|
I have noticed this Company thus fully, because its extent of stock, and large field of operation, make it a fit illustration of the views which I have advanced throughout this work. I have no desire to depreciate the stock, or in any other way injure the Company, as my own enterprise gives me quite enough to do.
Many of the views advanced with regard to the Pacific Mail Company will apply to the United States Mail Steamship Company. That Company, at the outset, built very fine steamers, and ran them incessantly, until they were unfit for duty. They have constantly supplied their place, and have at all times, by building and by chartering at the highest prices, kept up a large and costly fleet for their ramified service. The service contemplated in their original contract, at $1.88-3/4 cents per mile, is but about two thirds of that actually performed. The contract required them to run 3,200 miles semi-monthly, but they actually perform semi-monthly 5,200. (See Mr. King's Letter, Paper G.) The actual service has required nearly twice the number of steamers necessary to do that for which they contracted, although a part of it is in the coasting trade. Consequently the steamers have been rapidly worn out, from too heavy duty, and the stock of the Company has never paid as well as it should. The Company have, morever, suffered severely from disaster. The "Crescent City" was lost on the Bahama Banks, in 1855; all hands saved. The "Cherokee" was burned when in active service, in 1853; and the "George Law," or "Central America," but recently foundered at sea in a terrible gale. They were all good ships; but like those other excellent ships, the "Arctic" and "Pacific," they could not defy the powers of pure accident. In the same gale the "Empire City" was dismantled, having all of her upper works swept off, while the "Illinois" was injured by being on the Colorado Reef. They have both been undergoing most costly repairs for several weeks. While writing this, the "Philadelphia" is also in the shop. She recently broke her shaft and her cross-tail, and had to put into Charleston. All of these repairs cost an immense sum of money, and are calculated, with the severe losses which the Company has sustained, to dishearten the most hopeful and enterprising. Yet, since these disasters, and the completion of the "Moses Taylor," the Company are about laying the keel of another fine ship. This is another verification of my statement that the mail companies are in nearly every instance compelled to build new steamers in the very last years of their contracted service. The new "Adriatic" attests the same fact on the part of the Collins Company. (See pages 141 and 142.)
The Company have had at various times the "Falcon," "Ohio," "Georgia," "Crescent City," "El Dorado," "Cherokee," "Empire City," "Illinois," and "Philadelphia," and now have the three last-named ships, the "Granada," the "Star of the West," and the new steamer "Moses Taylor." The benefits conferred by the Company's lines on the trade of the country generally, and especially on our southern seaboard and Gulf connections, have been almost incalculable. They found all of these ports in the undisputed possession of the British, whose steamers furnished the only mail and locomotive facilities of the times. By their superior speed and accommodations the "Georgia" and the "Ohio" soon drove those enterprising steamers from our coast, and confined them to the foreign countries of the Gulf and the Carribean Sea, where they yet rule triumphant in news, transport, and commerce. Our southern harbors are no longer filled with British cruisers, while in their stead we have built up a noble war marine, inured thousands of Americans to the ocean steam service, and made one most effective movement in the direction of successful defenses. (See Letter of Hon. Edwin Croswell, Paper E, page 200.)
Of the Collins Company it is hardly necessary that I should speak. They have received much the largest subsidy from the Government; but they have had a most difficult task to perform. Their ships have never been surpassed in any country, whether as to the excellent style of their prime construction, their large size, or their very unusual speed. They have literally been engaged in a continual race across the ocean for seven years, determined at whatever cost and hazard to far excel those of the Cunard line. And this they have done most signally in all points of accommodation and speed. They have gained one and a half days the advantage over the Cunard line on their average voyages for the seven years. And this was no small achievement. By reference to Section IV. it will be seen how great is the cost of attaining and maintaining such speed with a steamer. The Collins ships, being so much larger than the Cunarders, the four present an aggregate tonnage nearly equal to the eight by which they run their weekly line. It is, moreover, not proportionally so expensive to maintain seven or eight ships on a line as four. The prime cost and repairs are by no means so great when engines are duplicated, or two sets built from the same patterns. Again, the general outlay in docks, shore establishment, offices, company paraphernalia, advertising, and innumerable items, is as great for a small as for a large fleet of steamers. The Collins line has to contend against all this. It also found the Cunard line long and well established, and inwrought into the public favor. It had the business, and most important of all, it monopolized the only freights passing between the two countries; those from England to America, which British shippers gave of course to British ships. They have had also to pay much larger prices for construction, repairs, wages, etc., than the Cunard Company; and not having so large a service and so large a fleet, they have not had so many reserve ships to fall back upon; but have been compelled frequently to send their ships off but half repaired, which of itself entailed immensely heavy expenses in ultimate repairs. There is very much to be said in favor of this Company, which has endeavored to build the finest ships in the world, and navigate them the most rapidly. If they have prominently failed in any thing it is in building larger ships, running them faster, and being far more enterprising with them than was required of the Company by the contract with the Government. Their disasters have been saddening and severe; and yet they have resulted from nothing which could have been controlled by human foresight. There is a great error in supposing that there are more marine disasters among American than among British ships. Such is not the case, as a careful examination of the lists will show.
Of the mail line belonging to Mr. Vanderbilt, between New-York and Bremen, via Southampton, it is impossible now to say any thing. The steamers "North Star" and "Ariel," the one of 1,867-60/95 tons, and the other of 1,295-28/95 tons, have but recently commenced the service, on the gross mail receipts. Whether Mr. Vanderbilt desires to make the service permanent or not, I am not advised.
The service of the Charleston and Havana line has been performed with great regularity; and although the return from it in the form of postages has been small, yet it has been of essential service to the South, in opening communications toward the Gulf, and in establishing much needed travelling facilities between Charleston, Savannah, and Key West.
PAPER A.
LIST OF AMERICAN OCEAN STEAMERS.
The mail service has 8 lines, and 21 steamers in commission, of 48,027 registered tonnage. Much of this tonnage belongs to supply ships, as for instance those of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company. (See Section I.)
Collins Line, 3 steamers, 9,727 tons.
Adriatic, 4,144-74/95 tons: Atlantic, 2,849-66/99 tons: Baltic, 2,733-1/95 tons.
Havre Line, 2 steamers, 4,548 tons.
Arago, 2,240 tons: Fulton, 2,308 tons.
Vanderbilt Bremen Line, 3 steamers, 6,523 tons.
North Star, 1,867-60/95 tons: Ariel, 1,295-28/95 tons: Vanderbilt[H], 3,360-54/95 tons.
[H] Independent, running between New-York, Southampton, and Havre, in connection with the Bremen steamers.
United States Mail Steamship Company, 6 steamers, 8,544 tons.
Illinois, 2,123-65/95 tons: Empire City, 1,751-21/95 tons: Philadelphia, 1,238-1/95 tons: Granada, 1,058-90/95 tons: Moses Taylor, 1,200 tons: Star of the West, chartered, 1,172-1/95, (contracting for a new ship.)
Pacific Mail Steamship Company, 13 steamers, 16,421 tons.
Golden Gate, 2,067-35/95 tons: Golden Age, 2,280 tons: J. L. Stephens, 2,189 tons: Sonora, 1,616 tons: St. Louis, 1,621 tons: Panama, 1,087-31/95 tons: California, 1,085-64/95 tons: Oregon, 1,099-9/95 tons: Columbia, 777-34/95 tons: Republic, 850 tons: Northerner, 1,010 tons: Fremont, 576 tons: Tobago, 189 tons.
Charleston, Savannah, Key West, and Havana, 1 steamer, the Isabel, 1,115 tons.
New-Orleans and Mexico, 1 steamer, the Tennessee, 1,149-1/2 tons.
The Coasting Service has 8 lines, and 23 steamers, of 24,071 tons registered tonnage.
New-York, Havana, and New-Orleans, 2. The Black Warrior, 1,556-1/95 tons: Cahawba, 1,643-1/95 tons = 3,199 tons.
New-York, Havana, and Mobile, 1. The Quaker City, 1,428-3/95 tons.
New-York and Savannah, 4. Alabama, 1,261-13/95 tons; Florida, 1,261-13/95 tons: Augusta, 1,310-61/95 tons; Star of the South, (propeller,) 960-1/95 tons = 4,793 tons.
New-York and Charleston, 4. Columbia, 1,347 tons: Nashville, 1,220 tons: James Adger, 1,151 tons; Marion, 962 tons = 4,680 tons.
New-York and Virginia, 2. Roanoke, 1,071 tons: Jamestown, 1,300 tons = 2,371 tons.
Philadelphia and Savannah, 2. Key Stone State and State of Georgia, each about 1,300 tons = 2,600 tons.
Boston and Baltimore, 2. Joseph Whitney, 800 tons: Unknown, 800 tons = 1,600 tons.
New-Orleans and Texas. The Charles Morgan, Texas, Mexico, and Atlantic, averaging 600 tons each=2,400 tons.
New-Orleans and Key West. The General Rusk, 600 tons, and the Calhoun, 400 tons = 1,000 tons.
There are also several propellers running: between New-York and Charleston, New-York and Portland, and between Philadelphia and the South. They are all, however, small, and irregular in their trade. The Calhoun is not a regular steamship.
Steamers lying up, 18. Registered tonnage, 24,845 tons.
Queen of the Pacific, 2,801-92/95 tons. Washington, 1,640-71/91 tons. Prometheus, 1,207-61/95 tons. St. Louis, 1,621-14/45 tons. Brother Jonathan, 1,359-52/95 tons. Oregon, 1,004-89/95 tons. Southerner, 900 tons. Herman, 1,734-45/95 tons. Northern Light, 1,747-91/95 tons. Uncle Sam, 1,433-44/95 tons. California, 1,058 tons. Northerner, 1,012 tons. Ericsson, 1,902-1/95 tons. Star of the West, 1,172-33/95 tons. Daniel Webster, 1,035 tons. Orizaba, 1,450-62/95 tons. Panama, 1,087 tons. Fremont, 576 tons.
The registered tonnage of these vessels was furnished me by Mr. S. P. Ingraham, of the New-York Custom-House.
PAPER B.
The following paper, prepared by Mr. Pliny Miles from the reports to which we have alluded, presents the British steam mail service in full detail.
"The following tabular statement gives the particulars of the ocean mail service of Great Britain, now carried on almost exclusively by steamships. The numbers in the margin, running from 1 to 15, will point out the different lines in the recapitulation at the close.
LINE OF COMMUNICATION, CONTRACTORS, AND CONTRACT PRICE. PLACES CONNECTED. -+ 1. Liverpool and Isle of Man. Liverpool and Douglas, Isle of Mona Isle Steam Co. Twice a Man. week. $4,250 per annum. 2. England and Ireland. City of Holyhead and Kingstown, near Dublin Steam Packet Co. Twice a Dublin. day. $125,000 a year. 3. Scotland and Shetland. Aberdeen, Wick, Kirkwall, Aberdeen, Leith and Clyde (Orkney,) and Lerwick, Shipping Co. Weekly, $6,000 a (Shetland.) year. 4. England, Spain, and Southampton, Vigo, Oporto, Gibraltar. Peninsular and Lisbon, Cadiz, and Gibraltar. Oriental Steam Navigation Co. Three times a month. $102,500. 5. Mediterranean, India, and Southampton, Malta, Alexandria, China. Peninsular and Oriental Suez, Aden, Bombay, Calcutta, Steam Navigation Co. Twice a Singapore, Hong Kong, and month to India monthly to China. Shanghae. $1,121,500. 6. England and United States. Liverpool, Halifax, and Boston; Sam. Cunard. Weekly. $866,700. and Liverpool and New-York. 7. North America, (Colonial.) Halifax, Newfoundland, Bermuda, Sam. Cunard. Monthly. $73,500. and St. Thomas. 8. West-Indies, Mexico and Southampton, Kingston, South-America. Royal Mail Steam (Jamaica,) St. Thomas, Vera Packet Co. Semi-monthly to the Cruz and Aspinwall; Southampton, West-Indies and Gulf of Mexico, Lisbon, Madeira, Teneriffe, St. and monthly to Brazil. Vincent, Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio $1,350,000. Janeiro, Monte Video, Buenos Ayres, and St. Thomas. 9. England, France, and Belgium. Dover and Calais. Dover and Jenkings and Churchward. Daily Ostend. to Calais; thrice a week to Ostend. $77,500. 10. Channel Islands. Southampton, Jersey, and South-western Railway Company. Guernsey. Thrice a week. $20,000. 11. West Coast of South-America. Panama, Callao, and Valparaiso. Pacific Steam Navigation Co. Allowed to touch at Buenaventura, Twice a month. $125,000. Guayaquil, Peyta, Lambayeque, Huanchaco, Santa, Pisco, Islay, Arica, Iquique, Cobija, Gopiapo, Huasco, and Coquimbo. 12. Scotland and Orkney. John From Scrabster Pier (Thurso) to Stanger, Esq., of Stromness. Stromness, (Orkney.) Daily in summer; every other day in winter. $6,500. 13. West Coast of Africa. Plymouth to Madeira, Teneriffe, African Steamship Co. Monthly. Goree, Bathurst, Sierra Leone, $106,250. Monrovia, Cape Coast Castle, Accra, Whydah, Badagry, Lagos, Bonny, Old Calabar, Cameroon and Fernando Po; omitting Cameroon, Calabar, and Bonny on return. 14. South-Africa, Mauritius, and Dartmouth to Cape of Good Hope, Calcutta. Adam Duncan Dundas, Mauritius and Calcutta. Esq. Monthly. $205,000. 15. England and Australia. The Southampton, Marseilles, Malta, European and Australian Mail Alexandria, Suez, and Sydney. Steam Packet Co. Monthly. $925,000.
The following are the names of the steamers in service in each line, with the amount of tonnage, the horse power of each, the draught of water, the number of the officers and crew attached to each one, and, when it could be obtained, the date that each vessel was surveyed and approved for the service. Where the date of survey of a vessel is unknown, it is placed as near as possible with others surveyed at the same time, the vessels in each line being arranged in chronological order:
1. LIVERPOOL AND ISLE OF MAN.
Draft of Horse Water. Date of Name, Class, etc. Power. Tonnage. F. I. Crew. Survey ———————————+———+————+————+——-+—————— King Orry, 190 429 0 0 22 Dec., 1845 Tynwald, iron, 260 657 8 9 29 Oct., 1846 Benmy Chree, 130 295 6 6 18 June, 1847 Mona's Queen, iron, 220 508 8 6 22 M'ch, 1853 ====== ======== ===== Total, 4 vessels, 790 2,089 91
2. ENGLAND AND IRELAND.
Prince Arthur, iron, 220 418 8 8 26 July, 1852 Llewellyn, iron, 342 654 9 6 29 Oct., 1852 Eblana, iron, 372 685 8 11 31 Jan., 1853 St. Columba, iron, 350 650 8 10 29 Sept., 1853 ====== ======== ===== Total, 4 vessels, 1,284 2,407 115
3. SCOTLAND AND SHETLAND.
Fairy, 120 350 — 18 — Duke of Richmond, 180 500 — 24 — ====== ======== ===== Total, 2 vessels, 300 850 42
4. ENGLAND, SPAIN, AND GIBRALTAR.
Sultan, iron, 420 1,001 14 0 67 Jan., 1853 Madrid, iron, 133 448 10 2 40 Feb., 1853 Tagus, 280 691 14 8 41 Jan., 1854 Alhambra, 140 642 13 7 52 July, 1855 ====== ======== ===== Total, 4 vessels, 973 2,782 200
5. MEDITERRANEAN, INDIA, AND CHINA.
Lady Mary Wood, 270 619 0 0 40 Feb., 1842 Precursor, 520 1,783 18 0 121 July, 1844 Pekin, iron, 415 1,003 14 0 78 Jan., 1847 Oriental, 420 1,427 13 0 78 M'ch, 1848 Achilles, 430 823 16 0 59 June, 1849 Malta, iron, 460 1,222 0 0 82 Sept., 1848 Hindostan, 500 1,595 16 10 53 July, 1849 Singapore, iron, 465 1,189 12 6 96 M'ch, 1851 Ganges, iron, 465 1,189 14 7 69 June, 1851 Pottinger, iron, 450 1,275 17 6 82 April, 1852 Formosa, screw, iron, 177 658 13 6 60 Aug., 1852 Chusan, screw, iron, 100 765 11 3 45 Aug., 1852 Haddington, iron, 450 1,303 17 7 105 Nov., 1852 Vectis, 400 900 0 0 51 — Shanghae, screw, iron, 90 825 0 0 60 — Manila, 60 646 0 0 60 — Bentinck, 520 1,973 19 3 83 Nov., 1852 Euxine, iron, 430 1,071 15 6 72 Jan., 1853 Bengal, screw, 465 2,185 17 6 115 Feb., 1853 Valetta, 400 984 12 2 51 July, 1853 Norna, screw, 230 1,040 0 0 80 Nov., 1853 Colombo, screw, 450 1,808 0 0 118 Dec., 1853 Ripon, iron, 445 1,400 14 9 94 Dec., 1853 Douro, screw, 230 903 13 3 63 Dec., 1853 Bombay, 280 1,240 0 0 84 — Madras, 288 1,217 0 0 82 — Indus, iron, 450 1,302 17 9 88 Jan., 1854 Candia, screw, iron, 450 2,212 18 9 115 June, 1854 Nubia, 450 2,095 21 0 122 — 1855 Pera, screw, iron, 450 2,013 19 0 129 Jan., 1856 Ava, screw, iron, 320 1,372 17 0 94 Feb., 1856 Alma, screw, iron, 450 2,164 20 0 124 M'ch, 1856 Aden, screw, iron, 210 507 18 9 40 Aug., 1856 Delta, screw, 210 985 0 0 64 — 1856 Delhi, screw, 450 2,400 0 0 125 — 1856 Unknown, 4 vessels. ====== ======== ===== Total, 39 vessels, 12,850 46,053 2,877
6. ENGLAND AND UNITED STATES.
Europa, 650 1,777 15 6 88 July, 1848 Canada, 680 1,774 19 6 88 Nov., 1848 Niagara, 630 1,774 19 6 88 Dec., 1849 America, 630 1,729 15 3 88 Jan., 1850 Asia, 800 2,073 19 0 105 May, 1850 Africa, 800 2,050 0 0 105 Oct., 1850 Arabia, 870 2,328 16 7 105 Dec., 1852 Persia, 858 3,587 21 0 165 Feb., 1856 ====== ======== ===== Total, 8 vessels, 5,918 17,092 922
7. NORTH AMERICA, (Colonial.)
Merlin, 120 451 0 0 26 May, 1850 Delta, screw, iron, 180 700 12 10 34 June, 1852 ====== ======== ===== Total, 2 vessels, 300 1,151 60
8. WEST-INDIES, MEXICO, AND SOUTH-AMERICA.
Dee, 410 1,269 18 0 87 May, 1846 Trent, 450 1,293 17 7 87 April, 1848 Eagle, 263 496 11 10 57 July, 1849 Derwent, 280 708 15 0 66 July, 1850 Magdalena, 760 2,250 19 0 108 May, 1852 Medway, 420 1,305 17 6 72 May, 1852 La Plata, 939 2,404 21 10 114 Aug., 1852 Conway, 270 827 12 10 55 Sept., 1852 Orinoco, 800 2,245 20 11 108 Oct., 1852 Avon, 450 2,069 17 0 94 M'ch, 1853 Teviot, 450 1,258 18 1 97 April, 1853 Parana, 800 2,222 21 2 120 May, 1853 Clyde, 430 1,335 19 1 87 June, 1853 Thames, 413 1,285 18 3 72 Aug., 1853 Solent, 420 1,805 14 11 88 Oct., 1853 Camilia, iron, 213 640 9 0 34 Oct., 1853 Wye, screw, iron, 180 818 14 0 45 Feb., 1854 Atrato, iron, 758 2,906 20 6 127 M'ch, 1854 Tamar, 400 1,873 18 7 93 June, 1854 Prince, 200 446 8 8 35 July, 1854 ====== ======== ===== Total, 20 vessels, 9,306 29,454 1,667
9. ENGLAND, FRANCE, AND BELGIUM.
Alliance, 120 300 7 3 16 — Vivid, 120 300 7 0 16 — Violet, 120 300 7 0 16 — Empress, 100 308 6 6 16 — Queen, 100 307 6 6 16 — Ondine, 80 250 6 0 16 — ====== ======== ===== Total, 6 vessels, 640 1,765 96
10. CHANNEL ISLANDS.
Atalanta, 120 240 8 4 21 Oct., 1846 Wonder, iron, 150 449 0 0 22 Feb., 1853 Courier, iron, 184 440 7 0 18 April, 1853 Dispatch, iron, 183 443 7 6 22 Aug., 1853 Express, iron, 160 380 7 4 24 Nov., 1853 ====== ======== ===== Total, 5 vessels, 797 1,852 107
11. WEST COAST OR SOUTH-AMERICA.
New-Granada, iron, 210 600 13 0 41 Nov., 1846 Bolivia, iron, 252 705 0 0 41 Oct., 1849 Inca, iron, 370 549 13 0 55 Aug., 1851 Lima, iron, 370 1,122 10 8 55 Nov., 1851 Bogota, iron, 394 1,122 13 6 61 April, 1852 Valdivia, screw, iron, 480 782 13 2 41 Nov., 1853 Valparaiso, iron, 320 839 13 6 84 — ====== ======== ===== Total, 7 vessels, 2,396 5,719 377
12. SCOTLAND AND ORKNEY.
(Unknown,) 60 250 6 0 16 —
13. WEST COAST OF AFRICA.
Hope, iron, 120 833 15 0 46 — Charity, iron, 120 1,007 15 6 52 — Ethiope, 120 674 0 0 42 — Candace, 120 900 0 0 46 — Retriever, 120 900 0 0 46 — Niger, 120 900 0 0 46 — Gambia, 130 637 14 0 42 — ====== ======== ===== Total, 7 vessels 850 5,951 320
14. SOUTH-AMERICA, MAURITIUS, AND CALCUTTA.
Five screw steamers, Total, 5 vessels, 2,000 8,000 — 570 —
15. ENGLAND AND AUSTRALIA.
Oneida, 400 1,600 15 6 84 — Simla, 630 2,510 17 2 88 — European, 530 2,200 18 9 115 — Columbian, 530 2,300 17 6 120 — (Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 — (Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 — (Unknown,) 400 1,600 0 8 88 — ====== ======== ===== Total, 7 vessels, 3,290 13,410 671
RECAPITULATION.
KEY: A: Lines. B: Number of steamers. C: Horse Power. D: Tonnage. E: Number of men. F: Service commenced. G: How often. H: Annual Compensation.
- - - A B C D E F G H - - - 1 4 790 2,089 91 1833 2 a week $4,250 2 4 1,284 2,408 115 1850 2 a day 125,000 3 2 300 850 42 1840 1 a week 6,000 4 4 973 2,782 200 1852 3 a month 102,500 5 35 12,850 46,053 2,877 1853 2 a month 1,121,500 6 9 6,418 18,406 922 1850 1 a week 866,700 7 2 300 1,151 60 1854 1 a month 73,500 8 20 9,308 29,454 1,667 1851 3 a month 1,350,000 9 6 640 1,765 96 1854 1 a day 77,500 10 5 797 1,852 107 1848 3 a week 20,000 11 7 2,396 5,719 378 1852 2 a month 125,000 12 1 60 250 16 1856 1 a day 6,500 13 7 850 5,951 320 1852 1 a month 106,250 14 5 2,000 8,000 575 1856 1 a month 205,000 15 7 3,290 13,410 671 1857 1 a month 925,000 ==== ======== ======== ====== ============ Total, 121 42,254 140,139 8,137 $5,114,700[I] - - - -
[I] There are some lines not here noticed, which swell the sum to $5,333,985.—T. R.
PAPER C.
PROJET OF FRANCO-AMERICAN NAVIGATION.
Mr. Wm. Iselin, of Havre, kindly furnished me the following:
"The French Government has offered the following contracts:
"Havre to New-York, 26 voyages a year, fr.3,100,000, or $620,000.
"Bordeaux to Rio Janeiro, touching at Lisbon, Goree, Bahia, or Pernambuco, and a branch line from Rio Janeiro to Montevideo and Buenos Ayres, 24 voyages a year, fr.4,700,000, or $940,000. The Government now requires 13 departures from Bordeaux and 13 from Marseilles at the same price.
"Nantes to St. Thomas, thence to Guadalupe, and thence to Martinique, with the following branch lines:
"No. 1. St. Thomas to St. Martha or Carthagena, and thence to Aspinwall.
"No. 2. St. Thomas to Porto Rico, thence to Havana, Vera Cruz, and Tampico.
"No. 3. From Martinique to Cayenne.
"The subvention offered is fr.6,200,000, or $1,400,000.
"The total amount of subvention offered for the 3 lines is therefore 14 millions of francs per annum, or $2,800,000.
"The Messageries Imperiales have given a tender for the Brazil lines.
"William Iselin of Havre, in connection with Mr. Calley St. Paul, for the Havre and New-York line; the necessary capital of $3,200,000 is subscribed; their intention is to have a weekly departure from Havre to New-York, by making the fortnightly departures of the French boats alternate with American Havre and Bremen boats.
"For the line from Nantes to the West-Indies the Company Gautier is said to have given a tender; but it is doubtful if they can make up their capital."
The Messageries Imperiales is one of the largest and strongest companies in all Europe. They have the following different lines: the Italian, the Constantinople direct, the Levant, the Egyptian, the Syrian, that of the Archipelago, the Anatolia, the Thessalian, the Danubian, the Trebizond, the Algiers, the Oran, and the Tunis lines, and forty-seven sea-steamers. They have already obtained the Brazilian service.
Mr. Iselin and others have proposed for the United States line, and will doubtless get it.
The Company Gautier may not get the West-India service, it is said. They had the line from Havre to New-York, with the steamers Alma, Cadis, Barcelona, Franc-Contois, Vigo, and the Lyonnaise, and without subvention. They found it impossible to run it without subsidy, and hence, sought a new home for their steamers. They attempted to run from Havre to New-Orleans; but this again failed, after four voyages. They had also the 1,800 ton ether ships, "Francois Arago," and "Jacquart," which broke down. These ether engines were built on the principle of De Tremblay; but the Company are now substituting steam for the ether engines. Thus, the experience of this Company proves two important positions which I have taken; that ocean mail steamers can not run on their receipts, and that many of the gazetted improvements on steam propulsion and the ordinary methods are valueless.
The Compagnie Gautier have a contract with Spain, for semi-monthly voyages between Cadiz and Havana, and receive $25,000 per round voyage for each steamer. They are all English built, iron vessels, of about 1,800 tons each. Lyons is the home of the Company.
PAPER D.
STEAM LINES BETWEEN EUROPE AND AMERICA.
COLLINS, steamers Adriatic, Atlantic, and Baltic; (running:)
HAVRE, steamers Arago, and Fulton; "
BREMEN, steamers North Star, and Ariel; "
HAVRE, in connection with the Bremen. Steamer Vanderbilt; (laid up:)
CUNARD, steamers Persia, Arabia, Asia, Africa, Canada, America, Niagara, and Europa; (running:)
CUNARD, screw-steamers Etna, Jura, Emue, Lebanon, and Cambria, (side-wheel; all running:)
GLASGOW, screw-steamers Glasgow, Edinburgh, and New-York; (running:)
BREMEN, steamer Ericsson; run temporarily by Mr. Sands; (laid up:)
LIVERPOOL AND PORTLAND, screw-steamers Khersonese and Circassian, General Williams and Antelope; the two latter about 1,500 each, running via St. John's, N. F., the two former chartered for the East-Indies:
LONDON AND MONTREAL, screw-steamers; (names not known:)
LIVERPOOL AND QUEBEC, screw-steamers; " " "
LIVERPOOL AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers City of Manchester, City of Baltimore, City of Washington, and Kangaroo, (running;) (line ran to Philadelphia and was withdrawn:)
HAMBURG AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Borussia and Hammonia; building two more steamers, each 2,000 tons, in the Clyde, for same line; (running:)
ANTWERP AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Belgique, Constitution, Leopold I., Duc de Brabant, and Congress. Taken off and chartered to British Government for transporting troops. Names altered:
LONDON, CORK AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Minna and Brenda; (laid up:)
HAVRE AND NEW-YORK, screw-steamers Barcelona, Jacquart, Alma, and Francois Arago, withdrawn, and running from Spain to Cuba. (See Paper C.)
BREMEN AND NEW-YORK. The North Dutch Lloyds are building four screw-steamers in the Clyde, of near 3,000 each, to run between Bremen and New-York:
THE CONTINENT, SOUTHAMPTON AND NEW-YORK. Croskey's lino consists of the following screws, of about 2,300 tons each: the Argo, Calcutta, Queen of the South, Lady Jocelyn, Hydaspes, Indiana, Jason, and Golden Fleece. (Most of these steamers have been withdrawn from the route, and five of them are chartered for troops for India.)
PAPER E.
The following numerous extracts from the Senate Reports of 1850 and 1852, and also from the letter of Judge Collamer, then Post Master General, as well as from a letter by the Hon. Edwin Croswell, will present in detail a strong corroboration of the views which I have taken in the preceding Sections. I copy first from the Report of 1852. The Committee was composed of Hon. Thomas J. Rusk, Chairman, and Messrs. Soule, Hamlin, Upham, and Morton. The Report says:
"Your Committee desire to have it understood at the outset, that, regarding the ocean mail service as the offspring of the wants of all of the producing classes of the country, they have not felt at liberty to consider the propositions which have been presented to them, in any other point of view than as connected with and subservient to the general policy of the government, which embraces alike every section of the country, and can not know nor recognize any personal or local influence.
"The system of ocean steam navigation was adopted by the Government for the joint purpose of extending and advancing the commercial and other great interests of the country, and, at the same time, providing a marine force which might be easily made available for the protection of American rights, in the event of a collision with foreign powers. The attainment of this double object was the motive which, in the opinion of Congress, justified the advance of public funds in aid of private enterprise, inasmuch as it was calculated to insure to the country the acquisition of a powerful means of maritime defense, with little or no expense, eventually, as the money so advanced was to be reimbursed in money or in mail service at the option of the parties concerned, while commerce and the arts would be promoted during the time of peace.
"At the time when this system was commenced, the ocean mails along our whole Southern coast were in the hands of foreign carriers, sustained and encouraged by the British Government, under the forms of contracts to carry the British mails; while the Cunard line between Liverpool and Boston, via Halifax, constituted the only medium of regular steam mail communication between the United States and Europe. In this way the commercial interests of the United States were, on the one hand, entirely at the mercy of British steamers which plied along our Southern coast, entering our ports at pleasure, and thereby acquiring an intimate knowledge of the soundings and other peculiarities of our harbors—a knowledge which might prove infinitely injurious to us in the event of a war with Great Britain; and on the other, of a foreign line of ocean mail steamers, which, under the liberal patronage of the British Government, monopolized the steam mail postage and freights between the two countries. Under such a state of things, it became necessary to choose whether American commerce should continue to be thus tributary to British maritime supremacy, or an American medium of communication should be established through the intervention of the Federal Government, in the form of advances of pecuniary means in aid of individual enterprise. It had been found to be impossible for our merchants to contend successfully, single handed, against the joint efforts of the British Government and British commercial influence. Our noble lines of packet ships which had far outstripped the sailing vessels of all other nations, in point of beauty and swiftness, had been superseded by the introduction of steamers, the power and capacity of which recommended them, as the best means of inter-communication by mail, and of transportation for lighter and more profitable freights, and American interests were becoming every day more and more tributary to British ascendency on the ocean.
"Under the circumstances above stated, it was impossible for Congress to hesitate for a moment which course to pursue, and it was determined to adopt a policy which, while it would be in strict accordance with the spirit of our free institutions, should place the country in its proper attitude, and render its commerce and postal arrangements independent of all foreign or rival agencies.
"Of the correctness of this determination, experience has furnished the most ample evidences in the results which thus far have attended the prosecution of the system. The line between New-York and Chagres via New-Orleans and its auxiliaries, have, by their superiority in point of swiftness and accommodation, already superseded the British steamers which had previously plied along our Southern maritime frontier, and the United States mails for Mexico, South-America, and our possessions on the Pacific are no longer in the hands of foreign carriers, but are transported in American steamers of the first class, convertible, at a very small expense, into war steamers, should occasion require, which have commanded the admiration of the world by their fleetness and the elegance of their accommodations for the travelling public. Our Southern ports are, consequently, no longer frequented by British steamers, commanded by officers of the British crown, whose legitimate business it is to collect intelligence respecting the approaches to and defenses of the harbors which they visit, to be made available for their own purposes, in the event of the existence of hostile relations.
"A similar result has, to a certain extent, attended the establishment of the American, or Collins line, between New-York and Liverpool. Previously to the commencement of this line, the transportation of the United States mail matter, as well as the finer and more destructible descriptions of merchandise, requiring rapidity of transmission to and from Europe, had been monopolized by the British Cunard line; and the British Government had, within the short space of six years, from the postage on this route alone, derived a clear income of no less than five million two hundred and eighty thousand eight hundred dollars, after deducting the amount paid to the concern under the contract to carry the mails.
"Since the establishment of the Collins line, notwithstanding the combined efforts of the British Government and commercial interests to confine their freights and postages to the Cunard line, the revenue to the Post Office Department of the United States has amounted to several hundreds of thousands of dollars per annum, whilst a large proportion of the money for freights has been received by American citizens. The effects of this measure have, it is true, thus far been but partial, because the trips of this line have been but twice a month, while those of its rival have, for a considerable portion of the time been weekly. During the intervals between the trips of the American line, the postages and freights must, of necessity, enure to the advantage of the British, and, consequently, the evil referred to has been but partially remedied."
Speaking of the large steamers built, the Report says:
"It is not to be supposed that engines of such vast dimensions could have been constructed in a country where there were, as yet, no workshops adapted to the purpose and where labor is very high, as cheaply as in a country where every appliance of the kind already existed and where the prices of labor are proverbially low. Nor can it be reasonably imagined that vessels of this description could have been navigated on as good terms, by men taken from this country, where there was little or no competition in this peculiar branch of maritime service, as by those who were easily to be found in a country in which the density of population and consequent competition for employment, caused the wages to be small.
"An attempt seems to have been made, in certain quarters, to create an impression that the aid heretofore extended by the Government to the individuals engaged under contracts to carry the ocean mail, has been induced by feelings of personal friendship, on the part of members of Congress. Such is not the case. The friends of the system of ocean mail steam navigation, have, so far as your Committee are advised, considered this important subject as a matter of great national concern and independently of the very secondary motive of individual interest. The question presented to their minds has not been whether A, B, or C should have a privilege extended to him, but whether the commerce, manufactures, and agriculture of the country would be benefited by the performance of a public service through the instrumentality of individual enterprise, under proper conditions and restrictions. As matters stood at the period when the system was adopted, Great Britain was exerting herself, successfully, to make the United States, in common with the rest of the world, tributary to her maritime supremacy. She possessed the monopoly of steam connection between the United States and Europe, the West-Indies and South-America. There was not a letter sent by ocean steam conveyance, in these quarters, which did not pay its tribute to the British crown, and not a passenger nor parcel of merchandise transported, by the agency of steam, upon the ocean, which did not furnish profit to the British capitalist. Great Britain asserted her right to be the 'queen of the ocean,' and, as such, she levied her imposts upon the industry and intelligence of all of the nations that frequented that highway of the world.
"In this condition of affairs, the law instituting the system of American ocean mail steam transportation in its present form was enacted, as the best, if not the only means of correcting a great evil, and, at the same time, building up a naval force which should be available for national defense in the event of a war. The system so instituted was deemed to be not only calculated to draw forth and reward the enterprise of American citizens, but it avoided the difficulty of keeping upon hand, in time of peace, a large and, for the moment at least, useless military marine, which could only be preserved in a condition for effective service by a vast annual outlay of the public money.
"It was right and proper, then, in the opinion of your Committee, that these ocean steam facilities should exist, through the intervention of the Government, more especially as they were, in all probability, beyond the reach of private means.
"The transportation of the ocean mails, with the greatest possible advantage to the important interests of the country at large, is an object of paramount importance; but which, however desirable, can only be effected at great expense. It is a matter of comparatively small moment at what precise time this expense is to be paid, provided that the end in view can be attained with certainty. The temporary loan of a part of the means required, under proper securities for reimbursement, appears to be the readiest mode by which the purpose can be effected. How is this security to be acquired? Simply, by taking due care that the funds advanced shall be faithfully and honestly applied to the object for which they are intended, and then holding a lien upon the ships, for the construction of which they are appropriated, in such a manner as to insure the reimbursement of the sums advanced in the form of mail service or money; or, should circumstances require, of ships suitable for national purposes, as war steamers. This has been done. In all cases the contractors for the transportation of the ocean mails, have been required to cause their ships to be built and equipped under the immediate superintendence of experienced naval officers and under the direction of naval constructors, appointed by the Government, in such manner as to be convertible, at the smallest possible expense, into war steamers of the first class.
"Nor has experience caused any regret, on the part of the friends of the system, further than that in some cases, owing to the increase in the tonnage and power of the ships and other circumstances, the expenses incurred by the contractors have outrun the receipts, and they have incurred heavy losses, which might even prove ruinous, if they were forced to sell the property acquired in this form. It should always be borne in mind, however, that in these cases, the increase of expenditure thus incurred has been caused by a laudable ambition on the part of the proprietors of these lines to do even more than they were required to do under their contracts, with a view to secure the confidence of the Government and the public. It should also be remembered that in thus increasing the cost and consequent value of their ships, these companies have enlarged the security of the Government for the money loaned, and promoted the safety and comfort of passengers. It has, in no instance, been charged that the companies referred to have, in any way, misapplied the aid extended to them, or given to it an improper direction. The products of their expenditures, even admitting them to have been greater than they might have been, show for themselves, in placing the American steam mail service, as far as it has gone, at the head of all others, in point of accommodation, elegance, strength, and swiftness. Nor is this all. The establishment of these lines is not to be regarded merely with reference to the immediate profits arising from the system, in connection with the transportation of the mails. Millions of money have been saved to American citizens, which, in the absence of these ocean steam lines, would have gone to fill foreign coffers. The Committee will refer to one fact in illustration of the truth of this proposition. Before the Collins line was established, the Cunard line was receiving L7 10s sterling per ton for freights; at present (1852) the rate is about L4 sterling. By whom were these L7 10s sterling paid? By the American consumer, in most instances, upon articles of British manufacture brought to this country by a British line. At present the American consumer pays but L4 sterling per ton; and, presuming that the American merchant makes his importations in the American line, this freight is paid to our own people and goes to swell the sum of our national wealth. Thus, it will be seen that, formerly, the American consumer paid very nearly twice as much for the service, and enriched the British capitalist; whereas, at present, he not only saves one half of the former cost of freight to himself but, in paying the remaining half, benefits his fellow citizen, who in return aids in consuming perhaps the very merchandise which he has imported.
"Under these circumstances, can any reasonable man doubt the propriety, even in a pecuniary point of view, of sustaining the present system, which, at its very commencement, has given such ample proofs of its usefulness? Your Committee think not, and do not hesitate to give it as their opinion that, merely as a matter of dollars and cents, the service in question should be liberally sustained by Congress, and will in the end make ample returns.
"But your Committee regard this proposition as one, the mere money feature of which is of minor consequence, when brought into comparison with other more important considerations. The question is no longer whether certain individuals shall be saved from loss or enabled to make fortunes, but whether the American shall succumb to the British lines, and Great Britain be again permitted to monopolize ocean mail steam transportation, not only between Europe and America, but throughout the world. We are aspiring to the first place among the nations of the earth, in a commercial point of view—a place which belongs to us as a matter of right—and are we to suffer ourselves to be overcome by British commercial capitalists under the auspices of the British crown? Shall it be said that, at the very moment when our steamships are admitted to excel those of any other people on the face of the globe, our enterprising citizens have been forced to relinquish the proud position they have attained, for the want of a few thousands of dollars, when the national treasury is full to overflowing? Let this end be attained and our great commercial rival will have postages and freights all her own way, while we shall be compelled to contribute, as heretofore, to her undisputed supremacy.
"With a view to a full and fair understanding of this important subject, your Committee have communicated, through their Chairman, with the Executive Departments of the Government and the presidents of the various companies engaged in carrying the ocean mail by steam, and will now proceed to lay before the Senate the results of their careful inquiries. It may not be improper here again to note, by way of illustration, the benefits to be derived from ocean steam mail transportation, when in successful operation, as manifested in the case of the British Cunard line, under the auspices of the British Government. During the first six years of its existence, the line above named received from the Government no less than $2,550,000, while the Government received from the Company, in the form of postages, the enormous sum of $7,836,800, or $5,826,800 net revenue.
"The Government has paid to the line, (the Collins,) for mail service, in the two years, $770,000, and has received from the line $513,546.80. If the receipts be deducted from the outlay, the balance against the Government is $256,453.20 for the whole time, or $128,226.60 per annum.
"Thus it appears, that from a fair statement of the account current between the line and the Government, the latter is out of pocket, at the end of the two first years of the undertaking and under circumstances the most disadvantageous to the line, $256,453.20, or in other words, has paid $128,226.60 per annum, for carrying the ocean mail by steam over about six thousand miles of the greatest commercial thoroughfare in the world, for which, as yet, it has received nothing in return. But your Committee would ask, what has the country received in return for this $256,453.20? They will furnish the answer. The country has received through the proprietors of this line, in the form of freights and passage money, a no less amount than $1,979,760.85, in cash; and, if the reduction in the prices of freight formerly paid to the British line be taken into account, nearly as much more, by saving the difference in freights and passage money, to say nothing of the general advantages derived by all of our producing interests from the existence of this American line, which, as your Committee believe, are incalculable. The money account will then stand as follows: Government debtor to $256,453.80; Country creditor to $1,979,760.85 in cash; and if the former be deducted from the latter, the balance in favor of the country will stand $1,723,307.05, in cash alone, leaving out of view the duties on increased importations caused by the establishment of the American line."
Speaking of the Pacific Mail Steam Company, the Report says:
"It will be seen from the above, that the total cost of the six vessels which have been accepted by the officers whose duty it was to supervise them and decide whether they had been built in accordance with the requisitions of the law and terms of the contract, and whose decision is presumed, by your Committee, to be conclusive in the premises, has been $1,555,069, and that their aggregate tonnage is 7,365 tons, instead of 5,200 tons, the amount agreed for. In addition to these ships, as your Committee are informed, the company has in the Pacific seven steamers, with an aggregate tonnage of five thousand tons, not yet accepted by the Government. The additional steamers are, and have been, always kept ready to replace the mail steamers in the event of detention. The cost of these additional steamers has been, it is stated, about two thirds of that of the accepted steamers of the same class, say about $1,036,712, making in all an outlay for steamships alone, of $2,518,337.
"It appears that the whole number of passengers, of all classes, transported by the Pacific Mail Ship Company, the line in question, previously to December 31, 1851, from Panama northward, has been 17,016, and from Oregon southward, 13,332. The prices of passage have constantly fluctuated, but, on the date above named, the 31st of December, 1851, the average rates were, for the first cabin, two hundred and twenty-two dollars; second cabin, one hundred and sixty dollars, and steerage, one hundred and seven dollars, between Panama and San Francisco. In the early stages of emigration the prices were increased in consequence of the enormous prices of labor and supplies on that comparatively unsettled coast, but were subsequently reduced. At the commencement of the undertaking, the Company incurred, of necessity, vast expenses in the selection of proper harbors for taking in provisions, water, coal, etc., and in the construction of depots; and even at present, coal and supplies of every description are sent to the Pacific via Cape Horn, a distance of from thirteen thousand to fifteen thousand miles.
"The freights from Panama northward, have been small in amount, and confined to the lighter descriptions of articles sent by express, while the mails have been very large, amounting in some instances to one hundred and fifty bags, each, and, together with coal, water, etc., occupying all of the space not required for passengers. From California, the freights southward, have consisted of treasure, amounting, it is supposed, to the value of seventy millions of dollars, but it is extremely difficult to compute the worth accurately, as a large portion of the gold, etc., sent has been in the possession of passengers, and the value does not appear in the manifests."
In noticing the Panama Railroad and the California lines, the Report says:
"Nearly two millions of dollars have already, as your Committee are informed, been expended on this important work, by a company possessed of ample means, and the completion of it can not fail to open the way for a vast commerce, between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and at the same time cause our fellow-citizens in California and Oregon no longer to be regarded as exiles. This road being once opened, the passage of the Isthmus, now so much dreaded, will be effected with perfect ease and comfort in a couple of hours, instead of two or three days, as at present, and families, instead of individuals, will be enabled to seek homes in the fertile valleys of our possessions on the Pacific coast. The value of the lines of ocean steamers, of which your Committee have been speaking, to the commercial and other great interests of our country and the world at large, can not well be estimated until this road shall have been finished and put into full operation. When such shall be the case, the trade between California and Oregon, as well as that of China and the islands of the Pacific and Indian oceans and the Atlantic States and Europe, which now passes around Cape Horn, a distance of some fifteen thousand miles, will be enabled to take a direct course across the Isthmus of Panama, the passage of which will require but two or three hours. The United States mail, from San Francisco to New York, has already been transported within the space of twenty-five days and eighteen hours, a day less than the time claimed to have been taken by any other route, at a period, too, when there were but seven or eight miles of the road in operation. On a late occasion, five hundred government troops were sent to California by this route, and were placed at the point of their destination in a little more than thirty-five days, without any serious desertion or accident of any kind. A similar operation by the way of Cape Horn would have occupied six months at least. The store-ship Lexington, which sailed from New-York for San Francisco, during the last year, arrived at the latter place on the last day of February, 1852, after a passage of seven months and one day. In a country the military establishment of which is so small as that of the United States, facilities of concentrating troops at points distant from each other, in a short time, are of incalculable value, and may be said to add manifold to the efficiency of the military force.
"From what has been already said, it will be seen that the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, independently of the associate line on this side of the Isthmus, and without taking into view the cost of the railroad, has expended in the construction of mail steamers alone $2,518,337; and if to this be added $2,606,440.45, the expense incurred for a similar purpose by the Company on the Atlantic side of the Isthmus, the entire cost of steamships, to the two companies engaged in the transportation of the California and Oregon mails, has been $5,124,777.
"It is no more than sheer justice that your Committee should state that the California lines, east as well as west of the Isthmus of Panama, have proved themselves worthy in all respects of the confidence of the country. In no single instance has an accident occurred involving loss of life or serious injury in any way to the travelling public. Such is the strength of the vessels employed, that on two several occasion when, owing to dense fogs and under-currents, cooperating with the defectiveness of the charts of the Pacific coast, one of the ships of the Aspinwall line struck, at one time, upon a soft bottom, and, at another, upon a hard sandy bar, she was steamed off, after thumping, without the slightest injury whatever. Facts such as these are the more important, inasmuch as several steamers have lately been lost on the same coast with a great sacrifice of human life, evidently owing to a want of the strength necessary to resist, effectually, the force of the winds and waves. In the opinion of your Committee, the security afforded to travellers by the strong fastenings and heavy timbers of the ocean mail steamers, built as they are, under the supervision of naval officers, who are selected on account of their thorough acquaintance with and experience in such matters, and made capable of sustaining heavy armaments, is a matter of the greatest moment. Experience has shown that, in the race after gain, our countrymen are, perhaps, more regardless of risk to human life than the people of any other country in the world. Scarcely a day passes without fresh evidences of the truth of this proposition. The river, as well as the sea-going steamers, are generally built with reference to speed and lightness, coupled with smallness of draft of water, and hence, in case of touching the ground, or of violent storms, it is found that if one portion of the frame gives way, the breaking up of the entire structure follows with a rapidity that is but too well calculated to show the slight manner in which these vessels are constructed. Your Committee think that the additional expenditure of a few hundreds of thousands of dollars is a matter not worthy of consideration, when brought into comparison with the loss of life, and would rather see even millions devoted to the construction of strong steamers, than witness the sudden and heart-rending ruptures of the dearest ties of our nature, caused by the accidents that so frequently occur. Such is their feeling of stern disapprobation of the reckless indifference respecting the safety of passengers, daily manifested by some of the proprietors and officers of steam lines, that they are resolved, so far at least as they are concerned, not in any way to countenance, directly or indirectly, such a course of proceeding. In the extension of the system of ocean mail transportation which they propose to recommend, care will be taken, that the steamers which carry the Government mails shall be regarded as national ships, to a certain extent, and as such, under the charge of the law-making power, and be so built as to secure safety to travellers; and that, in all contracts, this consideration shall be regarded as one of paramount importance."
Regarding a few sailing-ship owners in New-York and Boston, who had memorialized Congress against the Collins and other lines, the Report says:
"The memorialists are loud in their complaints respecting the alleged improper interference of the Government with matters that should be left, as they say, entirely to individual enterprise, which in their opinion becomes paralyzed under the effects of Government patronage bestowed upon some to the exclusion of others. If the authors of this memorial will take a fair and dispassionate view of the matter, they will, as your Committee think, be convinced that they are wrong in their supposition, and that the Government has not gratuitously meddled in concerns with which it should have nothing to do. The merchants and ship-owners referred to seem to forget, in the first place, that the system of ocean steam mail navigation is intended to secure adequate protection for our commerce from foreign aggression in the event of war; and in the second, that it was instituted at a moment when the fine packet ships, to which the memorialists refer with such becoming pride, had in fact been driven from the ocean to a certain extent by the overwhelming power of a British mail steam line, sustained by the British Government, which had monopolized ocean mail and passenger steam transportation, as well as the freights of lighter and more perishable descriptions of merchandise. If, as these gentlemen have stated, the sailing ships have been made to succumb, it has been under the force of an agency more certain and not less powerful than the one named by them—wielded by foreign capitalists and directed by a foreign government claiming for itself the supremacy of the ocean. The Cunard line of ocean steamers had been in possession of a monopoly of freights, letter postage, and passage money for years, in despite of the attempts of the memorialists to resist, successfully, before the Government of the United States, seeing that American interests were made tributary to foreign capital, aided by a foreign government, adopted the wise course of correcting the evil by kindred means, and placing, at least, to a certain extent, American interests under the auspices of American intelligence and enterprise. What would have been the condition of the New-York lines and other ships had not the Government of the United States thought proper to extend its aid to the establishment of the Collins line? Would it have been any better than at present? or rather would it not have been infinitely worse? Had the Cunard line continued to prosper, as it must have done in the natural course of things, would it not in all probability have increased its number of ships until it would have monopolized every description of ocean transportation? Would not the trade with the United States have been entirely carried on in British steamers, navigated at small expense, and therefore able to do the carrying trade at low prices? Again, what would have been the condition of the Southern coasting business, so far as mails, passengers, and light freights, at least, are concerned, had the fourteen British steamers then employed been permitted to operate, unchecked by the American line of mail steamers, between New-York and Chagres? Would it not have been entirely at the mercy of the commissioned agents of the British crown, who so well know how to avail themselves of opportunities to promote their own interests by advancing those of their government? To carry the inquiry further, what would have been the condition of our possessions on the Pacific coast, visited as they would have been by British steamers—for where is the spot on the inhabited or inhabitable globe to which they do not bear the union jack of old England—had not the Aspinwall line been established? Such is the universal pervasion of the money power in British hands, that at present, as is well known, the Cunard line has extended a branch to Havre, to transport goods to England almost free of cost, with a view to appropriate to itself the freights from that quarter, and thus not only crush the American line of steamers to Havre, but be enabled to underbid the Collins line, and, if possible, again monopolize the trade with the United States over that route. Would all this have raised the prices of freights in American sailing vessels, and given an advantage to the memorialists in question, who had at one time monopolized to themselves the freights, postage, and passage money in sailing ships? or would not, on the contrary, such a state of things have operated so to give a British tendency to trade everywhere, and to furnish freights to British ships, at prices at which the American ship owners could not afford to navigate their vessels?
"What, the Committee would ask, has the Government of the United States done in the premises? Having under its charge the control and direction of the United States mails upon land and sea, it has thought proper to say that it would pay for the transportation of the mails in American steamers, which can, if necessary, be converted, at a small expense, into war steamers, and adopted, if need be, into the navy proper, at an appraised value, and thereby become efficient protectors of American commerce in the event of a war. This is the head and front of the Government's offending, and has, forsooth, aroused the ire of the commercial monopolists of New-York, Boston, and elsewhere, because they can not any longer enjoy the gains which, for more than a quarter of a century, they had wrested from the mass of consumers throughout the land, north, south, east, and west. Your Committee must say that, in their opinion, such complaints come with a bad grace from such quarters, and it is to be feared that victorious steam will ere long, without the aid of the Federal Government, supersede the sailing ships of the memorialists, through the instrumentality of the discoveries daily in progress, whereby the navigation of vessels propelled by that power will be made a matter of comparatively small cost."
Speaking of steam communication with Para and Rio de Janeiro, the Report further says:
"When the almost unbounded capacity for trade of the basins of the La Plata and Amazon is taken into view, embracing as it does a great variety of useful products which may be advantageously exchanged for the manufactures and agricultural productions of our own country, the mind is at a loss what limit to assign to the trade to which civilization and the extension of commercial facilities must eventually give rise. Nor are the advantages of this great prospective commerce to be confined to the immediate intercourse between this country and the regions to which we refer. While the prevalence of certain winds, and the form of the coast of South-America, are favorable to a direct trade with the continent of North-America, they are such as to compel the commerce with Europe to pass along our shores, and thus constitute our Atlantic seaports so many stopping places at which the ships of the old world may touch in their voyages to and fro. Heretofore the policy of the governments which occupy the regions watered by the La Plata and the Amazon, and their respective tributaries, has been so exclusive in its character as to trammel, if not entirely prevent, their intercourse with distant nations. The different sovereignties which have sprung into existence since South-America became independent of European control, have been so jealous of each other that they have appeared to try which should be most succesful in expelling foreign commerce, lest it might bring to some one of them benefits which others did not and could not possess. A wiser policy, however, appears to be about to prevail since the fall of Rosas, and there is good reason to believe that, hereafter, the commerce of those communities with the rest of the world, will be placed upon a more liberal foundation. Should such be the case, Rio de Janeiro can not fail to become the great centre of a largely increased trade in the southern hemisphere."
"Should it be preferred to limit the extent of the American line to Para, at the mouth of the Amazon, the largest river in the world, there is at present a Brazilian line between that point and Rio de Janeiro, which, with the lines between Rio and the mouth of the La Plata, will render the connection complete.
"Of the Amazon, it is proper to state that it is navigable by the largest vessels, and presents a line of shore of not less than six thousand miles, abounding in every description of product, with climates of all temperatures and soils adapted to all sorts of vegetable growth. As the regions through which this vast river passes are peopled by communities to which manufacturing is unknown, it will at once be seen what an immense market will be opened to American industry in the various departments of the useful arts. The proposed connection would, together with the intercourse by steam, which will inevitably be established on the Amazon, draw to that river the trade of the interior, which at present passes over the Andes on the backs of sheep and mules to the Pacific ocean, and constitutes a large portion of the commodities that are transported around Cape Horn. With a view to this river navigation, Brazil has already entered into a boundary treaty with Peru, by which she has engaged to establish steamboat navigation on the Peruvian tributaries of the Amazon, and is preparing to put seven steamers upon the river, where none have heretofore been.
"The experience of the world has shown that nations do not become commercial or manufacturing, so long as the products of the soil are sufficiently abundant to yield them wealth; and, hence, it may be reasonably inferred that the carrying trade to and from South-America will, if proper measures be taken, fall into the hands of American ship-owners. By way of ascertaining what the extent of this trade will be, if reference be had to the interior or back country as the standard of the commercial resources furnished by rivers, it will be found that the total area drained by the rivers of the world is as follows:
Sq. Miles. Europe, emptying into the Atlantic, 532,940 Africa, emptying into the Mediterranean, 198,630 ————— Total Old World, 1,731,570 ========== Asia, emptying into the Pacific, 1,767,280 Asia, emptying into the Indian ocean, 1,661,760 ————— Total Asiatic, 3,429,040 ========== North-America, including St. Lawrence and Mississippi emptying into the Atlantic, 1,476,800 ========== South-America, emptying into the Atlantic— Amazon and its confluents, 2,048,480 La Plata and all others, 1,329,490 ————— Total South-American 3,377,970 ========== Total American to the Atlantic, 4,854,770 ==========
"From the above statement it will be seen that the proposed line of steam communication will bring within thirty days of each other, the commercial outlets of navigable streams which drain a back country greater in extent than that which is drained by all of the navigable streams which empty themselves into the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian oceans, from those portions of Europe, Asia, and Africa, which are accessible to American commerce. Settlement and cultivation will, in the course of time, make these American river basins as rich in products as those of the old world.
"The question next arises, who are to be the carriers of the trade which is hereafter to spring out of these American river basins, the English or the Americans? If Great Britain be suffered to monopolize commerce as she has heretofore done by her steam navigation, her people will enjoy this great boon; but if, on the contrary, the United States take advantage of circumstances as they should, the prize will be won by Americans."
"Your Committee would remark, in concluding this Report, that, regarding as they do the existence and rapid extension of the system of ocean mail steam navigation, as absolutely essential to the dignity and permanent prosperity of the country, and as the only means, consistent with the genius and policy of our free institutions, of acquiring a maritime strength, which, by keeping pace with the improvements of the age, shall place us upon an equal footing with other civilized countries of the world, without the necessity of an overgrown and expensive naval establishment proper, in time of peace, they would feel themselves derelict in the performance of their duties, did they not recommend the measure, with the earnestness which its importance demands.
"Circumstances indicate, with a clearness not to be misunderstood, that in any future struggle for superiority on the ocean, the contest will be decided by the power of steam. With a view to this result, England has applied herself with even more than her wonted energy to the construction of a regular steam navy which shall be superior to all others. The number of ships which Great Britain has of this kind, is at present two hundred and seventy-one, and there are no less than nine royal war steamers in progress of construction, to say nothing of the mail and other steamers which are being built. The course thus pursued by the great commercial rival of the United States, renders a corresponding energy and activity on our part absolutely necessary, in a national point of view; a steam navy must be provided for future emergencies in the way proposed by the Committee, or war steamers must be built at an enormous outlay of public money and kept ready in the navy yards, or in commission, at an expense which is appalling to every lover of judicious economy, or the stripes and stars of our country, which have heretofore floated so triumphantly on every sea, must grow dim, not only before the 'meteor flag of England,' but the standards of the secondary powers of Europe. If members of Congress are prepared to adopt either of these latter two alternatives, let them say so, and let a system which promises, under an honest and faithful discharge of duty on the part of the executive branch of the Government, to realize the most sanguine expectations of its friends, be at once abandoned. Let Great Britain be again the guardian of our commercial interests and the beneficiary of American trade. Let the Liverpool, Bremen, Havre, California, and other lines, which have furnished twenty-four as noble sea steamers as ever floated, be abandoned to their fate, and let the Cunard line and other British steam mail lines and royal steamers supply their places on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and our Southern seas.
"Your Committee would again repeat that the question to be considered is not one of mere dollars and cents, or whether certain individuals are to be sustained, or not, but one of infinitely greater consequence—whether this proud republic shall now and hereafter exist as a power competent to maintain her rights upon the ocean. The present condition of political affairs in Europe is such as, in the opinion of many, to threaten a general war among the nations of that quarter of the globe, and the United States should stand ready, and able too, to protect the rights of her citizens upon the ocean, in such an event. Were such a crisis to take place to-morrow, or the next year, or within the next five years, is the country prepared for it? The steam navy proper amounts to sixteen steamers of all classes, which, together with the twenty-four ocean mail steamers in the employ of the Post Office Department, would give us a steam naval force not exceeding forty in all. Is this the position we should occupy, while Great Britain has at command upwards of three hundred war and mail steamers? France has, it is believed, upwards of a hundred, and the secondary powers of Europe have naval steam armaments in proportion, most of them exceeding our own. This question will be decided by the continuation or rejection of the system under consideration, which, with all the difficulties attendant upon new enterprises and under the most embarrassing circumstances, has gone very far to sustain itself, and promises, at no distant period, to become a source of large revenue to the Government, and incalculable commercial advantages, pecuniarily and otherwise, to the country."
The following is copied from the Report made by Mr. Rusk in 1850, and published in Special Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1852. Speaking of the services of the mail steamers in our system of defenses, the Report says:
"The truth is, that, in the opinion of your Committee, the temper of the times requires that we shall keep pace with the rapid improvements of other nations in their commercial and military marine, and that the only choice is, whether it is to be done by constructing vessels for the packet service, at a boundless expense to the Government, or by aiding private enterprise, and thus not only eventually avoiding expense, but adding largely to the revenues of the country. It will be seen from the above extract from Mr. King's speech, that, in the course of five years, the balance in favor of the Government from the Cunard line alone was $5,286,000. The New-York and Liverpool and Bremen lines will come in for a large, if not by far the greater, share of the postage and freightage heretofore enjoyed by the Cunard line; and the line to Chagres, for the advantages that have, up to the time of its partial commencement, been in the exclusive possession of the British packet establishment in that direction. Nor are the freightage and postage moneys the only sources of profit. In proportion to the increase of these facilities will be the extension of trade, and consequently the Government will receive the duties payable upon all foreign merchandise brought into the country. Besides, persons in transitu will leave much money in our cities and along their routes, to say nothing of the porterage and costs of transportation of goods. To benefit our people is to benefit our Government; as the more we enrich the former, the more able are they to contribute to the support of the latter.
"To construct ships and keep them in our navy-yards, subject to the injuries of time and casualties, does not consist with the notions of the American people, on the score of economy; nor is it in accordance with received opinions in regard to the propriety of placing excessive patronage in the hands of the General Government. At the same time, it is in perfect unison with the spirit of our free institutions that the arts of peace shall be made tributary to the purposes of defense, and the same energies which extend the commerce and manufactures of our country shall, in the event of necessity, be capable of being made use of for our protection. While the crowned heads of the Old World keep in constant pay vast armies and navies sustained by the heart's blood of the oppressed people, for the protection and preservation of their unhallowed power, it is the proud boast of our country that our soldiers are our citizens, and the sailors, who, in time of peace, spread the canvas of our commercial marine throughout the world, are the men who, in time of war, have heretofore directed, and will continue to direct, our cannon against our foes."
"The simple fact that the ships employed in it [the mail service] may hereafter, if the Government thinks proper, be purchased and commissioned as regular war steamers, to be officered and manned as ships of war, should not and can not prevent the construction of steam or sailing vessels for ordinary naval purposes. Your Committee are of opinion that, so far from being an impediment to the proper increase of the Navy, the prosperity of the ocean steam packet service must operate in favor of an enlargement of the naval force, the necessity for which is increased in proportion to the extension of our commercial relations with foreign countries. The routes upon which lines of steam packets can be sustained and made profitable to the owners are comparatively few, when we take into view the infinitely diversified ramifications of trade. Great Britain, with her vast colonial and general commerce, had, in 1848, but fifteen lines in which national or contract vessels were employed, including the home stations, as they are called, or points of connection between the British islands. Nor has the ocean steam packet system hindered, in the slightest degree, her progress in the construction of steam or sailing vessels for the naval service. In speaking of steam vessels available for naval service, Captain W. H. Hall, of the British Navy, in the course of his examination before the special Committee of the House of Commons, hereinbefore referred to, says: 'I some time ago sent to the Admiralty a plan for making the whole of the merchant steamers available in case of need; and if there were an Act of Parliament that these ships should be strengthened forward and aft to carry guns, it might be then done with a very trifling expense; that would give this country more power than any other country in the world. We have nearly one thousand steam vessels, half of which, at least, might be made available in case Government required their services. Our mercantile steamers are some of the finest in the world, and five hundred of them might be turned to account. They should all be numbered and classed, so that Government would merely have to ask for the number of vessels they wanted, when they might go to Woolwich, or other places, and put the guns on board, and then they would be ready for service.'
"Here is the opinion of a captain in the British Navy with reference to the availability of steam vessels for national defense; and what a lesson does it teach to us in America, where steam navigation is found penetrating every portion of the Union, and spreading itself on our maritime and lake frontier in every direction! Here is found no expression of apprehension lest the mercantile steamers might interfere with the growth or efficiency of the Navy to which the witness belonged. This opinion, moreover, is expressed in a country where, according to the testimony before the Committee already named, there were, in 1848, 174 war steamers, with an aggregate horse-power of 44,480 horses; and where Mr. Alexander Gordon states, in a letter addressed to the same Committee, the Steam Navy had then cost the country L6,000,000 sterling, or $30,000,000, 'exclusive of all reinstatements and expenses during commission;' the same gentleman also alleging that the annual repairs amounted to L108,000 Annual cost for coals, 110,000 Depreciation at a moderate allowance, 600,000 ————- Making the total amount of annual cost, L818,000 Or $4,094,000 ===========
"The regular employment of the best engineers on board of contract vessels, and the great experience they would acquire from being constantly on active duty, would furnish to the naval service, in the event of a war, a corps that would be invaluable. In speaking of the superiority of the engineers on board of contract vessels in the employ of the British Government over those on board of the Queen's ships, a witness before the select Committee of the House of Commons says: 'Last year there was a universal complaint of the inferiority of the engineers and all persons connected with steam employed in her Majesty's service. It was explained, and very easily explained, by the superior advantages in the merchant service, and particularly the high wages paid. In all contract steam packets, they have men on board the vessels who are competent to superintend any alterations or repairs in the machinery which may be required.'"
Secretary Graham said on this subject to the Senate Committee, 20 March, 1853:
"While their discussions [mail steamers] justify the conclusion that vessels of this description can not be relied on to supersede those modelled and built only for purposes of war, it is respectfully suggested that a limited number of them, employed in time of peace in the transportation of the mails, would be found a most useful resource of the Government on the breaking out of war.
"If conforming to the standards required by these contracts, their readiness to be used at the shortest notice, their capacity as transports for troops and munitions of war, and their great celerity of motion, enabling them to overhaul merchantmen, and at the same time escape cruisers, would render them terrible as guerrillas of the ocean, if fitted with such armaments as could be readily put upon them in their present condition."
Post Master General Collamer also said on this subject, June 27, 1850:
"There are three modes which have been mentioned of transporting the mail. The first is by naval steamships, conducted by the Navy, as a national service. This will occasion so enormous an expense that it is not probable the project will be entertained.
"The next mode suggested is the sending the mails, from time to time, by the fastest steamers which are first going. This has one advantage: it gives occasional aid to the enterprising; but there are many and great objections to it:
"1st. It is entirely inconsistent with fixed periods of departure and arrival.
"2d. It makes all connections on or with the route uncertain.
"3d. A price must be fixed, to prevent undue exactions of the Government; and yet no one would be under obligation to take the mail at the price, so that it would be uncertain of going at all.
"4th. It would be impracticable to send agents with all those mails, to take care of them and make distributions, except at an enormous cost.
"5th. There would be constant difficulty with slow and unsafe boats.
"6th. The great object of obtaining steamships, so constructed, under the inspection of the Navy Department, as to be suitable for war vessels, and subject to exclusive appropriation and use as such, would be sacrificed.
"The third project is the making of contracts, for a stated term of years, upon proposals advertised for in the ordinary method adopted for mail-coach service. This would not answer for ocean steam service, unless provision were made for security, in the strength, capacity, and adaptation of the vessels, with their machinery, etc."
Regarding our steam service in the Gulf, and in reviewing the contract made by the United States Mail Steamship Company, the Hon. Edwin Croswell, and associates, in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Postal Committee, presented the following important reflections:
"As early as the year 1835, the attention of the British Government was directed to the plan of changing the mode of conveying the mails by the ships of the East-India Company and the Government, and adopting the contract system with individuals and companies, with a view to combining the essential properties of a naval and commercial steam marine.
"In consequence of the Report of the Commissioners appointed by Parliament to inquire into the management of the English Post Office Department in 1836, the mail steam packet service was transferred to the Admiralty. The Report stated the conviction of the Commissioners of Inquiry that 'the advantages which a System of contract must generally secure to the public over one of the establishment, however well conducted, were such that they wish they could have felt justified in recommending that it should be universally and immediately adopted.'
"The Secretary of the Admiralty stated that, 'in acting upon this opinion, the Admiralty entered into contracts for conveying the mails by steam vessels to and from Spain and Portugal, and subsequently between Alexandria and England, with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company. Contracts were also entered into for the conveyance of the mails between England and North-America, and England and the West-Indies and Mexico.' That 'the execution of all these contracts, with the exception of the latter, had given general satisfaction. But for this exception, the extent and complication of the plan at its commencement afforded some apology.' That 'the spirit in which the steam contractors had generally executed their contracts merited notice, as they had in almost every instance exceeded the horse-power stipulated in their agreements, and thus insured an accuracy in the delivery of mails which experience has shown, if the letter of the contract had been adhered to by them, would not have been the case.' And that 'the contract system had been generally satisfactory to the Admiralty and the public, and had tended largely to increase the steam tonnage of this country, (England,) to encourage private enterprise in scientific discovery, and the regulation and economical management of steam.' |
|