Mr. Sumner opposed the amendment and he declined to vote upon the passage of the resolution. Wendell Phillips saved it in the Senate. General Grant, more than anyone else secured its ratification by the people. I append a copy of my letter to Mr. Phillips:

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1870. MY DEAR SIR:—

This letter will recall to your mind the circumstance that when the Fifteenth Amendment was suspended between the two houses you published an editorial in the Standard in favor of the House proposition. Can you send me that article? It may not be known to you that that article saved the amendment. A little of the secret history was thus. Various propositions were offered in the House—among them one of my own—and all were referred to the Judiciary Committee.

In the Judiciary Committee, upon my motion the various resolutions for amending the Constitution in that particular were referred to a sub- committee consisting of myself, Churchill of New York and Eldridge of Wisconsin. Churchill and myself were living at the same house and conferred together several times. Eldridge took no interest in the matter and never joined us—perhaps he was not invited. After an examination of all the plans I wrote that proposed amendment which was passed by the House and is in substance and almost in language the amendment as adopted.

With the concurrence of Mr. Churchill I reported it to the committee and without one word of criticism and as far as I could judge without any particular consideration I was directed to report it to the House. In the House it encountered considerable opposition and Mr. Wilson, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, made a speech which was a great surprise to me, though directed chiefly to the bill which I had also reported by direction of the Judiciary Committee giving at once the right of suffrage to negroes in all national elections and for members of the Legislature. This I thought necessary to secure the passage of the amendment through the State Legislatures. However, the resolution was finally passed by the House. In the Senate it met with great opposition because it omitted to secure in terms the right to hold office. This point had been raised in the House where I had successfully met the proposition by the statement and an argument in support of the statement that the right to vote as a matter of fact and in law carries with it the right to hold office. In the Senate, Mr. Sumner, supported by all the Southern Republicans and a part of the Northern Republicans succeeded in substituting a new resolution securing in terms the right to hold office. Upon the return of the Resolution to the House I was obliged to take what appeared a conservative position and resist the proposition to concur with the Senate upon the ground that the change was unnecessary and that its adoption threatened the loss of the measure in doubtful States as Ohio, Indiana, West Virginia and others. The House adhered to its position, yet with such weakness of purpose on the part of many who sustained me, as indicated that they would not withstand another assault. The struggle was then renewed in the Senate and with every indication that the Senate would insist upon its amendment. It was then that your article appeared. Its influence was immediate and potential. Men thought that if you the extremest radical could accept the House proposition they might safely do the same. Had the Senate adhered one of two things would have happened, either the House would have seceded or the amendment would have failed.

Had the House concurred I fear we should have failed to carry several States which have since ratified it.

Upon reflection I think as at the time I thought that your voice saved the Fifteenth Amendment.

I am very truly, GEO. S. BOUTWELL.

WENDELL PHILLIPS, ESQ. Boston.

P. S. This letter is not for the public use in so far as names are mentioned, and of course, not for publication. G. S. B.

The article of Mr. Phillips became so important in its influence upon the final action of the Senate that I reproduce it in justice to Mr. Phillips and as a further record of an historical event.

"We see the action of the Senate touching the Constitutional Amendment with great anxiety. The House had passed a simple measure, one covering all the ground that people are ready to occupy. It answered completely the lesson of the war. Its simplicity gave it all the chance that exists for any form of amendment being ratified.

"Why was it not left in that shape? Leaving out of sight the manifest risk of attempting too much, the very fact of the little time left before the session closes, was warning enough to clutch at anything satisfactory and to run no risk of possible disagreement between the Houses. We wait further knowledge before indulging any conjectures as to the motive for this strange course of the Senate; before even suspecting that it grew out of any concealed hate toward the whole measure and was indeed a trick to defeat it. Whoever, in either House, gratifies some personal whim to the extent of defeating or even postponing this measure will incur the gravest responsibility. We exhort every man who professes himself a friend of liberty to drop all undue attachment to any form of words and to co-operate, heartily, earnestly, with the great body of the members in carrying through as promptly as possible, any form which included the substance of a constitutional protection to the votes and right to office of the colored race. That is the work of the hour. That is the lesson the war has burned in on the brain and conscience of the Nation.

"To include with this, 'Nationality, education, creed,' etc., is utter lack of common sense. Such a total forgetfulness of the commonest political prudence as makes it hard to credit the good intentions of the proposers.

"Our disappointment is the greater because we had reason to believe that the Senators who have this matter in charge, would be the last men to forget themselves at such a crisis. They have been timidly 'practical,' ludicrously tied up to precedents, when, in times past we have urged them to some act which seemed likely to jeopard party. Then Sir Oracle was never more sententious, more full of 'wise saws and modern instances,' than they. The inch they were willing to move ahead was hardly visible to the naked eye. How they lectured us on the 'too fast' and 'too far' policy! Now in an emergency which calls for the most delicate handling, they tear up not one admitted abuse, but include in the grasp half a dozen obstinate prejudices, which no logic of events has loosened. For the first time in our lives we beseech them to be a little more politicians—and a little less reformers— as those functions are usually understood."

Under the date of March 18, 1869, I received from Mr. Phillips a letter in acknowledgment of my letter of thanks and commendation, in these words:

"DEAR SIR:—

"Thank you for the intimation in your letter. I am glad if any words of mine helped get rid of the too prompt action at that time. I think it was of the greatest importance to act at once."

The public mind seems to be misled in regard to the scope and legal value of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The amendments were in the nature of grants of power to the National Government, and in a corresponding degree they were limitations of the powers of the States, but the grants of power to the nation were also subject to limitations. Until the ratification of the amendments the States had full power to extend the right of suffrage, or to restrict its enjoyment with the freedom that they possessed when the Treaty of Peace of 1783 had been signed, and when the Constitution had not been framed and ratified.

All limitations of the right of suffrage by male inhabitants of twenty-one years of age, must fall under the control of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.

If in any State the right to vote shall be "denied or abridged on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude," the statutes may be annulled by a decision of the Supreme Court. Neither the people of the United States in their political sovereignty, nor the political branch of the Government in its representative capacity can exert any direct influence upon the decision of the questions that may arise. The questions that may arise will be judicial questions, and they will fall under the decision of the judicial tribunals. Hence there has never been a time when it was the duty or when it was in the power or within the scope of the duty of the executive branch of the National Government to take official notice of the legislation in some of the former slave States, which is designed manifestly to limit the voting power of the negro population in those States.

If such legislation does not fall under the Fifteenth Amendment it will be subject to the penalty imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment,—a proportionate loss of representative power in the House of Representatives and in the Electoral Colleges.

As one of the three remaining members of the Committee on the Judiciary, and as one of the three remaining members of the Committee on Reconstruction, I wish to say, without any reservation whatever, that the amendments are accomplishing and are destined to accomplish all that was expected by the committees that were charged with the duty of providing for the protection of the rights of the freedmen.

They were relived from the disparaging distinctions that came into existence with the system of slavery. They were placed upon an equality with other citizens and in the forms of law all discriminations affecting unfavorably the right of suffrage must apply equally to all citizens. The injustice and unwisdom of the restrictive legislation in which the Southern States are indulging, are subject of concern for the whole country, but the negro populations have no ground for the complaint that their rights have been neglected by the General Government.

This, however, is true: The negro population, in common with all others, has ground for just and continuing complaint against the legislation of Congress by which a portion of the inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands have been denationalized on account of race or color, or on account of a condition of mental or physical inferiority.

The process of reasoning by which the legislation of the States of the South is condemned, by those who uphold the legislation in regard to Hawaii involves a question in political ethics which for the moment I am not able to answer in a manner satisfactory to myself.

XXXI INVESTIGATIONS FOLLOWING THE CIVIL WAR

In the years 1865, '66 and '67 three important subjects of inquiry were placed in the hands of committees of which I was a member.

The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives by resolutions adopted respectively the 9th and 30th days of April, 1866, was directed "to inquire into the nature of the evidence implicating Jefferson Davis and others in the assassination of Mr. Lincoln."

James M. Ashley of Ohio introduced a resolution for the impeachment of President Johnson, and on the 7th day of January, 1867, the House authorized the Committee on the Judiciary "to inquire into the official conduct of Andrew Johnson, Vice-President of the United States, discharging the powers and duties of President of the United States," etc.

By a resolution of the two Houses of Congress passed the 12th and 13th of December, 1865, a joint committee was created under instructions to "inquire into the condition of the States which formed the so-called Confederate States of America and report whether they or any of them are entitled to be represented in either House of Congress."

William Pitt Fessenden was chairman on the part of the Senate and Thaddeus Stevens was chairman of the part of the House. Upon the death of Mr. Stevens I succeeded to his place. The testimony taken in these cases fills three huge volumes. No inconsiderable part of the testimony was taken by myself, and I was but seldom absent from the meetings of the committees.

JOHN WILKES BOOTH

In no other situation in life is the character of a man more fully and truthfully brought into view than when he is placed upon the witness- stand and subjected to an examination by counsel or others who aim to support opposite opinions and to reach adverse results. The committees that conducted the investigations were composed of men who entertained opposite views in regard to the reconstruction of the government and in regard to the impeachment of President Johnson. There was also a difference of opinion upon the question of the responsibility of the Confederate authorities for the assassination of Mr. Lincoln. As a consequence of this diversity of opinion the witnesses were subjected to the equivalent of a cross-examination in a court of justice. Some of the impressions of men that I received in the many hearings, and some of the opinions I formed, are recorded here.

In each branch of these comprehensive inquiries there may be found something in the nature of evidence that may appear to have a bearing upon the assassination of Mr. Lincoln. It is my purpose in these paragraphs to bring in to view the testimony which relates directly to John Wilkes Booth, the most conspicuous and without question the chief criminal in the tragedy of the assassination of President Lincoln, and the attempt upon the life of Mr. Seward.

The first step in the proceedings which culminated in the murder was the deposit at Surrattsville (a place about five miles from Washington, and owned by the Surratt family) of a carbine, two bottles of whiskey, a small coil of rope, a field glass, a monkey wrench, and some other articles.

The house was kept by a man named Lloyd, and neither the character of the house nor that of the keeper could bear a rigid test in ethics. The deposit was made about the first of March by John H. Surratt, Atzerodt and David E. Herold, all of whom were afterwards implicated in the crime. The articles were received and secreted by Lloyd, but only after objections by him, as appears from his testimony. Lloyd connected Mrs. Surratt with the crime by these facts as related by him. She called upon Lloyd the Tuesday preceding the fatal Friday and gave him this message: "She told me to have them ready (speaking of the shooting-iron) that they would be called for or wanted soon, I have forgotten which."

Mrs. Surratt made a second call the afternoon preceding the murder, when this conversation took place, as stated by Lloyd: "When I drove up in my buggy to the back yard Mrs. Surratt came out to meet me. She handed me a package, and told me as well as I remember to get the guns or those things—I really forget now which, though my impression is that guns was the expression she made use of—and a couple of bottles of whisky and give them to whoever should call for them that night."

That night, after the murder, Booth and Herold called, and took the carbine and drank of the whisky. In these facts there is a basis for a reasonable theory. The theory is this. Previous to the fall of Richmond and the surrender of Lee's army the Confederate authorities set on foot a scheme for the capture and abduction of Mr. Lincoln. The articles deposited, including the rope and the monkey wrench, might be useful had Mr. Lincoln been abducted, but when the crime became murder the rope and wrench were neglected.

This view derives support from two directions. In Booth's diary is this entry. "April 13-14 Friday. The Ides. Until to-day nothing was ever thought of sacrificing to our country's wrongs. For six months we had worked to capture. But our cause being almost lost something decisive and great must be done. But its failure was owing to others who did not strike for their country with a heart."

Colonel Baker, a detective, testified that when he was in Canada, engaged in negotiations for the purchase of letters that had passed between the Confederate authorities at Richmond and Clay, Tucker, Thompson and others, he read a letter from Jefferson Davis to Jacob Thompson dated March 8, 1865, in which was this expression: "The consummation of the act that would have done more to have ended this terrible strife, being delayed, has probably ruined our cause."

The scheme for the abduction of Mr. Lincoln was a wild scheme, born of desperation, and its success would have worked only evil to the Confederacy. The purpose of the North would have been strengthened, the public feeling would have been embittered and the friendship of England and of the Continental states would have been suppressed. When Lee had surrendered, when Davis was fleeing from Richmond, when Benjamin was preparing to leave the country, the leaders of the Confederacy could not have entertained a project for the capture of Mr. Lincoln, nor of any injury to him whatever. Their opposition to Mr. Lincoln was not tainted with personal hostility. One fact remains; the persons who had knowledge of the project to abduct Mr. Lincoln and who were engaged in it at Washington, were implicated in the final crime.

If Booth's diary can be accepted as a faithful representation of his mental condition it will appear that he had on that fatal Friday submitted himself to the influence of three strong passions. He had accepted the South as his country, and he had come to look upon Mr. Lincoln as a tyrant and as its enemy. Hence he was influenced with hatred for Mr. Lincoln. Finally he had become maddened by an ambition to rival, or to excel Brutus. The influence of his possession is to be seen in the entries in his diary in the days following the 14th of April:

"I can never repent it, though we hated to kill. Our country owed all our troubles to him, and God simply made me the instrument of his punishment.

"The country is not what it was. This forced union is not what I have loved. I have not desired to outlive my country. . . . After being hunted like a dog through swamps, woods, and last night being chased by gunboats till I was forced to return wet, cold, and starving with every man's hand against me, I am here in despair. And why? For doing what Brutus was honored for—what made Tell a hero. And yet I for striking down a greater tyrant than they ever knew, am looked upon as a common cut-throat. My action was purer than either of theirs. One hoped to be great. The other had not only his country's, but his own wrongs to avenge. I knew no private wrong. I struck for my country and that alone. A country that groaned beneath this tyranny, and prayed for the end, and yet now behold the cold hand they extend to me.

"God cannot pardon me if I have done wrong, yet I cannot see my wrong except in serving a degenerate people. The little, the very little I left behind to clear my name, the Government will not allow to be printed. So ends all. For my country I have given up all that makes life sweet and holy, brought misery upon my family, and am sure there is no pardon for me in Heaven since man so condemns me.

"I do not repent of the blow I struck. I may before my God but not to man. I think I have done well. Thought I am abandoned with the curse of Cain upon me, when if the world knew my heart that one blow would have made me great, though I did desire no greatness."

Finally, he writes:

"I bless the entire world. Have never hated or wronged anyone. This last was not a wrong unless God deems it so; and it is with him to damn or bless me."

These extracts from Booth's diary reveal the influences that controlled him in the great tragedy in which he became the principal actor.

The death of Booth was only a lesser tragedy than the death of Mr. Lincoln.

Following the murder and escape of Booth a small military force was organized hastily under the direction and command of Colonel Lafayette C. Baker, a detective in the service of the War Department. The force consisted of about thirty men chiefly convalescents from the army hospitals in Washington. Colonel Everton G. Conger was in command of the expedition, and his testimony contains a clear account of what transpired at Garrett's Farm, where Booth was captured and shot. Conger reached Garrett's Farm on the night of the 25th of April, or the early morning of the 26th. The men were posted around the tobacco shed in which Booth and Herold were secreted and their surrender was demanded by Conger. Booth refused to surrender and tendered, as a counter proposition, a personal contest with the entire force. Herold surrendered. Upon Booth's persistent refusal to surrender, a fire was lighted in a corner of the building. Booth then came forward with his carbine in his hand and engaged in a conversation with Lieut. L. Byron Baker. While so engaged a musket was fired from the opposite side of the shed and Booth fell, wounded fatally in the neck, at or near the spot where Mr. Lincoln had been struck. Conger had given orders to the men not to shoot under any circumstances. The examination disclosed the fact that the shot was fired by a sergeant, named Boston Corbett. When Colonel Conger asked Corbett why he shot without orders Corbett saluted the colonel and said: "Colonel, Providence directed me." Thus the parallel runs. Booth claimed that he was the instrument of the Almighty in the assassination of Lincoln, and Boston Corbett claimed that he acted under the direction of Providence when he shot Booth.

Booth was shot at about three o'clock in the morning of April 26, and he died at fifteen minutes past seven. During that time he was conscious for about three fourths of an hour. He asked whether a person called Jett had betrayed him. His only other intelligible remark was this:

"Tell my mother I died for my country."

During the afternoon preceding the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, Booth met John Matthews a brother actor, and requested him to hand a letter to Mr. Coyle, of the National Intelligencer, the next morning. Mathews had a part in the play at Ford's Theater. When the shot was fired and Mathews was changing his dress to leave the theater, he discovered the letter, which for the time he had forgotten. When he reached his rooms he opened the letter. It contained an avowal of Booth's purpose to murder the President, and he named three of his associates. Booth referred to a plan that had failed, and he then added: "The moment has at length arrived when my plans must be changed." These statements were made by Mathews from recollection. Mathews destroyed the letter under the influence of the apprehension that its possession would work his ruin.

The records seem to warrant certain conclusions:

1. That the Confederate authorities at Richmond made a plan for the capture of Mr. Lincoln, and that Booth, Mrs. Surratt and others—who were implicated finally in the murder—were concerned in the project to abduct the President and to hold him a hostage.

2. That the undertaking failed.

3. That following Lee's surrender and the downfall of the Confederacy, Booth originated the plan to murder the President, under the influence of the motives and reasons that are set forth in his diary and in the letter to Mr. Coyle.

4. His influence over the persons who were involved in the conspiracy to abduct Mr. Lincoln, was so great that he was able to command their aid in the commission of the final crime.

When the investigations were concluded there remained in the possession of the Committee on the Judiciary a quantity of papers, affidavits, letters and memoranda of no value as evidence. These were placed within a sealed package. The package was deposited with the clerk of the House of Representatives. The preservation of the papers may have been an error. They should have been destroyed by the committee. Some doubts were expressed however as to the authority of the committee. Further investigations were suggested as not impossible. I am the only person living who has knowledge of the papers. They are now in the possession of the House of Representatives. It is not in the public interest that the papers should become the possession of the public.

MR. LINCOLN AND THE ATTACK ON FORT SUMTER

The testimony of John Minor Botts of Virginia, given before the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, February 18, 1866, presents Mr. Lincoln as a diplomatist at the outset of his experience as President.

Mr. Botts had been a leading member of the Whig Party and he was a Union man from the beginning of the contest to the end of the war. As the work of secession was advancing in the Gulf States Mr. Lincoln became anxious for the fate of the border States and especially for Virginia and Kentucky, which promised to serve as barriers to the aggressive movements of the South in case of war. Mr. Botts came to Washington at the request of Mr. Lincoln in the early days of April, 1861, and they were together and in private conversation during the evening of the 7th of April from seven to eleven o'clock. In the conversation of that evening the President gave Mr. Botts an account of the steps that he had taken to prevent a collision in the harbor of Charleston.

Mr. Summers and Mr. Baldwin of Virginia had been delegates in the Peace Congress and they had been counted among the Union men of the State. Soon after the inauguration the President was informed that the small garrison in Fort Sumter was nearly destitute of provisions and that an attempt to add to the supply would be resisted. The President, Mr. Summers and Mr. Botts had served together as Whigs in the Thirtieth Congress and the President invited Mr. Summers by letter and by special messenger to a conference in Washington. To this invitation no answer was given by Mr. Summers until the 5th of April, when Mr. Baldwin appeared and said that he had come upon the request of Mr. Summers. Mr. Lincoln said at once: "Ah! Mr. Baldwin, why did you not come sooner? I have been expecting you gentlemen to come to me for more than a week past. I had a most important proposition to make to you. I am afraid you have come too late. However, I will make the proposition now. We have in Fort Sumter with Major Anderson about eighty men and I learn from Major Anderson that his provisions are nearly exhausted . . . I have not only written to Governor Pickens, but I have sent a special messenger to say that if he will allow Major Anderson to obtain his marketing at the Charleston market, or, if he objects to allowing our people to land at Charleston, if he will have it sent to him, then I will make no effort to provision the fort, but, that if he does not do that, I will not permit these people to starve, and that I shall send provisions down,—and that if fires on that vessel he will fire upon an unarmed vessel, loaded with nothing but bread but I shall at the same time send a fleet along with her, with instructions not to enter the harbor of Charleston unless the vessel is fired into; and if she is, then the fleet is to enter the harbor and protect her. Now, Mr. Baldwin, that fleet is now lying in the harbor of New York and will be ready to sail this afternoon at five o'clock, and although I fear it is almost too late, yet I will submit anyway the proposition which I intended for Mr. Summers. Your convention in Richmond, Mr. Baldwin, has been sitting now nearly two months and all they have done has been to shake the rod over my head. You have recently taken a vote in the Virginia Convention, on the right of secession, which was rejected by ninety to forty-five, a majority of two thirds, showing the strength of the Union Party in that convention; and, if you will go back to Richmond and get that Union majority to adjourn and go home without passing the ordinance of secession, so anxious am I for the preservation of the peace of this country and to save Virginia and the other States from going out, that I will take the responsibility of evacuating Fort Sumter, and take the chance of negotiating with the cotton States, which have already gone out."

This quotation is from the testimony of Mr. Botts and there cannot be better evidence of the facts existing in the first days of April, nor a more trustworthy statement of the position of Mr. Lincoln in regard to the secession movement. At that time the Virginia Convention had rejected a proposed ordinance of secession by a vote of ninety to forty-five, and there can be no doubt that Mr. Lincoln had hopes that his proposition might calm the temper and change the purposes of the secessionists in that State if he did not change the schemes of Governor Pickens, of which, indeed, the prospect was only slight.

In his Inaugural Address, and in all his other public utterances, Mr. Lincoln sought to place the responsibility of war upon the seceding States. At a later day Mr. Lincoln, in a conversation with Senator Sumner and myself, expressed regret that he had neglected to station troops in Virginia in advance of the occupation of the vicinity of Alexandria by the Confederates, a course of action to which he had been urged by Mr. Chase and others.

Mr. Lincoln's proposition for the relief of Fort Sumter was rejected by Mr. Baldwin, as was the proposition for the adjournment of the convention, sine die.

When Mr. Botts appeared the time had passed when arrangements could have been made for the relief of Sumter and the adjournment of the convention. Although the situation may not have been realized at the time it was not the less true that Mr. Botts and the small number of Union men in Virginia were powerless in presence of the movement in favor of secession under the lead of Tyler, Seddon and others.

The political side of Mr. Lincoln's character is seen in the fact that he enjoined secrecy upon Mr. Botts. He may have been unwilling to allow his supporters in the North to know how far he had gone in the line of conciliation. In the conversation with Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Lincoln had given an assurance that upon the acceptance of his two propositions he would evacuate Fort Sumter. When Mr. Lincoln made these facts known to Mr. Botts at the evening interview, Mr. Botts said; "Will you authorize me to make that proposition to the Union men of the convention? I will take a steamboat to-morrow morning, and have a meeting of the Union men to-morrow night, I will guarantee with my head, that they will adopt your proposition." In reply, Mr. Lincoln said: "It is too late. The fleet has sailed." In truth it was too late for the acceptance of the propositions in Virginia. The Union men were powerless, and the secessionists were dominant in affairs and already vindictive. The charge that Mr. Seward gave a promise that Sumter would be abandoned, may or it may not have been true, but there can be no ground for doubting the statement made by Mr. Botts in regard to the terms tendered by Mr. Lincoln, and which were rejected by Mr. Baldwin.

Mr. Baldwin admitted the interview with Mr. Lincoln, and the nature of it as herein given, to Mr. John F. Lewis, who was a Union man and a member of the convention that adopted the Ordinance of Secession by a vote of eighty-eight to fifty-five.

Of the three witnesses, Baldwin, Botts and Lewis, Mr. Baldwin was the first witness who was examined by the Committee on Reconstruction. At that time the committee had no knowledge of the conversation between Mr. Baldwin and President Lincoln. Speaking, apparently, under the influence of the criticisms of Botts and Lewis of his rejection of Mr. Lincoln's propositions, Baldwin introduced the subject with the remark: "I had a good deal of interesting conversation with him (that is with Mr. Lincoln) that evening. I was about to state that I have reason to believe that Mr. Lincoln himself had given an account of this conversation which has been understood—but I am sure misunderstood—by the persons with whom he talked, as giving the representation of it, that he had offered to me, that if the Virginia Convention would adjourn sine die he would withdraw the troops from Sumner and Pickens." As there was no occasion in the conversation between Lincoln and Baldwin for a reference to Fort Pickens, and as the President did not mention Fort Pickens in the account of the conversation that he gave to Mr. Botts, the denial of Mr. Baldwin may fall under one of the forms of falsehood mentioned by Shakespeare.

The evidence is conclusive to this point: That at an interview at the Executive Mansion, April 5, 1861, between President Lincoln and Colonel John B. Baldwin, then a member of the Virginia Convention that finally adopted the Ordinance of Secession, President Lincoln assured Mr. Baldwin that he would evacuate Fort Sumter if the fort could be provisioned and the Virginia Convention would adjourn sine die.

Colonel Baldwin's voluntary and qualified denial is of no value in presence of President Lincoln's report of the interview as given by Mr. Botts and in presence of the testimony that Mr. Baldwin did not deny the truthfulness of Mr. Botts' limited statement, when it was asserted by Mr. Botts in the presence of Lewis.

ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS AND HIS STATE-RIGHTS DOCTRINES

Upon the death of Mr. Calhoun the task of maintaining the extreme doctrine of State Rights, as that doctrine had been taught by Mr. Calhoun fell upon Jefferson Davis and Alexander H. Stephens. That doctrine was carried to its practical results in the ordinances of secession as they were adopted by the respective States under the lead of Mr. Davis.

If Mr. Stephens advised against secession, the advice given was not due to any doubt of the right of a State to secede from the Union, but to doubts of the wisdom of the undertaking.

In form of proceedings Mr. Stephens was examined by the Committee on the Judiciary, the 11th and 12th days of April, 1866, but in fact I was the only member of the committee who was present, and I conducted the examination in my own way, and without help or hindrance from others.

It was the opinion of Governor Clifford of Massachusetts, that the examination of Mr. Stephens gave the best exposition of the doctrine of State Rights that had been made. I was then ignorant of the fact, that in the convention of 1787 the form of the Preamble to the Constitution was so changed as to justify the opinion, if not to warrant the conclusion that the State-Rights doctrines had been considered and abandoned. In two plans of a constitution, one submitted by Mr. Randolph, and one by Mr. Charles Pinckney, and in the original draft of the Constitution as reported by Mr. Rutledge, the source of authority was laid in the respective States, which were named. This form was adhered to in the Rutledge report, which was made August 6, 1787. On the 12th of September the Committee on Style reported the Preamble which opens thus: "We the people of the United States, etc." This change seems not to have been known to Mr. Webster, nor have I noticed a reference to it in any of the speeches that were made in the period of the active controversy on the doctrine of State Rights.

Mr. Stephens was a clear-headed and uncompromising expositor and defender of the doctrine of State Rights as the doctrine was accepted by General Lee and by the inhabitants generally of the slave States.

Mr. Stephens did not disguise his opinions: "When the State seceded against my judgment and vote, I thought my ultimate allegiance was due to her, and I prepared to cast my fortunes and destinies with hers and her people rather than take any other course, even though it might lead to my sacrifice and her ruin."

When he was asked for his reason for accepting the office of vice- president in the Confederacy, he said: "My sole object was to do all the good I could in preserving and perpetuating the principles of liberty as established under the Constitution of the United States." Mr. Stephens advanced to his position by conclusively logical processes. Standing upon the ground of Mr. Lincoln and the Republican Party, he assumed that, inasmuch as the States in rebellion had never been out of the Union, they had had the opportunity at all times during the war of withdrawing from the contest and resuming their places in the Senate and House as though nothing had occurred of which the existing government could take notice.

If, however, there were to be terms of adjustment, then those terms must have a "continental basis founded upon the principles of mutual convenience and reciprocal advantage, and the recognition of the separate sovereignty of the States." He was ready for a conference or convention of all the States, but he did not admit the right of the successful party to dictate terms to the States that had been in rebellion. He expressed the personal, individual opinion, that tax laws passed in the absence of representatives from the seceded States would be unconstitutional. It was the opinion of Mr. Stephens that the people of Georgia by a large majority thought that the State was entitled to representation in the national Congress and without any conditions.

When he was invited to consider the alternative of universal suffrage or a loss of representation as a condition precedent to the restoration of the State, he said with confidence that neither branch of the alternative would be accepted. "If Georgia is a State in the Union her people feel that she is entitled to representation without conditions imposed by Congress; and if she is not a State in the Union then she could not be admitted as an equal with the others if her admission were trammeled with conditions that did not apply to all the rest alike."

It had been his expectation, and in his opinion such had been the expectation of the people generally that the State would assume its place in the Union whenever the cause of the Confederacy should be abandoned.

Such were the results of the State-Rights doctrines as announced by the most intellectual of the Southern leaders in the war of the Rebellion. In the opinion of Mr. Stephens a State could retire from the Union either for purposes of peace or of war and return at will, and all without loss of place or power.

At the close of his examination he made this declaration: "My convictions on the original abstract question have undergone no change."

As a sequel to the doctrines of Mr. Stephens, I mention the history of Andrew J. Lewis. When the Legislature of Massachusetts assembled in January, 1851, Lewis took a seat in the House as the Democratic member from the town of Sandisfield. He acted with the Coalitionists, and he voted for Mr. Sumner as United States Senator. Lewis was returned for the year 1852, and in General Pierce's administration he held an office in the Boston Customs House.

Upon the fall of Port Hudson I received a letter from General Banks. In that letter he mentioned the fact that Lewis was among the prisoners, holding the office of captain in a South Carolina regiment. His account of himself was this: "I was born in South Carolina. When my State seceded I thought I must go too, and so I left Massachusetts and returned to South Carolina."

GENERAL ULYSSES S. GRANT

General Grant's examination during the investigation embraced a variety of topics and the report is a volume of not less than twenty thousand words. His testimony is marked by the qualities for which he was known both on the civil and military side of his career. These qualities were clearness of thought, accuracy and readiness of memory, directness of expression and the absence of remarks in the nature of exaggeration or embellishment. The character of the man and the history of events may gain something from an examination of his testimony upon three important points to which it related: the opinion of President Lincoln in regard to the reconstruction of the government; the opinion of President Johnson upon the same subject, and his own view of the rights of General Lee and of the army under his command that had surrendered at Appomattox.

When President Johnson entered upon the work of reconstructing the government of North Carolina it was claimed that he was giving form and effect to the plan which President Lincoln had accepted as a wise policy.

There was some foundation for the claim as appears from the testimony of General Grant, Mr. Seward, Mr. Stanton, and others, but there is no ground for the claim that Mr. Lincoln had matured a plan or had accepted any scheme of reconstruction at the hands of any one. In an exigency, as in the case of the resignation of General Hooker, he could act immediately, but time and thought, and discussion with others were accepted as valuable aids, whenever there was not a pressure for instant action.

General Grant was examined in July, 1867, and the opening was conducted by Mr. Eldridge of Wisconsin. It related to the parole granted to General Lee and his army. The nature of the questions led General Grant to make this remark: "I will state here, that I am not quite certain whether I am being tried, or who is being tried, by the questions asked."

General Grant may have thought that Mr. Eldridge was endeavoring to secure from him an admission that he had exceeded his authority in the terms of the parole granted to General Lee. General Grant was able to state the terms with exactness and within his powers as commander of the conquering army. He claimed that General Lee surrendered his army "in consideration of the fact that they were to be exempt from trial so long as they conformed to the obligations which they had taken." President Johnson claimed that the leaders should be tried. This position he abandoned previous to July, 1867. Of an interview with President Johnson, General Grant made this statement:

"He insisted on it that the leaders must be punished, and wanted to know, when the time would come when those persons could be tried. I told him when they violated their parole." In the opinion of General Grant the terms of the parole did not include Jefferson Davis, as he had been captured.

In the early part of the controversy President Johnson insisted that General Lee should be tried for treason. That purpose on the part of the President was resisted by General Grant. His position, in his own language, was this:

"I insisted on it that General Lee would not have surrendered his army and given up all their arms if he had supposed that after surrender, he was going to be tried for treason and hanged. I thought we got a very good equivalent for the lives of a few leaders in getting all those arms and getting themselves under control bound by the oaths to obey the laws. That was the consideration, which I insisted upon, we had received."

General Grant added:

"Afterwards he got to agreeing with me on that subject."

On the question of political rights as involved in the surrender and in the parole, General Grant said:

"I never claimed that the parole gave those prisoners any political right whatever. I thought that that was a matter entirely with Congress, over which I had no control, that simply as general-in-chief commanding the army, I had a right to stipulate for the surrender on terms which protected their lives. The parole gave them protection and exemption from punishment for all offences not in violation of the rules of civilized warfare."

The point of difference between General Grant and President Johnson in regard to the parole is very clear from General Grant's answers to questions by Mr. Thomas and Mr. Eldridge.

"You have stated your opinion as to the rights and privileges of General Lee and his soldiers; do you mean that to include any political rights?"

"I have explained that I did not."

"Was there any difference of opinion on that point between yourself and President Johnson at any time?"

"On that point there was no difference of opinion; but there was as to whether the parole gave them any privileges or rights . . . He claiming that the time must come when they would be tried and punished, and I claiming that that time could not come except by a violation of their parole."

Grant claimed also that the army that had surrendered to Sherman came under the same rules.

These quotations give General Grant's standing as an interpreter of public law and as a leader capable of applying the rules and principles of public law to practical affairs. His training at West Point may have given him a knowledge of principles and his good sense enabled him to apply the principles in the terms that he dictated at Appomattox.

General Grant's natural qualities were such that with training he might have succeeded in great causes involving principles, but he was not adapted to the ordinary business of a county-court lawyer.

It is quite certain from the testimony of General Grant that Mr. Lincoln had had in mind a scheme for the organization of the States that had been in rebellion and that Mr. Johnson's proclamation for the government of North Carolina was not a wide departure from that scheme.

General Grant was present at two meetings of the Cabinet in Mr. Lincoln's time, when a proclamation was read and considered. In the language of General Grant, "after the assassination it continued right along and I was there with Mr. Johnson." General Grant's interest was directed to two points: First, that civil government should be set up but subject to the final action of Congress, and second, that the parole should not be infringed. He states his position thus:

"I was always ready to originate matters pertaining to the army, but I was never willing to originate matters pertaining to the civil government of the United States. When I was asked my opinion about what had been done I was willing to give it. I originated no plans and suggested no plans for civil government."

The examination by Mr. Eldridge was in the nature of cross-examination and for the purpose of gaining an admission from General Grant that he had advised or sanctioned President Johnson's plan of reconstruction. Hence General Grant's declarations that his part was limited to the military side of the measure and that in his view the entire plan was subject to Congressional action.

General Grant's testimony is explicit upon these points: He advised President Johnson to grant a pardon to General Lee and a pardon to General Johnston. He was especially urgent in favor of a pardon to General Johnston in consideration of his speech to his army at the time of the surrender. He advised against the proclamation of amnesty upon the ground that the act was then premature.

General Grant's testimony adds strength to the statement that President Johnson contemplated the recognition of a Congress composed of Democratic members from the North and of the representatives from the States that had been organized under the President's proclamation.

"I have heard him say—and I think I have heard him say it twice in his speeches—that if the North carried the election by members enough to give them, with the Southern members, a majority why would they not be the Congress of the United States?"

In answer to this question: "Have you heard him make a remark kindred to that elsewhere?" General Grant said:

"Yes, I have heard him say that aside from his speeches, in conversation. I cannot say just when."

The North Carolina proclamation was read at an informal meeting at which only Grant and Stanton were with the President. General Grant did not criticise the paper. He said of it: "It was a civil matter and although I was anxious to have something done I did not intend to dictate any plan. I looked upon it simply as a temporary measure to establish a sort of government until Congress should meet and settle the whole question and that it did not make much difference how it was done so there was a form of government there. . . . I don't suppose that there were any persons engaged in that consultation who thought of what was being done at that time as being lasting—any longer than Congress would meet and either ratify that or establish some other form of government."

General Grant understood that the North Carolina proclamation was in substance the paper which had been considered by Mr. Lincoln, but General Grant said also, that Mr. Lincoln's plan was "temporary, to be either confirmed, or a new government set up by Congress."

General Grant's testimony upon one point is supported by the testimony of Mr. Seward and the testimony of Mr. Stanton. They agree that Mr. Johnson's plan of reconstruction was in substance the plan that Mr. Lincoln had had under consideration. Mr. Stanton regarded the plan as temporary.

If President Johnson intended to enforce the plan upon the country he concealed his purpose when the North Carolina proclamation was under consideration.

In the month of October, 1866, the police commissioners of the city of Baltimore were engaged in the work of registering voters for the November elections, and the authorities were engaged in the work of registering the voters in all parts of the State of Maryland. It was claimed that many thousands who had been engaged in the rebellion and who were excluded under a provision of the Constitution had been registered by the connivance of the authorities and especially by the police commissioners of Baltimore. There were rumors of secret, hostile organizations, there were threats of disturbance, and Governor Swann became alarmed.

President Johnson became alarmed also and under date of October 25 he wrote a letter to General Grant in which these paragraphs may be found:

"From recent development serious troubles are apprehended from a conflict of authority between the executive of the State of Maryland and the police commissioners of the city of Baltimore." . . . "I therefore request that you inform me of the number of Federal troops at present stationed in the city of Baltimore and vicinity."

General Grant informed the President on the 27th, that the number of available and efficient troops was 1,550. Thereupon, on the first day of November the President issued the following instruction to Secretary Stanton:

"In view of the prevalence in various portions of the country of a revolutionary and turbulent disposition which might at any moment assume insurrectionary proportions and lead to serious disorders, and of the duty of the government to be at all times prepared to act with decision and effect this force is not deemed adequate for the protection and security of the seat of government."

Secretary Stanton referred the President's letter to General Grant with instructions "to take such measures as in his judgment are proper and within his power to carry into operation the within directions of the President."

Under this order six or eight companies in New York and on the way to join regiments in the South were detained at Fort McHenry, and a regiment in Washington was under orders to be ready to move upon notice.

On the second day of November the President qualified his demands in a letter to Secretary Stanton and limited the expression of anxiety to the city of Baltimore. It is certain that General Grant and Secretary Stanton did not share the President's apprehensions and the day of election passed without serious disturbance.

In the Philadelphia Ledger of October 12, 1866, there appeared a series of questions which were accompanied by the statement or the suggestion that the President had submitted them to the Attorney- General for an official opinion. The questions related to the constitutional validity of the Thirty-ninth Congress, and upon the ground that all the States were not represented although hostilities had ceased.

From the testimony of Henry M. Flint, a newspaper correspondent, it appears that the President had no knowledge of the questions until after the publications in the Ledger. Flint's account of the affair may be thus summarized. For himself and without conference with the President, he reached the conclusion that the Thirty-ninth Congress was an illegal body and he had reached the conclusion also that the President entertained the same opinion. Thereupon he assumed that the President would take the opinion of the Attorney-General. Having advanced thus far, he next proceeded to write the questions that he imagined the President would prepare and submit to the Attorney-General.

These questions he transmitted to a brother correspondent in New York —Mr. F. A. Abbott—under cover of a letter which was not produced. Flint gave the substance of his letter to Abbott in these words:

"These questions are supposed or believed to have submitted by the President to the Attorney-General." Speaking of Abbott, Flint said: "I knew he was connected with several newspapers and I had no doubt when I sent these questions that they would appear in some paper in some shape. . . . The object I had in view in writing these questions and in sending them to Mr. Abbott was that they might appear before the public, and that the public mind might be directed to that point, and that the newspapers particularly might be led to express their sentiments upon the questions involved in it."

When the publication "had given rise to considerable discussion" in the language of Flint, "I thought," he says, "I ought to go the President and tell him what part of the despatch was mine and what connection I had had with the publication of it."

Of his interview with the President, he gives this report: "He showed me an article, which I think, appeared the day after the questions were published, in the Daily News of Philadelphia, which took pretty nearly the same ground my questions would indicate. . . . He spoke of it rather approvingly."

Flint adds: "I had remarked to him: 'Mr. Johnson, it seemed to me that it would be by no means remarkable that you should prepare such questions as bear upon a subject which I know must have occupied your mind as it has the public mind.' I forget what reply he made; it was a sort of affirmative response or assent."

Whatever may have been the origin of Flint's questions, their appearance in the manner indicated is an instance of volunteer service not often paralleled in the rough contests of life. Without any effort on his own part the President gained knowledge of a public sentiment upon the question of the legality of the Thirty-ninth Congress—a question in which he had much interest in the autumn of 1866.

The project to increase the army around Washington and the project to proclaim the Thirty-ninth Congress an illegal body may have had an intimate connection with the project to send General Grant on a mission to Mexico and to place General Sherman in command at Washington, a project of which I have spoken in another place.

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE

General Robert E. Lee was examined by the Committee on Reconstruction the 17th day of February, 1866.

The inquiries related to the state of public sentiment in the South, and especially in Virginia with regard to secession, to the treatment of the negroes, to the public debts of the United States, and of the Confederacy, and to the treatment of Northern soldiers in Southern prisons.

General Lee was then in good health and in personal appearance he commended himself without delay. He was large in frame, compactly built, and he was furnished with all the flesh and muscle that could be useful to a man who was passing the middle period of life. The elasticity of spirits, the vigor of mind and body that are the wealth of a successful man at sixty were wanting in General Lee. His appearance commanded respect and it excited the sympathy even of those who had condemned his abandonment of the Union in 1861.

The examination gave evidence of integrity and of entire freedom from duplicity. Freedom from duplicity was a controlling feature in General Grant's character and in that attribute of greatness Grant and Lee may have been equals.

General Lee was free to disclose his own opinions, but he was cautious in his statements when questioned as to the opinions and purposes of the men and States that had been in the Rebellion. He was careful to say at the beginning of the examination that he had no communication with politicians and that he did not read the papers. What he said of the South assumed that the people were in poverty and were so dejected that they had no plans for the future, nor any hopes of restoration to wealth, happiness and power in the affairs of the country. His testimony as a whole might justify the opinion that there would be no serious resistance to any form of government that might be set up. He favored the governments which President Johnson had organized and he expressed the opinion that they were acceptable to the people generally. A comprehensive statement was this:

"I do not know of a single person who either feels or contemplates any resistance to the government of the United States, or, indeed any opposition to it." He gave this assurance to the committee: "The people entirely acquiesce in the government of the United States and are for co-operating with President Johnson in his policy."

The payment of the public debt had not been a topic of discussion in his presence, but the people were disposed to pay such taxes as were imposed and they were struggling to get money for that purpose.

He was of the opinion that the people made no distinction between the Confederate debt and the debt of the United States—that they were disposed to pay both debts, and would pay both if they had the power. For himself, however, he had no expectation that the indebtedness of the Confederacy would ever be paid.

General Lee manifested a kindly spirit for the freedmen, but he was unwilling to accept them as citizens endowed with the right of suffrage. Of the feeling in Virginia, General Lee said: "Every one with whom I associate expresses kind feelings toward the freedmen. They wish to see them get on in the world, and especially to take up some occupation for a living."

He rejected the suggestion that there was anywhere within the State any combinations having in view, "the disturbance of the peace, or any improper or unlawful acts." He characterized the negroes as "an amiable, social race, who look more to the present than to their future condition."

In answer to the question whether the South would support the government in case of a war with France or England, General Lee was distinctly reserved: "I cannot speak with any certainty on that point. I do not know how far they might be actuated by their feelings. I have nothing whatever to base an opinion upon. So far as I know they contemplate nothing of the kind now. What may happen in the future I cannot say." He then added this remark: "Those people in Virginia with whom I associate express a hope that the country may not be led into war."

As to an alliance during the war he said that he knew nothing of the policy of the Confederate government: "I had no hand or part of it," was his remark. It was his opinion during the war that an alliance with a foreign country was desirable, and he had assumed that the authorities were of the same opinion. His ideas were those of General Grant, and he avoided responsibility for the measures of the government on the civil side.

With kind feelings for the colored people of Virginia General Lee favored the substitution of a white class of laborers, if an exchange could be made, of which however, he had neither plan nor hope. Nor could he give any assurance that Northern men would be received upon terms of equality and friendship, if they avowed the opinions that then prevailed generally in the North: "The manner in which they would be received would depend entirely upon the individuals themselves —they might make themselves obnoxious, as you can understand," was the statement of General Lee. His testimony as a whole indicated an opinion that it was more important to secure capital for business, than it was to rid the State of the negro laborer. In his opinion, most of the blacks were willing to work for their former masters, but they were unwilling to make engagements for a year, a form of engagement which the farmers and planters preferred, that they might be sure of help when it would be most needed. The negroes may have been influenced by one or both of two reasons. Their unthrifty habits—the outcome of slavery—or an apprehension that a formal engagement for a year was a kind of bondage that might lead to a renewal of the old system.

When General Lee was pressed by Senator Howard as to the feeling in the South in regard to the National Government, he said: "I believe that they will perform all the duties that they are required to perform. I think that is the general feeling. . . . I do not know that there is any deep-seated dislike. I think it is probable that there may be some animosity still existing among some of the people of the South. . . . They were disappointed at the result of the war."

General Lee was of the opinion that a Southern jury would not find an accused guilty of treason for participation in the war. Indeed his doctrine of State Rights excused the citizen and placed the sole responsibility on the State. Of the common sentiment in the South he said: "So far as I know, they will look upon the action of the State, in withdrawing itself from the government of the United States, as carrying the individuals of the State along with it; that the State was responsible for the act, not the individual." This was the framework of his own defence. Speaking of the advocates of secession, he said: "The ordinance of secession, or those acts of a State which recognized a condition of war between the State and the General Government, stood as their justification for their bearing arms against the Government of the United States. They considered the act of the State as legitimate. That they were merely using the reserved right, which they had a right to do."

From these views General Lee was led to a specific statement of his own position:

Question: "State, if you please, what your own personal views on that question were?"

Answer: "That was my view; that the act of Virginia in withdrawing herself from the United States carried me along as a citizen of Virginia, and that her laws and her acts were binding on me.'

Question: "And that you felt to be your justification in taking the course you did?"

Answer: "Yes, sir."

In the course of the examination General Lee expressed the opinion that the "trouble was brought about by the politicians of the country."

General Lee disclaimed all responsibility for the care and treatment of prisoners of war. He had always favored a free exchange of prisoners, knowing that the proper means for the care and comfort of prisoners could not be furnished in the Confederacy. He thought that the hardships and neglects had been exaggerated. As to himself, he had never had any control over prisoners, except as they were captured on the field of battle. He sent his prisoners to Richmond where they came under the command of the provost-marshal-general. His orders to surgeons on the field were to treat all the wounded alike.

In the examinations that were made by the committee I read a large number of reports of surgeons connected with the prisons and hospitals and I may say that in all cases they exhibited humanity and in many cases specific means of relief for the sufferings of the soldiers were recommended. Their reports were forwarded from officer to officer, but in a large majority of cases the reports were neglected.

In a letter written by General Lee to his sister a few days before he abandoned the service of the United States, he expressed the opinion that there was no sufficient cause for the rebellion. This opinion, in connection with his opinion that the rebellion was the work of politicians demonstrates the power which the doctrine of State Rights had obtained over a man of experience and of admitted ability. Upon his own admission, he subordinated his conduct to the action of his State, and in disregard of his personal obligation through his oath of office. If he had followed his own judgment as to what was wise and proper he would have remained in his place as an officer in the army of the United States.

If in 1861 an officer of the army had entertained the opinion that the North was in the wrong and that the South was in the right, it could be claimed, fairly, that that officer might forswear his obligations to the old Government and accept service in the Confederacy.

Moral obliquity is not to be assumed in the case of General Lee. His pecuniary and professional interests must have invited him to remain in the army. General Scott, a Virginian, was at the head of the army, and General Scott was his friend. His promotion was certain, and important commands were probable. His large estates in the vicinity of the city of Washington were exposed to the ravages of war if not to confiscation. These sacrifices, some certain, and others probable were present when he left Washington and entered into the service of the Confederacy under the superior authority of the State of Virginia in disregard of his own opinion, and in disregard, not to say violation, of his oath as a soldier who had sworn to support the Constitution of the United States. General Lee was unable to say whether he had taken an oath to support the Confederate States. He could not recall the fact of taking the oath, but he said he should have taken the oath if it had been tendered to him.

The full report of the testimony of General Lee should appear in any complete biography of the man. It reveals his character, explains the leading influences to which he was subjected, and it sheds light upon the state of public opinion in the South at the end of the contest in arms.

General Scott and General George H. Thomas were Virginians, but they acted in defiance of the State-Rights doctrines of the South. In April, 1861, General Scott gave me an account of the efforts that had been made to induce him to follow the fortunes of Virginia, and he spoke with a voice of emotion of his veneration for the flag, and of his attachment to the Union.

GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS

Of the soldiers of the Northern army in the war of the Rebellion, General George H. Thomas takes rank next after the first three—Grant, Sherman and Sheridan. When Grant became President and Sherman was general of the army the President was unwilling to appear to neglect either Sheridan or Thomas. With high appreciation of Thomas as a soldier, the President gave higher rank to Sheridan. He said to me that he placed Sheridan above every other officer of the war. He gave Sheridan credit for two supreme qualities—great care in his plans and great vigor in execution.

Yet, although the President acted upon a sound basis of opinion, the choice left a painful impression upon his memory.

General Thomas and General Lee were alike in personal appearance, and they resembled each other in their mental characteristics. In one important particular they differed—General Thomas had no respect for State-Rights doctrines. He was a native of Virginia, but there was no indication in his testimony, nor were there rumors, that he had ever hesitated in his course when the rebellion opened.

General Thomas was examined by the Committee on Reconstruction January 29, and February 2, 1866. He was then in command of the Military Division of the Tennessee which included the States of Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama and Mississippi. It was the main object of the committee to obtain information as to the public sentiment touching the treatment of the negroes and the re-establishment of civil government in the States that had been in rebellion. The Union sentiment was stronger in Tennessee than in any other State of the Confederacy. The inhabitants of the mountainous districts of eastern and middle Tennessee had been loyal from the opening of the contest in 1860 and 1860. Yet in 1866 General Thomas advised the committee that it would "not be safe to remove the national troops from Tennessee, or to withdraw martial law; or to restore the writ of habeas corpus to its full extent." At that time the peace of eastern Tennessee was disturbed by family feuds and personal quarrels, the outcome of political differences. In west Tennessee and in portions of middle Tennessee there was a deep seated hostility to Union men, and especially to Southern men who had served in the Union army.

General Thomas said of them: "They are more unfriendly to Union men natives of the State of Tennessee or of the South, who have been in the Union army, than they are to men of Northern birth."

At that time the contract system of labor had been introduced, and the contracts were regarded as binding both by whites and blacks.

General Thomas advised the admission of Tennessee into the Union as a State, and his advice was acted upon favorably by its admission in the summer of that year. His recommendations were based upon the facts that Tennessee had "repudiated the rebel debt, had abolished slavery, had adopted the Constitutional amendment upon that subject, had passed a franchise law prohibiting from voting every man who had been engaged in the rebellion" and had "passed a law allowing negroes to testify."

His opinion of the four other States of his command was not as favorable. "I have received communications from various persons in the South that there was an understanding among the rebels and perhaps organizations formed or forming, for the purpose of gaining as many advantages for themselves as possible; and I have heard it also intimated that these men are very anxious and would do all in their power to involve the United States in a foreign war, so that if a favorable opportunity should occur, they might then again turn against the United States."

At the end of his first examination he gave this opinion as the result of his experience:

Question: "In what could those advantages consist in breaking up the government?"

Answer: "They would wish to be recognized as citizens of the United States, with the same rights they had before the war."

Question: "How can they do that? By wishing us in a war with England or France, in which they would take part against us?"

Answer: "In that event their desire is to establish the Southern Confederacy. They have not yet given up their desire for a separate government, and if they have an opportunity to strike for it again they will do so."

When asked what he knew of secret organizations he said that he had received several communications to that effect but the parties were unwilling to have their names made public. He added: "The persons communicating with me are reliable and truthful and I believe their statements are correct in the main.

"The nature and object of the organizations," he said, "are the embarrassment of the Government of the United States in the proper administration of the affairs of the county, and if possible, to repudiate the national debt, or to gain such an ascendency in Congress as to make provision for the assumption by Congress of the debt incurred by the rebel government; also, in case the United States Government can be involved in a foreign war to watch their opportunity and take advantage of the first that comes to strike for the independence of the States lately in rebellion."

These extracts from the testimony of General Thomas are a fair exposition of the condition of public sentiment in the Confederate States with the exception in a degree of the border States. It is apparent also that General Thomas had not the degree of confidence in the good purposes of those who had been in the rebellion that was entertained by Northern officers including Grant, Sherman and Sheridan.

As the loyal men of the South were greater sufferers from the war, their hostility was more intense against those who were responsible for the war.

If we cannot say that Thomas was a great soldier in the large use of the phrase, it can be said that he was a good soldier and that without qualifying words. He should live in history as a true patriot and a man of the highest integrity.

SECRETARY STANTON

Of the men who occupied places in Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet, no one was more free from just criticism affecting unfavorably the value of his public services than Secretary Stanton.

Of those who were nearest to him, no one ever received the impression from his acts or his conversation that he thought of the Presidency as a possibility under any circumstances. Seward, Chase and Bates had been candidates at Chicago in 1860, and whatever may have been the fact in regard to Seward and Bates, it is quite certain that ambition for the Presidency never lost its hold upon Mr. Chase, even when he became Chief Justice of the United States.

Coupled with the absence of ambition, or perhaps in a degree incident to the absence of ambition, Mr. Stanton was the possessor of courage for all the emergencies of the place that he occupied—a courage that was always available, whether in its exercise the wishes of individuals or the fortunes of the country were involved.

It was understood by those who frequented the War Office in the gloomy days of 1862 and '63 that a card signed "A. L." would not always command full respect from Secretary Stanton. He was a believer in the rigid principles of the army, and although he was a humane man he smothered or subdued his sympathy for heart-broken mothers whose sons had deserted the cause of the country, in his determination to save the country through the strictest enforcement of the rules and regulations of the army. Mr. Lincoln, in his abounding good nature, could not resist the appeals of disconsolate wives and heart-stricken mothers, and it was often Mr. Stanton's fortune to resist such appeals even when supported by the President's card in the form of a request which in ordinary times and upon ordinary men would be treated as an order.

Hence there may have been a foundation for the report that an unsuccessful user of one of the President's cards returned to the President for a reinforcement of the order. The President insisted upon a full report of the Secretary's answer. The applicant repeated the Secretary's remark, which was not complimentary to the President's good sense. The President hesitated, and then declined to renew the order, saying: "Stanton is generally right."

Mr. Stanton's testimony was taken February 11, 1867, and on subsequent days. The record of the text and the accompanying documents cover more than two hundred printed pages. The evidence was taken by the Committee on the Judiciary, and it had special reference to the charges that had been made against President Johnson. At that time, the separation between Mr. Stanton and the President had become irreconcilable, but there are no indications of hostility in the answers given by the Secretary. Indeed, he assumed, without reserve, full responsibility for acts that had been charged on the President by others.

During the war the railroads that fell within our lines were appropriated to the use of the United States, and heavy outlays had been made upon some of them for repairs and improvements. In many cases expenses had been incurred, that in the hands of the corporation would not have been chargeable to a construction account. In a majority of cases, if not in all, the roads had been surrendered without compensation, and the rolling stock had been transferred for very slight consideration.

Mr. Stanton assumed the responsibility of the policy, upon the ground that it was important to the South and to the country that the channels of commerce should be made available without delay and that the army could not be used wisely in commercial traffic. As the President was interested in one of the railroads that received a large benefit by the restoration of its property much improved, he was relieved of all responsibility for a policy that had been much condemned.

Through the testimony of Secretary Stanton the committee was enabled to find the origin and to trace with a degree of accuracy the history of President Johnson's plan of reconstruction. At a time not many days prior to Mr. Lincoln's death, Secretary Stanton prepared an order which contained a projet for the government of the States that had been in rebellion. The paper was submitted to President Lincoln and it was considered by him in a cabinet meeting that was held during the day preceding the night of the assassination.

As this paper became the basis for the proclamations for the government of the States that had been in rebellion, its history, as given by Mr. Stanton, is worthy of exact report in his own words:

"On the last day of Mr. Lincoln's life, there was a Cabinet meeting, at which General Grant, and all the members of the Cabinet, except Mr. Seward, were present. General Grant at that time made a report of the condition of the country, as he conceived it to be, and as it would be on the surrender of Johnston's army, which was regarded as absolutely certain. The subject of reconstruction was talked of at considerable length. Shortly previous to that time I had myself, with a view of putting into a practicable form the means of overcoming what seemed to be a difficulty in the mind of Mr. Lincoln, as to the mode of reconstruction, prepared a rough draft of a form or mode by which the authority and laws of the United States should be re-established, and governments reorganized in the rebel States under the Federal authority, without any necessity whatever for the intervention of rebel organizations or rebel aid.

In the course of that consultation Mr. Lincoln alluded to the paper, went into his room, brought it out, and asked me to read it, which I did, and explained my ideas in regard to it. There was one point which I had left open; that was as to who should constitute the electors in the respective States . . . I left a blank upon that subject to be considered. There was at that time nothing adopted about it, and no opinions expressed; it was only a projet."

At the request of Mr. Lincoln and the Cabinet, the order was printed and a copy was given to each member, and a copy was given to Mr. Johnson when he had become President.

The plan was further considered in Mr. Johnson's Cabinet, and some alterations were made. The point of chief difference related to the elective franchise—whether it should be extended to the negro race.

Mr. Stanton said: "There was a difference of opinion upon that subject. The President expressed his views very clearly and distinctly. I expressed my views, and other members of the Cabinet expressed their views. The objection of the President to throwing the franchise open to the colored people appeared to be fixed, and I think every member of the Cabinet assented to the arrangement as it was specified in the proclamation relative to North Carolina. After that I do not remember that the subject was ever again discussed in the Cabinet."

Thus from Mr. Stanton's testimony we gather the important facts as to the origin of a measure which became the subject of bitter controversy between President Johnson and the Republican Party. The framework of the North Carolina proclamation was furnished by Mr. Stanton. When alterations had been made the proclamation was agreed to by the Cabinet but without a declaration or even an understanding upon the point which, without much delay, became the vital point: was the policy of government that was announced in the proclamation a permanent policy or was it a temporary expedient, a substitute for military government, and subject to the approval or disapproval of Congress?

General Grant was of the opinion that the organizations which the President set up in the States were temporary and that they were subject to the action of Congress.

Mr. Stanton's opinion is expressed carefully, in his own words: "My opinion is, that the whole subject of reconstruction and the relation of the State to the Federal Government is subject to the controlling power of Congress; and while I believe that the President and his Cabinet were not violating any law, but were faithfully performing their duty in endeavoring to organize provisional governments in those States, I supposed then, and still suppose, that the final validity of such organizations would rest with the law-making power of the government."

In an official letter, dated January 8, 1866, Secretary Stanton gave his reasons for the payment of the salaries of the provisional governors: "The payments were made from the appropriation of army contingencies because the duties performed by the parties were regarded of a temporary character ancillary to the withdrawal of military force, and to take the place of the armed forces in the respective States."

On the other hand the President chose to treat the governments that had been set up as permanent governments and beyond the control of Congress. On this point, the contest between President Johnson and the Republican Party was made up. It ended in an appeal to the people, who rendered a judgment against the President by a two-thirds majority. The testimony of Secretary Seward, and official papers that were issued by the Department of State in the year 1865, may warrant the conclusion that President Johnson was not then prepared to treat the new state organizations as final and binding upon Congress and the country.

Under date of July 8, 1865, Secretary Seward said, in an official letter to Governor Holden of North Carolina: "It is understood here that besides cotton which has been taken by the Secretary of the Treasury under Act of Congress there were quantities of resin, and other articles, as well as funds, lying about in different places in the State and not reduced into possession by United States officers as insurgent property. The President is of the opinion that you can appropriate these for the inevitable and indispensable expenses of the civil government of the State during the continuance of the provisional government."

On the 14th day of November, 1865, Mr. McCulloch authorized Mr. Worth, acting as treasurer in North Carolina, to use the fragments of rebel property that might be gathered to defray the expenses of the provisional government of the State.

In answer to a question put to Secretary Seward, he said: "I do not remember that any provisional governor held a military office, except Mr. Johnson."

In the further examination of Mr. Seward, May 16, 1867, he indicated his concurrence with President Johnson in this remark: "The object was to proceed with the work of the restoration of the Union as speedily and effectively and wisely as possible, having no reference as to whether Congress would be in session or not."

This question was put to Mr. Seward:

"Did not he (the President) urge these parties to be prepared to be at the doors of Congress by the time of its next meeting?"

The answer was: "Very likely he did. I do not know of the fact. I know that I was very anxious that these States should be represented in Congress, and that he was equally so, that they should be provided with representatives who could be admitted."

The policy of the administration, July 24, 1865, is set forth in a despatch from Secretary Seward to Governor Sharkey, of Mississippi (he is addressed as Provisional Governor): "The President sees no occasion to interfere with General Slocum's proceedings. The government of the State will be provisional only until the civil authorities shall be restored with the approval of Congress."

Upon the united testimony of General Grant, Secretary Stanton and Secretary Seward, it may be claimed fairly that the governments that were set up under proclamations of the President were treated in the beginning as provisional governments and subject to the final judgment of Congress.

In 1866, when the rupture between Congress and the President had taken form, the President with the support of Mr. Seward announced the doctrine that the governments which had been set up were valid governments, and that claimants for seats in Congress from those who could prove their loyalty were entitled to admission.

Thus was a foundation laid for the impeachment of President Johnson by the House of Representatives, and his trial by the Senate.

XXXII IMPEACHMENT OF ANDREW JOHNSON

The nomination of Andrew Johnson to the Vice-Presidency in 1864, by the Republican Party, was a repetition of the error committed by the Whig Party in 1840, in the nomination of John Tyler for the same office.

In each case the nomination was due to an attempt to secure the support of a body of men who were not in accord in all essential particulars with the party making the nomination.

John Tyler was opposed to the administration of Mr. Van Buren, but he was opposed also to a national bank, which was then an accepted idea and an assured public policy of the Whig Party. Hence, it happened that when Mr. Tyler came to the Presidency, he resisted the attempt of Congress to establish a national bank, and by the exercise of the veto- power, on two occasions, he defeated the measure. This controversy caused the overthrow of the Whig Party, and it ended the contest in behalf of a United States bank.

In the case of John Tyler and in the case of Andrew Johnson there was an application, in dangerous excess, of a policy that prevails in all national conventions. When the nomination of a candidate for the Presidency has been secured, the dominant wing of the party turns to the minority with a tender of the Vice-Presidency. In 1880, when the nomination of General Garfield had been made, the selection of a candidate for the Vice-Presidency was tendered to the supporters of General Grant, and it was declined by more than one person.

Mr. Johnson never identified himself with the Republican Party; and neither in June, 1864, nor at any other period of his life, had the Republican Party a right to treat him as an associate member. He was, in fact, what he often proclaimed himself to be—a Jacksonian Democrat. He was a Southern Union Democrat. He was an opponent, and a bitter opponent, of the project for the dissolution of the Union, and a vindictive enemy of those who threatened its destruction.

His speeches in the Senate in the Thirty-sixth and the Thirty-seventh Congress were read and much approved throughout the North, and they prepared the way for the acceptance of his nomination as a candidate of the Republican Party in 1864.

Mr. Johnson was an earnest supporter of the Crittenden Compromise. That measure originated in the House of Representatives. It was defeated in the Senate by seven votes and six votes of the seven came from the South. The provisions of the bill were far away from the ideals of Republicans generally, although the measure was sustained by members of the party. By that scheme the Fugitive Slave Law was made less offensive in two particulars, but the United States was to pay for fugitives from slavery whenever a marshal failed to perform his duty. As an important limitation of the powers of Congress, the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia was to be dependent upon the consent of the States of Maryland and Virginia.

Mr. Johnson gave voice to his indignation when he spoke of the Southern men whose votes contributed to the defeat of the Crittenden Compromise. "Who, then," said he, "has brought these evils upon the country? Whose fault is it? Who is responsible for it? With the help we had from the other side of the chamber, if all those on this side had been true to the Constitution and faithful to their constituents, and had acted with fidelity to the country, the amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire could have been voted down. Whose fault was it? Who did it? Southern traitors, as was said in the speech of the Senator from California. They did it. They wanted no compromise."

These extracts show the style of speech in which Mr. Johnson indulged, and they prove beyond question that in the winter of 1861 he had no sympathy with the Republican Party of 1856 and 1860. These facts explain, and in some measure they palliate, the peculiarities of his career, which provoked criticism and an adverse popular judgment when he came to the Presidency. Nor is there evidence within my knowledge that he ever denied the right of secession. However that may have been, he disapproved of the exercise of the right at all stages of the contest.

In the Thirty-sixth Congress Mr. Johnson proposed amendments to the Constitution which gave him consideration in the North. By his proposition the Fugitive Slave Law was to be repealed, and in its place the respective States were to return fugitives or to pay the value of those that might be retained.

Slavery was to be abolished in the District of Columbia with the consent of Maryland and upon payment of the full value of the slaves emancipated. The Territories were to be divided between freedom and slavery. His scheme contemplated other changes not connected necessarily with the system of slavery. Of these I mention the election of President, Vice-President, Senators, and Judges of the Supreme Court by the people, coupled with a limitation of the terms of judges to twelve years.

The Crittenden Resolution contained these declarations of facts and policy:

1. The present deplorable war has been forced upon the country by the disunionists of the Southern States.