CHAPTER XXXII. ENACTMENT OF THE BLAND-ALLISON SILVER LAW. Amendments to the Act Reported by the Committee on Finance—Revival of a Letter Written by Me in 1868—Explained in Letter to Justin S. Morrill Ten Years Later—Text of the Bland Silver Bill as Amended by the Senate and Agreed to by the House—Vetoed by President Hayes —Becomes a Law Notwithstanding His Objections—I Decide to Terminate the Existing Contract with the Syndicate—Subscriptions Invited for Four per Cent. Bonds—Preparations for Resumption—Interviews with Committees of Both Houses—Condition of the Bank of England as Compared with the United States Treasury—Mr. Buckner Changes His Views Somewhat.

CHAPTER XXXIII. SALE OF BONDS FOR RESUMPTION PURPOSES. Arrangements Begun for the Disposal of $50,000,000 for Gold or Bullion—Interviews with Prominent Bankers in New York—Proposition in Behalf of the National Banks—Terms of the Contract Made with the Syndicate—Public Comment at the Close of the Negotiations— "Gath's" Interview with Me at the Completion of the Sale—Eastern Press Approves the Contract, While the West Was Either Indifferent or Opposed to it—Senate Still Discussing the Expediency of Repealing the Resumption Act—Letter to Senator Ferry—Violent and Bitter Animosity Aroused Against Me—I Am Charged with Corruption—Interview with and Reply to Letter of Peter Cooper—Clarkson N. Potter's Charges.

CHAPTER XXXIV. A SHORT RESPITE FROM OFFICIAL DUTIES. Visit to Mansfield and Other Points in Ohio—Difficulty of Making a Speech at Toledo—An Attempt to Break up a Meeting that Did Not Succeed—Various Reports of the Gathering—Good Work of the Cincinnati "Enquirer"—Toledo People Wanted "More Money"—Remarks Addressed to the Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce—Visit to Lancaster, the Place of My Birth—My Return to Washington—I Begin to Exchange Silver Dollars for United States Notes—My Authority to Do So Before January 1 Questioned—The Order is Withdrawn and Some Criticism Follows—Instructions to the United States Treasurer and Others— Arrangements with New York Clearing House.

CHAPTER XXXV. INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW YORK CUSTOMHOUSE. A General Examination of Several Ports Ordered—No Difficulty Except at New York—First Report of the Commission—President Hayes' Recommendations—Letter of Instructions to Collector C. A. Arthur —Second Report of the Commission—Losses to the Government by Reason of Inefficiency of Employees—Various Measures of Reform Recommended—Four Other Reports Made—The President Decides on the Removal of Arthur, Cornell and Sharpe—Two Letters to R. C. McCormick on the Subject—Arthur et al. Refuse to Resign—The Senate Twice Refuses to Confirm the Men Appointed by the President to Succeed Them—Conkling's Contest Against Civil Service Reform—My Letter to Senator Allison—Final Victory of the President.

CHAPTER XXXVI. PREPARATIONS FOR RESUMPTION OF SPECIE PAYMENTS. Annual Report to Congress on Dec. 2, 1878—Preparations for Resumption Accompanied with Increased Business and Confidence—Full Explanation of the Powers of the Treasurer Under the Act—How Resumption Was to Be Accomplished—Laws Effecting the Coinage of Gold and Silver —Recommendation to Congress That the Coinage of the Silver Dollar Be Discontinued When the Amount Outstanding Should Exceed $50,000,000 —Funding the Public Debt—United States Notes at Par with Gold— Instructions to the Assistant Treasurer at New York—Political Situation in Ohio.

CHAPTER XXXVII. REFUNDING THE NATIONAL DEBT. Over $140,000,000 of Gold Coin and Bullion in the Treasury January 1, 1879—Diversity of Opinion as to the Meaning of Resumption— Effect of the Act to Advance Public Credit—Funding Redeemable Bonds Into Four per Cents.—Letters to Levi P. Morton and Others— Six per Cent. Bonds Aggregating $120,000,000 Called During January, 1879—The Sale in London—Charges of Favoritism—Further Enactments to Facilitate the Funding—Difficulty of Making Sales of Four per Cent. Bonds to English Bankers—Large Amounts Taken in the United States—One Subscription of $190,000,000—Rothschild's Odd Claim— Complimentary Resolution of the New York Chamber of Commerce.

CHAPTER XXXVIII. GENERAL DESIRE TO NOMINATE ME FOR GOVERNOR OF OHIO. Death of My Brother Charles—The 46th Congress Convened in Special Session—"Mending Fences" at My Home in Mansfield—Efforts to Put Me Forward as a Candidate for the Governorship of Ohio—Letter to Murat Halstead on the Question of the Presidency, etc.—Result of My Letter to John B. Haskin—Reasons of My Refusal of the Nomination for Governor—Invitation from James G. Blaine to Speak in Maine— My Speech at Portland—Victory of the Republican Party—My Speech at Steubenville, Ohio—Evidences of Prosperity on Every Hand—Visit to Cincinnati and Return to Washington—Results in Ohio.

CHAPTER XXXIX. LAST DAYS OF THE HAYES ADMINISTRATION. Invitation From General Arthur to Speak in New York—Letter to Hon. John Jay on the Subject—Mr. Evarts' Refined Specimen of Egotism— An Anecdote of the Hayes Cabinet—Duty of the Government to Protect the Election of All Federal Officers—My Speech in Cooper Institute —Offers of Support to Elect Me as a Successor of Senator Thurman —My Replies—Republican Victory in New York—President Hayes' Message to Congress—My Report as Secretary of the Treasury— Modification of My Financial Views Since that Time—Bank Notes as Currency—Necessity for Paper Money—Mr. Bayard's Resolution Concerning the Legal Tender Quality of United States Notes—Questions Asked Me by the Finance Committee of the Senate.

CHAPTER XL. THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION IN 1880. Talk of Grant for President for a Third Term—His Triumphal Return from a Trip Around the World—The Candidacy of Mr. Blaine and Myself —Many of My Opponents Those Who Disagreed with Me on Financial Questions—Accused of Being a Catholic and of Using Patronage to Aid in My Nomination—My Replies—Delay in Holding the Ohio State Convention—My Interview with Garfield—Resolution of the State Convention in My Favor—National Convention at Chicago, on June 2, 1880—Fatal Move of Nine Ohio Delegates for Blaine—Final Nomination of Garfield—Congratulations—Letter to Governor Foster and to Garfield—Wade Hampton and the "Ku-Klux Klan."

CHAPTER XLI. MY LAST YEAR IN THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT. Opening of the 1880 Campaign in Cincinnati—My First Speech Arraigned as "Bitterly Partisan"—Letter from Garfield Regarding the Maine Election—Ohio Thought to Be in Doubt—Many Requests for Speeches —Republican Ticket Elected in Ohio and Indiana—A Strange Warning from Detroit Threatening Garfield with Assassination—The Latter's Reply—My Doubts About Remaining in the Treasury Department or Making an Effort for the Senate—Letter to Dalzell—Last Annual Report to Congress in December, 1880—Recommendations Regarding Surplus Revenue, Compulsory Coinage of the Silver Dollar, the Tariff, etc.—Bills Acted Upon by Congress.

CHAPTER XLII. ELECTED TO THE SENATE FOR THE FOURTH TIME. Blaine Appointed Secretary of State—Withdrawal of Governor Foster as a Senatorial Candidate—I Am Again Elected to My Old Position to Succeed Allen G. Thurman—My Visit to Columbus to Return Thanks to the Legislature—Address to Boston Merchants on Finances—Windom Recommended to Succeed Me as Secretary of the Treasury—Personal Characteristics of Garfield—How He Differed from President Hayes —The Latter's Successful Administration—My One Day out of Office in Over Forty Years—Long Animosity of Don Piatt and His Change of Opinion in 1881—Mahone's Power in the Senate—Windom's Success in the Treasury—The Conkling-Platt Controversy with the President Over New York Appointments.

CHAPTER XLIII. ASSASSINATION OF GARFIELD AND EVENTS FOLLOWING. I Return to Mansfield for a Brief Period of Rest—Selected as Presiding Officer of the Ohio State Convention—My Address to the Delegates Indorsing Garfield and Governor Foster—Kenyon College Confers on Me the Degree of Doctor of Laws—News of the Assassination of the President—How He Differed from Blaine—Visit of General Sherman—Reception by Old Soldiers—My Trip to Yellowstone Park— Speechmaking at Salt Lake City—Visit to Virginia City—Placer Mining in Montana—The Western Hunter Who Was Lost in a "St. Louis Canon"—Sunday in Yellowstone Park—Geysers in the Upper Basin— Rolling Stones Down the Valley—Return Home—Opening of the Ohio Campaign—Death of Garfield.

CHAPTER XLIV. BEGINNING OF ARTHUR'S ADMINISTRATION. Special Session of the Senate Convened by the President—Abuse of Me by Newspapers and Discharged Employees—Charges Concerning Disbursement of the Contingent Fund—My Resolution in the Senate— Secretary Windom's Letter Accompanying the Meline Report—Investigation and Complete Exoneration—Arthur's Message to Congress in December —Joint Resolutions on the Death of Garfield—Blaine's Tribute to His Former Chief—Credit of the United States at "High Water Mark" —Bill Introduced Providing for the Issuing of Three per Cent. Bonds—Corporate Existence of National Banks Extended—Bill to Reduce Internal Revenue Taxes—Tax on Playing Cards—Democratic Victory in Ohio.

CHAPTER XLV. STEPS TOWARDS MUCH NEEDED TARIFF LEGISLATION. Necessity of Relief from Unnecessary Taxation—Views of the President as Presented to Congress in December, 1882—Views of the Tariff Commission Appointed by the President—Great Changes Made by the Senate—Regret That I Did Not Defeat the Bill—Wherein Many Sections Were Defective or Unjust—Bill to Regulate and Improve the Civil Service—A Mandatory Provision That Should be Added to the Existing Law—Further Talk of Nominating Me for Governor of Ohio—Reasons Why I Could Not Accept—Selected as Chairman of the State Convention —Refusal to Be Nominated—J. B. Foraker Nominated by Acclamation —His Career—Issues of the Campaign—My Trip to Montana—Resuming the Canvass—Hoadley Elected Governor—Retirement of Gen. Sherman.

CHAPTER XLVI. EFFECT OF THE MARINE NATIONAL BANK AND OTHER FAILURES. Continued Prosperity of the Nation—Arthur's Report to Congress— Resolution to Inquire into Election Outrages in Virginia and Mississippi—Reports of the Investigating Committee—Financial Questions Discussed During the Session—Duties and Privileges of Senators—Failure of the Marine National Bank and of Grant and Ward in New York—Followed By a Panic in Which Other Institutions Are Wrecked—Timely Assistance from the New York Clearing House—Debate in the Senate on the National Bank System—Dedication of the John Marshall Statue at Washington—Defeat of Ingalls' Arrears of Pensions Amendment to Bill to Grant Pensions to Soldiers and Sailors of the Mexican War—The Senate Listens to the Reading of the Declaration of Independence on July 4.

CHAPTER XLVII. MY PARTICIPATION IN THE CAMPAIGN OF 1884. Again Talked of as a Republican Candidate for the Presidency—I Have No Desire for the Nomination—Blaine the Natural Candidate of the Party—My Belief that Arthur Would be Defeated if Nominated— Speech at Washington, D. C., for Blaine and Logan—Opening of the Ohio Campaign at Ashland—Success of the Republican State Ticket in October—Speeches in Boston, Springfield, Mass., New York and Brooklyn—Address to Business Men in Faneuil Hall—Success of the National Democratic Ticket—Arthur's Annual Message to Congress— Secretary McCulloch's Recommendations Concerning the Further Coinage of Silver Dollars—Statement of My Views at This Time—Statue to the Memory of General Lafayette—Controversy Between General Sherman and Jefferson Davis.

CHAPTER XLVIII. DEDICATION OF THE WASHINGTON MONUMENT. Resolution of Senator Morrill Providing for Appropriate Dedicatory Ceremonies—I Am Made Chairman of the Commission—Robert C. Winthrop's Letter Stating His Inability to Attend the Exercises—Letters of Regret from General Grant and John G. Whittier—Unfavorable Weather for the Dedication—My Address as Presiding Officer—The President's Acceptance of the Monument for the Nation—Mr. Winthrop's Address Read in the House by John D. Long—Inauguration of the First Democratic President Since Buchanan's Time—Visit to Cincinnati and Address on the Election Frauds—Respects to the Ohio Legislature —A Trip to the West and Southwest—Address on American Independence.

CHAPTER XLIX. REUNION OF THE "SHERMAN BRIGADE." Patriotic Address Delivered at Woodstock, Conn., On My Return from the Pacific Coast—Meeting of the Surviving Members of the Sherman Family at Mansfield—We Attend the Reunion of the "Sherman Brigade" at Odell's Lake—Addresses of General Sherman and Myself to the Old Soldiers and Others Present—Apathy of the Republican Party During the Summer of 1885—Contest Between Foraker and Hoadley for the Governorship—My Speech at Mt. Gilead Denounced as "Bitterly Partisan"—Governor Hoadley Accuses Me of "Waving the Bloody Shirt" —My Reply at Lebanon—Election of Foraker—Frauds in Cincinnati and Columbus—Speeches Made in Virginia.

CHAPTER L. ELECTED PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE. Death of Vice President Hendricks—I Am Chosen to Preside Over the United States Senate—Letter of Congratulation from S. S. Cox— Cleveland's First Annual Message to Congress—His Views on the Tariff and Condition of Our Currency—Secretary Manning's Report— Garfield's Statue Presented to the Nation by the State of Ohio—I Am Elected a Senator from Ohio for the Fifth Time—I Go to Columbus to Return Thanks to the Legislature for the Honor—Business of this Session of Congress—Attempt to Inquire Into the Methods of Electing Mr. Payne to the Senate from Ohio—My Address on "Grant and the New South"—Address Before the Ohio Society of New York.

CHAPTER LI. A PERIOD OF POLITICAL SPEECH MAKING. Organization of the "Sherman Club" at Mansfield, Ohio—My Experiences with Newspaper Reporters—Address at the State Fair in Columbus on Agricultural Implements—Other Speeches Made in the Campaign of that Year—Address at Louisville, Ky.—Courteous Treatment by Henry Watterson, of the "Courier Journal"—Hon. John Q. Smith's Change of Heart—Answering Questions Propounded by Him at a Gathering in Wilmington, Ohio—Success of the Republican Party—Second Session of the 49th Congress—But Little Legislation Accomplished—Death of Senator John A. Logan—Tributes to His Memory—His Strong Characteristics—My Reason for Resigning the Presidency of the Senate—Succeeded by John J. Ingalls.

CHAPTER LII. VISIT TO CUBA AND THE SOUTHERN STATES. Departure for Florida and Havana—A Walk Through Jacksonville— Impressions of the Country—Visit to Cigar Factories and Other Places of Interest—Impressions of Cuba—Experience with Colored Men at a Birmingham Hotel—The Proprietor Refuses to Allow a Delegation to Visit Me in My Rooms—Sudden Change of Quarters— Journey to Nashville and the Hearty Reception Which Followed—Visit to the Widow of President Polk—My Address to Nashville Citizens— Comment from the Press That Followed It—An Audience of Workingmen at Cincinnati—Return Home—Trip to Woodbury, Conn., the Home of My Ancestors—Invitation to Speak in the Hall of the House of Representatives at Springfield, Ill.—Again Charged with "Waving the Bloody Shirt."

CHAPTER LIII. INDORSED FOR PRESIDENT BY THE OHIO STATE CONVENTION. I Am Talked of as a Presidential Possibility—Public Statement of My Position—Unanimous Resolution Adopted by the State Convention at Toledo on July 28, 1887—Text of the Indorsement—Trip Across the Country with a Party of Friends—Visit to the Copper and Nickel Mining Regions—Stop at Winnipeg—A Day at Banff—Vast Snowsheds Along the Canadian Pacific Railroad—Meeting with Carter H. Harrison on Puget Sound—Rivalry Between Seattle and Tacoma—Trying to Locate "Mount Tacoma"—Return Home After a Month's Absence—Letter to General Sherman—Visit to the State Fair—I Attend a Soldiers' Meeting at Bellville—Opening Campaign Speech at Wilmington—Talk to Farmers in New York State—Success of the Republican Ticket in Ohio—Blaine Declines to Be a Candidate.

CHAPTER LIV. CLEVELAND'S EXTRAORDINARY MESSAGE TO CONGRESS. First Session of the 50th Congress—The President's "Cry of Alarm" —Troubled by the Excess of Revenues over Expenditures—My Answer to His Doctrines—His Refusal to Apply the Surplus to the Reduction of the Public Debt—The Object in Doing So—My Views Concerning Protection and the Tariff—In Favor of a Tariff Commission—"Mills Bill" the Outcome of the President's Message—Failure of the Bill During the Second Session—My Debates with Senator Beck on the Coinage Act of 1873, etc.—Omission of the Old Silver Dollar—Death of Chief Justice Waite—Immigration of Chinese Laborers—Controversy with Senator Vest—Speech on the Fisheries Question—Difficulties of Annexation with Canada.

CHAPTER LV. REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION OF 1888. Majority of the Ohio Delegates Agree to Support Me for President— Cleveland and Thurman Nominated by the Democrats—I Am Indorsed by the State Convention Held at Dayton, April 18-19—My Response to a Toast at the Americus Club, Pittsburg, on Grant—Meeting with Prominent Men in New York—Foraker's Reply to Judge West's Declaration Concerning Blaine—Blaine's Florence Letter to Chairman Jones—His Opinion of My Qualifications for the Honorable Position—Meeting of the Convention in Chicago in June—I Am Nominated by General D. H. Hastings and Seconded by Governor Foraker—Jealousy Between the Ohio Delegates—Predictions of My Nomination on Monday, June 25— Defeated by a Corrupt New York Bargain—General Harrison is Nominated —Letters from the President Elect—My Replies—First Speeches of the Campaign—Harrison's Victory—Second Session of the 50th Congress —The President's Cabinet.

CHAPTER LVI. FOUR AND A HALF MONTHS IN EUROPE. Our Party Takes Its Departure on the "City of New York" on May 1— Personnel of the Party—Short Stop in London—Various Cities in Italy Visited—Sight-Seeing in Rome—Journey to Pompeii and Naples —Impressions of the Inhabitants of Southern Italy—An Amusing Incident Growing Out of the Ignorance of Our Courier—Meeting with Mr. Porter, Minister to Rome—Four Days in Florence—Venice Wholly Unlike Any Other City in the World—Favorable Impression of Vienna —Arrival at Paris—Reception by the President of the Republic of France—Return Home—My Opinion Concerning England and Englishmen —Reception at Washington—Campaigning Again for Foraker—Ohio Ballot Box Forgery and Its Outcome—Address at Cleveland on "The Congress of American States"—Defeat of Foraker for Governor.

CHAPTER LVII. HISTORY OF THE "SHERMAN SILVER LAW." President Harrison's First Annual Message—His Recommendations Regarding the Coinage of Silver and Tariff Revisions—Bill Authorizing the Purchase of $4,500,000 Worth of Silver Bullion Each Month— Senator Plumb's "Free Silver" Amendment to the House Bill—Substitute Finally Agreed Upon in Conference—Since Known as the "Sherman Silver Law"—How It Came to Be so Called—Chief Merit of the Law— Steady Decline of Silver After the Passage of the Act—Bill Against Trusts and Combinations—Amendments in Committee—The Bill as Passed —Evils of Unlawful Combinations—Death of Representative Wm. D. Kelley and Ex-Member S. S. Cox—Sketch of the Latter—My Views Regarding Immigration and Alien Contract Labor—McKinley Tariff Law—What a Tariff Is—Death of George H. Pendleton—Republican Success in Ohio—Second Session of the 51st Congress—Failure of Senator Stewart's "Free Coinage Bill."

CHAPTER LVIII. EFFORTS TO CONSTRUCT THE NICARAGUAN CANAL. Early Recognition of the Need of a Canal Across the Isthmus Connecting North and South America—M. de Lesseps Attempts to Build a Water Way at Panama—Feasability of a Route by Lake Nicaragua— First Attempts in 1825 to Secure Aid from Congress—The Clayton- Bulwer Convention of 1850—Hindrance to the Work Caused by This Treaty—Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations in 1891— Failure to Secure a Treaty Between the United States and Nicaragua in 1884—Cleveland's Reasons for Withdrawing This Treaty—Incorporation of the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua—Inevitable Failure of Their Attempts Unless Aided by the Government—Why We Should Purchase Outright the Concessions of the Maritime Company—Brief Description of the Proposed Canal—My Last Letter from General Sherman—His Death from Pneumonia After a Few Days' Illness—Messages of President Harrison—Resolution—My Commemorative Address Delivered Before the Loyal Legion.

CHAPTER LIX. THE CAMPAIGN OF 1890-91 IN OHIO. Public Discussion of My Probable Re-election to the Senate—My Visit to the Ohio Legislature in April, 1891—Reception at the Lincoln League Club—Address to the Members—Appointed by the Republicans as a Delegate to the State Convention at Columbus—Why My Prepared Speech Was Not Delivered—Attack on Me by the Cincinnati "Enquirer"—Text of the Address Printed in the "State Journal"— Beginning of a Canvass with Governor Foraker as a Competitor for the Senatorship—Attitude of George Cox, a Cincinnati Politician, Towards Me—Attempt to Form a "Farmers' Alliance" or People's Party in Ohio—"Seven Financial Conspiracies"—Mrs. Emery's Pamphlet and My Reply to It.

CHAPTER LX. FREE SILVER AND PROTECTION TO AMERICAN INDUSTRIES. My Views in 1891 on the Free Coinage of Silver—Letter to an Ohio Newspaper on the Subject—A Problem for the Next Congress to Solve —Views Regarding Protection to American Industries by Tariff Laws —My Deep Interest in This Campaign—Its Importance to the Country at Large—Ohio the Battle Ground of These Financial Questions— Opening the Campaign in Paulding Late in August—Extracts from My Speech There—Appeal to the Conservative Men of Ohio of Both Parties —Address at the State Fair at Columbus—Review of the History of Tariff Legislation in the United States—Five Republican Principles Pertaining to the Reduction of Taxes—Speeches at Cleveland, Toledo, Cincinnati and Elsewhere—McKinley's Election by Over 21,000 Plurality.

CHAPTER LXI. ELECTED TO THE UNITED STATES SENATE FOR THE SIXTH TIME. I Secure the Caucus Nomination for Senator on the First Ballot— Foraker and Myself Introduced to the Legislature—My Address of Thanks to the Members—Speech of Governor Foraker—My Colleague Given His Seat in the Senate Without Opposition—Message of President Harrison to the 52nd Congress—Morgan's Resolutions and Speech for the Free Coinage of Silver—Opening of the Silver Debate by Mr. Teller—My Speech on the Question—Defeat of the Bill in the House —Discussion of the Chinese Question—My Opposition to the Conference Report on Mr. Geary's Amended Bill—Adopted by the Senate After a Lengthy Debate—Effect of the Tariff Laws Upon Wages and Prices— Senator Hale's Resolution—Carlisle's Speech in Opposition to High Prices—My Reply—Resume of My Opinions on the Policy of Protection —Reception by the Ohio Republican Association—Refutation of a Newspaper Slander Upon H. M. Daugherty—Newspaper Writers and Correspondents—"Bossism" in Hamilton County.

CHAPTER LXII. SECOND ELECTION OF GROVER CLEVELAND. Opposition to General Harrison for the Presidential Nomination—My Belief That He Could Not Be Elected—Preference for McKinley— Meeting of the National Republican Convention at Minneapolis— Meeting of Republicans at Washington to Ratify the Ticket—Newspaper Comment on My Two Days' Speech in the Senate on the Silver Question —A Claim That I Was Not in Harmony with My Party on the Tariff— My Reply—Opening Speeches for Harrison and Reid—Publication of My "History of the Republican Party"—First Encounter with a "Kodak" —Political Addresses in Philadelphia, New York, Cincinnati, Chicago and Milwaukee—Return to Ohio—Defeat of Harrison.

CHAPTER LXIII. ATTEMPTS TO STOP THE PURCHASE OF SILVER BULLION. My Determination to Press the Repeal of the Silver Purchasing Clause of the "Sherman Act"—Reply to Criticisms of the Philadelphia "Ledger"—Announcement of the Death of Ex-President Hayes—Tribute to His Memory—Efforts to Secure Authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to Sell Bonds to Maintain the Resumption of United States Notes—The Senate Finally Recedes from the Amendment in Order to Save the Appropriation Bill—Loss of Millions of Dollars to the Government—Cleveland Again Inducted Into Office—His Inaugural Address—Efforts to Secure an Appropriation for the "World's Fair" —Chicago Raises $1,000,000—Congress Finally Decides to Pay the Exposition $2,500,000 in Silver Coin—I Attend the Dedication of the Ohio Building at the Fair—Address to the Officers and Crew of the Spanish Caravels.

CHAPTER LXIV. REPEAL OF PART OF THE "SHERMAN ACT" OF 1890. Congress Convened in Extraordinary Session on August 7, 1893—The President's Apprehension Concerning the Financial Situation—Message from the Executive Shows an Alarming Condition of the National Finances—Attributed to the Purchase and Coinage of Silver—Letter to Joseph H. Walker, a Member of the Conference Committee on the "Sherman Act"—A Bill I Have Never Regretted—Brief History of the Passage of the Law of 1893—My Speech in the Senate Well Received —Attacked by the "Silver Senators"—General Debate on the Financial Legislation of the United States—Views of the "Washington Post" on My Speech of October 17—Repeal Accomplished by the Republicans Supporting a Democratic Administration—The Law as Enacted—Those Who Uphold the Free Coinage of Silver—Awkward Position of the Democratic Members—My Efforts in Behalf of McKinley in Ohio—His Election by 81,000 Plurality—Causes of Republican Victories Throughout the Country.

CHAPTER LXV. PASSAGE OF THE WILSON TARIFF BILL. Second Session of the 53rd Congress—Recommendations of the President Concerning a Revision of the Tariff Laws—Bill Reported to the House by the Committee of Ways and Means—Supported by Chairman Wilson and Passed—Received in the Senate—Report of the Senate Committee on Finance—Passes the Senate with Radical Amendments— These are Finally Agreed to by the House—The President Refuses to Approve the Bill—Becomes a Law After Ten Days—Defects in the Bill —Not Satisfactory to Either House, the President or the People— Mistakes of the Secretary of the Treasury—No Power to Sell Bonds or to Borrow Money to Meet Current Deficiencies—Insufficient Revenue to Support the Government—A Remedy That Was Not Adopted— Gross Injustice of Putting Wool on the Free List—McKinley Law Compared with the Wilson Bill—Sufficient Revenue Furnished by the Former—I Am Criticized for Supporting the President and Secretary.

CHAPTER LXVI. SENIORITY OF SERVICE IN THE SENATE. Notified That My Years of Service Exceed Those of Thomas Benton— Celebration of the Sons of the American Revolution at the Washington Monument—My Address to Those Present—Departure for the West with General Miles—Our Arrival at Woodlake, Nebraska—Neither "Wood" nor "Lake"—Enjoying the Pleasures of Camp Life—Bound for Big Spring, South Dakota—Return via Sioux City, St. Paul and Minneapolis —Marvelous Growth of the "Twin Cities"—Publication of the "Sherman Letters" by General Sherman's Daughter Rachel—First Political Speech of the Campaign at Akron—Republican Victory in the State of Ohio—Return to Washington for the Winter of 1894-95—Marriage of Our Adopted Daughter Mary with James Iver McCallum—A Short Session of Congress Devoted Mainly to Appropriations—Conclusion.

CHAPTER XXXI. EFFECT OF THE BLAND BILL ON THE COUNTRY. An Act Passed by the House Providing for the Free Coinage of the Silver Dollar—Mr. Ewing Makes an Attack on Resumption—Fear of Capitalists Regarding Our National Credit—Four Per Cents. Sell Below Par—Suspense and Anxiety Continued Throughout the Year—My First Report as Secretary of the Treasury—Recommendations of a Policy to be Pursued "To Strengthen the Public Credit"—Substitution of $50,000,000 in Silver Coin for Fractional Currency—Silver as a Medium of Circulation—Its Fluctuation in Value—Importance of Gold as a Standard of Value—Changes in the Market Value of Silver Since 1873.

The silver question was suddenly thrust upon the House of Representatives on the 5th of November, 1877, by a motion, submitted by Mr. Bland, of Missouri, that the rules be suspended so as to enable him to introduce, and the House to pass, a bill to authorize the free coinage of the standard silver dollar of 4121/2 grains, and to restore its legal tender character. The motion to suspend the rules cut off all amendments and all debate. Several members demanded a hearing. Efforts were made to adjourn, but this was refused. The previous question being ordered and the rules suspended, a single vote would introduce the bill without a reference to a committee, and would pass it without any power of amendment, without the usual reading at three separate times. The motion was agreed to by a vote of yeas 163, nays 34. So, two-thirds voting in favor thereof, the rules were suspended and the bill was passed.

The first section of this bill provided that there shall be coined, at the several mints of the United States, the silver dollar of the weight of 4121/2 grains, troy, of standard silver, as provided in the act of January 18, 1837, on which shall be the devices and superscriptions provided by said act; which coins, together with all silver dollars heretofore coined by the United States, of like weight and fineness, shall be a legal tender at their nominal value for all debts and dues, public and private, except where otherwise provided by contract; and any owner of silver bullion may deposit the same in any United States coinage mint or assay office, to be coined into such dollars for his benefit, upon the same terms and conditions as gold bullion is deposited for coinage under existing law. Section 2 provided for repealing all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with provisions of the act.

Thus this bill, of wide-reaching importance, was introduced and passed by the House under the previous question, and a suspension of the rules without debate on the same day of its introduction by a vote of yeas 163, nays 34. It was sent to the Senate and referred to the committee on finance.

On the same day Mr. Ewing moved in the House of Representatives to suspend the rules and adopt the following resolution:

"Resolved, That the bill to repeal the third section of the resumption law be made the special order, not to interfere with any appropriation bills, for to-morrow at the expiration of the morning hour, and from day to day thereafter until the following Tuesday at three o'clock, when the previous question shall be ordered on it and on any amendments then pending, all amendments meanwhile to be in order, provided the time shall be extended, if necessary, so as to allow five days after the morning hour for the consideration of said bill and amendments."

This resolution passed by a vote of yeas 143, nays 47.

In consequence of this action of the House, the syndicate declined to offer the bonds, and no further calls for six per cent. bonds were therefore made.

On the 7th of November August Belmont wrote me from New York as follows;

"I fear that the threatening position of the silver question will check completely any demand for the four per cent. bonds here and in Europe. The damage which the passage of this measure will do to our public credit abroad cannot be over estimated. To remonetize silver upon the old standard, and make it a legal tender for all private and public debts, will be considered by the whole civilized world as an act of repudiation on the part of the federal government, and cast a stain upon our national credit, which has hitherto stood as high and bright as that of any government in the world.

"It is just as much repudiation for the federal government to compel its bondholders to accept the payment of their interest in silver, which is at a discount of ten per cent., against the gold which the government received for the bonds, as it would be if Congress decreed that all the bonds of the United States should not bear a higher interest than two per cent. per annum. To do such a thing now as is contemplated by the Bland silver bill, when the federal finances are in a flourishing condition, when the premium of gold has been reduced two and a half to three per cent., and when our funded debt sells equal to that of any other public security in the world, is actually as if a man of wealth and position, who had by a life-long course of strict honesty acquired the well-earned confidence and respect of his fellow-citizens and of the outer world, should in the midst of his affluence, and without the palliating excuse of any temptation of want or necessity, commit open theft.

"I am sure I do not over estimate the damaging effect which the passage of the bill must have upon American credit. All my letters from abroad, and conversations with people familiar with the English and continental money markets, confirm my convictions on that point. When you look back and find in the archives of your department the proud records of a nation's faith kept inviolate with a most punctilious and chivalrous spirit during a century, amidst all the trials of foreign and civil war which strained the resources of our country to the very verge of ruin, the task before you is certainly a difficult and harassing one; but while the path of duty is often narrow and difficult, it is always straight and so well defined that it can never be mistaken.

"Sound financial policy and love of our country's fair name alike demand from those to whom the administration of its affairs have been intrusted the most uncompromising hostility to the blind and dishonest frenzy which has taken hold of Congress, and I sincerely hope that you will be seconded in the task before you by the hearty support of the President and your colleagues."

On the 9th of November I was advised that the four per cent. bonds were selling at 99 and interest, in a small way only. The syndicate had bought in the market about $750,000 of these bonds at less than par in order to prevent a further depreciation. On the same day I was informed by August Belmont & Co., as follows:

"After conference and careful consideration of the whole subject, it is the conclusion of all the associates, in Europe and here, that it is injudicious to undertake further negotiations of the fours, during the pendency of the legislation proposing to make silver a full legal tender, as the discussion has checked dealings in the bonds by the public. To make a call in the face of a market quotation (to-day 983/4 and interest) below the price fixed by law would not convince the public that new business had been undertaken at a loss, but that the call was connected with business previously done.

* * * * *

"Further than this, we are satisfied that, holding the views expressed in your letters mentioned, the President and all his cabinet will agree with us that it would be wrong for us to ask for another call at this juncture, as such action would be held by those advocating the legislation in favor of silver as proving that such legislation in our opinion was not prejudicial to the national credit and the refunding of our national debt."

On the 10th of November Mr. Conant wrote me that our bonds had been depressed by the rumors which had been circulated respecting probable legislation which would depreciate their value, and that four and a half per cent. bonds had fallen off three-fourths per cent. He said: "If, in any legislation which may be enacted regarding silver, provision could be made not only exempting the debt and interest thereon from payment in silver, but declaring that payment of the same shall be made in gold coin, it would aid us immeasurably in placing our bonds."

Two days later I received a letter from F. O. French, of New York, as follows:

"Our business people are very much alarmed at the rumored strength of the silver people, and, as they apprehend the gravest disasters from the success of the Bland bill, a committee of gentlemen connected with insurance and trust companies, as well as with the banks, go to Washington to-morrow to present their views to the finance committee.

"Once dispatch this silver business—and I have faith that it cannot live in the light of full discussion by the Senate—and we shall renew funding, and by attaining resumption put an end to financial discussions as we did to slavery."

And on the following day I wrote to August Belmont & Co.:

"Your letter of the 9th instant was received, and also a personal letter from Mr. Belmont.

"I am watchful of the course of legislation in Congress and of the current of public sentiment, both in our own and foreign countries, on the silver question. I am not prepared at present to give any assurance as to what will be done in Congress, nor of the action of the executive department. It is better to let the matter stand as it is, awaiting events without any committals whatever. I have faith to believe that all will come our right so far as the public credit is affected, and will write you again when anything definite can be said."

On the 29th of November Belmont wrote me a long letter containing the following statements:

"I need hardly assure you, at this late day, of my earnest solicitude for the success of the funding and resumption operations, and of my personal deep regret, apart from all pecuniary considerations, as a member of the syndicate, to see this unfortunate situation of the silver question put a complete stop to all further sales of the four per cent. bonds at present, here and in England. The capitalists and banks on both sides of the Atlantic will not buy a bond at par in gold, when it is almost certain, from the overwhelming vote in the House, and the known attitude of the Senate, that a silver bill, making the old silver dollar a legal tender for all private and public obligations, will pass both Houses this winter. . . .

"The bonds are selling at ninety-nine and one-fourth in gold in open market, and it seems to me very doubtful policy to offer bonds, by us, to the public at this moment, and thus assist the advocates of the old silver dollar by our apparent indifference to the injustice and dishonesty of the Bland bill."

This condition of suspense and anxiety continued during the remainder of the year.

My first annual report, as Secretary of the Treasury, was made to Congress on the 3rd of December, 1877. The statement made of our financial condition was a very favorable one, showing a surplus revenue of $30,340,577.69. The receipts from different sources of revenue were largely diminished, but the expenditures for the year were reduced by an equal amount. The surplus revenue was applied to the redemption of United States notes and of fractional currency, and to the payment of six per cent. bonds for the sinking fund. The report dealt with the usual topics of such reports, embracing a great variety of subjects. What attracted the most attention was, naturally, what was said about refunding the public debt and the resumption of specie payments. The results of refunding during the previous year have already been sufficiently stated. The plans for the resumption of specie payments were fully explained. The mode and manner of bringing this about was not specified in the law, but the time for resumption was fixed and the means provided for accumulating coin for that purpose were ample.

By the resumption act the Secretary of the Treasury was required to redeem legal tender notes to the amount of eighty per centum of the sum of national bank notes issued, and to continue such redemption, as circulating notes were issued, until there was outstanding the sum of $300,000,000 of such legal tender United States notes, and no more.

By the same act it was provided that, on and after the 1st day of January, 1879, the Secretary of the Treasury should redeem, in coin, the United States legal tender notes then outstanding, on their presentation for redemption at the office of the assistant treasurer of the United States, in the city of New York, in sums of not less than fifty dollars. "And," it continued, "to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to prepare and provide for the redemption in this act authorized or required, he is authorized to use any surplus revenues, from time to time, in the treasury, not otherwise appropriated, and to issue, sell, and dispose of, at not less than par, in coin, either of the descriptions of bonds, of the United States, described in the act of Congress approved July 14, 1870, entitled 'An act to authorize the refunding of the national debt,' with like qualities, privileges, and exemptions, to the extent necessary to carry this act into full effect, and to use the proceeds thereof for the purposes aforesaid."

In obedience to this provision I had sold at par, for coin, $15,000,000 four and a half per cent. bonds, or $5,000,000 during each of the months of May, June and July, and $25,000,000 at par, in coin, of four per cent. bonds, or $5,000,000 for each of the months of August, September, October, November and December. Of the coin thus received $4,000,000 had been sold for the redemption of United States notes, and the residue was in the treasury. The surplus revenue had also, under the same authority, been applied to the redemption of the residue of United States notes, not redeemed by the sale of coin, and the balance was held in the treasury in preparation for resumption.

These operations, aided greatly, no doubt, by the favorable condition of our foreign commerce, had advanced the market value of United States notes to ninety-seven and three-eighths per cent., or within nearly two and a half per cent. of coin. They had also conclusively demonstrated the practicability of restoring United States notes to par, in coin, by the time fixed by law, and that without disturbing either domestic or foreign trade or commerce. Every step had been accompanied with growing business, with the advance of public credit, and the steady appreciation of United States notes. The export of bullion had been arrested, and our domestic supply had accumulated in the treasury. The exportation of other domestic products had been largely increased, with great advantage to all industries. I said the course adopted under the resumption act, if pursued, would probably be followed with like favorable results, and a sufficient fund for the maintenance of resumption would doubtless accumulate in the treasury at or before the date fixed by law.

I strongly urged the firm maintenance of a policy that would make good the promise contained in the United States note when issued— a promise repeated in the act "To strengthen the public credit," approved March 18, 1869, and made definite and effective by the resumption act, and asserted that dishonored notes, less valuable than the coin they promise, though justified by the necessity which led to their issue, should be made good as soon as practicable; that the public credit was injured by failure to redeem them; that every holder who was compelled by law to receive them was deprived of a part of his just due; that our national resources being ample, the process of appreciation being almost complete, and the wisdom of the law having been demonstrated, it was the dictate of good policy and good faith to continue the process of preparation, so that, at or before the time fixed by law, every United States note would have equal purchasing power with coin; that to reverse this policy in the face of assured success would greatly impair the public credit, arrest the process of reducing the interest on the public debt, and cause anew the financial distress our country had recently suffered.

The first section of the resumption act plainly provided for the permanent substitution of silver coin for the whole amount of fractional currency outstanding. Section 3 directed the permanent reduction of United States notes to an amount not exceeding $300,000,000. No distinct legislative declaration was made in the resumption act that notes redeemed after that limit was reached should not be reissued; but section 3579 of the Revised Statutes of the United States provided that "when any United States notes are returned to the treasury they may be reissued, from time to time, as the exigencies of the public interest may require."

I expressed in my report the opinion that, under this section, notes, when redeemed after the 1st of January, 1879, if the amount outstanding was not in excess of $300,000,000, might be reissued as the exigencies of the public service required. A note redeemed with coin was in the treasury and subject to the same law as if received for taxes, or as a bank note, when redeemed by the corporation issuing it. The authority to reissue it did not depend upon the mode in which it was returned to the treasury. But this construction was controverted, and I thought should be settled by distinct provisions of law. It should not be open to doubt or dispute. The decision of this question by Congress would involve not merely the construction of existing law, but the public policy of maintaining in circulation United States notes, either with or without the legal tender clause. These notes were of great public convenience—they circulated readily; were of universal credit; were a debt of the people without interest; were protected by every possible safeguard against counterfeiting; and, when redeemable in coin at the demand of the holder, formed a paper currency as good as had yet been devised.

It was conceded, I said, that a certain amount could, with the aid of an ample reserve in coin, be always maintained in circulation. Should not the benefit of this circulation inure to the people, rather than to corporations, either state or national? The government had ample facility for the collection, custody, and care of the coin reserves of the country. It was a safer custodian of such reserves than a multitude of scattered banks would be. The authority to issue circulating notes by banks was not given to the banks for their benefit, but for the public convenience, and to enable them to meet the ebb and flow of currency caused by varying crops, productions, and seasons. It was indispensable that a power should exist somewhere to issue and loan credit money at certain times, and to redeem it at others. This function could be performed better by corporations than by the government. The government could not loan money, deal in bills of exchange, or make advances on property.

I expressed the opinion, that the best currency for the people of the United States would be a carefully-limited amount of United States notes, promptly redeemable on presentation in coin, supported by ample reserves of coin, and supplemented by a system of national banks, organized under general laws, free and open to all, with power to issue circulating notes secured by United States bonds, deposited with the government and redeemable on demand in United States notes or coin. Such a system would secure to the people a safe currency of equal value in all parts of the country, receivable for all dues, and easily convertible into coin. Interest could thus be saved on so much of the public debt as could be conveniently maintained in permanent circulation, leaving to national banks the proper business of such corporations, of providing currency for the varying changes, the ebb and flow of trade.

I said that the legal tender quality given to United States notes was intended to maintain them in forced circulation at a time when their depreciation was inevitable. When they were redeemable in coin this quality might either be withdrawn or retained, without affecting their use as currency in ordinary times. But all experience had shown that there were periods when, under any system of paper money, however carefully guarded, it was impracticable to maintain actual coin redemption. Usually contracts would be based upon current paper money, and it was just that, during a sudden panic, or an unreasonable demand for coin, the creditor should not be allowed to demand payment in other than the currency upon which the debt was contracted. To meet this contingency, it would seem to be right to maintain the legal tender quality of the United States notes. If they were not at par with coin it was the fault of the government and not of the debtor, or, rather, it was the result of unforseen stringency not contemplated by the contracting parties.

In establishing a system of paper money, designed to be permanent, I said it should be remembered that theretofore no expedient had been devised, either in this or other countries, that in times of panic or adverse trade had prevented the drain and exhaustion of coin reserves, however large or carefully guarded. Every such system must provide for a suspension of specie payment. Laws might forbid or ignore such a contingency, but it would come; and when it came it could not be resisted, but had to be acknowledged and declared, to prevent unnecessary sacrifice and ruin. In our free government the power to make this declaration would not be willingly intrusted to individuals, but should be determined by events and conditions known to all. It would be far better to fix the maximum of legal tender notes at $300,000,000, supported by a minimum reserve of $100,000,000, of coin, only to be used for the redemption of notes, not to be reissued until the reserve was restored. A demand of coin to exhaust such a reserve might not occur, but, if events should force it, the fact would be known and could be declared, and would justify a temporary suspension of specie payments. Some such expedient could, no doubt, be provided by Congress for an exceptional emergency. In other times the general confidence in these notes would maintain them at par in coin, and justify their use as reserves of banks and for the redemption of bank notes.

As to the fractional currency I said the resumption act provided for the exchange and substitution of silver coins for such currency. To facilitate this exchange, the joint resolution, approved July 22, 1876, provided that such coin should be issued to an amount not exceeding $10,000,000, for an equal amount of legal tender notes. It also provided that the aggregate amount of such coin and fractional currency outstanding should not exceed, at any time, $50,000,000. That limit would have been reached if the whole amount of fractional currency issued and not redeemed, had been held to be "outstanding." It was well known, however, that a very large amount of fractional currency issued had been destroyed, and could not be presented for redemption, and could hardly be held to be "outstanding." The Treasurer of the United States, the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Director of the Mint concurred in estimating the amount, so lost and destroyed, to be not less than $8,083,513.

As it was evident that Congress intended to provide an aggregate issue of $50,000,000 of such coin and currency in circulation, I directed the further issue of silver coin, equal in amount to the currency estimated to have been lost and destroyed.

I recommended that the limitation upon the amount of such fractional coin, to be issued in exchange for United States notes, be repealed. The coin was readily taken, was in great favor with the people, its issue was profitable to the government, and experience had shown that there was no difficulty in maintaining it at par with United States notes. The estimated amount of such coin in circulation in the United States in 1860, at par with gold, was $43,000,000. Great Britain, with a population of 32,000,000, maintained an inferior fractional coin to the amount of $92,463,500, at par with gold, and other nations maintained a much larger per capita amount. The true limit of such coin was the demand that might be made for its issue, and if only issued in exchange for United States notes there was no danger of an excess being issued.

By the coinage act of 1873, any person might deposit silver bullion at the mint to be coined into trade dollars of the weight of 420 grains, troy, upon the payment of the cost of coinage. This provision had been made at a time when such a dollar, worth in the market $1.02-13/100 in gold, was designed for the use of trade in China, where silver was the only standard. By the joint resolution of July 22, 1876, passed when the trade dollar in market value, had fallen greatly below one dollar in gold, it was provided that it should not be thereafter a legal tender, and the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized "to limit the coinage thereof to such an amount as he may deem sufficient to meet the export demand for the same." Under these laws the amount of trade dollars issued, mainly for exportation, was $30,710,400.

In October, 1877, it became apparent that there was no further export demand for trade dollars, but deposits of silver bullion were made, and such dollars were demanded of the mint for circulation in the United States, that the owner might secure the difference between the value of such bullion in the market and United States notes. At the time the mints were fully occupied by the issue of fractional, and other coins, on account of the government. Therefore, under the authority of the law of 1876 referred to, I directed that no further issues of trade dollars be made until necessary again to meet an export demand. In case another silver dollar was authorized, I recommended that the trade dollar be discontinued.

The question of the issue of a silver dollar for circulation as money had, previous to my report, been discussed and carefully examined by a commission organized by Congress, which had recommended the coinage of the old silver dollar. With such legislative provisions as would maintain its current value at par with gold, its issue was recommended by me. I thought a gold coin of the denomination of one dollar was too small for convenient circulation, while such a coin in silver would be convenient for a multitude of daily transactions, and in a form to satisfy the natural instinct of hoarding.

I discussed the silver question to some length and said that of the metals, silver was of the most general use for coinage. It was a part of every system of coinage, even in countries where gold was the sole legal standard. It best measured the common wants of life, but, from its weight and bulk, was not a convenient medium in the larger exchanges of commerce. Its production was reasonably steady in amount. The relative market value of silver and gold was far more stable than that of any other two commodities—still, it did vary. It was not in the power of human law to prevent the variation. This inherent difficulty had compelled all nations to adopt one or the other as the sole standard of value, or to authorize an alternative standard of the cheaper coin, or to coin both metals at an arbitrary standard, and to maintain one a par with the other by limiting the amount and legal tender quality of the cheaper coin, and receiving or redeeming it at par with the other.

It had been the careful study of statesmen for many years to secure a bimetallic currency not subject to the changes of market value, and so adjusted that both kinds could be kept in circulation together, not alternating with each other. The growing tendency had been to adopt, for coins, the principle of "redeemability" applied to different forms of paper money. By limiting tokens, silver, and paper money, to the amount needed for business, and promptly receiving or redeeming all that might at any time be in excess, all these forms of money could be kept in circulation, in large amounts, at par with gold. In this way, tokens of inferior intrinsic value were readily circulated, and did not depreciate below the paper money into which they were convertible. The fractional coin then in circulation, though the silver of which it was composed was of less market value than the paper money, passed readily among all classes of people and answered all the purposes for which it was designed. And so the silver dollar, if restored to our coinage, would greatly add to the convenience of the people. But this coin should be subject to the same rule, as to issue and convertibility, as other forms of money. If the market value of the silver in it was less than that of gold coin of the same denomination, and it was issued in unlimited qualities, and made a legal tender for all debts, it would demonetize gold and depreciate our paper money.

The importance of gold as the standard of value was conceded by all. Since 1834, it had been practically the sole coin standard of the United States, and, since 1815, been the sole standard of Great Britain. Germany had recently adopted the same standard. France, and other Latin nations, had suspended the coinage of silver, and, it was supposed, would gradually either adopt the sole standard of gold, or provide for the convertibility of silver coin, on the demand of the holder, into gold coin.

In the United States, several experiments had been made with the view of retaining both gold and silver in circulation. The 2nd Congress undertook to establish the ratio of fifteen of silver to one of gold, with free coinage of both metals. By this ratio gold was under-valued, as one ounce of gold was worth more in the markets of the world than fifteen ounces of silver, and gold, therefore, was exported. To correct this, in 1837, the ratio was fixed at sixteen to one, but sixteen ounces of silver were worth, in the market, more than one ounce of gold, so that silver was demonetized.

These difficulties in the adjustment of gold and silver coinage had been fully considered by Congress, prior to the passage of the act approved February 21, 1853. By that act a new, and it was believed a permanent, policy was adopted to secure the simultaneous circulation of both silver and gold coins in the United States. Silver fractional coins were provided for at a ratio of 14.88 in silver to one in gold, and were only issued in exchange for gold coin. The right of private parties to deposit silver bullion for such coinage was repealed, and these coins were issued from bullion purchased by the Treasurer of the Mint, and only upon the account, and for the profit, of the United States. The coin was a legal tender only in payment of debts for all sums not exceeding five dollars. Though the silver in this coin was then worth in the market 3.13 cents on the dollar less than gold coin, yet its convenience for use in change, its issue by the government only in exchange for, and its practical convertibility into, gold coin, maintained it in circulation at par with gold coin. If the slight error in the ratio of 1792 prevented gold from entering into circulation for forty-five years, and the slight error in 1837 brought gold into circulation and banished silver until 1853, how much more certainly would an error then of nine per cent. cause gold to be exported and silver to become the sole standard of value? Was it worth while to travel again the round of errors, when experience had demonstrated that both metals could only be maintained in circulation together by adhering to the policy of 1853?

The silver dollar was not mentioned in the act of 1853, but from 1792 until 1874 it was worth more in the market than the gold dollar provided for in the act of 1837. It was not a current coin contemplated as being in circulation at the passage of the act of February 12, 1873. The whole amount of such dollars, issued prior to 1853, was $2,553,000. Subsequent to 1853, and until it was dropped from our coinage in 1873, the total amount issued was $5,492,838, and this was almost exclusively for exportation.

By the coinage act approved February 12, 1873, fractional silver coins were authorized, similar in general character to the coins of 1853, but with a slight increase in silver in them, to make them conform exactly to the French coinage, and the old dollar was replaced by the trade dollar of 420 grains of standard silver.

Much complaint had been made that this was done with the design of depriving the people of the privilege of paying their debts in a cheaper money than gold, but it was manifest that this was an error. No one then did or could foresee the subsequent fall in the market value of silver. The silver dollar was an unknown coin to the people, and was not in circulation even on the Pacific slope, where coin was in common use. The trade dollar of 420 grains was substituted for the silver dollar of 4121/2 grains because it was believed that it was better adapted to supersede the Mexican dollar in the Chinese trade, and experiment proved this to be true. Since the trade dollar was authorized $30,710,400 had been issued, or nearly four times the entire issue of old silver dollars since the foundation of the government. Had not the coinage act of 1873 passed, the United States would have been compelled to suspend the free coinage of silver dollars, as the Latin nations were, or to accept silver as the sole coin standard of value.

Since February, 1873, great changes had occurred in the market value of silver. Prior to that time the silver in the old dollar was worth more than a gold dollar, while it was worth then, in 1877, about 92 cents. If by law any holder of silver bullion might deposit in the mint and demand a full legal tender dollar for every 4121/2 grains of standard silver deposited, the result would be inevitable that as soon as the mints could supply the demand the silver dollar would, by a financial law as fixed and invariable as the law of gravitation, become the only standard of value. All forms of paper money would fall to that standard or below it, and gold would be demonetized and quoted at a premium equal to its value in the markets of the world. For a time the run to deposit bullion at the mint would give to silver an artificial value, of which the holders and producers of silver bullion would have the sole benefit. The utmost capacity of the mints would be employed for years to supply this demand at the cost of, and without profit to, the people. The silver dollar would take the place of gold as rapidly as coined, and be used in the payment of customs duties, causing an accumulation of such coins in the treasury. If used in paying the interest on the public debt, the grave questions then presented would arise with public creditors, seriously affecting the public credit.

It had been urged that the free coinage of silver in the United States would restore its market value to that of gold. Market value was fixed by the world, and not by the United States alone, and was affected by the whole mass of silver in the world. As the enormous and continuous demand for silver in Asia had not prevented the fall of silver, it was not likely that the limited demand for silver coin in this country, where paper money then was, and would be, the chief medium of exchange, would cause any considerable advance in its value. This advance, if any, would be secured by the demand for silver bullion for coin, to be issued by and for the United States, as well as if it were issued for the benefit of the holder of the bullion. If the financial condition of our country was so grievous that we must at every hazard have a cheaper dollar, in order to lessen the burden of debts already contracted, it would be far better, rather than to adopt the single standard of silver, to boldly reduce the number of grains in the gold dollar, or to abandon and retrace all efforts to make United States notes equal to coin. Either expedient would do greater harm to the public at large than any possible benefit to debtors.

The free coinage of silver would also impair the pledge made of the customs duties, by the act of February, 1862, for payment of the interest of the public debt. The policy adhered to of collecting these duties in gold coin, had been the chief cause of upholding and advancing the public credit, and making it possible to lessen the burden of interest by the process of refunding.

In view of these considerations, I felt it to be my duty to earnestly urge upon Congress the serious objections to the free coinage of silver on such conditions as would demonetize gold, greatly disturb all the financial operations of the government, suddenly revolutionize the basis of our currency, throw upon the government the increased cost of coinage, arrest the refunding of the public debt, and impair the public credit, with no apparent advantage to the people at large.

I believed that all the beneficial results hoped for from a liberal issue of silver coin could be secured by issuing this coin, in pursuance of the general policy of the act of 1853, in exchange for United States notes, coined from bullion purchased in the open market, by the United States, and by maintaining it by redemption, or otherwise, at par with gold coin. It could be made a legal tender for such sums and on such contracts as would secure to it the most general circulation. It could be easily redeemed in United States notes and gold coin, and only reissued when demanded for public convenience. If the essential quality of redeemability given to the United States notes, bank bills, tokens, fractional coins and currency, maintained them at par, how much easier it would be to maintain the silver dollar, of intrinsic market value nearly equal to gold, at par with gold coin, by giving to it the like quality of redeemability. To still further secure a fixed relative value of silver and gold, the United States might invite an international convention of commercial nations. Even such a convention, while it might check the fall of silver, could not prevent the operation of that higher law which places the market value of silver above human control. Issued upon the conditions stated, I was of opinion that the silver dollar would be a great public advantage, but that if issued without limit, upon the demand of the owners of silver bullion, it would be a great public injury.

CHAPTER XXXII. ENACTMENT OF THE BLAND-ALLISON SILVER LAW. Amendments to the Act Reported by the Committee on Finance—Revival of a Letter Written by Me in 1868—Explained in Letter to Justin S. Morrill Ten Years Later—Text of the Bland Silver Bill as Amended by the Senate and Agreed to by the House—Vetoed by President Hayes —Becomes a Law Notwithstanding His Objections—I Decide to Terminate the Existing Contract with the Syndicate—Subscriptions Invited for Four per Cent. Bonds—Preparations for Resumption—Interviews with Committees of Both Houses—Condition of the Bank of England as Compared with the United States Treasury—Mr. Buckner Changes His Views Somewhat.

The President's message supported and strengthened the position taken by me both in favor of the policy of resumption and against the free coinage of silver provided for in the Bland bill. The comments in the public press, both in the United States and in Europe, generally sustained the position taken by the President and myself. I soon had assurances that the Bland bill would not pass the Senate without radical changes. Even the House of Representatives, so recently eager to repeal the resumption act, and so hasty and united for the free coinage of silver, had become more conservative and would not have favored either measure without material changes. I conversed with Mr. Allison and wrote him the following letter:

"Washington, D. C., December 10, 1877. "Hon. W. B. Allison, U. S. Senate.

"Dear Sir:—Permit me to make an earnest appeal to you to so amend the silver bill that it will not arrest the refunding of our debt or prevent the sale of our four per cent. bonds. I know that upon you must mainly rest the responsibility of this measure, and I believe that you would not do anything that you did not think would advance the public service, whatever pressure might be brought to bear upon you.

"It is now perfectly certain that unless the customs duties and the public debt—as least so much of it as was issued since February, 1873—are excepted, we cannot sell the bonds. The shock to our credit will bring back from abroad United States bonds, and our people will then have a chance to buy the existing bonds and we cannot sell the four per cent. bonds. This will be a grievous loss and damage to the administration and to our party, for which we must be held responsible. You know I have been as much in favor of the silver dollar as anyone, but if it is to be used to raise these difficult questions with public creditors, it will be an unmixed evil.

"I wish I could impress you as I feel about this matter, and I know you would then share in the responsibility, if there is any, in so amending this bill that we can have all that is good out of it without the sure evil that may come from it if it arrests our funding and resumption operations.

"With much respect, yours, etc. "John Sherman.

The amendments to the Bland bill proposed by Mr. Allison from the committee on finance, completely revolutionized the measure. The Senate committee proposed to strike out these words in the House bill:

"And any owner of silver bullion may deposit the same at any coinage mint or assay office, to be coined into such dollars, for his benefit, upon the same terms and conditions as gold bullion is deposited for coinage under existing laws."

And to insert the following:

"And the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed, out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, to purchase, from time to time, at the market price thereof, not less than $2,000,000 per month, nor more than $4,000,000 per month, and cause the same to be coined into such dollars. And any gain or seigniorage arising from this coinage shall be accounted for and paid into the treasury, as provided under existing laws relative to the subsidiary coinage: Provided, that the amount of money at any one time invested in such silver bullion, exclusive of such resulting coin, shall not exceed $5,000,000."

These amendments were agreed to.

Sections two and three of the bill were added by the Senate. The bill, as amended, was sent to the House of Representatives, and the Senate amendments were agreed to. The bill as amended was as follows;

"AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE COINAGE OF THE STANDARD SILVER DOLLAR, AND TO RESTORE ITS LEGAL TENDER CHARACTER.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there shall be coined, at the several mints of the United States, silver dollars of the weight of four hundred and twelve and a half grains troy of standard silver, as provided in the act of January eighteenth, eighteen hundred thirty-seven, on which shall be the devices and superscriptions provided by said act; which coins, together with all silver dollars heretofore coined by the United States, of like weight and fineness, shall be a legal tender, at their nominal value, for all debts and dues, public and private, except where otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract. And the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to purchase, from time to time, silver bullion, at the market price thereof, not less than two million dollars worth per month, nor more than four million dollars worth per month, and cause the same to be coined monthly, as fast as so purchased, into such dollars; and a sum sufficient to carry out the foregoing provision of this act is hereby appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated. And any gain or seigniorage arising from this coinage shall be accounted for and paid into the treasury, as provided under existing laws relative to the subsidiary coinage: Provided, That the amount of money at any one time invested in such silver bullion, exclusive of such resulting coin, shall not exceed five million dollars: And provided further, That nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize the payment in silver of certificates of deposit issued under the provisions of section two hundred and fifty-four of the Revised Statutes.

"Sec. 2. That immediately after the passage of this act, the President shall invite the governments of the countries composing the Latin union, so-called, and of such other European nations as he may deem advisable, to join the United States in a conference to adopt a common ratio between gold and silver, for the purpose of establishing, internationally, the use of bimetallic money, and securing fixity of relative value between those metals; such conference to be held at such place, in Europe or in the United States, at such time within six months, as may be mutually agreed upon by the executives of the governments joining in the same, whenever the governments so invited, or any three of them, shall have signified their willingness to unite in the same.

"The President shall, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint three commissioners, who shall attend such conference on behalf of the United States, and shall report the doings thereof to the President, who shall transmit the same to Congress.

"Said commissioners shall each receive the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars and their reasonable expenses, to be approved by the Secretary of State; and the amount necessary to pay such compensation and expenses is hereby appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated.

"Sec. 3. That any holder of the coin authorized by this act may deposit the same with the treasurer or any assistant treasurer of the United States in sums not less than ten dollars, and receive therefor certificates of not less than ten dollars each, corresponding with the denominations of the United States notes. The coin deposited for or representing the certificates shall be retained in the treasury for the payment of same upon demand. Said certificates shall be receivable for customs, taxes, and all public dues, and, when so received, may be reissued.

"Sec. 4. All acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed."

It was sent to the President, and was disapproved by him. His veto message was read in the House on the 28th of February, and upon the question whether the bill should pass, the objections of the President notwithstanding, it was adopted by a vote of yeas 196, nays 73. It passed the Senate on the same day, by a vote of yeas 46, nays 19, and thus became a law.

I did not agree with the President in his veto of the bill, for the radical changes made in its terms in the Senate had greatly changed its effect and tenor. The provisions authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to purchase not less than $2,000,000 worth of silver bullion per month, at market price, and to coin it into dollars, placed the silver dollars upon the same basis as the subsidiary coins, except that the dollar contained a greater number of grains of silver than a dollar of subsidiary coins, and was a legal tender for all debts without limit as to amount. The provision that the gain or seigniorage arising from the coinage should be accounted for and paid into the treasury, as under the existing laws relative to subsidiary coinage, seemed to remove all serious objections to the measure. In view of the strong public sentiment in favor of the free coinage of the silver dollar, I thought it better to make no objections to the passage of the bill, but I did not care to antagonize the wishes of the President. He honestly believed that it would greatly disturb the public credit to make a legal tender for all amounts, of a dollar, the bullion of which was not of equal commercial value to the gold dollar.

The provision made directing the President to invite the governments of the countries composing the Latin Union, and of such other European countries as he deemed advisable, to unite with the United States in adopting a common ratio between gold and silver, has been made the basis of several conferences which have ended without any practical result, and the question of a single or double standard still stands open as the great disturbing question of public policy, affecting alike all commercial countries.

While this measure was pending in the Senate, a casual letter written by me ten years previously was frequently quoted, as evidence that I was then in favor of paying the bonds of the United States with United States notes, at that date at a large discount in coin. The letter is as follows:

"United States Senate Chamber,} "Washington, March 20, 1868. } "Dear Sir:—I was pleased to receive your letter. My personal interests are the same as yours, but, like you, I do not intend to be influenced by them. My construction of the law is the result of a careful examination, and I feel quite sure an impartial court would confirm it, if the case could be tried before a court. I send you my views, as fully stated in a speech. Your idea is that we propose to repudiate or violate a promise when we offer to redeem the 'principal' in 'legal tender.' I think the bondholder violates his promise when he refuses to take the same kind of money he paid for the bonds. If the coin is to be tested by the law, I am right; if it is to be tested by Jay Cooke's advertisements, I am wrong. I hate repudiation, or anything like it, but we ought not to be deterred from doing what is right by fear of undeserved epithets. If, under the law as it now stands, the holder of the 5-20's can only be paid in gold, then we are repudiators if we propose to pay otherwise. If, on the other hand, the bondholder can legally demand only the kind of money he paid, he is a repudiator and an extortioner to demand money more valuable than he gave.

"Your truly, "John Sherman. "Hon. A. Mann, Jr., Brooklyn Heights."

On the 26th of March, 1878, I wrote the following letter to Senator Justin S. Morrill, which was read by him in the debate, and, I think, was a conclusive answer to the erroneous construction put upon my letter to Mann:

"My Dear Sir:—Your letter of the 24th inst. is received. I have noticed that my casual letter to Dr. Mann, of the date of March 20, 1868, inclosing a speech made by me, has been frequently used to prove that I have changed my opinion since that time as to the right of the United States to pay the principal of the 5-20 bonds in legal tenders. This would not be very important, if true, but it is not true, as I never have changed my opinion as to the technical legal right to redeem the principal of the 5-20 bonds in legal tenders, but, as you know and correctly state, have always insisted that we could not avail ourselves of this legal right until we complied, in all respects, with the legal and moral obligations imposed by the legal tender note, to redeem it in coin on demand or to restore the right to convert it into an interest- bearing government bond. The grounds of this opinion are very fully stated in the speech made February 27, 1868, referred to in the letter to Dr. Mann, and in a report on the funding bill made by me from the committee on finance, December 7, 1867.

"If my letter is taken in connection with the speech which it inclosed and to which it expressly referred, it will be perceived that my position there is entirely consistent with what it is now, and time has proven that, if the report of the committee on finance had been adopted, we would long since have reached the coin standard, with an enormous saving of interest, and without impairing the public credit. My position was, that while the legal tender act made United States notes a legal tender for all debts, private and public, except for customs duties and interest of the public debt, yet we could not honestly compel the public creditors to receive United States notes in the payment of bonds until we made good the pledge of the public faith to pay the notes in coin. That promise was printed on the face of the notes when issued, was repeated in several acts of Congress, and was declared valid and obligatory by the Supreme Court.

"From the first issue of the legal tender note, which I heartily supported and voted for, I have sought to make it good, to support, maintain and advance its value. It was in the earnest effort to restore to the greenback the right to be converted, on the demand of the holder, into a five per cent. bond and, as soon as practicable, into coin, that I made the speech referred to, resisting alike the demand of those who wished to exclude United States notes from the operation of funding and the large class of persons who wished to cheapen, degrade and ultimately repudiate them. In all my official connection with legislation as to legal tender notes, I have but one act to regret and to apologize for, and that is my acquiescence in the act of March 3, 1863, which, under the pressure of war and to promote the sale of bonds, took away from the holders of these notes the right to convert them into interest-bearing securities. This right might properly have been suspended during the war, but its repeal was a fatal act, the source and cause of all the financial evils we have suffered and from which we cannot recover until we restore that right or redeem on demand our notes in coin.

"The speech referred to, and which I have recently read by reasons of the reference to it in the letter to Dr. Mann, will clearly show that I have not been guilty of inconsistency or a change of opinion —the most pardonable of all offenses—but then insisted, as I now insist, that no discrimination should be made against the note holder, but that until we are ready to pay him in coin he should be allowed, at his option, to convert his money into a bond at par. Until then our notes are depreciated by our wrongful act, and we have no right to take advantage of our own wrong by forcing upon the bondholders the notes we refuse to receive. This is the precise principle involved in the act to strengthen the public credit, approved March 18, 1869. That act did not in any respect change the legal and moral obligations of the United States, but expressly provides that none of the interest-bearing obligations not already due shall be redeemed or paid before maturity, unless at such time as the United States notes shall be convertible into coin, at the option of the holder. And the act further 'solemnly pledges the public faith to make provisions, at the earliest practicable period, for the redemption of United States notes in coin.'

"This is in exact harmony with the position I held when I wrote the letter to Dr. Mann and that I now maintain, the primary principle being that the United States notes shall first be brought to par in coin before they shall be forced upon the public creditor in payment of his bonds. This act is the settled law, and whatever any man's opinions were before it passed, he would assume a grave responsibility who would seek to evade its terms, weaken its authority or change its provisions. It has entered into every contract made since that time. It has passed the ordeal of four Congresses and two elections for Presidents. It cannot be revoked without public dishonor. So far as the bondholder is concerned, it is an executed law. Over $700,000,000 of bonds have been redeemed in coin under it, and the civilized world regards all the remainder as covered by its sanction, and in their faith in it our securities have become the second only in the markets of the world. This law is not yet quite executed so far as the note holder is concerned. His note is not yet quite as good as coin. Congress has debated ever since its passage the best mode to make it good. The Senate in 1870 provided, in the third section of the refunding act, as it passed that body, that these notes might be converted into four per cent. bonds, but the House would not concur. Everybody can now see that if this had been done these notes would now be at par in coin. Other expedients were proposed, and finally the resumption act was passed, and, if undisturbed, is now on the eve of execution.

"The promise made in 1862, and so often repeated, is about to be fulfilled. Agitation on collateral questions may delay it, but the obligation of public faith, written on the face of every United States note and sacredly pledged by the act to strengthen the public credit, will give us neither peace nor assured prosperity until it is fulfilled. Public opinion may vibrate, and men and parties may array themselves against the fulfillment of these public promises, but in time they will be fulfilled, and I think the sooner the better. Pardon me for this long answer to your note, but I have no time to condense it.

"Very respectfully, "John Sherman."

Relief from the fear of the enactment of the Bland bill, and the limitation of the amount of silver dollars to be coined, removed the great impediment to the sale of four per cent. bonds, for refunding purposes, and the progress toward specie payments.

As already indicated, I had concluded to terminate the existing contract with the syndicate, and to make the sales directly through national bank depositaries, and the treasury and sub-treasuries of the United States. I therefore gave August Belmont & Co. the following notice:

"Treasury Department, January 14, 1878. "Messrs. August Belmont & Co., New York.

"Gentlemen:—In compliance with the second clause of the contract between the Secretary of the Treasury and yourselves and associates, of the date of June 9, 1877, for the sale of four per cent. bonds, I give you notice that from and after the 26th day of January instant that contract is terminated. It is the desire of the President, in which I concur, to open subscriptions in the United States to the four per cent. bonds in a different way from that provided in our contract, and therefore this notice is given. I sincerely hope to have your active co-operation in the new plan, and am disposed, if you are willing, to continue in substance, by a new contract with you, the sale of these bonds in European markets, and invite your suggestions to that end.

"Very respectfully, "John Sherman, Secretary."

I received from them the following answer:

"New York, January 15, 1878. "Hon. John Sherman, Secretary of the Treasury, Washington.

"Dear Sir:—We beg to acknowledge receipt of your favor of the 14th instant, notifying us of the termination of the contract of June 9, 1877, for the sale of four per cent. bonds, on the 29th of this month, which we have communicated to the associates here and in London.

"We have also communicated to our friends in London your willingness to continue the contract for the sale of the four per cent. bonds in Europe, with such modifications as may become necessary, and as soon as we have received their views we shall take pleasure in writing to you again for the purpose of appointing a conference on the subject.

"In the meantime, we remain, very respectfully,

"Aug. Belmont & Co."

Notice was given to Mr. Conant of the termination of the contract, but he was advised by me that we would probably agree to the continuance of the syndicate in the European markets. He had expressed to me a fear that a panic would occur about our bonds in Europe, on account of the anticipated passage of the Bland bill, but I was able to assure him that it would not become a law in the form originally proposed.

Being thus free from all existing contracts, I published the following notice inviting subscriptions to the four per cent. bonds:

"Treasury Department, } "Washington, D. C., January 16, 1878.} "The Secretary of the Treasury hereby gives notice that, from the 26th instant, and until further notice, he will receive subscriptions for the four per cent. funded loan of the United States, in denominations as stated below, at par and accrued interest, in coin.

"The bonds are redeemable July, 1907, and bear interest, payable quarterly, on the first day of January, April, July, and October, of each year, and are exempt from the payment of taxes or duties to the United States, as well as from taxation in any form by or under state, municipal, or local authority.

"The subscriptions may be made for coupon bonds of $50, $100, $500, and $1,000, and for registered bonds of $50, $100, $500, $1,000, $5,000, and $10,000.

"Two per cent. of the purchase money must accompany the subscription; the remainder may be paid at the pleasure of the purchaser, either at the time of subscription or within thirty days thereafter, with interest on the amount of the subscription, at the rate of four per cent. per annum, to date of payment.

"Upon the receipt of full payment, the bonds will be transmitted, free of charge, to the subscribers, and a commission of one-fourth of one per cent. will be allowed upon the amount of subscriptions, but no commission will be paid upon any single subscription less than $1,000.

"Forms of application will be furnished by the treasurer at Washington, the assistant treasurers at Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and San Francisco, and by the national banks and bankers generally. The applications must specify the amount and denominations required, and, for registered bonds, the full name and post office address of the person to whom the bonds shall be made payable.

"The interest on the registered bonds will be paid by check, issued by the treasurer of the United States, to the order of the holder, and mailed to his address. The check is payable on presentation, properly indorsed, at the offices of the treasurer and assistant treasurers of the United States.

"Payments for the bonds may be made in coin to the treasurer of the United States at Washington, or the assistant treasurers at Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis, and San Francisco.

"To promote the convenience of subscribers, the department will also receive, in lieu of coin, called bonds of the United States, coupons past due or maturing within thirty days, or gold certificates issued under the act of March 3, 1863, and national banks will be designated as depositaries under the provisions of section 5153, Revised Statutes of the United States, to receive deposits on account of this loan, under regulations to be hereafter prescribed.

"John Sherman, Secretary of the Treasury."

After the publication of this notice inviting subscriptions to the four per cent. bonds, I found that the chief impediment in my way was the apparent disposition of both Houses of Congress to require the called bonds to be paid in United States notes. This was not confined to any party, for, while the majority of the Democrats of each House were in favor of such payment, many of the prominent Republicans were fully committed to the same policy. I was requested by committees of the two Houses, from time to time, to appear before them, which, in compliance with the law, I cheerfully did, and found that a free and unrestricted statement of what I proposed to do was not only beneficial to the public service, but soon induced Congress not to interfere with my plans for resumption. My first interview was on the 11th of March, 1878, with the committee on coinage of the House, of which Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, was chairman. I was accompanied by H. R. Linderman, Director of the Mint. The notes of the conference were ordered by the House of Representatives to be printed, and the committee was convinced of the correctness of the statements in regard to the amount of actual coin and bullion on hand, and where it was situated, which had been previously doubted.

On the 19th of March, I had an interview with the Senate committee on finance, of which Mr. Morrill, of Vermont, was chairman. I was examined at great length and detail as to the preparations for resumption, and the actual state of the treasury at that time. The principal topic discussed was whether the four per cent. bonds could be sold, Mr. Bayard being evidently in favor of the substitution of the four and a half per cents. for the four per cent. bonds I had placed on the market. The question of how to obtain gold coin and bullion was fully considered in this interview, and here I was able to convince the committee that a purchase of domestic gold coin and bullion would meet all the requirements of the treasury, and that no necessity existed for the purchase of gold abroad. This interview, which covers over twenty printed pages, I believe entirely satisfied the committee of the expediency of the steps taken by me and their probable success. After this interview I had the assistance of the committee of finance, without regard to party, in the measures adopted by me. Mr. Bayard and Mr. Kernan gave me their hearty support, and Mr. Voorhees made no unfriendly opposition. The report of this interview was subsequently published, and had a good effect upon the popular mind.

By far the most important interview was one with the committee on banking and currency, of the House of Representatives, of which A. H. Buckner, of Missouri, was chairman. A large majority of this committee had reported a bill to repeal the resumption act, and the members of the committee of each party were among the most pronounced greenbackers in the House of Representatives. Perhaps the most aggressive was Thomas Ewing, a friend, and by marriage a relative of mine, a Member of ability and influence, and thoroughly sincere in his convictions against the policy of resumption. I was summoned before this committee to answer a series of interrogatories furnished me a few days previously, calling for statements as to the actual amount of gold and silver belonging to, and in the custody of, the treasury department on the 28th of March, where located and what deductions were to be made from it, on account of actual existing demands against it. This interview, extending through several days, and covering seventy-three printed pages, embraced every phase of the financial condition of the United States, and the policy of the treasury department in the past and in the future. At the end of the first day the principal question seemed to be whether it was possible that the United States could resume specie payments and maintain them. This led to a careful scrutiny of the amount of gold in the treasury, Mr. Ewing assuming that a portion of the amount stated was "phantom" gold, and was really not available for the purposes of resumption. I said that the United States would be, on the 1st of January, in a better condition to resume specie payments than the Bank of England was to maintain them, and gave my reasons for that opinion. I saw that Mr. Ewing regarded this statement as an exaggeration.

After the adjournment I understood that Mr. Ewing said that I was grossly in error, and that he would be able to show it by authentic documents as to the condition of the Bank of England. He said that I was laboring under delusions, which he would be able to expose at the next meeting. When we again met with the full committee present, Mr. Ewing said:

"I ask your attention to a comparison of the condition of the treasury for resumption with the condition of the Bank of England in 1819 and now, with the Bank of France this year, and with the banks of the United States in 1857 and 1861."

To this I replied:

"When I said the other day that I thought the condition of the treasury, on the 1st of January next, would be as good as the Bank of England, I had not then before the actual figures or tables, but only spoke from a general knowledge of the facts. Since then I have given the matter a good deal of attention, and now have some carefully prepared tables, founded upon late information, giving the exact comparison of the condition of the Bank of England, the Bank of France, the Bank of Germany, the Bank of Belgium, the national banks, and the treasury. These tables will show that pretty accurately."

I handed the tables to the committee, and they are printed with the report. I then proceeded to show in detail that while the Bank of England had notes outstanding to the amount of L38,698,020, it had on hand as assets: Government debt, L11,015,100; other securities, L3,984,900; gold coin and bullion, L23,698,020; that upon this it was apparent that in the issue department the Bank of England was stronger than the United States; but in the banking department, the bank was liable for deposits, the most dangerous form of liability, and various other forms of liability, to the amount of L46,277,277. To pay these it had government securities, notes and other securities and L1,032,773 gold and silver coin, in all amounting to L46,277,277. Combining these accounts it was shown that the demand liabilities on the bank were L54,639,171, while the gold and bullion on hand was only L24,730,793. Then I said: