This diminishing value of silver began to affect the coinage of the United States as early as 1811, and by 1820 the disappearance of gold was everywhere commented upon. The process by which this result is produced is a simple one, and is adopted as soon as a margin of profit is seen arising from a divergence between the mint and market ratios. In 1820 the market ratio of gold to silver was 1 to 15.7—that is, the amount of gold in a dollar (24-3/4 grains) would exchange for 15.7 times as many grains of silver in the market, in the form of bullion; while at the mint, in the form of coin, it would exchange for only 15 times as many grains of silver. A broker having 1,000 gold dollars could buy with them in the market silver bullion enough (1,000 x 15.7 grains) to have coined, when presented at the mint, 1,000 dollars in silver pieces, and yet have left over as a profit by the operation 700 grains of silver. So long as this can be done, silver (the cheapest money) will be presented at the mint, and gold (the dearest money) will become an article of merchandise too valuable to be used as money when the cheaper silver is legally as good. The best money, therefore, disappears from circulation, as it did in the United States before 1820, owing to the fall in the value of silver. It is to be said, that it has been seriously urged by some writers that silver did not fall, but that gold rose, in value, owing to the demand of England for resumption in 1819.(237) Chronology kills this view; for the change in the value of silver began too early to have been due to English measures, even if conclusive reasons have not been given above why silver should naturally have fallen in value.



Chart X. Chart showing the Changes in the Relative Values of Gold and Silver from 1501 to 1880. From 1501 to 1680 a space is allotted to each 20 years; from 1681 to 1871, to each 10 years; from 1876 to 1880, to each year.

II. The change in the relative values of gold and silver finally forced the United States to change their mint ratio in 1834. Two courses were open to us: (1) either to increase the quantity of silver in the dollar until the dollar of silver was intrinsically worth the gold in the gold dollar; or (2) debase the gold dollar-piece until it was reduced in value proportionate to the depreciation of silver since 1792. The latter expedient, without any seeming regard to the effect on contracts and the integrity of our monetary standard, was adopted: 6.589 per cent was taken out of the gold dollar, leaving it containing 23.22 grains of pure gold; and as the silver dollar remained unchanged (371-1/4 grains) the mint ratio established was 1 to 15.988, or, as commonly stated, 1 to 16. Did this correspond with the market ratio then existing? No. Having seen the former steady fall in silver, and believing that it would continue, Congress hoped to anticipate any further fall by making the mint ratio of gold to silver a little larger than the market ratio. This was done by establishing the mint ratio of 1 to 15.988, while the market ratio in 1834 was 1 to 15.73. Here, again, appeared the difficulty arising from the attempt to balance a ratio on a movable fulcrum. It will be seen that the act of 1834 set at work forces for another change in the coinage—forces of a similar kind, but working in exactly the opposite direction to those previous to 1834. A dollar of gold coin would now exchange for more grains of silver at the mint (15.98) than it would in the form of bullion in the market (15.73). Therefore it would be more profitable to put gold into coin than exchange it as bullion. Gold was sent to the mint, while silver began to be withdrawn from circulation, silver now being more valuable as bullion than as coin. By 1840 a silver dollar was worth 102 cents in gold.(238) This movement, which was displacing silver with gold, received a surprising and unexpected impetus by the gold discoveries of California and Australia in 1849, before mentioned, and made gold less valuable relatively to silver, by lowering the value of gold. Here, again, was another natural cause, independent of legislation, and not to be foreseen, altering the value of one of the precious metals, and in exactly the opposite direction from that in the previous period, when silver was lowered by the increase from the Mexican mines. In 1853 a silver dollar was worth 104 cents in gold (i.e., of a gold dollar containing 23.22 grains); but, some years before, all silver dollars had disappeared from use, and only gold was in circulation. For a large part of this period we had in reality a single standard of gold, the other metal not being able to stay in the currency.

III. After our previous experience, the impossibility of retaining both metals in the coinage together, on equal terms, now came to be generally recognized, and was accepted by Congress in the legislation of 1853. This act made no further changes intended to adapt the mint to the market ratios, but remained satisfied with the gold circulation. But hitherto no regard had been paid to the principles on which a subsidiary coinage is based, as explained by Mr. Mill in the last section ( 2). The act of 1853, while acquiescing in the single gold standard, had for its purpose the readjustment of the subsidiary coins, which, together with silver dollar-pieces, had all gone out of circulation. Before this, two halves, four quarters, or ten dimes contained the same quantity of pure silver as the dollar-piece (371-1/4 grains); therefore, when it became profitable to withdraw the dollar-pieces and substitute gold, it gave exactly the same profit to withdraw two halves or four quarters in silver. For this reason all the subsidiary silver had gone out of circulation, and there was no "small change" in the country. The legislation of 1853 rectified this error: (1) by reducing the quantity of pure silver in a dollar's worth of subsidiary coin to 345.6 grains. By making so much less an amount of silver equal to a dollar of small coins, it was more valuable in that shape than as bullion, and there was no reason for melting it, or withdrawing it (since even if gold and silver changed considerably in their relative values, 345.6 grains of silver could not easily rise sufficiently to become equal in value to a gold dollar, when 371-1/4 grains were worth only 104 cents of the gold dollar); (2) this over-valuation of silver in subsidiary coin would cause a great flow of silver to the mint, since silver would be more valuable in subsidiary coin than as bullion; but this was prevented by the provision (section 4 of the act of 1853) that the amount or the small coinage should be limited according to the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury; and, (3) in order that the overvalued small coinage might not be used for purposes other than for effecting change, its legal-tender power was restricted to payments not exceeding five dollars. This system, a single gold standard for large, and silver for small, payments, continued without question, and with great convenience, until the days of the war, when paper money (1862-1879) drove out (by its cheapness, again) both gold and silver. Paper was far cheaper than the cheapest of the two metals.



Relative values of gold and silver, by months, in 1876.

The mere fact that the silver dollar-piece had not circulated since even long before 1853 led the authorities to drop out the provisions for the coinage of silver dollars and in 1873 remove it from the list of legal coins (at the ratio of 1 to 15.98, the obsolete ratio fixed as far back as 1834). This is what is known as the "demonetization" of silver. It had no effect on the circulation of silver dollars, since none were in use, and had not been for more than twenty-five years. There had been no desire up to this time to use silver, since it was more expensive than gold; indeed, it is somewhat humiliating to our sense of national honor to reflect that it was not until silver fell so surprisingly in value (in 1876) that the agitation for its use in the coinage arose. When a silver dollar was worth 104 cents, no one wanted it as a means of liquidating debts; when it came to be worth 86 cents, it was capable of serving debtors even better than the then appreciating greenbacks. Thus, while from 1853 (and even before) we had legally two standards, of both gold and silver, but really only one, that of gold, from 1873 to 1878 we had both legally and really only one standard, that of gold.

It might be here added, that I have spoken of the silver dollar as containing 371-1/4 grains of pure silver. Of course, alloy is mixed with the pure silver, sufficient, in 1792, to make the original dollar weigh 416 grains in all, its "standard" weight. In 1837 the amount of alloy was changed from 1/12 to 1/10 of the standard weight, which (as the 371-1/4 grains of pure silver were unchanged) gave the total weight of the dollar as 412-1/2 grains, whence the familiar name assigned to this piece. In 1873, moreover, the mint was permitted to put its stamp and devices—to what was not money at all, but a "coined ingot"—on 378 grains of pure silver (420 grains, standard), known as the "trade-dollar." It was intended by this means to make United States silver more serviceable in the Asiatic trade. Oriental nations care almost exclusively for silver in payments. The Mexican silver dollar contained 377-1/4 grains of pure silver; the Japanese yen, 374-4/10; and the United States dollar, 371-1/4. By making the "trade-dollar" slightly heavier than any coin used in the Eastern world, it would give our silver a new market; and the United States Government was simply asked to certify to the fineness and weight by coining it, provided the owners of silver paid the expenses of coinage. Inadvertently the trade-dollar was included in the list of coins in the act of 1873 which were legal tender for payments of five dollars, but, when this was discovered, it was repealed in 1876. So that the trade-dollar was not a legal coin, in any sense (although it contained more silver than the 412-1/2-grains dollar). They ceased to be coined in 1878, to which time there had been made $35,959,360.

IV. In February, 1878, an indiscreet and unreasonable movement induced Congress to authorize the recoinage of the silver dollar-piece at the obsolete ratio of 1834 (1 to 15.98), while the market ratio was 1 to 17.87. So extraordinary a reversal of all sound principles and such blindness to our previous experience could be explained only by a desire to force this country to use a silver coinage only, and had its origin with the owners of silver-mines, aided by the desires of debtors for a cheap unit in which to absolve themselves from their indebtedness. There was no pretense of setting up a double standard about it; for it was evident to the most ignorant that so great a disproportion between the mint and market ratios must inevitably lead to the disappearance of gold entirely. This would happen, if owners could bring their silver freely, in any amounts, to the mint for coinage ("Free Coinage"), and so exchange silver against gold coin for the purpose of withdrawing gold, since gold would exchange for less as coin than as bullion. This immediate result was prevented by a provision in the law, which prevented the "free coinage" of silver, and required the Government itself to buy silver and coin at least $2,000,000 in silver each month. This retarded, but will not ultimately prevent, the change from the present gold to a single silver standard. At the rate of $24,000,000 a year, it is only a question of time when the Treasury will be obliged to pay out, for its regular disbursements on the public debt, silver in such amounts as will drive gold out of circulation. In February, 1884, it was feared that this was already at hand, and was practically reached in the August following. Unless a repeal of the law is reached very soon, the uncomfortable spectacle will be seen of a gradual disarrangement of prices, and consequently of trade, arising from a change of the standard.

In order that the alternate movements of silver and gold to the mint for coinage may be seen, there is appended a statement of the coinage(239) during the above periods, which well shows the effects of Gresham's law.

Ratio in the mint and in Period. Gold coinage. Silver dollars the market. coined. 1:15 (silver lower in 1792-1834 $11,825,890 $36,275,077 market) 1:15.98 (gold lower in 1834-1853 224,965,730 42,936,294 market) 1:15.98 (gold lower in 1853-1873 544,864,921 5,538,948 market) Single gold standard. 1873-1878 166,253,816 ........ 1:15.98 (silver lower, 1878-1883 354,019,865 147,255,899 but no free coinage)

From this it will be seen that there has been an enforced coinage by the Treasury, of almost twice as many silver dollars since 1878 as were coined in all the history of the mint before, since the establishment of the Government.

It may, perhaps, be asked why the silver dollar of 412-1/2 grains, being worth intrinsically only from 86 to 89 cents, does not depreciate to that value. The Government buys the silver, owns the coin, and holds all that it can not induce the public to receive voluntarily; so that but a part of the total coinage is out of the Treasury. And most of the coins issued are returned for deposit and silver certificates received in return. There being no free coinage, and no greater amount in circulation than satisfies the demand for change, instead of small bills, the dollar-pieces will circulate at their full value, on the principle of subsidiary coin, even though overvalued. And the silver certificates practically go through a process of constant redemption by being received for customs dues equally with gold. When they become too great in quantity to be needed for such purposes, then we may look for the depreciation with good reason.(240)

There are, then, the following kinds of legal tender in the United States in 1884: (1) Gold coins (if not below tolerance); (2) the silver dollar of 412-1/2 grains; (3) United States notes (except for customs and interest on the public debt); (4) subsidiary silver coinage, to the amount of five dollars; and (5) minor coins, to the amount of twenty-five cents.

The question of a double standard has provoked no little vehement discussion and has called forth a considerable literature since the fall of silver in 1876. A body of opinion exists, best represented in this country by F. A. Walker and S. D. Horton, that the relative values of gold and silver may be kept unchanged, in spite of all natural causes, by the force of law, which, provided that enough countries join in the plan, shall fix the ratio of exchange in the coinage for all great commercial countries, and by this means keep the coinage ratio equivalent to the bullion ratio. The difficulty with this scheme, even if it were wholly sufficient, has thus far been in the obstacles to international agreement. After several international monetary conferences, in 1867, 1878, and 1881, the project seems now to have been practically abandoned by all except the most sanguine. (For a fuller list of authorities on bimetallism, see Appendix I.)



Chapter VIII. Of Credit, As A Substitute For Money.



1. Credit not a creation but a Transfer of the means of Production.

Credit has a great, but not, as many people seem to suppose, a magical power; it can not make something out of nothing. How often is an extension of credit talked of as equivalent to a creation of capital, or as if credit actually were capital! It seems strange that there should be any need to point out that, credit being only permission to use the capital of another person, the means of production can not be increased by it, but only transferred. If the borrower's means of production and of employing labor are increased by the credit given him, the lender's are as much diminished. The same sum can not be used as capital both by the owner and also by the person to whom it is lent; it can not supply its entire value in wages, tools, and materials, to two sets of laborers at once. It is true that the capital which A has borrowed from B, and makes use of in his business, still forms a part of the wealth of B for other purposes; he can enter into arrangements in reliance on it, and can borrow, when needful, an equivalent sum on the security of it; so that to a superficial eye it might seem as if both B and A had the use of it at once. But the smallest consideration will show that, when B has parted with his capital to A, the use of it as capital rests with A alone, and that B has no other service from it than in so far as his ultimate claim upon it serves him to obtain the use of another capital from a third person, C.



2. In what manner it assists Production.

But, though credit is never anything more than a transfer of capital from hand to hand, it is generally, and naturally, a transfer to hands more competent to employ the capital efficiently in production. If there were no such thing as credit, or if, from general insecurity and want of confidence, it were scantily practiced, many persons who possess more or less of capital, but who from their occupations, or for want of the necessary skill and knowledge, can not personally superintend its employment, would derive no benefit from it: their funds would either lie idle, or would be, perhaps, wasted and annihilated in unskillful attempts to make them yield a profit. All this capital is now lent at interest, and made available for production. Capital thus circumstanced forms a large portion of the productive resources of any commercial country, and is naturally attracted to those producers or traders who, being in the greatest business, have the means of employing it to most advantage, because such are both the most desirous to obtain it and able to give the best security. Although, therefore, the productive funds of the country are not increased by credit, they are called into a more complete state of productive activity. As the confidence on which credit is grounded extends itself, means are developed by which even the smallest portions of capital, the sums which each person keeps by him to meet contingencies, are made available for productive uses. The principal instruments for this purpose are banks of deposit. Where these do not exist, a prudent person must keep a sufficient sum unemployed in his own possession to meet every demand which he has even a slight reason for thinking himself liable to. When the practice, however, has grown up of keeping this reserve not in his own custody, but with a banker, many small sums, previously lying idle, become aggregated in the banker's hands; and the banker, being taught by experience what proportion of the amount is likely to be wanted in a given time, and knowing that, if one depositor happens to require more than the average, another will require less, is able to lend the remainder, that is, the far greater part, to producers and dealers: thereby adding the amount, not indeed to the capital in existence, but to that in employment, and making a corresponding addition to the aggregate production of the community.

While credit is thus indispensable for rendering the whole capital of the country productive, it is also a means by which the industrial talent of the country is turned to better account for purposes of production. Many a person who has either no capital of his own, or very little, but who has qualifications for business which are known and appreciated by some possessors of capital, is enabled to obtain either advances in money, or, more frequently, goods on credit, by which his industrial capacities are made instrumental to the increase of the public wealth.

Such are, in the most general point of view, the uses of credit to the productive resources of the world. But these considerations only apply to the credit given to the industrious classes—to producers and dealers. Credit given by dealers to unproductive consumers is never an addition, but always a detriment, to the sources of public wealth. It makes over in temporary use, not the capital of the unproductive classes to the productive, but that of the productive to the unproductive.



3. Function of Credit in economizing the use of Money.

But a more intricate portion of the theory of Credit is its influence on prices; the chief cause of most of the mercantile phenomena which perplex observers. In a state of commerce in which much credit is habitually given, general prices at any moment depend much more upon the state of credit than upon the quantity of money. For credit, though it is not productive power, is purchasing power; and a person who, having credit, avails himself of it in the purchase of goods, creates just as much demand for the goods, and tends quite as much to raise their price, as if he made an equal amount of purchases with ready money.

The credit which we are now called upon to consider, as a distinct purchasing power, independent of money, is of course not credit in its simplest form, that of money lent by one person to another, and paid directly into his hands; for, when the borrower expends this in purchases, he makes the purchases with money, not credit, and exerts no purchasing power over and above that conferred by the money. The forms of credit which create purchasing power are those in which no money passes at the time, and very often none passes at all, the transaction being included with a mass of other transactions in an account, and nothing paid but a balance. This takes place in a variety of ways, which we shall proceed to examine, beginning, as is our custom, with the simplest.

First: Suppose A and B to be two dealers, who have transactions with each other both as buyers and as sellers. A buys from B on credit. B does the like with respect to A. At the end of the year, the sum of A's debts to B is set against the sum of B's debts to A, and it is ascertained to which side a balance is due. This balance, which may be less than the amount of many of the transactions singly, and is necessarily less than the sum of the transactions, is all that is paid in money; and perhaps even this is not paid, but carried over in an account current to the next year. A single payment of a hundred pounds may in this manner suffice to liquidate a long series of transactions, some of them to the value of thousands.

But, secondly: The debts of A to B may be paid without the intervention of money, even though there be no reciprocal debts of B to A. A may satisfy B by making over to him a debt due to himself from a third person, C. This is conveniently done by means of a written instrument, called a bill of exchange, which is, in fact, a transferable order by a creditor upon his debtor, and when accepted by the debtor, that is, authenticated by his signature, becomes an acknowledgment of debt.



4. Bills of Exchange.

Bills of exchange were first introduced to save the expense and risk of transporting the precious metals from place to place.

The trade between New York and Liverpool affords a constant illustration of the uses of a bill of exchange. Suppose that A in New York ships a cargo of wheat, worth $100,000, or L20,000, to B in Liverpool; also suppose that C in Liverpool (independently of the negotiations of A and B) ships, about the same time, a cargo of steel rails to D in New York, also worth L20,000. Without the use of bills of exchange, B would have been obliged to send L20,000 in gold across the Atlantic, and so would D, at the risk of loss to both. By the device of bills of exchange the goods are really bartered against each other, and all transmission of money saved.



A has money due to him in Liverpool, and he sells his claim to this money to any one who wants to make a payment in Liverpool. Going to his banker (the middle-man between exporters and importers and the one who deals in such bills) he finds there D, inquiring for some one who has a claim to money in Liverpool, since D owes C in Liverpool for his cargo of steel rails. A makes out a paper title to the L20,000 which B owes him (i.e., a bill of exchange) and by selling it to D gets immediately his L20,000 there in New York. The form in which this is done is as follows:

NEW YORK, January 1, 1884.

At sight [or sixty days after date] of this first bill of exchange (second and third unpaid), pay to the order of D [the importer of steel rails] L20,000, value received, and charge the same to the account of

[Signed] A [exporter of wheat]. To B [buyer of wheat], Liverpool, Eng.

D has now paid $100,000, or L20,000, to A for a title to money across the Atlantic in Liverpool, and with this title he can pay his debt to C for the rails. D indorses the bill of exchange, as follows:

Pay to the order of C [the seller of steel rails], Liverpool, value in account. D [importer of steel rails].

To B [the buyer of wheat].

By this means D transfers his title to the L20,000 to C, sends the bill across by mail ("first" in one steamer, "second" in another, to insure certain transmission) to C, who then calls upon B to pay him the L20,000 instead of B sending it across the Atlantic to A; and all four persons have made their payments the more safely by the use of this convenient device. This is the simplest form of the transaction, and it does not change the principle on which it is based, when, as is the case, a banker buys the bills of A, and sells the bills to D—since A typifies all exporters and D all importers.

Bills of exchange having been found convenient as means of paying debts at distant places without the expense of transporting the precious metals, their use was afterward greatly extended from another motive. It is usual in every trade to give a certain length of credit for goods bought: three months, six months, a year, even two years, according to the convenience or custom of the particular trade. A dealer who has sold goods, for which he is to be paid in six months, but who desires to receive payment sooner, draws a bill on his debtor payable in six months, and gets the bill discounted by a banker or other money-lender, that is, transfers the bill to him, receiving the amount, minus interest for the time it has still to run. It has become one of the chief functions of bills of exchange to serve as a means by which a debt due from one person can thus be made available for obtaining credit from another.

Bills of exchange are drawn between the various cities of the United States. In the West, the factor who is purchasing grain or wool for a New York firm draws on his New York correspondents, and this bill (usually certified to by the bill of lading) is presented for discount at the Western banks; and, if there are many bills, funds are possibly sent westward to meet these demands. But the purchases of the West in New York will serve, even if a little later in time, somewhat to offset this drain; and the funds will again move eastward, as goods move westward, practically bartered against each other by the use of bills. There is, however, less movement of funds of late, now that Western cities have accumulated more capital of their own.

The notes given in consequence of a real sale of goods can not be considered as on that account certainly representing any actual property. Suppose that A sells L100 worth of goods to B at six months' credit, and takes a bill at six months for it; and that B, within a month after, sells the same goods, at a like credit, to C, taking a like bill; and again, that C, after another month, sells them to D, taking a like bill, and so on. There may then, at the end of six months, be six bills of L100 each existing at the same time, and every one of these may possibly have been discounted. Of all these bills, then, only one represents any actual property.

The extent of a man's actual sales forms some limit to the amount of his real notes; and, as it is highly desirable in commerce that credit should be dealt out to all persons in some sort of regular and due proportion, the measure of a man's actual sales, certified by the appearance of his bills drawn in virtue of those sales, is some rule in the case, though a very imperfect one in many respects. When a bill drawn upon one person is paid to another (or even to the same person) in discharge of a debt or a pecuniary claim, it does something for which, if the bill did not exist, money would be required: it performs the functions of currency. This is a use to which bills of exchange are often applied.

Many bills, both domestic and foreign, are at last presented for payment quite covered with indorsements, each of which represents either a fresh discounting, or a pecuniary transaction in which the bill has performed the functions of money.



5. Promissory Notes.

A third form in which credit is employed as a substitute for currency is that of promissory notes.

The difference between a bill of exchange and a promissory note is, that the former is an order for the payment of money, while the latter is a promise to pay money. In a note the promissor is primarily liable; in a bill the drawer becomes liable only after an ineffectual resort to the drawee.

In the United States a Western merchant who buys $1,000 worth of cotton goods, for instance, of a Boston commission-house on credit, customarily gives his note for the amount, and this note is put upon the market, or presented at a bank for discount. This plan, however, puts all risk upon the one who discounted the note. In the United States such promissory notes are the forms of credit most used between merchants and buyers. The custom, however, is quite different in England and Germany (and generally, it is stated, on the Continent), where bills of exchange are employed in cases where we use a promissory note. A house in London sells $1,000 worth of cotton goods to A, in Carlisle, on a credit of sixty days, draws a bill of exchange on A, which is a demand upon A to pay in a given time (e.g., sixty days), and if "accepted" by him is a legal obligation. The London house takes this bill (perhaps adding its own firm name as indorsers to the paper), and presents it for discount at a London bank. This now explains why it is that, when a particular industry is prosperous and many goods are sold, there is more "paper" offered for discount at the banks (cf. p. 222), and why capital flows readily in that direction.

It is chiefly in the latter form [promissory notes] that it has become, in commercial countries, an express occupation to issue such substitutes for money. Dealers in money wish to lend, not their capital merely, but their credit, and not only such portion of their credit as consists of funds actually deposited with them, but their power of obtaining credit from the public generally, so far as they think they can safely employ it. This is done in a very convenient manner by lending their own promissory notes payable to bearer on demand—the borrower being willing to accept these as so much money, because the credit of the lender makes other people willingly receive them on the same footing, in purchases or other payments. These notes, therefore, perform all the functions of currency, and render an equivalent amount of money, which was previously in circulation, unnecessary. As, however, being payable on demand, they may be at any time returned on the issuer, and money demanded for them, he must, on pain of bankruptcy, keep by him as much money as will enable him to meet any claims of that sort which can be expected to occur within the time necessary for providing himself with more; and prudence also requires that he should not attempt to issue notes beyond the amount which experience shows can remain in circulation without being presented for payment.

The convenience of this mode of (as it were) coining credit having once been discovered, governments have availed themselves of the same expedient, and have issued their own promissory notes in payment of their expenses; a resource the more useful, because it is the only mode in which they are able to borrow money without paying interest.



6. Deposits and Checks.

A fourth mode of making credit answer the purposes of money, by which, when carried far enough, money may be very completely superseded, consists in making payments by checks. The custom of keeping the spare cash reserved for immediate use, or against contingent demands, in the hands of a banker, and making all payments, except small ones, by orders on bankers, is in this country spreading to a continually larger portion of the public. If the person making the payment and the person receiving it keep their money with the same banker, the payment takes place without any intervention of money, by the mere transfer of its amount in the banker's books from the credit of the payer to that of the receiver. If all persons in [New York] kept their cash at the same banker's, and made all their payments by means of checks, no money would be required or used for any transactions beginning and terminating in [New York]. This ideal limit is almost attained, in fact, so far as regards transactions between [wholesale] dealers. It is chiefly in the retail transactions between dealers and consumers, and in the payment of wages, that money or bank-notes now pass, and then only when the amounts are small. As for the merchants and larger dealers, they habitually make all payments in the course of their business by checks. They do not, however, all deal with the same banker, and, when A gives a check to B, B usually pays it not into the same but into some other bank. But the convenience of business has given birth to an arrangement which makes all the banking-houses of [a] city, for certain purposes, virtually one establishment. A banker does not send the checks which are paid into his banking-house to the banks on which they are drawn, and demand money for them. There is a building called the Clearing-House, to which every [member of the association] sends, each afternoon, all the checks on other bankers which he has received during the day, and they are there exchanged for the checks on him which have come into the hands of other bankers, the balances only being paid in money; or even these not in money, but in checks.

A clearing-house is simply a circular railing containing as many openings as there are banks in the association; a clerk from each bank presents, in the form of a bundle of checks, at his opening, all the claims of his bank against all others, and notes the total amount; a clerk inside takes the checks, distributes each check to the clerk of the bank against whom it is drawn, and all that are left at his opening constitute the total demands of all the other banks against itself; and this sum total is set off against the given bank's demands upon the others. The difference, for or against the bank, as the case may be, may then be settled by a check.(241)

The total amount of exchanges made through the New York Clearing-House in 1883 was $40,293,165,258 (or about twenty-five times the total of our national debt in that year), and the balances paid in money were only 3.9 per cent of the exchanges.(242) For valuable explanations on this subject, consult Jevons, "Money and the Mechanism of Exchange," Chapters XIX-XXIII. The explanation of the functions of a bank, Chapter XX, is very good.



Chapter IX. Influence Of Credit On Prices.



1. What acts on prices is Credit, in whatever shape given.

Having now formed a general idea of the modes in which credit is made available as a substitute for money, we have to consider in what manner the use of these substitutes affects the value of money, or, what is equivalent, the prices of commodities. It is hardly necessary to say that the permanent value of money—the natural and average prices of commodities—are not in question here. These are determined by the cost of producing or of obtaining the precious metals. An ounce of gold or silver will in the long run exchange for as much of every other commodity as can be produced or imported at the same cost with itself. And an order, or note of hand, or bill payable at sight, for an ounce of gold, while the credit of the giver is unimpaired, is worth neither more nor less than the gold itself.

It is not, however, with ultimate or average, but with immediate and temporary prices that we are now concerned. These, as we have seen, may deviate very widely from the standard of cost of production. Among other causes of fluctuation, one we have found to be the quantity of money in circulation. Other things being the same, an increase of the money in circulation raises prices; a diminution lowers them. If more money is thrown into circulation than the quantity which can circulate at a value conformable to its cost of production, the value of money, so long as the excess lasts, will remain below the standard of cost of production, and general prices will be sustained above the natural rate.

But we have now found that there are other things, such as bank-notes, bills of exchange, and checks, which circulate as money, and perform all the functions of it, and the question arises, Do these various substitutes operate on prices in the same manner as money itself? I apprehend that bank-notes, bills, or checks, as such, do not act on prices at all. What does act on prices is Credit, in whatever shape given, and whether it gives rise to any transferable instruments capable of passing into circulation or not.



2. Credit a purchasing Power, similar to Money.

Money acts upon prices in no other way than by being tendered in exchange for commodities. The demand which influences the prices of commodities consists of the money offered for them. Money not in circulation has no effect on prices.

In the case, however, of payment by checks, the purchases are, at any rate, made, though not with the money in the buyer's possession, yet with money to which he has a right. But he may make purchases with money which he only expects to have, or even only pretends to expect. He may obtain goods in return for his acceptances payable at a future time, or on his note of hand, or on a simple book-credit—that is, on a mere promise to pay. All these purchases have exactly the same effect on price as if they were made with ready money. The amount of purchasing power which a person can exercise is composed of all the money in his possession or due to him, and of all his credit. For exercising the whole of this power he finds a sufficient motive only under peculiar circumstances, but he always possesses it; and the portion of it which he at any time does exercise is the measure of the effect which he produces on price.

Suppose that, in the expectation that some commodity will rise in price, he determines not only to invest in it all his ready money, but to take up on credit, from the producers or importers, as much of it as their opinion of his resources will enable him to obtain. Every one must see that by thus acting he produces a greater effect on price than if he limited his purchases to the money he has actually in hand. He creates a demand for the article to the full amount of his money and credit taken together, and raises the price proportionally to both. And this effect is produced, though none of the written instruments called substitutes for currency may be called into existence; though the transaction may give rise to no bill of exchange, nor to the issue of a single bank-note. The buyer, instead of taking a mere book-credit, might have given a bill for the amount, or might have paid for the goods with bank-notes borrowed for that purpose from a banker, thus making the purchase not on his own credit with the seller, but on the banker's credit with the seller, and his own with the banker. Had he done so, he would have produced as great an effect on price as by a simple purchase to the same amount on a book-credit, but no greater effect. The credit itself, not the form and mode in which it is given, is the operating cause.



3. Great extensions and contractions of Credit. Phenomena of a commercial crisis analyzed.

The inclination of the mercantile public to increase their demand for commodities by making use of all or much of their credit as a purchasing power depends on their expectation of profit. When there is a general impression that the price of some commodity is likely to rise from an extra demand, a short crop, obstructions to importation, or any other cause, there is a disposition among dealers to increase their stocks in order to profit by the expected rise. This disposition tends in itself to produce the effect which it looks forward to—a rise of price; and, if the rise is considerable and progressive, other speculators are attracted, who, so long as the price has not begun to fall, are willing to believe that it will continue rising. These, by further purchases, produce a further advance, and thus a rise of price, for which there were originally some rational grounds, is often heightened by merely speculative purchases, until it greatly exceeds what the original grounds will justify. After a time this begins to be perceived, the price ceases to rise, and the holders, thinking it time to realize their gains, are anxious to sell. Then the price begins to decline, the holders rush into the market to avoid a still greater loss, and, few being willing to buy in a falling market, the price falls much more suddenly than it rose. Those who have bought at a higher price than reasonable calculation justified, and who have been overtaken by the revulsion before they had realized, are losers in proportion to the greatness of the fall and to the quantity of the commodity which they hold, or have bound themselves to pay for.

This is the ideal extreme case of what is called a commercial crisis. There is said to be a commercial crisis when a great number of merchants and traders at once either have, or apprehend that they shall have, a difficulty in meeting their engagements. The most usual cause of this general embarrassment is the recoil of prices after they have been raised by a spirit of speculation, intense in degree, and extending to many commodities. When, after such a rise, the reaction comes and prices begin to fall, though at first perhaps only through the desire of the holders to realize, speculative purchases cease; but, were this all, prices would only fall to the level from which they rose, or to that which is justified by the state of the consumption and of the supply. They fall, however, much lower; for as, when prices were rising, and everybody apparently making a fortune, it was easy to obtain almost any amount of credit, so now, when everybody seems to be losing, and many fail entirely, it is with difficulty that firms of known solidity can obtain even the credit to which they are accustomed, and which it is the greatest inconvenience to them to be without, because all dealers have engagements to fulfill, and, nobody feeling sure that the portion of his means which he has intrusted to others will be available in time, no one likes to part with ready money, or to postpone his claim to it. To these rational considerations there is superadded, in extreme cases, a panic as unreasoning as the previous over-confidence; money is borrowed for short periods at almost any rate of interest, and sales of goods for immediate payment are made at almost any sacrifice. Thus general prices, during a commercial revulsion, fall as much below the usual level as during the previous period of speculation they have risen above it; the fall, as well as the rise, originating not in anything affecting money, but in the state of credit.

Professor Jevons seriously advanced a theory that, inasmuch as the harvests of the world were the causes of good or bad trade, and that their deficiency would regularly be followed by commercial distress, then a periodic cause of bad harvests, if found, would explain the constant recurrence of commercial crises. This cause he claimed to have found in the sun-spots, which periodically deprive the crops of that source of growth which is usually furnished by the sun when no spots appear.(243) It has not received general acceptance.

In the United States financial disasters have occurred in 1814, 1819, 1825, 1837-1839, 1857, and 1873. Those of 1837 and 1873 seem to have been the most serious in their effects; but this field, so far as scientific study is concerned, has not been fully worked, and much remains to be learned about these crises in the United States. The crisis of 1873 was due to excessive railway-building. It was testified(244) concerning the New York banks in 1873 that "their capital needed for legitimate purposes was practically lent out on certain iron rails, railroad-ties, bridges, and rolling-stock, called railroads, many of them laid down in places where these materials were practically useless."

Under the effects due to swift communication by steam, but especially to the electric telegraph, modern credit is a very different thing from what it was fifty years ago. Now, a shock on the Bourse at Vienna is felt the same day at Paris, London, and New York. A commercial crisis in one great money-center is felt at every other point in the world which has business connections with it. Moreover, as Cherbuliez(245) says: "A country is more subject to crises the more advanced is its economical development. There are certain maladies which attack only grown-up persons who have reached a certain degree of vigor and maturity."



4. Influence of the different forms of Credit on Prices.

It does not, indeed, follow that credit will be more used because it can be. When the state of trade holds out no particular temptation to make large purchases on credit, dealers will use only a small portion of the credit-power, and it will depend only on convenience whether the portion which they use will be taken in one form or in another. One single exertion of the credit-power in the form of (1) book-credit, is only the foundation of a single purchase; but, if (2) a bill is drawn, that same portion of credit may serve for as many purchases as the number of times the bill changes hands; while (3) every bank-note issued renders the credit of the banker a purchasing power to that amount in the hands of all the successive holders, without impairing any power they may possess of effecting purchases on their own credit. Credit, in short, has exactly the same purchasing power with money; and as money tells upon prices not simply in proportion to its amount, but to its amount multiplied by the number of times it changes hands, so also does credit; and credit transferable from hand to hand is in that proportion more potent than credit which only performs one purchase.

There is a form of credit transactions (4) by checks on bankers, and transfers in a banker's books, which is exactly parallel in every respect to bank-notes, giving equal facilities to an extension of credit, and capable of acting on prices quite as powerfully. A bank, instead of lending its notes to a merchant or dealer, might open an account with him, and credit the account with the sum it had agreed to advance, on an understanding that he should not draw out that sum in any other mode than by drawing checks against it in favor of those to whom he had occasion to make payments. These checks might possibly even pass from hand to hand like bank-notes; more commonly, however, the receiver would pay them into the hands of his own banker, and when he wanted the money would draw a fresh check against it; and hence an objector may urge that as the original check would very soon be presented for payment, when it must be paid either in notes or in coin, notes or coin to an equal amount must be provided as the ultimate means of liquidation. It is not so, however. The person to whom the check is transferred may perhaps deal with the same banker, and the check may return to the very bank on which it was drawn.

This is very often the case in country districts; if so, no payment will be called for, but a simple transfer in the banker's books will settle the transaction. If the check is paid into a different bank, it will not be presented for payment, but liquidated by set-off against other checks; and, in a state of circumstances favorable to a general extension of banking credits, a banker who has granted more credit, and has therefore more checks drawn on him, will also have more checks on other bankers paid to him, and will only have to provide notes or cash for the payment of balances; for which purpose the ordinary reserve of prudent bankers, one third of their liabilities, will abundantly suffice.



5. On what the use of Credit depends.

The credit given to any one by those with whom he deals does not depend on the quantity of bank-notes or coin in circulation at the time, but on their opinion of his solvency. If any consideration of a more general character enters into their calculation, it is only in a time of pressure on the loan market, when they are not certain of being themselves able to obtain the credit on which they have been accustomed to rely; and even then, what they look to is the general state of the loan market, and not (preconceived theory apart) the amount of bank-notes. So far, as to the willingness to give credit. And the willingness of a dealer to use his credit depends on his expectations of gain, that is, on his opinion of the probable future price of his commodity; an opinion grounded either on the rise or fall already going on, or on his prospective judgment respecting the supply and the rate of consumption. When a dealer extends his purchases beyond his immediate means of payment, engaging to pay at a specified time, he does so in the expectation either that the transaction will have terminated favorably before that time arrives, or that he shall then be in possession of sufficient funds from the proceeds of his other transactions. The fulfillment of these expectations depends upon prices, but not specially upon the amount of bank-notes. It is obvious, however, that prices do not depend on money, but on purchases. Money left with a banker, and not drawn against, or drawn against for other purposes than buying commodities, has no effect on prices, any more than credit which is not used. Credit which is used to purchase commodities affects prices in the same manner as money. Money and credit are thus exactly on a par in their effect on prices.

It is often seen, in our large cities, that money is very plentiful, but no one seems to wish its use (that is, no one with safe securities). Inability to find investments and to find industries in which the rate of profit is satisfactory—all of which depends on the business character and activity of the people—will prevent credit from being used, no matter how many bank-notes, or greenbacks, or how much gold there is in the country. It is impossible to make people invest, simply by increasing the number of counters by which commodities are exchanged against each other; that is, by increasing the money. The reason why more credit is wanted is because men see that increased production is possible of a kind that will find other commodities ready to be offered (i.e., demand) in exchange for that production. Normal credit, therefore, on a healthy basis, increases and slackens with the activity or dullness of trade. Speculation, or the wild extension of credit, on the other hand, is apt to be begotten by a plethora of money, which has induced low rates for loans, and moves with the uncertain waves of popular impression. By normal credit we mean that the wealth represented by the credit is really at the disposal of the borrowers; in a crisis, the quantity of wealth supposed to be represented by credit is very much greater than that at the disposal of the lenders.(246)



6. What is essential to the idea of Money?

There has been a great amount of discussion and argument on the question whether several of these forms of credit, and in particular whether bank-notes, ought to be considered as money. It seems to be an essential part of the idea of money that it be legal tender. An inconvertible paper which is legal tender is universally admitted to be money; in the French language the phrase papier-monnaie actually means inconvertibility, convertible notes being merely billets a porteur. An instrument which would be deprived of all value by the insolvency of a corporation can not be money in any sense in which money is opposed to credit. It either is not money, or it is money and credit too.

It would seem, from all study of the essentials of money (Book III, Chapter IV), that the necessary part of the idea of money is that it should have value in itself. No one parts with valuable commodities for a medium of exchange which does not possess value; and we have seen that Legislatures can not control the natural value of even the precious metals by giving them legal-tender power. Much less could it be done for paper money. Paper, therefore, may, as an instrument of credit, be a substitute for money; but, in accordance with the above test, it can not properly be considered as money in the full sense. Of course, paper money, checks, etc., perform some of the functions of money equally well with the precious metals. F. A. Walker holds that anything is money which performs money-work; but he excludes checks from his catalogue of things which may serve as money. It is practically of little importance, however, what we include under money, so long as its functions are well understood; it is merely a question of nomenclature, and need not disturb us.



Chapter X. Of An Inconvertible Paper Currency.



1. What determines the value of an inconvertible paper money?

After experience had shown that pieces of paper, of no intrinsic value, by merely bearing upon them the written profession of being equivalent to a certain number of francs, dollars, or pounds, could be made to circulate as such, and to produce all the benefit to the issuers which could have been produced by the coins which they purported to represent, governments began to think that it would be a happy device if they could appropriate to themselves this benefit, free from the condition to which individuals issuing such paper substitutes for money were subject, of giving, when required, for the sign, the thing signified. They determined to try whether they could not emancipate themselves from this unpleasant obligation, and make a piece of paper issued by them pass for a pound, by merely calling it a pound, and consenting to receive it in payment of the taxes.

In the case supposed, the functions of money are performed by a thing which derives its power of performing them solely from convention; but convention is quite sufficient to confer the power; since nothing more is needful to make a person accept anything as money, and even at any arbitrary value, than the persuasion that it will be taken from him on the same terms by others. The only question is, what determines the value of such a currency, since it can not be, as in the case of gold and silver (or paper exchangeable for them at pleasure), the cost of production.

We have seen, however, that even in the case of metallic currency, the immediate agency in determining its value is its quantity. If the quantity, instead of depending on the ordinary mercantile motives of profit and loss, could be arbitrarily fixed by authority, the value would depend on the fiat of that authority, not on cost of production. The quantity of a paper currency not convertible into the metals at the option of the holder can be arbitrarily fixed, especially if the issuer is the sovereign power of the state. The value, therefore, of such a currency is entirely arbitrary.

The value of paper money is, of course, primarily and mainly dependent on the quantity issued. The general level of value depends on the quantity; but we also find that deviations from this general level, in the direction of further depreciation than could be due to quantity alone, is caused by any event which shakes the confidence of any one that he may get the existing value for his paper. The "convention" by which real value (the essential idea of money) was associated with this paper in the minds of all is thereby broken. Fiat money—that is, a piece of paper, not containing a promise to pay a dollar, but a simple declaration that this is a dollar—therefore, separates the paper from any connection with value. And yet we see that fiat money has some, although a fluctuating, value at certain times: if the State receives it for taxes, if it is a legal acquittal of obligations, then, to that extent, a certain quantity of it is given a value equal to the wealth represented by the taxes, or the debts. Jevons remarks on this point(247) that, if "the quantity of notes issued was kept within such moderate limits that any one wishing to realize the metallic value of the notes could find some one wanting to pay taxes, and therefore willing to give coin for notes," stability of value might be secured. If there is more in circulation than performs these functions, it will depreciate in the proportion of the quantity to the extent of the uses assigned to it; so that the relation of quantity to uses is the only thing which can give value to fiat money, but beyond a certain point in the issues other forces than mere quantity begin to affect the value. Although the paper is not even a promise to pay value, the form of expression on its face, or the term used as its designation, generally tends, under the force of convention and habit, to give a popular value to paper.

Although the State may not promise to pay a dollar, yet, wherever such paper money carries any purchasing power with it (which has very seldom happened, and then only for short periods), it will be found that there is a vague popular understanding that the State intends, at some time or other, to redeem the notes with value in coin to some amount. In the early cases of irredeemable money in our colonies, the income of taxes, or similar resources, were promised as a means of redemption. To some—although a slight—extent, the idea of value was associated with such paper. The actual quantity issued did not measure the depreciation. The paper did depreciate with increased issues. But only in so far as the increased issues proved to the community that there was less and less possibility of ever receiving value for them did they depreciate. In other words, we come to the familiar experience, known to many, of a paper money depending for its value on the opinions of men in the country. This was partially true, even of our own greenbacks, which were not fiat money, but promises to pay (although not then redeemable), as may be seen by the movement of the line in Chart XII (p. 359), which represents the fluctuations of our paper money during the civil war. The upward movement of the line, which indicates the premium on gold during our late war, of course represents correspondingly the depreciation of the paper. Every victory or defeat of the Union arms raised or lowered the premium on gold; it was the register of the opinion of the people as to the value to be associated with the paper. The second and third resorts to issues of greenbacks were regarded as confessions of financial distress; it was this which produced the effect on their value. It was not only the quantity but also that which caused the issue of the quantity. It is, of course, clear that the value of a paper money like the greenbacks, which were the promises to pay of a rich country, would bear a definite relation to the actual quantity issued; and this is to be seen by the generally higher level of the line on the chart, showing a steadily diminishing purchasing power as the issues increased. But the thing which weighed largely in people's minds was the possibility of ultimate redemption; and the premium on gold was practically a register of the "betting" on this possibility. In 1878, when Secretary Sherman's reserve was seen to be increasing to an effective amount, and when it became evident that he would have the means (i.e., the value represented by all the paper that was likely to be presented) to resume on the day set, January 1, 1879, the premium gradually faded away. The general shifting of the level to a lower stage in this later period was not due to any decrease in the quantity outstanding, because the contraction had been stopped in 1868, and that consequent on the resumption act in May, 1878.

Suppose that, in a country of which the currency is wholly metallic, a paper currency is suddenly issued, to the amount of half the metallic circulation; not by a banking establishment, or in the form of loans, but by the Government, in payment of salaries and purchase of commodities. The currency being suddenly increased by one half, all prices will rise, and, among the rest, the prices of all things made of gold and silver. An ounce of manufactured gold will become more valuable than an ounce of gold coin, by more than that customary difference which compensates for the value of the workmanship; and it will be profitable to melt the coin for the purpose of being manufactured, until as much has been taken from the currency by the subtraction of gold as had been added to it by the issue of paper. Then prices will relapse to what they were at first, and there will be nothing changed, except that a paper currency has been substituted for half of the metallic currency which existed before. Suppose, now, a second emission of paper; the same series of effects will be renewed; and so on, until the whole of the metallic money has disappeared [see Chart No. XIV, Chap. XV, for the exportation of gold from the United States after the issue of our paper money in 1862]: that is, if paper be issued of as low a denomination as the lowest coin; if not, as much will remain as convenience requires for the smaller payments. The addition made to the quantity of gold and silver disposable for ornamental purposes will somewhat reduce, for a time, the value of the article; and as long as this is the case, even though paper has been issued to the original amount of the metallic circulation, as much coin will remain in circulation along with it as will keep the value of the currency down to the reduced value of the metallic material; but the value having fallen below the cost of production, a stoppage or diminution of the supply from the mines will enable the surplus to be carried off by the ordinary agents of destruction, after which the metals and the currency will recover their natural value. We are here supposing, as we have supposed throughout, that the country has mines of its own, and no commercial intercourse with other countries; for, in a country having foreign trade, the coin which is rendered superfluous by an issue of paper is carried off by a much prompter method.

Mr. Mill's statement, that, if paper be not issued of as low a denomination as the lowest coin, "as much will remain as convenience requires for the smaller payments," will not hold true. During our recent experiment of depreciated paper, the depreciation was such as to drive out the subsidiary silver coins, by July, 1862, and we were forced to supply their place by a fractional paper currency. By an amendment inserted June 17, 1862, into the act authorizing a second issue of $150,000,000 of greenbacks, it was ordered "that no note shall be issued for the fractional part of a dollar, and not more than $35,000,000 shall be of lower denominations than five dollars" (act, finally passed July 11, 1862). Although there were no fractional notes, yet one-dollar notes drove out subsidiary silver, simply because the paper had depreciated to a value below that of the 345.6 grains of silver in two halves or four quarters of a dollar. By July 2d the disappearance of small coin was distinctly noted. Let the value of gold be represented by 100; and a dollar of small silver coin (345.6 grains), relatively to a gold dollar, by 96. Now, if paper depreciates to 90, relatively to gold, it will drive out the subsidiary silver at 96, in accordance with Gresham's law.

Up to this point the effects of a paper currency are substantially the same, whether it is convertible into specie or not. It is when the metals have been completely superseded and driven from circulation that the difference between convertible and inconvertible paper begins to be operative. When the gold or silver has all gone from circulation, and an equal amount of paper has taken its place, suppose that a still further issue is superadded. The same series of phenomena recommences: prices rise, among the rest the prices of gold and silver articles, and it becomes an object, as before, to procure coin, in order to convert it into bullion. There is no longer any coin in circulation; but, if the paper currency is convertible, coin may still be obtained from the issuers in exchange for notes. All additional notes, therefore, which are attempted to be forced into circulation after the metals have been completely superseded, will return upon the issuers in exchange for coin; and they will not be able to maintain in circulation such a quantity of convertible paper as to sink its value below the metal which it represents. It is not so, however, with an inconvertible currency. To the increase of that (if permitted by law) there is no check. The issuers may add to it indefinitely, lowering its value and raising prices in proportion; they may, in other words, depreciate the currency without limit.

Such a power, in whomsoever vested, is an intolerable evil. All variations in the value of the circulating medium are mischievous: they disturb existing contracts and expectations, and the liability to such changes renders every pecuniary engagement of long date entirely precarious. The person who buys for himself, or gives to another, an annuity of one [hundred dollars], does not know whether it will be equivalent to [two hundred or to fifty dollars] a few years hence. Great as this evil would be if it depended only on accident, it is still greater when placed at the arbitrary disposal of an individual or a body of individuals, who may have any kind or degree of interest to be served by an artificial fluctuation in fortunes, and who have at any rate a strong interest in issuing as much as possible, each issue being in itself a source of profit—not to add, that the issuers may have, and, in the case of a government paper, always have, a direct interest in lowering the value of the currency, because it is the medium in which their own debts are computed.

The United States Supreme Court had decided in December, 1870, by the second legal-tender decision, that the issue of greenbacks (inconvertible from 1862 to 1879) was constitutional during a time of war; but it was thought that the reissue of these notes since the war, when no war emergency could be pleaded, was unconstitutional. This view, however, was met by the unfortunate decision of the Supreme Court, delivered by Justice Gray, March, 1884, which announced the doctrine that the expediency of an issue of legal-tender paper money was to be determined solely by Congress; and that, if Congress judged the issue expedient, it was within the limits of those provisions of the Constitution (section 8), which gave Congress the means to do whatever was "necessary and proper" to carry out the powers expressly granted to it. Nothing now can prevent Congress, should it choose to do so, from issuing paper money of any description whatever, even if of absolutely no value. The disaster that might be brought upon the country by a rising tide of repudiation among debtors, taking its effect through a facile and plastic Congress (as in the case of the silver coinage in 1878), is appalling to reflect upon.



2. If regulated by the price of Bullion, as inconvertible Currency might be safe, but not Expedient.

In order that the value of the currency may be secure from being altered by design, and may be as little as possible liable to fluctuation from accident, the articles least liable of all known commodities to vary in their value, the precious metals, have been made in all civilized countries the standard of value for the circulating medium; and no paper currency ought to exist of which the value can not be made to conform to theirs. Nor has this fundamental maxim ever been entirely lost sight of, even by the governments which have most abused the power of creating inconvertible paper. If they have not (as they generally have) professed an intention of paying in specie at some indefinite future time, they have at least, by giving to their paper issues the names of their coins, made a virtual, though generally a false, profession of intending to keep them at a value corresponding to that of the coins. This is not impracticable, even with an inconvertible paper. There is not, indeed, the self-acting check which convertibility brings with it. But there is a clear and unequivocal indication by which to judge whether the currency is depreciated, and to what extent. That indication is the price of the precious metals. When holders of paper can not demand coin to be converted into bullion, and when there is none left in circulation, bullion rises and falls in price like other things; and if it is above the mint price—if an ounce of gold, which would be coined into the equivalent of [$18.60], is sold for [$20 or $25] in paper—the value of the currency has sunk just that much below what the value of a metallic currency would be. If, therefore, the issue of inconvertible paper were subjected to strict rules, one rule being that, whenever bullion rose above the mint price, the issues should be contracted until the market price of bullion and the mint price were again in accordance, such a currency would not be subject to any of the evils usually deemed inherent in an inconvertible paper.

But, also, such a system of currency would have no advantages sufficient to recommend it to adoption. An inconvertible currency, regulated by the price of bullion, would conform exactly, in all its variations, to a convertible one; and the only advantage gained would be that of exemption from the necessity of keeping any reserve of the precious metals, which is not a very important consideration, especially as a government, so long as its good faith is not suspected, need not keep so large a reserve as private issuers, being not so liable to great and sudden demands, since there never can be any real doubt of its solvency.

The United States since 1879 finds that a reserve of from $130,000,000 to $140,000,000 is a sufficient reserve for outstanding notes to the amount of $346,000,000, and greenbacks are now at a par with gold.

Against this small advantage is to be set, in the first place, the possibility of fraudulent tampering with the price of bullion for the sake of acting on the currency, in the manner of the fictitious sales of corn, to influence the averages, so much and so justly complained of while the corn laws were in force. But a still stronger consideration is the importance of adhering to a simple principle, intelligible to the most untaught capacity. Everybody can understand convertibility; every one sees that what can be at any moment exchanged for five [dollars] is worth five [dollars]. Regulation by the price of bullion is a more complex idea, and does not recommend itself through the same familiar associations. There would be nothing like the same confidence, by the public generally, in an inconvertible currency so regulated, as in a convertible one: and the most instructed person might reasonably doubt whether such a rule would be as likely to be inflexibly adhered to. The grounds of the rule not being so well understood by the public, opinion would probably not enforce it with as much rigidity, and, in any circumstances of difficulty, would be likely to turn against it; while to the Government itself a suspension of convertibility would appear a much stronger and more extreme measure than a relaxation of what might possibly be considered a somewhat artificial rule. There is therefore a great preponderance of reasons in favor of a convertible, in preference to even the best regulated inconvertible, currency. The temptation to over-issue, in certain financial emergencies, is so strong, that nothing is admissible which can tend, in however slight a degree, to weaken the barriers that restrain it.

The French Government, in the Franco-Prussian War (1870), issued inconvertible paper on this plan, as explained by Mr. Mill; but, acting through the Bank of France, they conducted their issues so successfully that the notes never depreciated more than about one half of one per cent. But this was a very rare management of inconvertible paper, since the issues were actually limited as the price of gold in paper rose above par.



3. Examination of the doctrine that an inconvertible Current is safe, if representing actual Property.

Projectors every now and then start up, with plans for curing all the economical evils of society by means of an unlimited issue of inconvertible paper. There is, in truth, a great charm in the idea. To be able to pay off the national debt, defray the expenses of government without taxation, and, in fine, to make the fortunes of the whole community, is a brilliant prospect, when once a man is capable of believing that printing a few characters on bits of paper will do it. The philosopher's stone could not be expected to do more.(248)

As these projects, however often slain, always resuscitate, it is not superfluous to examine one or two of the fallacies by which the schemers impose upon themselves. One of the commonest is, that a paper currency can not be issued in excess so long as every note issued represents property, or has a foundation of actual property to rest on. These phrases, of representing and resting, seldom convey any distinct or well-defined idea; when they do, their meaning is no more than this—that the issuers of the paper must have property, either of their own, or intrusted to them, to the value of all the notes they issue, though for what purpose does not very clearly appear; for, if the property can not be claimed in exchange for the notes, it is difficult to divine in what manner its mere existence can serve to uphold their value. I presume, however, it is intended as a guarantee that the holders would be finally reimbursed, in case any untoward event should cause the whole concern to be wound up. On this theory there have been many schemes for "coining the whole land of the country into money" and the like.

In so far as this notion has any connection at all with reason, it seems to originate in confounding two entirely distinct evils, to which a paper currency is liable. One is, the insolvency of the issuers; which, if the paper is grounded on their credit—if it makes any promise of payment in cash, either on demand or at any future time—of course deprives the paper of any value which it derives from the promise. To this evil paper credit is equally liable, however moderately used; and against it, a proviso that all issues should be "founded on property," as for instance that notes should only be issued on the security of some valuable thing, expressly pledged for their redemption, would really be efficacious as a precaution. But the theory takes no account of another evil, which is incident to the notes of the most solvent firm, company, or government; that of being depreciated in value from being issued in excessive quantity. The assignats, during the French Revolution, were an example of a currency grounded on these principles. The assignats "represented" an immense amount of highly valuable property, namely, the lands of the crown, the church, the monasteries, and the emigrants; amounting possibly to half the territory of France. They were, in fact, orders or assignments on this mass of land. The revolutionary government had the idea of "coining" these lands into money; but, to do them justice, they did not originally contemplate the immense multiplication of issues to which they were eventually driven by the failure of all other financial resources. They imagined that the assignats would come rapidly back to the issuers in exchange for land, and that they should be able to reissue them continually until the lands were all disposed of, without having at any time more than a very moderate quantity in circulation. Their hope was frustrated: the land did not sell so quickly as they expected; buyers were not inclined to invest their money in possessions which were likely to be resumed without compensation if the revolution succumbed; the bits of paper which represented land, becoming prodigiously multiplied, could no more keep up their value than the land itself would have done if it had all been brought to market at once; and the result was that it at last required an assignat of five hundred francs to pay for a cup of coffee.

The example of the assignats has been said not to be conclusive, because an assignat only represented land in general, but not a definite quantity of land. To have prevented their depreciation, the proper course, it is affirmed, would have been to have made a valuation of all the confiscated property at its metallic value, and to have issued assignats up to, but not beyond, that limit; giving to the holders a right to demand any piece of land, at its registered valuation, in exchange for assignats to the same amount. There can be no question about the superiority of this plan over the one actually adopted. Had this course been followed, the assignats could never have been depreciated to the inordinate degree they were; for—as they would have retained all their purchasing power in relation to land, however much they might have fallen in respect to other things—before they had lost very much of their market value, they would probably have been brought in to be exchanged for land. It must be remembered, however, that their not being depreciated would presuppose that no greater number of them continued in circulation than would have circulated if they had been convertible into cash. However convenient, therefore, in a time of revolution, this currency convertible into land on demand might have been, as a contrivance for selling rapidly a great quantity of land with the least possible sacrifice, it is difficult to see what advantage it would have, as the permanent system of a country, over a currency convertible into coin; while it is not at all difficult to see what would be its disadvantages, since land is far more variable in value than gold and silver; and besides, land, to most persons, being rather an incumbrance than a desirable possession, except to be converted into money, people would submit to a much greater depreciation before demanding land, than they will before demanding gold or silver.(249)

It has been said that the assignats circulated without legal-tender power. They were received by the French treasury, and a law was passed condemning a man to six years in irons for exchanging gold or silver for assignats at a greater than the nominal or face value of the latter. The subsequent issues, called mandats, did not represent land, but were directly exchangeable for the land. Even that kind of money is no more valuable than a proportional amount of tax receipts for land. In a very short time mandats were worth 1/1000 of their face value, and assignats very much less. The assignats, moreover, were not limited in quantity to the money value of the lands they represented. By 1796, 45,000,000,000 francs of assignats had been issued.



4. Experiments with paper Money in the United States.

The experience of the colonies before our Revolution is rich in warning examples of the over-issue of inconvertible paper money. Those of Rhode Island(250) and the Province of Massachusetts(251) are the most conspicuous, perhaps, because we have better knowledge of them, but other colonies suffered in as great a degree. The experience of the latter illustrates as well as any, perhaps, not only the general theory of inconvertible paper, but the device of supporting the paper by paying interest upon the notes. Although the issues since 1690 had depreciated, in 1702 L10,000 more notes were issued, because, as it was said, there was a scarcity of money. It is always noticeable that the more issues of paper money there are made, the more there is a cry of scarcity, much like the thirst of a hard drinker after the first exhilaration has passed off. On the new issues five per cent interest was paid, and even excises and imposts were set aside as security for their payment. The year 1709 saw a new expedition to Canada, and saw also the broken promises of the province, when L20,000 more notes were put out; the collection of the taxes with which to pay the notes was deferred in 1707 for two years; in 1709 deferred for four years; in 1710 for five years; in 1711 for six years. By 1712 they had depreciated thirty per cent, when the charm of legal tender was thrown around them, but to no purpose. The idea of value was not associated with them in people's minds, and they put no faith in promises. The usual result took place. People divided politically on the money question, and parties began to agitate for banks which should issue notes based on real estate, or for loans from the state to private persons at interest to be paid annually. Such facts show the train of evils following the first innocent departure from the maintenance of a currency equivalent to coin. The people forgot, or did not know, the nature of money, or the offices it performed. They did not understand that creating paper money did not create wealth. This experiment closed only in 1750 (March 31st), when the province had courage enough to resume specie payments. The effect was to transfer the West India trade from paper-issuing colonies to Massachusetts, and to produce a steady prosperity in her business interests.



Chart XI. Continental Currency, Issue and Depreciation.

The issue of paper money as a means of making a forced loan from the people, when there seem to be no other means of getting funds, has been fully illustrated in our country by the Continental currency issued during our Revolution. It is not, however, considered that this is also accompanied by a process by which every debtor takes "a forced contribution from his creditor." Congress had no power to tax, and the separate States would not do it; and this has been considered as the excuse for making issues of that well-known paper money, which has given rise to the familiar by-word for absence of value, "not worth a Continental." Without going into details,(252) in one year, 1779, Congress issued $140,000,000, worth in coin only $7,000,000. They, however, bravely declared that paper had not depreciated, but that the price of coin had gone up! Legal attempts were made to repress the premium on silver; but resolutions do not create wealth as fast as money can be printed. The depreciation went on more rapidly than the issues (see Chart No. XI, in which the black line represents the amounts of issues, and the broken line the depreciation of paper, starting at 100); and, finally, March 18, 1780, Congress decided to admit a depreciation, and resumed in silver at the rate of one dollar in silver for forty in paper.

The question of government issues(253) of paper money again came up in the United States in 1862, during the civil war, and part of our present currency is the result of the policy then adopted. The first step—the one that generally costs—however, was taken July 17, 1861, when the Treasury issued $50,000,000 of "demand notes," not bearing interest. These notes, however, were not made legal tender. They could be used in payment of salaries and other dues from the United States. It may be well to state that the Treasury balanced the arguments for and against the issues of paper at the beginning of the experiment, and we can see how these views were realized as we go along. In favor of paper issues it was urged that we could borrow a large amount without interest, as in the case of the Continental currency; that there would be no expense beyond the coin necessary for keeping the paper at par; and that the country would gain a uniform currency. On the other hand, it was seen that there might be temptations to issue without provisions for redemption; that even if a fund were kept, a disturbance of the money market would precipitate a demand for coin, and all upon this single fund; and, lastly, that there were all the dangers of over-issue. Secretary Chase(254) then decided against paper issues. Government bonds, however, did not sell, and the attempt of the banks toward the end of 1861 to carry $150,000,000 of bonds brought on a suspension of specie payments, December 31, 1861. Without any taxation policy, the country drifted along, until in a spasm of dread at seeing an empty Treasury, Congress passed the legal-tender act (February 25, 1862), issuing $150,000,000 of paper in the form of promises to pay. A committee of bankers showed that the issue could have been avoided by selling bonds at their market price; but Congress would not sell them below par. No necessity for the issues of paper need have arrived. In four months another issue of $150,000,000 was authorized (July 11, 1862); and a third issue of a like amount (March 3, 1863), in all $450,000,000. The depreciation took place (see Chart No. XII), for, as Secretary Chase anticipated, no provision was made for redemption. They were made legal tender, but this "essential idea" did not preserve their value; nor did the provision that they be received for taxes (except customs), avail for this purpose.

The effects of the depreciation were as evil as can well be imagined. (1) The expenses of the Government were increased by the rise in prices, so that (2) our national debt became hundreds of millions larger than it need have been; (3) a vicious speculation in gold began, leading to the unsettling of legitimate trade and to greater variations in prices; (4) the existence of depreciated paper later gave rise to all the dishonest schemes for paying the coin obligations of the United States in cheap issues, to the ruin of its credit and honor; and (5) it has practically become a settled part of our circulation, and a possible source of danger.

Of the whole $450,000,000, $50,000,000 were set aside as a reserve for temporary deposits; but in July, 1864, $431,000,000 were in circulation. At this time (June 30, 1864) Congress, retaining distinctly the feeling that the issue of paper was but a temporary measure, forbade any further issues. Secretary McCulloch, immediately on the close of the war, began to contract, and, by a resolution of the lower branch in Congress (December 18, 1865), a cordial concurrence in the measures for contraction was manifested. Of course, the return from the path of inflated credit and high prices was painful, and Congress began to feel the pressure of its constituents. Had they not yielded, much of the severity of the crisis of 1873 might have been avoided; but (April 12, 1866) they forbade any greater contraction than $4,000,000 a month. Here was a lack of courage not foreseen by Secretary Chase. This was again shown (February 4, 1868) by a law which absolutely forbade the Secretary to further reduce the currency, which now stood at $356,000,000. This marks an important change in the attitude of the Government, as compared with 1862. After the panic of 1873, the paper evil produced its usual effect in the cry for more money, and, as in the Province of Massachusetts in 1712, parties divided on the question of inflation or contraction. A bill to expand the Government issues to $400,000,000 (and the national-bank notes also to $400,000,000) actually passed both Houses of Congress, and we were fortunately saved from it only by the veto of President Grant (April 22, 1874). This was another landmark in the history of our paper money. Secretary Richardson, however, had already, without authority, reissued $26,000,000 of the $44,000,000 withdrawn by Secretary McCulloch, and the amount outstanding was thus $382,000,000. A compromise measure was passed (June 20, 1874), which retained this amount in the circulation.

When the resumption act was passed (January 14, 1875), the provision that, for every $100 of new national-bank notes issued, $80 of United States notes should be retired, resulted in a contraction of the latter from $382,000,000 to $346,000,000. The reason of this was, that there was no provision for the increase of United States notes when national banks withdrew their own issues; and after the crisis many banks naturally did so. The culmination of the policy of Congress came in a law (May 31, 1878) which absolutely forbade all further retirement of United States notes, and we are now left at the present time with an inelastic limit of $346,000,000. Finally, in 1877 and 1878, Secretary Sherman, aided by a most fortunate state of foreign trade, began to accumulate gold in order to carry out the provisions of the resumption act, which required him to resume specie payments on January 1, 1879. He successfully collected $133,000,000 of gold, and on December 17, 1878, the premium on gold disappeared, and resumption was accomplished quietly on the day appointed, without a jar to business.

But it is a significant fact that even after all the evils inflicted on our country by over-issues, in spite of the temptation to misuse paper money if it is in any way permitted, in spite of all the warnings of history, there seems to be a dangerous acquiescence in the presence of government paper money in our currency. It is an open pitfall, tempting to evils whenever sudden emergencies arise. It ought not to be allowed to remain any longer.



5. Examination of the gain arising from the increase and issue of paper Currency.

Another of the fallacies from which the advocates of an inconvertible currency derive support is the notion that an increase of the currency quickens industry. Mr. Attwood maintained that a rise of prices produced by an increase of paper currency stimulates every producer to his utmost exertions, and brings all the capital and labor of the country into complete employment; and that this has invariably happened in all periods of rising prices, when the rise was on a sufficiently great scale. I presume, however, that the inducement which, according to Mr. Attwood, excited this unusual ardor in all persons engaged in production must have been the expectation of getting more of commodities generally, more real wealth, in exchange for the produce of their labor, and not merely more pieces of paper. This expectation, however, must have been, by the very terms of the supposition, disappointed, since, all prices being supposed to rise equally, no one was really better paid for his goods than before. It calculates on finding the whole world persisting forever in the belief that more pieces of paper are more riches, and never discovering that, with all their paper, they can not buy more of anything than they could before. At the periods which Mr. Attwood mistook for times of prosperity, and which were simply (as all periods of high prices, under a convertible currency, must be) times of speculation, the speculators did not think they were growing rich because the high prices would last, but because they would not last, and because whoever contrived to realize while they did last would find himself, after the recoil, in possession of a greater number of [dollars], without their having become of less value.

Hume's version of the doctrine differed in a slight degree from Mr. Attwood's. He thought that all commodities would not rise in price simultaneously, and that some persons therefore would obtain a real gain, by getting more money for what they had to sell, while the things which they wished to buy might not yet have risen. And those who would reap this gain would always be (he seems to think) the first comers. It seems obvious, however, that, for every person who thus gains more than usual, there is necessarily some other person who gains less. The loser, if things took place as Hume supposes, would be the seller of the commodities which are slowest to rise; who, by the supposition, parts with his goods at the old prices, to purchasers who have already benefited by the new. This seller has obtained for his commodity only the accustomed quantity of money, while there are already some things of which that money will no longer purchase as much as before. If, therefore, he knows what is going on, he will raise his price, and then the buyer will not have the gain, which is supposed to stimulate his industry. But if, on the contrary, the seller does not know the state of the case, and only discovers it when he finds, in laying his money out, that it does not go so far, he then obtains less than the ordinary remuneration for his labor and capital; and, if the other dealer's industry is encouraged, it should seem that his must, from the opposite cause, be impaired.

An issue of notes is a manifest gain to the issuers, who, until the notes are returned for payment, obtain the use of them as if they were a real capital; and, so long as the notes are no permanent addition to the currency, but merely supersede gold or silver to the same amount, the gain of the issuer is a loss to no one; it is obtained by saving to the community the expense of the more costly material. But, if there is no gold or silver to be superseded—if the notes are added to the currency, instead of being substituted for the metallic part of it—all holders of currency lose, by the depreciation of its value, the exact equivalent of what the issuer gains. A tax is virtually levied on them for his benefit.

But besides the benefit reaped by the issuers, or by others through them, at the expense of the public generally, there is another unjust gain obtained by a larger class—namely, by those who are under fixed pecuniary obligations. All such persons are freed, by a depreciation of the currency, from a portion of the burden of their debts or other engagements; in other words, part of the property of their creditors is gratuitously transferred to them. On a superficial view it may be imagined that this is an advantage to industry; since the productive classes are great borrowers, and generally owe larger debts to the unproductive (if we include among the latter all persons not actually in business) than the unproductive classes owe to them, especially if the national debt be included. It is only thus that a general rise of prices can be a source of benefit to producers and dealers, by diminishing the pressure of their fixed burdens. And this might be accounted an advantage, if integrity and good faith were of no importance to the world, and to industry and commerce in particular.



6. Resume of the subject of money.

Before passing on to another branch of our subject, it may be a gain to clearer ideas to collect in the form of the following classification the main points discussed (in Chaps. IV to X) under money and credit, in continuance of a similar classification of value: