"In the name of the managers of this exposition I give thanks and welcome to all who have brought them here, and especially to the government and people of Spain, who have thus contributed to the interest and success of this exposition."

CHAPTER LXIV. REPEAL OF PART OF THE "SHERMAN ACT" OF 1890. Congress Convened in Extraordinary Session on August 7, 1893—The President's Apprehension Concerning the Financial Situation—Message from the Executive Shows an Alarming Condition of the National Finances—Attributed to the Purchase and Coinage of Silver—Letter to Joseph H. Walker, a Member of the Conference Committee on the "Sherman Act"—A Bill I Have Never Regretted—Brief History of the Passage of the Law of 1893—My Speech in the Senate Well Received —Attacked by the "Silver Senators"—General Debate on the Financial Legislation of the United States—Views of the "Washington Post" on My Speech of October 17—Repeal Accomplished by the Republicans Supporting a Democratic Administration—The Law as Enacted—Those Who Uphold the Free Coinage of Silver—Awkward Position of the Democratic Members—My Efforts in Behalf of McKinley in Ohio—His Election by 81,000 Plurality—Causes of Republican Victories Throughout the Country.

On the 30th of June, 1893, the President issued a proclamation convening Congress in extraordinary session on the 7th of August. In reciting the reasons for this unusual call, only resorted to in cases of extreme urgency, he said that "the distrust and apprehension concerning the financial situation which pervades all business circles have already caused great loss and damage to our people, and threaten to cripple our merchants, stop the wheels of manufacture, bring distress and privation to our farmers, and withhold from our workingmen the wage of labor;" that "the policy which the executive branch of government finds embodied in unwise laws which must be executed until repealed by Congress;" and that Congress was convened "to the end that the people may be relived, through legislation, from present and impending danger and distress."

Congress met in pursuance of the proclamation, and on the 8th of August the President sent a message to each House, in which he depicted an alarming condition of the national finances, and attributed it to congressional legislation touching the purchase and coinage of silver by the general government. He said:

"This legislation is embodied in a statute passed on the 14th day of July, 1890, which was the culmination of much agitation on the subject involved, and which may be considered a truce, after a long struggle, between the advocates of free silver coinage and those intending to be more conservative."

He ascribed the evil of the times to the monthly purchase of 4,500,000 ounces of silver bullion, and the payment therefor with treasury notes redeemable in gold or silver coin at the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury, and to the reissue of said notes after redemption. He stated that up to the 15th of July, 1893, such notes had been issued for the purpose mentioned to the amount of more than $147,000,000. In a single year over $40,000,000 of these notes had been redeemed in gold. This threatened the reserve of gold held for the redemption of United States notes, and the whole financial system of the government. No other subject was presented in the message of the President, and Congress had to face the alternative of the single standard of silver, or the suspension of the purchase of silver bullion.

I had foreseen this inevitable result and had sought, as far as possible, to avoid it by the inserting of sundry provisions in the act of July 14, 1890. No portion of that act was objected to by the President except the clause requiring the purchase of silver bullion and the issue of treasury notes in payment for it. In this I heartily concurred with him. From the date of the passage of that law, to its final repeal, I was opposed to this compulsory clause, but yielded to its adoption in preference to the free coinage of silver, and in the hope that a brief experience under the act would dissipate the popular delusion in favor of free coinage. Joseph H. Walker, of Massachusetts, a prominent Member of the House of Representatives, who was one of the conferees with me on the bill referred to, and agreed with me in assenting to it, wrote me a letter, my reply to which was in substantial accordance with the subsequent message of the President and with the action taken by Congress. I insert it here:

"Mansfield, O., July 8, 1893. "Hon. J. H. Walker.

"My Dear Sir:—Yours of 28th ult., inclosing a copy of your statement of the causes that led Mr. Conger, yourself and me to agree with reluctance to the silver act of 1890, is received. An answer had been delayed by my absence at Chicago. You clearly and correctly state the history of that act. The bill that passed the House provided for the purchase of $4,500,000 worth of silver at gold value. The Senate struck out this provision and provided for the free coinage of silver or the purchase of all that was offered at the rate of 129 cents an ounce. As conferees acting for the two Houses, it was our duty to bring about an agreement, if practicable, without respect to individual opinion. The result of the conference was to reject free coinage and to provide for the purchase of four million five hundred thousand ounces of silver at its gold price— a less amount than was proposed by the House, the provisions declaring the public policy of the United States to maintain the parity of the two metals or the authority to stipulate on the contracts for payments in gold, the limit of the issue of treasury notes to the actual cost of silver bullion at gold value, and the repeal of the act providing for the senseless coinage of silver dollars when we already had 300,000,000 silver dollars in the treasury we could not circulate, were all in the line of sound money.

"Another object I had in view was to secure a much needed addition to our currency, then being reduced by the compulsory retirement of national bank notes in the payment of United States bonds. This would have been more wisely provided by notes secured by both gold and silver, but such a provision could not then be secured. These reasons fully justified the compromise.

"But the great controlling reason why we agreed to it was that it was the only expedient by which we could defeat the free coinage of silver. Each of us regarded the measure proposed by the Senate as a practical repudiation of one-third of the debts of the United States, as a substantial reduction of the wages of labor, as a debasement of our currency to a single silver standard, as the demonetization of gold and a sharp disturbance of all our business relations with the great commercial nations of the world. To defeat such a policy, so pregnant with evil, I was willing to buy the entire product of American silver mines at its gold value.

"And that was what we provided, guarded as far as we could. To accomplish our object we had to get the consent of the Republican Representatives from the silver-producing states. This we could only do by buying the silver product of those states. It was a costly purchase. The silver we purchased is not worth as much as we paid for it, but this loss is insignificant compared to our gain by the defeat of the free coinage of silver. It is said there was no danger of free coinage, that the President would have vetoed it. We had no right to throw the responsibility upon him. Besides, his veto would leave the Bland act in force. We did not believe that his veto would dispel the craze that then existed for free coinage. Many people wanted the experiment tried. The result of the experiment of buying four and a half million ounces of silver a month at its market value will be the best antidote against the purchase of the silver of the world at one-third more than its market value.

"I never for a moment regretted the passage of the act of 1890, commonly called the 'Sherman act,' though, as you know, I had no more to do with it than the other conferees. There is but one provision in it that I would change and that is to strike out the compulsory purchase of a given quantity of silver and give authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to buy silver bullion at its market price when needed for subsidiary coinage. The only position we can occupy in the interests of our constituents at large is one fixed standard of value and the use of both metals at par with each other, on a ratio as near as possible to their market value.

"Such a policy I believe is right. With reserves both of gold and silver in the proper proportions we can maintain the entire body of our paper money, including coin, at par with each other. For one I will never agree to the revival of state bank paper money, which cannot be made legal tender, and which, on the first sign of alarm, will disappear or be lost in the hands of the holder.

"Very respectfully yours, "John Sherman."

I had expressed similar views in speeches in Congress and before the people and in numerous published interviews, and in the previous Congress had introduced a bill to suspend the purchase of silver bullion, substantially similar in terms to the bill that became a law in November, 1893. During the month of August I took a more active part in the proceedings than usual. On the 8th, the 16th and the 18th I made speeches in the current debate.

A brief statement of the passage of this law of 1893 may be of interest. It was introduced as a bill by William L. Wilson, of West Virginia, in the House of Representatives, in the words of the bill introduced by me in the Senate on the 14th of July, 1892, as already stated, and passed the House on the 28th of August, by the decisive vote of 239 yeas and 108 nays. It was referred in the Senate to the committee on finance, of which Daniel W. Voorhees was then chairman. It was on the next day reported by him from that committee, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, but substantially similar in legal effect to the House bill.

On the next day, August 30, I took the floor and made one of the longest speeches in my congressional life, covering more than forty closely printed pamphlet pages. I quote a few of the opening paragraphs:

"The immediate question before us is whether the United States shall suspend the purchase of silver bullion directed by the act of July 14, 1890. It is to decide this question the President has called Congress together in special session at this inconvenient season of the year. If this was the only reason for an extraordinary session it would seem insufficient. The mere addition of eighteen hundred million ounces of silver to the vast hoard in the treasury, and the addition of fourteen millions of treasury notes to the one thousand millions of notes outstanding, would hardly justify this call, especially as Congress at the last session neglected or refused to suspend the purchase of silver. The call is justified by the existing financial stringency, growing out of the fear that the United States will open its mints to the free coinage of silver. This is the real issue. The purchase of silver is a mere incident. The gravity of this issue cannot be measured by words. In every way in which we turn we encounter difficulties.

"If we adopt the single standard of gold without aid from silver, we will greatly increase the burden of national and individual debts, disturb the relation between capital and labor, cripple the industries of the country, still further reduce the value of silver, of which we now have in the treasury and among our people over $593,000,000, and of which we are the chief producers, and invite a struggle with the great commercial nations for the possession of the gold of the world.

"On the other hand, if we continue the purchase of 54,000,000 ounces of silver a year, we will eventually bring the United States to the single standard of silver—a constantly depreciating commodity, now rejected by the great commercial nations as a standard of value; a commodity confessedly inconvenient, by its weight, bulk, and value, for the large transactions of foreign and domestic commerce, and detach us from the money standard now adopted by all European nations, with which we now have our chief commercial and social relations. In dealing with such a question we surely ought to dismiss from our minds all party affinities or prejudices; all local or sectional interests, and all preconceived opinions not justified by existing facts and conditions.

"Upon one thing I believe that Congress and our constituents agree: That both these extreme positions shall be rejected; that both silver and gold should be continued in use as money—a measure of value; that neither can be dispensed with. Monometallism, pure and simple, has never gained a foothold in the United States. We are all bimetallists. But there are many kinds of bimetallism. One kind favors the adoption of the cheaper metal for the time being as the standard of value. Silver being now the cheaper metal, they favor its free coinage at the present ratio, with the absolute certainty that silver alone will be coined at our mints as money; that gold will be demonetized, hoarded at a premium, or exported where it is maintained as standard money. The result would be monometallism of silver.

* * * * *

"The two metals, as metals, never have been, are not now, and never can be, kept at par with each other for any considerable time at any fixed ratio. This necessarily imposes upon the government the duty of buying the cheaper metal and coining it into money. The government should only pay for the bullion its market value, for it has the burden of maintaining it at par with the dearer metal. If the bullion falls in price the government must make it good; if it rises in value the government gains.

"The government is thus always interested in advancing the value of the cheaper metal. This is the kind of bimetallism I believe in. It is the only way in which two commodities of unequal value can be maintained at parity with each other. The free coinage of silver and gold at any ratio you may fix means the use of the cheaper metal only. This is founded on the universal law of humanity, the law of selfishness. No man will carry to the mint one ounce of gold to be coined into dollars when he can carry sixteen ounces of silver, worth but little more in the market than half an ounce of gold, and get the same number of dollars.

"The free coinage of silver means the single standard of silver. It means a cheaper dollar, with less purchasing power. It means a reduction in the wages of labor; not in the number of dollars, but in the quantity of bread, meat, clothes, comforts he can purchase with his daily wage. It means a repudiation of a portion of all debts, public and private. It means a bounty to all banks, savings institutions, trust companies that are in debt more than their credits. It means a nominal advance in the prices of the produce of the farmer, but a decrease in the purchasing power of his money. Its chief attraction is that it enables a debtor to pay his debt contracted upon the existing standard with money of less value. If Senators want cheap money and to advance prices, free coinage is the way to do it; but do not call it bimetallism. The problem we have to solve is how to secure to our people the largest use of both gold and silver without demonetizing either.

"Now, let us examine the situation in which we are placed. Our country is under the pressure of a currency famine. Industries, great and small, all suspended by the owners, not because they cannot sell their products, but because they cannot get the money to pay for raw material and the wages of their employees. Banks conducted fairly are drained of their deposits and are compelled not only to refuse all loans, but to collect their bills receivable. This stringency extends to all trades and businesses; it affects even your public revenues, all forms of public and private securities, and, more than all, its stops the pay of a vast army of laboring men, of skilled mechanics, and artisans, and affects the economy and comfort of almost every home in the land.

"The strange feature of this stringency is unlike that of any of the numerous panics in our past history. They came from either an irredeemable currency, which became worthless in the hands of the holder, or from expanded credit, based upon reckless enterprises which, failing, destroyed confidence in all industries. Stringency followed failure and reckless speculation. This panic occurs when money is more abundant than ever before. Our circulating notes to- day are sixty millions more than one year ago. It is all good—as good as gold. No discrimination is made between the gold and silver dollar, or between the United States note, the treasury note, the silver certificate, or the gold certificate. All these are indiscriminately hoarded, and not so much by the rich as by the poor. The draft is upon the savings bank, as well as the national or state bank. It is the movement of fear, the belief that their money will be needed, and that they may not be able to get it when they want it. In former panics, stringency followed failures. In this, failures follow stringency.

"Now, as representatives of the people, we are called here in Congress to furnish such measures of relief as the law can afford. In the discharge of this duty I will sweep away all party bias, all pride of opinion, all personal interest, and even the good will of my constituents, if it were necessary; but, fortunately, I believe their opinions concur with my own."

In conclusion I said:

"It is said that if we stop the coinage of silver it will be the end of silver. I have heard that moan from some of my friends near me. I do not think it will be the end of silver. We have proven by our purchases that the mere purchase of silver by us in a declining market, when all the nations of Europe are refusing to buy silver and throwing upon us their surplus, is an improvident use of the public money, and it ought to be abandoned, or at least suspended until a time should come when we may, by an international ratio or by some other provision of law, prevent the possible coming to the single standard of silver. Now, that can be done.

"What do we propose to do now? We simply propose to stop the purchase. We do not say when we will renew it again, but we simply say we believe, in view of a panic or any possibilities of a panic, that it would be idle for us to waste either our credit money or our actual money to buy that which must be put down into the cellar of our treasury and there lie unused, except as it is represented by promises to pay gold. I say that such a policy as that would be foolish and delusive.

"Senators say that this is a blow at silver. Why, silver is as much a part of the industry of my country as it is a part of the industry of the state of the Senator from Colorado, the able exponent of this question. The production of silver is a great interest, and the people of Ohio are as deeply interested in the success of that interest as the people of Colorado. It is true we have not the direct ownership of the property, but it enters into measures of value of our property. There could be no desire on the part of any portion of the people of the United States to strike down silver. That idea ought to be abandoned at once. Therefore, in order to at least give the assurance of honest men that we do not intend to destroy an industry of America, we put upon this bill a provision proposed now by the Senator from Indiana.

"I say that instead of desiring to strike down silver we will likely build it up; and any measure that could be adopted for an international ratio that will not demonetize gold will meet my approbation and favor. But I would not dissever the financial business of this great country of ours, with its 65,000,000 of people, from the standards that are now recognized by all the Christian nations of Europe. I would not have our measure less valuable than the measure of the proudest and haughtiest country of the world.

"This is not a question of the mere interest of Nevada or Colorado. It is not a question about what Wall street will do. They will always be doing some deviltry or other, it makes no difference who is up or who is down. We take that as a matter of course. The question is what ought to be done for the people of the United States in their length and breadth. If Congress should say that in its opinion it is not now wise, after our experience, to continue the purchase of silver bullion, is any injustice done to Colorado or Nevada? Are we bound to build up the interest of one section or one community at the expense of another or of the whole country?

"No. I heartily and truly believe that the best thing we can now do is to suspend for time, at least, the purchase of silver bullion. We should then turn our attention to measures that are demanded immediately to meet the difficulties of the hour. Let this be done promptly and completely. It involves a trust to your officers and great powers over the public funds. I am willing to trust them. If you are not, it is a strange attitude in political affairs. I would give them power to protect the credit of the government against all enemies at home and abroad.

"If the fight must be for the possession of gold, we will use our cotton and our corn, our wheat and other productions, against all the productions of mankind. We, with our resources, can then enter into a financial competition. We do not want to do it now. We prefer to wait awhile until the skies are clear and see what will be the effect of the Indian policy, and what arrangements may be made for conducting another international conference. In the meantime let the United States stand upon its strength and credit, maintaining its money, different kinds of money, at a parity with each other. If we will do that I think soon all these clouds will be dissipated and we may go home to our families and friends with a conscientiousness that we have done good work for our country at large."

I was frequently interrupted, and this led to the discussion of collateral questions and especially the dropping of the silver dollar by the act of 1873, the history of which I have heretofore stated. This speech was a temperate and nonpartisan presentation of a business question of great importance, and I can say without egotism that it was well received and commended by the public press and by my associates in the Senate. Though I sought to repeal a single clause of a bill of which I was erroneously alleged to be the author, I was charged with inconsistency, and my speech was made the text of the long debate that followed. The "silver Senators," so called, attacked it with violence, and appeals were made to Democratic Senators to stand by those who had defeated the election law, and by the position the Democratic Senators had previously taken in favor of free coinage.

On the 28th of September, and on the 2nd, 13th, 17th and 28th of October, I made speeches in the current debate, which extended to every part of the financial legislation of the United States since the formation of the government. I insert here the description given by the Washington "Post" of the scene on the 17th:

"The climax of the remarkable day was now at hand. There is no man in the Senate for whom a deeper feeling of esteem is felt than John Sherman. He saw the Republican party born, he has been its soldier as well as its sage, he has sat at the council table of Presidents. His hair is white, and his muscles have no longer the elasticity of youth, but age has not dimmed the clearness of his intellectual vision, while it has added to the wisdom of his councils. Upon Mr. Sherman, therefore, as he arose, every eye was turned. Personalities were forgotten, the bitterness of strife was laid aside. In a picture which must live in the memory of him who saw it, the spare and bowed form of Mr. Sherman was the central figure. There was not the slightest trace of feebleness in his impassioned tones. Except once or twice, as he hesitated a moment or two for a word to express his thought, there was not a reminder that the brain at seventy may be inert or the fire be dampened in the veins.

"Mr. Sherman spoke, as he himself said, neither in reproach nor anger. It was the appealing tones that gave his speech its power —its convincing earnestness, its lack of rancor, its sober truth that gave it weight. Elsewhere it is printed in detail. Suffice it to say here that he predicted that the rules would have to be changed since they had been made the instrument of a revolutionary minority. Never before had he seen such obstruction in the Senate, never before the force bill had he known of a measure which failed, after due deliberation, to come to a vote. The Republicans had remained steadfast to the President, although under no obligation to him, and now the time had come when the Democrats must take the responsibility.

"In times past, when the Republicans were in the majority, they never shrank from responsibility. They were Republicans because they believed in Republican principles and Republican men and Republican measures, and whenever a question was to be decided they never pleaded the 'baby act' and said 'we could not agree.' They met together and came to an agreement, and in that way they passed all the great measures which have marked the history of the last thirty years of our country, and it was not done by begging votes on the other side.

"'They say they cannot agree, They must agree,' thundered Mr. Sherman, drawing himself to his full height, and pointing his quivering finger to the Democratic side, 'or else surrender their political power!'

"Then Mr. Sherman pointed out the important legislation that was so sadly needed, not the least being some provision for the deficit of the government, which, he quoted Secretary Carlisle as saying, would be $50,000,000 this year. 'These things cannot be evaded,' he said, while the Senate lingered on his words. 'We must decide the silver question one way or the other. If you,' he added, looking the Democrats in the fact, 'cannot do it, then retire from the Senate Chamber, and we will fix it on this side, and do the best we can with our silver friends who belong to us, who are blood of our blood, and bone of our bone. But yours is the proper duty, and, therefore, I beg of you, not in reproach or anger, to perform it. You have the supreme honor of being able to settle this question now, and you ought to do it.'

"Mr. Sherman ceased, but the thrall of his words remained long after his venerable form had disappeared. No Democrat answered him. Mr. Voorhees, who had sat within arm's reach of him on the Republican side, crossed the Chamber to his own seat, and sank down as a man laden with deep care."

The debate continued in the Senate until the 30th of October, when the Senate substitute was adopted by the vote of 43 yeas and 32 nays. Of the yeas 22 were Republicans, and of the nays 20 were Democrats; so that the bill in the Senate was supported by a majority of Republicans and opposed by a majority of Democrats. On this important question the President was acting with a majority of Republicans and a minority of Democrats, and it is to his credit that he firmly held his ground in spite of the opposition in his party.

On the 1st of November, when the amended bill came to the House, Mr. Wilson moved to concur in the amendment of the Senate. A casual debate followed, mostly by Bland and Bryan against the bill, and Wilson and Reed for it. The Senate amendment was agreed to and the bill as amended passed by the decisive vote of yeas 194 and nays 94, and was approved by the President on the same day. The law thus enacted is as follows:

"That so much of the act approved July 14, 1890, entitled 'An act directing the purchase of silver bullion and issue of treasury notes thereon, and for other purposes,' as directs the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase from time to time silver bullion to the aggregate amount of 4,500,000 ounces, or so much thereof as may be offered in each month at the market price thereof, not exceeding one dollar for 371.25 grains of pure silver, and to issue in payment for such purchases treasury notes of the United States, be, and the same is hereby, repealed. And it is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to continue the use of both gold and silver as standard money, and to coin both gold and silver into money of equal intrinsic and exchangeable value, such equality to be secured through international agreement or by such safeguards of legislation as will insure the maintenance of the parity in value of the coins of the two metals, and the equal power of every dollar at all times, in the markets and in the payment of debts. And it is hereby further declared that the efforts of the government should be steadily directed to the establishment of such a safe system of bimetallism as will maintain at all times the equal power of every dollar coined or issued by the United States, in the markets and in the payment of debts."

Thus the vital principles of the act of July 14, 1890, remained in force, and the provisions for the purchase of silver bullion and for the issue of treasury notes were repealed. The maintenance of the gold standard, the parity of all money whether of gold, silver or paper, and the payment of all bonds of the United States in coin, were preserved.

The free coinage of silver is still upheld by a large body of those who are interested in mining it, or who want to pay their debts with a depreciated coin; but the danger of the adoption of this policy is lessening daily. It received a severe blow by the action of the Ohio Democratic convention in 1895 in rejecting it by a vote of more than two to one. The bimetallic system of maintaining all forms of money at par with gold will probably soon be fully established. To complete this system and to extend it to our paper money it would be wise to gradually withdraw treasury notes and silver certificates and replace them with United States notes supported and maintained by large reserves of gold. Thus all kinds of paper money issued by the United States would be of the same form and value. The great mass of standard silver dollars, amounting on August 1, 1895, to $371,542,531, now held in the treasury represented by $320,355,188 of silver certificates in circulation, is the one great disturbing element in our finances. But 51,746,706 standard silver dollars are in circulation, and experience has shown that a greater amount cannot be kept out among the people. The certificates representing the silver dollars are in circulation and a legal tender for customs dues as well as for all debts, public and private. They must be treated as United States notes, and maintained at par with gold coin, or the parity of our coin and currency will be endangered. They now enter into the general aggregate of our legal tender money and are largely used in the payment of customs duties, and when received are paid out for the current expenses of the government. While supported by the aggregate silver dollars in the treasury, and the pledge of the public faith to maintain them at par with gold coin and United States notes, they are a safe and useful currency, but any measure to increase these certificates, based upon the coining of more silver dollars from bullion alleged to be gain or seigniorage, would seriously impair the ability of the government to maintain their parity with gold. The great depreciation of silver bullion has resulted in a vast loss to the government and its disposition is the most serious problem pending in Congress.

During the entire extra session of 1893 the body of the Democratic Senators and Members were placed in an awkward position. They were desirous of aiding the President, but their constituents behind them were generally in favor of the free coinage of silver. In some of the northern states, especially in Ohio, the Democratic party had declared, in its convention, in favor of free coinage, and now their President demanded, in the strongest language, the repeal of the only provision of law for the purchase or coinage of silver. The House promptly responded to the appeal, but the Democratic Senators hesitated and delayed action until after three months of weary debate. Their party had a majority in each House, and should have disposed of the only question submitted by the President in thirty days. Voorhees was the first Democratic Senator to announce his purpose to vote for the repeal, although previously an advocate of free coinage, and he, as chairman of the committee on finance, reported the bill of the committee, while others lingered in doubt. The Republican Senators, except those representing silver states, as a rule, promptly avowed their purpose to vote for repeal, although they had voted for the law.

After the call for the extra session was issued, I had expressed my opinion of silver legislation, but I did not wish to embarrass the President. When interviewed I refused to answer, saying the people had called upon the present administration to handle these questions, and neither I nor anyone should do aught to add embarrassment, when so much already existed. When Congress met, the Republicans remained quiet, and did not seek to embarrass the administration, but it was soon ascertained that a decided majority of them would vote for the repeal of the purchasing clause of the act of 1890, but against any modification of any other provision of that act. The position of the Republican Senators from the states west of the Mississippi River was also known. They would vote against any change of the law, unless they could secure the free coinage of silver. During this period the position of the Democratic Senators was unknown, but it was rapidly developed, with the result already stated.

Congress adjourned on the 3rd of November. The closing days were memorable for their excitement. For fourteen consecutive days the Senate did not adjourn, but from time to time took recesses. On the 31st of October the journal had not been read for fourteen days.

During this period I was requested by Governor McKinley to take part in the pending canvass in Ohio, which involved his re-election as governor. In the condition of the Senate I did not feel justified in leaving, but immediately upon the passage of the repeal bill started for Columbus to render such service as I could. It had been falsely stated that I was indifferent about McKinley's election, which I promptly denied. But a few days intervened before the election. On the day of my arrival in Ohio, I spoke at Springfield. On the evening of the next day, the 3rd of November, at Central Turner Hall in Cincinnati, I spoke to a very large meeting. This speech was fully reported. It was mostly devoted to the tariff, a struggle over which was anticipated. After paying my usual visit to the chamber of commerce and the Lincoln club, I proceeded to Toledo, where I spoke at Memorial Hall on the evening before the election, and then returned home to Mansfield, where I voted. The result was even more decisive than expected. The 81,000 plurality for McKinley was the best evidence of his popularity, and was regarded as an indorsement of the McKinley tariff law.

On the 8th of November I returned to Washington. Many interviews with me were reported, in which I expressed my satisfaction with the overwhelming victory gained by the Republicans all over the United States, and especially with their success in New York. In response to a request by a leading journal, before the meeting of Congress, I carefully prepared a statement of the causes that led to these results. I undertook to review the political changes in the past four years, but will insert only two paragraphs of this paper.

"It is manifest that the causes of the defeat of the Democratic party in the recent election were general and not local. They extended to Colorado, Dakota, Iowa, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts. If the opposition to the Democratic party in Virginia had been organized and conducted by the Republican party, the results in that state would have been very different. The ideas of the Populists are too visionary and impracticable to be made the basis of a political organization. A canvass conducted in Virginia upon the issues that prevailed in Ohio would, in my judgment, have greatly changed the results in that state. Aside from the memories of the war, the economic principles of the Republican party have great strength in the southern states, and whenever the images of the war fade away the people of those states will be influenced by the same ideas that prevail in the northern states. The leading cause of the enormous Republican majorities in northern states I have mentioned was the united protest of the unemployed against radical changes of our tariff laws. Whatever theories may be proposed, it may be regarded as an axiom that the protective principle is a well established principle in the United States. It has been recommended by all the Presidents from Washington to Harrison, and by none more emphatically than Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Jackson. This is and has been the natural and instinctive policy of a new nation with enormous undeveloped resources. While the terms of our tariff laws provided for revenue, their foundation and background were to encourage domestic manufactures and diversify productions. The extent of protection was limited to the want of revenue, but the duties were uniformly so adjusted as, while producing revenue, to encourage manufactures.

* * * * *

"But, after all, we must place as the chief cause of Democratic defeat the profound and settled distrust that the Democratic party will now, having the President and a majority in both Houses, disturb the enormous industries of our country developed by, and dependent upon, our tariff laws, and will seek to substitute the policy of Great Britain, of free trade, as against the example of the leading nations of Europe as well as our own, of a wise and careful protection, and encouragement by tariff laws of all forms of domestic industry that can be conducted with a reasonable hope of profit in this country. The future of parties will depend more largely upon the manner in which this condition of things is met by the present Congress than upon all other causes combined."

CHAPTER LXV. PASSAGE OF THE WILSON TARIFF BILL. Second Session of the 53rd Congress—Recommendations of the President Concerning a Revision of the Tariff Laws—Bill Reported to the House by the Committee of Ways and Means—Supported by Chairman Wilson and Passed—Received in the Senate—Report of the Senate Committee on Finance—Passes the Senate with Radical Amendments— These are Finally Agreed to by the House—The President Refuses to Approve the Bill—Becomes a Law After Ten Days—Defects in the Bill —Not Satisfactory to Either House, the President or the People— Mistakes of the Secretary of the Treasury—No Power to Sell Bonds or to Borrow Money to Meet Current Deficiencies—Insufficient Revenue to Support the Government—A Remedy That Was Not Adopted— Gross Injustice of Putting Wool on the Free List—McKinley Law Compared with the Wilson Bill—Sufficient Revenue Furnished by the Former—I Am Criticized for Supporting the President and Secretary.

The second session of the 53rd Congress commenced on the 4th of December, 1893. The President in his message was especially urgent in his recommendation of a revision of the tariff laws. He said:

"After a hard struggle tariff reform is directly before us. Nothing so important claims our attention, and nothing so clearly presents itself as both an opportunity and a duty—an opportunity to deserve the gratitude of our fellow-citizens, and a duty imposed upon us by our oft-repeated professions, and by the emphatic mandate of the people. After a full discussion our countrymen have spoken in favor of this reform, and they have confided the work of its accomplishment to the hands of those who are solemnly pledged to it.

"If there is anything in the theory of a representation in public places of the people and their desires, if public officers are really the servants of the people, and if political promises and professions have any binding force, our failure to give the relief so long awaited will be sheer recreancy. Nothing should intervene to distract our attention or disturb our effort, until this reform is accomplished by wise and careful legislation.

* * * * *

"Not less closely related to our people's prosperity and well-being is the removal of restrictions upon the importation of the raw materials necessary to our manufactures. The world should be open to our national ingenuity and enterprise. This cannot be while federal legislation, through the imposition of high tariffs, forbids to American manufactures as cheap materials as those used by their competitors."

In view of this message, it was manifest that the tariff would be the chief subject of legislation during the session. It was understood that a bill had been prepared by the committee of ways and means, which had been submitted to the President and Secretary of the Treasury and approved by them. It was reported to the House of Representatives, December 19, 1893. On the 8th of January, 1894, Mr. Wilson, chairman of the committee, made an elaborate speech in its support. The debate continued until the 1st of February, when, with some amendments, it passed the House. In the Senate, on the next day, it was referred to the committee on finance. On the 20th of March it was reported to the Senate, with amendments, by Mr. Voorhees. Mr. Morrill said:

"I desire to say that so far as the Republican members of the committee on finance are concerned they did not object to the reporting of the bill, while they are opposed not only to the proposed income tax, but to the many changes of specifics to ad valorems, and to the great bulk of the provisions of the bill."

On the 2nd of April Voorhees made a carefully prepared speech in support of the bill. The debate continued, occupying much the larger part of the time until the 3rd day of July, when the bill passed with radical amendments, which changed it in principle and details. Two conferences of the two Houses were held on amendments disagreed to, but failed to agree, and it appeared, after the long struggle, that he bill would be defeated, when, on the 13th of August, upon motion of Mr. Catchings, the House agreed to the Senate amendments in gross and thus the bill passed Congress. The President refused to approve it and it became a law after ten days without his approval.

This skeleton history of what is now known as the Wilson tariff partly discloses its imperfections. Framed in the House as a tariff for revenue only, and radically changed in the Senate to a tariff with protection to special industries, it was not satisfactory to either House, to the President or to the people. So far as it copied the schedules and the legislative provisions of the McKinley law, it met with approval. Its new features were incongruous, were decidedly sectional, and many of its provisions were inconsistent with each other.

The vital defect of this bill is that it does not provide sufficient revenue to carry on the government. This is the primary and almost the only cause of the financial difficulties of the present administration. The election of Mr. Cleveland in 1892, upon the platform framed by him, naturally created distrust as to the ability of the government to maintain the parity of the different forms of money in circulation. Added to this, the broad declaration of the purpose to reduce taxation led to the reduction of importations and the diminution of the revenue from the McKinley tariff. Importers and dealers naturally reduced their imports in view of the expectation that duties would be reduced. By the 1st of July, 1893, when the Wilson bill was in embryo, the revenues had been so diminished as to yield a surplus of only $2,341,074 during the previous year. It was apparent, when Congress met in August, that the administration, having a majority in each House of Congress, was determined to reduce duties, and yet it made no effort to reduce expenditures. Soon after there was a large deficiency in the revenue, and the Secretary of the Treasury was compelled either to refuse to pay appropriations made by law in excess of receipts or to borrow money to meet the deficiencies.

In my judgment the better way for him would have been not to pay appropriations not needed to meet specific contracts, for an appropriation of money by Congress is not mandatory, but is permissive, an authority but not a command to pay, nor does an appropriation in itself authorize the borrowing of money. When this authority is required Congress must grant it, and, upon its failure to do so, all the Secretary of the Treasury should do is to pay such appropriations as the revenues collected by the government will justify. It is for Congress to provide such sums, by taxation or loans, as are necessary to meet all appropriations made in excess of revenue. If it refuses or neglects to do this, the responsibility is on it, not on the secretary. All he can do is choose what appropriations he will pay. This is a dangerous and delicate power, but it has frequently been employed and has never been abused. His failure to exercise this discretion was a grave mistake.

As revenues diminished deficiencies increased. A doubt arose whether, under the then existing conditions, the government would be able to pay gold coin for United States notes and treasury notes. These were supported by a reserve of $100,000,000 in gold coin and bullion, but this reserve fund was not segregated from the general balance in the treasury, as it ought to have been, but was liable to be drawn upon for all appropriations made by Congress. There was not then, and there is not now, any specific authority invested in the Secretary of the Treasury to sell bonds or to borrow money to meet current deficiencies, and he felt called upon to pay these out of the general fund, embracing that created for the redemption of United States notes under the act of 1875. The result was to create an alarm that the government could not or would not pay such notes and thus maintain the gold standard. The timid, and those whose patriotism is in their purse, were making inroads on the gold reserve, which fell below $100,000,000.

By the resumption act of 1875 the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized, to enable him to pay United States notes on demand, to sell either of three classes of bonds bearing respectively five, four and a half and four per cent. interest, but the question arose, in 1894, whether he could sell these bonds to meet current expenditures. All of them were worth a premium in the market. Bonds bearing three per cent. running a short period could then have been sold at par. In common with many others I foresaw, in February, 1893, that the tariff policy of the then incoming administration would reduce our revenue below our expenditures, and sought to have Congress authorize the sale of bonds bearing three per cent. interest instead of those at a higher rate already authorized. I saw plainly that the incoming administration would enter on precisely the same course as that adopted by Buchanan, of providing insufficient revenue for the support of the government, resulting in the gradual increase of the public debt and the disturbance of our financial system. During each year of Buchanan's administration the public debt increased, as it has been steadily increasing during Cleveland's administration, and great embarrassment grows out of this fact. My friendly suggestion was defeated and the result has been the sale of four per cent. bonds at a sacrifice.

The President recommended the removal of restrictions upon the importation of the raw materials necessary to our manufactures. The tariff bill, as it passed, imposed duties on nearly all raw materials except wool. This important product of the farmer was made duty free. I made every effort to prevent this injustice. Free wool was the culminating atrocity of the tariff law. By it a revenue of over eight millions a year was surrendered for the benefit of woolen manufacturers. I appealed to the Senate to give some protection to this great industry of our country. It was generally classed as the fifth of the industries of the United States, including the manufacture of woolens, and I have no doubt it fully came up to that grade. Over a million farmers were engaged in the growth of wool. It involved an annual product estimated at $125,000,000 under the former prices, but probably under the prices after the passage of the Wilson bill it was reduced to about eighty or ninety million dollars. It was, therefore, a great industry. And yet it was left solitary and alone without the slightest protection given to it directly or indirectly. The manufacture of woolen goods was amply protected. Amendments were proposed and adopted without dissent, adding largely to the protection at first proposed on manufactures of wool.

The value of the wool in woolen goods as a rule is equal to the cost of manufacturing the cloth. The duty on cloth under this law averages 40 per cent., so that the domestic manufacturer of cloth gets the benefit not only of a duty of 40 per cent. on the cost of manufacture, but he gets a duty of 40 per cent. on the cost of the wool in the cloth, thus getting a protection of 80 per cent. on the cost of manufacture, while the farmer gets no protection against foreign competition for his labor and care. This gross injustice is done under the name of free raw materials. When I appealed to the Senate for a duty on wool I was answered by one Senator that free wool was all that was left in the bill of the Democratic doctrines of free raw materials, and, if only for this reason, must be retained. I made two speeches in support of a duty, but was met by a united party vote, every Democrat against it and every Republican for it. In the next tariff bill I hope this decision will be reversed.

On the 31st of May, 1894, I made a long speech in favor of the McKinley law and against the Wilson bill. While the McKinley law largely reduced the taxes and duties under pre-existing laws, yet it furnished ample revenue to support the government. The object of the act was declared to be to reduce the revenue. It was impartial to all sections and to all industries. The south was well cared for in it, and every reasonable degree of protection was given to that section. In growing industries in the north, which it is desirable to encourage, an increase of duty was given. In nearly all the older industries the rates were reduced, and the result was a reduction of revenue to the extent of $30,000,000. There was no discrimination made in the McKinley act between agriculture and mechanical industries. The Wilson bill sacrificed the interests of every farmer in the United States, except probably the growers of rice and of fruit in the south. The McKinley act, I believe, was the most carefully framed, especially in its operative clauses and its classification of duties, of any tariff bill ever passed by the Congress of the United States.

It has been said that the McKinley act was the cause of the deficiency of revenue that commenced about three years after its passage. That is a mistake. Until Mr. Cleveland was sworn into office, March 4, 1893, there was no want of revenue to carry on the operations of the government. Until July, 1893, there was a surplus of revenue, and not a deficiency. The receipts during the fiscal years ending June 30, 1891, 1892, 1893, under the McKinley act, furnished ample means for the support of the government, and it was not until after Cleveland had been elected, and when there was a great fear and dread all over the country that our industries would be disturbed by tariff legislation, that the revenues fell off. The surplus in 1891 was $37,000,000; in 1892, in the midst of the election, it was $9,914,000, and in 1893, up to June 30, the surplus revenue was $2,341,000. Yet in a single year afterwards, after this attempt to tinker with the tariff had commenced, after the announcement as to the tariff had been made by Mr. Cleveland, after the general fear that sprang up in the country in regard to tariff legislation, the revenues under the McKinley act fell off over $66,000,000, and the deficiency of that year was $66,542,000.

I believe that if Harrison had been elected President of the United States the McKinley act would have furnished ample revenue for the support of the government, because then there would have been no fear of disturbance of the protected industries of our country. Cleveland's election created the disturbances that followed it. The fear of radical changes in the tariff law was the basis of them. That law caused the falling of prices, the stagnation of some industries, and the suspension of others. No doubt the fall in the value of silver and the increased demand for gold largely precipitated and added to the other evils that I have mentioned.

If when Congress met in December, 1893, there had been a disposition on the part of both sides to take up the tariff question and discuss it and consider it as a pure question of finance, there would have been no difficulty with the Republicans. We were all ready to revise the rates contained in the McKinley tariff act. The body of that act had been embodied in the Wilson bill as part of the proposed law. Nearly all of the working machinery of the collection of customs, framed carefully under the experienced eye of Senator Allison, is still retained. All the schedules, the formal parts of the act, which are so material, and the designation into classes —all those matters which are so complicated and difficult to an ordinary lawyer or an ordinary statesman, have been retained.

If the bill had been taken up in the spirit in which it should have been, and if an impartial committee of both parties in the Senate and the House had gone over it, item by item, it would have passed in thirty days without trouble. That was not the purpose; it was not the object, and it was not the actual result.

During the long session of 1893-94 I was the subject of much controversy, debate, censure and praise. While distinctly a Republican, and strongly attached to that party, I supported, with the exception of the tariff law, the financial policy of the President and Secretary Carlisle. Mr. Cleveland was a positive force in sustaining all measures in support of the public credit. Mr. Carlisle, who as a Member and Senator had not been always equally positive on these measures, yet was regarded as a conservative advocate of a sound financial policy, readily and heartily supported the President in his recommendations. As these were in harmony with my convictions I found myself indorsing them as against a majority of the Democratic Senators. My Republican colleagues, with scarcely an exception, favored the same policy.

CHAPTER LXVI. SENIORITY OF SERVICE IN THE SENATE. Notified That My Years of Service Exceed Those of Thomas Benton— Celebration of the Sons of the American Revolution at the Washington Monument—My Address to Those Present—Departure for the West with General Miles—Our Arrival at Woodlake, Nebraska—Neither "Wood" nor "Lake"—Enjoying the Pleasures of Camp Life—Bound for Big Spring, South Dakota—Return via Sioux City, St. Paul and Minneapolis —Marvelous Growth of the "Twin Cities"—Publication of the "Sherman Letters" by General Sherman's Daughter Rachel—First Political Speech of the Campaign at Akron—Republican Victory in the State of Ohio—Return to Washington for the Winter of 1894-95—Marriage of Our Adopted Daughter Mary with James Iver McCallum—A Short Session of Congress Devoted Mainly to Appropriations—Conclusion.

On the 16th of June, 1894, I was notified by William E. Spencer, the experienced journal clerk of the Senate, that I that day had reached a term of service in the Senate equal in length to that of Thomas Benton, whose service had previously held first rank in duration, covering the period from December 6, 1821, to March 3, 1851, making 29 years, 2 months and 27 days. I had entered the Senate March 23, 1861, and served continuously until March 8, 1877, making 15 years, 11 months and 15 days, when I entered the cabinet of President Hayes. My second term of service in the Senate began March 4, 1881, and has continued until the present time. My service since June 16, 1894, is in excess of that of Benton.

On the 4th of July, 1894, the Sons of the American Revolution celebrated the day by a ceremony held literally in the shadow of the Washington monument. There, at the base of the great shaft, the members and friends of this organization and several chapters of the Daughters of the Revolution gathered at 10 o'clock to listen to patriotic addresses. The societies had been escorted from the Arlington hotel by the Marine Band, and gathered in seats around a grand stand while a battery of artillery welcomed them with a salute. The band played national hymns, and the audience sang "America." General Breckinridge introduced me and I was heartily greeted. After narrating the principal events of the American Revolution, and especially incidents connected with the Declaration of American Independence, I said:

"It is a marvel of the world that these humble colonies, composed of plain men, for there were no nobles or rich men in those times, furnished genius which brought to mankind greater wisdom in the framing of a government than ever elsewhere existed. It was of these men that Lord Chatham said that they had prepared papers stronger than ever emanated from any court of Europe. Our country was built up on intelligence, obedience to law, desire for freedom and the equal enjoyment of rights. Those who are gathered here to- day are classified as sons and daughters of the Revolution, and therefore they are under deeper obligations to be true and patriotic citizens."

I then spoke of the character of our people and our institutions, and the Civil War, happily ended, and the increasing strength and power of the republic. I narrated how the Washington monument came to be completed. I said it was true it cost a million of dollars, but what was that to 65,000,000 people! The occasion was enjoyable, the speeches were suitable for the 4th of July, patriotism and love of country being the watchwords.

On the 28th of August, 1894, the second session of the 53rd Congress closed. It was a laborious session. Its principal act was a measure that did not satisfy anyone. It laid the foundations for insufficient revenue, an increase of the public debt and the general defeat of the party in power.

I was much fatigued, and had already arranged to accompany General Nelson A. Miles and his party on a military inspection in Nebraska and South Dakota. I arrived in Chicago on the 2nd of September, where General Miles was stationed. There I was met by the reporters and told them all I knew about the intended trip. I got as much information from them as they did from me. What they wanted was prophecy of the future, and I wanted to get into the wilderness. Here our little party was made up, consisting of General Miles, his wife, daughter and son, a lad about thirteen years old, Dr. Daly and brother, two staff officers, and myself. We had a car and lived in it, and the cook supplied us bountifully with good healthy food, largely of game. I cannot imagine a more delightful change to a man weary with talk in the hot chambers of the capitol at Washington in August than the free, fresh air of the broad plains of Nebraska, with congenial company in a palace car, and with no one to bother him. Our first stopping place was called Woodlake, a small village on the railroad in the northwestern part of Nebraska. We arrived there in the afternoon; our car was detached from the train and became our home for a week. Around us in every direction was a broad rolling plain as dry as a powder horn, with scarcely any signs of habitation, but the air was pure and exhilarating and imparted a sense of health and energy. My first inquiry to one of the denizens was "Where is your wood and your lake which gave a name to your town?" He said that when the railroad was located there was a grove near by, and water in the low ground where we stood, but the trees had been cut and utilized in constructing the railroad, and the lake was dried up by a long drouth. Woodlake had neither wood nor lake in sight! We took long walks without fatigue, and our hunters, of whom General Miles was chief, supplied us with prairie chickens, the only game of the country.

After a few days thus spent we left our car and followed after a company of United States Infantry, from Fort Niobrara, then engaged in their usual drill, to a lake about twenty-five miles away, where we lived in tents and had a taste of real camp life. With the consent of the owner of the land we pitched our tents near his house on the banks of the lake about three miles long and perhaps half a mile wide. This sight of water was pleasing, but we were warned not to drink it. We had a bountiful supply of pure healthy water, however, from an artesian well driven over a hundred feet into the earth and pumped by almost continuous winds into a great basin, which furnished water in abundance for man and beast. The only house in sight besides the one near our camp was occupied by the brother of our host, three miles away at the other end of the lake. The two brothers were the lords of all they surveyed. They owned large herds of cattle that ranged over the plains around, drank of the waters of the lake and fed upon the sparse herbage. A few hundred of them were kept in a corral near the homesteads for sale, but the larger portion roamed under the care of herdsmen wherever the herbage seemed the best.

Here our hunters, with a fine pack of dogs, pursued prairie chickens, and not only supplied our table but contributed to the soldiers in their shelter tents near by. Mrs. Miles and I, escorted by her young son, Sherman Miles, on horseback, had the benefit of a horse and buggy with which we could drive in any direction. There was no fence or bog or obstruction in the way. We generally kept in sight of our hunters, but if we lost the trail we could go to the hills and soon locate our camp. This free and easy life soon cured my languor and weariness and I was able to walk or ride long distances as well as any of the party.

Returning to Woodlake we attached our car to the train for Big Spring in South Dakota. Here we spent two or three days, mainly in riding through the picturesque country around. We intended to extend our journey to Deadwood but the duties of General Miles required him to visit St. Paul and the military post at Fort Snelling. We returned by way of Sioux City, and thence to St. Paul. This city and its sister Minneapolis, were familiar ground. I had seen them when they were small towns, and had by frequent visits kept pace with their growth, but the change noticed on my last visit was a surprise to me. The two cities, but a few miles apart when rival rural villages, were approaching each other and no doubt are destined to blend into one great city of the north. Here I met many friends, chief of whom I am glad to place Senator Cushman K. Davis, of Minnesota. After a brief stay our little party returned to Chicago and dispersed, I going back to Mansfield to engage in the political campaign.

At this period "The Sherman Letters" was published, and at once attracted attention and general commendation. I though the experiment was a risky one, but it was the desire of General Sherman's children to publish them, and especially of his daughter, Rachel Thorndike, who undertook to compile them. I have been in the habit of preserving letters written to me on personal matters, or by members of my family, and, as General Sherman was a copious writer, I placed his letters in separate books. He did the same with mine, but many of these had been lost by fire in California. Rachel arranged in chronological order such letters as she thought worth preserving, and they were published in a handsome volume. I have a multitude of letters from almost every man with whom I have been associated in political life, but will not publish them while the writers live without their consent, nor even after their death if the letters would tend to wound the feelings of surviving friends or relatives. Letters are the best evidence of current thought or events, but they ought to be guarded by the person to whom they are written as confidential communications, not to be disclosed to the injury of the writer. General Sherman's inmost thoughts could be disclosed without fear of injury to him, and his letters, though rapidly written, did not indicate a dishonorable thought or action. I have seen nothing in the comments of the press on these letters but what is kindly to the "two brothers."

On the 5th of October I made my usual annual visit to Cincinnati. I called at the chamber of commerce, and had the same hearty welcome its members have always given me. I made the usual short speech, and it was all about "King Corn." General surprise was expressed at my healthy appearance. The remark was frequently made that I was looking better and healthier than for years. The impression of my failing health was gathered from the newspaper descriptions of "the old man" in the debates in the Senate. The effect of the pure, open air of Nebraska was apparent. While on this visit I was greatly pleased with a drive to Fort Thomas, and the high lands on the Kentucky side of the river.

My first political speech of the campaign was made on the 12th of October at Akron. It was confined almost exclusively to the tariff and silver questions. The meeting was very large, composed chiefly of men employed in the numerous factories and workshops of that active and flourishing city. On the 18th I spoke at Sandusky upon the same general topics as at Akron. Here I visited the Soldiers' Home near that city. It is an interesting place, where I think the old soldiers are better cared for than in the larger national homes.

I continued in the canvass, speaking at several places, until the election on the first Tuesday of November. The result was the re- election of Samuel M. Taylor, the Republican candidate for Secretary of State, by the abnormal plurality of 137,086, and nineteen Republicans were elected to Congress out of the twenty-one. Though this was a state election, it turned mainly upon national issues, and especially evidenced strong opposition to the Wilson tariff bill.

I was often asked by reporters, after my return to Washington, as to the meaning of the election in Ohio. I uniformly expressed the opinion that it meant the adoption of a nonpartisan tariff that would, with a few internal taxes, yield revenue enough to pay current expenses and the interest of the public debt and a portion of the principal. I still hope that will be the result. The framework of the McKinley law, with such changes as experience may show to be essential, would remove the tariff from among the political questions of the day and give reasonable encouragement to American industries.

On the 10th of November my family and I returned to Washington for the winter. The chief interest and occupation of my wife and myself, for the time being, was the preparation for the approaching marriage of our adopted daughter, Mary Stewart Sherman, to James Iver McCallum, of Washington. This was fixed for noon, the 12th of December. Full details of all the preparations made, of the dresses worn, of the members of the family in attendance, and of the distinguished guests present, were given in the city papers. It is sufficient for me to say that Mary has been carefully educated and trained by us, and never for a moment has given us anxiety as to her prudence, deportment and affection. We gave her in marriage to a young gentleman, a native of Washington, and a clerk in the supreme court, and entertain for her all the affection and solicitude that a father or mother can bestow.

Congress convened on the 3rd of December, 1894. The languor that followed the excitement of the two previous sessions, and the defeat suffered by the administration in the recent elections, no doubt caused an indifference to political questions during the short remaining session. But little was done except to consider and pass the appropriations for the support of the government. I was often annoyed by unfounded assertions that I had influence with the administration, and especially with Carlisle, that I was in frequent conference with the President and secretary. These stories were entirely unfounded. Neither of these gentlemen ever consulted me as to the business of their offices, nor did I ever seek to influence them or even to converse with them on political questions. It was a delicate matter for either of them or myself to deny such statements when our personal relations were so friendly.

And now these memoirs must end. I know there are many events not noted that should have been referred to, and many persons whose names should not have been omitted. I would be glad to mention with honor and credit hundreds of men who participated with me in the political events of public life, but this seemed impracticable within reasonable limits. I might have omitted many events and speeches as of not sufficient consequence to be preserved, but if I had I would not have written the recollections of my public life. The life of a civilian is in what he says or writes, that of a soldier in what he does. What I have written is no doubt clouded with partisanship, but I would not be honest if I did not express my attachment to my party. This, however, never impaired my patriotism or swerved me from the path of duty.

To the people of Ohio I owe all the offices and honors that have been conferred upon me. No constituency could have been more forbearing and kind. During forty years of public life, though many able men have aspired to the office I hold, the people of Ohio, through their general assembly, have preferred me to represent them. Though my grateful thanks are due to them and have been often expressed, yet I have felt, as they do, that my duty was to the whole country. Proud of Ohio, of its history and people, willing at all times to sound its praise in the sisterhood of states, yet, according to my convictions, the United States is entitled to my allegiance, and all parts of it should receive equal care and consideration. "Our country, our whole country, and nothing but our country" has been the watchword and creed of my public life. It was the opposite doctrine of "states' rights," allegiance to a state, that led to the Civil War. It was settled by this war that we have a country limited in its powers by the constitution of the United States fairly construed. Since that time our progress and development have been more rapid than any other country's.

The events of the future are beyond the vision of mankind, but I hope our people will be content with internal growth, and avoid the complications of foreign acquisitions. Our family of states is already large enough to create embarrassment in the Senate, and a republic should not hold dependent provinces or possessions. Every new acquisition will create embarrassments. Canada and Mexico as independent republics will be more valuable to the United States than if carved into additional states. The Union already embraces discordant elements enough without adding others. If my life is prolonged I will do all I can to add to the strength and prosperity of the United States, but nothing to extend its limits or to add new dangers by acquisition of foreign territory.

INDEX [omitted]

THE END