A merchant in the United States, A, has exported American commodities, consigning them to his correspondent, B, in England. Another merchant in England, C, has exported English commodities, suppose of equivalent value, to a merchant, D, in the United States. It is evidently unnecessary that B in England should send money to A in the United States, and that D in the United States should send an equal sum of money to C in England. The one debt may be applied to the payment of the other, and the double cost and risk of carriage be thus saved. A draws a bill on B for the amount which B owes to him: D, having an equal amount to pay in England, buys this bill from A, and sends it to C, who, at the expiration of the number of days which the bill has to run, presents it to B for payment. Thus the debt due from England to the United States, and the debt due from the United States to England, are both paid without sending an ounce of gold or silver from one country to the other.(274)



This implies (if we exclude for the present any other international payments than those occurring in the course of commerce) that the exports and imports exactly pay for one another, or, in other words, that the equation of international demand is established. When such is the fact, the international transactions are liquidated without the passage of any money from one country to the other. But, if there is a greater sum due from the United States to England than is due from England to the United States, or vice versa, the debts can not be simply written off against one another. After the one has been applied, as far as it will go, toward covering the other, the balance must be transmitted in the precious metals. In point of fact, the merchant who has the amount to pay will even then pay for it by a bill. When a person has a remittance to make to a foreign country, he does not himself search for some one who has money to receive from that country, and ask him for a bill of exchange. In this, as in other branches of business, there is a class of middle-men or brokers, who bring buyers and sellers together, or stand between them, buying bills from those who have money to receive, and selling bills to those who have money to pay. When a customer comes to a broker for a bill on Paris or Amsterdam, the broker sells to him perhaps the bill he may himself have bought that morning from a merchant, perhaps a bill on his own correspondent in the foreign city; and, to enable his correspondent to pay, when due, all the bills he has granted, he remits to him all those which he has bought and has not resold. In this manner these brokers take upon themselves the whole settlement of the pecuniary transactions between distant places, being remunerated by a small commission or percentage on the amount of each bill which they either sell or buy. Now, if the brokers find that they are asked for bills, on the one part, to a greater amount than bills are offered to them on the other, they do not on this account refuse to give them; but since, in that case, they have no means of enabling the correspondents on whom their bills are drawn to pay them when due, except by transmitting part of the amount in gold or silver, they require from those to whom they sell bills an additional price, sufficient to cover the freight and insurance of the gold and silver, with a profit sufficient to compensate them for their trouble and for the temporary occupation of a portion of their capital. This premium (as it is called) the buyers are willing to pay, because they must otherwise go to the expense of remitting the precious metals themselves, and it is done cheaper by those who make doing it a part of their especial business. But, though only some of those who have a debt to pay would have actually to remit money, all will be obliged, by each other's competition, to pay the premium; and the brokers are for the same reason obliged to pay it to those whose bills they buy. The reverse of all this happens, if, on the comparison of exports and imports, the country, instead of having a balance to pay, has a balance to receive. The brokers find more bills offered to them than are sufficient to cover those which they are required to grant. Bills on foreign countries consequently fall to a discount; and the competition among the brokers, which is exceedingly active, prevents them from retaining this discount as a profit for themselves, and obliges them to give the benefit of it to those who buy the bills for purposes of remittance.

When the United States had the same number of dollars to pay to England which England had to pay to her, one set of merchants in the United States would want bills, and another set would have bills to dispose of, for the very same number of dollars; and consequently a bill on England for $1,000 would sell for exactly $1,000, or, in the phraseology of merchants, the exchange would be at par. As England also, on this supposition, would have an equal number of dollars to pay and to receive, bills on the United States would be at par in England, whenever bills on England were at par in the United States.

If, however, the United States had a larger sum to pay to England than to receive from her, there would be persons requiring bills on England for a greater number of dollars than there were bills drawn by persons to whom money was due. A bill on England for $1,000 would then sell for more than $1,000, and bills would be said to be at a premium. The premium, however, could not exceed the cost and risk of making the remittance in gold, together with a trifling profit; because, if it did, the debtor would send the gold itself, in preference to buying the bill.

If, on the contrary, the United States had more money to receive from England than to pay, there would be bills offered for a greater number of dollars than were wanted for remittance, and the price of bills would fall below par: a bill for $1,000 might be bought for somewhat less than $1,000, and bills would be said to be at a discount.

When the United States has more to pay than to receive, England has more to receive than to pay, and vice versa. When, therefore, in the United States, bills on England bear a premium, then, in England, bills on the United States are at a discount; and, when bills on England are at a discount in the United States, bills on the United States are at a premium in England. If they are at par in either country, they are so, as we have already seen, in both.(275)

Thus do matters stand between countries, or places which have the same currency. So much of barbarism, however, still remains in the transactions of the most civilized nations, that almost all independent countries choose to assert their nationality by having, to their own inconvenience and that of their neighbors, a peculiar currency of their own. To our present purpose this makes no other difference than that, instead of speaking of equal sums of money, we have to speak of equivalent sums. By equivalent sums, when both currencies are composed of the same metal, are meant sums which contain exactly the same quantity of the metal, in weight and fineness.

The quantity of gold in the English pound is equivalent to $4.8666+ of our gold coins. If the bills offered are about equal to those wanted, a claim to a pound in England will sell for $4.86. If many are wanted, and but few to be had, their price will go up, of course; but it can not go more than a small fraction beyond $4.90, since about 3-1/4 cents is sufficient to cover the brokerage, insurance, and freight per pound sterling in a shipment of gold to London. Therefore, in order to get money to a creditor in London, no one will pay more for a pound in the form of a bill than he will be obliged to pay for sending it across in the form of bullion. Bills of exchange, then, can not rise in price beyond the point ($4.90 +) since, rather than pay a higher sum for a bill, gold will be sent. This point is called the "shipping-point" of gold. When the exchanges are at $4.90, it will be found that gold is going abroad. On the other hand, when the supply of bills is greater than the demand, their price will fall. A man having a bill on London to sell—i.e., a claim to a pound in London—will not sell it at a price here lower than $4.86, by more than the expense of bringing the gold itself across. Since this expense is about 3-1/4 cents, bills can not fall below about $4.83. When exchange is at that price, it will be found that gold is coming to the United States from England. This price is the "shipping-point" for imports of gold. This, of course, applies to sight-bills only.

Formerly, we computed exchange on a scale of percentages, the real par being about 109. This was given up after the war.

When bills on foreign countries are at a premium, it is customary to say that the exchanges are against the country, or unfavorable to it. In order to understand these phrases, we must take notice of what "the exchange," in the language of merchants, really means. It means the power which the money of the country has of purchasing the money of other countries. Supposing $4.86 to be the exact par of exchange, then when it requires more than $1,000 to buy a bill of L205, $1,000 of American money are worth less than their real equivalent of English money: and this is called an exchange unfavorable to the United States. The only persons in the United States, however, to whom it is really unfavorable are those who have money to pay in England, for they come into the bill market as buyers, and have to pay a premium; but to those who have money to receive in England the same state of things is favorable; for they come as sellers and receive the premium. The premium, however, indicates that a balance is due by the United States, which must be eventually liquidated in the precious metals; and since, according to the old theory, the benefit of a trade consisted in bringing money into the country, this prejudice introduced the practice of calling the exchange favorable when it indicated a balance to receive, and unfavorable when it indicated one to pay; and the phrases in turn tended to maintain the prejudice.



2. Distinction between Variations in the Exchanges which are self-adjusting and those which can only be rectified through Prices.

It might be supposed at first sight that when the exchange is unfavorable, or, in other words, when bills are at a premium, the premium must always amount to a full equivalent for the cost of transmitting money. But a small excess of imports above exports, or any other small amount of debt to be paid to foreign countries, does not usually affect the exchanges to the full extent of the cost and risk of transporting bullion. The length of credit allowed generally permits, on the part of some of the debtors, a postponement of payment, and in the mean time the balance may turn the other way, and restore the equality of debts and credits without any actual transmission of the metals. And this is the more likely to happen, as there is a self-adjusting power in the variations of the exchange itself. Bills are at a premium because a greater money value has been imported than exported. But the premium is itself an extra profit to those who export. Besides the price they obtain for their goods, they draw for the amount and gain the premium. It is, on the other hand, a diminution of profit to those who import. Besides the price of the goods, they have to pay a premium for remittance. So that what is called an unfavorable exchange is an encouragement to export, and a discouragement to import. And if the balance due is of small amount, and is the consequence of some merely casual disturbance in the ordinary course of trade, it is soon liquidated in commodities, and the account adjusted by means of bills, without the transmission of any bullion. Not so, however, when the excess of imports above exports, which has made the exchange unfavorable, arises from a permanent cause. In that case, what disturbed the equilibrium must have been the state of prices, and it can only be restored by acting on prices. It is impossible that prices should be such as to invite to an excess of imports, and yet that the exports should be kept permanently up to the imports by the extra profit on exportation derived from the premium on bills; for, if the exports were kept up to the imports, bills would not be at a premium, and the extra profit would not exist. It is through the prices of commodities that the correction must be administered.

Disturbances, therefore, of the equilibrium of imports and exports, and consequent disturbances of the exchange, may be considered as of two classes: the one casual or accidental, which, if not on too large a scale, correct themselves through the premium on bills, without any transmission of the precious metals; the other arising from the general state of prices, which can not be corrected without the subtraction of actual money from the circulation of one of the countries, or an annihilation of credit equivalent to it.

It remains to observe that the exchanges do not depend on the balance of debts and credits with each country separately, but with all countries taken together. The United States may owe a balance of payments to England; but it does not follow that the exchange with England will be against the United States, and that bills on England will be at a premium; because a balance may be due to the United States from Holland or Hamburg, and she may pay her debts to England with bills on those places; which is technically called arbitration of exchange. There is some little additional expense, partly commission and partly loss of interest in settling debts in this circuitous manner, and to the extent of that small difference the exchange with one country may vary apart from that with others.

A common use of bills of exchange is that by which, when three countries are concerned, two of them may strike a balance through the third, if both countries have dealings with that third country. New York merchants may buy of China, but China may not be buying of New York, although both may have dealings with London.



A, we will suppose, is a buyer of L1,000 worth of tea from F, in Hong-Kong; B is an exporter of wheat (L1,000) to C in London; D has sent L1,000 worth of cotton goods to E in Hong-Kong. A can now pay F through London without the transmission of coin. A buys B's claim on C for L1,000, and sends it to F. E wishes to pay D in London for the cotton goods he bought of him; therefore, he buys from F for L1,000 the claim he now holds (i.e., a bill of exchange on London) against C for L1,000. E sends it to D, and, when D collects it from C, the whole circle of exchanges is completed without the transmission of the precious metals.



Chapter XVII. Of The Distribution Of The Precious Metals Through The Commercial World.



1. The substitution of money for barter makes no difference in exports and imports, nor in the Law of international Values.

Having now examined the mechanism by which the commercial transactions between nations are actually conducted, we have next to inquire whether this mode of conducting them makes any difference in the conclusions respecting international values, which we previously arrived at on the hypothesis of barter.

The nearest analogy would lead us to presume the negative. We did not find that the intervention of money and its substitutes made any difference in the law of value as applied to adjacent places. Things which would have been equal in value if the mode of exchange had been by barter are worth equal sums of money. The introduction of money is a mere addition of one more commodity, of which the value is regulated by the same laws as that of all other commodities. We shall not be surprised, therefore, if we find that international values also are determined by the same causes under a money and bill system as they would be under a system of barter, and that money has little to do in the matter, except to furnish a convenient mode of comparing values.

All interchange is, in substance and effect, barter; whoever sells commodities for money, and with that money buys other goods, really buys those goods with his own commodities. And so of nations: their trade is a mere exchange of exports for imports; and, whether money is employed or not, things are only in their permanent state when the exports and imports exactly pay for each other. When this is the case, equal sums of money are due from each country to the other, the debts are settled by bills, and there is no balance to be paid in the precious metals. The trade is in a state like that which is called in mechanics a condition of stable equilibrium.

But the process by which things are brought back to this state when they happen to deviate from it is, at least outwardly, not the same in a barter system and in a money system. Under the first, the country which wants more imports than its exports will pay for must offer its exports at a cheaper rate, as the sole means of creating a demand for them sufficient to re-establish the equilibrium. When money is used, the country seems to do a thing totally different. She takes the additional imports at the same price as before, and, as she exports no equivalent, the balance of payments turns against her; the exchange becomes unfavorable, and the difference has to be paid in money. This is, in appearance, a very distinct operation from the former. Let us see if it differs in its essence, or only in its mechanism.

Let the country which has the balance to pay be the United States,(276) and the country which receives it, England. By this transmission of the precious metals, the quantity of the currency is diminished in the United States, and increased in England. This I am at liberty to assume. We are now supposing that there is an excess of imports over exports, arising from the fact that the equation of international demand is not yet established: that there is at the ordinary prices a permanent demand in the United States for more English goods than the American goods required in England at the ordinary prices will pay for. When this is the case, if a change were not made in the prices, there would be a perpetually renewed balance to be paid in money. The imports require to be permanently diminished, or the exports to be increased, which can only be accomplished through prices; and hence, even if the balances are at first paid from hoards, or by the exportation of bullion, they will reach the circulation at last, for, until they do, nothing can stop the drain.

When, therefore, the state of prices is such that the equation of international demand can not establish itself, the country requiring more imports than can be paid for by the exports, it is a sign that the country has more of the precious metals, or their substitutes, in circulation, than can permanently circulate, and must necessarily part with some of them before the balance can be restored. The currency is accordingly contracted: prices fall, and, among the rest, the prices of exportable articles; for which, accordingly, there arises, in foreign countries, a greater demand: while imported commodities have possibly risen in price, from the influx of money into foreign countries, and at all events have not participated in the general fall. But, until the increased cheapness of American goods induces foreign countries to take a greater pecuniary value, or until the increased dearness (positive or comparative) of foreign goods makes the United States take a less pecuniary value, the exports of the United States will be no nearer to paying for the imports than before, and the stream of the precious metals which had begun to flow out of the United States will still flow on. This efflux will continue until the fall of prices in the United States brings within reach of the foreign market some commodity which the United States did not previously send thither; or, until the reduced price of the things which she did send has forced a demand abroad for a sufficient quantity to pay for the imports, aided perhaps by a reduction of the American demand for foreign goods, through their enhanced price, either positive or comparative.

Now, this is the very process which took place on our original supposition of barter. Not only, therefore, does the trade between nations tend to the same equilibrium between exports and imports, whether money is employed or not, but the means by which this equilibrium is established are essentially the same. The country whose exports are not sufficient to pay for her imports offers them on cheaper terms, until she succeeds in forcing the necessary demand: in other words, the equation of international demand, under a money system as well as under a barter system, is the law of international trade. Every country exports and imports the very same things, and in the very same quantity, under the one system as under the other. In a barter system, the trade gravitates to the point at which the sum of the imports exactly exchanges for the sum of the exports: in a money system, it gravitates to the point at which the sum of the imports and the sum of the exports exchange for the same quantity of money. And, since things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another, the exports and imports which are equal in money price would, if money were not used, precisely exchange for one another.(277)



2. The preceding Theorem further illustrated.

Let us proceed to [examine] to what extent the benefit of an improvement in the production of an exportable article is participated in by the countries importing it.

The improvement may either consist in the cheapening of some article which was already a staple production of the country, or in the establishment of some new branch of industry, or of some process rendering an article exportable which had not till then been exported at all. It will be convenient to begin with the case of a new export, as being somewhat the simpler of the two.

The first effect is that the article falls in price, and a demand arises for it abroad. This new exportation disturbs the balance, turns the exchanges, money flows into the country (which we shall suppose to be the United States), and continues to flow until prices rise. This higher range of prices will somewhat check the demand in foreign countries for the new article of export; and will diminish the demand which existed abroad for the other things which the United States was in the habit of exporting. The exports will thus be diminished; while at the same time the American public, having more money, will have a greater power of purchasing foreign commodities. If they make use of this increased power of purchase, there will be an increase of imports; and by this, and the check to exportation, the equilibrium of imports and exports will be restored. The result to foreign countries will be, that they have to pay dearer than before for their other imports, and obtain the new commodity cheaper than before, but not so much cheaper as the United States herself does. I say this, being well aware that the article would be actually at the very same price (cost of carriage excepted) in the United States and in other countries. The cheapness, however, of the article is not measured solely by the money-price, but by that price compared with the money-incomes of the consumers. The price is the same to the American and to the foreign consumers; but the former pay that price from money-incomes which have been increased by the new distribution of the precious metals; while the latter have had their money-incomes probably diminished by the same cause. The trade, therefore, has not imparted to the foreign consumer the whole, but only a portion, of the benefit which the American consumer has derived from the improvement; while the United States has also benefited in the prices of foreign commodities. Thus, then, any industrial improvement which leads to the opening of a new branch of export trade benefits a country not only by the cheapness of the article in which the improvement has taken place, but by a general cheapening of all imported products.

Let us now change the hypothesis, and suppose that the improvement, instead of creating a new export from the United States, cheapens an existing one. Let the commodity in which there is an improvement be [cotton] cloth. The first effect of the improvement is that its price falls, and there is an increased demand for it in the foreign market. But this demand is of uncertain amount. Suppose the foreign consumers to increase their purchases in the exact ratio of the cheapness, or, in other words, to lay out in cloth the same sum of money as before; the same aggregate payment as before will be due from foreign countries to the United States; the equilibrium of exports and imports will remain undisturbed, and foreigners will obtain the full advantage of the increased cheapness of cloth. But if the foreign demand for cloth is of such a character as to increase in a greater ratio than the cheapness, a larger sum than formerly will be due to the United States for cloth, and when paid will raise American prices, the price of cloth included; this rise, however, will affect only the foreign purchaser, American incomes being raised in a corresponding proportion; and the foreign consumer will thus derive a less advantage than the United States from the improvement. If, on the contrary, the cheapening of cloth does not extend the foreign demand for it in a proportional degree, a less sum of debts than before will be due to the United States for cloth, while there will be the usual sum of debts due from the United States to foreign countries; the balance of trade will turn against the United States, money will be exported, prices (that of cloth included) will fall, and cloth will eventually be cheapened to the foreign purchaser in a still greater ratio than the improvement has cheapened it to the United States. These are the very conclusions which [would be] deduced on the hypothesis of barter.(278)

The result of the preceding discussion can not be better summed up than in the words of Ricardo.(279) "Gold and silver having been chosen for the general medium of circulation, they are, by the competition of commerce, distributed in such proportions among the different countries of the world as to accommodate themselves to the natural traffic which would take place if no such metals existed, and the trade between countries were purely a trade of barter." Of this principle, so fertile in consequences, previous to which the theory of foreign trade was an unintelligible chaos, Mr. Ricardo, though he did not pursue it into its ramifications, was the real originator.

On the principles of trade which we have before explained, the same rule will apply to the distribution of money in different parts of the same country, especially of a large country with various kinds of production, like the United States. The medium of exchange will, by the competition of commerce, be distributed in such proportions among the different parts of the United States, by natural laws, as to accommodate itself to the number of transactions which would take place if no such medium existed. For this reason, we find more money in the so-called great financial centers, because there are more exchanges of goods there. In sparsely settled parts of the West there will be less money precisely because there are fewer transactions than in the older and more settled districts. So that there could be no worse folly than the following legislation of Congress to distribute the national-bank circulation: "That $150,000,000 of the entire amount of circulating notes authorized to be issued shall be apportioned to associations in the States, in the District of Columbia, and in the Territories, according to representative population" (act of March 3, 1865).



3. The precious metals, as money, are of the same Value, and distribute themselves according to the same Law, with the precious metals as a Commodity.

It is now necessary to inquire in what manner this law of the distribution of the precious metals by means of the exchanges affects the exchange value of money itself; and how it tallies with the law by which we found that the value of money is regulated when imported as a mere article of merchandise.

The causes which bring money into or carry it out of a country (1) through the exchanges, to restore the equilibrium of trade, and which thereby raise its value in some countries and lower it in others, are the very same causes on which the local value of money would depend, if it were never imported except (2) as a merchandise, and never except directly from the mines. When the value of money in a country is permanently lowered (1) [as a medium of exchange] by an influx of it through the balance of trade, the cause, if it is not diminished cost of production, must be one of those causes which compel a new adjustment, more favorable to the country, of the equation of international demand—namely, either an increased demand abroad for her commodities, or a diminished demand on her part for those of foreign countries. Now, an increased foreign demand for the commodities of a country, or a diminished demand in the country for imported commodities, are the very causes which, on the general principles of trade, enable a country to purchase all imports, and consequently (2) the precious metals, at a lower value. There is, therefore, no contradiction, but the most perfect accordance, in the results of the two different modes [(1) as a medium of exchange; and (2) as merchandise] in which the precious metals may be obtained. When money [as a medium of exchange] flows from country to country in consequence of changes in the international demand for commodities, and by so doing alters its own local value, it merely realizes, by a more rapid process, the effect which would otherwise take place more slowly by an alteration in the relative breadth of the streams by which the precious metals [as merchandise] flow into different regions of the earth from the mining countries. As, therefore, we before saw that the use of money as a medium of exchange does not in the least alter the law on which the values of other things, either in the same country or internationally, depend, so neither does it alter the law of the value of the precious metals itself; and there is in the whole doctrine of international values, as now laid down, a unity and harmony which are a strong collateral presumption of truth.



4. International payments entering into the "financial account."

Before closing this discussion, it is fitting to point out in what manner and degree the preceding conclusions are affected by the existence of international payments not originating in commerce, and for which no equivalent in either money or commodities is expected or received—such as a tribute, or remittances, or interest to foreign creditors, or a government expenditure abroad.

To begin with the case of barter. The supposed annual remittances being made in commodities, and being exports for which there is to be no return, it is no longer requisite that the imports and exports should pay for one another; on the contrary, there must be an annual excess of exports over imports, equal to the value of the remittance. If, before the country became liable to the annual payment, foreign commerce was in its natural state of equilibrium, it will now be necessary, for the purpose of effecting the remittances, that foreign countries should be induced to take a greater quantity of exports than before, which can only be done by offering those exports on cheaper terms, or, in other words, by paying dearer for foreign commodities. The international values will so adjust themselves that, either by greater exports or smaller imports, or both, the requisite excess on the side of exports will be brought about, and this excess will become the permanent state. The result is, that a country which makes regular payments to foreign countries, besides losing what it pays, loses also something more, by the less advantageous terms on which it is forced to exchange its productions for foreign commodities.

The same results follow on the supposition of money. Commerce being supposed to be in a state of equilibrium when the obligatory remittances begin, the first remittance is necessarily made in money. This lowers prices in the remitting country, and raises them in the receiving. The natural effect is, that more commodities are exported than before, and fewer imported, and that, on the score of commerce alone, a balance of money will be constantly due from the receiving to the paying country. When the debt thus annually due to the tributary country becomes equal to the annual tribute or other regular payment due from it, no further transmission of money takes place; the equilibrium of exports and imports will no longer exist, but that of payments will; the exchange will be at par, the two debts will be set off against one another, and the tribute or remittance will be virtually paid in goods. The result to the interests of the two countries will be as already pointed out—the paying country will give a higher price for all that it buys from the receiving country, while the latter, besides receiving the tribute, obtains the exportable produce of the tributary country at a lower price.

It has been seen, as in Chart No. XIII, that, considering the exports and imports merely as merchandise, there is, in fact, no actual equilibrium at any given time in accordance with the equation of International Demand. Another element, the "financial account" between the United States and foreign countries, must be considered before we can know all the factors necessary to bring about the equation. If we had been borrowing largely of England, Holland, and Germany, we should owe a regular annual sum as interest, and our exports must, as a rule, be exactly that much more (under right and normal conditions) than the imports. Or, take another case, if capital is borrowed in Europe for railways in the United States, this capital generally comes over in the form of imports of various kinds; but, if our exports are not sufficient at once to balance the increased imports, we go in debt for a time—or, in other words, in order to establish the balance, we send United States securities abroad instead of actual exports. This shipment of securities is not seen and recorded as among the exports; and so we find a period, like that during and after the war, from 1862 to 1873, of a vast excess of imports. Since 1873 the country has been practically paying the indebtedness incurred in the former period; and there has been a vast excess of exports over imports, and an apparent discrepancy in the equilibrium. But our government bonds and other securities have been coming back to us, producing a return current to balance the excessive exports.(280) In brief, the use of securities and various forms of indebtedness permits the period of actual payment to be deferred, so that an excess of imports at one time may be offset by an excess of exports at another, and generally a later, time. Moreover, the large expenses of people traveling in Europe will require us to remit abroad in the form of exports more than would ordinarily balance our imports by the amount spent by the travelers. The financial operations, therefore, between the United States and foreign countries, must be well considered in striking the equation between our exports and imports. As formulated by Mr. Cairnes,(281) the Equation of International Demand should be stated more broadly, as follows: "The state of international demand which results in commercial equilibrium is realized when the reciprocal demand of trading countries produces such a relation of exports and imports among them as enables each country by means of her exports to discharge all her foreign liabilities." If we were a great lending instead of a great borrowing country, we should have, as a rule, a permanent excess of imports.



Chapter XVIII. Influence Of The Currency On The Exchanges And On Foreign Trade.



1. Variations in the exchange, which originate in the Currency.

In our inquiry into the laws of international trade, we commenced with the principles which determine international exchanges and international values on the hypothesis of barter. We next showed that the introduction of money, as a medium of exchange, makes no difference in the laws of exchanges and of values between country and country, no more than between individual and individual: since the precious metals, under the influence of those same laws, distribute themselves in such proportions among the different countries of the world as to allow the very same exchanges to go on, and at the same values, as would be the case under a system of barter. We lastly considered how the value of money itself is affected by those alterations in the state of trade which arise from alterations either in the demand and supply of commodities or in their cost of production. It remains to consider the alterations in the state of trade which originate not in commodities but in money.

Gold and silver may vary like other things, though they are not so likely to vary as other things in their cost of production. The demand for them in foreign countries may also vary. It may increase by augmented employment of the metals for purposes of art and ornament, or because the increase of production and of transactions has created a greater amount of business to be done by the circulating medium. It may diminish, for the opposite reasons; or, from the extension of the economizing expedients by which the use of metallic money is partially dispensed with. These changes act upon the trade between other countries and the mining countries, and upon the value of the precious metals, according to the general laws of the value of imported commodities: which have been set forth in the previous chapters with sufficient fullness.

What I propose to examine in the present chapter is not those circumstances affecting money which alter the permanent conditions of its value, but the effects produced on international trade by casual or temporary variations in the value of money, which have no connection with any causes affecting its permanent value.



2. Effect of a sudden increase of a metallic Currency, or of the sudden creation of Bank-Notes or other substitutes for Money.

Let us suppose in any country a circulating medium purely metallic, and a sudden casual increase made to it; for example, by bringing into circulation hoards of treasure, which had been concealed in a previous period of foreign invasion or internal disorder. The natural effect would be a rise of prices. This would check exports and encourage imports; the imports would exceed the exports, the exchanges would become unfavorable, and a newly acquired stock of money would diffuse itself over all countries with which the supposed country carried on trade, and from them, progressively, through all parts of the commercial world. The money which thus overflowed would spread itself to an equal depth over all commercial countries. For it would go on flowing until the exports and imports again balanced one another; and this (as no change is supposed in the permanent circumstances of international demand) could only be when the money had diffused itself so equally that prices had risen in the same ratio in all countries, so that the alteration of price would be for all practical purposes ineffective, and the exports and imports, though at a higher money valuation, would be exactly the same as they were originally. This diminished value of money throughout the world (at least if the diminution was considerable) would cause a suspension, or at least a diminution, of the annual supply from the mines, since the metal would no longer command a value equivalent to its highest cost of production. The annual waste would, therefore, not be fully made up, and the usual causes of destruction would gradually reduce the aggregate quantity of the precious metals to its former amount; after which their production would recommence on its former scale. The discovery of the treasure would thus produce only temporary effects; namely, a brief disturbance of international trade until the treasure had disseminated itself through the world, and then a temporary depression in the value of the metal below that which corresponds to the cost of producing or of obtaining it; which depression would gradually be corrected by a temporarily diminished production in the producing countries and importation in the importing countries.

The same effects which would thus arise from the discovery of a treasure accompany the process by which bank-notes, or any of the other substitutes for money, take the place of the precious metals. Suppose(282) that the United States possessed a currency, wholly metallic, of $200,000,000, and that suddenly $200,000,000 of bank-notes were sent into circulation. If these were issued by bankers, they would be employed in loans, or in the purchase of securities, and would therefore create a sudden fall in the rate of interest, which would probably send a great part of the $200,000,000 of gold out of the country as capital, to seek a higher rate of interest elsewhere, before there had been time for any action on prices. But we will suppose that the notes are not issued by bankers, or money-lenders of any kind, but by manufacturers, in the payment of wages and the purchase of materials, or by the Government [as, e.g., greenbacks] in its ordinary expenses, so that the whole amount would be rapidly carried into the markets for commodities. The following would be the natural order of consequences: All prices would rise greatly. Exportation would almost cease; importation would be prodigiously stimulated. A great balance of payments would become due, the exchanges would turn against the United States, to the full extent of the cost of exporting money; and the surplus coin would pour itself rapidly forth, over the various countries of the world, in the order of their proximity, geographically and commercially, to the United States.

A study of Chart No. XIV will show how exactly this description fits the case of our country, when the rise of prices stimulated imports of merchandise (see Chart No. XIII) in 1862, and sent gold out of the country.

The efflux would continue until the currencies of all countries had come to a level; by which I do not mean, until money became of the same value everywhere, but until the differences were only those which existed before, and which corresponded to permanent differences in the cost of obtaining it. When the rise of prices had extended itself in an equal degree to all countries, exports and imports would everywhere revert to what they were at first, would balance one another, and the exchanges would return to par. If such a sum of money as $200,000,000, when spread over the whole surface of the commercial world, were sufficient to raise the general level in a perceptible degree, the effect would be of no long duration. No alteration having occurred in the general conditions under which the metals were procured, either in the world at large or in any part of it, the reduced value would no longer be remunerating, and the supply from the mines would cease partially or wholly, until the $200,000,000 were absorbed.(283)

Effects of another kind, however, will have been produced: $200,000,000, which formerly existed in the unproductive form of metallic money, have been converted into what is, or is capable of becoming, productive capital. This gain is at first made by the United States at the expense of other countries, who have taken her superfluity of this costly and unproductive article off her hands, giving for it an equivalent value in other commodities. By degrees the loss is made up to those countries by diminished influx from the mines, and finally the world has gained a virtual addition of $200,000,000 to its productive resources. Adam Smith's illustration, though so well known, deserves for its extreme aptness to be once more repeated. He compares the substitution of paper in the room of the precious metals to the construction of a highway through the air, by which the ground now occupied by roads would become available for agriculture. As in that case a portion of the soil, so in this a part of the accumulated wealth of the country, would be relieved from a function in which it was only employed in rendering other soils and capitals productive, and would itself become applicable to production; the office it previously fulfilled being equally well discharged by a medium which costs nothing.

The value saved to the community by thus dispensing with metallic money is a clear gain to those who provide the substitute. They have the use of $200,000,000 of circulating medium which have cost them only the expense of an engraver's plate. If they employ this accession to their fortunes as productive capital, the produce of the country is increased and the community benefited, as much as by any other capital of equal amount. Whether it is so employed or not depends, in some degree, upon the mode of issuing it. If issued by the Government, and employed in paying off debt, it would probably become productive capital. The Government, however, may prefer employing this extraordinary resource in its ordinary expenses; may squander it uselessly, or make it a mere temporary substitute for taxation to an equivalent amount; in which last case the amount is saved by the tax-payers at large, who either add it to their capital or spend it as income. When [a part of the] paper currency is supplied, as in our own country, by banking companies, the amount is almost wholly turned into productive capital; for the issuers, being at all times liable to be called upon to refund the value, are under the strongest inducements not to squander it, and the only cases in which it is not forthcoming are cases of fraud or mismanagement. A banker's profession being that of a money-lender, his issue of notes is a simple extension of his ordinary occupation. He lends the amount to farmers, manufacturers, or dealers, who employ it in their several businesses. So employed, it yields, like any other capital, wages of labor, and profits of stock. The profit is shared between the banker, who receives interest, and a succession of borrowers, mostly for short periods, who, after paying the interest, gain a profit in addition, or a convenience equivalent to profit. The capital itself in the long run becomes entirely wages, and, when replaced by the sale of the produce, becomes wages again; thus affording a perpetual fund, of the value of $200,000,000, for the maintenance of productive labor, and increasing the annual produce of the country by all that can be produced through the means of a capital of that value. To this gain must be added a further saving to the country, of the annual supply of the precious metals necessary for repairing the wear and tear, and other waste, of a metallic currency.

The substitution, therefore, of paper for the precious metals should always be carried as far as is consistent with safety, no greater amount of metallic currency being retained than is necessary to maintain, both in fact and in public belief, the convertibility of the paper.

But since gold wanted for exportation is almost invariably drawn from the reserves of the banks, and is never likely to be taken directly from the circulation while the banks remain solvent, the only advantage which can be obtained from retaining partially a metallic currency for daily purposes is, that the banks may occasionally replenish their reserves from it.



3. Effect of the increase of an inconvertible paper Currency. Real and nominal exchange.

When metallic money had been entirely superseded and expelled from circulation, by the substitution of an equal amount of bank-notes, any attempt to keep a still further quantity of paper in circulation must, if the notes are convertible [into gold], be a complete failure.

This brings up the whole question at issue between the "Currency Principle" and the "Banking Principle." The latter, maintained by Fullerton, Wilson, Price, and Tooke (in his later writings), held that, if notes were convertible, the value of notes could not differ from the value of the metal into which they were convertible; while the former, advocated by Lord Overstone, G. W. Norman, Colonel Torrens, Tooke (in his earlier writings), and Sir Robert Peel, implied that even a convertible paper was liable to over-issues. This last school brought about the Bank Act of 1844.(284)

[A] new issue would again set in motion the same train of consequences by which the gold coin had already been expelled. The metals would, as before, be required for exportation, and would be for that purpose demanded from the banks, to the full extent of the superfluous notes, which thus could not possibly be retained in circulation. If, indeed, the notes were inconvertible, there would be no such obstacle to the increase in their quantity. An inconvertible paper acts in the same way as a convertible, while there remains any coin for it to supersede; the difference begins to manifest itself when all the coin is driven from circulation (except what may be retained for the convenience of small change), and the issues still go on increasing. When the paper begins to exceed in quantity the metallic currency which it superseded, prices of course rise; things which were worth $25 in metallic money become worth $30 in inconvertible paper, or more, as the case may be. But this rise of price will not, as in the cases before examined, stimulate import and discourage export. The imports and exports are determined by the metallic prices of things, not by the paper prices; and it is only when the paper is exchangeable at pleasure for the metals that paper prices and metallic prices must correspond.

Let us suppose that the United States is the country which has the depreciated paper. Suppose that some American production could be bought, while the currency was still metallic, for $25, and sold in England for $27.50, the difference covering the expense and risk, and affording a profit to the merchant. On account of the depreciation, this commodity will now cost in the United States $30, and can not be sold in England for more than $27.50, and yet it will be exported as before. Why? Because the $27.50 which the exporter can get for it in England is not depreciated paper, but gold or silver; and since in the United States bullion has risen in the same proportion with other things—if the merchant brings the gold or silver to the United States, he can sell his $27.50 [in coin] for $33 [in paper], and obtain as before 10 per cent for profit and expenses.

It thus appears that a depreciation of the currency does not affect the foreign trade of the country: this is carried on precisely as if the currency maintained its value. But, though the trade is not affected, the exchanges are. When the imports and exports are in equilibrium, the exchange, in a metallic currency, would be at par; a bill on England for the equivalent of $25 would be worth $25. But $25, or the quantity of gold contained in them, having come to be worth in the United States $30, it follows that a bill on England for $25 will be worth $30. When, therefore, the real exchange is at par, there will be a nominal exchange against the country of as much per cent as the amount of the depreciation. If the currency is depreciated 10, 15, or 20 per cent, then in whatever way the real exchange, arising from the variations of international debts and credits, may vary, the quoted exchange will always differ 10, 15, or 20 per cent from it. However high this nominal premium may be, it has no tendency to send gold out of the country for the purpose of drawing a bill against it and profiting by the premium; because the gold so sent must be procured, not from the banks and at par, as in the case of a convertible currency, but in the market, at an advance of price equal to the premium. In such cases, instead of saying that the exchange is unfavorable, it would be a more correct representation to say that the par has altered, since there is now required a larger quantity of American currency to be equivalent to the same quantity of foreign. The exchanges, however, continue to be computed according to the metallic par. The quoted exchanges, therefore, when there is a depreciated currency, are compounded of two elements or factors: (1) the real exchange, which follows the variations of international payments, and (2) the nominal exchange, which varies with the depreciation of the currency, but which, while there is any depreciation at all, must always be unfavorable. Since the amount of depreciation is exactly measured by the degree in which the market price of bullion exceeds the mint valuation, we have a sure criterion to determine what portion of the quoted exchange, being referable to depreciation, may be struck off as nominal, the result so corrected expressing the real exchange.

The same disturbance of the exchanges and of international trade which is produced by an increased issue of convertible bank-notes is in like manner produced by those extensions of credit which, as was so fully shown in a preceding chapter, have the same effect on prices as an increase of the currency. Whenever circumstances have given such an impulse to the spirit of speculation as to occasion a great increase of purchases on credit, money prices rise, just as much as they would have risen if each person who so buys on credit had bought with money. All the effects, therefore, must be similar. As a consequence of high prices, exportation is checked and importation stimulated; though in fact the increase of importation seldom waits for the rise of prices which is the consequence of speculation, inasmuch as some of the great articles of import are usually among the things in which speculative overtrading first shows itself. There is, therefore, in such periods, usually a great excess of imports over exports; and, when the time comes at which these must be paid for, the exchanges become unfavorable and gold flows out of the country. This efflux of gold takes effect on prices [by withdrawing gold from the reserves of the banks, and so by stopping loans and the use of credit, or purchasing power]: its effect is to make them recoil downward. The recoil once begun, generally becomes a total rout, and the unusual extension of credit is rapidly exchanged for an unusual contraction of it. Accordingly, when credit has been imprudently stretched, and the speculative spirit carried to excess, the turn of the exchanges and consequent pressure on the banks to obtain gold for exportation are generally the proximate cause of the catastrophe.

A glance at Chart No. XIII will give illustration to the situation here described. After the war, and until 1873, while the United States was under the influence of high prices and a speculation which has been seldom equaled in our history, the resulting great excess of imports became very striking. It was an unhealthy and abnormal condition of trade. The sudden reversal of the trade by the crisis in 1873 is equally striking, and, as prices fell, exports began to increase. The effect on international trade of a collapse of credit is thus clearly marked by the lines on the chart.



Chapter XIX. Of The Rate Of Interest.



1. The Rate of Interest depends on the Demand and Supply of Loans.

The two topics of Currency and Loans, though in themselves distinct, are so intimately blended in the phenomena of what is called the money market, that it is impossible to understand the one without the other, and in many minds the two subjects are mixed up in the most inextricable confusion.

In the preceding book(285) we defined the relation in which interest stands to profit. We found that the gross profit of capital might be distinguished into three parts, which are respectively the remuneration for risk, for trouble, and for the capital itself, and may be termed insurance, wages of superintendence, and interest. After making compensation for risk, that is, after covering the average losses to which capital is exposed either by the general circumstances of society or by the hazards of the particular employment, there remains a surplus, which partly goes to repay the owner of the capital for his abstinence, and partly the employer of it for his time and trouble. How much goes to the one and how much to the other is shown by the amount of the remuneration which, when the two functions are separated, the owner of capital can obtain from the employer for its use. This is evidently a question of demand and supply. Nor have demand and supply any different meaning or effect in this case from what they have in all others. The rate of interest will be such as to equalize the demand for loans with the supply of them. It will be such that, exactly as much as some people are desirous to borrow at that rate, others shall be willing to lend. If there is more offered than demanded, interest will fall; if more is demanded than offered, it will rise; and in both cases, to the point at which the equation of supply and demand is re-established.

The desire to borrow and the willingness to lend are more or less influenced by every circumstance which affects the state or prospects of industry or commerce, either generally or in any of their branches. The rate of interest, therefore, on good security, which alone we have here to consider (for interest in which considerations of risk bear a part may swell to any amount), is seldom, in the great centers of money transactions, precisely the same for two days together; as is shown by the never-ceasing variations in the quoted prices of the funds and other negotiable securities. Nevertheless, there must be, as in other cases of value, some rate which (in the language of Adam Smith and Ricardo) may be called the natural rate; some rate about which the market rate oscillates, and to which it always tends to return. This rate partly depends on the amount of accumulation going on in the hands of persons who can not themselves attend to the employment of their savings, and partly on the comparative taste existing in the community for the active pursuits of industry, or for the leisure, ease, and independence of an annuitant.



2. Circumstances which Determine the Permanent Demand and Supply of Loans.

In [ordinary] circumstances, the more thriving producers and traders have their capital fully employed, and many are able to transact business to a considerably greater extent than they have capital for. These are naturally borrowers: and the amount which they desire to borrow, and can give security for, constitutes the demand for loans on account of productive employment. To these must be added the loans required by Government, and by land-owners, or other unproductive consumers who have good security to give. This constitutes the mass of loans for which there is an habitual demand.

Now, it is conceivable that there might exist, in the hands of persons disinclined or disqualified for engaging personally in business, (1) a mass of capital equal to, and even exceeding, this demand. In that case there would be an habitual excess of competition on the part of lenders, and the rate of interest would bear a low proportion to the rate of profit. Interest would be forced down to the point which would either tempt borrowers to take a greater amount of loans than they had a reasonable expectation of being able to employ in their business, or would so discourage a portion of the lenders as to make them either forbear to accumulate or endeavor to increase their income by engaging in business on their own account, and incurring the risks, if not the labors, of industrial employment.

The low rates of interest, rather, tempt people to take some additional risk, and enter into investments which offer a higher rate of dividends; so that a period of low interest is a time when speculative enterprises find victims, and then by bad and worthless investments much of the loanable funds is actually lost; thereby reducing the total quantity of loans more nearly to that demand which will give an ordinary rate of interest.

(2.) On the other hand, the capital owned by persons who prefer lending it at interest, or whose avocations prevent them from personally superintending its employment, may be short of the habitual demand for loans. It may be in great part absorbed by the investments afforded by the public debt and by mortgages, and the remainder may not be sufficient to supply the wants of commerce. If so, the rate of interest will be raised so high as in some way to re-establish the equilibrium. When there is only a small difference between interest and profit, many borrowers may no longer be willing to increase their responsibilities and involve their credit for so small a remuneration: or some, who would otherwise have engaged in business, may prefer leisure, and become lenders instead of borrowers: or others, under the inducement of high interest and easy investment for their capital, may retire from business earlier, and with smaller fortunes, than they otherwise would have done.

Or, lastly, instead of [capital] being afforded by persons not in business, the affording it may itself become a business. A portion of the capital employed in trade may be supplied by a class of professional money-lenders. These money-lenders, however, must have more than a mere interest; they must have the ordinary rate of profit on their capital, risk and all other circumstances being allowed for. [For] it can never answer, to any one who borrows for the purposes of his business, to pay a full profit for capital from which he will only derive a full profit: and money-lending, as an employment, for the regular supply of trade, can not, therefore, be carried on except by persons who, in addition to their own capital, can lend their credit, or, in other words, the capital of other people. A bank which lends its notes lends capital which it borrows from the community, and for which it pays no interest.

Of late years, however, banks are generally not permitted to issue notes on their simple credit. That privilege has been so often abused in this country that now, in the national banking system, a separate part of the resources are set aside for the security of the circulating notes (as is also true of the Bank of England since 1844). It is not generally true, then, that banks now create the means to make loans by issuing notes by which they borrow capital from the community without paying interest. They do, however, depend almost entirely on deposits.

A bank of deposit lends capital which it collects from the community in small parcels, sometimes without paying any interest, and, if it does pay interest, it still pays much less than it receives; for the depositors, who in any other way could mostly obtain for such small balances no interest worth taking any trouble for, are glad to receive even a little. Having this subsidiary resource, bankers are enabled to obtain, by lending at interest, the ordinary rate of profit on their own capital. The disposable capital deposited in banks, together with the funds belonging to those who, either from necessity or preference, live upon the interest of their property, constitute the general loan fund of the country; and the amount of this aggregate fund, when set against the habitual demands of producers and dealers, and those of the Government and of unproductive consumers, determines the permanent or average rate of interest, which must always be such as to adjust these two amounts to one another.(286) But, while the whole of this mass of lent capital takes effect upon the permanent rate of interest, the fluctuations depend almost entirely upon the portion which is in the hands of bankers; for it is that portion almost exclusively which, being lent for short times only, is continually in the market seeking an investment. The capital of those who live on the interest of their own fortunes has generally sought and found some fixed investment, such as the public funds, mortgages, or the bonds of public companies, which investment, except under peculiar temptations or necessities, is not changed.



3. Circumstances which Determine the Fluctuations.

Fluctuations in the rate of interest arise from variations either in the demand for loans or in the supply. The supply is liable to variation, though less so than the demand. The willingness to lend is greater than usual at the commencement of a period of speculation, and much less than usual during the revulsion which follows. In speculative times, money-lenders as well as other people are inclined to extend their business by stretching their credit; they lend more than usual (just as other classes of dealers and producers employ more than usual) of capital which does not belong to them. Accordingly, these are the times when the rate of interest is low; though for this too (as we shall immediately see) there are other causes. During the revulsion, on the contrary, interest always rises inordinately, because, while there is a most pressing need on the part of many persons to borrow, there is a general disinclination to lend.(287)

This disinclination, when at its extreme point, is called a panic. It occurs when a succession of unexpected failures has created in the mercantile, and sometimes also in the non-mercantile public, a general distrust in each other's solvency; disposing every one not only to refuse fresh credit, except on very onerous terms, but to call in, if possible, all credit which he has already given. Deposits are withdrawn from banks; notes are returned on the issuers in exchange for specie; bankers raise their rate of discount, and withhold their customary advances; merchants refuse to renew mercantile bills. At such times the most calamitous consequences were formerly experienced from the attempt of the law to prevent more than a certain limited rate of interest from being given or taken. Persons who could not borrow at five per cent had to pay, not six or seven, but ten or fifteen per cent, to compensate the lender for risking the penalties of the law; or had to sell securities or goods for ready money at a still greater sacrifice.

The pernicious and hurtful custom exists in various States in this country of making any interest beyond a certain rate illegal. When it is remembered that legitimate business is often largely done on credit—until the proceeds of goods sold on credit are collected—the rate of interest from day to day is very important to trade. So, when there is a sudden demand for loans, a rate higher than the legal one will certainly be paid, and the law violated, if the getting of a loan is absolutely necessary to save the borrower from commercial ruin. The effect of a legal rate is to stop loans at the very time when loans are most essential to the business public. It would be far better to adopt such a sliding scale as exists at great European banks, which allows the rate of interest to rise with the demand. No one, then, with good security, need want loans if he is willing to pay the high rates; and those not really in need will defer their demand until the sudden emergency is past. Already in New York the legal penalty has been removed for loaning at higher than the legal rates when charged upon call-loans; and it has mitigated the extreme fluctuations of the rate in a market when financial necessity is contending against the law.

Except at such periods, the amount of capital disposable on loan is subject to little other variation than that which arises from the gradual process of accumulation; which process, however, in the great commercial countries, is sufficiently rapid to account for the almost periodical recurrence of these fits of speculation; since, when a few years have elapsed without a crisis, and no new and tempting channel for investment has been opened in the mean time, there is always found to have occurred in those few years so large an increase of capital seeking investment as to have lowered considerably the rate of interest, whether indicated by the prices of securities or by the rate of discount on bills; and this diminution of interest tempts the possessors to incur hazards in hopes of a more considerable return.

The demand for loans varies much more largely than the supply, and embraces longer cycles of years in its aberrations. A time of war, for example, is a period of unusual draughts on the loan market. The Government, at such times, generally incurs new loans, and, as these usually succeed each other rapidly as long as the war lasts, the general rate of interest is kept higher in war than in peace, without reference to the rate of profit, and productive industry is stinted of its usual supplies.

The United States during the late war found that it could not borrow at even six or seven per cent. By receiving depreciated paper at par for its bonds it really agreed to pay six gold dollars on each loan of one hundred dollars in paper (worth, perhaps, at the worst only forty gold dollars), which was equivalent to fifteen per cent. This high rate was largely due to the weakened credit of the Government; but still it remains true that the rate was higher because the United States was in the market as a competitor for large loans. Now the Government can refund its bonds at three per cent.

Nor does the influence of these loans altogether cease when the Government ceases to contract others; for those already contracted continue to afford an investment for a greatly increased amount of the disposable capital of the country, which, if the national debt were paid off, would be added to the mass of capital seeking investment, and (independently of temporary disturbance) could not but, to some extent, permanently lower the rate of interest.

The rapid payment of the public debt by the United States, $137,823,253 in 1882-1883, and more than $100,000,000 in 1883-1884, has taken away the former investment for enormous sums of loanable funds, and to the same extent increased the supply in the market. Without doubt this aids in making the present rate of interest a very low one. Whether the rate will remain "permanently lower," however, will depend upon whether the field of investment in the United States is already practically occupied. We believe it is not.

The same effect on interest which is produced by government loans for war expenditure is produced by the sudden opening of any new and generally attractive mode of permanent investment. The only instance of the kind in recent history, on a scale comparable to that of the war loans, is the absorption of capital in the construction of railways. This capital must have been principally drawn from the deposits in banks, or from savings which would have gone into deposit, and which were destined to be ultimately employed in buying securities from persons who would have employed the purchase-money in discounts or other loans at interest: in either case, it was a draft on the general loan fund. It is, in fact, evident that, unless savings were made expressly to be employed in railway adventure, the amount thus employed must have been derived either from the actual capital of persons in business or from capital which would have been lent to persons in business.



4. The Rate of Interest not really Connected with the value of Money, but often confounded with it.

From the preceding considerations it would be seen, even if it were not otherwise evident, how great an error it is to imagine that the rate of interest bears any necessary relation to the quantity or value of the money in circulation. An increase of the currency has in itself no effect, and is incapable of having any effect, on the rate of interest. A paper currency issued by Government in the payment of its ordinary expenses, in however great excess it may be issued, affects the rate of interest in no manner whatever. It diminishes, indeed, the power of money to buy commodities, but not the power of money to buy money. If a hundred dollars will buy a perpetual annuity of four dollars a year, a depreciation which makes the hundred dollars worth only half as much as before has precisely the same effect on the four dollars, and therefore can not alter the relation between the two. Unless, indeed, it is known and reckoned upon that the depreciation will only be temporary; for people certainly might be willing to lend the depreciated currency on cheaper terms if they expected to be repaid in money of full value.

In considering the effect produced by the proceedings of banks in encouraging the excesses of speculation, an immense effect is usually attributed to their issues of notes, but until of late hardly any attention was paid to the management of their deposits, though nothing is more certain than that their imprudent extensions of credit take place more frequently by means of their deposits than of their issues. Says Mr. Tooke: "Supposing all the deposits received by a banker to be in coin, is he not, just as much as the issuing banker, exposed to the importunity of customers, whom it may be impolitic to refuse, for loans or discounts, or to be tempted by a high interest; and may he not be induced to encroach so much upon his deposits as to leave him, under not improbable circumstances, unable to meet the demands of his depositors?"

In truth, the most difficult questions of banking center around the functions of discount and deposit. The separation of the Issue from the Banking Department by the act of 1844, which renewed the charter of the Bank of England, makes this perfectly clear. After entirely removing from their effect on credit all influences due to issues, England has had the same difficulties to encounter as before, which shows that the real question is concerned with the two essential functions of banking—discount and deposit. Since 1844, there have been the commercial disturbances of 1847, 1857, 1866, and 1873. Although no expansion of notes, without a corresponding deposit of specie, is possible.



5. The Rate of Interest determines the price of land and of Securities.

Before quitting the general subject of this chapter, I will make the obvious remark that the rate of interest determines the value and price of all those salable articles which are desired and bought, not for themselves, but for the income which they are capable of yielding. The public funds, shares in joint-stock companies, and all descriptions of securities, are at a high price in proportion as the rate of interest is low. They are sold at the price which will give the market rate of interest on the purchase-money, with allowance for all differences in the risk incurred, or in any circumstance of convenience.

The price of land, mines, and all other fixed sources of income, depends in like manner on the rate of interest. Land usually sells at a higher price, in proportion to the income afforded by it, than the public funds, not only because it is thought, even in [England], to be somewhat more secure, but because ideas of power and dignity are associated with its possession. But these differences are constant, or nearly so; and, in the variations of price, land follows, caeteris paribus, the permanent (though, of course, not the daily) variations of the rate of interest. When interest is low, land will naturally be dear; when interest is high, land will be cheap.

A lot of land, which fifty years ago gave an annual return of $100, if ten per cent was then the common rate of interest, would sell for $1,000. If the return from the land remains the same ($100) to-day, and if the usual rate of interest is now five per cent, the same piece of land, therefore, would sell for $2,000, since $100 is five per cent of $2,000.

The price of a bond, it may be said, also varies with the time it has to run. At the same rate of interest, a bond running for a long term of years is better for an investment than one for a short term. The lumberman, who looks at two trees of equal diameter at the base, estimates the total value of each according to the height of the tree. Then, again, a bond running for a short term may be worth less than one for a long term, even though the first bears a higher rate of interest. That is, to resume the illustration, one tree, not rising very high, although larger at the bottom, may not contain so many square feet as another, with perhaps a less diameter at the bottom, but which stretches much higher up into the air.



Chapter XX. Of The Competition Of Different Countries In The Same Market.



1. Causes which enable one Country to undersell another.

In the phraseology of the Mercantile System, there is no word of more frequent recurrence or more perilous import than the word underselling. To undersell other countries—not to be undersold by other countries—were spoken of, and are still very often spoken of, almost as if they were the sole purposes for which production and commodities exist.

Nations may, like individual dealers, be competitors, with opposite interests, in the markets of some commodities, while in others they are in the more fortunate relation of reciprocal customers. The benefit of commerce does not consist, as it was once thought to do, in the commodities sold; but, since the commodities sold are the means of obtaining those which are bought, a nation would be cut off from the real advantage of commerce, the imports, if it could not induce other nations to take any of its commodities in exchange; and in proportion as the competition of other countries compels it to offer its commodities on cheaper terms, on pain of not selling them at all, the imports which it obtains by its foreign trade are procured at greater cost.

One country (A) can only undersell another (B) in a given market, to the extent of entirely expelling her from it, on two conditions: (1) In the first place, she (A) must have a greater advantage than the second country (B) in the production of the article exported by both; meaning by a greater advantage (as has been already so fully explained) not absolutely, but in comparison with other commodities; and (2) in the second place, such must be her (A's) relation with the customer-country in respect to the demand for each other's products, and such the consequent state of international values, as to give away to the customer-country more than the whole advantage possessed by the rival country (B); otherwise the rival will still be able to hold her ground in the market.

Let us suppose a trade between England and the United States, in iron and wheat. England being capable of producing ten cwts. of iron at the same cost as fifteen bushels of wheat, the United States at the same cost as twenty bushels, and the two commodities being exchanged between the two countries (cost of carriage apart) at some intermediate rate, say ten for seventeen. The United States could not be permanently undersold in the English market, and expelled from it, unless by a country (such as India) which offered not merely more than seventeen, but more than twenty bushels of wheat for ten cwts. of iron. Short of that, the competition would only oblige the United States to pay dearer for iron, but would not disable her from exporting wheat. The country, therefore, which could undersell the United States, must, in the first place, be able to produce wheat at less cost, compared with iron, than the United States herself; and, in the next place, must have such a demand for iron, or other English commodities, as would compel her, even when she became sole occupant of the market, to give a greater advantage to England than the United States could give by resigning the whole of hers; to give, for example, twenty-one bushels for ten cwts. For if not—if, for example, the equation of international demand, after the United States was excluded, gave a ratio of eighteen for ten—the United States would be now the underselling nation; and there would be a point, perhaps nineteen for ten, at which both countries would be able to maintain their ground, and to sell in England enough wheat to pay for the iron, or other English commodities, for which, on these newly adjusted terms of interchange, they had a demand. In like manner, England, as an exporter of iron, could only be driven from the American market by some rival whose superior advantages in the production of iron enabled her, and the intensity of whose demand for American produce compelled her, to offer ten cwts. of iron, not merely for less than seventeen bushels of wheat, but for less than fifteen. In that case, England could no longer carry on the trade without loss; but, in any case short of this, she would merely be obliged to give to the United States more iron for less wheat than she had previously given.(288)

It thus appears that the alarm of being permanently undersold may be taken much too easily; may be taken when the thing really to be anticipated is not the loss of the trade, but the minor inconvenience of carrying it on at a diminished advantage; an inconvenience chiefly falling on the consumers of foreign commodities, and not on the producers or sellers of the exported article. It is no sufficient ground of apprehension to the [American] producers, to find that some other country can sell [wheat] in foreign markets, at some particular time, a trifle cheaper than they can themselves afford to do in the existing state of prices in [the United States]. Suppose them to be temporarily unsold, and their exports diminished; the imports will exceed the exports, there will be a new distribution of the precious metals, prices will fall, and, as all the money expenses of the [American] producers will be diminished, they will be able (if the case falls short of that stated in the preceding paragraph) again to compete with their rivals.

The loss which [the United States] will incur will not fall upon the exporters, but upon those who consume imported commodities; who, with money incomes reduced in amount, will have to pay the same or even an increased price for all things produced in foreign countries.

But the business world would regard what was going on under economic laws as a great and dreaded disaster, if it meant that prices were to fall, and gold leave the country. Those holding large stocks of goods would for that time suffer; and so, at first, it might really happen that "exporters," in the sense of exporting agents (not the producers, perhaps, of the exportable article), would incur a loss. In the end, of course, the consumers of imports suffer. But, temporarily, and on the face of it, exporters do lose.



2. High wages do not prevent one Country from underselling another.

According to the preceding doctrine, a country can not be undersold in any commodity, unless the rival country has a stronger inducement than itself for devoting its labor and capital to the production of the commodity; arising from the fact that by doing so it occasions a greater saving of labor and capital, to be shared between itself and its customers—a greater increase of the aggregate produce of the world. The underselling, therefore, though a loss to the undersold country, is an advantage to the world at large; the substituted commerce being one which economizes more of the labor and capital of mankind, and adds more to their collective wealth, than the commerce superseded by it. The advantage, of course, consists in being able to produce the commodity of better quality, or with less labor (compared with other things); or perhaps not with less labor, but in less time; with a less prolonged detention of the capital employed. This may arise from greater natural advantages (such as soil, climate, richness of mines); superior capability, either natural or acquired, in the laborers; better division of labor, and better tools, or machinery. But there is no place left in this theory for the case of lower wages. This, however, in the theories commonly current, is a favorite cause of underselling. We continually hear of the disadvantage under which the [American] producer labors, both in foreign markets and even in his own, through the lower wages paid by his foreign rivals. These lower wages, we are told, enable, or are always on the point of enabling, them to sell at lower prices, and to dislodge the [American] manufacturer from all markets in which he is not artificially protected.

It will be remembered that, as we have before seen, international trade, in actual practice, depends on comparative prices within the same country (even though the exporter may not consciously make a comparison). We send wheat abroad, because it is low in price relatively to certain manufactured goods; that is, we send the wheat, but we do not send the manufactured goods. But, so far, this is considering only the comparative prices in the same country. Yet we shall fail to realize in actual practice the application of the above principles, when we use the terms prices and money, if we do not admit that there is in the matter of underselling a comparison, also, between the absolute price of the goods in one country and the absolute price of the same goods in the competing country. For example, wheat is not shipped to England unless the price is lower here than there. If India or Morocco were to send wheat into the English market in close competition with the United States, and the price were to fall in London, it would mean that, if we continued our shipments of wheat to England, we must part with our wheat at a less advantage in the international exchange. In the illustration already used, we must, for example, offer more than seventeen bushels of wheat for ten cwts. of iron. The fall in the price of wheat, without any change in that of iron, implies the necessity of offering a greater quantity of wheat for the same quantity of iron, perhaps nineteen or twenty bushels for ten cwts. of iron. If the price went so low as to require twenty-one bushels to pay for ten cwts. of iron, then we should be entirely undersold; and the price here as compared with the price in London would be an indication of the fact. So that the comparison of prices here with prices abroad is merely a register of the terms at which our international exchanges are performed; but not the cause of the existence of the international trade. If the price falls so low in a foreign market that we can not sell wheat there, it simply means that we have reached in the exchange ratios the limit of our comparative advantages in wheat and iron; so that we are obliged to offer twenty or more bushels of wheat for ten cwts. of iron.

But in all this it must be noted that this price must include the return to capital also, and that it must be equal to the usual reward for capital in other competing industries, that is, the ordinary rate of profit. In exporting wheat from the United States the capital engaged will insist on getting the rate of profit to be found in other occupations to which the capital can go, in the United States. Now, the price, if it stands for the value (which is supposed to be governed by cost of production in this case), is the sum out of which wages and profits are paid. If the price were to fall in the foreign market, then there might not be the means with which to pay the usual rate of wages and the usual rate of profit also. Then we should probably hear of complaints by the shippers that there is no profit in the exportation of wheat, and of a falling off in the trade. In other words, as the capitalist is the one who manages the operation, and is the one first affected, the diminution of advantage in foreign trade arising from competition, generally shows itself first in lessened profits. The price, then, is the means by which we determine whether a certain article gives us that comparative advantage which will insure a gain from international trade.

An exportable article whose price in this country is low—since it is for this reason selected as an export—is one whose cost is low. If the cost be low, it means that the industry is very productive; that the same capital and labor produce more for their exertion in this than in other industries. And yet it is precisely in the most productive industries that higher wages and profits can be, and are, paid. Although each article is sold at a low price, the great quantity produced makes the total sum, or value, out of which the industrial rewards, profits, and wages, are paid, large. That is, the price may be very low (lower, also, in direct comparison with prices abroad) and yet pay the rate of wages and profits current in this country. Consequently, although wages and profits may be very high (relatively to older countries) in those industries of the United States whose productiveness is great, yet the very fact of this low cost, and consequently this low price (where competition is effective), is that which fits the commodity for exportation. We are, therefore, inevitably led to a position in which we see that high wages and low prices naturally go together in an exportable commodity. In practice, certainly, the high wages do not, by raising the price, prevent us, by comparing our price with English prices, from sending goods abroad—because we send goods abroad from our most productive employments. As an illustration of this principle, it is found that the leading exports of the United States, in 1883, were cotton, breadstuffs, provisions, tobacco, mineral oils, and wood.

But, since a direct comparison is in practice made between prices here and prices in England (for example), in order to determine whether the trade can be a profitable one, we constantly hear it said that we can not send goods abroad because our labor is so dear. It need scarcely be observed that we do not hear this from those engaged in any of the extractive industries just mentioned as furnishing large exports, which are admittedly very productive; it is generally heard in regard to certain kinds of manufactured goods. The difficulty arises not with regard to articles in which we have the greatest advantage in productiveness, but those in which we have a less advantage. If the majority of occupations are so productive as to assure a generally high reward to labor and capital throughout the country, these less advantageously situated industries—not being so productive as others (either from lack of skill or good management, or high cost of machinery and materials, or peculiarities of climate, or heavy taxation)—can not pay the usual high reward to labor, and at the same time get for the capitalist the same high reward he can everywhere else receive at home. For, at a price low enough to warrant an exportation, the quantity made by a given amount of labor and capital does not yield a total value so great as is given in the majority of other occupations to the same amount of labor and capital, and out of which the usual high wages and profits can be paid. The less productiveness of an industry, compared with other industries in the same country, then, is the real cause which prevents it from competing with foreign countries consistently with receiving the ordinary rate of profit. It is the high rate of profits as well as the high rate of wages common in the country which prevents selling abroad. It is absurd to say that it is only high wages: it is just as much high profits. Of course, if the less productive industries wish to compete with England, and if they pay—as we know they must—the high rate of wages due to the general productiveness of our country's industries, they must submit to less profits for the pleasure of having that particular desire. It is not possible that we should produce everything equally well here; nor is it possible that England should produce everything equally well. If we wish to send any goods at all to England, we must receive some goods from her. In order to get the gain arising from our productiveness, we must earnestly wish that England should have some commodity also in which she has a comparative advantage, in order that any trade whatever may exist. It is not, however, worth while, in my opinion, to go on in this discussion to consider the position of those who would shut us off from any and all foreign trade.

Our present high wages should be a cause for congratulation, because they are due to the generally high productiveness of our resources, or, in other words, due to low cost; and it is to be hoped that they may long continue high. We do not seem to be in imminent danger of not having goods which we can export in quantities which will buy for us all we may wish to import from abroad. (See Chart No. XIII, and note the vast increase of exports at the same time that wages are known to be higher in this country than abroad.) So long as wages continue high, we may possibly be unwilling to see gratified that false and ignorant desire which leads some people to think that we ought to produce, equally well with any competitor in the world, everything that is made. If, as was pointed out under the discussion on cost of labor,(289) we must necessarily connect with efficiency of labor all natural advantages under which labor works, it is easy to see that high wages are entirely consistent with low prices; and that high wages do not prevent us to-day from having an hitherto unequaled export trade. Even if all wages and all profits were lower, it would, however, affect all industries alike, and some would still be more productive relatively to others, and the same inequality would remain. If, however, we learn to use our materials better, use machinery with more effect on the quantity produced, adapt our industries to our climate, get the raw products more cheaply, free ourselves from excessive and unreasonable taxation, it would be difficult to say what commodities we might not be able eventually to manufacture in competition with the rest of the world. For we have scarcely ever, as a country, had the advantage of such conditions to aid us in our foreign trade.

Mr. Mill now goes on to consider the suggestive fact that wages are higher in England than on the Continent, and yet that the English have no difficulty in underselling their Continental rivals.

Before examining this opinion on grounds of principle, it is worth while to bestow a moment's consideration upon it as a question of fact. Is it true that the wages of manufacturing labor are lower in foreign countries than in England, in any sense in which low wages are an advantage to the capitalist? The artisan of Ghent or Lyons may earn less wages in a day, but does he not do less work? Degrees of efficiency considered, does his labor cost less to his employer? Though wages may be lower on the Continent, is not the Cost of Labor, which is the real element in the competition, very nearly the same? That it is so seems the opinion of competent judges, and is confirmed by the very little difference in the rate of profit between England and the Continental countries. But, if so, the opinion is absurd that English producers can be undersold by their Continental rivals from this cause. It is only in America that the supposition is prima facie admissible. In America wages are much higher than in England, if we mean by wages the daily earnings of a laborer; but the productive power of American labor is so great—its efficiency, combined with the favorable circumstances in which it is exerted, makes it worth so much to the purchaser—that the Cost of Labor is lower in America than in England; as is proved by the fact that the general rate of profits and of interest is very much higher.



3. Low wages enable a Country to undersell another, when Peculiar to certain branches of Industry.

But is it true that low wages, even in the sense of low Cost of Labor, enable a country to sell cheaper in the foreign market? I mean, of course, low wages which are common to the whole productive industry of the country.

If wages, in any of the departments of industry which supply exports, are kept, artificially or by some accidental cause, below the general rate of wages in the country, this is a real advantage in the foreign market. It lessens the comparative cost of production of those articles in relation to others, and has the same effect as if their production required so much less labor. Take, for instance, the case of the United States in respect to certain commodities. In that country tobacco and cotton, two great articles of export, are produced by slave-labor, while food and manufactures generally are produced by free laborers, who either work on their own account or are paid by wages. In spite of the inferior efficiency of slave-labor, there can be no reasonable doubt that, in a country where the wages of free labor are so high, the work executed by slaves is a better bargain to the capitalist. To whatever extent it is so, this smaller cost of labor, being not general, but limited to those employments, is just as much a cause of cheapness in the products, both in the home and in the foreign market, as if they had been made by a less quantity of labor. If the slaves in the Southern States were emancipated, and their wages rose to the general level of the earnings of free labor in America, that country might be obliged to erase some of the slave-grown articles from the catalogue of its exports, and would certainly be unable to sell any of them in the foreign market at the present price. Their cheapness is partly an artificial cheapness, which may be compared to that produced by a bounty on production or on exportation; or, considering the means by which it is obtained, an apter comparison would be with the cheapness of stolen goods.