thirdly, a tariff system which should protect the American laborer against the active competition of the laborers of other countries who were compelled to work for smaller compensation.

From the year 1834 to the year 1836 the country was engaged in an active controversy over the policy of the Whig Party, of which Mr. Clay was then the recognized head. Indeed, the controversy began as early as the year 1824, and it contributed, more than all other causes, to the new organization of parties under the leadership, respectively, of Mr. Clay and General Jackson.

General Grant was educated under these influences, and in the belief that the policy of the Whig Party would best promote the prosperity of the country. Those early impressions ripened into opinions, which he held and on which he acted during his public life. It happened by the force of circumstances that the Republican Party was compelled to adopt the policy of Mr. Clay—not in measures, but in the ideas on which his policy was based. It is not now necessary to inquire whether the weight of argument was with Mr. Clay or with his opponents. The war made inevitable the adoption of a policy which Mr. Clay had advocated as expedient and wise.

The Pacific Railways were built by the aid of the Government and under the pressure of a general public opinion that the East must be brought into a more intimate connection with our possessions on the Pacific Ocean, for mutual support and for the common defence.

The national banking system was established for the purpose of securing the aid of the banks as purchasers and negotiators of the bonds of the Government, at a time when the public credit was so impaired that it seemed impossible to command the funds necessary for the prosecution of the war.

The same exigency compelled Congress to enact, and the country to accept, a tariff system more protective in its provisions than any scheme ever suggested by Mr. Clay. The necessities of the times compelled free-traders, even, to accept the revenue system with its protective features; but General Grant accepted it as a system in harmony alike with his early impressions and with his matured opinions.

It has happened, by the force of events, that the policy of the old Whig Party has been revived in the national banking system, while the Independent Treasury, the leading measure of the old Democratic Party, has been preserved in all its features as the guide of the Treasury Department in its financial operations.

When General Grant became President, these three measures had been incorporated into the policy of the Republican Party. Their full acceptance by him did not require any change of opinion on his part. It was true that he had voted for Mr. Buchanan in 1856; but his vote was given in obedience to an impression that he had received touching the qualifications of General Fremont. The fact that he had voted for Mr. Buchanan excited suspicions in the minds of some Republicans, and it engendered hopes in the bosoms of some Democrats that he might act in harmony with the Democratic Party. The suspicions and the hopes were alike groundless.

As early as the month of August, 1863, in a letter to Mr. E. B. Washburne, he said: "It became patent to my mind early in the rebellion that the North and South could never live at peace with each other except as one nation, and that without slavery. As anxious as I am to see peace established, I would not, therefore, be willing to see any settlement until this question is forever settled."

Thus was General Grant, at an early moment, and upon his own judgment, brought into full accord with the Republican Party upon the two debatable and most earnestly debated questions during Mr. Lincoln's administration—the prosecution of the war and the abolition of slavery.

And thus it is apparent that in 1868 he was in a condition, as to all matters of opinion, to accept a nomination at the hands of the Republican Party; and it is equally apparent that he was separated from the Democratic Party by a chasm wide, deep, and impassable. It is, however, true that General Grant's feelings were not intense, and in the expression of his opinions his tone was mild and his manner gentle. It often happened, also, that he did not undertake to controvert opinions and expressions with which he had no sympathy. This peculiarity may at times have led to a misunderstanding, or to a misinterpretation of his views. Upon this basis of his early impressions, and matured opinions his administrative policy was constructed.

When he became President, there was a body of American citizens, not inconsiderable in numbers, who doubted the ability of the Government to pay the war debt; there were others who advocated payment in greenbacks, or the substitution of a note not bearing interest for a bond that bore interest; and there were yet others who denied the validity of the existing obligations. All these classes, whether they were dishonest or only misled, were alike rebuked in his inaugural address. These were his words: "A great debt has been contracted in securing to us and to our posterity the Union. The payment of this debt, principal and interest, as well as the return to a specie basis, as soon as it can be accomplished without material detriment to the debtor class, or to the country at large, must be provided for. . . . To protect the national honor, every dollar of Government indebtedness should be paid in gold, unless otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract. . . .

"Let it be understood that no repudiator of one farthing of our public debt will be trusted in public place, and it will go far toward strengthening a credit which ought to be the best in the world, and will ultimately enable us to replace the debt with bonds bearing less interest than we now pay."

In the same address he asserted the ability of the country to pay the debt within the period of twenty-five years, and he also declared his purpose to secure a faithful collection of the public revenues. At the close of his administration of eight years one fifth part of the public debt had been paid, and if the system of taxation that existed in 1869 had been continued the debt would have been extinguished in less than a quarter of a century from the year 1869. In his administration, however, the crisis was passed. The ability and the disposition of the country were made so conspicuous that all honest doubts were removed, and the repudiators were shamed into silence. The redemption of the debt by the purchase of bonds in the open market strengthened the public credit, and laid a foundation for the resumption of specie payments.

General Grant's inaugural address was followed by the passage of the act of March 18, 1869, entitled "An act to strengthen the public credit." This act was a pledge to the world that the debts of the United States, unless there were in the obligations express stipulations to the contrary, would be paid in coin.

In accordance with the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, President Grant, in his annual message of December, 1869, recommended the passage of an act authorizing the funding of the public debt at a lower rate of interest.

Following this recommendation, the bill for refunding the public debt, prepared by the Secretary of the Treasury, was enacted and approved July 14, 1870.

By this act the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to issue bonds to the amount of $200,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 5 per cent, $300,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 4 1/2 per cent, and $1,000,000,000 bearing interest at the rate of 4 per cent.

Under this act, and the amendments thereto, the debt has been refunded from time to time until the average rate of interest does not now exceed 3 1/2 per cent. Although these two important measures of administration were not prepared by General Grant, they were but the execution of his policy set forth in his inaugural address.

In respect to the rights of the negro race, General Grant must be ranked with the advanced portion of the Republican Party. Upon the capture of Fort Donelson, a number of slaves fell into the hands of the Union army. General Grant issued an order, dated Feb. 26, 1862, in which he authorized their employment for the benefit of the Government, and at the close he said that under no circumstances would he permit their return to their masters.

In his inaugural address he urged the States to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment, and its ratification was due, probably, to his advice. At that moment his influence was very great. It may well be doubted whether any other President ever enjoyed the confidence of the country in as high a degree. He gave to that measure the weight of his opinion and the official influence of his administration. The amendment was opposed by the Democratic Party generally, and a considerable body of Republicans questioned its wisdom. General Grant was responsible for the ratification of the amendment. Had he advised its rejection, or had he been indifferent to its fate, the amendment would have failed, and the country would have been left to a succession of bitter controversies arising from the application of the second section of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provided that the representation of a State should be based upon the number of male citizens over twenty-one years of age entitled to vote.

General Grant accepted the plan of Congress in regard to the reconstruction of the Union. There were three opinions that had obtained a lodgment in the public mind. President Johnson and his supporters claimed that the President held the power by virtue of his office to convene the people of the respective States, and that under his direction constitutions might be framed, and that Senators and Representatives might be chosen who would be entitled to seats in Congress, as though they represented States that had not been engaged in secession and war. Others maintained that neither by the ordinances of secession nor by the war had the States of the Confederacy been disturbed in their legal relations to the Union.

It was the theory of the Republican Party in Congress that the eleven States by their own acts had destroyed their legal relations to the Union; that the jurisdiction of the National Government over the territory of the seceding States was full and complete; and that, as a result of the war, the National Government could hold them in a Territorial condition and subject to military rule. Upon this theory the re-appearance of a seceded State as a member of the Union was made to depend upon the assent of Congress, with the approval of the President, or upon an act of Congress by a two-thirds vote over a Presidential veto.

General Grant sustained the policy of Congress during the long and bitter contest with President Johnson, and when he became President he accepted that policy without reserve in the case of the restoration of the States of Virginia, Georgia, Texas, and Mississippi. Upon this statement it appears that General Grant was a Republican, and that he became a Republican by processes that preclude the suggestion that his nomination for the Presidency wrought any change in his position upon questions of principle or policy in the affairs of government. Indeed, his nomination in 1868 was distasteful to him, as he then preferred to remain at the head of the army. It was in the nature of things, however, that he should have wished for re-election. He was re- elected, and at the end of his second term he accepted a return to private life as a relief from the cares and duties of office. The support which he received for the nomination in 1880 was not due to any effort on his part. Not even to his warmest supporters did he express a wish, or dictate or advise an act. His only utterance was a message to four of his friends at the Chicago Convention, that whatever they might do in the premises would be acceptable to him. His political career was marked by the same abstention from personal effort for personal advancement that distinguished him as an officer of the army. But he did not bring into civil affairs the habits of command that were the necessity of military life. Although by virtue of his position he was the recognized head of the Republican Party, he made no effort to control its action. Wherever he placed power, there he reposed trust.

There was not in General Grant's nature any element of suspicion, and his confidence in his friends was free and full. Hence it happened that he had many occasions for regret.

On no man in public life in this generation were there more frequent charges and insinuations of wrong-doing, and in this generation there has been no man in public life who was freer from all occasion for such insinuations and charges.

When he heard that the Treasury Department was purchasing bullion of a company in which he was a stockholder, he sold his shares without delay, and without reference to the market price or to their real value.

General Grant had no disposition to usurp power. He had no policy to impose upon the country against the popular will. This was shown in the treatment of the Santo Domingo question. General Grant was not indisposed to see the territories of the Republic extended, but his love of justice and fair dealing was such that he would have used only honorable means in his intercourse with other nations. Santo Domingo was a free offering, and he thought that its possession would be advantageous to the country.

Yet he never made it an issue, even in his Cabinet, where, as he well knew, very serious doubts existed as to the expediency of the measure. He was deeply pained by the unjust attacks and groundless criticism of which he was the subject, but he accepted the adverse judgment of the Senate as a constitutional binding decision of the question, and of that decision he never complained.

In a message to the Senate of the 31st of May, 1870, he urged the annexation of Santo Domingo. He said, "I feel an unusual anxiety for the ratification of this treaty, because I believe it will redound greatly to the glory of the two countries interested, to civilization, and to the extirpation of the institution of slavery." He claimed for the scheme great commercial advantages, that it was in harmony with the Monroe doctrine, and that the consummation of the measure would be notice to the states of Europe that no acquisitions of territory on this continent would be permitted. In his second inaugural address General Grant referred to the subject in these words: "In the first year of the past administration the proposition came up for the admission of Santo Domingo as a Territory of the Union. . . . I believe now, as I did then, that it was for the best interests of this country, for the people of Santo Domingo, and all concerned, that the proposition should be received favorably. It was, however, rejected constitutionally, and therefore the subject was never brought up again by me." General Grant considered the failure of the treaty as a national misfortune, but he never criticised the action of its opponents.

General Grant's firmness was shown in his veto of the Senate currency bill of 1874. It is known that unusual effort was made to convince him that the measure was wise in a financial view, and highly expedient upon political grounds. The President wrote a message in explanation of his act of approval, but upon its completion he was so much dissatisfied with his own argument that he resolved to veto the bill. Hence the veto message of April 22, 1874.

In foreign policy, the principal measure of General Grant's administration was the treaty with Great Britain of May, 1871. The specific and leading purpose of the negotiations was the adjustment of the claim made by the United States that Great Britain was liable in damages for the destruction of American vessels, and the consequent loss of commercial power and prestige, by the depredations of Confederate cruisers that were fitted out or had obtained supplies in British ports. Neither the treaty of peace of 1783, nor the subsequent treaties with Great Britain, made a full and final settlement of the fishery question or of our northern boundary-line at its junction with the Pacific Ocean. These outlying questions were considered in the negotiations, and they were adjusted by the terms of the treaty. The jurisdiction of the island of San Juan on the Pacific coast, then in controversy, was referred to the Emperor of Germany as arbitrator, with full and final power in the premises. By his award the claim of the United States was sustained.

The fishery question was referred to arbitrators, but it was a misfortune that the award was not satisfactory to the United States, and the dispute is reopened with capacity to vex the two governments for an indefinite period of time.

The claims against Great Britain growing out of the operations of the Confederate cruisers, known as the Alabama claims, were referred to arbitrators, by whose award the Government of the United States received the sum of $15,500,000. But the value of the treaty of 1871 was not in the award made. The people of the United States were embittered against the Government of Great Britain, and had General Grant chosen to seek redress by arms he would have been sustained throughout the North with substantial unanimity. But General Grant was destitute of the war spirit, and he chose to exhaust all the powers of negotiation before he would advise a resort to force. A passage in his inaugural address may have had an influence upon the policy of the British Government: "In regard to foreign policy, I would deal with nations as equitable law requires individuals to deal with each other. . . . I would respect the rights of all nations, demanding equal respect for our own. If others depart from this rule in their dealings with us, we may be compelled to follow their precedent."

The reference of the question at issue to the tribunal at Geneva was a conspicuous instance of the adjustment of a grave international dispute by peaceful methods.

By the sixth article of the treaty of 1871, three new rules were made for the government of neutral nations. These rules are binding upon the United States and Great Britain, and the contracting parties agreed to bring them to the knowledge of other maritime powers, and to invite such powers to accede to the rules.

In those rules it is stipulated that a neutral nation should not permit a belligerent to fit out, arm, or equip in its ports any vessel which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or carry on war against a power with which it is at peace. It was further agreed, as between the parties to the treaty, that neither would suffer a belligerent to make use of its ports or waters as a base of operations against the other. Finally, the parties agreed to use due diligence to prevent any infraction of the rules so established.

Mr. Fish was then Secretary of State, and to him was General Grant and the country largely indebted for the settlement of the Alabama controversy; but the settlement was in harmony with General Grant's inaugural address.

Before the final adjustment of the controversy, by the decision of the tribunal at Geneva, General Grant had occasion to consider whether the allegation against Great Britain, growing out of her recognition, in May, 1861, of the belligerent character of the Confederacy, could be maintained upon the principles of public law. Upon his own judgment he reached the conclusion that the act was an act of sovereignty within the discretion of the ruler, for which a claim in money could not be made. This opinion was accepted, finally, by his advisers, by the negotiators, and by the country.

General Grant was not a trained statesman. His methods of action were direct and clear. His conduct was free from duplicity, and artifice of every sort was foreign to his nature. In the first years of his administration he relied upon his Cabinet in all minor matters relating to the departments. Acting upon military ideas, he held the head of a department to his full responsibility, and he waited, consequently, until his opinion was sought or his instructions were solicited.

In his conferences with the members of his Cabinet he expressed his opinions with the greatest freedom, and, upon discussion, he often yielded to the suggestions or arguments of others. He was so great that it was not a humiliation to acknowledge a change in opinion, or to admit an error in policy or purpose.

In his intercourse with members of Congress upon the business of the Government, he gave his opinions without reserve when he had reached definite conclusions, but he often remained a silent listener to the discussion of topics which he had not considered maturely.

His politics were not narrow nor exclusive. He believed in the growth of the country, and in the power of republican ideas. He was free from race prejudice, and free from national jealousy, but he believed in the enlargement of our territory by peaceful means, in the spread of republican institutions, and in the predominance of the English- speaking race in the affairs of the world.

The spirit of philanthropy animated his politics, and the doctrines of peace controlled his public policy.

[* This article was printed in Appleton's Cyclopedia for the year 1885. Copyright, 1886, by D. Appleton & Co.]

XXXIX REMINISCENCES OF PUBLIC MEN

GENERAL BANKS

Of the men whom I have known in public affairs, General Banks was in his personality one of a small number who were always agreeable and permanently attractive. He was the possessor of an elastic spirit; he was always hopeful of the future and in adversity he saw or fancied that he saw, days of prosperity for himself, for his party, for the commonwealth and for the country. His interest in the fortunes of the laboring classes was a permanent interest, and they are largely indebted to him for the passage of the eight-hour law by the Congress of the United States. Not infrequently his thoughts and schemes were too vast for realization. While the contest in Kansas was going on, he suggested an organization of capitalists for the purchase of the low-priced lands in Delaware, then a sale to Northern farmers and the conversion of Delaware into a free State.

His studies in law had been fragmentary and superficial, and nature had not endowed him with all the qualities that are essential to the successful lawyer. His reading on the literary side was considerable, especially in the Spanish language. Early in life he accepted the idea that our relations with the Spanish race were to be intimate in a not far off future. He was a careful observer of character, and of conditions in affairs, and in a free debate he was never in peril of being overmatched. Of a mutual friend and an associate in politics he said: "He has no serious side to his character—a defect that has been the bane of many otherwise able men."

When the coalition came into power Banks was made speaker of the Massachusetts House of Representatives. Wilson was president of the Senate and I was in the office of Governor. In an evening stroll with Banks around Boston Common, engaged in a survey of public affairs, he changed the conversation suddenly with the remark: "It's almighty queer that the people of this commonwealth have put their government into the hands of men who have no last and usual place of abode." The pertinency of this remark is to be found in the facts to which it was applicable. There were some men of wealth in the Coalition Party but the three places that I have named were held by men who were destitute of even the means of well-to-do mechanics and tradespeople.

Mr. Banks had power in repartee which made him a formidable adversary in parliamentary debate. When he was a mechanic at Waltham he took an active part in temperance meetings. At one of the meetings a Unitarian clergyman of conservative leanings, made a speech in which he criticized the speeches and said finally: "I do not attend the meetings because I cannot approve of what I hear said." He then referred to Mr. Banks as a young man who was guilty of indiscretions in speech. He had seen him once only at his church. He had made inquiries of his brethren and he could not learn that Mr. Banks was a regular attendant at any church. Banks in reply admitted that he had been in the church of the reverend gentleman but once, and that he was not a regular attendant at any church. Said he: "I do not go to church because I hear things said there which I do not approve." The reverend gentleman was forced to join in the general laugh which was raised at his expense.

Two extracts from General Banks' letters, written to me during the war may give an idea of his characteristics in his maturer years.

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP AT DAMSTOWN, MD. October 15, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR:— I received your letter of the 8th inst . . . and also one of an earlier date.

I am very glad to hear from you. I see few people and hear little news from home. Newspapers I have little relish for and scarcely time to read them, if I had.

I am glad to know that you contemplate the army for a pursuit. Our people will in the end surrender all business except that of the war, and that which pertains to the war. Our country is in a sad condition. It is already clear that the influence of France and England is against us. How sadly all our anticipations in regard to the war have failed us,—the insurrection of the blacks, the material deficiencies of the South, their want of men, and worst of all the friendship or the indifference of England. We have now, or shall have by and by to do what we should have done at the start, rely upon ourselves and prepare for our work upon a scale proportionate to its magnitude. It would amuse you to know how far the highest civil authority is subordinated to military direction. I do not doubt in the slightest degree the success of the Government in the end, but it grieves me to see how slow we have been and still are in comprehension and preparation.

This continent is just as important to England and France as it is to us. It is hardly to be doubted that they will postpone all international questions, and secure what has never before been offered to them—a controlling foothold here. How many times I have spoken to you in the old Executive Chamber of the importance to the whole world of the possession of Mexico—and of the power it would infallibly give to this continent, as in Europe to those who possessed it. And now Spain, France, and England are there. "Birnam Wood has to great Dunsinane come." There is but one remedy for us. Every male creature born and unborn must become a soldier. Soldiers do not criticize, so you must consider this Private. And believe me very truly yours, etc. N. P. BANKS.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE GULF. New Orleans, 27 Decr. 1863.

MY DEAR SIR:— I have written to the President upon the subject of a free State organization in Louisiana. It appears quite certain to me that the course pursued here by the officers to whom the matter is entrusted will not lead to an early or a certain result. It will not be accomplished sooner than August or September, and then will be involved in the struggles of the Presidential contest, and very likely share the fate of that struggle. It certainly ought not to be dependent upon that issue, and settled, not only independent of it, but before it opens. It can be easily done, in March. A Free State government upon the basis of immediate emancipation can be acquired as early as March with the general consent of the People, and without any material opposition, in such a manner as to draw after it all the Southern States, on the same basis, and by the same general consent. But it cannot be done in the manner now proposed here. It is upon this subject that I have written the President. Three months ago I wrote him upon the same idea but did not send my letter. Subsequent reflection and inquiry have made the theory so clear to mind that I felt impelled to put my views before him. I write this as from the request of my previous letter you may have spoken to him upon the subject of the Depart't and the reorganization of the State. The election of next year does not seem as clear to me as it appears to you. I fancy it to be a struggle between the Democratic Party, backed by the entire power of the regular army and the People. It will be a contest of great violence.

* * * * * * * * The report of General Halleck is singularly incorrect, in its references to the Department—so much so that it is impossible to attribute them to anything else but misapprehension of facts. I refer to that which relates to Galveston, and the movement against Port Hudson in April. If it were not so palpable, I shd think the Department hostile & shd be very glad to know if you see or hear anything to indicate such feeling towards me. General Wilson would probably know the facts.

The Austrian Consul here, said to me the other day that he was confident that Maximilian would not go to Mexico. He is a sensible and well informed man, and I have confidence in his opinion. I shall send you by Satds mail three despatches from Europe of recent date.

Very truly yours, N. P. BANKS. M. G. C. HON. GEO. S. BOUTWELL.

As the conclusion of my remarks upon General Banks, I refer to my final and unexaggerated estimate of General Banks as given in the chapter on the Legislature of 1849 (Chapter XIV).

GENERAL SHERMAN, GENERAL SHERIDAN AND GENERAL GRANT.

The death of General Sherman removed the last member of the triumvirate of soldiers who achieved the highest distinction in the Civil War. In the Senate one speaker gave him the highest place, but on the contrary I cannot rank him above either Grant or Sheridan. When we consider the vastness of the command with which Grant was entrusted through a period of more than a year, the magnitude and success of his operations, and the tenacity with which he prosecuted all his varied undertakings, it must appear that neither Sherman nor Sheridan was entitled to the position of a rival. As to Sherman, I can say from a long and intimate acquaintance with him, and under circumstances when his real feeling would have been disclosed, that he never assumed an equality with Grant.

As between Sherman and Sheridan it is not easy to settle the question of pre-eminence. For myself the test would be this: Assume that Grant had disappeared during the Battle of the Wilderness, would the fortunes of the country have been best promoted, probably, by the appointment of Sherman or Sheridan? I cannot now say what my opinion would have been in 1864, but I should now have pronounced for Sheridan. He was more cool and careful in regard to the plan of operations and equally bold and vigorous in execution. General Grant expressed the opinion to me in conversation that Sheridan was the best officer in the army. He spoke of his care and coolness in the preparation of his plans and his celerity in execution. Of "the younger set of officers" he placed Ames (Adelbert) as the most promising.

In one of my last conversations with Sheridan he expressed the opinion that the improvement in the material of war was so great that nations could not make war, such would be the destruction of human life.

Upon his return from Germany at the end of the Franco-Prussian War, he spoke very disparagingly of the military movements and among several things he said that the French forces were placed where the Germans would have dictated had they had the power. He added the either of our armies at the close of the war could have marched over the country in defiance of both the French and German forces combined. This was a rash remark, probably; a remark which he could not justify upon the facts. Without intending to betray any confidence, the remark, as coming through me, got into the newspapers. Sheridan with a skill superior to that of politicians caused the announcement to be made that General Sheridan had never had any conversation with Governor Boutwell in regard to the Franco-Prussian war.

At the end it may be claimed justly, that they were three great soldiers—that they served the country with equal fidelity—that they lived and acted without the manifestation in either of a feeling of rivalry, and that they earned the public gratitude.

The death of General Sherman was followed to two contradictory statements from his sons. The younger, Tecumseh, is reported as saying that his father was never a Catholic, while the older, Thomas, who is a priest of the Order of Jesuits, had stated over his signature that his father was baptized as a Catholic, was married as a Catholic, and that he had heard him say often, "that if there was any true religion it was the Catholic."

All this may be true and yet General Sherman may not have been a Catholic. His baptism may have been without his consent or knowledge, his marriage by the Catholic Church may have been in deference to his wife's wishes, and because he was wholly indifferent to the matter, and the remark may have been made in the impression that there was no true religion, and that the Catholic was as likely, or even more likely to be true, than any other.

The statement made by Thomas puts an imputation upon General Sherman that he ought not to bear. Of the thousands that one may meet in a lifetime, General Sherman was among the freest from anything in the nature of hypocrisy or dissimulation. Of those who knew him intimately after the close of the war there are but few, probably, who did not hear him speak with hostility and bitterness of the Catholic Church. For myself I can say that I heard him speak in terms of contempt of the church. On one occasion with reference to fasts and abstinence from meat of Friday, he said:

"I know better than these priests what I want to eat."

General Sherman was not a friend to the Catholic Church in the last years of his life and there is no honor in the attempt to enroll his name among its devotees now that he is dead and cannot speak for himself.

SECRETARY WINDOM

Funeral services were performed February 2, 1891, at the Church of the Covenant in Washington in honor of Mr. Windom, late Secretary of the Treasury. He made a good record, if not a distinguished one. As a member of the House of Representatives and of the Senate he was noted for fairness, for freedom from bitterness of opinion upon party questions, and for good sense in action.

He was indisposed to take responsibility and he went no farther than the case in hand seemed to require. As the head of the Treasury he was anxious to gather opinions upon matters of general public interest, and it was in his nature to strive to accommodate his action to the public opinion, if he could do so without serious consequences. He worked within narrow limits, the limits set by business and politics. Of enemies he had but few—of warm friends but few—the many had confidence in his integrity in the affairs of government, and in his ability to guide those affairs in ordinary times.

JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL

In a number of the Edinburgh Review is an article on James Russell Lowell in which the writer errs widely in two particulars as to the effect of the "Biglow Papers." The writer's name is not given, but he is not an American and he is ignorant, probably, of America as it was from 1830 to 1850. When the "Biglow Papers" appeared, I was a Democrat, and I am quite sure that the publication produced no effect, not even the least, upon the opinions of Democrats or the action of the Democratic Party. Upon my knowledge of the Democratic Party I can say with confidence that the writer is in error when he says: "He (Lowell) converted many bigoted Northern Democrats to a course of action in conflict with their old party relations and apparent interests."

For this broad statement there is no evidence. The first break came in 1848 and it was due to rivalries in the Democratic Party. If the "Biglow Papers" played any part it was too unimportant to produce an appreciable result. They were treated as a fortunate jeu d'esprit that everybody enjoyed, but the Democratic Party did not change its policy nor did it lose adherents. The Mexican War was prosecuted and bigotry political and religious continued to flourish. They may have contributed though, insensibly, to a public opinion that became formidable in the end but the effect was not as perceptible as was the effect of Garrison's legend that slavery was a covenant with hell and a league with death, which had its place at the head of the Liberator through successive years. Nor do I believe that "it revolutionized the tone of Northern society." Indeed, there is a "tone" of Northern society that has not been revolutionized to this day. The South is still the land of gentle birth. The slave-holder still lives as a man of breeding and the owner of estates. The negro is still of an inferior caste and in some circles the days of slavery were the great days of the Republic. When the "Biglow Papers" appeared Mr. Lowell had not achieved distinction. Society did not know him to follow him. It cared nothing for what he thought, and it was only amused by what he said. The Lowell of 1840 was not the Lowell of 1890. Nor can any series of statements be more untruthful and absurd than the statements of the writer that "thenceforth it became creditable to advocate abolition in drawing rooms, and to preach it from fashionable city pulpits to congregations paying fancy prices for their pews. In the workshops, the barrooms and other popular resorts the laugh was turned against the slave-owners; the ground was prepared for the popular enthusiasm which recruited the armies that exhausted the South, and Lowell must share with Lincoln and Grant the glory of the crowning victories."

If any work of romance contains more fiction in the same space, it is my fortune not to have seen that work. The circulation of the Boston Courier in which the papers were printed was very limited. It did not go into barrooms nor into workshops. It was read chiefly by the converted and semi-converted abolitionists. As to fashionable pulpits thenceforth preaching abolition it is to be said that there was only one leading pulpit, Theodore Parker's pulpit, in which abolitionism was tolerated until years after the appearance of the "Biglow Papers." As to society, it is to be said that in the Fifties Charles Sumner, a Senator, was ostracized for his opinions upon slavery.

It is nearer the truth to say that what passes for society in New England never tolerated abolitionists nor encouraged abolitionism.

The one writing which in an historical point of view contributed most largely to recruit the armies of the Republic during the Rebellion was Webster's speech in reply to Hayne. The closing paragraph of the speech was in the schoolbooks of the free States, and it had been declaimed from many a schoolhouse stage.

Lowell deserves credit for what he did. He chose his place early and firmly on the anti-slavery side, but it is absurd and false to say that thenceforward and therefor abolitionism became popular and abolitionists the sought for or the accepted by society. Mr. Lowell was the son of a Boston Unitarian clergyman. In the Forties he had not gained standing ground for himself, to omit all thought of his ability to carry an unpopular cause.

Indeed, up to the time of the repeal of the Missouri Compromise the whole array of anti-slavery writers and speakers had not accomplished the results which the reviewer attributes to the "Biglow Papers."

Indeed, should there be a signal reform in the fashion and cost of ladies' dresses it might with equal propriety be attributed to Butler's poem "Nothing to Wear."

GENERAL GARFIELD AND GENERAL ROSECRANS

The statement is revived that General Garfield, when chief of the staff of General Rosecrans in the campaign which ended at Chickamauga was false to Rosecrans. The allegation and the fact are that he wrote to Mr. Chase, then in Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet, that Rosecrans was incompetent to the command. Garfield's statements, as I recall the letters, were free from malice and the professional and ethical question is, "Was Garfield justified as a citizen and soldier, in giving his opinion to the Administration?" His view of Rosecrans was confirmed by events, and it may be assumed that the opinion was free from any improper influence when the letters were written. On this assured basis of facts I cannot doubt that Garfield did only what was his duty. Neither the President nor the War Department could obtain specific knowledge of the officers in command except through associates and subordinates unless they trusted to newspapers and casual visitors to the army. The struggle was a desperate one and the volunteer army was composed of men who were citizens before they were soldiers and they remained citizens when they became soldiers. Garfield was of the citizen soldiery and to him and to the country the etiquette of the army and the etiquette of society were subordinate to the fortunes of the nation. Of General Rosecrans' unfitness for any important command there can be no doubt. After the disaster of Chickamauga, Rosecrans was relieved and General Thomas was put in command and General Grant was ordered to the field. He met Rosecrans at Nashville where they had an interview. From General Grant I received the statement that Rosecrans had sound views as to the means of relieving the army; "And," said General Grant, "my wonder was that he had not put them in execution."

This one fact expresses enough of the weak side of Rosecrans as a military leader to warrant the opinion given to Chase by Garfield, and that opinion having been formed upon a knowledge of facts and of Rosecrans as a military man and not from prejudice or rivalry, Garfield should be honored for his course, rather than condemned.

GEORGE BANCROFT

The death of Mr. Bancroft at the age of more than ninety years removes one of the few men in private life who can be ranked as personages. He was, perhaps, the only person in private life whose death would have received a semi-public recognition from any of the rulers of Europe. Such a recognition was accorded by the Emperor of Germany, and chiefly, as it is understood, on account of the friendship which existed between Mr. Bancroft and the grandfather of the present Emperor.

Mr. Bancroft's long and successful career as a writer and diplomatist would seem to be evidence of the presence of qualities of a high order, and yet no one who was near him accepted that opinion. His conversation was not instructive, certainly not in later years, nor was he an original thinker upon any subject. He was an enthusiast in politics in early and middle life, and while his mental faculties remained unimpaired his interest in political movements was great—and usually it was in sympathy with the Democratic Party. He was an adhesive man in politics, capable of appearing to be reconciled to the success of his opponents and ready to accept favors from them in the way of office and honors and yet without in fact committing himself to their policy.

He was a laborious student, and he had access to standard and in many particulars to original authorities. At the commencement of his history he erred in denying with much confidence the claim of the visits of the Northmen to this continent in the ninth and tenth centuries.

That early claim seems to be supported by evidence which is nearly, if not absolutely, conclusive. Of all his chapters that on Washington was most attractive to me and it is quite the equal of Mr. Everett's oration, that yielded a large sum of money, that the orator applied to the purchase of Mount Vernon. Mr. Bancroft aimed to illustrate his history by an exhibition of philosophy. This feat in literature can be accomplished successfully only by a great mind. First the events, then the reasons for or sources of, then the consequences, then the wisdom or unwisdom of the human agencies that have had part in weaving the web, are all to be considered. Examples are Gibbon and Buckle.

GENERAL GRANT AS A MAN AND A FRIEND

The simplicity of General Grant's nature, his frankness in all his intercourse with his fellow men, his freedom from duplicity were not touched unfavorably in any degree by his rapid advancement from the ordinary pursuits of ordinary men to the highest places in military and civil life. There was never in his career any ostentatious display of power, never any exercise of wanton or unnecessary authority.

He disliked controversy even in conversation, and his reticence when not in the company of habitual companions and trusted friends was due in part to his rule of life on this subject.

From the many years of my acquaintance with General Grant I cannot recall an instance of a reference to theological opinions upon controverted topics of faith.

The humanitarian side of his nature was strong, but it was not ostentatiously exhibited—indeed it was concealed rather than proclaimed. It was made known to me by his interest and by his lack of interest in appointments in the Treasury Department.

Of salaried places he controlled the appointment of General Pleasanton as commissioner of internal revenue, and of that only.

On several occasions he suggested the designation of a person named for employment in some menial and non-salaried service. The person named was in every instance the widow or daughter of some soldier of the war. At intervals, not widely separated, he would bring the subject to my notice. Thus, without a command, I was forced to follow his suggestion.

The purity of his conversation might have been a worthy example for the most carefully trained person in etiquette and morals. My intercourse with General Grant was intimate through many years, and never on any occasion did he repeat a story or a phrase that contained a profane remark or carried a vulgar allusion. He had a relish for untainted wit and for genial humor, and for humor he had some capacity. He was not an admirer of Mr. Sumner and a trace of irony may be found in a remark attributed to him: When some one said: "Mr. Sumner does not believe in the Bible," General Grant said: "No, I suppose not, he didn't write it."

General Grant was attracted by a horse driven by a butcher. He purchased the animal at the cost of five hundred dollars. He invited Senator Conkling to a drive behind the new horse. The Senator criticised the animal, and said: "I think I should prefer the five hundred dollars to the horse." "That is what the butcher thought," said General Grant.

He was sincere and devoted in his friendships, but when he discovered that his confidence had been misplaced, a reconciliation became impossible. With him there could be no genuine forgiveness, and his nature could not tolerate any degree of hypocrisy. All voluntary intercourse on his part had come to an end.

There was a time when a demand for my removal from office was made by some Republican Senators and by the New York Herald, to which he gave no attention.

The imperturbability of spirit which was indicated in his conversation and movements was deep-seated in his nature. I was with him in a night trip to New York; when the train was derailed in part. As the wheels of the car struck the sleepers, he grasped the back of the seat in front of him and remained motionless, while many of the passengers added to their peril by abandoning their seats.

On a time General Grant received a pair of large roan horses from his farm in Missouri. He invited me to take one of the horses and join him in a ride on the saddle. I declined the invitation. I was then invited to take a seat with him in an open wagon. When we were descending a slight declivity one of the horses laid his weight on the pole and broke it, although the parts did not separate. General Grant placed his foot upon the wheel, thus making a brake and saving us from a disaster. General Grant's faculties were at command on the instant and under all circumstances.

When the Ku Klux organizations were active in the South, the President gave members of Congress to understand that he would send a message with a recommendation for punitive legislation. Upon reflection he came to doubt the wisdom of the measure, especially as the use of the military forces at New Orleans and elsewhere had been criticised in the country. While the subject was thus undisposed of, I received a message from the President which ended with a request that I should accompany him to the Capitol. On the way he informed me that he doubted the wisdom of a message and that he intended to so inform those to whom he had given encouragement. At the interview which followed several members who were present urged adherence to the original policy. While the discussion was going on, the President returned to his original opinion and wrote a message which was transmitted to the Congress after one or two verbal changes that may have been suggested by Secretary Fish or Secretary Robeson.

General Grant's sense of justice was exact and he did not spare himself in his criticism. He said to me in conversation, what is indicated in his Memoirs, that he assumed some responsibility upon himself for the removal of General Warren at Five Forks. He had known that General Warren was disqualified by natural defects from command in the field, and hence that it was an error on his part that he had not assigned Warren to duty at a station.

Again he said to me that his final campaign against Vicksburg was the only one of his campaigns that he could not criticise adversely when tested by reflection and experience.

During my term of service an appointment of some importance was made by the collector of New York. The appointment was approved by me. In the meantime some opponents of the appointee approached the President. Upon his suggestion the appointment was suspended. After a delay I received a letter from the President dated June 28th, 1869, in which he says: "If it should still be the pleasure of Mr. Grinnell to confer the appointment before tendered, let it be so, so far as I am concerned. I am not willing knowingly to do anyone injustice as I now am led to believe I may have done in the case of General Egan."

In the month of December, 1884, there were paragraphs in the newspapers which justified the apprehension that General Grant was suffering from a cancer. In the late days of the month, I called upon him at his house in New York. He was then in good health, apparently. I found him in his library engaged in the preparation of articles for the Century Magazine. In the days of our more intimate acquaintance he had said to me that it was his purpose to leave the history of his campaigns to others. He referred to that remark and said that his financial embarrassments had forced him to change his purpose. As I was about to leave, he referred to a difficulty in his throat that he had noticed for about six months. He expressed the fear that he had neglected it too long. I avoided any serious remark in reply. Soon after my return to Groton my daughter received a letter from him, which, in photographic copy, I here give. It contains his parting words to me and my family. It is a precious souvenir of my acquaintance and service with a man who was great and good above any estimate that the world has placed upon him.

I called upon him in the month of June. He rose to receive me. His power of speech was much impaired, and our interview was brief. The final parting was a sad event to me.

[Facsimile] New York City, January 3d, 1884;

My dear Miss Boutwell:

Many thanks for your New Year welcome, just received. There is no family that I have ever known whose friendship I prize more highly than that of your father. I wish for him and his family many returns of new years, and that all of them may find him and his in the enjoyment of good health and peace of mind.

Very truly yours, U. S. Grant

GRANT AS A SOLDIER*

When General Grant came before the public, and into a position that compelled notice, he was called to meet a difficulty that his predecessor in the office of President had encountered and overcome successfully.

An opinion existed in the cultivated classes, an opinion that was especially local in the East, that a great place could not be filled wisely and honorably, unless the occupant had had the benefit of a university training.

Of such training Mr. Lincoln was destitute, utterly, and the training which General Grant had received at West Point, where it was his fortune to attain only to advanced standing in the lower half of his class, was at the best the training thought to be necessary for the vocation of a soldier. That minority of critics overlooked the fact that the world had set the seal of its favorable judgment upon Cromwell, Washington, Franklin, Napoleon, Hamilton and others who had not the advantages of university training. Napoleon in a military school and Hamilton in Columbia College for the term of a year, more or less, did not rank among university men.

That minority of critics did not realize the fact that colleges and universities cannot make great men. Great men are independent of colleges and universities. In truth, a really great man is supreme over college and universities.

Lincoln was such a man in speech, in power of argument, in practical wisdom, by which he was enabled to act fearlessly and with success in the great affairs of administration.

Such a man was General Grant on the military side of his career. With great military capacity, he was destitute of the military spirit. During the period of his retirement from the army after the close of the Mexican War he gave no attention to military affairs. When he came to Washington in 1865 as General of the Army, he was not the owner of a work on war nor on the military art or science.

His military capacity was an endowment. It might have been impaired or crippled by the training of a university; but it is doubtful whether it could have been improved thereby, and it is certain that it was, in its quality, quite outside of the possibilities of university training.

As General Grant approached the end of his career the voice of the critics, who judged men by the testimony of college catalogues and the decorations of learned societies, was heard less frequently; and his death, followed by the publication of his memoirs, written when the hand of death was upon him, silenced the literary critics at once and forever.

Since the month of July, 1885, there has appeared on the other side of the Atlantic a set of military critics, of whom General Wolseley, Commander of the British Army, must be treated as the chief, who deny to General Grant the possession of superior military qualities, and who assert that General Lee was his superior in the contest which they carried on from February, 1864, to April, 1865. On this side of the Atlantic there is toleration, if not active and open support of General Wolseley's opinion.

General Wolseley is entitled to an opinion and to the expression of his opinion; but his authority cannot be admitted. On the practical side of military affairs his experience is a limited experience only.

It is not known that General Wolseley ever, in any capacity, engaged in any battle that can be named in comparison with the battles of the Wilderness, with Spottsylvania, with Cold Harbor, or the battle of Five Forks; and it is certain that it was never his fortune to put one hundred thousand men, or even fifty thousand men, into the wage of battle and thus assume the responsibility of the contest.

It was never the necessity of the situation that General Lee should assume the offensive, and in the two instances where he did assume the offensive his campaigns were failures; and can any one doubt that if General Grant had been in command either at Antietam or Gettysburg, the war would than have come to an end of the left bank of the Potomac River by the capture of Lee's army? If this be so, then Lee's undertaking was a hazard for which there could have been no justifying reason, and his escape from destruction was due to the inadequacy of the men in command of the Northern armies. Following this remark I ought to say that General Meade was a brave and patriotic officer, but he lacked the qualities which enable a man to act promptly and wisely in great exigencies. While General Lee was acting on the defensive did he engage in and successfully execute any strategic movement that can be compared with Grant's campaign of May, 1863, through Mississippi and to the rear of Vicksburg? Or can General Wolseley cite an instance of individual genius and power more conspicuous than the relief of our besieged army at Chattanooga, the capture of six thousand prisoners, forty pieces of artillery, seven thousand stands of small arms and large quantities of other material of war?