President Wilson took no action as a result of the message, waiting to hear from Ambassador Gerard whether anything of a more formal character could be obtained by him which the United States might communicate to Great Britain, France, and Russia. It was understood tonight that the British and French Ambassadors who are in Washington were not informed officially or unofficially by Secretary Bryan of the conversation between the Imperial German Chancellor and Ambassador Gerard.

Germany's position is that she will give her opinion on terms of peace when she has received a definite statement from the Allies of their proposals. The statement that Germany did not want war, but had it forced upon her, as well as the declaration that she wanted a lasting peace, is almost identical with the remarks which Sir Edward Grey made to Ambassador Page in London last week. The British Foreign Secretary said England wanted no temporary truce, but a permanent peace, and one that would safeguard her against sudden attacks such as Germany had made.

President's Future Course.

The general belief in well-informed circles tonight was that the President, after waiting a few days for more information from Berlin, probably would instruct the American Ambassadors at London, Paris, and Petrograd to communicate what the Imperial German Chancellor had said to Ambassador Gerard. It was believed the Ambassadors would be asked to reiterate the wish of the American Government to be of service in bringing about peace and to point out the readiness of the United States to communicate to Germany and Austria any statement of terms which the Allies might care to make.

Diplomatists are disposed to believe that through such informal conversations something definite in the way of peace terms may yet be obtained as a working basis. If a concord of opinion for the discussion of peace terms were reached President Wilson then would endeavor to obtain an acceptance by all the belligerents of the original tender of good offices. This would not mean a cessation of hostilities, unless the mediating power specifically made it a condition of mediation and all the belligerents agreed to it. An armistice would not hinder military movements or preparations, serving merely as a truce while peace was discussed.

President Wilson already has indicated that he believes that the final reckoning of the war should be made in a conference of the European powers, and it would be the function of the United States to preside at such a conference if its services as a mediator were accepted.

Various reports were current today that Germany had named several conditions under which she would make peace, that she had refused proposals to alter the territorial status of her empire and possessions, and would cede no territory or dismantle her fleet, but it was said authoritatively that nothing of this character was contained in any of the messages from Berlin to the American Government.

A statement made at the White House today was the first authoritative acknowledgment that any inquiry on the subject of Germany's attitude concerning peace had been made by the United States. Officials heretofore have maintained silence in regard to the effort made by the Government to get at the bottom of the expression in favor of peace reported to have been made by the German Emperor to the Imperial Chancellor and mentioned in a private conversation in New York by Count von Bernstorff, the German Ambassador to the United States.

What was said by Count von Bernstorff in that conversation brought Oscar S. Straus post-haste to Washington, and as a result of what he told Secretary Bryan instructions were sent to Ambassador Gerard to ascertain whether the remarks attributed to the Emperor were to be taken as an indication that the German Government would not be averse to the exercise of the good offices of the United States in an effort to end the hostilities in Europe.

The conversation at which the German Ambassador made the statement occurred at the house of James Speyer, the banker, in New York. Oscar S. Straus, a member of the Permanent Tribunal of Arbitration at The Hague, was present. In the course of a discussion of the war in Europe and the prospects of peace Count von Bernstorff, it is understood, said that, while he had no advices from the Imperial Government since he had left Berlin, he recalled that the Imperial Chancellor had told him that he believed Emperor William would be willing to discuss a proposal of peace through mediation.

With the permission of Count von Bernstorff, Mr. Straus came to Washington and told Secretary Bryan of what the German Ambassador had said. On the following day Count von Bernstorff made a trip from New York to Washington and had an interview with Secretary Bryan.

It has been understood that Mr. Bryan, in an excess of caution, desired to ask Count von Bernstorff personally if he would consent to having Ambassador Gerard instructed to make inquiry of the German Government as to whether the conversation between the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor might be regarded as indicating that an offer of mediation of the United States would not be unwelcome to Germany. Count von Bernstorff is understood to have assented to Mr. Bryan's suggestion, and the instructions to Mr. Gerard followed.

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WHO BEGAN THE WAR, AND WHY?

CASE FOR THE TRIPLE ENTENTE



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FIRST WARNINGS OF EUROPE'S PERIL.

Speeches by British Ministers.

Sir John Simon, British Attorney General, in Speech Before Altrincham Liberals, at Manchester, July 25.

We have been so filled with our own political development that some of us may not have noticed how serious a situation is threatening on the Continent of Europe. All I will say about it this afternoon is this—if times of anxiety are coming into relationships between different European powers, we in this country, and I think not only Liberals among us, have reason to be glad that our foreign administration is in the calm, cool hands of Sir Edward Grey.[06] [Cheers.] And let us all resolve that, whatever may be the difficulties and dangers which threaten the peaceful relations in Europe, the part which this country plays shall from beginning to end be the part of a mediator simply desirous of promoting better and more peaceful relations.

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[06] On the next day, July 26, Earl Grey addressed to The London Times the following appeal for national unity:

To the Editor of The Times:

Sir: The Lord Chancellor, in his speech on Friday, called on every Liberal to work for the peace of Europe, but to go forward unflinchingly to civil war at home.

It is obvious that the only hope of England's effective mediation lies in the unity and solidarity of the United Kingdom.

Is it not time that the common sense of the nation asserted itself and called upon our rulers to take steps which will enable a united nation to confront with confidence the perils which encompass us?

In moments of national peril every loyal citizen should not hesitate, however painful the process may be, to burst the fetters of party allegiance in order that he may devote his whole energies to an endeavor to safeguard the higher interests of the State.

What is the cause which is dividing a so-called United Kingdom into two hostile camps? It is the endeavor of a tyrannical House of Commons to force upon the acceptance of the people a bill which in the common belief they not only do not want but are strongly opposed to. I approach the consideration of the national crisis from no party standpoint, but from that of one who believes that the peace of Ireland, the honor of England, and the strength of the empire are all concerned in a speedy and satisfactory settlement of the Irish question.

I believe that such a settlement is to be found in a measure which will give to the peoples of Ireland powers of local self-government similar to those enjoyed by the Provinces of Canada and South Africa.

It is because the Ministerial policy of home rule is based on a principle which would not be tolerated in any one of the Legislatures of Washington, Ottawa, or Melbourne that I am so strongly opposed to it. No party, no political group, however small, could be found in Canada, Australia, or the United States which would venture to propose that the Province of Quebec, or the State of Queensland or California, should be endowed by means of a measure like the Home Rule bill with separatist constitutional rights which could not be given to the other provinces and States.

I challenge his Majesty's Ministers to deny this plain, unanswerable statement.

I further challenge his Majesty's Ministers to deny that their home rule policy, if carried into effect, will make slaves of one part of Ireland or another.

If their bill for the better government of Ireland reaches the statute book without the amending bill it will make slaves of the Ulstermen. It will deprive them of half of the representation to which their population entitles them in the House of Commons, thus reducing them to a political inferiority, as compared with the peoples of Great Britain, which can hardly be distinguished from political slavery, and it will further compel them to accept the administration of a Dublin Parliament which they fear and detest in all matters relating to their local government. I have often wondered how any one rejoicing in the inheritance of old Liberal traditions could for a moment suppose that any group of free men would ever accept such dishonoring conditions.

Again, if the Home Rule bill is passed with the amending bill tacked on to it, the chains of slavery from which Ulster will be relieved will be riveted on the rest of Ireland. Ulster will have thirty-three representatives in the Imperial House of Commons, and the rest of Ireland twenty-seven! What germ of a settlement of the Irish question can any one discover in a policy which proposes that one-fourth of the people of Ireland should be able to outvote the other three-fourths in matters affecting their liberties and taxation?

No! The Ministerial bills of home rule are fundamentally bad and should be withdrawn, in order that a new attempt may be made to reach a settlement by general consent in accordance, as I believe, with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the people.

Is it not better to wait a little for a settlement by consent on lines which will conduce to permanent peace and prosperity than to try to force on the pages of the statute book a measure which must lead to bloodshed and civil war? If party considerations veto the withdrawal of the Ministerial measure of home rule without the aid of a general election, then let us have a general election without one moment's unnecessary delay.

The times are too perilous to allow us even to contemplate with any other feeling than that of horror and dismay the Lord Chancellor's appeal to go forward unflinchingly to civil war.

I have the honor to remain, Sir,

Yours respectfully,

GREY.

22 South Street, Park Lane, July 26.

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"A CLOUD OVER EUROPE."

London Times Report, July 27, of Speech by Under Secretary Acland.

F.D. Acland, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, speaking at an open-air Liberal demonstration at Steyning, Sussex, on Saturday [July 25], said there was a cloud over Europe, the position there being far graver and more serious than the position in Ireland. No one could imagine the disasters which a war in which a great European power was involved might bring to the whole world. He hoped the power of accommodating the difficulties in the same way as in the Balkan trouble last year would be found effective. The whole of the influence of this country would be used in the interests of peace.

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AUSTRO-SERVIAN CRISIS.

Statement in House of Commons, July 27, by Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The House will, of course, be aware from the public press of what the nature of the situation in Europe is at the present moment. I think it is due to the House that I should give in short narrative form the position which his Majesty's Government have so far taken up. ["Hear, hear."] Last Friday morning I received from the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador the text of the communication made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the powers, which has appeared in the press, and which included textually the demand made by the Austro-Hungarian Government upon Servia.

In the afternoon I saw other Ambassadors, and expressed the view that as long as the dispute was one between Austria-Hungary and Servia alone I felt that we had no title to interfere, but that if the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia became threatening, the question would then be one of the peace of Europe—a matter that concerned us all.

I did not then know what view the Russian Government had taken of the situation, and without knowing how things were likely to develop I could not make any immediate proposition; but I said that if relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia did become threatening, the only chance of peace appeared to me to be that the four powers—Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain—who were not directly interested in the Servian question, should work together both in St. Petersburg and Vienna simultaneously to get both Austria-Hungary and Russia to suspend military operations while the four powers endeavored to arrange a settlement.

After I had heard that Austria-Hungary had broken off diplomatic relations with Servia I made, by telegraph yesterday afternoon, the following proposal, as a practical method of applying the views that I had already expressed:

I instructed his Majesty's Ambassadors in Paris, Berlin, and Rome to ask the Governments to which they were accredited whether they would be willing to arrange that the French, German, and Italian Ambassadors in London should meet me in a conference to be held in London immediately to endeavor to find a means of arranging the present difficulties. At the same time I instructed his Majesty's Ambassadors to ask those Governments to authorize their representatives in Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Belgrade to inform the Governments there of the proposed conference and to ask them to suspend all active military operations pending the result of the conference.

To that I have not yet received complete replies, and it is of course a proposal in which the co-operation of all four powers is essential. In a crisis so grave as this the efforts of one power alone to preserve the peace must be quite ineffective.

The time allowed in this matter has been so short that I have had to take the risk of making a proposal without the usual preliminary steps of trying to ascertain whether it would be well received. But, where matters are so grave and the time so short, the risk of proposing something that is unwelcome or ineffective cannot be avoided. I cannot but feel, however, assuming that the text of the Servian reply as published this morning in the press is accurate, as I believe it to be, that it should at least provide a basis on which a friendly and impartial group of powers, including powers who are equally in the confidence of Austria-Hungary and of Russia, should be able to arrange a settlement that would be generally acceptable.

It must be obvious to any person who reflects upon the situation that the moment the dispute ceases to be one between Austria-Hungary and Servia and becomes one in which another great power is involved, it can but end in the greatest catastrophe that has ever befallen the Continent of Europe at one blow; no one can say what would be the limit of the issues that might be raised by such a conflict; the consequences of it, direct and indirect, would be incalculable.

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A GRAVE SITUATION.

Statement in House of Commons, July 29, by H.H. Asquith, British Prime Minister.

Mr. Bonar Law (Lancs, Bootle)—May I ask the Prime Minister whether he has any information to give the House with regard to the European situation?

Mr. Asquith—As the House is aware, a formal declaration of war was issued yesterday by Austria against Servia. The situation at this moment is one of extreme gravity and I can only say—usefully say—that his Majesty's Government are not relaxing their efforts to do everything in their power to circumscribe the area of possible conflict. ["Hear! hear!"]

* * * * *



RISK OF A CATASTROPHE.

Declaration in House of Commons, July 30, by Prime Minister Asquith.

We meet today under conditions of gravity which are almost unparalleled in the experience of every one of us. The issues of peace and war are hanging in the balance, and with them the risk of a catastrophe of which it is impossible to measure either the dimensions or the effects. In these circumstances it is of vital importance in the interests of the whole world that this country, which has no interests of its own directly at stake, should present a united front and be able to speak and act with the authority of an undivided nation. If we were to proceed today with the first order on the paper we should inevitably, unless the debate was conducted with an artificial tone, be involved in acute controversy in regard to domestic differences whose importance to ourselves no one here in any quarter of the House is disposed to disparage or to belittle. I need not say more than that such a use of our time at such a moment might have injurious, and lastingly injurious, effects on the international situation. I have had the advantage of consultation with the leader of the Opposition, who, I know, shares to the full the view which I have expressed. We shall therefore propose to put off for the present the consideration of the second reading of the amending bill—of course, without prejudice to its future—in the hope that by a postponement of the discussion the patriotism of all parties will contribute what lies in our power, if not to avert at least to circumscribe the calamities which threaten the world. In the meantime the business which we shall take will be confined to necessary matters which will not be of a controversial character.

* * * * *



OPPOSITION CONCURS.

Assent of Bonar Law, Leader of the British Opposition, and of Sir Edward Carson, July 30.

As the Prime Minister has informed the House, it is with our concurrence that he has made the suggestion which we have just heard. At a moment like the present, when even those of us who do not share diplomatic secrets feel that the statement of the Prime Minister is true, that peace and war may be trembling in the balance, I think it is of the utmost importance that it should be made plain to every one that, whatever our domestic differences may be, they do not prevent us from presenting a united front in the councils of the world. I am obliged to the Prime Minister for saying that in the meantime party controversial business will not be taken. I am sure that it is his intention, as it would be the wish of the whole House, that this postponement will not in any way prejudice the interests of any of the parties to the controversy. I should like to add—and I do so, not to give information to the House, the members of which quite understand the position, but in order that it may be plain outside that in what I have now said I speak not only, so far as I am entitled to speak, for the Unionist Party, but for Ulster—that in what I have just said I have the concurrence of my right honorable friend the member for Trinity College [Sir Edward Carson].

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PEACE THE GREAT OBJECT.

Statement by Sir Edward Grey in House of Commons, July 30.

I regret that I cannot say the situation is less grave than it was yesterday. The outstanding facts are much the same. Austria has begun war against Servia. Russia has ordered a partial mobilization. This has not hitherto led to any corresponding steps by other powers, so far as our information goes. We continue to pursue the one great object of preserving European peace, and for this purpose we are keeping in close touch with other powers. In thus keeping in touch we have, I am glad to say, had no difficulty so far; though it has not been possible for the powers to unite in diplomatic action as was proposed on Monday.

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RUSSIA'S MOBILIZATION.

Statement in House of Commons by Prime Minister Asquith, Aug. 1.

We have just heard, not from St. Petersburg but from Germany, that Russia has proclaimed a general mobilization of her army and fleet, and in consequence of this martial law is to be proclaimed in Germany.

We understand this to mean that mobilization will follow in Germany if the Russian mobilization is general and is proceeded with.

In these circumstances I should prefer not to answer any further question until Monday.

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THE GERMAN INVASION.

Editorial Article of The London Times, Aug. 3.

The die is cast. The great European struggle which the nations have so long struggled to avert has begun. Germany declared war upon Russia on Saturday evening, and yesterday her troops entered Luxemburg and crossed the French frontier in Lorraine without any declaration at all. It is idle to dwell upon events such as these. They speak for themselves in a fashion which all can understand. They mean that Europe is to be the scene of the most terrible war that she has witnessed since the fall of the Roman Empire. The losses in human life and in the accumulated wealth of generations which such a contest must involve are frightful to think on. That it should have come about despite the zealous efforts of diplomacy, and against the wishes of almost all the nations whom it is destined to afflict, is a grim satire upon the professions of peace yet fresh upon the lips of those who have plunged the Continent into its miseries and its calamities. The blame must fall mainly upon Germany. She could have stayed the plague had she chosen to speak in Vienna as she speaks when she is in earnest. She has not chosen to do so. She has preferred to make demands in St. Petersburg and in Paris which no Government could entertain, and to defeat by irrevocable acts the last efforts of this country and of others for mediation. She has lived up to the worst principles of the Frederician tradition—the tradition which disregards all obligations of right and wrong at the bidding of immediate self-interest. She believes that her admirable military organization has enabled her to steal a march upon her rivals. She has been mobilizing in all but name, while their mobilization has been retarded by the "conversations" she continued until her moment had come. Then she flung the mask aside. While her Ambassador was still in Paris, while by the customs traditional with all civilized peoples she was still at peace with France, she has sent her soldiers into Luxemburg, and invaded the territory of the republic. It is hard to say which of these acts is the grosser infringement of public right. With Luxemburg she makes no pretense of quarrel. She is herself a party to the guarantee of its neutrality contained in the Treaty of 1867. The other guarantors are Great Britain, France, Russia, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, and the Netherlands. She solemnly pledged herself with some of them, including France and ourselves, to respect this neutrality. The world sees how Germany keeps her word. She has been weak enough, or cynical enough, to issue an explanation of her breach of faith. Let Englishmen, who have been disposed to trust her, judge it for themselves. She has not, she says, committed a hostile act by crossing the frontiers, by forcibly seizing the Government offices, and by forcibly interrupting the telephonic communication. These are merely measures to protect the railways from a possible attack by the French. For the sudden invasion of France no excuse has yet been published. When it comes it will doubtless be of about equal worth.

The whole situation has been revolutionized by the events of yesterday. The doubts which many of us tried hard to cherish as to Germany's real intentions have been dispelled by her high-handed contempt for public law. The Government and the nation now realize that she has been bent on a European war—a European war to be waged in the first instance against France, and through at least one of those neutral States whose safety we have bound ourselves to defend because it is indispensable to our own. The Cabinet, which has been sitting almost uninterruptedly since Saturday morning, reached a decision at an early hour yesterday, which shows that they know what is before us. They have called up the Naval Reserves. They would not have taken this step had they not felt that in this quarrel our interests are now directly at stake. After the example of what Germany has done in Luxemburg and on the French border we can no longer rely upon the presence of her Ambassador as a security against some sudden surprise. We have no controversy with her, it is true. We have been willing and anxious to develop those better relations with her which had of late sprung up. We were eager to work with her for mediation and for peace. Now she has shown her hand. She is resolved to crush France, and to trample upon the rights of those who happen to stand in her way. Yesterday it was Luxemburg. Today it may be Belgium or Holland, or she may treat us as she has treated our French friends, and assail us without a declaration of war. She will find the empire ready. Here at home and in the far-off dominions the sure instinct of our peoples teaches them that the ruin of France or of the Low Countries would be the prelude to our own. We can no more tolerate a German hegemony in Europe than we can tolerate the hegemony of any other power. As our fathers fought Spain and France in the days of their greatest strength to defeat their pretense to Continental supremacy, and their menace to the narrow seas, which are the bulwark of our independence, so shall we be ready, with the same unanimity and the same stubborn tenacity of purpose, to fight any other nation which shows by her acts that she is advancing a like claim and confronting us with a like threat. If any individual member of the Cabinet dissents from this view, the sooner he quits the Government the better. Mr. Asquith may find it no disadvantage to take fresh blood into his Administration, as M. Viviani has undoubtedly strengthened the French Government by the admission of M. Delcasse and M. Clemenceau. The controversy between Austria-Hungary and Servia, and that between Austria-Hungary and Russia, have passed away from the eyes of the nation. These are fixed on the German attack upon the French Republic and upon Luxemburg. In that conflict the nation know their duty. With the blessing of Heaven they will do it to the uttermost.

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PEACE OF EUROPE CANNOT BE PRESERVED.

Sir Edward Grey's Speech in House of Commons, Aug. 3.

Last week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country, but to preserve the peace of Europe. Today events move so rapidly that it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs, but it is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany, at any rate, have declared war upon each other.

Before I proceed to state the position of his Majesty's Government I would like to clear the ground so that, before I come to state to the House what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, the House may know exactly under what obligations the Government is, or the House can be said to be, in coming to a decision on the matter. First of all, let me say, very shortly, that we have consistently worked with a single mind, with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace. The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it. During these last years, as far as his Majesty's Government are concerned, we would have no difficulty in proving that we have done so. Throughout the Balkan crisis, by general admission, we worked for peace. The co-operation of the great powers of Europe was successful in working for peace in the Balkan crisis. It is true that some of the powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time and labor and discussion before they could settle their differences, but peace was secured, because peace was their main object, and they were willing to give time and trouble rather than accentuate differences rapidly.

In the present crisis it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe; because there has been little time, and there has been a disposition—at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell—to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace, and, as we now know, the result of that is that the policy of peace as far as the great powers generally are concerned is in danger. I do not want to dwell on that, and to comment on it, and to say where the blame seems to us to lie, which powers were most in favor of peace, which were most disposed to risk war or endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach this crisis in which we are now from the point of view of British interests, British honor, and British obligations, free from all passion as to why peace has not been preserved.

We shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week when we were working for peace, and when those papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine and whole-hearted our efforts for peace were, and that they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.

I come first, now, to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honor upon the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups, the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple Entente, for some years past. The Triple Entente was not an alliance—it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis—also a Balkan crisis—originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Isvolsky, came to London, or happened to come to London, because his visit was planned before the crisis broke out. I told him definitely then, this being a Balkan crisis, a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising to give anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised.

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support—up till yesterday no promise of more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to his Majesty's Government when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise and I used no threats; but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorized that, on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter, that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on the 22d November, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Government:

My dear Ambassador:

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common.

Lord Charles Beresford—What is the date of that?

Sir E. Grey—The 22nd November, 1912. That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free, and, a fortiori, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France—a dispute which concerned France and France primarily—a dispute, as it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Servia than the Government and the Country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honor under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honor cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House—and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart, and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon any one else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration; can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that today we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defense of vital British interests, we shall go to war; and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral—because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defense of vital British interests ourselves to fight—what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:

I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding his Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.

I read that to the House, not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move very hurriedly from hour to hour. Fresh news comes in, and I cannot give this in any very formal way; but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious consideration—becoming more serious every hour—there is the question of the neutrality of Belgium.

I shall have to put before the House at some length what is our position in regard to Belgium. The governing factor is the Treaty of 1839, but this is a treaty with a history—a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose, and various things were said. Among other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance to Belgium that—confirming his verbal assurance, he gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in reference to the treaty in existence—that the German Confederation and its allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by the other belligerent powers. That is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights.

What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville on the 8th August, 1870, used these words. He said:

We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations that we could not think this country was bound either morally or internationally, or that its interests were concerned in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium; though this course might have had some conveniences, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country's honor or to the country's interests.

Mr. Gladstone, spoke as follows two days later:

There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty; but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion, that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities upon foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen, such as Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston, never to my knowledge took that rigid and, if I may venture to say so, that impracticable view of the guarantee. The circumstance, that there is already an existing guarantee in force, is, of necessity, an important fact, and a weighty element in the case, to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also this further consideration, the force of which we must all feel most deeply, and that is, the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any power whatever.

The treaty is an old treaty—1839—and that was the view taken of it in 1870. It is one of those treaties which are founded, not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits under the treaty, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium. The honor and interests are, at least, as strong today as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations, and of the importance of those obligations, than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870.

I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilization was beginning, I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy—a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time in similar terms to both Paris and Berlin to say that it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These are the replies. I got from the French Government this reply:

The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure the defense of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs today.

From the German Government the reply was:

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Imperial Chancellor.

Sir Edward Goschen, to whom I had said it was important to have an answer soon, said he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir Edward Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign. I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government, and I got the following reply from Sir Francis Villiers:

Belgium expects and desires that other powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign Affairs said, that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

It now appears from the news I have received today—which has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure how far it has reached me in an accurate form—that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she would facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Well, Sir, until one has these things absolutely definitely, up to the last moment, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one were in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information upon the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether, if a guarantee were given that, after the war, Belgian integrity would be preserved, that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality.

Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by our King—King George:

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessors, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the poof of friendship she has just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital interests in the independence—and integrity is the least part—of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to submit to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their one desire is that they should be left alone and independent. The one thing they fear is, I think, not so much that their integrity but that their independence should be interfered with. If in this war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action be taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone.

I have one further quotation from Mr. Gladstone as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. It will be found in "Hansard," Vol. 203, Page 1,787. I have not had time to read the whole speech and verify the context, but the thing seems to me so clear that no context could make any difference to the meaning of it. Mr. Gladstone said:

We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin.

No, Sir, if it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten in a struggle of life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a great power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater than herself—consequences which I do not anticipate, because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often—still, if that were to happen, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any power?

It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect to put things right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honor and interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost. And do not believe, whether a great power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand aside.

We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war, whether we are in it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no trade at the other end. Continental nations engaged in war—all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth, engaged in a desperate struggle—they cannot carry on the trade with us that they are carrying on in times of peace, whether we are parties to the war or whether we are not. I do not believe for a moment that at the end of this war, even if we stood aside and remained aside, we should be in a position, a material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the west of Europe opposite to us—if that had been the result of the war—falling under the domination of a single power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would be such as to have lost us all respect. I can only say that I have put the question of Belgium somewhat hypothetically, because I am not yet sure of all the facts, but, if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present, it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed.

I have read to the House the only engagements that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House to say that we have taken no engagement yet with regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the country. Mobilization of the fleet has taken place; mobilization of the army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement, because I feel that—in the case of a European conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the empire, or in countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors—we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand. One thing I would say.

The one bright spot in the whole of this, terrible situation is Ireland. The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad—does not make the Irish question a consideration which we feel we have now to take into account. I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have put to the House and dwelt at length upon how vital is the condition of the neutrality of Belgium.

What other policy Is there before the House? There is but one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that. We have made the commitment to France that I have read to the House which prevents us doing that. We have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality, and, without these conditions absolutely satisfied and satisfactory, we are bound not to shrink from proceeding to the use of all the forces in our power. If we did take that line by saying, "We will have nothing whatever to do with this matter" under no conditions—the Belgian treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, with damage to British interests, and what may happen to France from our failure to support France—if we were to say that all those things mattered nothing, were as nothing, and to say we would stand aside, we should, I believe, sacrifice our respect and good name and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

My object has been to explain the view of the Government, and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said, and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we are prepared, for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment—we know not how soon—to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know, if the facts all be as I have stated them, though I have announced no intending aggressive action on our part, no final decision to resort to force at a moment's notice, until we know the whole of the case, that the use of it may be forced upon us. As far as the forces of the Crown are concerned, we are ready. I believe the Prime Minister and my right honorable friend the First Lord of the Admiralty have no doubt whatever that the readiness and the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than they are today, and never was there a time when confidence was more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce and to protect our shores. The thought is with us always of the suffering and misery entailed, from which no country in Europe will escape by abstention, and from which no neutrality will save us. The amount of harm that can be done by an enemy ship to our trade is infinitesimal, compared with the amount of harm that must be done by the economic condition that is caused on the Continent.

The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have disclosed our minds to the House of Commons. We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have, and made clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that situation, and that should it develop, as probably it may develop, we will face it. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. How hard, how persistently, and how earnestly we strove for peace last week the House will see from the papers that will be before it.

But that is over, as far as the peace of Europe is concerned. We are now face to face with a situation and all the consequences which it may yet have to unfold. We believe we shall have the support of the House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be and whatever measures may be forced upon us by the development of facts or action taken by others. I believe the country, so quickly has the situation been forced upon it, has not had time to realize the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of the quarrel between Austria and Servia, and not the complications of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between Austria and Servia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has been happening on the French frontier. We do not know that the German Ambassador has left Paris.

The situation has developed so rapidly that technically, as regards the condition of the war, it is most difficult to describe what has actually happened. I wanted to bring out the underlying issues which would affect our own conduct, and our own policy, and to put them clearly. I have now put the vital facts before the House, and if, as seems not improbable, we are forced, and rapidly forced, to take our stand upon those issues, then I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, what the real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the west of Europe, which I have endeavored to describe to the House, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the courage, and the endurance of the whole country.

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GERMANY AND BELGIUM.

Further Statement by Sir Edward Grey in House of Commons, Aug. 3, 1914.

I want to give the House some information which I have received, and which was not in my possession when I made my statement this afternoon. It is information I have received from the Belgian Legation in London, and is to the following effect:

Germany sent yesterday evening at 7 o'clock a note proposing to Belgium friendly neutrality, covering free passage on Belgian territory, and promising maintenance of independence of the kingdom and possession at the conclusion of peace, and threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. A time limit of twelve hours was fixed for the reply. The Belgians have answered that an attack on their neutrality would be a flagrant violation of the rights of nations, and that to accept the German proposal would be to sacrifice the honor of a nation. Conscious of its duty, Belgium is firmly resolved to repel aggression by all possible means.

Of course, I can only say that the Government are prepared to take into grave consideration the information which they have received. I make no further comment upon it.

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UNHESITATING SUPPORT.

Statement by Bonar Law, Opposition Leader, in House of Commons, Aug. 3.

The right honorable gentleman has made an appeal for support and it is necessary that I should say a word or two, but they shall be very few. I wish to say in the first place that I do not believe there is a single member in this House who doubts that not only the right honorable gentleman himself, but the Government which he represents, have done everything in their power up to the last moment to preserve peace. [Cheers.] And I think we may be sure that if any other course is taken it is because it is forced upon them and that they have absolutely no alternative. [Cheers.] One thing only further I should like to say. The right honorable gentleman spoke of the bright spot in the picture which only a day or two ago was a black spot in the political horizon. Everything that he has said I am sure is true and I should like to say this further—that if the contingencies which he has not put into words, but which are in all our minds as possible, arise, then we have already had indications that there is another bright spot—that every one of his Majesty's dominions beyond the seas will be behind us in whatever act it is necessary to take. [Cheers.] This only I should add. The Government already know, but I give them now the assurance on behalf of the party of which I am leader in this House, that in whatever steps they think it necessary to take for the honor and security of this country they can rely upon the unhesitating support of the Opposition. [Loud Ministerial and Opposition cheers.]

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CHANGED IRISH FEELING.

Statement in House of Commons, Aug. 3, by John E. Redmond, M.P.

I hope the House will not consider it improper on my part in the grave circumstances in which we are assembled if I intervene for a very few moments. I was moved a great deal by that sentence in the speech of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in which he said that the one bright spot in the situation was the changed feeling in Ireland. In past times, when this empire has been engaged in these terrible enterprises it is true—it would be the utmost affectation and folly on my part to deny it—the sympathy of the Nationalists of Ireland, for reasons to be found deep down in centuries of history, has been estranged from this country. But allow me to say that what has occurred in recent years has altered the situation completely. [Ministerial cheers.] I must not touch, and I may be trusted not to touch, on any controversial topics, but this I may be allowed to say—that a wider knowledge of the real facts of Irish history have, I think, altered the view of the democracy of this country toward the Irish question, and today I honestly believe that the democracy of Ireland will turn with the utmost anxiety and sympathy to this country in every trial and every danger that may overtake it. [General cheers.] There is a possibility at any rate of history repeating itself. The House will remember that in 1778, at the end of the disastrous American war, when it might, I think, truly be said that the military power of this country was almost at its lowest ebb, and when the shores of Ireland were threatened with foreign invasion, a body of 100,000 Irish volunteers sprang into existence for the purpose of defending her shores. At first no Catholic—ah! how sad the reading of the history of those days is—was allowed to be enrolled in that body of volunteers, and yet from the very first day the Catholics of the South and West subscribed money and sent it toward the arming of their Protestant fellow-countrymen. Ideas widened as time went on, and finally the Catholics in the South were armed and enrolled brothers in arms with their fellow-countrymen of a different creed in the North. May history repeat itself! [Cheers.] Today there are in Ireland two large bodies of volunteers. One of them sprang into existence in the North. Another has sprung into existence in the South. I say to the Government that they may tomorrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. [General cheers.] I say that the coasts of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestant Ulstermen in the North. [Cheers.] Is it too much to hope that out of this situation there may spring a result which will be good not merely for the empire, but good for the future welfare and integrity of the Irish Nation. [Cheers.] I ought to apologize for having intervened [cries of "No"], but while Irishmen generally are in favor of peace, and would desire to save the democracy of this country from all the horrors of war, while we would make any possible sacrifice for that purpose, still if the dire necessity is forced upon this country we offer to the Government of the day that they may take their troops away, and that if it is allowed to us in comradeship with our brethren in the North we will ourselves defend the coasts of our country. [Loud cheers.]

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GREAT BRITAIN'S ULTIMATUM TO GERMANY.

Prime Minister Asquith Explains Its Nature in House of Commons, Aug. 4, 1914.

Mr. Bonar Law—I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he has any statement that he can now make to the House?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Asquith)—In conformity with the statement of policy made here by my right honorable friend the Foreign Secretary yesterday, a telegram was early this morning sent by him to our Ambassador in Berlin. It was to this effect:

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to his Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium. His Majesty's Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours. We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations. His Majesty's Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium may not be proceeded with, and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

We received this morning from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram:

German Minister has this morning addressed note to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that, as Belgian Government have declined the well-intended proposals submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of the French menaces.

Simultaneously—almost immediately afterward—we received from the Belgian Legation here in London the following telegram:

General Staff announces that territory has been violated at Gemmenich (near Aix-la-Chapelle).

Subsequent information tended to show that the German force has penetrated still further into Belgian territory. We also received this morning from the German Ambassador here the telegram sent to him by the German Foreign Secretary, and communicated by the Ambassador to us. It is in these terms:

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretense whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgic territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

I have to add this on behalf of his Majesty's Government: We cannot regard this as in any sense a satisfactory communication. We have, in reply to it, repeated the request we made last week to the German Government, that they should give us the same assurance in regard to Belgian neutrality as was given to us and to Belgium by France last week. We have asked that a reply to that request and a satisfactory answer to the telegram of this morning—which I have read to the House—should be given before midnight.

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PENETRATION OF BELGIAN TERRITORY.

Statement by Prime Minister Asquith in House of Commons, Aug. 5.

Mr. Bonar Law—May I ask the Prime Minister if he has any information he can give us today?

The Prime Minister—Our Ambassador at Berlin received his passports at 7 o'clock last evening and since 11 o'clock last night a state of war has existed between Germany and ourselves.

We have received from our Minister at Brussels the following telegram:

I have just received from Minister for Foreign Affairs [that is the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs] a note of which the following is a literal translation:

"Belgian Government regret to have to inform his Majesty's Government that this morning armed forces of Germany penetrated into Belgian territory in violation of engagements assumed by treaty.

Belgian Government are further resolved to resist by all means in their power.

Belgium appeals to Great Britain and France and Russia to co-operate, as guarantors in defense of her territory.

There would be concerted and common action with the object of resisting the forcible measures employed by Germany against Belgium, and at the same time of guarding the maintenance for future of the independence and integrity of Belgium.

Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will assume defense of her fortified places."

We have also received today from the French Ambassador here the following telegram received by the French Government from the French Minister at Brussels:

The Chef du Cabinet of the Belgian Ministry of War has asked the French Military Attache to prepare at once for the co-operation and contact of French troops with the Belgian Army pending the results of the appeal to the guaranteeing powers now being made. Orders have, therefore, been given to Belgian Provincial Governors not to regard movements of French troops as a violation of the frontier.

This is all the information I am at the moment able to give to the House, but I take the opportunity of giving notice that tomorrow, in Committee of Supply, I shall move a vote of credit of L100,000,000.

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Great Britain's Mobilization

Measures Taken Throughout the Empire Upon the Outbreak of War.



Message from King George V. to the House of Commons, Aug. 5.

Mr. Asquith then proceeded to the bar amid cheers and, on being called upon by the Speaker, announced: A message from his Majesty signed by his own hand. The announcement was received with loud cheers, which were continued as Mr. Asquith advanced up the floor and handed the document to the Speaker. All the members uncovered.

The Speaker read the message as follows:

The present state of public affairs in Europe constituting in the opinion of his Majesty a case of great emergency within the meaning of the acts of Parliament in that behalf, his Majesty deems it proper to provide additional means for the military service and, therefore, in pursuance of these acts his Majesty has thought it right to communicate to the House of Commons that his Majesty is by proclamation about to order that the army reserve shall be called out on permanent service, that soldiers who would otherwise be entitled in pursuance of the terms of their enlistment to be transferred to the reserve shall continue in army service for such period not exceeding the period for which they might be required to serve if they were transferred to the reserve and called out for permanent service as to his Majesty may seem expedient; and that such directions as may seem necessary may be given for embodying the territorial force and for making such special arrangements as may be proper with regard to units or individuals whose services may be required in other than a military capacity.—Signed by his Majesty in his own hand.

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KING TO BRITAIN'S FLEET.

Message from George V. to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Aug. 5.

At this grave moment in our national history I send to you, and through you to the officers and men of the fleets of which you have assumed command, the assurance of my confidence that under your direction they will revive and renew the old glories of the royal navy, and prove once again the sure shield of Britain and of her empire in the hour of trial.

GEORGE R. I.

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NAPOLEONISM ONCE AGAIN.

Speech by Bonar Law, Opposition Leader, in House of Commons, Aug. 6.

No Minister has ever fulfilled a duty more responsible or in regard to which the responsibility was more acutely felt than that which has just been fulfilled by the right honorable gentleman. This is not a time for speech-making, and I should have been quite ready to leave the statement which he has given to the committee as the expression of the view, not of a party, but of a nation. [Cheers.] But as this, I think, will be the only opportunity which will be given for expressing the views of a large section of this House, I feel that I am bound to make it clear to the committee and to the country what is the attitude of his Majesty's Opposition on this question. There are two things which I desire to impress upon the committee. The first is that we have dreaded war and have longed for peace as strongly as any section of this committee; and the second is that in our belief we are in a state of war against our will, and that we, as a nation, have done everything in our power to prevent such a condition of things arising. [Cheers.] When this crisis first arose I confess that I was one of those who had the impulse to hope that even though a European conflagration took place we might be able to stay out. I had that hope strongly. But in a short time I became convinced that into this war we should inevitably be drawn and that it really was a question only whether we should enter it honorably or be dragged into it with dishonor. [Cheers.]

Folly and Wickedness.

I remember that on the first occasion after the retirement of my right honorable friend (Mr. Balfour) when I had to speak on foreign affairs I made this statement. It perhaps is wrong, though I do not think so even yet. I said that if ever war arose between Great Britain and Germany it would not be due to inevitable causes, for I did not believe in an inevitable war, but it would be due to human folly. [Cheers.] It is due to human folly and to human wickedness [cheers], but neither the folly nor the wickedness is here. [Cheers.] What other course was open to us? It is quite true, as the Foreign Secretary explained to the House the other day, that we were under no formal obligations to take part in such a struggle. But every member in this House knows that the entente meant this in the minds of this Government and of every other Government, that if any of the three powers were attacked aggressively the others would be expected to step in and to give their aid. ["Hear, hear!"] The question, therefore, to my mind was this: Was this war in any way provoked by those who will now be our allies? No one who has read the "White Paper" can hesitate to answer that question. I am not going to go into it even as fully as the Prime Minister has done; but I would remind the House of this, that in this "White Paper" is contained a statement made by the German Ambassador, I think at Vienna, that Russia was not in a condition and could not go to war. And in the same letter are found these words: "As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter." Now, every one for years has known that the key to peace or war lay in Berlin, and at this crisis no one doubts that Berlin, if it had chosen, could have prevented this terrible conflict. [Cheers.] I am afraid that the miscalculation which was made about Russia was made also about us. The dispatch which the right honorable gentleman referred to is a dispatch of a nature which I believe would not have been addressed to Great Britain if it had been believed that our hands were free and that we held the position which we had always held before the entente. That, at least, is my belief.

Napoleonism Without a Napoleon.

We are fighting, as the Prime Minister said, for the honor and, what with the honor is bound up always, the interest of our nation. But we are fighting also for the whole basis of the civilization for which we stand and for which Europe stands. [Cheers.] I do not wish, any more than the Prime Minister, to inflame passion. I only ask the House to consider one aspect. Look at the way Belgium is being treated today. There is a report—if it is not true now it may be true tomorrow—that the City of Liege is invaded by German troops and that civilians, as in the days of the Middle Ages, are fighting for their hearths and homes against trained troops. How has that been brought about? In a state of war, war must be waged. But remember that this plan is not of today or of yesterday; that it has been long matured; that the Germans knew that they would have this to face; and that they were ready to take the course which they took the other day of saying to Belgium, "Destroy your independence. Allow our troops to go through, or we will come down upon you with a might which it is impossible for you to resist." If we had allowed that to be done, our position as one of the great nations of the world and our honor as one of the nations of the world would in my opinion have been gone forever. [Cheers.] This is no small struggle. It is the greatest, perhaps, that this country has ever engaged in. It is Napoleonism once again. ["Hear, hear!"] Thank Heaven, so far as we know, there is no Napoleon.

I am not going to say anything more about the causes of the war, for I do not desire to encourage controversy on this subject. But if I may be allowed to say so, I should like to say that I read yesterday with real pleasure an article in a paper which does not generally commend itself to me—The Manchester Guardian. ["Hear, hear!"] In that article it still held that the war ought not to have been entered upon; but it took this view, that that was a question for history, and that now we are in it there is only one question for us, and that is to bring it to a successful issue. [Cheers.]

Sir, I have full sympathy far more than at any other time for the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. I can imagine nothing more terrible than that the Foreign Secretary should have a feeling that perhaps he has brought his country into an unnecessary war. No feeling could be worse. I can say this, and, whether we are right or wrong, the whole House agrees with it, I am sure, that that is a burden which the right honorable gentleman can carry with a good conscience, [cheers,] and that every one of us can put up unhesitatingly this prayer: "May God defend the right."

Trade and Food Supplies.

I should like, if I may, to pass to another topic, for this is the only opportunity I can have. Consider the conditions under which this war is going to be carried on. I was pleased to hear the Prime Minister say the other day in answer to a speech of the honorable member for Merthyr Tydvil—he has developed it in describing the terms of this vote of credit—that he realized, as we all must realize, that in a country situated like ours the development of industry and the supply of food at home is just as much an operation of war as the conduct of our armed forces. [Cheers.] I do not wish to minimize our difficulties, but I am quite sure—as sure as I can be of anything—that there is no danger of a scarcity of food. ["Hear, hear!"] The only danger is the fear of a scarcity of food. ["Hear, hear!"] Every one who has been in business knows that what causes panic prices is not an actual scarcity at the time, but a fear of scarcity coming. This is a case where every one of us must do all he can to impress upon the people of this country that there is, as I believe, no danger. [Cheers.] Here I should like to give one warning note. Remember—at least I believe it—that this war, unexpected by us, is not unexpected by our enemies; and I shall be greatly surprised if we do not find that at first on our trade routes there is a destruction of our property which might create a panic. That is inevitable, I think, at the outset. Let us be prepared for it, and let us realize that it has no bearing whatever on the ultimate course of the war. [Cheers.]

There is something else which I think it is important to say. We had a discussion yesterday about credit. That is the basis of a successful war, as it is of every branch of industry at this moment. I think the Government have taken the right course. I have followed it closely, and I know that they have been supported by those who best understand the situation. I think the danger is minimized as much as it can be. But, after all, the question of credit really depends on what we believe is going to be the effect of this war upon our trade and our industry.

The Command of the Sea.

I hope the House will not think that I am too optimistic, but I do think there is a danger of our taking too gloomy a view of what the effects will be, ["Hear, hear!"] and, by taking that gloomy view, helping to bring about the very state of things which we all desire to avert. Again I wish to guard myself against seeming to be too hopeful; but let us look at the effect as if we were examining a chess problem. If we keep the command of the sea, what is going to happen? It all depends on that. I admit that if that goes the position is gloomy indeed; but of that I have no fear. [Cheers.] If we keep the command of the sea what is going to happen? Five-sixths of our production is employed in the home trade. What goes abroad is very important, and, of course, if the population which supplies this one-sixth were thrown out of work that would react on the whole. But, after all, the total amount of our exports to all the European countries which are now at war is only a small part of our total exports. There is here no question of fiscal policy. We are far beyond that. It is a question of fact. Our total exports to all the countries which are now at war do not, in my belief—I have not looked into the figures—exceed our exports to India and Australia taken alone. Now, consider this, we shall have freedom of trade, if the command of the sea is maintained, with the colonies and with the whole of the American Continent, while, unfortunately for them, both our allies and our enemies will not be competing with us in these markets. Look at it as a problem. I think we have a right to believe, not that trade will be good, but that it will be much more nearly normal than is generally supposed. [Cheers.] I hope the House will not think that that is a useless thing to say at such a time. [Cheers.]

There is one thing more only I wish to say. This is the affair of the nation. Every one would desire to help. There will be a great deal of work to be done which cannot be done by the Government. I was glad the Prime Minister has already asked the co-operation of my right honorable friends the members for West Birmingham and the Strand. They gladly came. But I am sure I speak not for this bench but for the whole of our party when I say that the Government has only got to requisition any one of us and we will serve them and our country to the best of our ability. [Loud cheers.]

* * * * *



PACT OF TRIPLE ENTENTE.

Statement Issued by British Foreign Office, Sept. 5.



DECLARATION.

The undersigned duly authorized thereto by the respective Governments hereby declare as follows:

The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies. In faith whereof the undersigned have signed this declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London in triplicate the 5th day of September, 1914.

E. GREY, his Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

PAUL CAMBON, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the French Republic.

BENCKENDORFF, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia.

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A COUNTERSTROKE.

Semi-Official Statement in The London Times, Sept. 6.

The declaration of the Allied Governments that they will not conclude peace separately during the war or demand terms of peace without previous agreement with each other is an opportune counterstroke to the campaign initiated by Germany for the purpose of detaching France from Russia and especially from Britain. Overtures in this sense have doubtless been made to France.

The German Government has not yet realized the strength of the moral forces it has ranged against itself by its wanton attack upon European civilization. It appears to imagine that, after having been sufficiently "punished" for her temerity in opposing the Kaiser's hosts, France would be open to a bargain, under which she would be "let off" lightly on condition that she should agree to become the ally of Germany.

This idea has been clearly expressed of late in the German press. It is based on the belief that the war was prepared by skillful British intrigues inspired by jealousy of Germany. German statesmen cannot conceive that nations should fight for any cause loftier than material "interests." Hence the constant mistakes of their diplomacy and its failure to foresee that little Belgium would resist German pretensions or that England would go to war for "a scrap of paper." Now they imagine that the determination of France to fight to the last in defense of her honor and her superior civilization can be undermined by an offer to mitigate the material losses she may suffer from the war.