Mr. Ward, on the contrary, holds that genius, like all other forms of human ability, is the product of circumstances. It is determined in its raw form by heredity, to be sure. In similar circumstances it will affect more than the average man. But like all other forms of energy it is subject to the law of causality. It is not omnipotent so that it is able to set at naught the effects of opposing forces. Nor can it develop in the absence of nourishing circumstances. Deprive it of cultural opportunities and it is like the sprout of the majestic tree which is deprived of moisture, or the great river cut off from the supply of snow and rain. In other words, it is a product of all the factors at work in its being and environment, and the internal can not manifest itself or its powers without the presence of the external. Modify the external factors to a perceptible degree and the individual is modified to the same degree.

In seeking to find the factors which are accountable for the development of talent Mr. Ward takes into consideration those of the physical environment, the ethnological, the religious, the local, the economic, the social, and the educational. Each one of these items is given a searching examination as to its force. I shall briefly deal with each of these in turn, giving the import of the findings in each case and as many of the basic facts as possible in a small space.

By a consideration of French regions by departments, provinces, and principal sections, as to their yield of talent, the physical environment was found to have had no perceptible influence. The mountain-situated Geneva and the lowland Paris produced alike prolifically talented men. The valley of the Seine and that of the Loire competed for hegemony in fecundity. The facts contradicted the highland theory, the lowland theory, the coast theory, and every other theory of the dominance of physical environment.

To get at the influence of the ethnological factor the Gaulic, Cimbrian, Iberian, Ligurian and Belgic elements of the population were examined as to their fecundity in talent. Odin confesses to being unable to discover "the least connection between races and fecundity in men of letters." Attention was paid likewise to races speaking other than French language. Again there was a conflict of facts. Inside of France ethnological elements exerted "no appreciable influence upon literary productivity." In Belgium and Lorraine, where the German language dominated, it was found that French literature mastered the situation, thus indicating that a common language does not necessitate a common literature. The conclusion ethnologically is that races possess an equality in yielding talent.

The religious factor was found to have been more influential formerly in bringing to light talent than at the close of the five-hundred-year period. From 1300 to 1700 the church furnished on the average 37.8 per cent. of all literary talent. Its fecundity dropped to 29 in the period from 1700 to 1750. Between 1750 and 1825 it produced but 6.5 of the talent. As Galton has shown, eminent men were killed or driven out during the period of religious persecution in Spain, France and Italy. The celibacy of the clergy which gave undisturbed leisure may have been an element in making the church productive in the earlier years. On the other hand, the quieting effect of family life of the protestant ministry seems to have had a propitious influence in later times, as there appeared a relative increase among protestant clergy of talent, while the output among the catholic clergy continued to decline.

In this investigation the local environment appeared to have the most influence in the production of talent. Odin gave witness to having a suspicion that somewhere there was a neglected factor. The facts connected talent with the cities in an overwhelming manner. The statement that genius is the product of the rural regions seems to have had no legs to stand on. The majority of the talented were born in the cities and practically all of them were connected with city life.

In proportion to population the cities produced 12.77, almost thirteen times as many men of talent as rural regions. The whole of France produced 6,382, the number selected by Odin as the more meritorious of the men of letters. If all France had been as productive as Paris it would have yielded 53,640; if as fecund as the other chief cities, it would have produced 22,060; but if only as fertile as the country the number would have fallen to 1,522.

It would seem that the matter of population has something to do with the production of talent. Aggregations of population offer frequent contact of persons, division of labor, competition between individuals, a better coordination of society for cooperative results, neutralization of physical qualities, and the ascendancy of innovation over the conservative attitude. It is not the mere density of population which is the effective element. It is rather the dynamic density which is productive, that is, the manifestation of the common life and spirit. City life is specialized in structure and function, rendering men more interdependent and cooperative. Specialization means moral coalescence

The chateaux of France are very prolific in producing talent. They yielded 2 per cent. of all the talent of the period, seemingly out of proportion to their importance.

Why are certain of the cities and the chateaux more fertile than most cities and the country in producing the talented? We have a general reply in the statement as to the dynamic density of cities. A further analysis finds those communities are possessed of elements which the country does not have. Odin calls them "properties." They are the location of the political, administrative and judicial agencies of society; they are in possession of great wealth and talent; they are depositories of learning and the tools of information. The avenues which open upon talent and the tools and agencies by means of which the passage to it is to be made segregate themselves in cities and towns

As the result of his investigation into the distribution of men of science in the United States, Professor Cattell arrives at nearly the same conclusion. He writes:

'The main factors in producing scientific and other forms of intellectual performance seem to be density of population, institutions and social traditions and ideals. All these may be ultimately due to race, but, given the existing race, the scientific productivity of the nation can be increased in quantity, though not in quality, almost to the extent that we wish to increase it.'[4]

[4] "American Men of Science," Second edition, p. 654.



It is interesting to note that nearly all of the women of talent have been born in cities and chateaux. This means that women had to be born where the means of development were to be had, as they were not free to move about in society, as were men.



Periods Rich Poor 1300-1500 24 1 1500-1550 39 4 1551-1600 42 — 1601-1650 84 5 1651-1700 73 4 1701-1725 36 3 1726-1750 53 7 1751-1775 86 8 1776-1800 52 12 1801-1825 73 11 —— —— Total 562 57, or 9 per cent.



The economic factor has been an important one in offering the leisure which is necessary for the development of talent. Men who have to use their time and energy wholly in the support of themselves and families are deprived of the leisure which productivity and creativeness in work demands. Of the French men of letters 35 per cent. belonged to the wealthy or noble class, 42 per cent. to the middle class, and 23 per cent. to the working class. Odin was able to discover the economic environment of 619 men of talent. They were distributed by periods between the rich and poor as shown in the table on page 169.

Of one hundred foreign associates of the French Academy the membership of the wealthy, middle and working classes were 41, 52 and 7. A combination of two other of Candole's tables yields for those classes in per cents 35, 42 and 23. In ancient and medieval times practically all of the talented came from the wealthy class. On the whole, but about one eleventh of the men of talent had to fight with economic adversity. But when we remember that the wealthy class formed but a small portion of the population in each period, probably not more than one fourth, this means that as compared with members of the working class individuals of the wealthy class had forty or fifty times as good a chance of rising to a position of eminence. The contrast is so sharp that Odin is led to exclaim, "Genius is in things, not in man."

The social and the economic factors are so closely intertwined that the influence of the social environment is already seen in treating the economic. The social deals with matter of classes and callings. The upper classes are of course the wealthier classes so that the social and economic measures largely agree. In Mr. Galton's inquiry into the callings of English men of science which he made in 1873, it appears that out of 96 investigated 9 were noblemen or gentlemen, 18 government officials, 34 professional men, 43 business men, 2 farmers and 1 other. Unless the one other was a working man the workers produced none of these 96 men of science. Odin's classification of the French men of letters gives to the nobility 25.5 per cent., to government officials 20.0, liberal professions 23.0, bourgeoise 11.6, manual laborers 9.8. Only a little over one fifth of the talented were produced by the two lower classes. Yet in numerical weight those classes constituted 90 per cent. of the population. Data from four other European countries show very much the same results, except that the workers and bourgeoise classes make a better showing. It is unquestionable, therefore, that the opportunities for developing talent or genius are largely withheld from the working class and bestowed on the upper classes.

We have yet one other factor to treat in the production of talent, namely, the educational. The facts relative to the education of the talented contradicts the assumption usually made that genius depends on education and opportunity for none of its success, but rises to its heights in spite of or without them.

Of 827 men of talent (not merit class) Odin was able to investigate as to their education he found that only 1.8 per cent. had no education or a poor education, while 98.2 per cent. had a good education. This number investigated was 73 per cent. of all men of that class, and it is fair to assume that about the same proportion of educated existed in the other 27 per cent. whose education was not known. Of the 16 of poor or no education 13 were born in Paris, other large cities, or chateaux, and three in other localities. Thus they had the opportunities presented by the cities. Facts as to talented men in Spain, Italy, England and Germany indicate that anywhere from 92 to 98 per cent. have been highly educated, and probably the latter per cent. is correct.

These figures can have but one meaning. They indicate that talent and genius are dependent on educational and conventional agencies of the cultural kind, as are other human beings for their evolution. Otherwise we should expect the figures to be reversed. If education and cultural opportunities count for naught, then we should expect that, at a time when education was by no means universal, the 90 or 98 per cent. Of genius would mount on their eagle wings and soar to the summits of eminence, clearing completely the conventional educational devices which society had established.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that social and economic opportunities afford the leisure as well as cultural advantages for the improvement of talent; that the local environment is of vital importance, offering as it does the cultural advantages of cities of certain kinds and of chateaux, and that of the local environment the educational facilities are of the supremest importance. Consequently, it appears that Mr. Ward's estimate of one person of talent to the 500 instead of Mr. Galton's estimate of one to the 4,000 does not seem strained. Produce in society generally the opportunities and advantages which Geneva, Paris and the chateaux possessed and which gave them their great fecundity in talent, and all regions and places will yield up their potential or latent genius to development and the ratio will be obtained.

This position is likely to be criticized, unless it is remembered that we admit that there is a hereditary difference at birth, and that all we seek to establish is that, given these differences, what conditions are likely to mature and develop the men of born talent. Thus after the appearance of my "Vocational Education" I received a letter from Professor Eugene Davenport in which he makes this statement:

'Ward's arguments as here employed seem to show that environment is a powerful factor in bringing out talent even to the exclusion of heredity. I doubt if you would care to be understood to this limit, and yet where you enumerate on page 61 the reasons why certain cities are fecund in respective talents, you seem to have overlooked the fact that if these cities have been for many generations centers of talent to such an extent as to provide exceptional environmental influences, the same conditions would also provide exceptional parentage, so that the birthrate of talent would be much higher in such a region than the normal. In other words, the very same conditions which would provide exceptional opportunities for development also and at the same time provide an exceptional birth condition. This is the rock on which very many arguments tending to compare heredity and environment wreck themselves.'[5]

[5] This is a criticism that needs to be met. Mr. George R. Davies of this institution has submitted facts in a paper which appeared in the March number of the Quarterly Journal of the University of North Dakota, which fills in the gap. He shows relative to American cities that there has been little or no segregation of talented parentage.



We have arrived at a point where we are able to consider the question of the conservation of talent. A position of advantage has been gained from which to view this question. For we have seen that talent has a decidedly important and indispensable social function to perform. It is the creative and contributive agency, the cause of achievement, and a vital factor in progress. Its conservation is consequently devoutly to be desired. We have also discovered the fact that, while a rare commodity, it is present in society in a larger measure than we have commonly believed. If progress is desirable in a measure it is likely to be desirable in a large measure. If talent is able to carry us forward at a certain rate with the development of a minimum of the quantity that is in existence we should be able to greatly accelerate our progress if all that is latent could be developed and put into active operation. Further, we have obtained some insight into the conditions which favor the development of talent and likewise some of the obstacles to its manifestation. If it abounds where certain conditions are present in the situation and fails to appear where those conditions are absent, we have a fertile suggestion as to the method of social control and direction which will bring the latent talent to fertility.

We must undoubtedly hold that if a larger supply of talent exists than is discovered, developed and put to use that, since, as we have seen, it is so valuable when estimated in terms of social progress, we are dealing wastefully with talent. We are allowing great ability to go to waste since we are leaving it lie in its undeveloped form. Therefore one of the problems of the proper conservation of talent consists in finding a method of discovering and releasing this valuable form of social energy.

When we come to inquire how this may be done, how this discovery is to take place, we must take for our guide the facts which were found to bear on the maturing of talent in the above studies. We discovered that the local environment seemed to contain the influential element in bringing forth talent. When that local environment was analyzed it turned out that the items of opportunity for leisure and the facilities for education were the most fruitful factors. Leisure is absolutely essential to afford that opportunity for self-development which is required even of the most talented. This can only be had when the income of the individual is sufficient to give him a considerable part of his active time for carrying out his intellectual aspirations. We have great numbers of people whom we have reason to believe are as able on the average, have as large a proportion of talent as the well-to-do, whose poverty is so crushing and whose days of toil are so long and so consuming of energy that the element of leisure is lacking. It is only an occasional individual of this class of people who is able to secure the wealth which means a measure of leisure by which he is able to mount out of obscurity. An improvement in the physical conditions of life of these people, together with an increase in their economic possibilities is a necessary means to the proper conservation of the talent of this group.

The cultural factor is one which must be made more omnipresent than it is now before we shall be able to awake the latent talent of the masses of people. There are certain sections of all nations, and more especially of such nations as the United States, where the population is widely scattered over vast areas of farming regions in which the opportunities for education and stimulative enterprises and institutions are lacking or meager. The same is true of very large sections of the populations of the cities. In both cases large neighborhoods exist in which the lives of the people move in a humdrum rut, never disturbed by matters which arouse the creative element in human nature. Especially is this important in the early years of life where the outlook for the whole future of the individual is so strongly stamped. To come into contact with no stimulus and arousing agent in the home, or the neighborhood in the earliest years is to become settled into a life-long habit of inert dullness.

When we revert to the schools which so generally abound, we fail to find the stimulating element in them which might be regarded as the necessary opportunity to develop talent. The vast majority of elementary teachers are persons whose intellectual natures have never been aroused. Their imaginative and sympathetic capacities lie undeveloped. Their work in the school is conducted on the basis of memory. It is parrot work and ends in making parrots of the pupils. The rational and causal as agencies in education are hardly ever appealed to. Until our teaching force is itself developed in the directions and capacities which alone characterize the intellectual we can not hope for much in the way of recovering the rich field of latent talent from its infertility.

Something remains to be said about the proper utilization of talent which has been developed. Did all genius depend on the hereditary factor and consequently we had developed all individuals possessing exceptional ability into contributors and creators, the question of their complete utilization by society remains. That all able men and women are working at the exact thing and in the exact place and under the exact methods which will yield the greatest and most fruitful results for society only the superficial could believe. Herbert Spencer used up a very large part of his superb ability during the larger portion of his life in the drudgery of making a living. The work of the national eugenics laboratory of England is carried on by a man of great talent, Professor Carl Pearson, in cramped quarters and with insufficient equipment and support. The enterprise is as important as any in England, that of discovering the conditions and means of improving the human race. The laboratory was built up in the first instance by the sacrifice of Sir Francis Galton, and it is maintained by means of the bequest of his personal fortune.

These are but instances of the many which exist where talented individuals are working under great handicaps which neither promote their talent nor secure fecundity of results to collective man. In nearly every line of human endeavor gifted individuals are consuming in an unnecessarily wasteful manner, from the point of view of social improvement, their splendid abilities. In educational institutions trained experts and specialists are doing the work which very ordinary ability of a merely clerical kind could conduct, sacrificing the higher and more fruitful attainments thereby. I have known a faculty of some forty members who were compelled to register the term standings by sitting in a circle and calling off the grades of several hundred students student by student and class by class for each student as it came their turn, while a clerk recorded the grades. The process consumed about ten hours per member each term, or something over a thousand hours a year for the whole faculty. Both economically and socially it was expensive and wasteful because a cheap clerk could have done the whole far better and have released the talent for productive purposes.

We shall be wise when we realize the worth of our workable talent and so establish its working conditions that it may secure the full measure of its productiveness. If scientific management for the mass of laborers of a nation is worth while how much more serviceable would it be to extend its fructifying influence to the most able members of the community.

But how to proceed in order to make the discovery of the latent talent is the pressing problem. For a long time our methods promise to be as empirical as are those we employ for the advancement of science. Relative to the latter, after enumerating a large list of conditions for promoting science of which we are ignorant, Professor Cattell says:

'In the face of endless problems of this character we are as empirical in our methods as the doctor of physic a hundred years ago or the agricultural laborer to-day. It is surely time for scientific men to apply scientific methods to determine the circumstances that promote or hinder the advancement of science.'[6]

[6] "American Men of Science," p. 565.



Since the discovery and utilization of genius and talent in general are so closely related to the problem of the promotion of science, his statement may be adopted to express the demand existing in those directions.



WAR, BUSINESS AND INSURANCE[1]

[1] Chairman's address on Peace Day of the Insurance Congress, Panama-Pacific International Exposition, San Francisco, October 11, 1915.

BY CHANCELLOR DAVID STARR JORDAN

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

THE complications behind the war in Europe are very many, ruthless exploitation, heartless and brainless diplomacy, futile dreams of national expansion (the "Mirage of the Map"), of national enrichment through the use of force (the "Great Illusion"), and withal a widespread vulgar belief in indemnities or highway robberies as a means of enriching a nation.

All these would represent only the unavoidable collision, unrest and ambition of human nature, were it not that every element involved in it was armed to the teeth. "When blood is their argument" in matters of business or politics, all rational interests are imperilled. The gray old strategists to whom the control of armament was assigned saw the nations moving towards peaceful solution of their real and imaginary difficulties. The young men of Europe had visions of a broader world, one cleared of lies and hate and the poison of an ingrowing patriotism. After a generation of doubt and pessimism in which world progress seemed to end in a blind sack, there was rising a vision of continental cooperation, a glimpse of the time when science, always international, should also internationalize the art of living.

Clearly the close season for war was near at hand. The old men found means to bring it on and in so doing to exploit the patriotism, enthusiasm, devotion and love of adventure of the young men of the whole world.

The use of fear and force as an argument in politics or in business—this is war. It is a futile argument because of itself it settles nothing. Its conclusion bears no certain relation to its initial aim. It must end where it should begin, with an agreement among the parties concerned. War is only the blind negation, the denial of all law, and only the recognition of the supremacy of some law can bring war to an end. In time of war all laws are silent as are all efforts for progress, for justice, for the betterment of human kind. If history were written truthfully every page in the story of war would be left blank, or printed black, with only fine white letters in the darkness to mark the efforts for humanity, which war can never wholly suppress.

In this paper I propose to consider only economic effects of this war and with special reference to the great industry which brings most of this audience together, the business of insurance.

The great war debts of the nations of Europe began with representative government. Kings borrowed money when they could, bankrupting themselves at intervals and sometimes wrecking their nations. Kings have always been uncertain pay. Not many loaned money to them willingly and only in small amounts and at usurious rates of interest. To float a "patriotic loan," it was often necessary to make use of the prison or the rack. With the advent of parliaments and chambers of deputies, the credit of nations improved and it became easy to borrow money. There was developed a special class of financiers, the Rothschilds at their head, pawnbrokers rather than bankers, men able and willing to take a whole nation into pawn. And with the advent of great loans, as Goldwin Smith wisely observed, "there was removed the last check on war."

With better social and business adjustments, and especially with the progress of railways and steam navigation with other applications of science to personal and national interests, the process of borrowing became easier, as also the payment of interest on which borrowing depends. Hence more borrowing, always the easiest solution of any financial complication or embarrassment. Through the substitution of regular methods of taxation for the collection of tribute, the nations became solidified. Only a solidified nation can borrow money. The loose and lawless regions called Kingdoms and Empires under feudalism were not nations at all. A nation is a region in which the people are normally at peace among themselves. In civil war, a nation's existence may be dissolved.

In all the ages war costs all that it can. All that can be extorted or borrowed is cast into the melting pot, for the sake of self-preservation or for the sake of victory. If the nations had any more to give war would demand it. The king could extort, but there are limits to extortion. The nation could borrow, and to borrowing there is but one limit, that of actual exhaustion.

Mr. H. Bell, cashier of Lloyd's Bank in London, said in 1913:

'The London bankers are not lending on the continent any more. We can see already the handwriting on the wall and that spells REPUDIATION. The people of Europe will say: "We know that we have had all this money and that we ought to pay interest on it. But we must live; and we can not live and pay."'

The chief motive for borrowing on the part of every nation has been war or preparation for war. If it were not for war no nation on earth need ever have borrowed a dollar. If provinces and municipalities could use all the taxes their people pay, for purposes of peace, they could pay off all their debts and start free. In Europe, for the last hundred years, in time of so-called peace, nations have paid more for war than for anything else. It is not strange therefore that this armed peace has "found its verification in war." It has been the "Dry War," the "Race for the Abyss," which the gray old strategists of the general staff have brought to final culmination.

The debt of Great Britain began with the revolution of 1869, with about $1,250,000. This unpopular move, known as Dutch finance, was the work of William of Orange. Other loans followed, based on customs duties with "taxes on bachelors, widows, marriages and funerals," and the profits on lotteries. At the end of the war of the revolution the debt reached $1,250,000,000, and with the gigantic borrowings of Pitt, in the interest of the overthrow of Napoleon, the debt reached its highest point, $4,430,000,000. The savings of peace duly reduced this debt, but the Boer war, for which about $800,000,000 was borrowed, swept these savings away. When the present war began the national debt had been reduced to a little less than $400,000,000 which sum a year of world war has brought up to $10,000,000,000.

The debt of France dates from the French Revolution. Through reckless management it soon rose to $700,000,000, which sum was cut by paper money, confiscation and other repudiations to $160,000,000. This process of easing the government at the expense of the people spread consternation and bankruptcy far and wide. A great program of public expenditure following the costly war and its soon repaid indemnity raised the debt of France to over $6,000,000,000. The interest alone amounted to nearly $1,000,000,000. A year of the present war has brought this debt to the unheard of figure of about $11,000,000,000. Thus nearly two million bondholders and their families in and out of France have become annual pensioners on the public purse, in addition to all the pensioners produced by war.

Germany is still a very young nation and as an empire more thrifty than her largest state. The imperial debt was in 1908 a little over $1,000,000,000. The total debt of the empire and the states combined was about $4,000,000,000 at the outbreak of the war. It is now stated at about $9,000,000,000, a large part of the increase being in the form of "patriotic" loans from helpless corporations.

The small debt of the United States rose after the Civil War to $2,773,000,000. It has been reduced to about $915,000,000, proportionately less than in any other civilized nation. The local debts of states and municipalities in this and other countries are, however, very large and are steadily rising. As Mr. E. S. Martin observes,

'We have long since passed the simple stage of living beyond our incomes. We are engaged in living beyond the incomes of generations to come.'

Let me illustrate by a supposititious example. A nation has an expenditure of $100,000,000 a year. It raises the sum by taxation of some sort and thus lives within its means. But $100,000,000 is the interest on a much larger sum, let us say $2,500,000,000. If instead of paying out a hundred million year by year for expenses, we capitalize it, we may have immediately at hand a sum twenty-five times as great. The interest on this sum is the same as the annual expense account. Let us then borrow $2,500,000,000 on which the interest charges are $100,000,000 a year. But while paying these charges the nation has the principal to live on for a generation. Half of it will meet current expenses for a dozen years, and the other half is at once available for public purposes, for dockyards, for wharves, for fortresses, for public buildings and, above all, for the ever-growing demands of military conscription and of naval power. Meanwhile the nation is not standing still. In these twelve years the progress of invention and of commerce may have doubled the national income. There is then still another $100,000,000 yearly to be added to the sum available for running expenses. This again can be capitalized, another $2,500,000,000 can be borrowed, not all at once perhaps, but with due regard to the exigencies of banking and the temper of the people. With repeated borrowings the rate of taxation rises. Living on the principal sets a new fashion in expenditure. The same fashion extends throughout the body politic. Individuals, corporations, municipalities all live on their principal.

The purchase of railways and other public utilities by the government tends further to complicate the problems of national debt. It is clear that this system of buying without paying can not go on forever. The growth of wealth and population can not keep step with borrowing, even though all funds were expended for the actual needs of society. Of late years, war preparation has come to take the lion's share of all funds, however gathered, "consuming the fruits of progress." What the end shall be, and by what forces it will be brought about, no one can now say. This is still a very rich world, even though insolvent and under control of its creditors. There is a growing unrest among taxpayers. There would be a still greater unrest if posterity could be heard from, for it can only save itself by new inventions and new exploitations or by frugality of administration of which no nation gives an example to-day.

Nevertheless, this burden of past debt, with all its many ramifications and its interest charges, is not the heaviest the nations have placed on themselves. The annual cost of army and navy in the world before the war was about double the sum of interest paid on the bonded debt. This annual sum represented preparation for future war, because in the intricacies of modern warfare "hostilities must be begun" long before the materialization of any enemy. In estimating the annual cost of war, to the original interest of upwards of $1,500,000,000 we must add yearly about $2,500,000,000 of actual expenditure for fighters, guns and ships. We must further consider the generous allowance some nations make for pensions. A large and unestimated sum may also be added to the account from loss of military conscription, again not counting the losses to society through those forms of poverty which have their primal cause in war. For in the words of Bastiat, "War is an ogre that devours as much when he sleeps as when he is awake." It was Gambetta who foretold that the final end of armament rivalry must be "a beggar crouching by a barrack door."

When the great war began, the nations of Europe were thus waist deep in debt, the total amount of national bonded indebtedness being about $30,000,000,000, or nearly three times the total sum of actual gold and silver, coined or not in all the world. A year of war at the rate of $50,000,000 to $70,000,000 per day has increased this indebtedness to nearly $50,000,000,000, the bonds themselves rated at half or less their normal value, while the actual financial loss through destruction of life and property has been estimated at upwards of $40,000,000,000.

In "The Unseen Empire," the forceful and prophetic drama of Mr. Atherton Brownell, the American ambassador, Stephan Channing, tries to show the chancellor of Germany that war with Great Britain is not a "good business proposition." He says:

'Our Civil War has cost us to date, if you count pensions for the wrecks it left—mental and physical—nearly twenty billions of dollars. And that doesn't include property losses, nor destruction of trade, nor broken hearts and desolate homes—that's just cold hard cash that we have actually paid out. You can't even think it. There have been only about one billion minutes since Christ was born. Now if there had been four million slaves and we had bought every one of them at an average of one thousand dollars apiece, set them free and had no war, we should have been in pocket to day just sixteen billion dollars. That one crime cost us in cash just about the equal of sixteen dollars a minute from the beginning of the Christian era.'

The war as forecast in the play is now on in fact, and one certain truth in regard to it is that it is assuredly not "a good business proposition" for anybody in any nation, excepting of course, the makers of the instruments of death.

DAILY COST OF GREAT EUROPEAN WAR (Charles Richet, 1912)

Feed of men. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $12,600,000 Feed of horses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,000,000 Pay (European rates) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,250,000 Pay of workmen in the arsenals and ports (100 per day)1,000,000 Transportation (60 miles in 10 days) . . . . . . 2,100,000 Transportation for provisions. . . . . . . . . . 4,200,000 Munitions: Infantry 10 cartridges a day. . . . . 4,200,000 Artillery: 10 shots per day. . . . . . . . . . . 1,200,000 Marine: 2 shots per day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400,000 Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,200,000 Ambulances: 500,000 wounded or ill ($1 per day). . 500,000 War ships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500,000 Reduction of imports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,000,000 Help to the poor (20 cents per day to 1 in 10) . 6,800,000 Destruction of towns, etc. . . . . . . . . . . . 2,000,000 Total per day . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$49,950,000



The actual war began, in accord with Professor Richet's calculation, at a cost of $50,000,000 per day. Previous to this the "dry war" or "armed peace" cost only $10,000,000 per day. This is Richet's calculation in 1912, an underestimate as to expenses on the sea and in the air. These with the growing scarcity of bread and shrapnel, the equipment of automobiles, and the unparalleled ruin of cities have raised this cost to $70,000,000 per day.

This again takes no account of the waste of men and horses, less costly than the other material of war and not necessarily replaced. All this is piled on top of "the endless caravan of ciphers" ($30,000,000,000), which represents the accumulated and unpaid war debt of the nineteenth century.

War is indeed the sport for kings, but it is no sport for the people who pay and die, and in the long run the workers of the world must pay the cost of it. As Benjamin Franklin observed:

'War is not paid for in war time) the bill comes later.'

And what a bill!

Yves Guyot, the French economist, estimates that the first six months of war cost western Europe in cash $5,400,000,000, to which should be added further destruction estimated at $11,600,000,000, making a total of $17,000,000,000. The entire amount of coin in the world is less than $12,000,000,000. Edgar Crammond, secretary of the Liverpool Stock Exchange, another high authority, estimates the cash cost of a year of war, to August 1, 1915, at $17,000,000,000, while other losses will mount up to make a grand total of $46,000,000,000. Mr. Crammond estimates that the cost to Great Britain for a year of war will reach $3,500,000,000. This sum is about equivalent to the accumulated war debt of Great Britain for a hundred years before the war. The war debt of Germany (including Prussia) is now about the same.

No one can have any conception of what $46,000,000,000 may be. It is four times all the gold and silver in the world. It represents, it is stated, about 100,000 tons of gold, and would probably outweigh the Washington monument. We have no data as to what monuments weigh, but we may try a few other calculations. If this sum were measured out in $20 gold pieces and they were placed side by side on the railway track, on each rail, they would line with gold every line from New York to the Pacific Ocean, and there would be enough left to cover each rail of the Siberian railway from Vladivostock to Petrograd. There would still be enough left to rehabilitate Belgium and to buy the whole of Turkey, at her own valuation, wiping her finally from the map.

Or we may figure in some other fashion. The average working man in America earns $518 per year. It would take ninety million years' work to pay the cost of the war; or ninety million American laborers might pay it off in one year, if all their living expenses were paid. The working men of Europe receive from half to a third the wages in America. They are the ones who have this bill to pay.

The cost of a year of the great war is a little greater than the estimated value of all the property of the United States west of Chicago. It is nearly equal to the total value of all the property in Germany ($48,000,000,000) as figured in 1906. The whole Russian Empire ($35,000,000,000) could have been bought for a less sum before the war began. It could be had on a cash sale for half that now. It would have paid for all the property in Italy ($13,000,000,000); Japan ($10,000,000,000); Holland ($5,000,000,000); Belgium ($7,000,000,000); Spain ($6,000,000,000) and Portugal ($2,500,000,000). It is three times the entire yearly earnings in wages and salaries of the people of the United States ($15,500,000,000).

We could go on indefinitely with this, playing with figures which nobody can understand, for the greatest fortune ever accumulated by man, in whatever fashion, would not pay for three days of this war.

The cost of this war would pay the national debts of all the nations in the world at the time the war broke out, and this aggregate sum of $45,000,000,000 for the world was all accumulated in the criminal stupidity of the wars of the nineteenth century. If all the farms, farming lands, and factories of the United States were wiped out of existence, the cost of this war would more than replace them. If all the personal and real property of half our nation were destroyed, or if an earthquake of incredible dimensions should shake down every house from the Atlantic to the Pacific, the waste would be less than that involved in this war. And an elemental catastrophe leaves behind it no costly legacy of hate; even the financial troubles are not ended with the treaty of peace. The credit of Europe is gone for one does not know how long. Before the war, it is said, there were $200,000,000,000 in bonds and stocks in circulation in Europe. Much of this has been sold for whatever it would bring. Some of the rest is worth its face value Some of it is worth nothing. In the final adjustment who can know whether he is a banker or a beggar?

The American Ambassador was quite within bounds when he said: "There isn't so much money in the world; you can't even think it!"

Or we may calculate (with Dr. Edward T. Devine) in a totally different way. The cost of this war would have covered every moral social, economic and sanitary reform ever asked for in the civilized world, in so far as money properly expended can compass such results. It could eliminate infectious disease, feeble-mindedness, the slums and the centers of vice. It could provide adequate housing, continuity of labor, insurance against accident; in other words it could abolish almost every kind of suffering due to outside influences and not inherent in the character of the person concerned.

A Russian writer, quoted by Dr. John H. Finley, puts this idea in a different form:

'Our most awful enemies, the elements and germs and insect destroyers, attack us every minute without cease, yet we murder one another as if we were out of our senses. Death is ever on the watch for us, and we think of nothing but to snatch a few patches of land! About 5,000,000,000 days of work go every year to the displacement of boundary lines. Think of what humanity could obtain if that prodigious effort were devoted to fighting our real enemies, the noxious species and our hostile environment. We should conquer them in a few years. The entire globe would turn into a model farm. Every plant would grow for our use. The savage animals would disappear, and the infinitely tiny animals would be reduced to impotence by hygiene and cleanliness. The earth would be conducted according to our convenience. In short, the day men realize who their worst enemies are, they will form an alliance against them, they will cease to murder one another like wild beasts from sheer folly. Then they will be the true rulers of the planet, the lords of creation.'

Says Robert L. Duffus:

'Money spent in warfare is not like spending money in other industries. It will bring far more beastliness, far more injustice, far more tyranny, far more danger to all that is honorable, generous and noble in the world, far more grief and rage than money spent in any other way. Not one per cent. of the amount devoted to these purposes, is, for the end aimed at, wasted.'

It is said that the main cause of the war lay in the envy of German commerce by British rivals. This is assuredly not true. But if it were, let us look at the business side of it. Taking the net profits of over-seas trade as stated two years ago by the Hamburg-American Company, the strongest in the world, and estimating the rest, we have something like this:

During the "Dry War" the net earnings of the German Mercantile fleet was about one third the cost of the navy supposed to protect it. It would take seventy years of trade, on the scale of the last year before the war, to repay Germany's expenses for a year of war. To make good all the losses of Europe would require more than one hundred years of the over-seas trading profits of all the world. War is therefore death to trade, as it is to every other agency of civilization.

At the beginning of the war the value of stocks and bonds in circulation in Europe amounted to about $200,000,000,000. What is the present value of all these certificates of ownership? What is the present value of any particular industrial plant or commercial venture?

A friend in London had inherited through his German wife a large aniline dye plant on the Rhine. He told me recently that he had not heard one word from it for six months. What will be its value when he hears from it? And what certainty has he as to its ownership?

Is it true that this war is the outcome of commercial jealousy? Let us look at this for a moment. The two greatest shipping companies in the world before the war were the Hamburg-American Company and the Nord-Deutscher Lloyd of Bremen. These companies had grown strong because they deserved to grow. They had attended to their affairs both in shipment of freight and transportation of passengers with that minute attention to details which is so large an element in German success. The growth of these companies arose through American trade and especially through trade with Great Britain and the British possessions. Did they clamor for war—a war, whatever else might result, sure to cripple their trade for a generation. It is said that Ballin, of the Hamburg Company, unable to prevent Great Britain from rising to the defense of Belgium "went home broken-hearted." Did Ballin build the great Imperator, costing nine million—six million of it borrowed money—with a view of laying her off after a few trips for an indefinite period in Hamburg? Did the Nord-Deutscher Lloyd contemplate leaving the Vaterland and the George Washington to lie in Hoboken till they were sold for harbor dues?

Nor was the jealousy on the other side. The growth of German commerce concerned mainly Great Britain. Presumably it was profitable on both sides, for all trade is barter. In any event, Great Britain has never raised a tariff wall against it, never protected her traders by a single differential duty. She has risen above the idea that by tariff exactions the foreigners can be made to pay the sages. As for envy of German commerce, who ever heard of an Englishman who envied anybody anything?

Again, did the Cunard Company build her three great steamships, the Mauretania, the Lusitania, the Aquitania for the fate which has come to them? In 1914 I saw the great Aquitania, finest of all floating palaces, tied by the nose to the wharf at Liverpool, the most sheepish-looking steamship I ever saw anywhere. Out of her had been taken $1,250,000 worth of plate glass and plush velvet, elevators and lounging rooms, the requirements of the tender rich in their six days upon the sea. The whole ship was painted black, filled with coal—to be sent out to help the warships at sea. And for this humble service I am told she proved unfitted.

No, commercial envy is not a reason, rivalry in business is not a reason, need of expansion is not a reason. These are excuses only, not causes of war. There is no money in war. There is no chance of highway robbery in the byways of history which can repay anything tangible of the expense of the expedition. The gray old strategists do not care for this. It is fair to them to say they are not sordid. They care no more for the financial exhaustion of a nation than for the slaughter of its young men. "An old soldier like me," said Napoleon, "does not care a tinker's damn for the death of a million men." Neither does he care for the collapse of a million industrial corporations.

Of the many forms of business and financial relation among men, none is more important than those included under the name of insurance. Insurance is a form of mutual help. By its influence the effects of calamity are spread so widely that they cease to be felt as calamity. The fact of death can not be set aside, but through insurance it need not appear as economic disaster, only as personal loss. Its essential nature is that of social cooperation and it furnishes some of the most effective of bonds which knit society together. As insurance has become already an international function, its influence should be felt continuously on the side of peace. That it is so felt is the justification of our meeting together to-day, as underwriters of insurance and as workers for peace. The essence of insurance, as Professor Royce observes, is that

'it is a principle at once peace-making in its general tendency and business-like in its practicable special application.... As a result of insurance, men gradually find themselves involved in a social network of complicated but beneficent relations of which individuals are usually very imperfectly aware but by means of which modern society has been profoundly transformed.'

For life insurance, in general, is not personally selfish in its motive. It is essentially altruistic, the effort of the benefit of some person beloved who is designated as the beneficiary. For the benefit of this surviving person, the efforts involved in the payment of premiums are put forth, and the insurance companies and their underwriters constitute the machinery by which this unification is given to society.

To all the interests of insurance, the lawlessness of war is wholly adverse and destructive. Insurance involves mutual trust and trust thrives under security of person and property. Insurance demands steadiness of purpose and continuity of law. In war, all laws are silent. War is the brutish, blind, denial of law, only admissible when all other honorable alternatives have been withdrawn—the last resort of "murdered, mangled liberty."

In its direct relation, war destroys those who to the underwriter represent the "best risks," the men most valuable to themselves and thus most valuable to the community. Those whom war leaves behind, to slip along the lines of least resistance into the city slums, are the people insurance rarely reaches. War confuses administration of insurance. Policies, in war time, can be written only on a sliding scale. This greatly increases the premium by reducing the final payments. Increase of rate of premium must decrease business. War means financial anarchy, inflated currency and depreciation of bonds. A currency which fluctuates demoralizes all business and war leaves no alternative. The slogan "business as usual" in war time deceives nobody. If it did, nobody would gain by the deception. Enforced loans from the reserve fund of insurance companies to the state mean the depreciation of reserves. The substitution of unstable government bonds means robbery of the bond holders. The yielding to the state, by enforced "voluntary action," of reserves of savings banks and insurance companies represents a form of state robbery. This is now in practice on the continent of Europe. Such funds are probably never actually confiscated but held in abeyance until the close of the war. This is another form of the everpresent "military necessity," which seizes men's property with little more compunction than it shows in seizing men's bodies. War conditions mean insecurity of investment. In war, all bonds are liable to become "scraps of paper," and no fund can be made safe. The insurance investments in Europe have been enormously depleted in worth, a reduction in market value estimated at 50 per cent.

Experts in insurance tell me that in war time certain policies are written so as to be scaled down automatically when the holder goes under the colors. Some are invalid in time of war, and some have the clause of free travel greatly abridged. A few are written to apply to all conditions, but on these the rates of premiums would naturally increase. Companies generally refuse to pay under conditions not nominated in the bond, and in general all policies are automatically reduced to level of war policies when war begins.

I am told that some American companies issue group policies as for any or all of a thousand men, these not subject to a physical examination. The war claims in Great Britain have been very heavy, because such a large proportion of clerks, artisans, students and other insurable or well-paid men have been first to volunteer. Some insurance companies have been much embarrassed by the general enlistment of their employees.

In fire insurance, conditions are much the same. All contracts in foreign nations are held in abeyance until the close of war. Such companies doing business in America are now mostly incorporated as American.

In every regard, the business of insurance is naturally allied with the forces that make for peace. War brings ruin, through increase of loans, through the exhaustion of reserves and the precarious nature of investment. The same remark applies in some degree to every honorable or constructive business. If any other form of danger threatened a great industry, its leaders would be on the alert. They would spare no money and leave no stone unturned for their own protection.

Towards war, business has always shown a stupid fatalism. War has been thought "inevitable," coming of itself at intervals with nobody responsible.

There could not be a greater error. War does not come of itself, nor without great and persistent preparation. A few hundred resolute men, bent on war, led by unscrupulous leaders brought on this war. The military group of one nation plays into the hands of like groups in other nations. To keep up war agitation long enough, whether the cause be real or imaginary, seems to hypnotize the public mind. The horrors of war fascinate rather than repel, and thousands of men in this land of peace are ready to fight in Europe to one who dreamed of such a line of action a year or two ago.

"Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." The interests involved should put honest business on its guard. The insurance men could afford to maintain a thousand observers, men wise in business as well as in International Law, and in the manners and customs of the people of the world. A few dozen skilful politico-military detectives—men like W. J. Burns for example employed in the interest of finance might save finance a billion dollars. These should watch the standing incentives to war. Such men should stand guard against the influences that work toward conflict. Those who work for peace should be not "firemen to be called in to put out the fire" already started through the negligence of business men but agents for "fireproof building material" in our national edifice, to stand at all times for the security of business, the sanctity of law, order and peace. This kind of "preparedness for war" would involve no risks of conflict, of victory or defeat.



THE EVOLUTION OF THE STARS AND THE FORMATION OF THE EARTH. II

BY WILLIAM WALLACE CAMPBELL

DIRECTOR OF THE LICK OBSERVATORY, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF SEQUENCE PROPOSED

THERE are several lines of evidence in support of the order of evolution which we have outlined.

1. The close relationship of the bright-line nebular spectrum, the bright-line stellar spectrum and the spectra of the simplest helium stars; the practically continuous sequence of spectra from the helium stars to the red stars.

2. In the long run, we must expect the stars to grow colder, at least as to the surface strata. What the average interior temperatures are is another question; the highest interior temperatures are thought to be reached at an intermediate or quite late stage in the process, in accordance with principles investigated by Lane and others; but the temperatures existing in the deep interiors seem to have little direct influence in defining the spectral characters of the stars, which are concerned more directly with the surface strata.[1] We should therefore expect the simpler types of spectra, such as we find in the helium and hydrogen stars, in the early stages of the evolutionary process. The complicated spectra of the metals, and particularly the oxides of the metals, should be in evidence late in stellar life, when the atmospheres of the stars have become denser and colder.

[1] This important point seems not to have been realized by all theorists.



3. The velocities of the Orion nebula, the Trifid nebula, the Carina nebula, and of several other irregular nebulae, have been measured with the spectroscope. These bodies seem to be nearly at rest with reference to the stellar system. The helium stars have the lowest-known stellar velocities, and the average velocities of the stars are higher and higher as we pass from the helium stars, through the hydrogen and solar stars, up to the red stars. The average velocities of the brighter stars of the different spectral classes, as determined with the D. O. Mills spectrographs at Mount Hamilton and in Chile, are as in the following table:

Spectral No. of Class Stars Average Velocity in Space B 225 12.9 km. per Sec. A 177 21.9 F 185 28.7 G 128 29.9 E 382 33.6 M 73 34.3



We can not place the irregular nebulae after the red stars: their velocities are too small, and their spectra have no resemblances to the red-star spectra.

4. Wherever we find large irregular gaseous nebulae we find stars in the early subdivisions of the helium group. They are closely related in position. This is true of the Orion and other similar regions. The irregular, gaseous nebulae are in general found in and near the Milky Way, and so are the helium stars. The yellow and red stars, at least the brighter ones, do not cluster in nebulous regions.

5. The stars are more and more uniformly distributed over the sphere as one goes from the helium stars through the hydrogen and solar stars, to the red stars. The Class M stars show little or no preference for the Milky Way. Of course, I am speaking here of the brighter and nearer stars which we have been able to study by means of the spectroscope, and not at all of the faint stars which form the unstudied distant parts of the Milky Way structure. The helium stars are young, their motions are slow, and they have not wandered far from the place of their birth. Not so with the older stars.

6. The visual double stars afford strong evidence that the order of evolution described is correct. The 36-inch refractor has shown that one star in 18, on the average, brighter than the ninth visual magnitude, consists of two or more suns which we can not doubt are in slow revolution around each other. The number of double stars observable would be very much greater than this if they were not so far away. Of the 20 stars which we say are our nearest neighbors, 8 are well known double stars; one double in each two and one half, on the average. Aitken has made a specialty of observing the double stars whose components in each case are very close together and are in comparatively rapid revolution. His program includes 164 such systems whose types of spectra are known, as in the following table:

Spectrum Number of Double Stars Bright-line 0 Class B 4 Class A-F 131 Class G-N 28 Class M-N? 1



The message which this table brings is clear. The double stars whose spectra are of the Bright-Line and Class B varieties have their components so close together that only 4, of Class B, are visible. The great majority fall in Classes A to K; 159 out of 164. The component stars in these classes are far enough apart to be visible in the telescopes, and yet are close enough to be revolving in periods reasonably short. In the Class M double stars, this program contains not more than one star, and I believe the explanation is this: double stars of Class M are in general so far apart, and therefore their periods of revolution are so long, that they do not get upon programs of rapidly revolving stars. Also, the fainter components in many red stars must have cooled off so far that they are invisible. The distances between the components of visual double stars are in general the greater as we proceed from the helium stars through the various spectral classes up to Class M. There are reasons for believing that two stars revolving around their center of mass have gradually increased their distance apart, and therefore their revolution period. If this is true, the Classes G and K; double stars are effectively older than Classes A and F double stars, and these in turn are effectively older than Class B double stars.

7. The spectrograph has great advantages over the telescope in discovering and observing double stars whose components are very close together, by virtue of the facts that the spectrograph measures, velocities of approach and recession in absolute units—so many kilometers per second—and that the speeds of rotation in binary systems are higher the closer together the two components are. The observations of the brighter helium stars, especially those made at the Yerkes Observatory by Frost and Adams, have shown that one helium star in every two and one half on the average is a very close double. In beta Cephei, an early Class B star, the components are so close that they revolve around each other in 4 1/2 hours; many systems have periods in the neighborhood of a day, of two days, of three days, and so on. Similar observations made with the D. O. Mills spectrographs in both hemispheres have shown that about one star in every four of the bright stars, on the average, is a double star. In general, the proportion of spectroscopic doubles discovered to date is greatest in Class B and decreases as we proceed toward Class M. The explanation is simple: in the Class B doubles the components are close together, their orbital velocities are very high and change rapidly, and the spectrograph is able to discover the variations with little loss of time. As we pass toward the yellow and red spectroscopic binaries we find the components separated more and more, the orbital velocities are smaller and the periods longer, the variations of velocity are more difficult to discover, and in the wider pairs we must wait many years before the variations become appreciable. There is a very marked progression of the average lengths of periods of the spectrographic double stars as we pass from the Class B to the Class M pairs. Similarly, the eccentricities of the orbits of the binaries increase as we proceed in the same direction. Accumulating evidence is to the effect that the proportion of double stars to single stars may be as great in the Classes A to K as in Class B.

8. Kapteyn believes that he is able to divide the individual stars—those whose proper motions are known—into the two star streams which he has described; and he finds that the first stream is rich in the early blue stars, less rich relatively in yellow stars, and poor in red stars, whereas the second stream is very poor in early blue stars, rich in yellows, and relatively very rich in reds. His interpretation is that the stream-one stars are effectively younger than the stream-two stars, on the whole. Stream one still abounds in youthful stars: they grow older and the yellow and red stars will then predominate. Stream two abounds in stars which were once young, but are now middle-aged and old.

The eight lines of argument outlined are in harmony to the effect that there is a sequence of development from nebulae to red stars.

The extremely red stars are all faint, only a very few being visible to the naked eye, and these near the limit of vision. Our knowledge concerning them is relatively limited. That these, and all stars, will become invisible to our telescopes, and ultimately be dark unshining bodies, is the logical conclusion to which the evolutionary processes will lead. As I have already stated, both Newcomb and Kelvin were inclined to believe that the major part of gravitational matter in the universe is already invisible.

It should be said that a few astronomers doubt whether the order of evolution is so clearly defined as I have outlined it; in fact, whether we know even the main trend of the evolutionary process. We occasionally encounter the opinion that the subject is still so unsettled as not to let us say whether the helium stars are effectively young or the red stars are effectively old. Lockyer and Russell have proposed hypotheses in which the order of evolutionary sequence begins with comparatively cool red stars and proceeds through the yellow stars to the very hot blue stars, and thence back through the yellow stars to cool red stars.

I think the essentially unanimous view of astronomers is to the effect that the great mass of accumulated evidence favors the order of evolution which I have described. We are all ready to admit that there are apparent exceptions to the simple course laid down, but that these exceptions are revolutionary in effect, and not hopeless of removal, has not yet, in my opinion, been established.

PHYSICAL CONDITIONS GOVERN APPEARANCES OF SPECTRA

A question frequently asked is this: if the yellow and red stars have been developed from the blue stars, why do not the thousands of lines in the spectra of the yellow and red stars show in the spectra of the blue stars? Indeed, why do not the elements so conspicuously present in the atmosphere of the red stars show in the spectra of the gaseous nebulae? The answer is that the conditions in the nebulae and in the youngest stars are such that only the SIMPLEST ELEMENTS, like hydrogen and helium, and in the nebulae nebulium, which we think are nearest to the elemental state of matter, seem to be able to form or exist in them; and the temperature must lower, or other conditions change to the conditions existing in the older stars, before what we may call the more complicated elements can construct themselves out of the more elemental forms of matter. The oxides of titanium and of carbon found in the red stars, where the surface temperatures must be relatively low, would dissociate themselves into more elemental components and lose their identity if the temperature and other conditions were changed back to those of the early helium stars. Lockyer's name is closely connected with this phenomenon of dissociation. There is no evidence, to the best of my knowledge, that the elements known in our Earth are not essentially universal in distribution, either in the forms which the elements have in the Earth, or dissociated into simpler forms wherever the temperatures or other conditions make dissociations possible and unavoidable.

The meteorites, which have come through the atmosphere to the Earth's surface, contain at least 25 known terrestrial elements. That they have not been found thus far to contain all of our elements is not surprising, for we should have difficulty in finding a piece of our Earth weighing a few kilograms which would contain 25 of our elements. We have not found any elements in meteorites which are unknown to our chemists. Our comets, which ordinarily show the presence of not more than three elements, carbon, nitrogen and oxygen, give certain evidence of sodium in their composition when they approach fairly near to the Sun; and the great comet of 1882, when very close to the Sun, developed in its spectrum many bright lines not previously seen in comet spectra, which Copeland said were due to iron. That the comets do not show a greater number of elements is not in the least surprising: they are not condensed bodies, and we think that their average temperature is low, too low generally to develop the luminous vapors of the more refractory elements. If their temperatures, approximated those which exist in the stars, their spectra would probably reveal the presence of many of the elements which exist in the meteorites. Of course the proof of this is lacking.

DESTINY OF THE STELLAR SYSTEM

We have said that the evolutionary processes depend primarily upon the loss of heat. This is to the best of our knowledge a genuine loss, except as some of the heat rays happen to strike other celestial bodies. The flow of heat energy from a star must be essentially continuous, always in one direction from hotter bodies to colder bodies, or into so-called unending and heatless space. Temperatures throughout the universe are apparently moving toward uniformity, at the level of absolute zero. Now, this uniformity would mean universal stagnation and death. It is possible to have life and to do work only when there are differences of temperature between the bodies concerned: work is done or accompanied by a flow of heat, always from the hotter to the colder body. We are not aware that any compensating principle exists. Several students of the subject, notably Arrhenius, have searched for such a principle, a fountain of youth so to speak, in accordance with which the vigor of stellar life should maintain itself from the beginning of time to the end of time; but I think that nothing approaching a satisfactory theory has yet been formulated. The stellar universe seems, from our present point of view, to be slowly "running down." The processes will not end, however, when all the heat generable WITHIN the stars shall have been radiated into an endless space. Every body within the universe, it is conceivable, could have cooled down to absolute zero, but the system might still be in its youth. So long as the stars, whether intensely hot or free from all heat, are rotating rapidly on their axes or are rushing through space with high speeds, the system will remain VERY MUCH ALIVE. Collisions or very close approaches of two stars are bound to occur sooner or later, whether the stars are hot or cold, and in all such cases a large share of the kinetic energy—the energy of motion—of the two bodies will be converted into heat. A collision, under average stellar conditions, should convert the two stars into a luminous gaseous nebula, or two or more nebulae, which would require hundreds or thousands of millions of years to evolve again into young stars, middle-aged stars, old stars, and stars absolutely cold. So long as any of these bodies retain motion with reference to other bodies, they retain the power of rebirth and another life. Not to go too far into speculative detail, the general effect of these processes would be the destruction of relative motions and the gradual decrease in the number of separate bodies, through coalescence. Assume further, however, that all existing bodies, widely scattered through the stellar system, are absolutely cold and absolutely at rest with reference to each other: the system might even then be only middle-aged. The mutual gravitations of the bodies would still be operative. They would pass each other closely, or collide, under high generated velocities: there would be new nebulae, and new and vigorous stellar life to continue through other long ages. The system would not run down until all the kinetic energy had been converted into heat, and all the heat generable had been dissipated. This would not occur until all material in the universe had been combined into one body, or into two bodies in mutual revolution. However, if there are those who say that the universe in action is eternal, through the operation of compensating principles as yet undiscovered, no man of science is at present equipped to prove the contrary.

THE NOVAE

The so-called new stars, otherwise known as temporary stars or novae, present interesting considerations. These are stars which suddenly flash out at points where previously no star was known to exist; or, in a few cases, where a faint existing star has in a few days become immensely brighter. Twenty-nine new stars have been observed from the year 1572 to date; 19 of them since 1886, when the photographic dry plate was applied systematically to the mapping of the heavens, and 15 of the 19 stand to the credit of the Harvard observers. This is an average of one new star in two years; and as some novae must come and go unseen it is evident that they are by no means rare objects. Novae pass through a series of evolutions which have many points in common; in fact, the ones which have been extensively studied by photometer and spectrograph have had histories with so many identities that we are coming to look upon them as standard products of evolutionary processes. These stars usually rise to maximum brilliancy in a few days: some of the most noted ones increased in brightness ten-thousand-fold in two or three days. All of them fluctuate in brightness irregularly, and usually in short periods of time. Several novae have become invisible to the naked eye at the end of a few weeks. With two or three exceptions, all have become invisible in moderate-sized telescopes, or have become very faint, within a few months. Two novae, found very early in their development, had at first dark line spectra, a night later bright lines appeared, and a night or two later the spectra contained the broad radiation and absorption bands characteristic of all recent novae. After the novae become fairly faint, the bright lines of the gaseous nebula spectrum are seen for the first time. These lines increase in relative brilliancy until the spectra are essentially the same as those of well-known nebulae, except that the novae lines are broad whereas the lines of the nebulae are narrow. In a few months or years the nebular lines diminish in brightness, and the continuous spectrum develops. Hartmann at Potsdam, and Adams and Pease with the 60-inch Mount Wilson reflector, have shown that the spectra of the faint remnants of four originally brilliant novae now contain some of the bright lines which are characteristic of Wolf-Rayet stars.[2]

[2] After this lecture was delivered Adams of Mount Wilson reported that in November, 1914, the chief nebular line (5007A) and another prominent nebular line (4363A) had entirely disappeared from the spectrum of Nova Geminorum No. 2, whereas the second nebular line in the green (4959A) remained strong; probably a step in progress from the nebular to the Wolf-Rayet spectrum.



Why the novae suddenly flare up, and what their relations to other celestial bodies may be, are questions which can not be regarded as settled. Their distribution on the celestial sphere is indicated in Figure 25 by the open circles. In this figure the densest parts of the Milky Way are drawn in outline. All of the novae have appeared in the Milky Way, with the exception of five: and these exceptions are worthy of note. One of the five appeared in the condensed nucleus of the great Andromeda nebula, not far from its center; another (zeta Centauri) was located close to the edge of a spiral nebula and quite possibly in a faint outlying part of the nebula; a third (tau Coronae) was observed to have a nebulous halo about it at the earliest stage of its observed existence; a fourth (tau Scorpii) appeared in a nebula; and the fifth (Nova Ophiuchi No. 2) in 1848 was not extensively observed. The other 24 novae appeared within the structure of the Milky Way. Keeping the story as short as possible, a nova is seemingly best explained on the theory that a dark or relatively dark star, traveling rapidly through space, has encountered resistance, such as a great nebula or cloud of particles would afford. While passing through the cloud the forward face of the star is bombarded at high velocities by the resisting materials. The surface strata become heated, the luminosity of the star increases rapidly. The effect of the bombardment by small particles can be only skin deep, and the brightness of the star should diminish rapidly and therefore the spectrum change speedily from one type to another. The new star of February, 1901, in Perseus, afforded evidence of great strength on this question. Wolf at Heidelberg photographed in August an irregular nebulous object near the nova. Ritchey's photograph of September showed extensive areas of nebulosity around the star. In October Perrine and Ritchey discovered that the nebular structure had apparently moved outward from the nova, from September to October. Going back to a March 29th photograph taken for a different purpose, Perrine found an irregular ring of nebulosity closely surrounding the star. Apparently, the region was full f nebulosity which is normally invisible to us. The rushing of the star through this resisting medium made the star the brightest one in the northern sky for two or three days. The great wave of light going out from the star when at its brightest traveled in five weeks as far as the ring of nebulosity, where, falling upon non-luminous nebulous materials, it made the ring visible. Continuing its progress, the wave of light illuminated the material which Wolf photographed in August, the materials which Ritchey photographed still farther away in September, and the still more distant materials which Perrine and Ritchey photographed in October, November, and later. We were able to see this material only as the very strong wave of light which left the star at maximum brightness made the material luminous in passing. That 24 novae should occur in the Milky Way, where the stars are most numerous, and where the resisting materials may preferably prevail, is not surprising; and it should be repeated that at least three of the five occurring outside of the Milky Way were located in nebulous surroundings.

The actual collision of two stars would necessarily be too violent in its effect to let the reduction of brilliancy occur so rapidly as to cause the disappearance of the nova in a few weeks or months. The close approach of two stars might conceivably produce the observed facts, but even this process seems too violent in its probable results. The chances for the collision of a rapidly traveling star with an enormously extended nebulous cloud are vastly greater, and the apparent mildness of the phenomenon observed is in better harmony with expectation.

RELATION OF NOVAE, PLANETARY NEBULAE AND WOLF-RAYET STARS

Although all recent novae have been observed to become planetary or stellar nebulae, they seem not to remain nebular for any length of time; they have gone further and become Wolf-Rayet stars. Whether any or all of the planetary nebulae that have been known since Herschel's day, and have remained apparently unchanged in form, have developed from new stars, is uncertain and doubtful. If they have, the disturbances which gave them their character must have been violent, such as would result from full or glancing collisions of two stars, in order to produce deep-seated effects which change slowly, rather than surface effects which change rapidly.

Whether the Wolf-Rayet stars have in general been formed from planetary nebulae is a different question: some of them certainly have. Wright has recently shown that the stellar nuclei of planetary nebulae are Wolf-Rayet stars, and he has formulated several steps in the process whereby the nebulosity in a planetary eventually condenses into the central star. The distribution of the planetaries and the Wolf-Rayet stars on the sphere affords further evidence of a connection. We saw. that the novae are nearly all in the Milky Way. The irregular, ring, planetary and stellar nebulae, plotted in Fig. 27, prefer the Milky Way, but not so markedly. The Wolf-Rayets, without exception, are located in the Milky Way and in the Magellanic Clouds, and those in the Milky Way are remarkably near to its central plane. 107 of these objects are known, 1 is in the Lesser Magellanic Cloud, and 21 are in the Greater Magellanic Cloud. The remaining 85 average less than 2 3/4 degrees from the central plane of the Milky Way.

We are obliged to say that the places of the novae, of the planetary and stellar nebulae, and of the Wolf-Rayets in the evolutionary process are not certainly known. If the Wolf-Rayet stars have developed from the planetaries, the planetaries from the novae, and the novae have resulted from the close approach or collision of two stars, or from the rushing of a dark or faint star through a resisting medium, then the novae, planetaries and Wolf-Rayets belong to a new and second generation: they were born under exceptional conditions. The velocities of the planetary nebulae seem to be an insuperable difficulty in the way of placing them between the irregular nebulae and the helium stars. The average radial velocity of 47 planetary nebulae is about 45 km. per second; and, if the motions of the planetaries are somewhat at random, their average velocities in space are twice as great, or 90 km. per second. This is fully seven times the average velocity of the helium stars, and the helium stars in general, therefore, could not have come from planetary nebulae. The radial velocities of only three Wolf-Rayet stars have been observed, and this number is too small to have statistical value, but the average for the three is several times as high as the average for the helium stars. We can not say, I think, that the velocities of any novae are certainly known.

If the planetaries have been formed from novae, especially the novae which encountered the fiercest resistance, the high velocities are in a sense not surprising, for those stars which travel with abnormally high speeds are the ones whose chances for collisions with resisting media are best; and, further, the higher the speeds of collision the more violent the disturbance. This line of argument also leads to the conclusion that the novae, planetaries and Wolf-Rayets belong not in general before the helium stars, but to another generation of stars. They may, and I think will, develop into a small class of helium stars having special characteristics; for example, high velocities.

KANT'S HYPOTHESIS

Immanuel Kant's writings, published principally in 1755, are in many ways the most remarkable contributions to the literature of stellar evolution yet made. Curiously, Kant's papers have not been read by the text-book makers, except in a few cases. We have already referred to his ideas on the Milky Way and on comets. In his hypothesis of the origin of the solar system, he laid emphasis upon the facts that the six known planets revolve around the Sun from west to east, nearly in the same plane and nearly in the plane of the Sun's equator; that the then four known moons of Jupiter, the five known moons of Saturn, and our moon revolve around these planets from west to east, and nearly in the same general plane; and that the Sun, our moon and the planets, so far as known, rotate in the same direction. These facts, he said, indicate indisputably a common origin for all the members of the solar system. He expressed the belief that the materials now composing the solar system were originally scattered widely throughout the system, and in an elemental state. This was a half century before Herschel's extensive observations of nebuae. Kant thought of this elemental matter as cold, endowed with gravitational power, and endowed necessarily with some repulsive power, such as exists in gases. He started his solar system from materials at rest. Most of the matter, he said, drifted to the center to form the Sun. He believed that nuclei or centers of attraction formed here and there throughout the chaotic structure, and that in the course of ages these centers grew by accretion of surrounding matter into the present planets and their satellites; and that in some manner motion in one direction prevailed throughout the whole system. Kant's explanation of the origin of the ROTATION of the solar system is unsound and worthless. We now know that such a cloud of matter, free from rotation, could not of itself generate rotation; it must get the start from outside forces. Kant's false reasoning was due in part to the fact that some of our most important dynamical laws were not yet discovered, in part to his faulty comprehension of certain dynamical principles already known, and probably in part to the unsatisfactory state of chemical knowledge existing at that date. This was half a century before Dalton's atomic theory of matter was proposed.