2. Congress has no purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the established rights of those States.

Upon a motion to include disunionists in the North under the first charge, Mr. Johnson voted in the negative with Sumner, Wilson, Wade, and other Republicans.

This brief survey of Mr. Johnson's Congressional career at the opening of the war may indicate the characteristics of his mind in controversy and debate, and furnish means for comprehending his actions in the troublous period of his administration.

Some conclusions are deducible from this survey. First of all it is to be said that he never assumed to be a member of the Republican Party. Next, I do not find evidence which will justify the statement that he was a disbeliever in the right of a State to secede from the Union. It is manifest that he was not an advocate of the doctrine of political equality as it came to be taught by the leaders of the Republican Party. When he became President, he was an opponent of negro suffrage.

This record, though not concealed, was not understood by the members of the convention that placed him in nomination for the second office in the country.

This analysis prepares the way for an extract from the testimony of Mr. Stanley Matthews, who was afterwards a justice of the Supreme Court, and who was examined by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives when engaged in investigating the doings of the President previous to his impeachment. Mr. Johnson was appointed Military Governor of Tennessee the third day of March, 1862. Colonel Matthews was provost-marshal at Nashville, where Johnson resided during his term as Governor. In that term Matthews and Johnson became acquainted. When Johnson was on his way to Washington to take the oath of office, he stopped at the Burnet House in Cincinnati. Matthews called upon him. Matthews had been a Democrat until the troubles in Kansas. In the conversation at the Burnet House Mr. Johnson made these remarks, after some personal matters had been disposed of. I quote from the testimony of Judge Matthews:

"I inquired as to the state of public feeling on political matters in Tennessee at that time. He remarked that very great changes had taken place since I had been there, that many of those who at first were the best Union men had turned to be the worst rebels, and that many of those who had originally been the worst rebels were now the best Union men. I expressed surprise and regret at what he said in reference to the matter.

"We were sitting near each other on the sofa. He then turned to me and said, 'You and I were old Democrats.' I said, 'Yes.' He then said, 'I will tell you what it is, if the country is ever to be saved, it is to be done through the old Democratic Party.'

"I do not know whether I made any reply to that, or, if I did, what it was; and immediately afterwards I took my leave."

The larger part of this quotation is only important as leading up to the phrase that is emphasized, and which may throw light upon Mr. Johnson's policy and conduct when he came to the Presidency.

This conversation occurred in the month of February, 1865, and it must be accepted as evidence, quite conclusive, that Mr. Johnson was then opposed to the policy of the Republican Party, whose honors he had accepted. In a party sense Mr. Johnson was not a Republican: he was a Union Democrat. He was opposed to the dissolution of the Union, but not necessarily upon the ground that the Union had a supreme right to exist in defiance of what is called "State sovereignty." This with the Republican Party was a fundamental principle. Under the influence of the principles of the old Democratic Party Mr. Johnson advanced to the Vice-Presidency, and while under the influence of the same idea he became President.

When the Republican Party came to power, the State of Maryland, that portion of Virginia now known as West Virginia, the State of Kentucky, and the State of Missouri were largely under the influence of sympathizers with the eleven seceding States of the South. It was necessary in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri to maintain the ascendency of the National Government by the exhibition of physical force, and in some instances by its actual exercise. Mr. Lincoln's policy in regard to the question of slavery was controlled, up to the month of July, 1862, by the purpose to conciliate Union slave-holders in the States mentioned. Of his measures I refer to the proposition to transfer the free negroes to Central America, for which an appropriation of $25,000 was made by Congress. Next, Congress passed an act for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia upon the payment of three hundred dollars for each slave emancipated.

Without representing in his history or in his person the slave-holding interests of the South, Mr. Johnson was yet a Southern man with Union sentiments. The impression was received therefrom that his influence would be considerable in restraining, if not in conciliating slave- holders in what were called the "border States." These facts tended to his nomination for the Vice-Presidency. I have no means for forming an opinion that is trustworthy as to the position of Mr. Lincoln in reference to the nomination of Mr. Johnson. His nomination may justify the impression that the Republican Party was in doubt as to its ability to re-elect Mr. Lincoln in 1864. From the month of July, 1862, to the nomination in 1864, I had frequent interviews with Mr. Lincoln, and I can only say that, during the period when the result of the election was a subject of thought, he gave no intimation in the conversations that I had with him that the element of doubt as to the result existed in his mind.

From what has been said, the inference may be drawn that Mr. Johnson came to the Vice-Presidency in the absence of any considerable degree of confidence on the part of the Republican Party, although there were no manifestations of serious doubt as to his fitness for the place, or as to his fidelity to the principles of the party.

The incidents of the inauguration of Mr. Johnson in the Senate Chamber, and especially his speech on the occasion, which was directed, apparently, to the diplomatic corps, excited apprehensions in those who were present, and the confidence of the country was diminished materially concerning his qualifications for the office to which he had been elected. Without delay these apprehensions circulated widely, and they were deepened in the public mind by the assassination of Mr. Lincoln and the elevation of Mr. Johnson to the Presidency.

The public confidence received a further serious shock by his proclamation of May 29, 1865, for the organization of a State government in North Carolina. That proclamation contained provisions in harmony with what has been set forth in this paper concerning the political principles of Mr. Johnson. First of all, he limited the franchise to persons "qualified as prescribed by the constitution and laws of the State of North Carolina in force immediately before the 20th day of May, 1861, the date of the so-called Ordinance of Secession." This provision was a limitation of the suffrage, and it excluded necessarily the negro population of the State. It was also a recognition of the right of the State to reappear as a State in the Union. It was, indeed, an early assertion of the phrase which afterwards became controlling with many persons—"Once a State, always a State." He further recognized the right of the State to reappear as a State in the organization and powers of the convention which was to be called under the proclamation. As to that he said: "The convention when convened, or the legislature which may be thereafter assembled, will prescribe the qualification of electors and the eligibility of persons to hold office under the constitution and laws of the State, a power the people of the several States composing the Union have rightfully exercised from the origin of the Government to the present time." There were further instructions given in the proclamation as to the duties of various officers of the United States to aid Governor Holden, who, by the same proclamation, was appointed "Provisional Governor of the State of North Carolina."

Upon the publication of this proclamation I was so much disturbed that I proceeded at once to Washington, but without any definite idea as to what could be done to arrest the step which seemed to me a dangerous step towards the re-organization of the Government upon an unsound basis. At that time I had had no conversation with Mr. Johnson, either before or after he came to the Presidency, upon any subject whatever. The interview which I secured upon that visit was the sole personal interview that ever occurred between us. I called upon Senator Morrill of Vermont, and together we made a visit to the President. I spoke of the features of the proclamation that seemed to be objectionable. He said that "the measure was tentative" only, and that until the experiment had been tried no other proclamation would be issued. Upon that I said in substance that the Republican Party might accept the proclamation as an experiment, but that it was contrary to the ideas of the party, and that a continuance of the policy would work a disruption of the party. He assured us that nothing further would be done until the experiment had been tested. With that assurance we left the Executive Mansion.

On the 13th day of June, 1865, a similar proclamation was issued in reference to the State of Mississippi, and on the 17th of June, corresponding proclamations were issued in reference to the States of Georgia, Texas, Alabama, South Carolina, and Florida. In each State a person was named as Provisional Governor. This action led to a division of the party and to its subsequent reorganization against the President's policy.

In his letter of acceptance of the nomination made by the Union Convention, Mr. Johnson endorsed, without reserve, the platform that had been adopted. The declarations of the platform did not contain a reference to the reorganization of the Government in the event of the success of the Union arms. The declarations were enumerated in this order: the Union was to be maintained; the war was to be prosecuted upon the basis of an unconditional surrender of the rebels; and slavery, as the cause of the war, was to be abolished. The added resolutions related to the services of the soldiers and sailors, and to the policy of Abraham Lincoln as President. It was further declared that the public credit should be maintained, that there should be a vigorous and just system of taxes, and that the people would view with "extreme jealousy," and as enemies to the peace and independence of the country, the efforts of any power to obtain new footholds for monarchical government on this continent. Such being the character of the platform, it cannot be said that Mr. Johnson challenged its declarations in the policy on which he entered for the reorganization of the Government. In Mr. Johnson's letter of acceptance he preserved his relations to the Democrats by the use of this phrase: "I cannot forego the opportunity of saying to my old friends of the Democratic Party proper, with whom I have so long and pleasantly been associated, that the hour has come when that great party can justly indicate its devotion to the Democratic policy in measures of expediency."

The controversy with Mr. Johnson had its origin in the difference of opinion as to the nature of the Government. That difference led him to the conclusion that the rebellion had not worked any change in the legal relations of the seceding States to the National Government. His motto was this: "Once a State, always a State," whatever might be its conduct either of peace or war. There were, however, differences of opinion among those who adhered to the Republican Party. Mr. Stevens, who was a recognized, if not the recognized, leader of the Republican Party, advocated the doctrine that the eleven States were to be treated as enemy's territory, and to be governed upon whatever system might be acceptable to the States that had remained true to the Union. Mr. Sumner maintained the doctrine that the eleven States were Territories, and that they were to be subject to the General Government until Congress should admit the several Territories as State organizations. The fourth day of May, 1864, I presented a series of resolutions in the House of Representatives, in which I asserted this doctrine: The communities that have been in rebellion can be organized into States only by the will of the loyal people expressed freely and in the absence of all coercion; that States so organized can become States of the American Union only when they shall have applied for admission and their admission shall have been authorized by the existing National Government. A small number of persons who were identified with the Republican Party sustained the policy of Mr. Johnson. Others were of the opinion that the eleven States were out of their proper relation to the Union, as was declared by Mr. Lincoln in his last speech, and that they could become members of the American Union only by the organized action of each, and the concurrent action of the existing National Government. The Government was reorganized without any distinct declaration upon the question whether the States that had been in rebellion were to be treated as enemy's territory, or as Territories according to the usage of former times. The difference of opinion was a vital one with Mr. Johnson. Whatever view may be taken of his moral qualities, it is to be said that he was not deficient in intellectual ability, that his courage passed far beyond the line of obstinacy, and that from the first to last he was prepared to resist the claims of the large majority of the Republican Party. The issue began with his proclamation of May, 1865, and the contest continued to the end of his term. The nature of the issue explains the character and violence of his speeches, especially that of the twenty-second day of February, 1866, when he spoke of Congress as a "body hanging on the verge of the Government."

In the many speeches which he delivered in his trip through the West, he made distinct charges against Congress. He was accompanied by Mr. Seward, General Grant, Admiral Farragut, and some others. In a speech at Cleveland, Ohio, he said, among other things, "I have called upon your Congress, which has tried to break up the Government." Again, in the same speech he said, "I tell you my countrymen, that although the powers of Thad Stevens and his gang were by, they could not turn me from my purpose. There is no power that can turn me, except you and the God who put me into existence." He charged, also, that Congress had taken great pains to poison their constituents against him. "What had Congress done? Had they done anything to restore the Union in those States? No; on the contrary, they had done everything to prevent it."

In a speech made at St. Louis, Missouri, September 8, 1866, Mr. Johnson discussed the riot at New Orleans.* In that speech he said, "If you will take up the riot in New Orleans, and trace it back to its source, or its immediate cause, you will find out who was responsible for the blood that was shed there. If you will take up the riot at New Orleans and trace it back to the radical Congress, you will find that the riot at New Orleans was substantially planned." After some further observations, he says: "Yes, you will find that another rebellion was commenced, having its origin in the radical Congress."

These extracts from Mr. Johnson's speeches should be considered in connection with his proclamations of May, June, and July, 1865. They are conclusive to this point: that he had determined to reconstruct the Government upon the basis of the return of the States that had been engaged in the rebellion without the imposition of any conditions whatsoever, except such as he had imposed upon them in his proclamations. In fine, that the Government was to be re-established without the authority or even the assent of the Congress of the United States. In his proclamations he made provision for the framing of constitutions in the respective States, their ratification by the people, excluding all those who were not voters in April, 1861, and for the election of Senators and Representatives to the Congress of the United States without the assent of the Representatives of the existing States.

When I arrived in Washington to attend the meeting of Congress at the December session, 1866, I received a note from Mr. Stanton asking me to meet him at the War Office with as little delay as might be practicable. When I called at the War Office, he beckoned me to retire to his private room, where he soon met me. He then said that he had been more disturbed by the condition of affairs in the preceding weeks and months than he had been at any time during the war. He gave me to understand that orders had been issued to the army of which neither he nor General Grant had any knowledge. He further gave me to understand also that he apprehended an attempt by the President to re-organize the Government by the assembling of a Congress in which the members from the seceding States and the Democratic members from the North might obtain control through the aid of the Executive. He then said that he thought it necessary that some act should be passed by which the power of the President might be limited. Under his dictation, and after such consultation as seemed to be required, I drafted amendments to the Appropriation Bill for the Support of the Army, which contained the following provisions: The headquarters of the General of the Army were fixed at Washington, where he was to remain unless transferred to duty elsewhere by his own consent or by the consent of the Senate. Next, it was made a misdemeanor for the President to transmit orders to any officer of the army except through the General of the Army. It was also made a misdemeanor for any officer to obey orders issued in any other way than through the General of the Army, knowing that the same had been so issued. These provisions were taken by me to Mr. Stevens, the chairman of the Committee on Appropriations. After some explanation, the measure was accepted by the committee and incorporated in the Army Appropriation Bill. The bill was approved by the President the second day of March, 1867. His approval was accompanied by a protest on his part that the provision was unconstitutional, and by the statement that he approved the bill only because it was necessary for the support of the army.

At the time of my interview with Mr. Stanton, I was not informed fully as to the events that had transpired in the preceding months, nor can I say now that everything which had transpired of importance was then known to Mr. Stanton. The statement that I am now to make was derived from conversations with General Grant. At a time previous to the December session of 1866, the President said to General Grant, "I may wish to send you on a mission to Mexico." General Grant replied, "It may not be convenient for me to go to Mexico." Little, if anything, further was said between the President and General Grant. At a subsequent time General Grant was invited to a Cabinet meeting. At that meeting Mr. Seward read a paper of instruction to General Grant as Minister of some degree to Mexico. The contents of the paper did not impress General Grant very seriously, for in the communication that he made to me he said that "the instructions came out very near where they went in." At the end of the reading General Grant said, "You recollect, Mr. President, I said it would not be convenient for me to go to Mexico." Upon that a conversation followed, when the President became heated, and rising from his seat, and striking the table with some force, he said "Is there an officer of the army who will not obey my instructions?" General Grant took his hat in his hand, and said, "I am an officer of the army, but I am a citizen also; and this is a civil service that you require of me. I decline it." He then left the meeting. It happened also that previous to this conversation the President had ordered General Sherman, who was in command at Fort Leavenworth, to report at Washington. General Sherman obeyed the order, came to Washington, and had a conference with General Grant before he reported to the President. In that situation of affairs General Sherman was sent to Mexico upon the mission which had been prepared for General Grant.

The suggestion that Mr. Johnson contemplated the re-organization of the Government by the admission of the States that had been in rebellion, and by the recognition of Senators and Representatives that might be assigned from those States, received support from the testimony given by Major-General William H. Emory, and also from the testimony of General Grant. In the latter part of the year 1867 and the first part of the year 1868, General Emory was in command of the Department of Washington. When he entered upon the command, he called upon the President. A conversation, apparently not very important, occurred between them, as to the military forces then in that department. In February, 1868, the President directed his secretary to ask General Emory to call upon him as early as practicable. In obedience to that request General Emory called on the twenty-second day of February. The President referred to the former conversation, and then inquired whether any changes had been made, and especially within the recent days, in the military forces under Emory's command. In the course of the conversation growing out of these requests for information, General Emory referred to an order which had then been recently issued which embodied the provisions of the act of March, 1867, in regard to the command of the army and the transmission of orders. The President then said to Emory:

"What order do you refer to?"

In reply Emory said: "Order No. 17 of the Series of 1867."

The order was produced and read by the President, who said:

"This is not in conformity with the Constitution of the United States, that makes me commander-in-chief, or with the terms of your commission."

General Emory said: "That is the order which you have approved and issued to the army for our government."

The President then said: "Am I to understand that the President of the United States cannot give an order except through the head of the army, or General Grant?"

In the course of the conversation, General Emory informed the President that eminent lawyers had been consulted, that he had consulted Robert J. Walker, and that all of the lawyers consulted had expressed the opinion that the officers of the army were bound by the order whether the statute was constitutional or unconstitutional.

When General Grant was before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives during the impeachment investigation, this question was put to him:

"Have you at any time heard the President make any remark in regard to the admission of members of Congress from rebel States in either House?"

"I cannot say positively what I have heard him say. I have heard him say as much in his public speeches as anywhere else. I have heard him say twice in his speeches that if the North carried the election by members enough to give them, with the Southern members, the majority, why should they not be the Congress of the United States? I have heard him say that several times."

That answer was followed by this question:

"When you say the North, you mean the Democratic Party of the North, or, in other words, the party advocating his policy?"

General Grant replied:

"I meant if the North carried enough members in favor of the admission of the South. I did not hear him say that he would recognize them as the Congress, I merely heard him ask the question, 'Why would they not be the Congress?'"

At this point, and without further discussion of the purpose of Mr. Johnson in regard to the reorganization of the Government, I think it may be stated without injustice to him, that while he was opposed to secession at the time the Confederate Government was organized, and thenceforward and always without change of opinion, yet he was also of opinion that the act of secession by the several States had not disturbed their legal relations to the National Government. Acting upon that opinion, he proceeded to reorganize the State governments, and with the purpose of securing the admission of their Senators and Representatives without seeking or accepting the judgment of Congress upon the questions involved in the proceeding. On one vital point he erred seriously and fundamentally as to the authority of the President in the matter. From the nature of our Government there could be no escape in a legal point of view from the conclusion that, whatever the relations were of the seceding States to the General Government, the method of restoration was to be ascertained and determined by Congress, and not by the President acting as the chief executive authority of the nation. In a legal and constitutional view, that act on his part, although resting upon opinions which he had long entertained, and which were entertained by many others, must be treated as an act of usurpation.

The facts embodied in the charges on which Mr. Johnson was impeached by the House and arraigned before the Senate were not open to doubt, but legal proof was wanting in regard to the exact language of his speeches. The charges were in substance these: That he had attacked the integrity and the lawful authority of the Congress of the United States in public speeches made in the presence of the country. The second charge was that he had attempted the removal of Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of War, and that, without the concurrence of the Senate, he had so removed him, contrary to the act of Congress, known as the Tenure of Office Act. In the first investigation into the conduct of Andrew Johnson, he was described in the resolution as "Vice-President of the United States, discharging at present the duties of President of the United States." The resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives the seventh day of March, 1867. A large amount of testimony was taken, and the report of the committee, in three parts, by the different members, was submitted to the House the fourth day of the following December. The majority of the committee, consisting of George S. Boutwell, Francis Thomas, Thomas Williams, William Lawrence, and John C. Churchill, reported a resolution providing for the impeachment of the President of the United States, in these words: "Resolved, that Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors." It will be observed that in the resolution for his impeachment he is described as "President of the United States," while in the resolution authorizing the inquiry into his conduct he is described as "Vice- President, discharging at present the duties of the President of the United States." This question received very careful consideration by the committee, and the conclusion was reached that he was the President of the United States, although he had been elected only to the office of Vice-President. As that question was not raised at the trial by demurrer or motion, it may now be accepted as the established doctrine that the Vice-President, when he enters upon the duties of President, becomes President of the United States. The extended report that was made by the majority of the committee was written by Mr. Williams. The summary, which was in the nature of charges, was written by myself. That summary set forth twenty-eight specifications of misconduct on the part of the President, many of which, however, where abandoned when the articles of impeachment were prepared in February, 1868.

In the discussion of the committee there were serious differences of opinion upon provisions of law. The minority of the committee, consisting of James F. Wilson, who was chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Frederick E. Woodbridge, S. S. Marshall, and Charles R. Eldridge, maintained the doctrine that a civil officer under the Constitution of the United States was not liable to impeachment except for the commission of an indictable offence. This doctrine had very large support in the legal profession, resting on remarks found in Blackstone. On the other hand, Chancellor Kent, in his Commentaries, had given support to the doctrine that a civil officer was liable to impeachment who misdemeaned himself in office. The provision of the Constitution is in these words:

"The President, Vice-President, and all Civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors."

The majority of the Judiciary Committee, in the controversy which arose in the committee and in the House of Representatives, maintained that the word "misdemeanors" was used in a political sense, and not in the sense in which it is used in criminal law. In support of this view attention was called to the fact that the party convicted was liable only to removal from office, and therefore that the object of the process of impeachment was the purification and preservation of the civil service. In the opinion of the majority, it was the necessity of the situation that the power of impeachment should extend to acts and offences that were not indictable by statute nor at common law. The report of the Judiciary Committee, made the twenty-fifth day of November, was rejected by the House of Representatives.

The attempt of the President to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary for the Department of War revived the question of impeachment, and on Monday, the twenty-fourth day of February, 1868, the House of Representatives "resolved to impeach Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, of high crimes and misdemeanors." The articles of impeachment were acted on by the House of Representatives the second day of March, and on the fourth day of March they were presented to the Senate through Mr. Bingham, chairman of the managers, who was designated for that duty.

The articles were directed to the following points, namely: That the President, by his speeches, had attempted "to set aside the rightful authority and powers of Congress"; that he had attempted "to bring into disgrace, ridicule, hatred, contempt, and reproach the Congress of the United States and the several branches thereof"; and "that he had attempted to incite the odium and resentment of all the good people of the United States against Congress and the laws by them duly and constitutionally enacted." Further, it was alleged that he had declared in speeches that the "Thirty-ninth Congress of the United States was not a Congress of the United States authorized by the Constitution of the United States to exercise legislative power in the same."

A further charge, and on which greater reliance was placed, was set forth in these words: "That he had denied and intended to deny the power of the Thirty-ninth Congress to propose amendments to the Constitution of the United States." These articles were in substance the articles that had been rejected by the House of Representatives in 1867. Finally, as the most important averment of all, the President was charged with an "attempt to prevent the execution of the act entitled 'An Act Regulating the Tenure of Certain Civil Offices,' passed March 2, 1867, by unlawfully devising and contriving and attempting to contrive means by which he could prevent Edwin M. Stanton from forthwith resuming the function of the office of the Secretary for the Department of War, notwithstanding the refusal of the Senate to concur in the suspension theretofore made by said Andrew Johnson of the said Edwin M. Stanton from said office of Secretary for the Department of War." In various forms of language these several charges were set forth in the different articles of impeachment—eleven in all. The eleventh article, which was prepared by Mr. Stevens, embodied the summary of all the charges mentioned. It is to be observed that in the eleventh article there is no allegation that the President had committed an offence that was indictable under any statute of the United States or that would have been indictable at common law. It may be assumed, I think, that for this country, at least, the question that was raised at the beginning and argued with great force, and by which possibly the House of Representatives may have been influenced in the year 1867, has been settled in accord with the report of the majority of the Judiciary Committee. The House decided that the President was impeachable for misdemeanors in office. With stronger reason it may be said that every other civil officer is bound to behave himself well in his office. He cannot do any act which impairs his standing in the place which he holds, or which may bring discredit upon the public, and especially he may not do any act in disregard of his oath to obey the laws and to support the Constitution of the country. The eleventh article was the chief article that was submitted to a vote in the Senate. The question raised by that article is this in substance: Is the President of the United States guilty in manner and form as set forth in this article? On that question thirty- five Senators voted that he was guilty, and nineteen Senators voted that he was not guilty. Under the Constitution the President was found not guilty of the offences charged, but the majority given may be accepted, and probably will be accepted, as the judgment of the Senate that the President of the United States is liable to impeachment and removal from office for acts and conduct that do not subject him to the process of indictment and trial in the criminal courts. At this point I express the opinion that something has been gained, indeed that much has been gained, by the decision of the House of Representatives, supported by the opinions of a large majority in the Senate.

The answer of the respondent, considered in connection with the arguments that were made by his counsel, sets forth the ground upon which the Republican members of the Senate may have voted that the President was not guilty of the two principal offences charged, viz: that in his speeches he had denounced and brought into contempt, intentionally, the Congress of the United States; and, second, that his attempted removal of Edwin M. Stanton was a violation of the Tenure of Office Act. In the President's answer to article ten, which contained the allegation that in his speech at St. Louis, in the year 1866, he had used certain language in derogation of the authority of the Congress of the United States, it was averred that the extracts did not present his speech or address accurately. Further than that, it was claimed that the allegation under that article was not "cognizable by the court as a high misdemeanor in office." Finally, it was claimed that proof should be made of the "actual" speech and address of the President on that occasion. The managers were not able to meet the demand for proof in a technical sense. The speech was reported in the ordinary way, and the proof was limited to the good faith of the reporters and the general accuracy of the printed report in the newspapers. In this situation as to the charges and the answer, it is not difficult to reach the conclusion that members of the Senate had ground for the vote of not guilty upon the several charges in regard to the speeches that were imputed to the President.

Judge Curtis, in his opening argument, furnished a technical answer to the article in which the President was charged with the violation of the Tenure of Office Act, in his attempt to remove Mr. Stanton from the office of Secretary of the Department of War. Judge Curtis gave to the proviso to that statute an interpretation corresponding to the interpretation given to criminal statutes. Mr. Stanton was appointed to the office in the first term of Mr. Lincoln's administration. The proviso of the statute was in these words: "Provided that the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, etc., shall hold their offices for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to their removal by and with the advice of the Senate." The proviso contained exceptions to the body of the statute, by which all civil officers who held appointments by and with the advice and consent of the Senate were secure in their places unless the Senate should assent to their removal. It was the object of the proviso to relieve an incoming President of Secretaries who had been appointed by his predecessor. The construction of the proviso, as given by Judge Curtis, was fatal to the position taken by the managers. It was claimed by the managers that the sole object of the proviso was the relief of an incoming President from the continuance of a Secretary in office beyond thirty days after the commencement of his term, and that it had no reference whatever to the right of the President to remove a Secretary during his term.

There were incidents in the course of the proceedings that possess historical value. By the Constitution the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is made the presiding officer in the Senate when the President is put upon trial on articles of impeachment. Chief Justice Chase claimed that he was to be addressed as "Chief Justice." That claim was recognized by the counsel for the President and by some members of the Senate. The managers claimed that he was there as the presiding officer, and not in his judiciary capacity. He was addressed by the managers and some of the Senators as "Mr. President."

There was a difference of opinion in the Senate, and a difference between the managers and the counsel for the respondent, as to the right of the presiding officer to rule upon questions of law and evidence arising in the course of the trial. Under the rule of the Senate as adopted, the rulings of the President were to stand unless a Senator should ask for the judgment of the Senate.

Other instances occurred which do not possess historical value, but were incidents unusual in judicial proceedings. When the Judiciary Committee of the House was entering upon the investigation of the conduct of President Johnson, General Butler expressed the opinion that upon the adoption of articles of impeachment by the House the President would be suspended in his office until the verdict of the Senate. As this view was not accepted by the committee, I made these remarks in my opening speech to the House after a review of the arguments for and against the proposition:

"I cannot doubt the soundness of the opinion that the President, even when impeached by the House, is entitled to his office until he has been convicted by the Senate."

This view was accepted.

At the first meeting of the managers I was elected chairman by the votes of Mr. Stevens, General Logan, and General Butler. Mr. Bingham received the votes of Mr. Wilson and Mr. Williams. Upon the announcement of the vote, Mr. Bingham made remarks indicating serious disappointment and a purpose to retire from the Board of Managers. I accepted the election, and acted as chairman at the meeting. At the next meeting, and without consultation with my associates, I resigned the place and nominated Mr. Bingham. The nomination was not objected to, and Mr. Bingham took the chair without comment by himself, nor was there any comment by any other person. The gentlemen who had given me their votes and support criticized my conduct with considerable freedom, and were by no means reconciled by the statement which I made to them. Having reference to the nature of the contest and the condition of public sentiment, I thought it important that the managers should avoid any controversy before the public, especially as to a matter of premiership in the conduct of the trial. It seemed to be important that the entire force of the House of Representatives should be directed to one object, the conviction of the accused. Beyond this, Mr. Bingham and Mr. Wilson had been opposed to the impeachment of Mr. Johnson when the attempt was first made in the House of Representatives. I thought it important to combine the strength that they represented in support of the proceeding in which we were then engaged. If Mr. Stevens had been in good health, he would have received my support and the support of General Butler and General Logan. At that time his health was much impaired, but his intellectual faculties were free from any cloud.

Another incident occurred which does not require explanation, and which may not be open to any explanation. After the report of the Judiciary Committee, and its rejection by the House of Representatives, I was surprised to receive an invitation from the President to dine with him at what is known as a State dinner. I assumed that arrangements had been made for a series of such dinners, and that the invitation had been sent out by a clerk upon a prearranged plan as to the order of invitations. When the matter had passed out of my mind, but before the day named for the dinner, I received a call on the floor of the House from Mr. Cooper, son-in-law of the President and secretary in the Executive Mansion. He asked me if I had received an invitation to dine with the President. I said I had. Next he said, "Have you answered it?" I said, "No, I have not." That was followed by the further question, "Will you answer it?" I said, "No, I shall not." That ended the conversation.

After the decision in the Senate had been made, the managers proceeded under the order of the House to investigate the truthfulness of rumors that were afloat, that money and other valuable considerations had been used to secure the acquittal of the President. That investigation established the fact that money had been in the possession of persons who had been engaged in efforts to secure the acquittal of the President. Those persons, with perhaps a single exception, were persons who had no official connection with the Government, and none of them were connected with the Government at Washington. As to most of them, it appeared that they had no reasons, indeed no good cause, why they should have taken part either for the conviction of the President or in behalf of his acquittal. The sources from which funds were obtained did not appear, nor was there evidence indicating the amount that had been used, nor the objects to which the money had been applied. It should be said as to Senators, that there was no evidence implicating them in the receipt of money or other valuable considerations. One very important fact not then known to the managers appeared afterwards in the report of the Treasury Department, showing a very large loss by the Government during the last eighteen months of Mr. Johnson's administration. In that period the total receipts from the duties on spirits amounted to $41,678,684.34. During the first eighteen months of General Grant's administration, when the rates of duties and taxation remained the same, the total receipts of revenue from spirits amounted to $82,417,419.85, showing a difference of $40,738,735.51. It is not easy to explain in full this money loss in one branch of the public service. Something may be attributed to the fact that persons obtained nominations for office by representations to the President that they were his friends and supporters, and would continue to be so, under all circumstances. When their nominations came to the Senate, they made representations of an opposite character. When they had received their appointments, they very naturally allied themselves with the President's policy, inasmuch as they could not be easily removed except upon an initiative taken by him. This deficiency occurred in the states and districts in which the money should have been collected and through the agents employed there. It other words, no part of the deficiency ever passed into the Treasury of the United States.

It is not improbable that a majority of the people now entertain the opinion that the action of the House of Representatives in the attempt that was made to impeach President Johnson was an error.

It is not for me to engage in a discussion on that point. I end by the expression of the opinion that the vote of the House and the vote of the Senate, by which the doctrine was established that a civil officer is liable to impeachment for misdemeanor in office, is a gain to the public that is full compensation for the undertaking, and that these proceedings against Mr. Johnson were free from any element or quality of injustice.

Johnson's case ought to be borne in mind in all agitation for a longer Presidential term. Whenever the country is engaged in a Presidential contest there are complains by business men accompanied by a demand for an extension of the term of office to six or in some instances to ten years. The disturbance of business is due to the importance of the election, and the importance of an election is due to the amount of power that is to be secured by the successful party. An extension of the term would add to the importance of the election, and a term of six or ten years would intensify the contest and the injury to business would be intensified, proportionately. It is doubtful whether in a period of twenty or fifty years any appreciable relief to business would be furnished by an extension of the term of the Presidential office.

It is by no means certain that the total of business is not as great as it would be in the same four years if the term were ten years instead of four. The total of production and consumption cannot be affected seriously by a political controversy that does not extend usually, over a period of more than three months. If business is diminished during those months there will be a corresponding gain in the months that are to follow.

In a popular government there must be elections, and in all such governments business interests must be subordinated to the general welfare. The changes that have taken place since the Government was organized would justify the shortening rather than the lengthening of the Presidential term. The means of communication are such that two years may give the mass of the people better means for judging men and measures than could be had in four years at the opening of this century.

There is no form of education that more fully justifies its cost than the education that is gained in a Presidential canvass. The newspapers, the magazines, and more than all the speakers—"stump orators" as they are called—communicate information and stimulate thought. The voters are converted into a great jury, and after full allowance is made for weakness, corruption and coercion, they are advanced at each quadrennial contest in their knowledge of men, in their ability to deal with measures of policy, and in comprehension of the principles of government. If the losses in business were as great as is ever represented, the educational advantages of a Presidential canvass are an adequate set-off. The people have an opportunity to see and hear the men who are engaged in public affairs and questions are discussed upon their intrinsic merits. In the sixty years of my experience there has been a great advance in the quality of the speeches to which the people have listened. The speeches of 1840 would not be tolerated in 1900.

When great questions are under debate appeals are made to the principles of government and proportionately the education of the people is of a higher grade.

A serious objection to a long term in the Presidential office is the fact that a spirit of discontent, that always exists, will develop into insubordination or even revolution. We have an example in the history of the Republic of Hayti. The term is seven years and in many cases the President has been superseded by the leader of a revolutionary party. The most recent instance was the overthrow of President Legitime and the instalment of Hyppolite. The peace and prosperity of Hayti would be promoted by reducing the term of the Presidential office to two years. The contests that are sure to arise among a mercurial people would thus be transferred from the battle-field to the ballot- box. Who could have answered for the peace of the United States in 1868 if President Johnson's term had been six years instead of eight months?

[* This was a race riot, which occurred July 30, 1866, and in which many negroes were killed.—EDITOR.]

XXXIII THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT IN 1869

In March, 1869, I was appointed Secretary of the Treasury by President Grant. Soon after my appointment Mr. McCulloch, the retiring Secretary, said to me that I should find the department in excellent order, and that in his opinion the financial difficulties of the Government had been overcome. The first of these statements was true in part, and in part it was very erroneous.

The accounting branch of the service was properly administered practically, but there were about one hundred persons on the pay rolls who had no desks in the department, and who performed but little work at their homes, where some of them ostensibly were employed in copying.

Several heads of bureaus were notoriously intemperate. This condition of things was due in part to the war and to the exigencies of the department consequent upon the war; and in part it was due to the constitutional infirmities of Mr. Chase and Mr. McCulloch. In some respects they resembled each other. They were phlegmatic in temperament, lacking in versatility, and lacking in facility for labor and business.

Mr. McCulloch was diligent, industrious and conscientiously devoted to his duties. He had been crippled in his administration by the conflict between Congress and the President. The head of the Treasury needs the confidence of the President, and the confidence and the support of Congress. The latter Mr. McCulloch did not enjoy, and there were indications that in some respects he differed with the President. He was hampered by the fact that any change in the personnel of his department would be followed by inquiries from one party or the other, coupled oftentimes with complaints and criticisms.

Great evils existed in the revenue system. The controversy between Congress and the President led to many removals of collectors of customs and of internal revenue. Their places were supplied by persons who could accommodate themselves to both parties. The President was made to believe that the applicants were his friends, but that their relations with Republican Senators were such that they could secure confirmation. When nominated these men represented themselves as good Republicans and friendly to the Congressional policy. From such persons an honest performance of duty could not have been expected. Hence gross frauds upon the revenue were perpetrated and in most instances by the connivance of those in office.

The returns for the last year of Johnson's administration, and the first years of Grant's administration, showed that the loss on whisky in the first named period was not less than thirty million dollars.

That there were other great losses was proved by the facts that the payments on the public debt were less than thirty million dollars during the last year of Johnson's administration and that the payments were one hundred million dollars during the first year of Grant's administration, and that without any additional sources of revenue.

If Mr. McCulloch's first statement had been true in the most important particulars, his second claim would not have been open to debate. It was true that the department had passed the point where there was any exigency for money. The Government was no longer a borrower. Payments on the public debt had been made, but otherwise nothing had been done to relieve the country of the interest account, nor was the credit of the Government such that any practicable movement in that direction could have been made.

The six per cent bonds were worth only 83 or 84, and no step had been taken to redeem the pledge of the Government in regard to the Sinking Fund made in the act of February 25, 1862. The interest account exceeded two hundred and thirty-three million dollars.

Mr. S. M. Clark was the chief of the Bureau of Printing and Engraving and everything was confided to him. It is to be said after the lapse of thirty years for examination, that not a tittle of evidence has been found warranting any imputation upon his integrity. It is true that in one instance a dishonest plate printer took an impression of a bond upon a sheet of lead for use in counterfeiting. The possibility of such an act was due to a lack of system and not to any want of fidelity in Mr. Clark. One of my first acts was to remove Mr. Clark, and then to open a new set of books. The printing of the old issues was suspended permanently, and new plates were prepared. Mr. Clark had had control of the manufacture of the paper, the control of the engravers, the control of the plates, the control of the printers, of the counters, and he had had the custody of the red seal. The postal currency was printed under his direction. The pieces were not numbered, they were due bills only. At the end of twenty years the books showed an issue of about fifteen million dollars in excess of the redemptions.

His power was unlimited as there were no checks upon him. He once said to me when a committee of Congress was investigating his bureau, during Mr. McCulloch's administration:

"They will never find a five cent piece out of the way."

After the discharge of Clark, I ordered an account of stock to be taken. I appointed a custodian of the plates after a full inventory had been made, whose duty it was to deliver the plates each morning to the printers, to charge them to the printers, to receive them at the close of the day, and to settle the account of each man. A special paper was designated and public notice was given under the statute by which it was made a crime for any person to make, use or have in his possession any paper so designated. The paper was manufactured under the supervision of an agent of the department, who was authorized to count and receive all the paper at the mills and to answer the orders for its delivery to the printers. The paper making machine was equipped with a register which numbered the sheets of paper. That record was compared daily with the number of sheets received by the agent, and thus the Government was protected against any fraudulent or erroneous issue of paper. Registers were also placed upon each printing press. Each morning one thousand sheets of paper were delivered to each plate printer, and at the close of work his printed sheets were counted and the number compared with the register before the printer was allowed to leave the office. In like manner there was an accounting with each counter. The same system was extended to the managers of the machines used for numbering bonds and bank notes. The registering machine was made by an employee, under my direction, and at the cost of the Government.

Books of account were opened upon the new system. During my administration, as far as I know, there was never the loss of a sheet of paper nor was there a fraud committed in connection with the business of the bureau. For further security, I made arrangements by which two bank note companies in the City of New York prepared sets of plates for a single printing on each security, the red seal being imprinted in the Treasury Bureau. By this arrangement collusion was impossible. The expense of printing was increased by this arrangement, but it seemed to be more important to attain absolute security against fraud than to save money. My successors have thought otherwise and the printing is now done in the Treasury.

During my term I ascertained that a man in New York who had once been employed to print certain securities, had in his possession the plates which he had used and which he claimed as his property. The printing had been done in Mr. Chase's administration and there was no agreement that the plates were to be delivered to the Government. The plates were obtained, finally, by the payment of a sum of money. The person who had the plates was an old man, and there was danger that they might fall into the hands of dishonest parties.

When I was in charge of the Treasury I had an understanding with Colonel Whiteley, the Chief of the Secret Service that I should have an interview with any expert professional criminals who might fall into his hands. I recall an interview with one such criminal. A man of forty years and a gentleman in appearance, and a professional gentleman, as well as a criminal by profession.

Upon the suggestion of Colonel Whiteley I gave the prisoner a fresh one dollar green-back note. He took a phial of liquid from his pocket, wet one half of the paper with the liquid and in my presence the colors disappeared from the paper. Time and exposure have given a dark tinge to the paper which was a pure white when the experiment was ended. By the use of the liquid the counterfeiter was able to obtain a piece of fibre paper on which a bill of large denomination might be printed, given only the engraving.

The revenue marine service was impaired by the incompetency of many of the officers, and its efficiency was also impaired by the size and quality of the ships. Some of them were sailing vessels, most of them were of wood, and the modern ones were unnecessarily large in size. I created a commission and all the officers except a few who were too old for active service were subjected to an examination and those who were found incompetent were discharged from the service. Their places were filled by young, active and well qualified men.

A commission was appointed to consider and report upon the size of the vessels that were best adapted to the service. Three reports from successive commissions were made before a satisfactory result was reached. Finally, a report was made by Captain Carlisle Patterson, that was approved by me and by a committee of Congress. The recommendations of that report have been followed, as far as I know.

At that time the Mint Service was without organization. Each mint and assay office was in charge of an officer called superintendent, but there was no head unless the Secretary of the Treasury could be so considered, as all the business came to him. Upon my recommendation Congress authorized the appointment of a Director of the Mint, and upon my recommendation the President appointed Dr. Linderman, a Philadelphia Democrat, but a gentleman familiar with the service. Under him the service was organized and made systematic.

When I took charge of the Treasury Department there was no system of bookkeeping and accounting, that was uniform in the various customs houses of the country. Each port had a plan or mode of its own, and there was no one that was so perfect that it could be accepted as a model in all the ports. The books and forms were made and prepared at the several ports and often at inordinate rates of cost.

I appointed a commission of Treasury experts to prepare forms and books for every branch of business. Their report was accepted and since that time the modes of accounting have been the same at all the ports. The stationery prepared is furnished through the Government printing office, at a considerable saving in cost, and clerks in the accounting branch of the Treasury are relieved of much labor in the preparation of statements.

Upon the transfer of Mr. Columbus Delano from the office of commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Secretaryship of the Interior Department, the question of the appointment of a successor was considered. The President named General Alfred Pleasanton, who was then a collector of internal revenue in the city of New York. He had been a good cavalry officer, a graduate of West Point, and the President was attached to him. My acquaintance with Pleasanton was limited, but I was quite doubtful of his fitness for the place. My opposition gave rise to some delay, but at the end the appointment was made, the President saying in reply to my doubts that if he did not succeed he had only to say so to the General and he would leave at once. The appointment of Pleasanton was urged by Mr. Delano and General Horace Porter as I understood, both of whom were very near the President.

Pleasanton had been informed of my position, and although I was his immediate superior he did not call upon me, nor did he ever, except upon one occasion, come into my office, unless I sent for him. On my part I resolved to avoid any criticism upon his official conduct unless compelled to do so. He entered upon his duties the first of January, 1871, and although in several instances I had occasion to control his purposes in regard to contracts and to the refund of taxes, I did not feel called upon to mention the facts to the President. In May the President said:

"I have come to the conclusion that Pleasanton is not succeeding in his office."

I replied: "That is so."

The President then said: "I will try to find some other place for him, and I will then ask him to resign."

The President went to Long Branch for the summer and nothing was done. I had very early discovered that Samuel Ward was exercising a good deal of influence over the commissioner. It was his policy to secure influence by giving dinners and entertainments, and, as far as possible, he obtained the attendance of influential members of Congress and of the chief officers in the executive departments. He once said:

"I do not introduce my measures at these entertainments, but I put myself upon terms with persons who have power."

On a time I received a report on the subject of refunding a cotton tax amounting to about $600,000. It bore two endorsements—one by the solicitor "Examined and disallowed, Chesley," and one by the commissioner "Allowed, Pleasanton."

I placed the report in my private drawer with the purpose of delaying action until I should ascertain where the propelling force existed. Having occasion to go to Massachusetts I was absent about two weeks. Upon my return Mr. Ward came into my office and inquired whether I had received the report. I replied that I had received it. "Had I acted upon it?" I said that I had not. He then proceeded to say that the claim was a good one,—that Mr. Delano had examined it, and had concluded to pass it, but as he left the office rather suddenly he had neglected to act upon it. Finally, he expressed the hope that I would act without delay. I had already decided the case adversely upon the ground that the allowance was unauthorized. Therefore I had only to endorse the word "disallowed" with my signature and to return the report to the commissioner. I learned that the commissioner was engaged through the agency of Ward in making a contract with a Connecticut firm that was in my opinion at once improvident and irregular. This act led me to determine to end the difficulty at once. I went to the Executive Mansion and asked General Babcock to go to Long Branch and say to the President that the business of the Internal Revenue Office was in such a condition that immediate action was necessary. As a result the President returned that night and early the next morning he sent for me. I stated the facts, and he said he would send for General Pleasanton and ask him to resign. At the interview Pleasanton asked for the reasons. The President said: "The Secretary is not satisfied with your administration." Pleasanton replied: "I think I can make everything satisfactory to the Secretary." The President replied, naturally: "If you can, I am content." Then for the first time Pleasanton came to my office without a request from me. I invited him into my private room, and when he had related his interview with the President, I said: "General, if this were a personal matter we might come to an understanding, but your administration of the office has been a failure from the first and you must resign." This ended the interview. He refused to resign and the President removed him. He appealed to the Senate in a lengthy communication, but without effect. Pleasanton may have been, and probably was, a good military officer, but he did not possess the qualities that are essential in the discharge of important civil trusts.

Neither from my experience in Congress nor in the Treasury Department can I deduce much support for the doctrines of the class of politicians called Civil Service Reformers. From their statements it would appear that every member of Congress was the recipient of an amount of patronage in the nature of clerkships that he could and did control. I can say for myself that as a member I never asserted any such right and as the head of the Treasury I can say that no such claim was ever made upon me by any member of Congress. The nearest approach to it was by George W. Julian. During one of his canvasses for re-nomination, a clerk named Smith, and a correspondent of a journal in Mr. Julian's district, had advocated the nomination of Mr. Wilson (Jeremiah). When Mr. Julian secured the nomination, Smith gave him his support. Nevertheless when Julian returned to Washington he demanded Smith's removal. After hearing all the facts I declined to act. Julian was very indignant, and afterwards from the Astor House, New York, wrote me a violent, I think I might say unreasonable letter.

The public mind has been much misled by the statements in regard to removals and appointments. The employees in a department are of two sorts. There is a class who are trained men in the places that they occupy. They have been in the service for a long period. They are familiar with the laws relating to their duties, and to the decisions of the courts thereon, and they are the possessors of the traditions of the offices. They are as nearly indispensable as one man can be to another, or to the safe management of business. The head of a department cannot dispense with the services of such men. All thought of political opinions disappears. The responsibility of a change in such a case is very great. No prudent administrator of a public trust will venture upon such experiments. There is another class of clerks who are employed in copying, in making computations in simple arithmetic, in writing letters under dictation, and in other ordinary clerical work.

The public interest is not very large in the retention of such persons. The ordinary graduates of the high schools of the country are competent for all those duties. But the clerks of this class are not removed in mass, and they never will be, under any administration. Even a fresh man at the head of a department will soon find that the fancied political advantages are no adequate compensation for the trouble that he assumes and the risk of error and fraud that he runs when he takes new and untried persons in the place of those who have been tested. As late as 1870 about thirty per cent. of the employees of the Treasury in 1860 were in office, and this notwithstanding that the Treasury furnished recruits for both armies. During my time and for years afterward, the post of Assistant Secretary was held by Mr. Hartley, a Democrat from the days of Pierce and Buchanan. He was experienced, diligent and entirely trustworthy.

Of the first class of employees it is to be said that there is no occasion to embalm them in their offices, and if their pay is adequate there is no ground for placing them upon the pension rolls. Their duties are not as exacting as the duties and labors of men in corresponding stations in private life. As to the second class, their relations to the public are such that no public obligation arises except to pay them the stipulated salaries.

It is essential to a proper administration that the Secretary or the President should have the power of removal, and it should never be coupled with the duty of making a statement of the cause. Not infrequently a statement would be the occasion of scandal and of suffering by innocent parties. The power may be abused as every power may be, in the hands of dishonest or corrupt men. This is one of the perils to the public, a peril from which no government can escape. With us a change of rulers is a remedy for political wrongs that do not belong to the catalogue of crimes. It may be said, however, that this power of removal gives to a dishonest administrator of a department the opportunity to secure the appointment of his political friends in the place of political opponents removed, and this whatever may be the method of appointment. The candidates may pass the competitive examination, and they may enter upon their duties, but their chief in thirty or sixty days may find them lacking in practical aptitude, and so on, until those of the true faith shall be sent forward by the examining board.

Honest administrators of official duties are embarrassed by the system and dishonest ones evade it. The system may become the enemy of honesty and the shield of hypocrisy. Only this is needed. When the appointing power has designated a person for an office, let that person be examined by an independent board with reference to character and those qualifications which seem to be a fit preparation for the practical duties of the place. Whenever the power of appointment and removal is abused the public has a remedy in a change of administration. And herein is one reason why the Presidential term should not be extended. There may be many evils of administration which are not so flagrant as to warrant proceedings for impeachment. Such evils may be borne for brief periods, when if the term of the President were extended to six or eight years the dissatisfied elements of society might be tempted to engage in revolutionary movements. Nor is there wisdom in limiting the Presidential office to a single term in the same person. The thought that one has a future is a great stimulus to careful and energetic action in the performance of public duties. For a President there is no future except a re-election, which is in fact an approval by the country of his administration. A wise man will strive to so conduct affairs as to merit that approval. A House of Representatives already condemned by a popular verdict is but a poor guardian of the rights of the people; and a defeated administration performs its duties in the most indifferent manner. After a defeat appointments will be made and acts done that would not have been hazarded pending an election. It is true, probably, of every administration, not excepting that of General Washington, that the second term was less acceptable to the country than the first. Mr. Lincoln had no second term, and it is useless to speculate upon its probable character, if he had lived to perform its duties.

It was my habit to be at the Treasury every morning at nine o'clock, and I usually sent immediately for one or more heads of division or chiefs of bureau for conference upon some matter connected with their duties. By frequent interviews I acquired such knowledge of their duties and of pending questions that I always had a reason for those interviews. By this course I maintained relations of familiarity with the officers who constituted the department for administrative purposes, and I also established a system of punctuality in the matter of attendance. When the head of a division is tardy, the clerks soon venture to follow his example, and if he is prompt they are ashamed to be dilatory unless they have an adequate excuse. The same relation exists between the bureau officers and the head of a department.

One of my first acts in the nature of a financial policy was to establish the Sinking Fund, agreeably to the act of February 25, 1862. Seven years had passed since the passage of the law and four years since the end of the war and yet nothing had been done to provide for the redemption of the public debt agreeably to the promise that had been made when the Government was a large borrower of money and when its credit was depreciated, seriously, in all the markets of the world. In my first annual report, December, 1869, I advised Congress of my action and I recommended the application of the bonds that I had then purchased, amounting to about fifty-four million dollars, to the Sinking Fund, until the deficiency then existing had been met. The step that I then took was taken in obedience to the law, and not from any great faith in the wisdom of the Sinking Fund policy, nor was it from any fear that the Government could not pay its debts whether a Sinking Fund was or was not created.

The faith of the Government had been pledged to a particular policy and I thought that the observance of that policy was both wise and just. A government cannot afford to disregard the terms of its undertakings even if a violation or neglect does not work harm to anyone. The payments to the Sinking Fund were made regularly during General Grant's administration, and the credit of the Government was thereby somewhat strengthened. The chief element of strength was in the fact that the payments were such as to astonish the heavily taxed and debt burdened States of Europe. In my four years of service as the head of the Treasury the payments on the debt reached the enormous sum of three hundred and sixty-four million dollars. No one of my successors has paid an equal amount, nor has an equal amount been paid in any other equal period of time by the United States or by any other government.

At the time I entered the Treasury the price of gold was at about forty per cent premium and when I left the Treasury it was at about twelve per cent premium. In the summer of 1869 I entered upon the policy of selling gold and buying bonds. The sales and purchases were made by the Assistant Treasurer in New York, but the bids were reported to me and by me accepted or rejected. A leading criticism was this: It was claimed that the simple method was to buy bonds in gold and thus to secure the bonds by one transaction.

This policy would have limited the number of purchasers of gold to those who could command bonds. By the policy pursued the sales of gold were open to anyone who had money. The gold was sold for currency, and the bonds were purchased with currency. When the Treasury announced its purpose to purchase bonds the price advanced in the market. The President remarked to me jocularly that he had suffered by not knowing what the department was about to do, inasmuch as he had sold bonds a few days too early and at a price below their then present value. During my service as Secretary of the Treasury I carried two questions only to the Cabinet discussions—and I have forgotten one of the questions, but it had some political significance. The other arose in this manner: My method of negotiating the sale of new bonds under the Funding Act of July, 1870, had been severely criticized. The Government was compelled to give ninety days' notice of its purpose to redeem five-twenty bonds, and as we could not with safety make a call until we had the funds, and as our chief source was the proceeds of new bonds we could not call until a sale was made. As a consequence the Government was a loser of interest on all called bonds for the period of ninety days. I arranged with the subscribers for new bonds, that they should have the interest for the ninety days upon a deposit of old bonds as security for the new ones subscribed and taken. The Government lost nothing, and the subscribers were benefitted greatly, and thus the subscriptions were increased.

During the campaign of 1872 I had an opportunity to negotiate a new loan upon the same basis. Knowing that the proceeding would renew criticism, I thought it proper to lay the case before the President and Cabinet. Upon their advice the negotiations were suspended.

Governor Fish on more than one occasion complained that the Cabinet were as ignorant of the proceedings and purposes of the Treasury as was the outside world. His complaints were well founded. Much of the business aside from routine matters was secret. For example my orders for the sale of gold and the purchase of bonds were never issued at any other time than Sunday evening, and then always by myself. The orders were sent to the Sub-Treasurer at New York, and given to the Associated Press at the same time. Consequently, on Monday morning all the country was informed, and under such circumstances that the chance of some to speculate upon the ignorance of others were reduced to the minimum. Moreover, the members of the Cabinet might divide. I should then be compelled to act upon my own judgment, and against the views of some of my associates. Again, if I had the support of the President and Cabinet, I could not have used the fact as an excuse for myself. The public knew no one but the Secretary. I chose to act upon my own judgment knowing that there was no one else to share the responsibility in case of failure.

In my report to Congress, in December, 1869, I set forth a system for refunding the Public Debt. I had unfolded the scheme in a speech in the House of Representatives, July 1868. I had already taken two steps preparatory to the undertaking. First, in May, 1869, I established the Sinking Fund under the Act of February 25, 1862. Second, by the purchase of bonds the world had assurance that the debt would be paid. The effect of these two measures was seen in the increasing market value of the bonds. In other words the credit of the country was improving. When the President was preparing his message of December, 1869, he called upon me for my views in regard to the Treasury, and I furnished him with a synopsis of my plan which he embodied in his message. I retained a copy of the synopsis and that copy is in the hands of my daughter. Simultaneously I prepared a bill upon the basis of the report and caused the same to be printed upon the Treasury press. Upon an examination of the papers on file in the archives of the Senate I find that cuttings from my printed bill form a part of the bill which was printed by the Finance Committee of the Senate of which Senator Sherman was chairman. The bill was changed in details but not in principle. The loan was in three parts as my bill was prepared. A portion at 5 per cent, a portion at 4 1/2 per cent, and a third portion at 4 per cent. The division was retained in the statute, but the amount of the loan at each of the several rates was changed. By my bill the interest could be made payable in Europe. This feature was stricken out by the committees in the House or the Senate. This change I overcame or avoided ultimately by a rule of the department by which interest on registered bonds could be made payable in checks of the Treasurer. These checks are now sent to all parts of the world and through the banking facilities they are everywhere as good as gold, subject only to the natural rates of exchange between different countries. Since that time railroad companies and other business corporations have accepted the system. My plan of making the interest on the bonds payable in Europe was rejected under the lead of gentlemen who thought it involved some sort of national degradation. My object was to make the loan more negotiable in Europe and thus to extend the demand, and consequently, to increase the value of our securities.

The records of the Treasury Department show that on the 23rd day of December, 1869, I sent to General Schenck of the House, a draught of a bill for refunding the Public Debt. The same records show that on the 19th of January, 1870, I sent to Senator Sherman eight copies of a bill. These bills were framed in conformity to the plan marked out in my report of December, 1869. Previous to the preparation of that report I had not any conference with any member of Congress nor with any other person in regard to the details of the scheme.

On the 12th of July, 1870, Mr. Sumner introduced a bill for refunding the Pubic Debt (Sen. S. 80). As might have been expected it was not a practical measure, and on the 3rd day of the following February Mr. Sherman reported the bill of Mr. Sumner in a new draught. A single copy of that bill is on file in the office of the secretary of the Senate, and no other copy can be found.

This bill conforms to my report, and upon my recollection it is the bill as prepared by me. The division of the loan conforms to my recommendation in the report, and it provides that the interest may be made payable abroad. Subsequently these provisions were changed. General Schenck had then recently returned from Europe and he was of the opinion that the loan could all be negotiated at four or four and one half per cent and it was this opinion on his part which led to delays. The bill was not passed till July, 1870, at the very moment when the Franco-Prussian War opened. Had the bill been passed in March, quite large negotiations could have been made in April of that year. But the sale of the new five per cent bonds was an undertaking of great difficulty. It is now impossible to realize that a six per cent bond was not worth par in 1869-'70. At that time the leading bankers of the world were unwilling to engage in the undertaking. The Rothschilds and Barings stood aloof. The Amsterdam bankers wrote letters of inquiry, but they did nothing more. Mr. Morton, of the firm of Morton, Bliss & Co., New York, was inclined to engage in the business, but his partner, Mr. Bliss was doubtful of the success of the scheme, and they therefore stood aside when the first negotiations were attempted. Finally an arrangement was made with Jay Cooke & Co., by which they advertised what was called a popular loan, asking for a subscription to the five per cent bonds.

Subsequently I advised Congress to issue four per cent fifty year bonds as a basis of the banking system, coupled with an offer to the existing banks of a preference, but in case any bank should refuse to exchange the bonds then held by such bank, its charter after one year should be annulled and its banking privileges should be open to any other association that would purchase the four per cent bonds. This proposition aroused the hostility of the national banks and forthwith the city was invaded by bank officers and agents who succeeded in defeating the bill.

I had early foreseen that the Public Debt could be paid without much delay, and without a system of oppressive taxation. In July, 1863, in the introduction to my volume on the tax system of the country, I had predicted that the revenues would be equal to the payment of interest on a debt twice as large as the Public Debt then was, together with large annual payments of principal. I predicted also that these payments would menace the national banking system. My scheme looked for the perpetuation of that system for fifty years at least. The banks looked upon the scheme as a hostile project and they were therefore led to defeat a measure which in fact was liberal in the extreme. At that time the capital of all the national banks was limited to three hundred million dollars. Thus did the banks defeat a measure which was designed to secure their perpetuity and calculated to promote their financial interests. They acted upon the idea that the credit of the country could never be so far advanced that a four per cent bond would be worth par.

The success of the five per cent loan of 1871, of which I give a full account elsewhere, should have ended the contest in regard to the credit of the United States. A five per cent bond had been sold at par in the London market. The principal of the Public Debt was undergoing a monthly reduction and the gain in the interest account was sufficient to guarantee the payment of the principal in half a century. From that time forward, the leading bankers of Europe and American were ready to co-operate in placing the remaining five per cents, and then the four and a half and four per cents.

From that time forward the credit of the Government has been improving constantly. It was no longer difficult to borrow money at the rate of five per cent, and with the adjustment of our controversy with Great Britain there remained no reason to question the rapid progress of the United States in wealth and population. Indeed, it was then entirely feasible for the Government to have resumed specie payments, as any demand upon the Treasury for gold could have been met with proceeds of bonds sold in Europe. It was my opinion, however, that it would be wiser to delay resumption until the balance of trade should be so much in our favor that specie payments could be maintained by our own resources. And this was accomplished in less than six years. It is with a state as it is with an individual. With an established credit, or with a credit improving constantly and an income in excess of expenditures, there is no difficulty in meeting all liabilities as they mature. Such was the condition of the Treasury when I left it in March, 1873. In March, 1869, the Government was paying interest, measured at the gold value of its securities at the rate of seven per cent. In 1873 the rate was five per cent or less. In that time the net Public Debt had been reduced in the sum of three hundred and sixty- four million dollars, and the interest account had been reduced about thirty million dollars.

When I was engaged in placing bonds in Europe, a discussion arose among bankers in regard to the conflict of statements as to the amount of the Public Debt. By the reports of the Treasurer, which were the basis of the monthly statements, the debt was represented by the securities actually issued after deducting those which had been redeemed. By the report from the Registrar's Office which once each year corresponded in time to the monthly report, the balance was widely different. These facts impaired our standing financially. Upon the register's books the Government was charged with every issue that passed out of his office, and it was days, usually, and not infrequently it was weeks, before the securities passed from the Treasury into the hands of creditors or purchasers of securities. On the other hand the Treasurer would be entitled to credit for redemptions made days or weeks before the evidence of such payments would appear on the register's books. An analogous fact exists in the discrepancy between a depositor's account with his bank and the account at the bank as long as there are outstanding checks. The books would not agree and yet each might be accurate. As it was a necessity of the situation that the business of the Treasury should proceed day by day without interruption and it was difficult to explain the discrepancy to the many inquirers, I ordered Mr. Allison, the register, to accept for his annual reports the statement of the Treasurer, as his statements conformed to the existing facts on the days when the statements were made. The register protested that the order was not justified by the law, and that was the truth although there was no law forbidding such an act. The transaction, including my order, was brought before a committee of the House of Representatives, but as far as I know, the question of the legality of the proceedings, was not canvassed, or if attention was directed to the subject the committee may have treated it as an act in the public interest and from which no injury had arisen. Upon these facts, Senator Henry G. Davis, of West Virginia, made the charge that the books of the Treasury had been altered by my direction and that it was possible that some great fraud had been perpetrated which might be discovered if a committee were appointed to investigate the Treasury. A committee was granted, of which Senator Davis was a member. The investigation was a failure from his standpoint. Indeed, the alteration of the books of the Treasury would required the collusive co-operation of many persons, and evidence of the fact of the alteration would, of necessity, become known to hundreds of clerks.

Mr. Davis and some other Democrats implicated me in an analogous matter which they tried to understand but did not. The Loan Accounts of the Treasury Department showed that the payments on the Public Debt exceeded the receipts from loans in the enormous sum of one hundred and sixteen million dollars. I appointed a committee of clerks to examine the account in detail for the purpose of ascertaining whether the discrepancy was real or only apparent. The fact of the discrepancy was reported to Congress and the progress made in the investigation was noted in the appendix to the Annual Reports. It is probable, however, that these reports were never seen by Mr. Davis, and hence his suspicion that an investigation into the accuracy of the Treasury accounts would show an alteration of Treasury books, and of course, for some improper purpose.

The error began in Mr. Hamilton's time, and in consequence of the assumption of the State debts. Bonds were issued for those debts but there were no receipts paid into the Treasury, and consequently the debit side of the account was a blank. When the bonds were paid the payment became a credit on the loan account. In after times bonds were issued and sold below par. The account was charged with the receipts and upon payment the loan account was credited with the full amount paid. In some cases the discrepancy was augmented by the purchase of bonds and the payment of a premium, as was done in the second term of General Jackson. The investigation showed that the discrepancy was only apparent, and the criticisms and complaints ceased.

During my administration of the Treasury Department, the government of the Territory of Alaska was in my hands. The legislation of Congress was brief and indefinite and the only officers were collectors of customs, treasury agents and the revenue cutter officials. The principal topics of thought were the exclusion of liquors and firearms and the protection of the fur seal fishery. During the session of the Forty-first Congress a bill was passed which required the Secretary to lease the seal fishery to the best bidder, with a preference to the company which was then engaged in the fishery. On the question of the nature of the preference I took the opinion of the Attorney-General in advance of the contract. At that time I was opposed to any system of leasing and I so advised the House of Representatives in a report upon the subject. Congress, however, adopted the system of leasing and upon experience that system was shown to be more advantageous to the country. The value of the fur seal fishery depends upon the market for the dressed furs, and the value of the dressed furs depends upon the fashions, and the fashions are manipulated by the producers of the varied competing goods. The Government could never engage in the business of promoting fashions and training the markets. Fur seal skins have only a moderate commercial value when the fashion is not with them.

The question of the claim on Behring Sea was not then much considered. By the law of nations it is difficult to maintain the position that that vast body of salt water can be treated as a closed sea, but there are peculiarities which distinguish it from other bodies of water as the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, which are partially enclosed.

Russia for a long time was the possessor of the adjacent mainland and of the islands which mark the limits and in a degree enclose the sea. That country claimed jurisdiction over the water. That claim was known and its validity was not disputed seriously. By the treaty Russia ceded about one half of the sea to the United States. Russia and the United States are the countries directly interested. England has no territorial rights and therefore she has no interest that is not common to other nations. The United States and Russia are interested in the seal fishery which can be preserved only by the protection of the animals in Behring Sea. It may be claimed fairly that Russia and the United State have property in these animals due to the fact that they gather upon the territory of the countries at certain seasons of the year. At other seasons they roam over the water as other animals roam over the land. They are, at least, partially domesticated. They are accustomed to the presence of the inhabitants of the islands which they occupy as breeding grounds and which they visit annually. Moreover, England has an interest in the preservation of the fishery. The skins are dressed in London, and thus far no one has been found, either in Europe or in the United States, who can compete with the London workmen. For the purpose of protecting and preserving the seal fishery, Behring Sea ought to be treated as a closed sea. For general commercial purposes it may be used as other parts of the ocean are used.

At a time, while I was Secretary of the Treasury, when I was detained at my lodgings by a slight illness, I received a visit from William E. Dodge a New York merchant and an importer of tin, whom I had known some years before when I was a member of Congress. He said that he had called to see me in regard to charges against his house preferred by the revenue officers relating to the importation of tin. I said, what was true, that I had not heard of the charges and that I had never suspected his house of any wrong-doing in their business. His statement in reply was a great surprise to me. He said that if there was anything which appeared to be wrong, or that was in fact a violation of law, the error or wrong was unintentional—that he and his partners intended to act always in good faith. He then stated that the claim amounted to more than two hundred thousand dollars, and he proposed then and there to pay the amount claimed, coupled, however, with the condition that the payment should be kept secret. I replied that I could not take the money upon such terms and that secrecy was impossible. Upon his statement there were three persons besides ourselves who had knowledge of the existence of the charges and the payment of money must come to the knowledge of the Treasury officials. I then said:

"Mr. Dodge, you cannot afford to pay this money. If you are innocent you should contest the matter in the courts, and if you convince the judge, even if you are technically wrong, that there was no intent to defraud the Government the Secretary can remit all the penalty, leaving you to pay the duty." His counsel, if they were competent, must have given him similar advice and yet he paid voluntarily, about two hundred and seventy-six thousand dollars to the officials in New York, of which he and his friends proceeded to complain. There was a suit, but it was the duty of the firm to contest the claim of the Government, if they had a defence. And if they had had a defence they were in no danger even if they had violated the law ignorantly, for no Secretary would have allowed honest men to suffer for an ignorant violation of the revenue laws. Senator Edmunds placed upon the records of the Senate a full statement of the case.

XXXIV THE MINT BILL AND THE "CRIME OF 1873"

Of the many measures of my administration of the Treasury Department, the Mint Bill of 1873 is the only one which has been made a party issue, and which has entered permanently into the policy of the country.

In the month of March, in the year 1869, I came to the head of the Treasury Department. At an early day my attention was directed to the disordered condition of the mint service, which was then, as it ever had been, without a responsible head. The proceedings at the mints were unsystematic, and I resolved upon an attempt to codify the laws and to place the administration in the hands of a recognized, responsible officer. President Grant appointed John Jay Knox comptroller of the currency. For many years Mr. Knox had held the office of deputy comptroller. He had been a careful, constant student, and he was already a recognized authority in financial matters.