On the 17th the camp was broken and we marched by way of Charles City Courthouse, across the Chickahominy at Long bridge to Baltimore Crossroads, arriving there on the evening of the 18th when another halt was made. May 19, I was sent with the Sixth Michigan to destroy Bottom's bridge and the railroad trestle work near it. My recollection is that this was accomplished.

The next morning General Custer was ordered with his brigade to Hanover Courthouse, the object being to destroy the railroad bridge across the South Anna river, a few miles beyond. This necessitating a ride of more than twenty miles, an early start was made. The Sixth was given the advance and it proved to be one of the most pleasant experiences of the campaign. The road led past Newcastle, Hanovertown and Price's; the day was clear, there was diversity of scenery and sufficient of incident to make it something worth remembering. No enemy was encountered until we reached the courthouse. A small body of cavalry was there, prepared to contest the approach of the advance guard. The officer in command of the advance did not charge, but stopped to skirmish and the column halted. Foght, Custer's bugler, rode up and offered to show me a way into the station from which the confederates could be taken in flank. Accepting his suggestion, I took the regiment and dashed through the fields to the left and captured the station, which brought us in on the left and rear of the force confronting the advance guard. Seeing this they took to flight, the advance guard pursuing them for some distance. A quantity of commissary stores were captured here, some of which were issued to the men, the balance destroyed. The railroad track was torn up and two trestles destroyed where the railroad crossed the creek near the station. Custer moved his brigade back to Hanovertown and encamped for the night. The next morning he returned to Hanover Courthouse and, sending the First and Fifth ahead, left the Sixth and Seventh to guard the rear. They advanced to near the South Anna river and found the bridge guarded by infantry, cavalry and artillery, which, en route from Richmond to Lee's army, had been stopped there for the exigency. Custer decided not to take the risk, as he learned that a force was also moving on his flank, and returned leisurely to Baltimore Crossroads.

One incident of the first day seems to me worth narrating. The brigade bivouacked on a large plantation, where was a colonial house of generous proportions. It fronted on a spacious lawn, which sloped from the house to the highway and was fringed with handsome old spruce and Austrian pines. In front and rear the house had broad porches. A wide hall ran through the center of the house from one porch to the other and on either side of the hall were well furnished rooms of ample size. In rear, in an enclosure as broad as the house, was a well kept flower garden. It was a typical southern home of refinement and comfort. There were several ladies. The men were, of course, in the army. General Custer with several of his officers called upon the ladies to pay his respects and assure them of protection. He was received with quiet dignity and refined courtesy and for an hour chatted with them about the events then transpiring. They knew all the confederate cavalry leaders and he was greatly interested in what they had to say about them. Before his departure he left with one of the ladies a piquant and chivalric message for his "friend Rosser," which she promised to deliver faithfully. Custer and Rosser, in war and in peace, were animated by the same knightly spirit. Their friendship antedated and outlived the war. The message was received and provoked one of a similar tenor in reply. He took especial care that no harm was done to the place and marched away leaving it as good as he found it.

Upon our return it was found that the Second and Reserve brigades by the most extraordinary activity and skill had succeeded in restoring the bridge across the Pamunkey at White House on which the entire corps crossed over May 22. May 24, Sheridan reported to General Meade at Chesterfield station, on the Richmond and Fredericksburg railroad, north of the North Anna river, opposite Hanover Station. The two days' march from Aylett's was hot and dusty, and marked by nothing worth recalling, unless it be that the road after the cavalry had passed over it was dotted at regular intervals with the bodies of dead horses, the order having been that when horses gave out and had to be abandoned they must be shot.



CHAPTER XIX

HANOVERTOWN AND HAW'S SHOP

June 26 the First and Second divisions, followed by Russell's division of the Sixth corps started down the north bank of the Pamunkey river to secure the crossings, Grant having determined on another movement by the left flank, and to throw his entire army across into the territory between the Pamunkey and Chickahominy. Feints were made that day at the fords near Hanover Courthouse, but after dark both Torbert and Gregg, leaving a small force on duty at each of these fords respectively, quietly withdrew and made a night march to Dabney's Ferry opposite Hanovertown, the First division leading. At daylight Custer in advance reached the Ferry and the First Michigan under Colonel Stagg gallantly forced the passage, driving away about one hundred cavalrymen who were guarding it and making a number of them prisoners. The entire division then crossed and moved forward through the town.

General Custer directed me to take the road from Hanovertown and push on in advance toward Hanover Courthouse. We had gone but a mile or so when, in the midst of a dense wood, a force which proved to be dismounted cavalry was encountered, strongly posted behind temporary earthworks hastily thrown up. The regiment was dismounted on the right of the road, the First Michigan, following closely, went in on the left and the two regiments made a vigorous attack, but met with a stubborn resistance and did not succeed in carrying the works at once. A band was playing in rear, indicating the presence of a brigade, at least.

Noticing that a portion of the enemy's fire came from the right, I sent the sergeant major to the rear with word that the line ought to be prolonged in that direction. The non commissioned officer returned and reported that the message had been delivered to the brigade commander, but that it was overheard by the major general commanding the division, who exclaimed with a good deal of impatience: "Who in —— is this who is talking about being flanked?" I was mortified at this and resolved never again to admit to a superior officer that the idea of being flanked had any terrors. But General Torbert, notwithstanding, did reinforce the line with a part of General Devin's brigade in exact accordance with my suggestion.

Custer, however, did not wait for this, but, taking the other two regiments of his brigade (the Fifth and Seventh Michigan) made a detour to the left by way of Haw's Shop, and came in on the flank and rear of the force which the First and Sixth, with Devin's help were trying to dislodge from its strong position, and which held on tenaciously so long as it was subjected to a front attack only. But, as soon as Custer made his appearance on the flank, the enemy, Gordon's brigade of North Carolinians, abandoned the earthworks and fled, the First and Sixth with Devin's regiments promptly joining in the pursuit.

Custer's approach was heralded by an amusing incident. The band that had been challenging us with its lips of brass stopped short in the midst of one of its most defiant strains, and the last note of the "Bonnie Blue Flag" had scarcely died on the air, when far to the left and front were heard the cheery strains of "Yankee Doodle."[26] No other signal was needed to tell of the whereabouts of our Michigan comrades, and it was then that the whole line moved forward, only to see as it emerged into the open, the Tar-heels of the South making swift time towards Crump's Creek, closely followed by Custer and his Michiganders. The latter had accomplished without loss by the flanking process what he had tried in vain to do by the more direct method.

The charge of the Fifth and Seventh Michigan, commanded by Captain Magoffin and Major Walker respectively, and led by General Custer in person, was most brilliant and successful, the Seventh continuing the pursuit for about three miles. First Sergeant Mortimer Rappelye of troop C, Sixth, and one of his men were killed at the first fire. Rappelye was in command of the advance guard and had been slated for a commission which he would have received had he lived.

That night the cavalry encamped on Crump's Creek. The next day the army was all over and Grant had taken up a new line extending from Crump's Creek to the Totopotomoy. Still, he was uncertain of what Lee was doing and it became necessary to find out. This led to what was one of the most sanguinary and courageously contested cavalry engagements of the entire war—the battle of Haw's Shop—in which Gregg and Custer with the Second division and the Michigan brigade, unassisted, defeated most signally, two divisions under the command of Wade Hampton in his own person. Indeed it is not certain that it was not even a more notable victory than that over Stuart on the right flank at Gettysburg. It was won at a greater sacrifice of life than either Brandy Station or Yellow Tavern.

After the death of Stuart, though so short a time had elapsed, the confederate cavalry had been reorganized into three divisions, commanded by Wade Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and W.H.F. Lee, the first named being the ranking officer. His division had been largely reinforced, notably by a brigade of South Carolinians under M.C. Butler who, after the war, was the colleague of Hampton in the United States senate. This brigade consisted of seven large regiments, numbering in all about four thousand men. It was a brigade that honored the state which produced Sumter, Marion, the Rutledges and the Hamptons.

All this cavalry had joined the army of Northern Virginia and was in position to cover the movements which Lee was making to confront the army of the Potomac. Sheridan's corps, now that it had returned to the army, was once more somewhat dispersed. Wilson was still north of the Pamunkey, covering the transfer of the several infantry corps and guarding the fords. The First division, as we have seen, led the crossing on the 27th and was covering the front and right of the infantry along Crump's Creek. Gregg, who had followed Torbert, was at Hanovertown.

On the morning of May 28, Gregg was sent out by Sheridan to discover the movements of Lee, who was skilfully masking his designs behind his cavalry. Gregg had advanced but a short distance beyond Haw's Shop when, in a dense wood, protected by swamps, behind breastworks of logs and rails, and with batteries advantageously posted, he found the enemy's cavalry dismounted and disposed in order of battle. He promptly attacked, notwithstanding the disparity in numbers and in position, Davies going into action first, followed by Irvin Gregg, and the entire division was quickly engaged. Gregg was resolute, Hampton determined, and for hours the battle was waged with the most unyielding bravery on both sides. The list of killed and wounded was unexampled in any other cavalry contest of the Civil war, aggregating in the Second division alone two hundred and fifty-six officers and men. Davies's brigade lost twenty-three officers. The First New Jersey cavalry had two officers killed and nine wounded. The enemy's losses were even greater.



It was an unequal contest—one division against two, two brigades against four—with the odds in favor of the confederates. Hampton who, in the beginning, maintained a posture of defense, began to assume a more aggressive attitude and showed a disposition to take the offensive. In the afternoon, towards four o'clock, he brought up Butler's brigade to reinforce the center of his line. These troops were armed with long range rifles and many of them had not been under fire before. This was their first fight. They came on the field with the firm purpose to win or die, and preferred death to defeat or surrender, as the sequel proved.

Then, and not till then, it began to look as though the hitherto invincible Gregg might have the worst of it. There was danger that the center of his line would be compelled to yield. It was in front of this new and valorous foe that the First New Jersey suffered its fearful losses. The attack was such that only the bravest men could have withstood it.

At this critical juncture, Sheridan ordered Custer to the front to reinforce Gregg. It was time. The Michigan men were having a rest, thinking it was their turn for "a day off." But, as in the "Wilderness" and at Meadow Bridge, they were instantly in the saddle and en route. Marching by fours along a country road, hearing the sounds, but not yet within sight of the conflict, lines of federal infantry were seen marshaled for action, and a knot of officers of high rank gazing toward the front. Passing to the right of these, the column turned to the right into the road leading past Haw's Shop, and through the woods where the two lines were fiercely contending, and which road bisected the battle-field. An impressive scene came into view. Beyond the wood, less than a mile away, which extended on both sides of the road, one of Hampton's batteries was firing shell with the utmost rapidity. These shells were exploding both in the woods and in a broad plain behind them and to the right of the column as it advanced. Hundreds of non combatants were fleeing to the rear across this open space. The woods, like a screen, hid the battery from view. Only the screaming and exploding shells could be seen. When the head of the Michigan column came into their line of vision, the confederate cannoneers trained one of their guns on the road and the shells began to explode in our faces. A right oblique movement took the column out of range.

Gregg's men had been gradually forced back to the very edge of the woods, and were hanging on to this last chance for cover with bull dog tenacity. The enemy were pressing them hard and, apparently conscious that reinforcements for them were coming, seemed to redouble their fire both of artillery and small arms. It was a fearful and awe inspiring spectacle.

Custer lost no time. Massing the brigade close behind Gregg's line of battle he dismounted it to fight on foot. Every fourth man remained with the horses which were sent back out of danger. The line formed in two ranks like infantry. The Sixth was to the right, its left resting on the road; the Seventh to the left, its right on the road. The First formed on the right of the Sixth, the Fifth on the left of the Seventh. The time for action had come. It was necessary to do one thing or the other. No troops in the world could have been held there long without going forward or back.

Custer, accompanied by a single aide, rode along the line from left to right, encouraging the men by his example and his words. Passing the road he dashed out in front of the Sixth and taking his hat in his hand, waved it around his head and called for three cheers. The cheers were given and then the line rushed forward. Custer quickly changed to the flank but, though thus rashly exposing himself, with his usual luck, he escaped without a scratch. Christiancy, his aide, had his horse shot under him and received two wounds, one a severe one through the thigh.

Gregg's men permitted the Michigan men to pass. In a moment the Wolverines and the Palmetto men were face to face and the lines very close. Michigan had Spencers. South Carolina, Enfields. Spencers were repeaters, Enfields were not. The din of the battle was deafening. It was heard distinctly back where the infantry was formed and where Grant, Meade, and Sheridan anxiously were awaiting the event. The Spencers were used with deadly effect. The South Carolinians, the most stubborn foe Michigan ever had met in battle, refused to yield and filled the air with lead from the muzzles of their long range guns as fast as they could load and fire. The sound of their bullets sweeping the undergrowth was like that of hot flames crackling through dry timber. The trees were riddled. Men began to fall. Miles Hutchinson, son of my father's foreman, who had left home to go to the war with me, fell dead at my side. "Jimmie" Brown, the handsome and brave sergeant, dropped his piece and falling, died instantly. Corporal Seth Carey met his fate like a soldier, his face to the foe. A member of troop H, shot through the breast, staggered toward me and exclaiming, "Oh, major," fell literally into my arms, leaving the stains of his blood upon my breast.

This strenuous work did not last long. It may have been ten minutes from start to finish—from the time we received the South Carolinians' fire till the worst of it was over and they began to give way. But, in that brief ten minutes eighteen brave men in the ranks of the Sixth Michigan had been either killed or mortally wounded; and as many more were wounded but not fatally. The enemy suffered even more severely. The brigade lost forty-one killed—eighteen in the Sixth; thirteen in the Fifth; five in the First and five in the Seventh. The losses of the Fifth in officers and men wounded but not fatally were larger than those in the Sixth, the total of killed and wounded aggregating something like fifty in the regiment. The First, though it did not meet with so sturdy a resistance in its immediate front, was able to work around the flank of the enemy, thus materially aiding in breaking their spirit and putting them to rout.

Some of the South Carolina men exhibited a foolhardy courage never seen anywhere else so far as my knowledge extends.

"Surrender," said Sergeant Avery to one of them who had just discharged his piece and was holding it still smoking in his hands.

"I have no orders to surrender, —— you," returned the undaunted confederate.

He surrendered, not his person, but his life. Such a fate befell more than one of those intrepid heroes. It was a pity but it was war and "war is hell." The enemy's line, at that time, had been driven beyond the woods into a clearing where was a house. While crossing a shallow ravine before reaching the house it was noticed that shots were coming from the rear. An officer with a troop was ordered back to investigate. It was found that at the first onset the regiment had obliqued slightly to the right, thus leaving an interval between the left flank and the road in consequence of which about fifteen confederates had been passed unnoticed. Some of them had the temerity to begin giving us a fire in the rear. They were all made prisoners.

The force in front was driven from the field, leaving their dead and wounded. Eighty-three dead confederates were counted by those whose duty it was to bury the dead and care for the wounded in the field and woods through which the Michigan men charged. Those who were killed in front of the Sixth Michigan were South Carolinians from Charleston and evidently of the best blood in that historic city and commonwealth. They were well dressed and their apparel, from outer garments to the white stockings on their feet, was clean and of fine texture. In their pockets they had plenty of silver money.

In this engagement, as well as in that at Hanovertown the day before, the Fifth Michigan was commanded by Captain Magoffin, Colonel Alger having remained at White House for a few days on account of illness. Colonel Stagg and Major Alexander Walker led the First and Seventh, respectively.

General Sheridan narrates that when he called upon Mr. Lincoln in Washington the president made a facetious reference to General Hooker's alleged fling at the cavalry, when he asked: "Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?" It is perhaps doubtful whether Hooker uttered so pointless a saying, devoid alike of sense and of wit. If such a question was ever seriously propounded by him or by any one else, its sufficient answer could have been found upon the battle field of Haw's Shop. And not there alone. The First Michigan cavalry had sixteen killed including its colonel at the second Bull Run and twelve at Gettysburg. The Fifth Michigan lost fifteen killed at Gettysburg; the Sixth Michigan twenty-four at Falling Waters and the Seventh Michigan twenty-two at Gettysburg—all of these before General Sheridan had that interview with Mr. Lincoln in the White House. This record was enough of itself, to render the cavalry immune to ironical disparagement. If there were any honest doubts as to the efficiency and fighting qualities of the Potomac cavalry, they were dissipated by the campaign of 1864. After Todd's Tavern, Yellow Tavern, Haw's Shop, Cold Harbor and Trevilian Station no slurring remarks aimed at the cavalry were heard. Its prestige was acknowledged in and out of the army by all those who had knowledge of its achievements and were willing to give credit where credit was deserved.

An all night march followed the battle, after the dead had been buried and the wounded cared for. The morning of May 29 found the two divisions in the neighborhood of Old Church and thence in the afternoon of May 30 Custer and Merritt marched out toward Cold Harbor, the Reserve brigade in advance, to reinforce Devin, who was having a hot fight at Matadequin Creek with Butler's South Carolinans, posted on the opposite side in a strong position. The entire division became engaged, the fighting being mostly dismounted and the opposing force was driven in great confusion from the field. The Sixth Michigan was held in reserve mounted and expected to be ordered in for a mounted charge but for some unexplained reason the order did not come. The First, Fifth and Seventh were in the thickest of it and rendered excellent service. The pursuit was kept up for several miles and the enemy retreated to Cold Harbor, leaving his dead and wounded on the field, as at Haw's Shop. Butler's men behaved with great gallantry, but were ready to surrender when the logic of the situation demanded it. They made no such resistance as in the former action.

May 31, in the afternoon, the First division advanced on Cold Harbor, Merritt in advance, on the road leading from Old Church. Custer followed Merritt. Devin was sent by another road to the left with the intention of having him attack in flank the force which the other two brigades were engaging in front. The Sixth Michigan moved by a country road to make connection between the First and Second brigades. Gregg's division followed Torbert as a reserve and support but did not become engaged.

Cold Harbor was a very important strategic point, as can be seen by a glance at the map, roads radiating from it in all directions. It was strongly held by Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, supported by a brigade of infantry. They had thrown up breastworks of rails and logs, and made preparations for a stout resistance.

I reached the intersection of the country road with the left hand road before Devin appeared. My orders being to connect with him, I awaited his arrival, sending a few men out to keep watch in both directions. When Devin's advance came up they saw these men and appeared to be suspicious of them, and did not advance very promptly. As soon as I could I gave them to understand who we were and what we were there for. Devin then moved along the main road and the Sixth deployed through the woods until touch with its own brigade was obtained.

In the meantime, a hard fight was in progress. Torbert, not hearing from Devin, changed his plans and attacked the enemy's left flank with the Reserve brigade and the First and Fifth Michigan. This was most skilfully and successfully done. The flanking movement was led by the First and Second United States, and the Fifth Michigan, still under Captain Magoffin. The final blow was struck by Major Melvin Brewer with one battalion of the First Michigan, whose charge mounted at the critical moment decided the fate of the field. The enemy who had been putting up a very hard fight did not await this charge but threw down their arms and fled, the pursuit being followed up to a point a mile and a half beyond the town. The Sixth took little part except to fill the gap between Custer and Devin. The latter found the confederate right flank too strong to circumvent, and added one more to the long list of lost opportunities.

Thus, Cold Harbor, the key to the maneuvers of the two armies, came into possession of the Union cavalry, but there was no infantry support within ten miles, the result having been unexpected by Meade, and Sheridan decided that it would not be safe for his command to try to hold it, unsupported. He, however, notified the general of the army what he had done and withdrew his cavalry after dark to the position of the night before. Grant, realizing the importance of the capture, directed Sheridan to return and hold Cold Harbor at all hazards, until the infantry could get up. The march was retraced and, reaching the position before daylight, the breastworks which the enemy had thrown up were brought into service, strengthened as much as possible and the division dismounted placed in line behind them. Ammunition boxes were distributed on the ground by the side of the men so they could load and fire with great rapidity. This was a strong line in single rank deployed thick along the barricade of rails. Behind the line only a few yards away were twelve pieces of artillery equally supplied with ammunition. The brigade was thus in readiness to make a desperate resistance to any attack that might be made. The only mounted man on the line was General Custer, who rode back and forth giving his orders. The Sixth was lying down behind the rails and directly in front of the artillery, the pieces being so disposed as to fire over our heads. I do not remember any other engagement in which so many pieces of artillery were posted directly on a skirmish line with no line of battle behind it and no reserves. It was an expedient born of a desperate emergency.

In front of the line was open ground. Two hundred yards to the front were woods. In the woods the confederate infantry was in bivouac. Kershaw's division was in front of the Michigan brigade. Before the first streaks of dawn began to appear in the east, their bugles sounded the reveille, and there was immediate commotion in the confederate camps. So close to us were they that the commands of the officers could be heard distinctly. Soon after daybreak an attack was made on the right of the line. As soon as the enemy emerged from the woods General Custer ordered all the twelve pieces of artillery to fire with shell and canister which they did most effectively. So furious was the fire that the confederate infantry did not dare to come out of the woods in front of Custer's left where the Sixth was, the artillery and the fire from the Spencers from behind the rails keeping them back. An attempt was made to charge the part of the line where the First Michigan was posted but each time it was repulsed. Here Captain Brevoort, one of the bravest and best officers in the brigade, was killed. Captain William M. Heazlett, another fine officer, was wounded. They both belonged to the First Michigan.

During the progress of the engagement, when the first attempt of Kershaw's infantry to come out of the woods had been repulsed, and there was a temporary suspension of the firing, General Custer riding along the line, in rear of the artillery, noticed that several of us who were lying down behind the barricade, were directly in front of one of the brass pieces. Though these pieces were firing over our heads, they were very nearly, if not quite, on the same level as the barricades. He, with characteristic thoughtfulness, called my attention to the danger of remaining where we were and I moved away from in front of the gun to a position in front of the interval between two of them, directing the others to do likewise. The three men who were with me were Lieutenant William Creevy, Corporal John Yax, and private Thomas W. Hill of troop C. Hill moved to the right when I moved to the left, but Creevy and Yax were slow about it. The very next time the gun was fired, there was a premature explosion, which killed Yax and wounded Creevy. Hill was a boy only seventeen years of age, one of the recruits of 1863-64. He survived the war and is now cashier of the Cleveland national bank, of Cleveland, Ohio, and one of the most influential and respected business men of that city. Another one of those young recruits of 1863-64 was A.V. Cole, corporal in the same troop as Hill. He was badly wounded in the action at Haw's Shop, May 28. For many years he was adjutant general of the state of Nebraska.



This line was successfully held, a most meritorious performance, by the cavalry until nearly noon, when the Sixth corps came on the ground and relieved it.

Never were reinforcements more cordially welcomed. Never did the uniform and arms of the infantry look better than when the advance of the Sixth corps made its appearance at Old Cold Harbor. In solid array and with quick step they marched out of the woods in rear of the line, and took our places. The tension was relaxed and for the first time since midnight the cavalryman drew a long breath.

This was the beginning of the intimate association of the First cavalry division with the Sixth corps. So close a bond did it become that its hold was not released until the war closed. It was a bond of mutual help, mutual confidence and respect. The Greek cross and the cross sabers were found together on all the battle fields of the Shenandoah valley and we shall see how at Cedar Creek they unitedly made a mark for American valor and American discipline unexcelled in all the annals of war. There, side by side, Wright and Ricketts, Getty and Wheaton stood with Merritt and Custer in the face of an enemy flushed with success, and refused to be beaten until Sheridan came on the field to lead them to victory.

The division then moved back near Old Church and went into camp. June 2 went into camp at Bottom's bridge, where we remained skirmishing with cavalry across the river. June 6 found the First and Second divisions in camp at Newcastle Ferry on the Pamunkey river, in readiness for what is known in the records and in history as the Trevilian raid, conducted by General Sheridan in person.



CHAPTER XX

THE TREVILIAN RAID

The contents of this chapter constitute the latest contribution of the author to the literature of the events recorded in this book. Much of that which has gone before and all of what follows was written many years ago. But in this final draft, every line has been revised. Time and the ripeness of years have tempered and mellowed prejudice; the hasty and sometimes intemperate generalizations of comparative youth have been corrected by maturer judgment; something of ill-advised comment and crudity has been eliminated. Many of his conclusions and even the accuracy of some of his statements of fact, he realizes fully, may not remain unchallenged; yet it has been his honest endeavor and purpose to give, so far as in him lies, a truthful and impartial recital of those salient memories that remain to him of the stirring experiences of the youthful days when, as a boy he "followed the fortunes of the boy general" in the campaigns of 1863-64, in the great civil war.

The outlines of the sketches herein made have been drawn from the official "records of the rebellion" which have been carefully consulted; the details for the most part have been taken from the storehouse of a somewhat retentive memory; something of color and atmosphere necessarily has been left to the imagination. It is a picture that he would present, rather than a dry recital of dates and places, or a mere table of statistics. The importance of these things need not be lessened by seeking to give them an attractive form.

The writer must confess, also to an ambition to contribute something, albeit but a little, toward giving to the Michigan cavalry brigade the place in history which it richly earned; so that it may receive in its due proportions the credit which it deserves for the patriotic and valiant services rendered on so many battle fields. And especially does it seem to be to him a duty to do this for the regiment in which it was his privilege and good luck to serve.

This ambition, however, was nearly stifled, soon after its birth, by an experience very galling to the pride of a well meaning, if sensitive and fallible historian.

It was something like twenty years ago that a paper on the battle of Cedar Creek, prepared with conscientious care and scrupulous fidelity to the facts as the writer understood them, was mailed to General Wesley Merritt, with the request, couched in modest and courteous phrase, that he point out after having read it any inaccuracies of statement that he might make a note of, as the article was intended for publication.

The distinguished cavalry officer replied, in a style that was bland, that he had "long since ceased to read fiction;" that he no longer read "even the Century war articles;" that an officer one month would give his version of things which another officer in a subsequent number of the same magazine would stoutly contradict; and that he was heartily tired of the whole business.

General Merritt was, however, good enough to give in detail his reasons for dissenting from the writer's account of a certain episode of the battle, and his letter lent emphasis to the discussion in one of the early chapters of this volume concerning men occupying different points of view in a battle. This particular matter will be more fully treated in its proper place. One must not be too sure of what he sees with his own eyes and hears with his own ears, unless he is backed by a cloud of witnesses.

Moreover this was notice plain as holy writ, that no mere amateur in the art of war may presume, without the fear of being discredited, to have known and observed that which did not at the time come within the scope of those who had a recognized status as professional soldiers and find its way into their official reports. Indeed, a very high authority as good as told the writer in the war records office in Washington that no man's memory is as good as the published record, or entitled to any weight at all when not in entire harmony therewith.

It is evident that this rule, though perhaps a proper and necessary one, to protect the literature of the war against imposition and fraud, may very easily bar out much that is valuable and well worth writing, if not indispensable to a fair and complete record, provided it can in some way be accredited and invested with the stamp of truth.

It was quite possible for brigade and even regimental commanders, not to draw the line finer still, to have experiences on the battle field of which their immediate superiors were not cognizant; nor is it necessary to beg the question by arguing that all commanding officers were allowed to exercise a discretion of their own within certain limits.

Official reports were oftentimes but hastily and imperfectly sketched amidst the hurry and bustle of breaking camp; or on the eve of battle, when the mind might be occupied with other things of immediate and pressing importance. Sometimes they were prepared long afterwards, when it was as difficult to recall the exact sequence and order of events as it would be after the lapse of years. Some of the "youngsters" of those days failed to realize the value their reports would have in after years as the basis for making history. Others were so unfortunate as to have them "lost in transit" so that, although they were duly and truly prepared and forwarded through the official channels, they never found their way into the printed record.

Attention already has been called to the absence of reports of the commanders of the Michigan cavalry brigade regiments for the Gettysburg campaign. General George B. Davis, U.S. army, when in charge of the war records office in Washington, told the writer that he had noticed this want and wondered at it. He could not account for it. A like misfortune befell the same regiments when they participated in the Kilpatrick raid. Only a part of their reports covering the campaign of 1864, including the Trevilian raid, were published. In this respect the Sixth Michigan suffered more than either of the others. Not a single report of the operations of that regiment for that period, appears in the record, though they were certainly made as required. General Custer's reports cover that regiment, of course, as they do the others in the brigade, but it is unfortunate that these are not supplemented by those of the regimental commander. Until the volumes successively appeared, he was not aware of this defect; nor did he ever receive from any source an intimation of it, or have opportunity to supply the deficiency. Hence, it appeals to him as a duty to remedy, so far as it can be done at this late day, the omissions in the record as published of this gallant regiment.

From the beginning to the end of the campaign of 1864, in Virginia—from the Wilderness, May 4, to Cedar Creek, October 19—except for a single month when he was in command of the brigade, the writer was present with and commanded the Sixth Michigan cavalry. Not a single day was he absent from duty, nor did he miss a battle or skirmish in which the regiment was engaged. Reports were made, but as we have shown they did not find their way into the war department. No copies were retained, so there is a hiatus in the record. There are numerous cases of a similar kind. Some officers, there is reason to believe, were smart enough to seek and were given the opportunity to restore the missing links.

The Trevilian raid resulted from the seeming necessity of drawing the confederate cavalry away from the front of the army of the Potomac while the movement of the latter from the Chickahominy to the James was in progress. Sheridan was ordered to take two divisions and proceed to Charlottesville, on the Virginia Central railroad. Incidentally he was to unite there with the force operating under General Hunter in the direction of Lynchburg. He decided to take the First and Second divisions (Gregg and Torbert). Wilson with the Third division was to remain with the army, taking his orders directly from General Meade.

As we have seen, the expeditionary force, before making the start, was at Newcastle Ferry, on the south bank of the Pamunkey river. Three days' rations to last five days were ordered to be taken in haversacks; also two days' forage strapped to the pommels of the saddles; one hundred rounds of ammunition—forty on the person, sixty in wagons; one medical wagon and eight ambulances; Heaton's and Pennington's batteries; and a pontoon train of eight boats. The brigade commanders were: Custer, Merritt, Devin, Davies and Irvin Gregg. In the Michigan brigade there had been some changes since Cold Harbor. Colonel Alger had returned and resumed command of his regiment. Major Melvin Brewer, of the First Michigan, had been promoted to lieutenant colonel and assigned to command of the Seventh Michigan, his appointment dating June 6.

There is a certain something about the events of that war that makes them stand out in bold relief, like architectural images on the facade of an edifice. They throw all other recollections of a lifetime into the shade. As I sit at my desk writing, with memory at elbow as a prompter, it is difficult to believe that today (May 7, 1908) it lacks but one short month of being forty-four years since those preparations were making on the banks of the Pamunkey river for a cavalry expedition in some respects more strenuous, more difficult than any which had preceded it. Yet those incidents are burned into the memory, and it seems that, after all, it may have been but yesterday, so deep and lasting were the impressions then produced. As the well focused optical image is transferred to a sensitized surface, reproducing the picture, so were those scenes fixed in the mind with photographic certainty, to be retained as long as memory lasts, somewhat faded by time, it may be, but complete in outline if not in details.

The campaign of the previous month had been a hard one for the cavalry. Aside from the fact that he was leaving one third of his force behind, Sheridan's corps had been decimated. A large number of his troopers had been killed and wounded, or rendered hors de combat in other ways. The horses had suffered terribly and many of them had been shot. So only about half the number of mounted men fit for duty that followed the colors of the cavalry corps out of the Wilderness, May 8, marched across the Pamunkey on the pontoon bridge, June 6. Readers who have followed this narrative through the preceding chapters will readily understand this.

Sheridan's plan[27] was to move along the north bank of the North Anna to a point opposite Trevilian Station, on the Virginia Central railroad; then cross the North Anna by one of the bridges or fords, and by a rapid movement capture the station, destroy the railroad from Louisa Courthouse to Gordonsville, and proceed thence to Charlottesville, where the expected junction with Hunter was to be made. If this plan should succeed, the two forces thus united were to advance on Lynchburg and do what, as a matter of fact, Sheridan did not accomplish until the spring of 1865. Instead of marching to Charlottesville, Hunter went the other way, and that feature of the expedition was a failure. Breckinridge's corps of infantry was sent to Gordonsville, the confederate cavalry succeeded in interposing between that place and Trevilian Station and Sheridan advanced no farther than the latter point.



Sheridan's march began on the morning of June 7. Passing between the Pamunkey and the Mattapony rivers, he reached Polecat station on the Richmond and Potomac (Fredericksburg) railroad the evening of June 8, and encamped there for the night. The next day the march was resumed, passing through Chilesburg to the North Anna, and along the bank of that river to Young's Mills, where the entire command bivouacked. June 10, he journeyed to Twyman's store and crossed the North Anna at Carpenter's Ford, near Miner's bridge, between Brock's bridge and New bridge, encamping for the night on the road leading past Clayton's store to Trevilian Station.

In the meantime, as soon as Sheridan's movement was discovered two divisions of confederate cavalry (Hampton's and Fitzhugh Lee's) under Hampton—the latter's division commanded by Butler—started by the direct road between the Annas for Gordonsville, for the purpose of intercepting Sheridan. Breckinridge timed his movements to make his line of march parallel with that of Sheridan. Hampton, having the shorter distance to cover, although he started two days later than his adversary, was able to anticipate the latter in arriving, and was between Gordonsville and Trevilian Station the night that Sheridan crossed the North Anna. Fitzhugh Lee at the same time was near Louisa Courthouse, the two confederate commanders thus being separated by a distance of some six or seven miles on the evening of June 10. The federal cavalry was all together and in position favorable for preventing a union of the confederate forces by a sudden movement in the morning. Both commanders were looking for a battle on the following day and had made their plans accordingly.

Hampton had with him the three brigades of Rosser, Butler and Young; while the other division consisted of the brigades of Lomax and Wickham. It will thus be seen that, while the federal commander had a much smaller force than that which followed him on the raid of the previous month, his opponent was able to meet him with nearly twice the relative strength with which Stuart confronted him at Yellow Tavern. In other words, while Stuart fought him with the three brigades of Lomax, Wickham and Gordon (Hampton not being present) the latter at Trevilian Station had five brigades, including the big South Carolina brigade which fought so gallantly at Haw's Shop. More than that, Breckinridge's infantry was behind the cavalry, ready to reinforce it, if needed.

Sheridan's camp was in the woods north of Clayton's store, and extending eastward as far as Buck Chiles's farm, Gregg on his left, Torbert on the right. His plan was to advance on Trevilian Station, at an early hour on the morning of June 11, by the direct road from Clayton's store. It was given to Gregg to look out for Fitzhugh Lee, who was expected to come into the action from the direction of Louisa Courthouse.

Hampton planned to advance from Trevilian Station with his own division and attack Sheridan at Clayton's store. Lee was to take the road from Louisa Courthouse to the same point and form on Hampton's right. A glance at the map will show that the two roads intersect. Still another country road runs from Louisa Courthouse to Trevilian Station.

Sheridan formed his line of battle with Merritt on the right, Devin to Merritt's left, Custer and Gregg, en echelon, still farther to the left. Custer covered the road toward Louisa Courthouse. The Seventh Michigan picketed that road during the night. At a very early hour the pickets of that regiment were attacked by Lee's advance. The First Michigan was sent to reinforce the Seventh. One brigade of Gregg's division was also sent out to meet Lee. The other one was formed on Devin's left. Sheridan then advanced and attacked Hampton instead of awaiting his attack.

Hampton moved from Trevilian Station with the two brigades of Butler and Young, Butler on the left. Rosser was sent to guard a road farther to the left, protecting that flank. Thus Rosser was isolated when the battle began and Hampton came into action with but two brigades on the line. Fitzhugh Lee was headed off by the First and Seventh Michigan and Gregg's brigade, so that, instead of coming to Hampton's assistance as intended, he was finally compelled to take the road leading directly to Trevilian Station instead of the one to Clayton's store. It will be seen later that he arrived there at an opportune moment to prevent the complete destruction of Hampton's division.

The entire country between the North Anna river and the railroad was covered with timber and a dense undergrowth, except where there were occasional patches of cleared farm lands. When Torbert with his two brigades came into contact with Hampton, his line was found strongly posted in woods so dense that it was difficult to make headway against the defense. From the start, however, Sheridan was the aggressor and Hampton was forced to fight a defensive battle.

In view of the rule laid down by General Sheridan himself (quoted in a footnote on page 241) a criticism might be made on the tactics of the battle. But whether the error, if it was an error, should be laid at the door of the chief of cavalry or of General Torbert there is no way of finding out, though there is reason to believe that the former left the tactics on the field to be worked out by the division commanders. Custer was ordered to take a country road and pass around the flank to the rear of the enemy confronting Torbert. The exact location of this road was unknown and Torbert states in his report that he was under a misapprehension about it; that it did not come out where he supposed it did; and that Custer by taking it lost touch with the other brigades which he was not able to regain until it was too late to accomplish the best results.

Such "combinations rarely work out as expected" and Custer should have been put into action on the left of the line of battle; should have advanced with the division, keeping touch to the right, all the brigades in position to support each other. Then, by directing the entire movement in person, it is probable that Sheridan might have thrown his left forward, completely enveloping Hampton's right and crushing it before there was any possibility of receiving reinforcements. In that event, this turning movement would have been Custer's part of the battle, his regiments would have been kept together, under his eye, and well in hand for a combined movement at the right moment. Complete success must have followed.

The road which Custer took leaves the North Anna river at New bridge, and runs to Trevilian Station. It crosses the Louisa Courthouse and Clayton store road east of Buck Chiles's farm. It intersects the direct road from Louisa Courthouse to Trevilian Station at a place designated on the map as "Netherland."

When Custer started out in the morning the chances were that he would have a hard fight with Fitzhugh Lee at the outset. But it has been shown how, by the interposition of the First and Seventh Michigan and one of Gregg's brigades, that officer was obliged to abandon the plan of reaching Clayton's store and take the other road. So Custer, being relieved from pressure in that direction, started with the Fifth Michigan in advance, followed by Pennington's battery, to carry out his orders to get in Hampton's rear, at or near Trevilian Station. The advance guard was led by Major S.H. Hastings, one of the most daring officers in the brigade. At some point beyond the crossroads, east of Buck Chiles's farm, the exact location being a matter of great uncertainty, upon which the official reports shed no light whatever, Hastings discovered a train of wagons, caissons, led horses and other impedimenta, which he reported to the brigade commander and received orders to charge upon it, the charge to be supported by the entire regiment under Colonel Alger. This charge resulted in the capture of the outfit, but was continued for a long distance beyond the station, this being necessary in order to head off the train, which made a desperate effort to escape in the direction of Gordonsville. Custer's order to the Fifth did not contemplate continuing the pursuit beyond the station, since he was supposed to make a junction there with the other brigades of the First division. But those two brigades were still fighting with Hampton, and the Fifth Michigan was directly in the latter's rear.

When this tumult arose in his rear, Hampton immediately recalled Rosser's brigade posted to protect his left flank, thereby leaving the way open for this foray around his right. Rosser, coming quickly upon the scene, not only intercepted Alger's retreat, but proceeded to contest with the Fifth Michigan the possession of the captures which that regiment had made.

But, I am outrunning my story:

The charge of the Fifth Michigan left Custer's front uncovered, and a force of confederates which belonged to Young's brigade and had probably been looking out for Hampton's right flank and rear, threw itself across his path and boldly challenged his right to advance. This was not a large body of troops, probably the Seventh Georgia cavalry, but it made up in audacity what it lacked in numbers. At that time—immediately after the charge of the Fifth Michigan—and before Rosser had begun his interference, Custer had with him only his staff and escort, and behind them was Pennington's battery which had no opportunity to come into action. The situation was apparently critical in the extreme.

The only available regiment at the time to throw into the breach was the Sixth Michigan and that was just starting to move out of the woods where it had been encamped during the night. It was not supposed then that the battle was joined and, indeed, the expectation was that the march was to be a continuation of that of the previous day, although the picket firing in the early morning indicated the close proximity of the enemy. But that had been the case for a morning or two before. Before mounting, the officer in command had thoughtlessly acceded to the request of a brother officer to ride a spirited and nervous black horse belonging to the latter, as he expressed it, "To take the ginger out of him." In place of the regulation McClellan saddle the horse was equipped with one of those small affairs used by jockeys in riding race horses. This had been picked up en route. Horse and saddle certainly made an attractive looking mount, but not such an one as a cavalry officer with a sound mind would select for close work on the battle line. The narration of these circumstances will enable the reader to judge of how little the subordinate officers knew of the real impending situation. It can be stated with absolute certainty that the officers of the Sixth were innocent of any knowledge of the fact that Custer had started out for a fight, up to the moment when they were ordered to mount and move out of the woods into a road running along the east side.

The commander of the regiment, mounted as described, and leading the column of files, not having yet formed fours, on account of the woods and brush, had barely reached the edge of the woods by the road, when a member of the brigade staff brought the order to, "Take the gallop and pass the battery." It is probable that this order was sent at the same time that the Fifth was sent forward to capture the train. Custer of course supposed that the Sixth was in column of fours in the road behind the battery. The commanding officer of the Sixth had moved out in compliance with orders and knew nothing about the conditions in front. The command, "Form fours, gallop, march" was given and a touch of the spur sent the black steed flying toward the front, followed as quickly as possible by the leading squadron of the regiment. A regimental staff officer remained to repeat the order to the other squadrons as they came into the road, successively.

Approaching the crossroads, the conditions were revealed as described in a previous paragraph. Custer and his escort were exchanging shots with their revolvers, at short range, with the confederates in their front. The most remarkable coolness and courage were being displayed on both sides. The enemy certainly was commanded by an officer of resources who realized to the fullest extent the responsibility resting upon him to delay our further advance as long as possible. Custer never lost his nerve under any circumstances. He was, however, unmistakably excited. "Charge them" was his laconic command; and it was repeated with emphasis.

Looking back to see that the leading squadron was pretty well closed up I gave the command, "Draw sabers" and, without waiting to form front into line, or for the remainder of the regiment, the column of fours charged straight at the line of confederates, the black horse leading. In a moment we were through the line. Just how it was done is to this day more or less of a mystery. The enemy gave way—scattered to the right and left—and did not await the contact. On down the road, one hundred, two hundred—it may have been five hundred—yards, but not more than that, at breakneck speed, the charge continued. Then it was seen that there was no enemy in front of us. Where was the enemy?

Custer says in his report that Alger's orders were to stop at the station. The single word "charge" comprehended his order to me. Nothing was said about stopping. No warning was given that the Fifth had already charged and was ahead of us. Nor did I know it. The order had been obeyed to the letter. The enemy had apparently been dispersed. At all events he had disappeared from our front. At such times the mind acts quickly. The obvious course was to halt, rally, reform, see what was going on in rear, rejoin the brigade commander, get the regiment all together, for work where we were most needed. Finding that both hands were required to curb the excited steed which, up to that moment had not allowed another horse to come up with him, I returned my revolver to the holster and, when his speed began to slacken, and Captain Vinton, commander of the charging squadron, came alongside, gave the command, "Halt" which was twice repeated. My horse swerved to the right and, when brought to a standstill, was a little way in the woods. The clatter of hoofs behind had told me that I was followed, and I supposed it was by my own troopers. Not so, however. Vinton either did not hear, or was too much "under the influence of a pardonable excitement and zeal" to heed the order to halt, and continued on down the road to and beyond the station, where he overtook the rear of the Fifth and proceeded to assist in the endeavor to bring away the captured property. He was attacked by Rosser who made a lot of his men prisoners. The detachment that went with him did not rejoin the regiment until late in the afternoon and then less the men who had been captured.

The word, "Surrender" uttered in imperious tones saluted my ear and, glancing over my left shoulder to find whence it came, I found that a well mounted and sturdy confederate officer had come up from my left rear and, addressing me in language both profane and apparently designed to cast reflections on my ancestry, declared that if I did not comply instantly with his polite request he would complete the front cut on my head. His men circling around in front with their carbines in the position of "ready" seemed to hint that they considered his demand a reasonable one and expressed a purpose to assist in enforcing it. Now, it is a maxim that no cavalry officer may surrender so long as he is not unhorsed. But in the situation in which I found myself there did not seem to be an available alternative. I surrendered, gave up the black horse and the jockey saddle, and never saw either of them afterwards. After the experience described I was glad to be rid of them on most any terms. Several others were captured at the same time and in the same way. One of them after being dismounted tried to run away but was quickly brought to a halt by a shot from a confederate's gun which wounded him.

It appears that when we went through their line the rascally confederates rallied and, leaving Custer's front charged our rear. Custer says in his report that after "the Sixth Michigan charged the rebels charged that regiment in rear." When he wrote that report he had forgotten that it was only a portion—less than a third of the Sixth which charged. Two-thirds of the regiment was still back where he was and not yet in the action. There were two squadrons, one commanded by Captain Manning D. Birge, the other by Captain Don G. Lovell in reserve. In using the term squadron here I mean what in the civil war was known as a battalion (four troops). Vinton's squadron did not all take part in the charge.

Four confederate cavalrymen undertook the duty of escorting myself and a young Sixth cavalryman who had been trapped in the same way to the rear through the woods. Anticipating that our attack would be followed up, we managed to delay our guards as much as possible, and had gone not more than a hundred yards when a yelling in the road proclaimed that the curtain had risen on the second scene of our little drama. Custer had ordered Birge to charge. Birge's advance put the confederates to flight, what there were left of them. The noise of the pursuit disconcerted our captors so that we took the chances and made our escape under cover of the thick undergrowth. They fired at us as we ran but did not succeed in making a hit. Fortunately Birge directed his course through the woods out of which the enemy had come and into which they had gone in their flight. In a minute we met him coming with a squad of men. He was greatly rejoiced to find that he had rescued me from my disagreeable predicament and, looking back across the years, I can see and freely acknowledge that to no man on this earth am I under greater obligations than to Manning D. Birge. But for his approach it might not have been possible for us to successfully make our break for freedom. That was the only time I ever was a prisoner of war and then only for about ten minutes. Custer, referring to my capture, says that I was rescued by a charge of my own regiment led by Captain Birge.



Bidding Birge to follow my late captors I hurried out to the road and thence to the crossroads from which we had started so short a time before. Custer was still there. His battery was there. Most of the Sixth was halted there. My recollection is that the First and Seventh about that time joined Custer, after finding that Fitzhugh Lee had withdrawn from their front looking toward Louisa Courthouse. Birge's charge had cleared the road of the enemy, for the time being. Custer ordered that a rail barricade be thrown up across the road leading to the right, from which direction the attacks had been made on him. Putting the men of Vinton's and Birge's squadrons who were available at work, Lovell's squadron of four troops which was intact and well in hand under as good an officer as there was in the brigade, was posted in line mounted, parallel with the road, and behind a screen of timber, in readiness to repel any further attack.

In a few minutes Sergeant Avery, one of the men who had gone with Birge in pursuit of the enemy from whom I had escaped, came in with a confederate prisoner splendidly mounted. Avery with cocked revolver was making his prisoner ride ahead of him and thus brought him in. Receiving orders to dismount, the man gave the horse a caress and with something very like a tear in his eye said:

"That is the best horse in the Seventh Georgia cavalry."

The horse, with Avery's consent was turned over to me to take the place of the captured black. He proved to be a prize. Handsome as a picture, kind and well broken, sound, spirited but tractable, with a glossy coat of silky luster, he was a mount that a real cavalryman would become attached to and be proud of. I rode him and he had the best of care until he succumbed to the cold weather and exposure near Winchester in the winter following. He was a finely bred southern horse and could not endure the climate.

Birge was not so fortunate. When he went after his prisoners he caught a Tartar, or came very near it. The barricade was only partially completed, when yelling in front,—that is in the road leading to the right,—caused every one to look in that direction. Birge and a few of his men were seen coming at full speed with what looked like a good big squadron of the enemy at their heels. Mounting the Seventh Georgia horse, I rode around the barricade and into the field where Lovell was with his battalion. He had been placed there for just such an emergency. Birge did not stop until he had leaped his mare over the barricade. When the confederate column came up, Lovell surprised them with a volley right in their teeth, which sent them "whirling" back into the woods out of which they had come.

This was the end of the fighting at that point. Taking with him the Seventh, under Lieutenant Colonel Brewer, and the battery Custer then moved on toward Trevilian Station, leaving the First under Lieutenant Colonel Stagg and the Sixth to bring up and look out for the rear. The affray at the crossroads had occupied less time than it takes to tell it. In giving the story it has been difficult to steer into the middle course between a seeming desire to give undue prominence to one's own part in the action, on one hand, and affectation of undue modesty, on the other. The only course appeared to be to narrate the incidents as they befell and leave it to the kind reader to judge the matter on its apparent merits.

When Custer approached the station he found Rosser in his way on his front and right flank. Fitzhugh Lee, coming from Louisa Courthouse, also attacked his left flank. For a time there was a melee which had no parallel in the annals of cavalry fighting in the civil war, unless it may have been at Brandy Station or Buckland Mills. Custer's line was in the form of a circle and he was fighting an enterprising foe on either flank and both front and rear. Fitzhugh Lee charged and captured a section of Pennington's battery. The Seventh Michigan led by Brewer recaptured it. Fragments of all the regiments in the brigade rallied around Custer for the mounted fighting, of which there was plenty, while the First and Sixth dismounted took care of the rear. Custer was everywhere present giving directions to his subordinate commanders, and more than one mounted charge was participated in by him in person.

Torbert's attack with Merritt's and Devin's brigades was at length successful in routing Hampton, whose men were driven into and through Custer's lines. Many of them were made prisoners. An officer and twelve men belonging to the Seventh Georgia cavalry, making for the rear as they supposed, came into the arms of the Sixth Michigan skirmishers at one time. The officer gave up his revolver to me and it proved to be a very fine five shooting arm of English make.

In the final stages of the battle, Gregg concentrated against Fitzhugh Lee, Torbert effected his junction with Custer, and the latter was extricated from his difficult and dangerous predicament, after performing prodigies of valor. The lines changed front and the confederates were driven across the railroad, Hampton towards Gordonsville, Lee to the eastward. The two did not succeed in coming together that night, and Lee was obliged to make a wide detour in order to reunite with his chief on the afternoon of the next day, Sunday, June 12.

The entire command encamped on the battle field in the neighborhood of Trevilian Station for the night. The next morning Gregg was set at work tearing up the railroad toward Louisa Courthouse. The First division was given a rest until the afternoon when, at about three o'clock, although it was Sunday, the order came for the First division to proceed in the direction of Gordonsville. In the meantime, the forces of Hampton and Lee had united and, as will be seen, had planned to stop Sheridan's further progress at all hazards. There is some reason to believe that a part of Breckinridge's infantry had come out from Gordonsville to reinforce Hampton. Such was the impression at the time, and one at least, of Sheridan's commanders, states in his report that he was confronted by infantry. The writer is of the opinion that the "infantry" was Butler's dismounted cavalry which, when in a good position as they were that day, could do as good fighting as any infantry in the confederate service.

The Michigan brigade moved out first and the Sixth had the advance. The order was to proceed to a certain point named and then halt until the division closed up. Memory does not recall what the place was, but is quite clear as to that being the specific direction given by General Custer to the officer in command of the advance regiment. We had gone but a short distance, not more than a mile or two at most, when the advance guard reported the enemy entrenched across the way. Skirmishing began at once between our mounted men in front and dismounted confederates behind breastworks of considerable strength. A squadron was deployed and Sergeant Avery was directed to make his way far enough into the woods to find, if possible, what we had in our front. He came back in about ten minutes and reported that the breastworks in our immediate front were thoroughly manned, and that he had seen a column of at least a thousand men moving into the entrenchments on the enemy's right, in front of our left flank. He was sent back to give Custer this information, and the general came up and ordered the entire regiment to be dismounted to fight on foot. The Sixth was put in on the right of the road and directly thereafter the Seventh was sent in on the left. It did not take long to demonstrate that two regiments were not enough and the First and Fifth went into the action on the right of the Sixth. Then Torbert reinforced the line with the Reserve brigade and a portion of the Second, all under Merritt. The entire division became engaged. Several assaults were made upon the confederate line but without success. They were in each instance repulsed. Fitzhugh Lee got in on the right flank of the division and inflicted severe damage upon the Reserve brigade. We have never been able to understand why, if it was intended to break the enemy's line, Gregg's division was not brought into the engagement to protect that flank. General Merritt in his report intimates that he had to do more than his share of fighting; that when the Reserve brigade advanced to the assault on the right it was supposed that the attack would be pressed on the left; that it was not so pressed and that his brigade suffered unduly on that account. This is another case of a man being unable to see all that is going on in a battle. The Michigan brigade was on the left of the line. It was the first brigade engaged. It began the fight and stayed in it till the end. Harder fighting has rarely been done than that which fell to the Michigan men in that battle. Several attempts were made to drive the enemy from their front. The First Michigan especially made a charge across an open field in the face of a terrible fire from behind breastworks, going half way across before they were repulsed. When the First Michigan could not stand before a storm of bullets, no other regiment in the cavalry corps need try. That is a certainty. The losses in killed and wounded were very severe, as will be shown in a table printed at the end of this chapter.



The fighting continued till ten o'clock that night, when Sheridan decided to withdraw and abandon the expedition. It is worthy of remark that the entire division was unable to advance one inch beyond the place where the advance guard first encountered the enemy and where Sergeant Avery made the reconnoissance which revealed to General Custer the true situation. Poor Avery was killed while doing his duty as he always did in the very front of the battle in the place of greatest danger. Captain Lovell and Lieutenant Luther Canouse of the Sixth were wounded; Captain Carr, and Lieutenants Pulver and Warren of the First Michigan were killed, and Captain Duggan and Lieutenant Bullock of the same regiment wounded. Captains Hastings and Dodge of the Fifth were wounded; also Lieutenant Colonel Brewer of the Seventh was wounded on the eleventh.

The casualties in the two days' fighting at Trevilian Station were very severe. The losses in killed and died from wounds received in the action aggregated in the brigade forty one, as follows:[28]

First Michigan 13 Fifth Michigan 8 Sixth Michigan 17 Seventh Michigan 3 —- Total 41

Of prisoners lost there were in all two hundred and forty-two, distributed as follows:

First Michigan 39 Fifth Michigan 102 Sixth Michigan 58 Seventh Michigan 43 —- Total 242

Of those who were captured and held as prisoners of war, eighty-eight died in southern prisons—most of them in Andersonville—as follows:[29]

First Michigan 12 Fifth Michigan 35 Sixth Michigan 26 Seventh Michigan 15 —- Total 88

The battle of Trevilian Station practically ended the fighting which was done by the Michigan brigade in the campaign from the Rapidan to the James. Sheridan's retreat was skilfully conducted but was not especially eventful. A tabulated statement of the losses in the command, beginning in the Wilderness, May 6, and ending at Trevilian Station June 12, is appended hereto. By losses I mean killed in action or died of wounds received in action. It is not possible to give a reliable statement of the wounded, reports of regimental commanders being very deficient in that particular. The table is compiled from the official records in the office of the adjutant general of Michigan and is believed to be approximately correct:

First Fifth Sixth Seventh Michigan Michigan Michigan Michigan Total

Wilderness 2 3 4 — 9 Todd's Tavern 3 — — 1 4 Beaver Dam Station 1 — — — 1 Yellow Tavern 14 7 3 9 33 Meadow Bridge — — 2 — 2 Hanovertown — — 3 — 3 Haw's Shop 5 13 18 6 42 Old Church 2 — — 1 3 Cold Harbor 5 1 1 3 10 Trevilian Station 13 8 17 3 41 —— —— —— —— —— Total 45 32 48 23 148

Recapitulation—Killed and died of wounds, the Rapidan to the James:

First Michigan 45 Fifth Michigan 32 Sixth Michigan 48 Seventh Michigan 23 —- Total 148

In General Merritt's official report[30] for the period May 26 to June 26, he makes the following statement:

"The losses in killed and wounded, (in the Reserve brigade,) are annexed in tabular statement. As they number more than the loss of the entire rest of the command they sufficiently attest the severe services of the brigade."

When General Merritt says "the entire rest of the command" we shall assume that he means "the entire rest" of the First division. We have no desire to make invidious comparisons, and have avoided doing so throughout these recollections. The Reserve brigade was a fine brigade and always fought well, and never better than at Trevilian Station and in the battles immediately preceding that engagement. To prove that his comparison was not warranted it is necessary only to refer to the official records. On page 810 of the same volume,[31] appended to the report of General Torbert, for the same period covered by General Merritt's report, we find:

Reserve Brigade— Officers killed 6 Officers wounded 17 —— Officers killed and wounded 23

Reserve Brigade— Men killed 57 Men wounded 275 —— 332 —— Total officers and men killed and wounded 355

Second Brigade— Officers killed 2 Officers wounded 15 —— Officers killed and wounded 17 Second Brigade— Men killed 42 Men wounded 163 —— Men killed and wounded 205 —— Total officers and men killed and wounded 222

First Brigade— Officers killed 3 Officers wounded 12 —— Officers killed and wounded 15

First Brigade— Men killed 62 Men wounded 192 —— Men killed and wounded 254 —— Total officers and men killed and wounded 269 Total killed and wounded First and Second Brigades 491 Total killed and wounded Reserve Brigade 355

The Reserve brigade comprised five regiments, two of volunteers and three of regulars. The Michigan brigade consisted of four regiments, of course, all volunteers. One third of the losses in killed and wounded at Trevilian Station in the Reserve brigade were in the single regiment, the First New York dragoons. My authority for this is still the official records. See page 186 of the volume already quoted and referred to in the footnote. Close analysis, therefore, shows that there are inconsistencies in the official records, and unguarded statements in the official reports.

The rest of the month of June was consumed in the return march to the army. Owing to the necessity of caring for a large number of wounded and of guarding several hundred prisoners, to say nothing of an army of colored people of all ages and of both sexes who joined the procession, it was necessary to take a tortuous course which traversed the Spottsylvania battle ground, touched at Bowling Green, followed the north bank of the Mattapony river, reaching King and Queen Courthouse June 18. From this place the sick, wounded and prisoners were sent to West Point. On the 19th we marched to Dunkirk, on the Mattapony river, which was crossed on a pontoon bridge and thence to the Pamunkey, opposite White House. June 21, the entire command crossed the Pamunkey at White House and marched the next day (June 22) to Jones's bridge on the Chickahoming. June 25 reached the James river and on the 28th crossed that river to Windmill Point. From here the First and Second divisions were sent to Reams's Station to the relief of the Third division under Wilson which had run into a situation similar to, if not more serious than that which Custer faced on the 11th at Trevilian. Finding that officer safe, we returned to Lighthouse Point and settled down—after having fought and marched for fifty-six consecutive days—for a period of rest and recuperation. During the entire march from Trevilian to the James, Hampton hovered on the flank of Sheridan's column, watching for a favorable opportunity to inflict a blow, but avoiding a general engagement. In crossing from the Pamunkey to the James, Sheridan was charged with the duty of escorting a train of 900 wagons from the White House to Douthat's Landing on the James. General Gregg was entrusted with the responsibility of protecting the right flank, which placed him in the post of danger, and the brunt of the fighting as well as the greater part of the honors of the movement fell to his share. Indeed, General Sheridan in his official report, written in New Orleans a year after the war closed, gave Gregg credit for saving the train.

The time from July 2, when we returned to Lighthouse Point on the James river, to July 26 was quiet and uneventful. Many hundred convalescent wounded and sick men returned from hospital to duty; many also who had been dismounted by the exigencies of the campaign returned from dismounted camps. A fine lot of new horses were received. During the month the condition of the animals was very much improved, good care and a plentiful supply of forage contributing to the result. The duty performed was to picket the left flank of the army, the Michigan regiments connecting with Crawford's division of the Fifth corps.

The story of the participation of the cavalry with the Second corps in the movement to the north side of the James, which began on the forenoon of July 26, has been so fully and so well told by General Sheridan in his reports and in his memoirs that nothing is left to be added. In fact there is little, if anything, in the part taken by any portion of the force taken across by Sheridan and Hancock to differentiate it from that played by the whole. The object of the movement was to draw the enemy's attention away from the lines around Petersburg preparatory for the explosion of the mine which was to take place on the 30th. In this it was successful. General Lee mistook the attack on his left for real instead of a feint, and detached enough troops to meet it to not only assure the success of the attack on Petersburg, if it had been made with determination, but to seriously menace the safety of the two corps engaged in the movement. General Sheridan truthfully says that, "The movement to the north side of the James for the accomplishment of our part of the plan connected with the mine explosion, was well executed, and every point made; but it was attended with such anxiety and sleeplessness as to prostrate almost every officer and man in the command."

This was the last incident of importance connected with the services of the First cavalry division with the army of the Potomac in the year 1864. August 1, Sheridan was ordered to the Shenandoah Valley and selected the First and Third cavalry divisions to go with him.

Since this is in some sort a personal narrative it may be of interest to mention that while at Lighthouse Point I received my commission as colonel and, July 9, was mustered out of the United States service as major—with which rank I had been commanding the regiment—and was mustered in in the new grade. The promotion, which was unsought, was due to a request made to the governor, signed by all the officers of the regiment serving in the field, and recommended by General Custer. On the original petition, on file in the adjutant general's office in Lansing, is an endorsement in the general's own handwriting.[32]



CHAPTER XXI

IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY

When Grant sent Sheridan to take charge of things in the Shenandoah Valley, and close that gateway to the north, he gave him one corps of infantry (Sixth) and two divisions of cavalry (First and Third) from the army of the Potomac. The Michigan cavalry brigade, still commanded by General George A. Custer, was a part of that force. It embarked on transports at City Point, Virginia, August 3, 1864, and proceeded to Washington, D.C., thence by the way of Poolesville, Maryland, to Halltown, Virginia, in front of Harper's Ferry, arriving there August 10, in time to join in the advance of the new army of the Middle Military Division,[33] under its new commander.

Gregg with the Second division was left behind, under the immediate direction of General Meade, and thus, much to their regret, the Michigan men parted finally with that fine officer and his superb command, with whom they had been associated so intimately and honorably at Gettysburg, Haw's Shop, and in many other places. When they rejoined the army of the Potomac, in the spring of 1865, he had retired from the service. They never saw him again but, from the eventful days of 1863 and 1864 to the present time, they have never ceased to respect him as a soldier and a man; and he always had their entire confidence as a commander of cavalry.

Sheridan wanted Early to cross into Maryland or to fight him in and around Winchester, but was in the dark as to his adversary's intentions or movements, so at daylight, August 11, he started a reconnoissance in force. Custer led the way across the Opequon creek, toward Winchester, and soon ran into Early's infantry. A sharp fight followed which showed that Early was retreating up the valley. Ransom's regular battery, attached to the brigade, was charged by confederate infantry, which was met and repulsed by a countercharge of one battalion of the Sixth Michigan cavalry led by Captain James Mathers, who was killed. Sheridan had left the gateway via the fords of the Potomac river open, but Early was too foxy to take the lure. He was getting away as fast as he could to a place of safety.

The pursuit was instantly taken up and the next day (12th) found us up against infantry again at Fisher's Hill, between Cedar Creek and Strasburg, a position impregnable against direct assault. For three days we remained face to face with Early's infantry, constantly so close as to draw their fire and keep them in their intrenchments.

On the 16th we marched to Front Royal. Sheridan had information that a force of infantry and cavalry had been despatched from Richmond to reinforce Early and, incidentally, to strike Sheridan in flank or rear, if he could be caught napping. The force consisted of Kershaw's division of infantry and Fitzhugh Lee's division of cavalry, all commanded by General R. H. Anderson. The route by which they were supposed to be approaching was through Chester Gap and Front Royal. If they could have reached the Shenandoah river and effected a crossing undiscovered, a short march would have brought them to Newtown, directly in rear of our army.

Custer crossed and marched through Front Royal but no enemy was found. He then recrossed and took position on commanding ground half a mile or so back from the river, and ordered the horses to be unsaddled and fed and the men to cook their dinner. Headquarters wagons were brought up, mess chests taken out, and we were just gathering around them to partake of a hastily prepared meal, when Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry, which had stealthily approached the ford, charged across and made a dash at our pickets. Major H.H. Vinton, of the Sixth Michigan was in command of the picket line and promptly rallying on his reserves, he courageously met Lee's attack and checked it. That dinner was never eaten. Custer's bugler sounded "to horse." As if by magic, the men were in the saddle. Custer dashed out with his staff and ordered the Fifth Michigan forward, to be followed by the other regiments, I supposed he would charge in the direction of the ford, where Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry was still contending with the Sixth Michigan. He did nothing of the kind. Moving diagonally to the left, he reached the crest overlooking the river just in time to surprise Kershaw in the act of crossing. The Fifth Michigan deployed into line in fine style and opened such a hot fire with their Spencers, that the head of Kershaw's column was completely crushed. Every confederate who was across was either killed or captured. Many of those who were in the water were drowned and those on the other side were kept there. Just then, Devin's brigade came up, and helped to drive the cavalry across the river. The prisoners, all infantry, numbered from three to five hundred.

This rencounter at Front Royal was one of the most brilliant affairs of the war and it illustrated well the marvelous intuition with which General Custer often grasped the situation, in an instant of time. He did not anticipate Kershaw's movement or he would not have given the order to unsaddle. It was a surprise but he was alert, and equal to the emergency. He was as bold to act as his perceptions were keen, and the incident recalls the intrepidity with which he met Rosser in the Wilderness under somewhat similar circumstances. Had he charged the cavalry, Anderson would have effected a crossing, and in a very short time might have had the Michigan brigade at such disadvantage that it would have required all of Custer's boldness and skill to extricate it. Custer divined that the dash of Lee's advance was a mask for the infantry, and by a movement that would have done credit to Murat or Ney, caught Kershaw astride the river and trapped him completely. The behavior of the Fifth Michigan was never more "superb." I do not believe that a single regiment, on either side, at any time, during the entire war, performed a more brilliant deed. Major Vinton and his detachment also earned especial praise by interrupting without aid, the first onset of Fitzhugh Lee's advance. The First and Seventh Michigan supported the Fifth in a most gallant manner. General Custer had a lock of hair shot away from his temple and Lieutenant Granger of his staff was killed. Lieutenant Lucius Carver of the Seventh also lost his life in the engagement.

After this fight it was found that Sheridan had begun a retrograde movement down the valley to take a defensive position in front of Halltown. The brigade brought up the rear, the Sixth Michigan acting as rear guard.

From the 16th to the 25th of August, it was marching and countermarching, picketing, reconnoitering and skirmishing, continually. Both armies were maneuvering for position and advantage. Anderson's reinforcement had joined Early and, with the esprit of the Army of Northern Virginia, was constantly pushing close up to our lines and harassing us. The Michigan brigade was mostly engaged with infantry and did not once, I believe, come into contact with the confederate cavalry. It was a lonesome day, indeed, when their mettle was not put to the proof in a skirmish with either Kershaw or Breckinridge. But one incident occurred to break the monotony. A part of the Fifth Michigan sent out to destroy some buildings supposed to contain supplies, was surprised by Mosby's command and fifteen men were killed outright. They were caught in a field where escape was impossible and shot without mercy. The Sixth was sent out to reinforce the Fifth and we searched far and near for the dashing partisan but did not succeed in coming up with him. He departed as swiftly as he came and made his escape to the mountains.

Sheridan had, in his turn, been reinforced by Wilson's division of cavalry (Third) and, on the 25th, Torbert[34] was sent out with Merritt's and Wilson's divisions, to hunt up Fitzhugh Lee, who was reported to have gone in the direction of the fords leading into Maryland. At or near Kearneysville, a small force of cavalry was encountered which was driven rapidly along the road toward Leetown. Nearing the latter place, the inevitable infantry was found and it turned out to be Breckinridge's corps, going north along the Smithfield and Shepherdstown pike. Shepherdstown is on the Potomac river, opposite Sharpsburg and the Antietam battle ground.

It never will be known what Breckinridge was intending to do, for he turned on Torbert and did not resume his journey. The collision was a complete surprise to both parties, but Early's design, whatever it may have been, was disarranged, the movement was discovered and, though the cavalry had rather the worst of it, the information gained was worth all it cost. If Early had been contemplating an invasion of Maryland, he relinquished the design and did not revive it.

Torbert, finding that he had more than he could handle, fell back toward Halltown, leaving Custer with his brigade for a rear guard. Custer, coming to a piece of woods south of Shepherdstown, neither the enemy nor our own cavalry being in sight, halted and had his men dismount to rest, they having been in the saddle since early morning. We were all sitting or lying down with bridle reins in hand, taking our ease with more or less dignity, when a small body of confederate horse made its appearance in the direction of Shepherdstown. The brigade mounted and started in pursuit but had hardly been put in motion when a line of infantry suddenly appeared in the woods we were vacating and opened fire upon us. The confederate horsemen were driven away by the First and Seventh and, when General Custer rallied his brigade to confront the new danger, he found that Breckinridge had intercepted his retreat in the direction the rest of the cavalry had gone, and was closing in with a line that threatened to envelop the brigade. In a few moments, the enemy's right and left flanks began to swing in towards the river and he found himself face to face with two alternatives: To cut his way through, or fall back and take the risky chance of fording the river, with Breckinridge close at his heels. Of course there was no thought of surrender and Custer was not much given to showing his heels. Torbert left Custer to shift for himself. So far as I ever was able to learn, he made no effort to save his plucky subordinate and the report that the Michigan brigade had been captured was generally credited, in and around Harper's Ferry.

Custer, with surprising coolness, put his brigade into line, the Sixth on the right, the First, Fifth and Seventh to the left of the Sixth, the battery in the center, with backs to the river and faces to the enemy, and presented so bold a front that the infantry did not charge, but moved up slowly, maneuvering to get around and obtain possession of the ford in rear. Custer had the men cheer and dared them to come on. With characteristic audacity, he actually unlimbered his pieces and gave them a charge or two right in their teeth; then limbering to the rear he took successive new positions and repeated the performance.

While holding one of these points, a squadron of the First New York dragoons, of Devin's brigade, which also in some way had been separated from its command, was driven in from the right, and, riding up to where I was, the commanding officer, Captain Brittain, saluted and said:

"Colonel, I am cut off from my own regiment and wish to report to you for duty."

"Form your men to the right," I said. "It looks as if your aid would be very acceptable."

"I have no cartridges. We have shot them all away."

"You have sabers."

"Yes, and by —— they are loaded," he retorted, as he brought his men front into line on the right.

Captain Brittain survived the war and came to Michigan to live. He often has sent me kindly reminders of his remembrance of the circumstances as narrated above. For many years he had a home in Wexford county, and I last heard of him as prospering on the Pacific coast.

At that moment, the thing had a critical look. We were inside a horseshoe of infantry, the extremities of which very nearly reached the river. We had to go through that line, or through the river, or surrender. Breckinridge's line was in plain sight, not a half mile away, in the open and moving up in splendid order. So far as I am informed, Custer was the only man in the command who knew that there was a ford and that we were making for it. The rest were screwing their courage up to the task of breaking through. I never have ceased to admire the nerve exhibited by Captain Brittain, when I told him it looked as if that was what we would have to do. He was an excellent officer and belonged to an excellent regiment.

"My sabers are loaded."

The greatest coolness was displayed by General Custer and his entire command. There was not a hint of weakness or fear in any quarter. The brigade, at each falling back, ployed from line into column and deployed into line again, as if on parade, with Breckinridge and his corps for the spectators. Every movement was at a walk. There was no haste—no confusion. Every officer was on his mettle and every man a hero.

Presently, Custer finally withdrew his battery, then the regiments one at a time, and slipped away into Maryland before the enemy realized what he was doing.

The delicate duty of bringing up the rear was entrusted to Colonel Alger with his own regiment and the Sixth. I was ordered to report to him. The battery crossed first, then the First and Seventh, the brigade staff and general commanding.

The two regiments stood in line, watching the enemy closing in closer and closer until this was accomplished. Then Colonel Alger told me to go. He followed leisurely and, as the Fifth and Sixth were marching up the Maryland bank, a line of confederates came up on the other side, and so astounded were they to see how we had escaped from their grasp, that some of them actually cheered, so I have been informed. They had been deceived by the audacity of Custer and his men in the first place and by the cleverness with which they eluded capture in the second.

The battle of Shepherdstown was the last in which Colonel Alger was engaged. While the brigade was lying in camp on the Maryland side awaiting orders, he was taken sick and was sent to hospital by order of the brigade surgeon. He was assigned to special duty by order of President Lincoln and did not rejoin. The esteem in which he was held by General Custer and the confidence which that officer reposed in him to the last moment of his service in the brigade is amply evidenced by the selection of him to lead the attack on Kershaw at Front Royal and to bring up the rear at Shepherdstown. The coolness and ability of the officers and the intrepidity of the men in the Michigan cavalry brigade were never more thoroughly tested than in those two battles. Custer was the hero of both and Alger was his right arm. At Meadow Bridge, at Yellow Tavern and in all the battles of that eventful campaign, wherever they were associated together, wherever the one wanted a man tried, true, trained and trustworthy, there he would put the other. No misunderstandings that arose later can alter the significance or break the force of these cold facts.

In the battle of Shepherdstown Captain Frederick Augustus Buhl, of the First Michigan was mortally wounded, dying a few days later. He was a Detroit boy, and a classmate of mine in Ann Arbor when the war broke out. I was deeply grieved at his death as I had learned to love him like a brother. He was conspicuous for his gallantry in all the engagements in which he participated, especially at Front Royal and Shepherdstown.