Just as its own Ambassador in Petersburg pointed out to the British Government the dangers of Russian mobilization, England did not lack German warnings. On July 28 the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir E. Goschen, reported as follows by wire concerning a conversation with the Imperial Chancellor:

... but if the news were true which he had just read in the papers, that Russia had mobilized fourteen army corps in the South, he thought the situation was very serious, and he himself would be in a very difficult position, as in these circumstances it would be out of his power to continue to preach moderation at Vienna. He added that Austria, who as yet was only partially mobilizing, would have to take similar measures, and if war were to result Russia would be entirely responsible.—(British "White Paper" No. 71.)

In a telegram of Mr. Goschen's of July 30, reporting a conversation with the Secretary of State, von Jagow, it is stated:

He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he hears are being taken in France.—(British "White Paper" No. 98.)

The British Government has added a few further publications to its "White Paper." Among these is a report of the hitherto British Ambassador in Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen. The document is dated Sept. 1; that is, a full month after the outbreak of the war. The tendency of this publication is not only to unburden Russia and England from all blame and to put it upon German and Austro-Hungarian politics, but it attempts to make Germany responsible for the war to greater extent than Austria-Hungary in trying to sow dissension between the two allies.

Ambassador de Bunsen represents matters as if Germany, through its ultimatum to Russia on July 31, had roughly interrupted negotiations promising success then going on between Vienna and Petersburg. In this report it is stated:

(Retranslated.) M. Schebeko [the Russian Ambassador at Vienna] on July 28th attempted to induce the Austrian Government to authorize Count Scapary to continue negotiations which he had been carrying on with M. Sazonof and which appeared very promising. Count Berchtold on this day declined, but two days later, July 30th, although Russia then had already started partial mobilization against Austria, he received M. Schebeko again in the most courteous manner and gave his consent to continuation of the pour parleurs.... On Aug. 1st M. Schebeko informed me that Austria was ready to submit to mediation those parts of its note to Servia which appeared to be irreconcilable to the independence of Servia.... Unfortunately these pour parleurs in St. Petersburg and Vienna were suddenly broken off by the quarrel being removed to the more dangerous territory of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany on July 31 stepped between the two with its double ultimatum addressed to St. Petersburg and Paris.... A delay of a few days in all probability would have spared Europe one of the greatest wars in history.

On the other hand, be it remembered that the fact that any negotiations between Austria and Russia were carried on up to the last hour was solely the result of the uninterrupted German efforts to maintain peace, which fact Sir Maurice de Bunsen very wisely buries in silence. These negotiations, by the way, hardly were as promising of success as is made to appear. The Austrian version of it is found in the Vienna Fremdenblatt of Sept. 25, 1914. There the most important spots of Bunsen's report, that Austria-Hungary had been ready to moderate several points of its note to Servia, are mentioned, as follows:

As we are told by a well-informed source, these assertions do not at all correspond to the facts; furthermore, from the very nature of the steps undertaken by the dual monarchy in Belgrade, this would have been entirely inconceivable.

A glance at the date shows that the Bunsen report is misleading, for he himself tells that Count Berchtold, on July 30, had expressed his consent to a continuation of the exchange of thought in Petersburg; the latter, therefore, could not begin before the 31st, while in the night from July 30 to 31 the mobilization of the entire Russian Army against Germany was ordered in Petersburg, finally making impossible the continuation of the last German attempt at mediation in Vienna.

The truth is, in spite of Russian and English twistings, that without the interval caused by Germany's efforts in Vienna, which interval England allowed to pass unused in Petersburg, the war would have broken out a few days sooner.

Let us consider how the fact of the Russian mobilization, the dimensions and tendency of which was brought to the knowledge of the London Cabinet at the very latest on July 24, must affect Germany.

On July 24 the Russian Government declared, in an official communique, it would be impossible for it to remain indifferent in an Austro-Servian conflict.

Germany's Hand Forced.

This declaration was followed immediately by military measures which represented the beginning of Russian mobilization long planned. But even on July 27 the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof, assured the German Military Attache upon word of honor (Annex 11 of the German "White Paper") that no order for mobilization had been given and no reservists had been drawn and no horse had been commandeered.

Although in this conversation there had been left no doubt to the Russian Minister of War concerning the fact that measures of mobilization against Austria must be considered by Germany also as very threatening toward itself, during the next days news of the Russian mobilization arrived in quick succession.

On the 29th mobilization of Southern and Southwestern Russia was ordered, which was extended on the 30th to twenty-three provinces.

On the night of the 30th to the 31st, while the efforts of the Kaiser to maintain peace were continuing and were receiving friendly attention in Vienna, in St. Petersburg the mobilization of the entire Russian Army was ordered. Even as late as 2 P.M. on the 31st, however, (German "White Paper," Page 18, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint,) the Czar telegraphed the Kaiser that the military measures now being taken were meant for defensive purposes against Austria's preparations, and he gave his pledge as far away from desiring war.

In the face of such evident duplicity of Russian politics, a further delay such as was desired by Sir Maurice de Bunsen would have been for every German statesman a crime against the security of his own country.

On the other hand, upon what German measures did the Russian Government base its order for mobilization? The British "White Paper" proves how frivolously steps leading to the most serious results were ordered in St. Petersburg. On July 30 Sir George Buchanan telegraphed:

M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of the Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia, more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland,—(British "White Paper" No. 97.)

Proofs Lacking.

On the other hand, Buchanan's telegram of July 31 (British "White Paper" No. 113) states:

Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a start.—(British "White Paper" No. 113.)

So, from one day to the next the "absolute proof" changed to a reason for the assumption. In reality, both were assertions that lack all proof.

The finishing part of a telegram sent by the British Ambassador in Berlin to Sir Edward Grey on July 31 deserves special mention:

He [the German Secretary of State] again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the request of the Emperor of Russia and the German Foreign Office, had even up till last night been urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussion—and telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising nature—but Russia's mobilization had spoiled everything.—(British "White Paper" No. 121.)

Therefore, the German Chancellor, in his memorandum placed before the Reichstag, stated with full justification:

The Russian Government has smashed the laborious attempts at mediation on the part of the European State Chancelleries, on the eve of success, by the mobilization, endangering the safety of the empire. The measures for a mobilization, about whose seriousness the Russian Government was fully acquainted from the beginning, in connection with their constant denial, show clearly that Russia wanted war.

To this is to be added that the English Government also was made fully cognizant of the intentions of the Russian mobilization, by a witness that could not be suspected, namely, its own representative in St. Petersburg, and therefore must bear full responsibility.

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II.

GREY'S OMISSIONS AND ERRORS.

We have seen from the "Blue Book" that the Secretary of State in London was informed at the very latest on July 24 by his Ambassador in St. Petersburg of the plan of the Russian mobilization and consequently of the tremendous seriousness of the European situation. Yet eight to nine days had to elapse before the beginning of the war. Let us see whether Sir Edward Grey used this time to preserve peace, according to his own documents.

From this testimony it appears that even at the beginning of the last and decisive part of the European crisis, which began on June 28, 1914, with the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Sir Edward Grey refrained from considering a direct participation of his country in the possible world war. At least, this must be the impression gained from his remarks to the representatives of the two powers with whom England is today at war. Thus, he said to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, on July 23:

The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four great powers of Europe—let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany—were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry.—(British "White Paper" No. 3.)

Here Grey speaks only of four of the big powers at most that may go to war, without even hinting at the fifth, namely, England. On July 24 he had another conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, the theme of which was the note—meanwhile presented to Servia. It caused apprehensions on his part, but he declared again:

The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of his Majesty's Government....

I [Grey] ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.—(British "White Paper" No. 5.)

We are already striking the fateful peculiarity of Grey's policy to hesitate where prompt action, or at least a clear and open conduct, would have been his duty. This weakness of his nature has been used with great art by French and Russian diplomacy. This is illustrated by the conversation of July 24 between him and the French Ambassador, Cambon, in London:

M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and, therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia it would be too late for any mediation.—(British "White Paper" No. 10.)

Thus, England must not give any advice to Russia before it knows Russia's intent and even its measures. But inasmuch as Austria will have proceeded against Servia by that time Russia must make war, and the conclusion is that even on July 24 the catastrophe is considered unavoidable. Grey shows himself more and more hypnotized by the fatalistic view that it is too late. Hence he reports also on July 24 a conversation of the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky:

I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence alone.—(British "White Paper" No. 11.)

From a conversation of Grey with the Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, on July 25:

Alone we could do nothing. The French Government were traveling [this refers to the visit at St. Petersburg by Messrs. Poincare and Viviani] at the moment, and I had had no time to consult them, and could not, therefore, be sure of their views.—(British "White Paper" No. 25.)

If Sir Edward Grey sincerely desired the maintenance of peace, he must have had to use his entire influence at St. Petersburg to bring about the stopping of the threatening military measures taken by Russia, whereas he was waiting for the opinion of the French Government. He was bound to do this, so much the more in view of the fact that he demanded from Germany that it should exert its influence with Austria.

That this request of Grey's was complied with by Germany in so far as it was in any way in accord with the alliance with Austria-Hungary, and that in Vienna every effort was made to conciliate matters, is shown by the assurance of the Chancellor; he declares:

In spite of this [the Austro-Hungarian Government having remarked with full appreciation of our action that it had come too late] we continued our mediatory efforts to the utmost and advised Vienna to make any possible compromise consistent with the dignity of the monarchy.—(German "White Paper," Page 17, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint.)

Grey well knew that Germany was doing all it could to mediate in Vienna. He expressed his recognition and his joy over it on July 28 ("Blue Book," Page 67):

It is very satisfactory to hear from the German Ambassador here that the German Government have taken action at Vienna in the sense of the conversation recorded in my telegram of yesterday to you.—(British "White Paper" No. 67.)[02]

Neither has Grey been left in the dark by the German side concerning the difficulties, which by the Russian mobilization made every attempt to mediate in Vienna abortive. Even on July 31 the British Ambassador in Berlin telegraphed:

The Chancellor informs me that his efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against Austria. He has done everything possible to obtain his object at Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at the Ballplatz.—(British "White Paper" No. 108.)

England and Russia.

How, on the other hand, about Grey's action with Russia? From the very beginning one should have had a right to expect that, as Germany acted in Vienna, thus France, if it was active in Grey's spirit, would be working in St. Petersburg for peace. Of this no trace whatsoever can be found. The French Government thus far has not published any series of documents concerning its activity during the crisis, and neither in the Russian "Orange Book" nor in the English "Blue Book" is anything mentioned of the mediating activity on the part of France.

On the contrary, the latter power, wherever she puts in an appearance—as for instance in the conversation of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg with his French colleague and M. Sazonof, as mentioned above—appears as fully identical with Russia.

It is also stated on July 24:

The French Ambassador gave me to understand that France would fulfill all the obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in all diplomatic negotiations.... It seems to me from the language held, by French Ambassador that even if we decline to join them, France and Russia are determined to make a strong stand.—(British "White Paper" No. 6.)

One should think that Grey, who in view of this could not possibly expect an influence for peace being brought to bear by France, but only a strengthening of the Russian desire for aggression, now would have acted in the most energetic manner in St. Petersburg for the maintenance of peace.

In reality, however, during the days that still remained, aside from a weak and in St. Petersburg absolutely ineffective advice to postpone mobilization, he did nothing whatsoever, and later placed himself in a manner constantly more recognizable on the side of Russia.

The claim that the time limit given by the Austrian note to Servia was the cause of the war, that Grey's mediation had only miscarried owing to the haste of Germany, is disproved by the British documents themselves. De Bunsen on July 26 telegraphed to Grey from Vienna:

Russian Ambassador just returned from leave, thinks that Austro-Hungarian Government are determined on war and that it is impossible for Russia to remain indifferent. He does not propose to press for more time in the sense of your telegram of the 25th inst.—(British "White Paper" No. 40.)

Therefore Russia has paid little attention to the very shy and timid efforts to maintain peace by the London Secretary of State, even where these were concerned in the attempt to change the position taken by Austria.

Another proof: Sazonof on July 27 sent a telegram to the Russian Ambassador in London which the latter transmitted to Grey, and which concerns itself with the much mentioned proposition of the latter to have the conflict investigated by a conference of the four great powers not immediately concerned.

Russian Sincerity Questioned.

The conference plan was declined without much hesitation and openly by Germany, because it was compelled to see therein an attempt to place Austria before a European court of arbitration, and because it knew the serious determination of its ally in this matter. But did Russia really want the conference? Minister Sazonof declares:

I replied to the [British] Ambassador that I have begun conversations with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, under conditions which I hope may be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two Cabinets.—(British "White Paper" No. 53.)

Here it is shown plainly how little the conference plan was after the heart of the Russians. Had they accepted it it would have had to be done immediately. As soon as the situation had grown very much more serious by the failure of the negotiations with Austria-Hungary there would have been no more time for this.[03]

A telegram of the English Ambassador in St. Petersburg, dated July 27, (British "White Paper" No. 55,) shows how this conference was expected to be conducted in St. Petersburg:

His Excellency [Sazonof] said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the powers accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of its taking place.—(British "White Paper" No. 55.)

Russian shrewdness evidently expected to control the conference by keeping in touch with Grey, who of course would have been the Chairman. The dispatches of his own Ambassadors lying before him should have enabled the Secretary of State to see the perfidy of the Russian policy. Buchanan wrote on the 28th from St. Petersburg:

... and asked him whether he would be satisfied with the assurance which the Austrian Ambassador had, I understood, been instructed to give in respect to Servia's integrity and independence.... In reply his Excellency stated that if Servia were attacked Russia would not be satisfied with any engagement which Austria might take on these two points....—(British "White Paper" No. 72.)

Entirely in contrast herewith is one report of the British representative in Vienna, dated Aug. 1, and speaking of a conversation with the Russian Ambassador there:

Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Servian integrity and independence. He said that Russia had no intention to attack Austria.—(British "White Paper" No. 141.)

What, then, may one ask, was the opinion which Sir Edward Grey had formed concerning Russia's real intentions? He learns from Russian sources and notes faithfully that Russia will accept Austrian guarantees for independence of Servia, and also that it will not accept such guarantees. It is the same duplicity which Russia, when its own mobilization was concerned, showed toward Germany. Did Sir Edward not notice this duplicity, or did he not wish to notice it? If the documents of the English Government have not been selected with the purpose to confuse, then in London the decision to take part in the war does not seem to have been a certainty at the beginning. We have seen that Ambassador Buchanan in St. Petersburg on July 24 gave the Russian Minister to understand that England was not of a mind to go to war on account of Servia. This position, taken by the Ambassador, was approved by Sir Edward Grey on the following day in the following words:

I entirely approve what you said ... and I cannot promise more on behalf of the Government.—(British "White Paper" No. 24.)

Based upon these instructions, Sir George Buchanan, even on July 27, stated to M. Sazonof, who continued to urge England to unconditionally join Russia and France:

I added that you [Grey] could not promise to do anything more, and that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their [the German] attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace.—(British "White Paper" No. 44.)

But on this same 27th day of July, Grey, submitting to the intrigues of Russian and French diplomacy, had committed one very fateful step (Telegram to Buchanan, July 27):

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an impression must produce. This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the first fleet which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland not to disperse for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.—(British "White Paper" No. 47.)

For Russia this order to the fleet meant very much more than a diplomatic action. Sazonof saw that the wind in London was turning in his favor and he made use of it. Among themselves the Russian diplomatists seem to have for a long time been clear and open in their discussion of their real object. You find among the documents of the Russian "Orange Book" the following telegram of Sazonof of July 25 to the Russian Ambassador in London:

In case of a new aggravation of the situation, possibly provoking on the part of the great powers' united action, [des actions conformes,] we count that England will not delay placing herself clearly on the side of Russia and France, with the view to maintaining the equilibrium of Europe, in favor of which she has constantly intervened in the past, and which would without doubt be compromised in the case of the triumph of Austria.—(Russian "Orange Paper" No. 17.)

There is no mention of Servia here, but Austria should not triumph. Russia's real intention, of course, was not placed so nakedly before the British Secretary of State, hence to him the appearance was maintained that the little State of the Sawe was the only consideration, although the Russian Army was already being mobilized with all energy.

On the 28th he wires to the Russian Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, to London to inform the British Government:

It seems to me that England is in a better position than any other power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.—(British "White Paper" No. 54.)

The opinion subtly suggested upon him by Paris and Petersburg diplomacy, namely, that he should not use any pressure upon Russia, but upon Germany, now takes hold of Grey more and more. On July 29 he writes to the German Ambassador as follows:

In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible if only Germany would "press the button in the interests of peace."—(British "White Paper" No. 84.)

Petersburg, now assured of the support of Grey, becomes more and more outspoken for war. On the 28th Grey again expressed one of his softhearted propositions for peace. Mr. Sazonof hardly made the effort to hide his contempt. Buchanan telegraphs on the 29th as follows:

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that proposal referred to in your telegram of the 28th inst. was one of secondary importance. Under altered circumstances of situation he did not attach weight to it.... Minister for Foreign Affairs had given me to understand that Russia would not precipitate war by crossing frontier immediately, and a week or more would in any case elapse before mobilization was completed. In order to find an issue out of a dangerous situation it was necessary that we should in the meanwhile all work together.—(British "White Paper" No. 78.)

Naivete or Cynicism?

Here it really becomes impossible to judge where the naivete of the British Secretary of State ends and cynicism begins, for Sazonof could not have told to him more plainly than in these lines that all Russia's ostensible readiness for peace served no other purpose than to win time to complete the strategical location of the Russian troops.

This point is emphasized by one document coming from a writer presumably unbiased, but presumably distrustful of Germany, wherein the confirmation is found that England and Russia had come to a full agreement during these days.

On July 30 the Belgian Charge d'Affaires de l'Escaille in Petersburg reported to the Belgian Government upon the European crisis. Owing to the fast developing events of a warlike nature, this letter did not reach its address by mail, and it was published later on. The Belgian diplomatist writes:

It is undeniable that Germany tried hard here [that is, in Petersburg] and in Vienna to find any means whatsoever in order to forestall a general conflict....

And after M. de l'Escaille has told that Russia—what the Czar and his War Minister with their highest assurances toward Germany had denied—was mobilizing its own army, he continues:

Today at Petersburg one is absolutely convinced, yes, they have even received assurances in that direction, that England and France will stay by them. This assistance is of decisive importance and has contributed much to the victory of the [Russian] war party.

This settles Grey's pretended "attempts at mediation." The truth is that British politics decided to prevent a diplomatic success of Germany and Austria, now worked openly toward the Russian aim. "The exertion of pressure upon Berlin" included already a certain threat, mingled with good advice.

On July 23 Grey had only spoken of four possible powers in war; hence when on the German side some hope of England maintaining neutrality was indulged in, this impression rested upon Grey's own explanations. On July 29, however, after a political conversation with Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador in London, he adds an important personal bit of information. He wires concerning it to Berlin, to Goschen:

After speaking to the German Ambassador this afternoon about the European situation, I said that I wished to say to him, in a quite private and friendly way, something that was on my mind. The situation was very grave.... But if we failed in our efforts to keep the peace, and if the issue spread so that it involved every European interest, I did not wish to be open to any reproach from him, that the friendly tone of all our conversations had misled him or his Government into supposing that we should not take action.... But we knew very well that if the issue did become such that we thought that British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once and the decision would have to be very rapid.—(British "White Paper" No. 89.)

But what is especially wrong is that Grey brought this warning, which only could have any effect if it remained an absolute, confidential secret between the English and German Governments, also to the French Ambassador, so that the entire Entente could mischievously look on and see whether Germany really would give in to British pressure. Of course, in his manner of swaying to and fro, he did not wish either that Cambon should not accept this information to the German Ambassador as a decided taking of a position on the part of England:

I thought it necessary [speaking to M. Cambon] to say that because as he knew we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise....—(British "White Paper" No. 87.)

Stirring Up Trouble.

On the German side Grey's open threat, which was presented, however, with smooth and friendly sounding words, was received with quiet politeness. Goschen telegraphed on the 30th concerning a talk with State Secretary von Jagow:

His Excellency added that telegram received from Prince Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with regret, but not exactly with surprise, and, at all events, he thoroughly appreciated the frankness and loyalty with which you had spoken.—(British "White Paper" No. 98.)

Now the work of stirring up trouble is continued unceasingly. On July 30 the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir F. Bertie, concerning a conversation with the President of the Republic, reports:

He [Poincare] is convinced that peace between the powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany ... there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude.—(British "White Paper" No. 99.)

Did Grey really think for one moment that the German Empire would change its position immediately, in other words, would suddenly leave its ally in need, or is all this only a mass of diplomatic blandishments?

On the same day Grey steps from the personal warning which he had given to the German Ambassador to the sharpest official threat. In a telegram to the Ambassador in Berlin upon the question placed before him by the Chancellor of the empire on the day prior, (British "White Paper" No. 85,) whether England would remain neutral if Germany would bind itself, after possible war, to claim no French territory in Europe whatever, while in lieu of the French colonies a like guarantee could not be accepted, Grey answers with thundering words:

His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From a material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable, for France without further territory in Europe being taken from her could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great power and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country could never recover.—(British "White Paper" No. 101.)

With this telegram the war on Germany was practically declared, for as a price of British neutrality an open humiliation of Germany was demanded. If France—the question of French colonies is of very minor importance in this connection—must not be defeated by Germany, then England forbade the German Government to make war. It was furthermore stated that Germany was absolutely compelled to accept Russian-French dictates, and would have to leave Austria to its own resources. This would have meant Germany's retirement from the position of a great power, even if she had backed down before such a challenge.

* * * * *



III.

THE AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE.

Only in the light of the developments concerning England's relation to France, given at the beginning of the war, Grey's policy, swaying between indecision and precipitate action, becomes apparent.

In all the explanations which the British Government in the course of eight years had presented to the British Parliament concerning the relations to other large powers, the assurance had been repeated that no binding agreements with the two partners of the Franco-Russian alliance had been made, above all, that no agreement with France existed. Only in his speech in the House of Commons on Aug, 3, 1914, which meant the war with Germany, Grey gave to the representatives of the people news of certain agreements which made it a duty for Great Britain to work together with France in any European crisis.

The fateful document, which in the form of an apparently private letter to the French Ambassador, dealt with one of the most important compacts of modern history, was written toward the end of the year 1912, and is published in the British "White Paper" No. 105, Annex 1:

London Foreign Office, Nov. 22, 1912.

My Dear Ambassador:

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be, regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,

E. GREY.

Was Parliament Deceived?

A few members of the English Parliament who on Aug. 3 dared to gingerly protest against the war may have had reason to complain about the hiding of facts from the House of Commons. When such understandings can be made without any one having an idea of their existence, then—so far as England is concerned—the supervision of the Government, theoretically being exercised by a Parliament, becomes a fiction.

Veiled Defensive Alliance.

As a matter of fact, Grey does not desire to have accepted as political obligations the conversations of the French and English Army and Navy General Staffs concerning the future plans of campaign which took place from time to time in times of peace. However, the true tendency of this agreement, for such it is, gives itself away in the promise to immediately enter with France into a political and military exchange of opinions in every critical situation; it means in realty nothing less than a veiled defensive alliance which by clever diplomatic manipulations can be changed without any difficulty to an offensive one, for inasmuch as the English Government promises to consult and work together with France, and consequently also with its ally, Russia, in every crisis, before a serious investigation of the moments of danger, it waives all right of taking an independent position.

How would England ever have been able to enter a war against France without throwing upon itself the accusation of faithlessness against one with whose plans for war it had become acquainted through negotiations lasting through years?

Here a deviation may be permissible, which leaves for a moment the basis of documentary proof.

If one considers how this agreement of such immeasurable consequences was not only hidden from the British Parliament by the Cabinet, but how to the very edge of conscious deceit its existence was denied—in the year 1913 Premier Asquith answered a query of a member of the House of Commons that there were no unpublished agreements in existence which in a case of war between European powers would interfere with or limit free decision on the part of the British Government or Parliament as to whether or not Britain should take part at a war—then certain reports making their appearance with great persistency in June, 1914, concerning an Anglo-Russian naval agreement are seen in a different light.

Persons who were acquainted with the happenings in diplomacy then stated that the Russian Ambassador in Paris, M. Iswolski, during the visit which the King of England and Sir Edward Grey were paying to Paris, had succeeded in winning the English statesmen for the plan of such an agreement. A formal alliance, it was said, was not being demanded by Russia immediately, for good reasons. M. Iswolski was attempting to go nearer to his goal, carefully, step by step.

It had been preliminarily agreed that negotiations should be started between the British Admiralty and the Russian Naval Attache in London, Capt. Wolkow. As a matter of fact Wolkow during June went to St. Petersburg for a few days to, as was assumed, obtain instructions and then return to London.

Grey's "Twisty" Answer.

These happenings aroused so much attention in England that questions were raised in Parliament concerning them. It was noted how twisty Grey's answer was. He referred to the answer of the Premier, already mentioned, stated that the situation is unchanged, and said then that no negotiations were under way concerning a naval agreement with any foreign nation. "As far as he was able to judge the matter," no such negotiations would be entered into later on.

The big Liberal newspaper, The Manchester Guardian, was not at all satisfied with this explanation; it assumed that certain conditional preliminary agreements might not be excluded.

This Russian plan, which was later worked out in St. Petersburg, went into oblivion on account of the rapidly following European war. In the light of the following revelation of Grey's agreement with France, the news of the naval agreement desired by Iswolski assumed another aspect.

Let us return to the Anglo-French agreement. The following remarks by the French Ambassador in London, reported by Grey, prove that, on the ground of this agreement, France, with very little trouble, would be able to make out of a diplomatic entanglement a case for Allies' interest as far as England is concerned.

A German "Attack."

He [Cambon] anticipated that the [German] aggression would take the form of either a demand to cease her preparations or a demand that she should engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia. Neither of these things would France admit.—(British "White Paper" No. 105.)

Therefore, even the demand addressed to France not to, jointly with Russia, attack Germany became a German "attack," which obliged England to come to the aid!

In spite of this, even on July 27 in a conversation with Cambon, Grey gave himself the appearance as if his hands were free. He told the Frenchman:

If Germany became involved and France became involved we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider.... We were free from engagements and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.—(British "White Paper" No. 87.)

M. Cambon remarked in reply that the Secretary of State had clearly pictured the situation, but on the very following day the French Ambassador took the liberty to remind Grey of the letter written in 1912. (British "White Paper" No. 105.)

Grey did not deny the claim implied in this reminder, but even as late as July 31 he reports as follows concerning the conversation with Cambon:

Up to the present moment we did not feel and public opinion did not feel that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved.... M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her. I said I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.... I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development; that at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.—(British "White Paper" No. 119.)

Now, if we remember that even on the day before Grey had informed the German Imperial Chancellor that it would be a shame for England to remain neutral and allow France to be crushed, we here find a new proof of the unreliability of his conduct. If he has been gullible, the declaration of 1912, the dangerous character of which is increased by its apparently undefined tenor, has enmeshed him more and more. Also the military and naval circles, whose consultations with the representatives of the French Army and Navy certainly have been continued diligently since the beginning of the Servian crisis, were forcing toward a decision.

At all events, it became more impossible with every hour for Germany to keep England out of the way by any offers whatsoever. This is proved by Grey's conversation of Aug. 1 with the German Ambassador:

He asked me whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be.... The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise.... (British "White Paper" No. 123.)

Belgium Not the Cause.

Hence, only if Germany would permit herself to be humiliated war with England could be avoided. The violation of Belgium's neutrality was in no way the cause of England joining Germany's enemies, for while German troops did not enter Belgium until the night from Aug. 3 to 4, Grey gave on Aug. 2 the following memorandum to the French Ambassador after a session of the Cabinet in London:

I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power.—(British "White Paper" No. 148.)

As the aim of this decision, of which M. Cambon was informed verbally, was to give France an assurance that it would be placed in a position "to settle the disposition of its own Mediterranean fleet," Grey would not accept the version of Cambon that England would take part in a war with Germany. This is a case of splitting hairs in order to put the blame of starting the war on Germany, for while England promised to protect the French coast and to make it possible for the French fleet to stay in the Mediterranean, she almost immediately proceeded to a warlike action against Germany, especially as the English Minister simultaneously refused to bind himself to maintain even this peculiar neutrality.

* * * * *



IV.

BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

The highest representatives of the German Empire with emphatic seriousness declared that it was with a heavy heart and only following the law of self-preservation that they decided to violate the neutrality of the Kingdom of Belgium, guaranteed by the great powers in the treaties of 1831 and 1839.

The German Secretary of State on Aug. 4 informed the English Government through the embassy in London that Germany intended to retain no Belgian territory, and added:

Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German Army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned, according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being with her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.—(British "White Paper" No. 157.)

In answer Grey caused the English Ambassador in Berlin to demand his passports and to tell the German Government that England would take all steps for defense of Belgian neutrality. This, therefore, represents, in the view which very cleverly has been spread broadcast by British publicity, the real reason for the war. But in spite of the moral indignation that is apparent against Germany, the consideration for Belgium, up until very late, does not seem in any way to have been in the foreground. We find on July 31 Grey stated to Cambon:

The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important, factor in determining our attitude.—(British "White Paper" No. 119.)

Here, therefore, there was no talk about England grasping the sword on account of Belgium. Now no one will claim that the assumption that the German troops could march through Belgium would be new or unheard of. For years this possibility had been discussed in military literature.[04]

This expression on the part of the historical Faculty is very interesting. It shows that a plan of campaign between the English and French had long been considered, and that the Belgian entry into the alliance against Germany was a matter agreed upon.

A Sudden Decision.

It must also be assumed that the Belgian Government knew toward the end of July at the latest that the war between Germany and France was probable and the march of Germans through Belgium very possible.

If England had not taken part in the war against Germany, it may be assumed that it would have given Belgium the advice to permit the marching through of the German Army, somewhat in the same manner as the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg did, with a protest. In doing so the Belgian people would have been spared a great deal of misery and loss of blood. On Aug. 3 the Belgian Government replied to an offer of military help by France as follows:

We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think necessary to take.—(British "White Paper" No. 151.)

One day later London decided to make Belgian neutrality the cause of the war against Germany before the eyes of the world. The Ambassador in Brussels received the following orders:

You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's Government expects that they will resist by any means in their power and that his Majesty's Government will support them in offering such resistance, and that his Majesty's Government in this event are prepared to join Russia and France.—(British "White Paper" No. 155.)

Not until England thus stirred Belgium up, holding out the deceptive hope of effective French and English help, did Belgian fanaticism break loose against Germany. Without the intervention of England in Brussels the events in Belgium, one may safely assert, would have taken an entirely different course, which would have been far more favorable to Belgium.

But, of course, England had thus found a very useful reason for war against Germany. Even on the 31st of July Grey had spoken of the violation of Belgian neutrality as not a decisive factor. On Aug. 1 he declined to promise Prince Lichnowsky England's neutrality, even if Germany would not violate Belgium's neutrality. On Aug. 4, however, the Belgian question was the cause that suddenly drove England to maintain the moral fabric of the world and to draw the sword.

This suddenly became the new development, which was still lacking for Grey in order to justify this war before public opinion in England.

Another English Advantage.

And something else was secured by the drawing of Belgium into the war by the British Government, which had decided to make war on Germany for entirely different reasons: the thankful part of the protector of the weak and the oppressed.

As an English diplomat, when Russia was mobilizing, openly stated, the interests of his country in Servia were nil, so for Grey even Belgium, immediately before the break with Germany, was not decisive. However, when England had irrevocably decided to enter the war it stepped out before the limelight of the world as the champion of—the small nations.

* * * * *



[02] Recently a book entitled "Why We Make War," in defense of Great Britain, appeared at Oxford, as the authors of which "Members of the Faculty for Modern History in Oxford" are mentioned. This work undertakes, on the ground of the official publications, to whitewash Grey's policy, and of course incidentally the Russian policy. All together this publication, parading in the gown of science, is contradicted by our own presentation of the facts; it may be mentioned also that this work contains in part positive untruths. Thus it states on Page 70 (retranslation):

No diplomatic pressure whatever was exerted [by Germany] on Vienna, which, under the protection of Berlin, was permitted to do with Servia as she liked.

Grey's own words contradict this assertion.

[03] In the aforementioned book of the Oxford historians there is stated on Page 69 (retranslation):

This mediation [namely, Grey's mediation proposition] had already been accepted, by Russia on July 25th.

We have shown in the foregoing that the Russian Government did in no manner subscribe to the conference plan in binding terms. As an additional proof, a part of Buchanan's dispatch of the 25th may be mentioned:

He [Sazonof] would like to see the question placed on international footing.... If Servia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy. It would be possible in his opinion that Servia might propose to submit the question to arbitration.—(British "White Paper" No. 17.)

Hence, not if England, but only if Servia would propose arbitration by the powers, Mr. Sazonof was willing! The most amusing part of this is that the Russian Minister himself considers such a proposition on the part of Servia merely as "possible"; evidently it would have appeared as a great condescension on the part of the Government at Belgrade if it, standing on the same basis as Austria-Hungary, would appear before a European tribunal! For us there is no additional proof necessary that a mediation conference, which for Austria was not acceptable even when proposed by England, would be unthinkable if the move for such came from Servia. In expressing such an idea. Mr. Sazonof proved that it was his intention to bring war about.

[04] The book, which appeared at Oxford, "Why We Are at War," mentioned previously states on Page 27 (retranslation):

That such a plan [the marching through Luxemburg and Belgium] had been taken into consideration by the Germans has been known in England generally for several years; and it has also been generally accepted that the attempt to carry out this plan would bring about the active resistance of the British armed forces: one assumed that these would be given the task of assisting the left wing of the French, which would have to resist German advance from Belgian territory.



* * * * *



"Truth About Germany"



* * * * *

Attested by Thirty-four German Dignitaries.[05]

Board of Editors.

Paul Dehn, Schriftsteller, Berlin.

Dr. Drechsler, Direktor des Amerika-Instituts, Berlin.

Matthias Erzberger, Mitglied des Reichstags, Berlin.

Prof. Dr. Francke, Berlin.

B. Huldermann, Direktor der Hamburg-Amerika Linie, Hamburg.

Dr. Ernst Jaeckh, Berlin.

D. Naumann, Mitglied des Reichstags, Berlin.

Graf von Oppersdorff, Mitglied des preussischen Herrenhauses, Mitglied des Reichstags, Berlin.

Graf zu Reventlow, Schriftsteller, Charlottenburg.

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, Dozent an der Handelshochschule, Berlin.

Dr. Schacht, Direktor der Dresdner Bank, Berlin.



Honorary Committee.

Ballin, Vorsitzender des Direktoriums der Hamburg-Amerika Linie, Hamburg.

Fuerst von Buelow, Hamburg.

Dr. R.W. Drechsler, Direktor des Amerika-Instituts, Berlin.

D. Dryander, Ober-Hof-und Domprediger, Berlin.

Dr. Freiherr von der Goltz, Generalfeldmarschall, Berlin.

Von Gwinner, Direktor der Deutschen Bank, Berlin.

Prof. Dr. von Harnack, Berlin.

Fuerst von Hatzfeldt, Herzog zu Trachenberg.

Dr. Heineken, Direktor des Norddeutschen Lloyds, Bremen.

Fuerst Henckel von Donnersmarck.

Dr. Kaempf, Praesident des Reichstags, Berlin.

Prof. Dr. Eugen Kuehnemann, Breslau.

Prof. Dr. Lamprecht, Leipsic.

Dr. Theodor Lewald, Direktor im Reichsamt des Innern, Berlin.

Franz von Mendelssohn, Praesident der Handelskammer, Berlin.

Fuerst Muenster-Derneburg, Mitglied des Herrenhauses.

Graf von Oppersdorff, Mitglied des Herrenhauses und des Reichstags, Berlin.

Graf von Posadowsky-Wehner.

Dr. Walther Rathenau, Berlin.

Viktor Herzog von Ratibor.

Dr. Schmidt, Ministerialdirektor, Berlin.

Prof. Dr. von Schmoller, Berlin.

Graf von Schwerin-Loewitz, Praesident des Hauses der Abgeordneten.

Wilhelm von Siemens, Berlin.

Friedrich Fuerst zu Solms-Baruth.

Max Warburg, Hamburg.

Siegfried Wagner, Baireuth.

* * * * *



Try to realize, every one of you, what we are going through! Only a few weeks ago all of us were peacefully following our several vocations. The peasant was gathering in this Summer's plentiful crop, the factory hand was working with accustomed vigor. Not one human being among us dreamed of war. We are a nation that wishes to lead a quiet and industrious life. This need hardly be stated to you Americans. You, of all others, know the temper of the German who lives within your gates. Our love of peace is so strong that it is not regarded by us in the light of a virtue, we simply know it to be an inborn and integral portion of ourselves. Since the foundation of the German Empire in the year 1871, we, living in the centre of Europe, have given an example of tranquillity and peace, never once seeking to profit by any momentary difficulties of our neighbors. Our commercial extension, our financial rise in the world, is far removed from any love of adventure, it is the fruit of painstaking and plodding labor.

We are not credited with this temper, because we are insufficiently known. Our situation and our way of thinking are not easily grasped.

Every one is aware that we have produced great philosophers and poets, we have preached the gospel of humanity with impassioned zeal. America fully appreciates Goethe and Kant, looks upon them as cornerstones of elevated culture. Do you really believe that we have changed our natures, that our souls can be satisfied with military drill and servile obedience? We are soldiers because we have to be soldiers, because otherwise Germany and German civilization would be swept away from the face of the earth. It has cost us long and weary struggles to attain our independence, and we know full well that, in order to preserve it, we must not content ourselves with building schools and factories, we must look to our garrisons and forts. We and all our soldiers have remained, however, the same lovers of music and lovers of exalted thought. We have retained our old devotion to all peaceable sciences and arts; as all the world knows, we work in the foremost rank of all those who strive to advance the exchange of commodities, who further useful technical knowledge. But we have been forced to become a nation of soldiers in order to be free. And we are bound to follow our Kaiser, because he symbolizes and represents the unity of our nation. Today, knowing no distinction of party, no difference of opinion, we rally around him, willing to shed the last drop of our blood. For though it takes a great deal to rouse us Germans, when once aroused our feelings run deep and strong. Every one is filled with this passion, with the soldier's ardor. But when the waters of the deluge shall have subsided, gladly will we return to the plow and to the anvil.

It deeply distresses us to see two highly civilized nations, England and France, joining the onslaught of autocratic Russia. That this could happen will remain one of the anomalies of history. It is not our fault; we firmly believed in the desirability of the great nations working together, we peaceably came to terms with France and England in sundry difficult African questions. There was no cause for war between Western Europe and us, no reason why Western Europe should feel itself constrained to further the power of the Czar.

The Czar, as an individual, is most certainly not the instigator of the unspeakable horrors that are now inundating Europe. But he bears before God and posterity the responsibility of having allowed himself to be terrorized by an unscrupulous military clique.

Ever since the weight of the crown has pressed upon him, he has been the tool of others. He did not desire the brutalities in Finland, he did not approve of the iniquities of the Jewish pogroms, but his hand was too weak to stop the fury of the reactionary party. Why would he not permit Austria to pacify her southern frontier? It was inconceivable that Austria should calmly see her heir apparent murdered. How could she? All the nationalities under her rule realized the impossibility of tamely allowing Servia's only too evident and successful intrigues to be carried on under her very eyes. The Austrians could not allow their venerable and sorely stricken monarch to be wounded and insulted any longer. This reasonable and honorable sentiment on the part of Austria has caused Russia to put itself forward as the patron of Servia, as the enemy of European thought and civilization.

Russia has an important mission to fulfill in its own country and in Asia. It would do better in its own interest to leave the rest of the world in peace. But the die is cast, and all nations must decide whether they wish to further us by sentiments and by deeds, or the government of the Czar. This is the real significance of this appalling struggle, all the rest is immaterial. Russia's attitude alone has forced us to go to war with France and with their great ally.

The German Nation is serious and conscientious. Never would a German Government dare to contemplate a war for the sake of dynastic interest, or for the sake of glory. This would be against the entire bent of our character. Firmly believing in the justice of our cause, all parties, the Conservatives and the Clericals, the Liberals and the Socialists, have joined hands. All disputes are forgotten, one duty exists for all, the duty of defending our country and vanquishing the enemy.

Will not this calm, self-reliant and unanimous readiness to sacrifice all, to die or to win, appeal to other nations and force them to understand our real character and the situation in which we are placed?

The war has severed us from the rest of the world, all our cable communications are destroyed. But the winds will carry the mighty voice of justice even across the ocean. We trust in God, we have confidence in the judgment of right-minded men. And through the roar of battle, we call to you all. Do not believe the mischievous lies that our enemies are spreading about! We do not know if victory will be ours, the Lord alone knows. We have not chosen our path, we must continue doing our duty, even to the very end. We bear the misery of war, the death of our sons, believing in Germany, believing in duty.

And we know that Germany cannot be wiped from the face of the earth.

* * * * *



[05]

"Athenwood," Newport, R.I.,

Sept. 17, 1914.

Today I have received from Germany a pamphlet entitled "Truth About Germany, Facts About the War." The correctness and completeness of its statements are vouched for by thirty-four persons, whose names are recorded therein as members of an Honorary Committee. I know personally seventeen of these thirty-four persons, and have known them for years, some of them intimately. With six of them I have labored as a colleague in university work. I have been introduced into their homes, have broken bread at their tables and have conversed with them long and often upon the problems of life and culture. They are among the greatest thinkers, moralists and philanthropists of the age. They are the salt of the earth! The great theologian Harnack, the sound and accomplished political scientist and economist von Schmoller, the distinguished philologian von Wilamowitz, the well-known historian Lamprecht, the profound statesman von Posadowsky, the brilliant diplomatist von Buelow, the great financier von Gwinner, the great promoter of trade and commerce Ballin, the great inventor Siemens, the brilliant preacher of the Gospel Dryander, the indispensable Director in the Ministry of Education Schmidt. Two of them are, in a sense, our own countrywomen, the Baroness Speck von Sternburg and Frau Staats-minister von Trott zu Solz. The latter is the granddaughter of our own John Jay. I have known her, her mother and her grandfather. No statement was ever issued which was vouched for by more solid, intelligent, and conscientious people. Its correctness, completeness and veracity cannot be doubted. As I read it the emotions which it arouses make both speech and sight difficult. I wish it might come into the hands of every man, woman, and child in the United States.

(Signed) JOHN W. BURGESS,

Ex-Dean Faculties of Political Science, Philosophy, Pure Science and Fine Arts, Columbia University; Roosevelt Professor of American History and Institutions at Friedrich Wilhelms University, Berlin, 1906; Visiting American Professor at Austrian Universities, 1914-15.

Under the head of "An Anti-British Pamphlet," The London Times of Aug. 23, 1914, noted as follows:

The Vossischezeitung gives extracts from a brochure issued under the auspices of a committee of such prominent Germans as Prince Buelow, Herr Ballin, Dr. von Gwinner, and Field Marshal von der Goltz, for the purpose of "opening the eyes" of the United States regarding the causes of the present war. Copies of this pamphlet are being given to all Americans returning home from Germany. One chapter, headed "Neutrality by Grace of England," scoffs at the idea of England today being the defender of neutral States and declares that it was England who in 1911 was ready to land 160,000 men at Antwerp to help the French against the Germans.

As to who will ultimately win in the war, the pamphlet asks whether it will be the striving nation, the young strength, or the old peoples, France and England, with their flagging civilization in alliance with Muscovite retrogression.



* * * * *



HOW THE WAR CAME ABOUT.

Who is responsible for the war?—Not Germany! England's policy! Her shifting of responsibility and promoting the struggle while alone possessing power to avert it.

It is an old and common experience that after the outbreak of a war the very parties and persons that wanted the war, either at once or later, assert that the enemy wanted and began it. The German Empire especially always had to suffer from such untruthful assertions, and the very first days of the present terrible European war confirm again this old experience. Again Russian, French, and British accounts represent the German Empire as having wanted the war.

Only a few months ago influential men and newspapers of Great Britain as well as of Paris could be heard to express the opinion that nobody in Europe wanted war and that especially the German Emperor and his Government had sincerely and effectively been working for peace. Especially the English Government, in the course of the last two years, asserted frequently and publicly, and was supported by The Westminster Gazette and a number of influential English newspapers in the assertion, that Great Britain and the German Empire during the Balkan crisis of the last few years had always met on the same platform for the preservation of peace. The late Secretary of State, von Kiderlen-Waechter, his successor, Mr. von Jagow, and the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, likewise declared repeatedly in the Reichstag, how great their satisfaction was that a close and confidential diplomatic co-operation with Great Britain, especially in questions concerning the Near East, had become a fact. And it has to be acknowledged today that at that time the German and British interests in the Near East were identical or at any rate ran in parallel lines.

The collapse of European Turkey in the war against the Balkan Alliance created an entirely new situation. At first Bulgaria was victorious and great, then it was beaten and humiliated by the others with the intellectual help of Russia. There could be no doubt about Russia's intentions: she was preparing for the total subjection of weakened Turkey and for taking possession of the Dardanelles and Constantinople in order to rule from this powerful position Turkey and the other Balkan States. Great Britain and the German Empire, which only had economic interests in Turkey, were bound to wish to strengthen Turkey besides trying to prevent the Muscovite rule on the whole Balkan peninsula.

Servia had come out of the second Balkan war greatly strengthened and with her territory very much increased. Russia had done everything to strengthen this bitter enemy of our ally, Austria-Hungary. For a great number of years Servian politicians and conspirators had planned to undermine the southeastern provinces of Austria-Hungary and to separate them from the Dual Monarchy. In Servia as well as in Russia prevailed the opinion that, at the first attack, Austria-Hungary would fall to pieces. In this case Servia was to receive South Austria and Russia was to dictate the peace in Vienna. The Balkan war had ruined Turkey almost entirely, had paralyzed Bulgaria, that was friendly, and had strengthened the Balkan States that were hostile to Austria. At the same time there began in Rumania a Russian and French propaganda, that promised this country, if it should join the dual alliance, the Hungarian Province of Siebenbuergen.

Thus it became evident in Germany and in Austria that at St. Petersburg, first by diplomatic and political, then also by military, action a comprehensive attack of Slavism under Russian guidance was being prepared. The party of the Grand Dukes in St. Petersburg, the party of the Russian officers, always ready for war, and the Pan-Slavists, the brutal and unscrupulous representatives of the idea that the Russian Czarism was destined to rule Europe—all these declared openly that their aim was the destruction of Austria-Hungary. In Russia the army, already of an immense size, was increased secretly but comprehensively and as quick as possible; in Servia the same was done, and the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, Mr. von Hartwig, was, after the second Balkan war, the principal promoter of the plan to form against Austria a new Balkan alliance. In Bosnia, during all this time, the Servian propaganda was at work with high treason, and in the end with revolver and the bomb.

In Vienna and in Berlin the greatness and the purpose of the new danger could not remain doubtful, especially as it was openly said in St. Petersburg, in Belgrade, and elsewhere that the destruction of Austria-Hungary was imminent. As soon as the Balkan troubles began Austria-Hungary had been obliged to put a large part of her army in readiness for war, because the Russians and Servians had mobilized on their frontiers. The Germans felt that what was a danger for their ally was also a danger for them and that they must do all in the power to maintain Austria-Hungary in the position of a great power. They felt that this could only be done by keeping perfect faith with their ally and by great military strength, so that Russia might possibly be deterred from war and peace be preserved, or else that, in case war was forced upon them, they could wage it with honor and success. Now it was clear in Berlin that in view of the Russian and Servian preparations, Austria-Hungary, in case of a war, would be obliged to use a great part of her forces against Servia and therefore would have to send against Russia fewer troops than would have been possible under the conditions formerly prevailing in Europe. Formerly even European Turkey could have been counted upon for assistance, that after her recent defeat seemed very doubtful. These reasons and considerations, which were solely of a defensive nature, led to the great German military bills of the last two years. Also Austria-Hungary was obliged to increase its defensive strength.

Whoever considers carefully the course of events that has been briefly sketched here will pronounce the assertion of our enemies, that Germany wanted the war, ridiculous and absurd. On the contrary, it can be said that Germany never before endeavored more eagerly to preserve peace than during the last few years. Germany had plenty of opportunities to attack and good opportunities to boot, for we knew for years that the army of France was no more ready than that of Russia. But the Germans are not a warlike nation and the German Emperor, with his Government, has always shown how earnestly he meant his reiterated assertions that the preservation of peace was his principal aim. He was actuated in this by general considerations of humanity, justice, and culture, as well as by the consideration of the German trade and commerce. This, especially the transoceanic commerce of Germany, has increased from year to year. War, however, means the ruin of commerce. Why expose Germany needlessly to this terrible risk, especially as everything in Germany prospered and her wealth increased? No, the German Army bills were merely meant to protect us against, and prepare us for, the attacks of Muscovite barbarism. But nobody in Germany has ever doubted for a moment that France would attack us at the first Russian signal. Since the first days of the Franco-Russian alliance things have become entirely reversed. Then France wanted to win Russia for a war of revenge against Germany; now, on the contrary, France thought herself obliged to place her power and her existence at the disposal of the Russian lust of conquest.

In the Spring of 1914 the German press reported from St. Petersburg detailed accounts of Russia's comprehensive preparations for war. They were not denied in Russia, and Paris declared that Russia would be ready in two or three years and then pursue a policy corresponding to her power; France, too, would then be at the height of her power. If the German Government had desired war, on the strength of these accounts, which were true, it could have waged a preventive war at once and easily. It did not do so, considering that a war is just only when it is forced upon one by the enemy. Thus Spring went by with the atmosphere at high tension. From St. Petersburg and Paris overbearing threats came in increasing numbers to the effect that the power of the Dual Alliance was now gigantic and that Germany and Austria soon would begin to feel it. We remained quiet and watchful, endeavoring with perseverance and with all our might to win over Great Britain to the policy of preserving peace. Colonial and economic questions were being discussed by the German and English Governments, and the cordiality between the two great powers seemed only to be equaled by their mutual confidence.

Then on the 28th of June occurred that frightful assassination by Servians of the successor to the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The Greater Servia propaganda of action had put aside the man who was especially hated in Servia as the powerful exponent of Austro-Hungarian unity and strength. This murder is the real cause of the present European war. Austria-Hungary was able to prove to a shuddering world, a few days after the murder, that it had been prepared and planned systematically, yea, that the Servian Government had been cognizant of the plan. The immense extent of the Servian revolutionary organization in the provinces of Southern Austria, the warlike spirit of the Servians and its instigation by Russia and France, imposed upon the Vienna Government the duty to insist upon quiet and peace within and without its borders. It addressed to the Servian Government a number of demands which aimed at nothing but the suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda. Servia was on the point of accepting the demand, when there arrived a dispatch from St. Petersburg, and Servia mobilized. Then Austria, too, had to act. Thus arose the Austro-Servian war. But a few days later the Russian Army was being mobilized, and the mobilization was begun also in France. At the same time, as the German "White Book" clearly proves, the diplomacy of Russia and France asserted its great love of peace and tried to prolong the negotiations in order to gain time, for, as is well known, the Russian mobilization proceeds slowly. Germany was waiting, and again and again the German Emperor tried to win the Czar over to the preservation of peace, for he considered him sincere and thought him his personal friend. Emperor William was to be cruelly disappointed. He finally saw himself obliged to proclaim a state of war for Germany. But at that time the Russian and French armies were already in a state of complete mobilization. At that time The London Daily Graphic wrote the following article, which shows how an English paper that was only slightly friendly to Germany judged of the situation at that time:

The Mobilization Mystery.

A general mobilization has been ordered in Russia, and Germany has responded by proclaiming martial law throughout the empire. We are now enabled to measure exactly the narrow and slippery ledge which still stands between Europe and the abyss of Armageddon. Will the Russian order be acted upon in the provinces adjoining the German frontier? If it is, then the work of the peacemakers is at an end, for Germany is bound to reply with a mobilization of her own armed forces, and a rush to the frontiers on all sides must ensue. We confess that we are unable to understand the action of Russia in view of the resumption of the negotiations with Austria. It is not likely that these negotiations have been resumed unless both sides think that there is yet a chance of agreement, but if this is the case, why the mobilization which goes far beyond the limits of necessary precaution, and is, indeed, calculated to defeat the efforts of the diplomatists, however promising they may be? There may, of course, be a satisfactory explanation, but as the matter stands it is inexplicable, and is all the more regrettable because it is calculated—we feel sure unjustly—to cast doubts on the loyalty and straightforwardness of the Russian Government.

When Russia had let pass the time limit set by Germany, when France had answered that she would act according to her own interests, then the German Empire had to mobilize its army and go ahead. Before one German soldier had crossed the German frontier a large number of French aeroplanes came flying into our country across the neutral territory of Belgium and Luxemburg without a word of warning on the part of the Belgian Government. At the same time the German Government learned that the French were about to enter Belgium. Then our Government, with great reluctance, had to decide upon requesting the Belgian Government to allow our troops to march through its territory. Belgium was to be indemnified after the war, was to retain its sovereignty and integrity. Belgium protested, at the same time allowing, by an agreement with France, that the French troops might enter Belgium. After all this, and not till France and Belgium itself had broken the neutrality, our troops entered the neutral territory. Germany wanted nothing from Belgium, but had to prevent that Belgian soil be used as a gate of entrance into German territory.

Little has as yet been said of Great Britain. It was Germany's conviction that the sincerity of Britain's love for peace could be trusted. At any rate, Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith asserted again and again in the course of the last few years that England wished friendly relations with Germany and never would lend its support to a Franco-Russian attack on Germany. Now this attack had been made; Germany was on the defensive against two powerful enemies. What would Great Britain do about it? That was the question. Great Britain asked in return for its neutrality that the German forces should not enter Belgium. In other words, it asked that Germany should allow the French and Belgian troops to form on Belgian territory for a march against our frontier! This we could not allow. It would have been suicidal. The German Government made Great Britain, in return for its neutrality, the following offers: we would not attack the northern coast of France, we would leave unmolested the maritime commerce of France and would indemnify Belgium after the war and safeguard its sovereignty and integrity. In spite of this Great Britain declared war on Germany and sides today with those Continental powers that have united for our destruction, in order that Muscovite barbarism may rule Europe. We know that Germany did not deserve such treatment on the part of Great Britain, and do not believe that Great Britain by this action did a service to humanity and civilization.

Today we are facing hard facts. Germany has to fight for her existence. She will fight knowing that the great powers beyond the ocean will do her justice as soon as they know the truth.

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REICHSTAG AND EMPEROR.

England, France, and Russia, unthreatened by Germany, go to war for political reasons—Germany defends her independence and fights for her very existence, for her future as a great power—How a peaceful people were imbued with the spirit of war.

The last days of the month of July were days of anxiety and distress for the German people. They hoped that they would be permitted to preserve an honorable peace. A few months earlier, in 1913, when the centennial of the war for independence from French oppression and the twenty-fifth anniversary of Emperor William's ascent of the throne had been celebrated, they had willingly taken upon their shoulders the great sacrifice of the so-called "Wehrvorlage," which increased the peace strength of the standing army enormously and cost 1,000,000,000 marks. They considered it simply as an increase of their peace insurance premium. Our diplomats worked hard for the maintenance of peace, for the localization of the Austro-Servian war. So sure were the leading men of the empire of the preservation of general peace that at the beginning of the week which was to bring general mobilization they said to each other joyfully: Next week our vacation time begins. But they were fearfully disappointed. Russia's unexpected, treacherous mobilization compelled Germany to draw the sword also. On the evening of the first day of August the one word, Mobilization! was flashed by the electric spark all over the country. There was no more anxiety and uncertainty. Cool, firm resolution at once permeated the entire German folk. The Reichstag was called together for an extra session.

Three days later, on the anniversary of the battles of Weissenburg and Spichern, the representatives of the German people met. This session, which lasted only a few hours, proved worthy of the great historical moment marking the beginning of such a conflagration as the world had never seen before. The railroad lines were under military control and used almost exclusively for purposes of mobilization. In spite of all such difficulties, more than 300 of the 397 Deputies managed to get to Berlin in time. The rest sent word that they were unable to come. On the evening of Aug. 3 the Imperial Chancellor called the leaders of all parties, including the Socialists, to his house and explained to them in a concise and impressive statement how frivolously Germany had been driven to war. At the time of this meeting the unanimous acceptance of all war measures by the Reichstag was already assured. In numerous conferences the heads of the several departments explained the content and meaning of the bills to be submitted to the Reichstag. The participants of the conferences showed already what spirit would characterize the next day. The session of the Reichstag filled the entire German nation with pride and enthusiasm; the Reichstag maintained the dignity of the German Empire and the German people.

In greater numbers than ever before the Deputies, high officers of the army and navy and the Civil Government assembled on Aug. 4, first in houses of worship to pray to God, and then in the Royal Castle of Berlin. The military character of the ceremony at the opening of the session showed under what auspices this memorable act took place. The Kaiser entered the hall in the simple gray field uniform, without the usual pomp, unaccompanied by chamberlains and court officials and pages in glittering court dresses. Only State Ministers, Generals, and Admirals followed him to the throne, from where he read his speech, after covering his head with his helmet. His voice betrayed the strain under which he was laboring. Repeatedly he was interrupted by enthusiastic applause, and when he closed, a rousing cheer thundered through the famous White Hall, something that had never before occurred there since the erection of the old castle. Then came a surprise. The Emperor laid down the manuscript of his speech and continued speaking. From now on he knew only Germans, he said, no differences of party, creed, religion or social position, and he requested the party leaders to give him their hands as a pledge that they all would stand by him "in Not und Tod"—in death and distress. This scene was entirely impromptu, and thus so much more impressive and touching. And it was hardly over when the Reichstag—an unheard of proceeding in such surroundings—began to sing the German national hymn, "Heil Dir im Siegerkranz." The magnificent hall, until then only the scene of pompous court festivities, witnessed an outburst of patriotism such as was never seen there before. To the accompaniment of loud cheers the Kaiser walked out, after shaking the hands of the Imperial Chancellor and the Chief of the General Staff, von Moltke.