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New York Times Current History; The European War, Vol 2, No. 4, July, 1915 - April-September, 1915
Author: Various
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I quote from the letter of a young cavalry officer writing from the trenches:

Although I can't pretend to like this nightmare, I cannot help realizing that it is doing something for those of us who are going through it that we otherwise would have missed; it brings out either the best or worst in a man. It makes character.

He speaks of a little black dog. They are living in two feet of water, he and his men. The German lines are a hundred yards off; wounds, disease, and death are around them. They are worried about this wretched little dog. He has, it seems, lost his people, and is not to be comforted. It is a curious picture. One sees the straggling line of grimy, mud-stained men. They are there to kill; their own life hangs on a thread. A nightmare of blood and dust and horror, and in the midst of it, growing there as if the soil suited it, this flower of pity for a little fellow-creature.

I quote from another letter:

I can assure you there is none of that insensate hatred that one hears about out here. We are out to kill, and kill we do at every opportunity. But when it is all over the splendid universal soldier spirit comes over all the men. Just to give you some idea of what I mean, the other night four German snipers were shot on our wire. The next night our men went out and brought one in who was near and getatable and buried him. They did it with just the same reverence and sadness as they do our own dear fellows. I went to look at the grave next morning, and one of the most uncouth-looking men in my company had placed a cross at the head of the grave, and had written on it:

Here lies a German, We don't know his name, He died bravely fighting For his Fatherland.

And under that "Got mitt uns," (sic,) that being the highest effort of all the men at German.

"Got mitt uns." One has the idea that He is—when the game is played in that spirit. God with us both, shaping brotherhood out of enmity.

Bernard Shaw in a moment of inspiration thinks that some way will have to be found enabling England and Germany to live together peaceably for the future. It is an idea that may possibly have occurred to others. Well, perhaps this is the way. Shaw would not approve of it. But then there is so much in human nature that Shaw does not approve of. There are times when one is compelled to a great pity for Shaw. He seems to have got into the wrong world. He is for ever thanking God that he is not as we other men—we Englishmen and Germans, mere publicans and sinners. It is a difficult world to understand, I admit, my dear Shaw, full of inconsistencies and contradictions. Perhaps there is a meaning in it somewhere that you have missed.

Perhaps we have got to fight one another before we understand one another. In the old Norse mythology Love is the wife of Strife; when we come to consider the nature of man, not such an odd union as it appears.

So long as the law runs that in sorrow woman shall bring forth her child; so long as the ground shall yield to the sons of Adam thorns also and thistles, so long will there be strife between man and man. So long, when the last word has been spoken and has failed, will there be war between the nations. The only hope of civilization is to treat it as a game. You cannot enforce a law without a policeman. You can only appeal to a man's honor—to his sporting instincts.

The mistake Germany is making is in not treating war as a game. To do so would be weakness and frivolity. War must be ruthless, must be frightful. It is not to be bound down by laws human or Divine. And even then she is not logical. Two German officers interned in Holland are released on parole. Taking their country at her word, they hasten back to rejoin their regiments. The German Staff is shocked, sends them back to be imprisoned.

So there really are rules to the game. An officer and gentleman may not lie. If a Sub-Lieutenant may not lie for the sake of his country, then what argument gives the right to the German Government to tear up its treaties, to the German Military Staff to disregard its Ambassador's signature to The Hague Convention?

Come, shade of Bismarck, and your disciples in Germany and other countries, (including a few in my own,) make up your mind. To be ruthless and frightful in a half-hearted, nervous, vacillating fashion is ridiculous. You have either got to go back to the beginning of things, and make war a battle of wild beasts, or you have got to go forward and make it a game—a grim game, I grant you, but one that the nations can play at and shake hands afterward. We have tried the ruthless and frightful method. We used to slaughter the entire population. To shoot a selected few is to court a maximum of contempt for a minimum of advantage. We used to lay waste the land. We did not content ourselves with knocking down a church spire and burning a library. We left not one stone upon another. We sowed salt where the cities had been. We tortured our prisoners before the ramparts. We did not "leave them their eyes to weep with"; we burned them out with hot irons; surely a much swifter means of striking terror! Why not return to these methods? They sound most effective.

They were not effective. God's chosen people—according to themselves—did not annihilate the Philistines, not even with the help of the Ark of the Covenant. The Philistines tightened their belts and acquitted themselves like men. Today the heathen rules in Canaan. Where Mohammed failed the shade of Bismarck is not likely to succeed. Poland is still a sore in European politics. The whole force of the Vatican could not suppress a handful of reformers. All the bloodthirsty edicts of the Revolution could not annihilate a few thousand aristocrats. These things cannot be done. War finishes nothing, it only interrupts. A nation cannot be killed; it can only die. This war is not going to be the end of all things either for Germany or for us. Germany can be beaten to her knees, as she beat France to her knees in 1870; as more than once before that France has beaten her. Later on we have all got to live together in peace, for a while.

Come, gentlemen, let us make an honorable contest of it, that shall leave as little of bitterness behind it as may be. Let us see if we cannot make a fine game of it that we shall be all the better for having played out to the end. From which we shall all come back home cleaner minded, clearer seeing, made kinder to one another by suffering. Come, gentlemen, you believe that God has called upon you to spread German culture through the lands. You are ready to die for your faith. And we believe God has a use for the thing called England. Well, let us fight it out. There seems no other way. You for St. Michael and we for St. George; and God be with us both.

But do not let us lose our common humanity in the struggle. That were the worst defeat of all—the only defeat that would really matter, that would really be lasting.

Let us call it a game. After all, what else is it? We have been playing it since the dawn of creation; and it has settled nothing—but the names of things. Its victories, its defeats! Time wipes them off the slate, with a smile.

I quote from a letter written by the officer who boarded the Emden. He speaks of the German officers: "A thoroughly nice fellow"—"also a good fellow." The order is given that there be no cheering from the Sydney when entering the harbor with her prisoners. English sailormen have fought with German sailormen; have killed a good many of them. It is over. No crowing, gentlemen—over fellow-sailormen. Our writer discusses the fight generally with Captain von Muller. "We agreed it was our job to knock one another out. But there was no malice in it."

We shall do better to regard war as a game—a game to be played for love, for honor, without hatred, without malice. So only shall we profit by it.



THE BELGIAN WAR MOTHERS



By Charlotte Porter

I.

The Dominant Voice, shrieking: Rancor unspeakable, white-hot wrath Spring in your furrow, rise in your path! Harvest you vengeance from Belgian dust, Ye who have turned love unto lust!

Subdominant Voices, murmuring: Month of Mary, may ye breed Vengers out of the August seed! Nourish'd hate of father-foe— Grow, ye War-babes, grow, grow!

II.

The Dominant Voice: Anger implacable, brand with fire, Sear out the soul of the bestial sire! Impotent render the insolent boor— Dead to the love and the life to endure!

Subdominant Voices: Month of Mary, ye shall breed Vengers out of the August seed, Cradled hate of father-foe— Grow, ye War-babes, grow, grow!

III.

The Dominant Voice: Miracle-May-month, fathered in death, Bred in corruption to breathe new breath Into foul body-dregs, breathe thy life Into the hate-sired babes of strife!

Subdominant Voices: Month of Mary, ye shall feed Saviours from the Judas-deed— Gods of life to quell that woe. Grow, ye War-babes, grow, grow!

IV.

The Dominant Voice: Ruin the arrogant hate of love! Ruin the haters, God above! Bless Thou their harvest to quell their sin— Honor the sinned-against, God within!

All Voices: Warring nations, bleed, bleed, But to let the leaders lead! Springs to come from Falls to go, Love's lords, Life's lords, show, show!



How England Prevented an Understanding With Germany

By Dr. Th. Schiemann.

The writings of Professor Schiemann of the University of Berlin, who is also the leading editorial writer of the Kreuz Zeitung, are regarded as inspired by the Kaiser's Government, and in some degree by the Kaiser himself. Dr. Schiemann is often spoken of as an intimate personal friend of the Kaiser. The subjoined article was, in the original, sent by Dr. Schiemann to Professor John Bates Clark of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with the special request that it be translated and forwarded for publication in THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY.

After the great crisis of the first world war, which terminated in the Congress of Vienna, the relations of England to the German States were fairly good. People lived in the protecting shade of the great alliance; England was busy digesting the enormous prey which it had seized at the expense of all the other powers that had taken part in the war; Continental Europe was endeavoring, as best it could, to heal the wounds and sores which had remained behind as mementos of oppressive but, despite all, glorious years. France recuperated most rapidly; by the Treaties of Paris there had been recovered from it only part of the abundant harvest which it had gathered in consequence of the victories and the coercive policy of Napoleon; the national soil was still fertile and the national consciousness was still imbued with the "gloire" which the Corsican General, with the help of his own and of foreign troops, had won for the French name. The great disturbances of world peace that marked the years 1830, 1854, and 1870 were attributable to an incessant pursuit of new "gloire," to which all other aims were subordinate. Parallel with this French striving for new "gloire" was England's endeavor to keep the Continent in a feverish condition; this was the policy of Lord Palmerston, and with it was combined a hysterical fear of attack on the part of possible enemies that were thought to exist in Russia, and especially in France. At the same time an arrogant challenge was constantly held forth to all the nations of the earth, and an almost uninterrupted war was carried on against the small States adjoining England's colonies in Asia and Africa. Between the years 1856 and 1900 England waged no less than thirty-four such wars, and by so doing acquired 4,000,000 square miles of land and 57,000,000 subjects. In Europe after the year 1815 England, for the most part, kept peace; the Crimean war, which was a coalition war, constitutes an exception, and it was not England's fault that Prussia, too, was not drawn into that war, which concerned a specifically English interest. At that time English threats were quite as numerous as they were in the year 1863, when The Daily News declared King William I. an outlaw, and The Daily Mail proclaimed for him the fate of Charles I. The cause of this, however, was that in London it was looked upon as an interference with English interests that Bismarck, by his attitude during the Polish insurrection, had prevented the effectuation of a coalition directed against Russia. During the war of 1864 over Schleswig-Holstein the threats were renewed, and even then we began to hear the watchwords with which public opinion in England for a decade has been mobilized against us: A Germany organized on a military basis, and with a fleet at its command besides, indicates that the goal of that State's policy, even more than in the case of France, is world rule. At that time, too, however, France and Russia were regarded by English war makers as the country's real enemies, and this conviction, rather than ideal considerations of any kind whatsoever, accounts for the fact that in the years 1870 and 1871 English policy followed a neutral course. England wished to see France weakened, had not foreseen Germany's great success, and had reserved for future opportunities the settlement of accounts with Russia, its very annoying rival in Asia.

In other respects, however, Bismarck was by no means satisfied with the way in which England pursued its policy of "neutrality." He had expected, at least, that the English would condemn the war, begun, as it was, in such a criminal manner, and not that they would carry on with France a flourishing trade in weapons. "It is a surprising fact, pregnant with warning," he wrote in May, 1874, "that Mr. Gladstone succeeded so easily in holding the country to an attitude directly opposed to the traditional hostility of the English masses toward France." He had all the more reason to expect a different attitude in view of the fact that, as was well known in England, it had been out of regard for England that Bismarck in December, 1870, had refused an offer of peace from Thiers, which rested on the condition that Belgium should be united to France under the rule of King Leopold. After the battle of Sedan Lord Odo Russell and Disraeli aroused the fears of the English people over the possibility of a German invasion; but Bismarck, nevertheless, was thinking of an English-German alliance, which, on account of the blood relationship of the two dynasties, was by no means impracticable, and which to Queen Victoria would have seemed a natural combination. Subsequently, in the years 1873 and 1874, Bismarck negotiated with Lord Odo Russell in Berlin regarding a German-English alliance, and through Muenster he also took up the matter with Disraeli, who denied very emphatically that he had French sympathies. Nothing, he said, was more incorrect. The two peoples, he alleged further, who alone could proceed hand in hand, and who must become more and more cognizant of that fact, were Germany and England. The power of France, he added, was on the wane, a fact regarding which the demoralization of the empire, the decrease of population, and the course of recent events left no room for doubt. Notwithstanding Disraeli's views, however, the alliance with England, as is well known, was never formed. The most serious obstacle was created by the fact that party government in England rendered binding obligations extraordinarily difficult. Then came all sorts of pinpricks, as, for instance, Derby's advocacy in the year 1875 of Gortchakoff's famous rescue campaign. But despite all Bismarck held fast to the idea of bringing about closer relations with England, and the formation of the alliance with Austria-Hungary confirmed him in that purpose. "We shall have to adjust our attitude more and more," he wrote to Schweinitz in March, 1880, "with the object of increasing the security of our relations with Austria and England." It was this political desire that prompted him to reject a Russian proposal to unite the four Eastern powers in a common protest against England's isolated procedure in connection with the occupation of Egypt. He wished to prevent England from being humiliated by a prearranged coalition. A letter from Bismarck to Salisbury (July 8, 1885) has been preserved, which is very characteristic of this friendly attitude of German policy. "As to politics," he writes, "I have not the slightest doubt that the traditional friendly relations between the two dynasties, as well as between the two nations, will give sufficient security for settling every existing or arising question in a conciliatory way."

With respect to the question of the Egyptian loan that was being discussed at that time, as well as with respect to the burning Afghan question, Bismarck adhered tenaciously to this policy, and later on, too, he was determined to spin the threads further. In the latter part of the Autumn of 1887 an exchange of letters again took place between Lord Salisbury and Prince Bismarck, wherein the latter gave expression to the idea that Austria and England were the natural allies of Germany. If they were opposed to an alliance it would be necessary for Germany to alter its policy entirely and to think about establishing more intimate relations with Russia. This, properly considered, was an invitation to enter into negotiations regarding an alliance treaty. But Salisbury, who hoped for a conflict of the Continental powers which would insure England's position of power for another generation, answered evasively, and Bismarck justly regarded his reply as a rejection. But such a conflict did not arise. The menacing danger brought about by Alexander III. was overcome by the publication of the German-Austrian treaty of alliance. Even then, however, Bismarck did not give up the idea of bringing about closer relations with England. In December, 1888, he wrote: "The promotion of common feeling with England is primo loco to be encouraged." If Bismarck had left behind a political testament this sentence would in all probability be contained in it. Such was also the attitude which our Emperor has consistently maintained from his accession to the throne until the outbreak of the present war. He was a favorite of the old Queen, and the treaty signed on July 1, 1890, whereby we obtained possession of Heligoland by relinquishing our claims to Witu and Zanzibar, was an outward sign of an honest endeavor on the part of both nations to bring about closer mutual relations. The mutual limitation of spheres of interest in East and West Africa in the year 1893, and the friendly adjustment of the conflict which Article III. of the British Agreement with the Congo Free State of the year 1894 had threatened to bring about, might be considered additional symptoms of this general disposition or tendency.

The year 1896, however, brought disturbances; the telegram which Emperor William on Jan. 5 sent to President Kruger, after the predatory invasion of Dr. Jameson had been fortunately repelled, was received very unfavorably in England, and led to demonstrations on the part of the British fleet, which, although they had a very provocative character, remained finally without lasting effect. The impression was created, however, that public opinion in England was very easily excited; it saw itself disturbed in the execution of a thoroughly considered political plan, and, as it were, caught in flagranti. But the fact that there were still deeper reasons for a gradually increasing mistrust of Germany is brought to light by Wilson's book, published in 1896, which, under the title "Made in Germany," developed a program of battle against Germany's rapidly growing economic power. Since then all steps taken by Germany in the pursuit of its internal as well as its external policy have been viewed with extraordinary disapprobation on the part of England. The adoption of our Naval bill by the Reichstag on March 28, 1898, the foundation of the Naval League two days later, the new East-Asiatic policy of Germany, which in the leasing of Kiao-Chau was exemplified in a manner not at all to the liking of the English politicians, the Emperor's trip to the Orient, which led to friendly relations between Turkey and Germany—all this was looked upon with the more displeasure in view of the fact that Emperor William in the Summer of 1895 had emphatically rejected a plan, proposed to him by Lord Salisbury, to divide up Turkey. In August, 1898, nevertheless, when the Fashoda crisis had strained the relations of England and France to the utmost, and when, at the same time, English-Russian relations were becoming critical in the Far East, an understanding between Germany and England, which might perhaps have the character of an alliance, seemed to be quite possible. Secretary of State von Buelow and the English Ambassador, Sir Frank Lascelles, took up the matter very earnestly, but it was impossible to secure from England the assurance that the entire English Government and Parliament would sanction an alliance. Russia warded off the menacing danger of a war with England by means of the well-known proposal which on May 18, 1899, led to the holding of the Disarmament Conference in The Hague, and Delcasse on Jan. 20, 1899, began, with reference to the Fashoda affair, the policy of retreat, which excluded France from the Nile territory. Then came England's war against the Boers. It is well known how the German Government during this war scrupulously maintained its neutrality (not according to the English method) despite the fact that all the sympathies of the German people were with the Boers in their struggle for freedom. It is not so well known, on the other hand, that the Imperial Government rejected a Russian proposal to form an alliance against England. That, too, was a service for which England has not thanked us. Of the tragedy in South Africa it has retained in mind only one incident, the so-called "Kruger Message," which it regarded as an interference with its right to do violence to a weaker power, figuratively speaking, as a slap in the face.

In the course of the war the old Queen died, and Edward VII. entered upon his fateful reign. Emperor William had gone over to London to attend the funeral of his grandmother, and Prince Henry had accompanied him, so that the dynastic relationship was made most conspicuous. After that the political relations of the two States seemed about to shape themselves most propitiously. Of the fact that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded on Jan. 30, 1902, was directed against Russia, there was never for a moment any doubt; indeed it was Japan, not England, which took the initiative in bringing it about. On the other hand, the co-operation of English and German war vessels in adjusting the difficulties which both powers had with Venezuela was in complete harmony with the political wishes and convictions of Emperor William, who, like Bismarck at an earlier date, was of the opinion that the interests of the two nations could readily be reconciled. But in England that co-operation resulted in an excited anti-German campaign on the part of the press. The Times, The National Review, The Daily News, The Daily Telegraph, The Daily Express, and other newspapers vehemently attacked the Government for acting conjointly with us, and there can be no doubt that in so doing they gave expression, not to the ideas of the Balfour Ministry, but to the sentiments which, as was well known in those journalistic circles, were held by King Edward. Balfour, in an address which he delivered in Liverpool on Feb. 13, 1903, had opposed with great emphasis the arousing of English public opinion against Germany. "We wish," he said, "to bear in mind an old ideal, namely, that all the nations which stand in the front ranks of civilization should learn to work together in the interest of the whole, and that nothing any longer stands in the way of the realization of this high ideal save those national bitternesses, jealousies, and hostilities.... As far as Venezuela is concerned, that is passing over ... but with respect to the future it fills me with anxiety when I think how easy it is to stir up the fire of international jealousy, and how hard it is to quench it." It was all the harder in view of the fact that the King, from the very beginning of his reign, adhered tenaciously to the political idea of using the old French revanche notion as the cardinal point of English policy.

In April, 1903, the King began a series of political trips to Portugal, Spain, France, and Austria, while Berlin, very strangely, was not visited by him. Each one of these visits resulted in political agreements, into which Vienna alone declined to enter, and which, after a return visit on the part of Loubet, at that time President of the French Republic, and after a surprising visit in Paris on the part of certain members of the English Parliament, led to the significant English-French agreement of April 8, 1904, a treaty which culminated in the balancing of Morocco against Egypt and made it possible for the English Government, as soon as it chose, to regulate the Morocco question in such a way that it would necessarily bring about a conflict between France and isolated Germany. The ally of King Edward was the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delcasse, who, on the basis of the agreements made with England, had likewise concluded treaties with Spain and Italy, which, as he confidently assumed, insured the penetration pacifique, i.e., the conquest, unhindered by Europe, of Morocco. How this plan presently fell through and how Delcasse was overthrown shall not be related here; on the other hand, attention should be called to the intimidating efforts to which England resorted for the purpose of exerting pressure upon Germany. The first effort of this nature took the form of an address delivered on Feb. 3, 1905, by Arthur Lee, a Civil Lord of the English Admiralty, who threatened the German fleet with destruction; the second effort came after Emperor William had landed in Tangier on March 31 and after Delcasse had been overthrown, and took the form of an appearance of an English fleet before Swinemuende, on which occasion it was officially asserted that the resolution had been adopted back in May, that is, at a time when the intrigues of Delcasse were culminating and when a war between Germany and France seemed likely to break out at any time. For even after Delcasse's overthrow England did not give up the game as lost; it declined to take part in a conference regarding Morocco and considered in all seriousness the question of an invasion. England's naval superiority was so great that the success of such an invasion could not seem doubtful, and in London it was thought that they could even do without the support of France. These plans were finally given up; for some time it was not known very well in London what decisions had been reached in the meeting between the Czar and Emperor William at Bjorkoe, and there was a feeling of uncertainty. Accordingly, England also sent delegates to the conference at Algeciras, wherein we were obliged to deal solely, except for the Austrian delegates, with friends of the English-French combination.

The result, therefore, could only be a vague understanding, wherein was concealed the germ of subsequent conflicts. The first consequence, nevertheless, was a relaxation of German-English relations. In December, 1905, a Liberal Ministry had taken the helm, and the idea was conceived of diverting Germany by other means from the pursuit of a "world policy." Sir Edward Grey championed the contention that more intimate relations between England and Germany were, to be sure, desirable, but could only be effected if we swallowed France's Morocco policy unflinchingly, like bitter medicine. For this event Mr. Haldane, the new Minister of War, proposed an understanding between us similar to that which England had reached with France. This constituted the preliminary step toward an endeavor to effect more intimate relations, an endeavor which at first had a non-official character. German Burgomasters visited the City of London and were cordially received by King Edward himself. This was followed, in August, 1906, by a meeting between the King and his imperial nephew, in Homburg vor der Hoehe, which, as was to be expected, passed off in a satisfactory manner. It should, nevertheless, be recalled to mind that the King expressed himself very ironically on the subject of The Hague Conference, which, he asserted, was a humbug. And Sir Charles Hardinge, who entered into negotiations with Secretary of State von Tschirschky, also voiced the opinion that the conference should offer no opportunity for serious interference with England's naval policy. On this point English and German views concurred, though from different motives. In the following September the English Minister of War, Mr. Haldane, was our guest. He came for the purpose of studying German military organization, and every conceivable courtesy was extended to him. In the addresses which he delivered after his return to England he referred many times to his sojourn in Berlin. He also made the assertion that the relations of England to France were closer and more intimate than ever before, that to Russia they were friendly, and that to Germany they were better than they recently had been. We now know—a fact which the Liberte also divulged at that time—that an English-French military convention had then been signed with reference to future possibilities. This fact was immediately denied, but it was merely a question of word quibbling. No convention, to be sure, was actually signed by the Government, but the "inner circle" of the Cabinet undoubtedly agreed that "conversations" between the military authorities of the two nations should take place, and these military conversations were held regularly, just as if a secret alliance existed, until the outbreak of the present war. Parallel with these political preparations were efforts that stood in sharp contrast to the irritating activities carried on without interruption by the above-mentioned anti-German press, which we embrace under the name "Pearson and Harmsworth Press." In England, as well as in Germany, societies were organized with the object of mitigating and, if possible, entirely abolishing the differences and antagonisms which existed between the two nations; these were the so-called "Friendship Committees." In England the Duke of Argyll and Lord Avebury were at the head of such a committee, and a visit made to London by representatives of our press initiated a well-meant movement which found enthusiastic representatives on both sides. English and German clergymen traveled back and forth between England and Germany, representatives of the English press paid a return visit to Germany, English and German workingmen's representatives endeavored to cement feelings of friendship by making personal observations and acquaintances, and in a similar way representatives of the Parliamentary groups of both countries thought and acted, while the leaders of science were working together at congresses held in Berlin and London. In this way were formed a number of valuable personal relations which led to political friendships and resulted in a conscious co-operation toward an honest English-German understanding.

These efforts continued until shortly before the month of August, 1914. One may safely say, moreover, that nobody has interceded more zealously and more constantly for English-German friendship and co-operation and for the removal of the difficulties that are ever cropping up anew than our Emperor. The enthusiasm with which Emperor William was always received in England on occasion of his numerous visits, especially in November and December, 1907, again in 1910, when he went to London to attend the funeral of Edward VII., and again in 1911, when he visited King George, would be absolutely inconceivable hypocrisy, which we regard as out of the question, had it not been the spontaneous expression of popular sentiment. Official English policy, however, followed other channels. As early as the year 1907 Sir Edward Grey had succeeded in securing from Russia an agreement which united England and Russia in co-operation at the expense of Persia, but which, indirectly, also affected German interests, the injury to which was later happily warded off by the Treaty of Potsdam. It soon became evident, moreover, that England, in concluding the agreement relating to Persia, was in reality less concerned about protecting its Asiatic interests than it was about including Russia in that coalition by means of which it expected to put a stop to the "world policy" of Germany and to check the further development of the German fleet. This became very distinctly evident on June 9, 1908, when a meeting took place at Reval between Edward VII. and Nicholas II. At that time it was agreed and decided between Hardinge and Iswolski, not officially, but in an oral exchange of views, that Russia would be ready to proceed hand in hand with England in European affairs (i.e., in the policy directed against Germany) as soon as it had sufficiently recovered from the after-effects of the war with Japan and the revolution. It was thought that this regeneration of Russia's military power would take six or eight years. The scope of this agreement is very obvious. Whereas Germany, during the persistent danger of a war with France over Morocco, had hitherto considered it highly probable that England would maintain a neutral attitude, it was obliged, as soon as England drew nearer to the Dual Alliance, to figure at all events upon a malevolent neutrality and very likely indeed upon open hostility. Sir Edward Grey, to be sure, who had not yet escaped from the anxiety with which English friends of peace were following the King's trip to Russia, in order to cover up his game, on July 7 had declared in the lower house, in reply to a question directed to the Government, that the visit of the King by no means had any diplomatic significance which might lead to an alliance or to an agreement or to any kind of a convention; no negotiations were being entered into, he asserted, for the purpose of concluding a treaty or a convention with Russia, nor would any such treaty or convention be concluded during the King's visit. But he went on to say that the visit would have some political effect, and it was very true that political effect was desired. "We wish that the visit shall exert a beneficent influence upon the mutual relations of both empires." Public opinion in England allowed itself to be satisfied with this equivocal, oracular statement. In other countries, however, a keener insight was displayed. THE NEW YORK TIMES judged the situation correctly when it said: "It is always a mistake to force a warm friend, who is at the same time a business friend, a blood relative, out of intimate and useful friendship into bitter antagonism, and this mistake, according to the judgment of all non-partisan observers of contemporary history, has been committed by King Edward." When Edward VII. acceded to the throne, it went on to say, England was a warm friend of Germany and of the German Emperor, who had given numerous proofs of his friendship, and was not only willing but anxious to become England's ally; now, however, the guns of the two nations were, so to speak, pointed at each other.



Such, indeed, was the actual case; a determined malevolence on the part of the King, the English statesmen, and that newspaper trust organized by Pearson and Harmsworth, began to mobilize Europe against Germany, and to incense, by means of cable and telegraph, the judgment of the world against our Emperor and against the German policy. No means seemed too infamous if it served this purpose. Over a private letter which Emperor William had sent to Admiral Lord Tweedmouth for the purpose of checking false rumors that were maliciously being spread abroad regarding our naval policy, The Times made a terrible fuss in order to disseminate the notion that Emperor William was interfering with the internal policy of Great Britain with a view to injuring English military power. The excitement of public opinion in England was then utilized by the press for the purpose of creating a sentiment in favor of a concentration of the British fleet in the North Sea. That, however, was certainly done at the instigation of the Government, which was fond of attributing resolutions it had already adopted to the pressure of public opinion throughout the country. The naval manoeuvres which in July, 1908, were carried out in the North Sea, close to our coastline, were participated in by a combination of the canal fleet and the so-called home fleet, and they bore a very provocative and demonstrative character. At this time, moreover, appeared that widely read book by Percival A. Hislam, entitled "The Admiralty of the Atlantic," the expositions of which culminated in the statement that a war between England and Germany was unavoidable, and that the sooner it broke out the shorter it would be and the less money and blood it would cost. All this, however, is rendered easily intelligible by the fact that the Balkan crisis, in consequence of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, had at that time assumed a very dangerous aspect, and was threatening to bring on a war between Austria and Russia and perhaps a world war, wherein England expected to gain its own particular ends. It was therefore a severe disappointment to English statesmen that Nicholas II., despite the vociferous protests of the Serbs, and despite the decidedly warlike attitude of the Russian people on March 25, 1909, recognized the annexation. The disappointment was all the more severe for the reason that shortly before that time, despite the still menacing conflict over Casablanca, the Morocco difficulties between Germany and France were also settled. On Feb. 9, 1909, the day on which King Edward made his first visit in Berlin, a German-French agreement regarding Morocco was signed, and in the latter part of May the Casablanca conflict was also adjusted by arbitration to the tolerable satisfaction of both contestants.

It is not too much to say that King Edward, in so far as he was able, did his best to bring about another outcome, and in England this was generally recognized. "There must be a definitive stopping of the King's interference in foreign politics," declared Mr. Sidebotham, M.P., in the Reform Club at Manchester during this crisis. His words were loudly approved by his hearers, but his voice, as well as the voice of other men in favor of establishing good relations with Germany, was drowned without effect under the influence of the panic which from the end of the year 1908 until well on into the Summer of 1909 kept all England in a state of excitement. Watchwords denoting the necessity of taking immediate action against the German fleet, as they were published in The Standard, The Morning Post, and in the great monthly periodicals, The Nineteenth Century, the Fortnightly Review, and The National Review, were echoed in the negotiations of Parliament, and they dominated the Maritime Law Conference held in London. The naval manoeuvres of July, 1909, brought together all three English fleets, and the plan was conceived of summoning the fleets of the larger colonies. A meeting of newspaper publishers, called in London, was designed to carry on propaganda for these ideas, and the Imperial Defense Conference, also held in London, proposed that England should be supported by its large colonies, though, to be sure, with certain reservations. In order to weaken the impression which Russia's recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had created, the Czar visited the English fleet at Spithead, and for the same reason, probably, the Russian Army manoeuvres in the Fall were considered a rehearsal of the measures that would be adopted to check the advance of an enemy toward St. Petersburg. Finally, on Oct. 23, agreements were made in Racconigi between Iswolski, who was accompanying the Czar on a new trip abroad, and Tittoni, which agreements were to make it possible for Russia, as a Russian newspaper put it, "to liberate itself from the necessity of friendly relations with Germany."

During this excitement in the political atmosphere the Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, endeavored to bring about a turn for the better by effecting an understanding with England, in whose attitude he correctly recognized the real cause of the political insecurity. At this point attention must be called to the fundamental difficulty with which all negotiations at that time, and subsequently, were confronted, and necessarily confronted. In Germany it was seen very clearly from the start that the probability of a combined French-Russian attack, for which influential political groups in St. Petersburg, as well as in Paris, were working, was very slight, so long as England's entrance into this anti-German combination could be left out of consideration. What we hoped to insure, therefore, was England's neutrality in the event of war, inasmuch as a German-English alliance, which might have definitely insured world peace, could not be effected. In order to win England over to the idea of neutrality, the Imperial Chancellor declared his willingness to decrease the rate at which our war vessels were being constructed. Both nations, moreover, were to give assurances that neither intended to attack the other, nor actually would make an attack. A second clause in the German proposal formulated the neutrality obligation. These negotiations continued until the Autumn of the year 1909, and were accompanied by the threatening chorus of the English anti-German press: "German dreadnoughts must not be built." [Black and White—"The Writing on the Wall."] The positive refusal on the part of Germany to abandon the naval program adopted by the Reichstag, and the fixed idea designedly fostered by the British Government that we were cherishing the intention of attacking France, gave England a pretext for rejecting the German efforts to effect an understanding between the two countries. But it is impossible to believe in the honesty of these arguments, which were recently defended, in dialectic perversion of the truth, by Sir Edward Cook in an article entitled "How Britain Strove for Peace." England's aggressive tendency is clearly shown by its above-mentioned agreements with France and Russia, which are today publici juris. Regarding that point there was no self-deception in those English circles which did not belong to the conspiracy; Edward Dicey, one of the most eminent of English publicists, expressed it in point-blank form in February, 1910, when he wrote in The Empire Review: "If England and Germany are friends, the peace of Europe is assured; but if the two nations fall apart, it will be a very unfortunate day for humanity." At that time, when Delcasse tendencies were again asserting themselves in France and a new political storm was brewing in the Balkan countries, King Edward died, on May 6. The hope could now be cherished, the leader of the anti-German policy of England being gone, that the moment had come when it would be possible to effect an understanding.

Dicey again began to argue for peace, the English-German Friendship Committee, the Albert Committee, the Archbishop of Canterbury, The Manchester Guardian, and The Economist advocated this idea, and Prime Minister Asquith found it profitable under these circumstances to strike the note of peace in a report which he submitted to the lower house regarding the frustrated German-English negotiations. But he included in this report false and disquieting statements regarding the German fleet. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied to these statements in the Reichstag, and this led to the resumption of negotiations regarding a permanent political agreement on the basis of the existing German naval program, provided we would decrease our rate of building war vessels, as we had already offered to do. It soon became evident, however, with what little sincerity these negotiations were entered into on the part of England. With the direct encouragement of England, which renewed its promises regarding its attitude in the event of war, France, in the latter part of April, and in outright violation of the treaty, began its advance again Fez; and at the same time, as if it was desired that no doubt should arise regarding the solidarity of England and France, The Fleet Annual published an illustration representing the German high sea fleet under full steam, and under it were printed the words "The Enemy." As a sign of our disapproval of the French violation of the treaty we sent the Panther to Agadir, and in place of German-English negotiations German-French negotiations were commenced. Meanwhile England, cherishing the hope that a German-French war would now break out with certainty, armed itself against us in August and September with might and main. This fact was placed beyond all doubt by the well-known disclosures of Captain Faber, (before his electors in Andover.) The Times said later on that the year 1911 had brought three German-English crises, the first in the third week of July, the second in the week ending on Aug. 19, (that was the time of the enormous and very disillusioning labor strikes,) and the third in September. It is amazing that Sir Edward Cook dared to assert under these circumstances that Great Britain had facilitated the conclusion of the French-German Morocco agreement, which was ratified on March 12, 1912. In the "Open Letter on Foreign Policy," which on Nov. 24, 1911, was submitted to the members of the English Parliament, and was signed with the initials E.D.M. and F.W.H., (which is to be resolved into Edmund D. Morel and Francis W. Hirst,) it is expressly stated by these esteemed and honorable politicians:

"Our attitude was determined exclusively by the ostensible interests of France, which were directly opposed to the interests of British commerce and of British enterprise.... From this it follows that alliances, nay, even political agreements, with Continental powers, which may coerce us to take steps that are, at a given moment, harmful to our national interests, should be avoided."

Sir Edward Grey took pains to conceal these facts from the lower house and passed lightly over the disclosures of Faber—when the Imperial Chancellor vigorously opposed him—with skillful legerdemain. In the upper house Grey's policy also met with severe criticism, and from his declarations, as well as from those of Lloyd George made at the same time, only one conclusion could be drawn—that official England was determined to remain steadfast in the form of its political co-operation with France and Russia. Precisely to this was to be attributed the insecurity of the European situation. It has not become publicly known but has been reliably ascertained that the English Naval Attache in Rome at that time pointed out that England, in the event of a war, which he expected to come, would have to occupy either Belgium or Copenhagen. That, he added, was very brutal, to be sure, but at the same time was rendered necessary by historic developments and by circumstances.

In view of all this we cannot deceive ourselves into believing that the mission which brought Lord Haldane to Berlin in February, 1912, had any other purpose than that of satisfying the voices in England which were calling with ever-increasing vigor for an understanding with Germany. The proposals which he submitted to us, after a discussion with Sir Edward Grey, were formulated by the English Cabinet as follows: "Inasmuch as both powers naturally wish to maintain relations of peace and friendship with each other, England declares that it will neither make an unprovoked attack upon Germany, nor support any other power in making such an attack. To attack Germany is neither the direct nor the indirect object of any treaty, understanding, or combination to which England is now a party, nor will England make itself a party to anything that has such an object." This carefully excogitated statement embraced in its Machiavellian wording neither those "oral conversations" at Reval nor the "innocent discussions" engaged in by the English and French General Staffs—discussions which were always revived on occasion of every political crisis. It was only natural, therefore, that we, since these relations between the General Staffs of the powers belonging to the Entente were no secret to us, demanded greater security and a declaration of neutrality on the part of England before consenting to enter into any general understanding.

This was all the more necessary in view of the fact that Poincare, the French President, while the negotiations, commenced by Haldane, between Berlin and London were being carried on, had undertaken, in August, 1912, that trip to St. Petersburg, from which he brought back to France the system of three years' compulsory military service; and at the same time Hartwig, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade, organized that Balkan Conference, the purpose of which was, first, to break the backbone of Turkey, and, secondly, to serve as a tool for the overthrow of Austria. The introduction and adoption of the German military program made it evident to all the world that we had recognized correctly, and betimes, the dangers which threatened the peace of the world, and in particular the peace of Germany. Furthermore, in a conversation with Prince Lichnowski, Lord Haldane said in so many words that England, in the event of a general war, would have to place itself on the side of France "in order to prevent Germany from becoming too powerful." We must not neglect to mention that during this critical year, as well as in the year 1913, negotiations were again entered into regarding the carrying out of the treaty concluded between England and Germany in the days of Caprivi with respect to an economic penetration of the Portuguese colonies in East and West Africa. The refusal of Sir Edward Grey to give these negotiations the secure form of a treaty, which could be laid before the English Parliament and the German Reichstag, here again shows that he was desirous of effecting only the appearance of an understanding. Both he and France were resolved to postpone their action against Germany until Russia, which was preparing itself with prodigious exertion, had finished its preparations, which in August, 1913, were critically inspected by General Joffre, and among which is to be included the construction of railways to run through Poland to the Austrian and Prussian frontiers. This consideration also accounts for England's attitude during the Balkan confusion of 1912 and 1913. At the London Conference we were able to co-operate with Sir Edward Grey in settling the great difficulties brought about by the war of the Balkan nations against Turkey, and subsequently their war inter se and the overthrow of Bulgaria. Under the impression created by this political co-operation the peace party in England also seemed to gain ground. On Feb. 18, 1913, Charles Trevelyan, M.P., paid me a visit and assured me with great positiveness that England would under no circumstances wage war. A Ministry which undertook to make preparations for war, he said, would at once be deposed. An inclination to bring about an understanding with Germany, he added, prevailed in all industrial circles. My impression that such was actually the case was confirmed during a sojourn in London in the months of March and April, 1914. On occasion of a political supper a deux with Lord Haldane the latter gave expression to the view that the present grouping of the powers offered the best guarantee of peace, that Sir Edward Grey was holding Russia in check and we were holding Austria-Hungary in check, in saying which he emphasized the fact that England had implicit confidence in the German Imperial Chancellor. I replied, saying that in consequence of the existing combination Paris and St. Petersburg would certainly count upon England's help in the event of a war, and would thus bring on the war. We then discussed the situation between England and Germany, and remarked how the present plan, adopted by both Governments, of fortifying both sides of the North Sea was detrimental to the real interests of both. The following letter, which I received from Lord Haldane in Berlin on April 17, is an echo of this conversation:

"It was a great pleasure to see you and have had the full and unreserved talk we had together. My ambition is, like yours, to bring Germany into relations of ever closer intimacy and friendship. Our two countries have a common work to do for the world as well as for themselves, and each of them can bring to bear on this work special endowments and qualities. May the co-operation, which I believe to be now beginning, become closer and closer. Of this I am sure, the more wide and unselfish the nations and the groups questions make her supreme purposes of their policies, the more will friction disappear and the sooner will the relations that are normal and healthy reappear. Something of this good work has now come into existence between our two peoples. We must see to it that the chance of growth is given."[5]

[Footnote 5: This passage from a letter of Lord Haldane is quoted in the original English by Professor Schiemann and is here copied verbatim.—TRANSLATOR.]

It is difficult to believe in the sincerity of the sentiments here expressed, when we consider that Lord Haldane belonged to the inner circle of the Cabinet and therefore must have known the secret chess-moves of Grey's policy. Furthermore, he did not resign, as did three other members of the Cabinet—Lord Morley, Burns, and Charles Trevelyan—when, on Aug. 4, Sir Edward's false game was shown up and when treaties grew out of those "conversations" and alliances out of those ententes, which had until then existed under counterfeit names. Even as late as June 13 Sir Edward Grey denied that he had entered into any binding obligations. Six weeks after that, however, England confronted Germany with the fait accompli of a life-and-death struggle. Grey had consciously uttered a falsehood before Parliament, and, as was ascertained from a Russian source, had not only accepted a Russian proposal to conclude a naval agreement, but had expressly given his approval that the deliberations regarding the effectuation of this agreement should be participated in by the Naval Staffs of both countries. In so doing he expressly counted upon a war between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, and upon the complete alliance of England. England, at the proper time, was to send merchantmen to Russian ports on the Baltic Sea for the purpose of landing Russian troops in Pomerania, and to send as many ships to the Mediterranean Sea as seemed necessary to insure the ascendency of France. With the help of French money it was intended to overthrow the Ministry of Rodoslawow in Bulgaria and, with the assistance of the Russophile, Malinow, to win over that country to the combination, which was to attack Austria in the rear. All this, which took place before the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, was the political plan of battle adopted by the conspiring powers, which subsequently found an excuse for their behavior in the alleged coercion of Serbia. The hypocrisy with which the intrigue was carried out is without precedent. The palm rests, probably, on the friendly visit of the English squadron, under Admiral Beatty, in Kiel. Two days after the assassination of the Archduke the squadron started on its way home, through the Emperor William Canal, for the purpose of joining the concentration of the entire English fleet, which lay, ready for war, off Spithead. That England afterward made common cause with Russia and France for the murderers of the Archduke, and with moral indignation rose against the satisfaction demanded of Serbia by Austria, is all part of the system of the frivolous use of any pretext which might bring England closer to its longed-for goal—the deposition of Germany from her position in the world. Such was England's role in the preparation of this wantonly prearranged war.



Germany Free!

By BEATRICE BARRY.

Deeds that have startled the civilized world Blot her escutcheon, brand her with shame; But though the German flag there be unfurled, Do Germans know what is done in their name? If not, the final accounting may see— Germany free!

Germany, free from the canker of self— Free from the lusting for prestige and power; Purged of her passion for place and for pelf— Shall she not rise to great heights in that hour? God speed its coming, for fain would we see— Germany free!

Free from the militant few who have ruled Seventy millions with sabre of steel; Free from the doctrine in which they are schooled— "Might shall prevail!" All the rancor we feel Strikes at that dogma, from which we would see— Germany free!

Much in her national life we admire, Much we recoil from, or needs must dispute; Germany needs her baptism of fire, But you will find us the first to salute— (God speed the "Day" the awakening shall be) Germany FREE!



Chronology of the War

Showing Progress of Campaigns on All Fronts and Collateral Events from April 30, 1915, Up to and Including June 15, 1915.

CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN EUROPE

May 1—Germans advance in their invasion of the Russian Baltic provinces, a Russian force retreating toward Mitau; fighting is being renewed along the East Prussian frontier and in Central Poland; Russians gain ground in their campaign for the Uzsok Pass; Germans defeat Russians near Szawle, in Kovno; Austrians repulse Russian attacks against the heights of the Orawa and Opor Valleys.

May 2—A great battle is developing in the plain of Rawa, Central Poland; Russians are taking the offensive; Austrians have opened an offensive in the region of Ciezkowice.

May 3—German and Austrian armies, under General von Mackensen, win a victory in West Galicia, breaking the Russian centre for miles, and gaining ground across practically the whole western tip of Galicia, from near the Hungarian border to the junction of the River Dunajec with the Vistula; the Teutonic allies take 30,000 prisoners, 22 cannon, and 64 machine guns; the Austrians gain ground in the Beskid region, and repulse Russians north of Osmaloda; the German advance in the Russian Baltic provinces continues unchecked along a 100-mile front, extending from the Baltic Sea, near Libau, southeast to the northern tributaries of the River Niemen.

May 4—Russians claim that the Austro-German drive in West Galicia is being checked; Germans hold positions on the right bank of the Dunajec; a fierce battle is raging in the direction of Stry; Germans make further progress in the Russian Baltic provinces.

May 5—Russians are retreating at points along the Galician line from the Vistula to the Carpathians, and are in retreat from positions they occupied on the Hungarian slopes of the Carpathians; the third line of Russian fortifications has been pierced; Austro-German Army captures the town of Gorlice.

May 6—Austro-German armies continue to advance in West Galicia; the northern wing has captured Tarnow; southern wing has crossed the Wisloka River and Russians are retreating east of the Lupkow Pass; Austro-Germans take the last Russian positions on the heights east of the Dunajec and Biala Rivers; Jaslo and Dukla have been taken from the Russians; Russians admit partial retreat in West Galicia.

May 7—Austro-German army is pursuing retreating Russians in West Galicia; Austrians take more prisoners, stores, and guns; in the eastern sector of the Carpathian front Russian attacks are repulsed by Austrians; Russian attacks in Southeast Galicia are repulsed; in Poland there is severe fighting.

May 8—Germans capture Libau, taking 1,600 prisoners, 18 cannon, and much war material; severe fighting continues in West Galicia, where General von Mackensen's army is pursuing the Russians; a Russian division surrounded near Dukla cuts its way through the surrounding troops and gets to the main Russian lines; all the passes in the Beskid Mountains, except Lupkow, are in the hands of Austro-German forces; Russians take the offensive southwest of Mitau.

May 9—Russians are retreating in Galicia along a front of 124 miles, from the Uzsok Pass to the Vistula; Austro-German forces have passed the line of the Uzsok Pass, Komanoza, Krosno, Debica, and Szezucin; in Southeast Galicia violent battles are developing; Austrians are pursuing Russians across the Dniester; Vienna reports that Hungary is now clear of Russians; German advance northeast of Kovno; Russian attacks on German positions on the Pilica are repulsed; Russians make progress southwest of Mitau.

May 10—Russian Embassy at Washington says that the Russians have retreated thirty miles in Galicia, but that only one division has withdrawn from Hungary; the first stage of the battle in West Galicia has been practically concluded; General von Mackensen's army is reforming for a new offensive; Germans have met a severe check west of Mitau.

May 11—Austro-German troops are still advancing in West Galicia; Russians are attacking in East Galicia and along the eastern section of the Carpathians; Russians have success in Bukowina, taking prisoners and guns; Austrians force Russian south wing in Russian Poland to retreat; Austrians repulse Russian attacks near Baligrod; advance Austrian troops have crossed the San near Dvornik.

May 12—Russians state that their counter-offensive has checked the Austro-Germans in West Galicia, while the Germans and Austrians state that their drive continues successfully; Austro-German troops have occupied Brozozow, Dynow, Sanok, and Lisko; there is severe fighting in the central Carpathians and Southeast Galicia, where the Russians are advancing on a forty-mile front; Austrians are repulsed in the direction of the Uzsok Pass and the Stry River.

May 13—Heavy fighting is in progress east of Tarnow; north of the Vistula the Austrians have forced the Nida line; Russians make progress on the right bank of the Dniester; Russians repulse Germans in the region of Shavli.

May 14—Russians break the Austrian line at various places on a ninety-four-mile front, driving the Austrians from Bukowina positions and forcing them over the Pruth River; Russians check the Austro-German advance in Galicia, and are concentrating on the line of the River San, with the object of occupying a shorter front; the advance guards of General Mackensen's armies are before Przemysl; the Teutonic allies are advancing in Russian Poland.

May 15—The Austro-German troops have now driven the Russians completely from Jaroslau, which they hold firmly, as well as all the towns on the west bank of the San River; the Austrian Tenth Army is now before Przemysl, its native stronghold; the rapid advance of the Teutonic allies is endangering the position of the Russians in the Carpathians; credit for the stiff and ceaseless pursuit of the Russians in the great West Galicia drive is being given by the Austrians to Field Marshal Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, Chief of the Austrian General Staff; the Russian counter-drive to the east continues, and the Czar's armies in Bukowina force back the Austro-German lines for twenty miles.

May 16—Russians continue to withdraw in West Galicia; they are massing at the San River for a stand; in Bukowina and East Galicia the Russian cavalry is pursuing retreating Austrians; the Austrians are retiring behind the Pruth, evacuating strongly fortified positions; Hungarian cavalry has made sacrifices of large bodies to enable the infantry to retreat in good order; in Russian Poland the Teutonic allies continue to push back the Russians; Russians win success against the Germans in the Baltic provinces.

May 17—Austro-German armies continue their advance in West Galicia; Austrians have captured Drohobycz, in Central Galicia, forty miles southwest of Lemberg; fighting is in progress around Przemysl; Russians repulse Germans at Shavli; Russians have made advances on the West Niemen; Russian official statement says that the West Galician defeat has been offset by successes in Bukowina against the Austrians.

May 18—Austro-German troops are bombarding the western forts of Przemysl; the Teutonic allies have a firm foothold on the eastern bank of the San River; Russians are making vigorous attacks on the Germans in South Poland; Russians have driven the Austro-German forces back from the Dniester to the Pruth in East Galicia, and are making strong attacks in Bukowina; heavy fighting is in progress in the Russian Baltic Provinces and along the East Prussian frontier; Austrian official statement declares that 174,000 Russian prisoners, 128 guns, and 308 machine guns have been taken since the beginning of May as a result of the West Galicia drive; unofficial dispatch from Petrograd says Russians have been beaten back on a 200-mile front in West Galicia.

May 19—The Russian lines along the San River are in danger, the Austro-Germans having crossed the river on a wide front; the Russians are attempting to reform their lines north and south of Przemysl; Teutonic Allies occupy Sieniawa; in Bukowina the Russians have broken the extreme Austrian right; it is stated from Petrograd that the Germans and Austrians are using between thirty and forty army corps on a 200-mile front from Opatow, in Poland, to Kolomea, Eastern Galicia.

May 20—Russians are fighting desperately to save the remains of their West Galicia army, now in new positions along the San River; Austro-German forces are attacking with tremendous artillery fire, the shells being followed by a close phalanx of 150,000 men; the Russians hold both banks of the San south of Jaroslau.

May 21—Russians are rallying along the San River; a desperate battle is in progress below Przemysl; Russians are taking a strong offensive in Poland; official Austrian announcements state that Russian prisoners now in Austrian hands, as a result of the recent fighting, are 194,000; the German official announcement says that General Mackensen's army, since May 1, has taken 104,000 prisoners, 72 cannon, and 253 machine guns; official Russian statement says that on four recent days the losses of the Austro-Germans were 10,000 a day, and on seventeen other recent days were much heavier, and adds that the Austro-Germans have used between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 shells during the recent fighting; Russian reports state that 3,000,000 men, including both sides, are now daily attacking and counter-attacking along the whole front, from Opatow to Kolomea; the Kaiser is stated to be personally directing operations at Jaroslau.

May 22—Stubborn fighting continues along the San, while severe fighting is in progress in the Russian Baltic Provinces and near the East Prussian frontier; on the left bank of the lower San the Russians have taken the offensive and captured the villages of Krawce, Biercza, Przyszow, and Kamerale; Russians repulse counter attacks in the direction of Nisko; Germans repulse Russians at Shavli; in Central Galicia the Austrians have gained some ground; east of Czernowitz Austrians repulse Russians; the right wing of the Austrian Army in Bukowina is falling back toward the Carpathians.

May 23—Russians, with strong reinforcements, have crossed the San at the junction of that river with the Vistula, and are advancing southward in an effort to outflank the Germany Army, which crossed the San in the vicinity of Jaroslau; Russians continue their offensive in Bukowina, and in the Opatow region; Germans defeat Russian northern wing near Shavli, and repulse Russian attacks from the Dubysa and Niemen Rivers; Russians are massing strong forces in the vicinity of Warsaw, Ivangrod, and Lublin.

May 24—Russians claim that they have definitely checked the German drive on the upper San River; a Russian movement upon Nisko, and the occupation of Ulanoff, Rudnik, Kraftza, Bourgny, and Shushav to the westward of the upper San, threatens the German position east of the river; General von Mackensen is drawing in his wings to protect his centre from attack; furious German assaults to the south of Przemysl continue without definite result; in the region of Shavli, the Russian troops now occupy a very extended front on the line of the Rivers Visdala, Venta, Dubysa, and Siup.

May 25—General von Mackensen renews his offensive against the Russians north of Przemysl, and takes six fortified villages, 21,000 prisoners, 39 cannon, and 40 machine guns; Austrians are advancing southeast of Przemysl; on the left bank of the upper Vistula, in the Opatow region, Russians repulse attacks and make counter-attacks.

May 26—Between Przemysl and Jaroslau, east of Radymno, Germans force a passage of the San River; Mackensen's army is making progress on both banks of the San in a southeasterly direction; southeast of Przemysl the Austro-German forces are progressing toward strong Russian positions; Russians repulse German attack near Ossowitz.

May 27—Austro-German forces continue to batter at the Russian lines northeast and southeast of Przemysl, and it is reported that they have severed communications between Przemysl and Lemberg; the Germans have forced another crossing of the San, eleven miles north of Przemysl, and are extending by several miles the zone held by them east of the San; Austro-German troops break through the Russian front line southeast of Drohobycz and near Stry, and force the Russians to fall back; Russians repulse attacks on the Upper Vistula; Russians have success in the region of the Dniester marshes.

May 28—Russians throw back the German force which crossed the San River and established itself at Sieniawa, fifty miles north of Przemysl; the Germans have retreated to the west bank of the San, with the loss of twelve guns; further south, between Jarislau and Przemysl, the Austro-German forces gain more ground on both banks of the San; Austrians reach Medyka, eight miles due east of Przemysl, leaving a gap of but twelve miles between the northern and eastern forces which are trying to encircle the fortress.

May 29—Germans and Austrians continue to fight fiercely to encircle Przemysl; in the Russian Baltic provinces heavy fighting is in progress; Russians are sending larger forces to meet the Germans in these provinces.

May 30—Fierce fighting is raging around Przemysl, the Austro-German forces striving to cut off the fortress; the Russians are bringing up huge reinforcements; north of Przemysl the Russians are making some progress, but to the southeast the Austro-German forces are making further headway, now commanding with their artillery the railway between Przemysl and Grodek; Russian attempts to cross the San near Sieniawa fail; in the Russian Baltic provinces German cavalry drives back Russian cavalry southeast of Libau.

May 31—Russians are beginning to assume the offensive at certain points along the San River, where severe fighting continues; near Stry the Austrians take several Russian positions.

June 1—The Serbians are resuming military activity against Austria; Austro-German forces are storming three of the outer forts of Przemysl; north and southeast of Przemysl the Austro-German forces are advancing; they have taken Stry.

June 2—Furious fighting continues around Przemysl; Austro-German troops take two fortifications on the north front of Przemysl; German official report states that during May the Teutonic allies took 863 Russian officers prisoners and 268,869 men, as well as capturing 251 cannon and 576 machine guns.

June 3—Austro-German troops, after a siege of twenty days, capture Przemysl, which has been in Russian possession since March 22, the present conquerors entering after storming the northern forts; Austro-Germans are driving back Russians north of Stry.

June 4—Severe fighting is in progress along the whole Galician front, Austro-Germans seeking to end the Russian campaign in Galicia; Russians are in position at Medyka Heights, ten miles east of Przemysl; they saved their batteries in evacuating Przemysl and claim to have removed all war material captured from the Austrians.

June 5—Austro-Germans are attempting an encircling movement against Lemberg; they are making progress from the southwest, but their left wing is checked by the Russians on the lower reaches of the San River; Austro-German extreme right in East Galicia and Bukowina is pounded by the Russians.

June 6—Battles over a wide area are in progress in Galicia; Russians are making considerable advances on the lower reaches of the San; southwest of Lemberg the Austro-Germans are advancing.

June 7—Austro-German armies are making progress in attempt to encircle Lemberg; Russians are being pressed back from their line on the San; Teutonic allies cross the Dniester; Germans advance in their invasion of the Baltic provinces of Russia.

June 8—Austro-Germans, having crossed the Dniester south of Lemberg, are assuming the offensive further to the south and are pushing back the Russians between Kolomea and Kalusz in East Galicia.

June 9—Austro-Germans take Stanislau, throwing the Russian left back to the Dniester River; in East Galicia, along the rest of the line, the Russians are holding their own and are counter-attacking.

June 10—Russians take offensive in their Baltic provinces, where they force the Germans to retreat to avoid being cut off; Russians advance again in Galicia; they attack Mackensen's forces, menacing Lemberg and Linsingen's forces on the Dniester; the Austro-German army of Bukowina crosses the Pruth and effects junction with Galician troops.

June 11—Russians win a series of successes against Germans and Austrians in East Galicia; they repulse Mackensen's troops with heavy loss and hurl Linsingen's army back across the Dniester; Russians take 17 guns and 49 machine guns; Germans are developing an offensive north of the Pilitza in Poland; Serbians are marching across Northern Albania toward the port of Durazzo, while Montenegrins are making for the port of Alessio.

June 12—A battle is raging along the Dniester, Austrians making gains on the lower reaches, while the Russians have success further up stream; Russians leave Bukowina, giving up their last positions on the Pruth and retreating across the frontier.

June 13—Austro-Germans commence an attack on the Russians on the River San north of Przemysl, and along the Dniester in Southeast Galicia; Germans are attacking Russian centre on the River Rawka, west of Warsaw; severe fighting continues in the Russian Baltic provinces.

June 14—Mackensen's army attacks Russian positions in Middle Galicia along a forty-three-mile front, and breaks the line, taking 16,000 prisoners; Austrians have successes on the Dniester.

June 15—Austro-Germans are renewing the drive in Galicia and advancing on a wide front; they capture Mosciska, thirty-seven miles from Lemberg, after a week's fight; Russian counter-attacks to protect Lemberg from the south are repulsed.

CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE.

May 1—Germans continue the bombardment of Dunkirk with a huge gun or guns, doing considerable damage and killing several persons; Germans make further gains on the west bank of the Ypres Canal; French repulse Germans in the Argonne, near Bagatelle; French take trenches in the Forest of Le Pretre; French artillery bombards fortifications of Altkirch, in Upper Alsace.

May 2—French have been bombarding for two days the southern fortifications of Metz; British and French attack the new German positions northeast of Ypres, but are beaten back; Germans make progress in the Argonne; German General Staff in Belgium admits a loss of 12,000 dead in the battle of Ypres.

May 3—Germans renew assaults near Ypres, the British lines being pounded north and south of that place, and Germans gain ground southeast of St. Julien; Germans damage French positions in Champagne at Ourchen, Sopain, and Perthes; French repulse an attack in the Forest of Le Pretre.

May 4—Germans gain more ground northeast of Ypres, and take the villages of Zonnebeke, Zevecote, and Westhoek, and the Forest of Polygonous and Nonnebosschen; French gain in the region of Steenstraete.

May 5—Germans gain ground northeast of Ypres, British losing four positions and being forced to retire; Hill 60 is again menaced by the Germans, who, the British state, have obtained a footing there through the use of gases; French check one German attack near Perthes, and another at Four de Paris; French take two lines of German trenches in the Mortmare Wood; French gain ground on the north bank of the Fecht River, in Alsace.

May 6—Germans make further gains near Ypres, taking two positions from the Allies; British recapture some of the trenches at Hill 60, recently lost; French repulse a German night attack near Steenstraete; Germans repulse French near Flirey; Germans advance west of Combres; Germans take French positions in the Ailly Wood, capturing 2,000 men.

May 7—Germans make more gains near Ypres; there is severe fighting for Hill 60; German artillery checks a French attack near Steinbrueck, in the valley of the Fecht; French repulse German attacks at Frise, west of Peronne, and in Champagne, around the Fort of Beausejour.

May 8—French capture a German position west of Lens; French check three attacks in the Forest of Le Pretre; French advance two-thirds of a mile along a mile front on the right bank of the Fecht River; British repulse a daybreak attack near St. Julien; British recapture a further section of recently lost trenches at Hill 60.

May 9—British repulse German attack east of Ypres; British gain ground toward Fromelles, after a vigorous attack on the German line; Germans capture the villages of Fresenburg and Terleranhoek; French make gains north of Arras; south of Carency the French make an advance by which they capture two lines of trenches over a front of 4-1/3 miles; French take the village of La Targette and half of the village of Neuville-St. Vaast.

May 10—The Allies are attacking along a front of twenty-six miles in the direction of Carency and Souchez; Allies repulse German attacks near Ypres; Germans make gains near Nieuport, and renew the bombardment of Dunkirk; French repulse Germans at the Forest of Le Pretre and at Berry-au-Bac.

May 11—A strong French offensive against the German lines north of Arras is being pushed; the French carry the German trenches guarding the road from Loos to Vermelles; French take a strongly fortified position on Lorette Heights; French make gains at Souchez and Carency; Germans shell the town of Bergues, near Dunkirk; Germans heavily bombard British trenches east of Ypres.

May 12—Severe fighting is now raging over the whole front from Ypres to Arras, the Allies taking the offensive; to the north the British centre has Lille for its objective, while to the south the French centre is aiming at Lens; French repulse counter attacks at Neuville-St. Vaast, and between Carency and Ablain; French make gains in the wood east of Carency, and take three successive lines of trenches bordering the wood to the north of Carency; French take another portion of the village of Carency; French lose some of the ground they captured near Loos; Germans take a hill east of Ypres; Germans bombard Dunkirk.

May 13—The French are in complete possession of Carency, having captured the last German position there; French take large stores of German ammunition, twenty big guns and many machine guns; French also make progress north of Carency, where they have established themselves at Ablain-St. Nazaire; French have also taken all of the Forest of Le Pretre, although Germans retain positions on the north and south slopes adjacent; Germans are making fierce assaults on the British positions east of Ypres, piercing the line at one point; Belgians repulse an attack on the right bank of the Yser; French now hold the forest at Notre Dame de Lorette.

May 14—French offensive is continued by the capture of German positions southeast of Angres, while they also make progress on the southern and eastern slopes of the Lorette hills, and at Neuville-St. Vaast; British attacks near Ypres are unsuccessful; Germans gain in the direction of Hooge; French artillery levels German trenches in the Valley of the Aisne.

May 15—French continue to advance near Carency; French also gain north of Ypres; they take several trenches in front of Het Sase, and occupy part of Steenstraete; French extend their attack southeast of Notre Dame de Lorette; Germans make progress on the St. Julien-Ypres road against the British; Germans state that they have taken since April 22 in the Ypres region 5,560 unwounded officers and men; artillery fighting is in progress southwest of Lille.

May 16—The first British army breaks the German line over most of a two-mile front northwest of La Bassee, and wins nearly a mile of territory; French repulse a counter-attack at Steenstraete; French make gains north of Arras; lively fighting in Champagne; Germans repulse French at Het Sase; British attack Germans south of Lille.

May 17—British make further advances northwest of La Bassee and carry additional German trenches, all trenches on a two-mile front now being in hands of the British; French and Belgians force Germans to evacuate positions they held west of the Yser Canal; French maintain gains on the east bank; French repulse German counter-attacks on the slopes of Lorette.

May 18—Heavy rains and mists hamper operations in Northern France; the French have consolidated the positions recently occupied by them to the east of the Yser Canal; French make gains near Ablain; an almost constant artillery duel is in progress north of Arras; Germans repulse British south of Neuve Chapelle.

May 19—Germans capture trenches from the French on the heights of Lorette; Germans repulse British attacks near Neuve Chapelle.

May 20—Recent heavy rains have made the ground in Flanders unsuited to infantry attacks and there is a lull, but artillery engagements are in progress; French make advances in Champagne by mining; French take trenches near Bagatelle, in the Argonne; fierce artillery duels between the Meuse and Moselle.

May 21—French drive Germans from the last of their positions on the heights of Lorette; The French now hold the entire Lorette Hill and the lesser ridges, which the Germans had defended for six months; French repulse German attack to the east of the Yser Canal; Canadians capture a German position to the north of Ypres after the British Guards fail twice.

May 22—British repulse attacks north of La Bassee; French make gains north of Arras; Germans repulse British and French attacks southwest of Neuve Chapelle; German official report states that the Allies, southwest of Lille and in the Argonne, are using mines charged with poisonous gases.

May 23—British advance east of Festubert; French gain ground northeast of Notre Dame de Lorette and near Neuville-St. Vaast; Germans are repulsed east of the Yser Canal.

May 24—Before attacking the British northeast of Ypres, the Germans roll a huge cloud of asphyxiating gas toward them, the volume of fumes being forty feet high along a six-mile front; because of the use of respirators, few British succumb; fighting in progress north of Arras.

May 26—British make further gains in their offensive against La Bassee, and it is officially announced that the net result of their operations in the territory to the west of that town since May 1 is the capture of a total front of more than three miles, along a considerable part of which two lines of German trenches have been taken; in the district north of Arras there is desperate fighting near Angres, the Germans attempting to regain ground lost yesterday.

May 27—French make further gains north of Arras; artillery engagements along the Yser Canal; Belgians repulse two German infantry attacks near Dixmude; artillery duels in the Vosges; French fail in attempt to break German lines between Vermelles and Lorette Hills.

May 28—British make further gains toward La Bassee; fierce fighting occurs north of Arras; French advance in Alsace on the mountain of Schepfenrieth; Germans repulse French attacks southeast of Lorette Ridge.

May 29—The village of Ablain-St. Nazaire, for which fighting has been in progress for three weeks, is now in the hands of the French, the Germans evacuating their last position this morning.

May 30—French gain ground at four points—near Neuville-St. Vaast, on the Yser, at Le Pretre Forest, and in Alsace at Schnepfenriethkopf; British make small gains at Festubert; Belgian and German artillery are fighting a duel north and south of Dixmude.

May 31—Severe fighting continues in the region north of Arras, Germans acting, for the most part, on the defensive; French gain ground on the road from Souchez to Carency; artillery fighting at the Forest of La Pretre.

June 1—French gain more ground at Souchez, where violent fighting is in progress, and also gain southeast of Neuville; French lose trenches on the outskirts of Le Pretre Forest.

June 2—Germans recapture from the French the sugar refinery at Souchez, which has changed hands four times in twenty-four hours; British, by a bayonet charge, take Chateau Hooge, in the Ypres region; French make further progress north of Arras, taking trenches in "the labyrinth," as the system of intrenchments in that region is termed; Rheims is again bombarded.

June 3—Fierce fighting continues north of Arras; French and Germans still battle for possession of the sugar refinery at Souchez.

June 4—In consequence of the successes in the Galician campaign, the Germans are sending reinforcements to the Western line; Germans retake some of trenches northeast of Givenchy captured by the British; Germans take the village and Chateau of Hooge; French bombard the southern front of the intrenched camp of Metz.

June 5—French make important gains in the area north of Arras where desperate fighting has so long been in progress; they have taken two-thirds of the village of Neuville-St. Vaast; they advance a quarter of a mile in the northern part of the labyrinth; they hold the sugar refinery at Souchez, where 3,000 Germans have been killed.

June 6—French capture two-thirds of a mile of trenches in a new zone of activity, near Tracy-le-Mont, north of the Aisne; they take more of Neuville-St. Vaast; they capture more trenches in the labyrinth, of which they now hold two-thirds; they gain ground at Souchez; Germans repulse French attacks on the eastern slopes of Lorette.

June 7—French make further gains at Neuville-St. Vaast, and in the labyrinth; near Hebuterne, east of Doullers, two lines of German trenches are carried by the French; French repulse a fierce attack at Tracy-le-Mont, retaining their recent gain; at Vauquois, in Champagne, the French spray flaming liquid on the German trenches, "by way of reprisal," their statement says.

June 8—French advance on a three-quarters of a mile front south of Arras, near Hebuterne, taking two lines of trenches; French make slight gains at Lorette, Neuville-St. Vaast, and in the labyrinth.

June 9—French make gains at Neuville-St. Vaast, in the labyrinth, at Hebuterne, and in the Forest of Le Pretre.

June 10—French hold substantially all their recent gains; artillery fighting is in progress north of Arras and on the heights of the Meuse; Germans take French trenches near Souvain and Les Mesnil, west of the Argonne.

June 11—French are organizing the positions recently won from the Germans north and south of Arras; in the Neuville-St. Vaast positions the French find 800,000 cartridges, three field and fifteen machine guns.

June 12—Germans regain some of the ground they lost at Ecurie, north of Arras; Germans repulse attacks northeast of Ypres, east of Lorette Heights, and in the Souchez district.

June 13—French take a strongly fortified ridge near Souchez and three trenches near Hebuterne; Germans bombard Soissons and the military works around Luneville.

June 14—Germans regain some of the trenches at Souchez recently lost; Germans repulse heavy French attacks on both sides of the Lorette Hills and on the Neuville-Rochincourt line.

June 15—Severe fighting continues north and south of Arras, both sides claiming successes.

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN.

May 23—A clash, regarded in Rome as being the first skirmish of the war, occurs between Italian and Austrian troops at Forcellini di Montozzo, in the pass between Pont di Legno and Pejo; an Austrian patrol crosses the frontier, but is driven back over the border by Italian Alpine Chasseurs; Lieut. Gen. Cadorna, Chief of the Italian General Staff, starts for the front.

May 24—Austrian artillery shells Italian outposts on the Adige in front of Rivoli; there are clashes at other points, including a skirmish of border forces in the Isonzo Valley on the eastern frontier; a general forward movement by the Italians begins; Austrians are massing for defense.

May 25—Italians are advancing on a 67-mile front, their line having as extreme points Caporetto on the north and the Gulf of Trieste on the south; in three lines they sweep across the frontier for four miles; Italians occupy Caporetto, the heights between the Idria and Isonzo Rivers, Cormons, Corvignano, and Terzo; Austrians withdraw, destroying bridges and burning houses.

May 26.—Italians occupy Austrian territory all along the frontier from Switzerland to the Adriatic; Italians have seized various towns in the Trentino and forced their way through mountain passes; King Victor Emmanuel has assumed supreme command of the Italian army and navy, and has gone to the front.

May 27—Italian armies make rapid progress in the invasion of Austria, part of the forces having crossed the Isonzo River; another force, which penetrated further north in the Crownland of Goritz and Gradisca, has repaired the railroad beyond Cormons and is marching on Goritz, the capital; sharp fighting has occurred on the Tyrol-Trentino border, where the Austrians are being driven back in advance guard engagements; a battle is raging around Ploken and also west of the Praedil Pass in Austria.

[Transcriber's Note: Text missing from original.] tinues in Austrian territory, the Austrians not making any determined resistance; they are laying waste large areas as they retreat; in the Provinces of Trentino and Friuli the Italians are pushing forward fast; the Austrians fall back in the direction of Trent; Italians are occupying the heights of Monte Baldo, overlooking the Valley of the Adige and commanding the railway from Verona to Trent; Italians have crossed the Venetian Alps, and among the lower spurs of the Dolomites are in touch with the left wing of the Austrian force thrown forward for the defense of Trent; in Carinthia the Italians have taken three passes and fourteen villages.

May 29—A large Italian army is trying to cross the Isonzo River; bayonet fighting is in progress south of Goritz, the Austrians slowly falling back; Italian forces are at Gradisca, eighteen miles from Trieste; Austrians repulse Italians at Caporetto and near Plava; Italians are penetrating from Tonale Pass into the Virmiglio Valley, with an objective north of Trent, in an attempt to place that city between two Italian armies; Italians capture the town of Storo and are bombarding Riva; the headquarters of the Austrian commander, Field Marshal Baron von Hoetzendorf, are established at Trent.

May 30—Italian advance in Friuli encounters strong opposition at the Isonzo defenses, where progress is also being impeded because the river is swollen; Italian artillery destroys the fort of Luserna, on the Asiago plateau; in Cadore the Italians take several positions; a battle along the Adige River has been in progress, the Italians taking the village of Pilcante; artillery duels are in progress on the frontier in Tyrol and Trentino; Austrians repulse Italians at Cortina.

May 31—The Italian invasion of the Province of Trent is progressing from the south along the Adige and Chiese Rivers, from the west across the Tonale Pass, and from the east by way of the Lavaronne Plateau; the Italian attack is continuing all along the zigzag frontier, up to the highest point north, where they have occupied the Ampezzo Valley, together with the town of Cortina; Italians now are in possession of Monte Baldo, which dominates Lake Garda; to the east of Caporetto the Italians make a vain attempt to climb the slopes of the Kern; a great Austrian army is being massed in Tyrol.

June 1—Thirty-seven villages surrounding Cortina in the Ampazzo Valley are in Italian hands; the whole high plateau of Lavarone is in the hands of the Italian force advancing into the Trentino from the east.

June 2—In Friule the Italians are now established firmly on the Monte Nero ridge across the Isonzo River; on the Carnia front an artillery duel is in progress; to check Italians who are advancing from the border northeast of Trent, Austrians are massing troops behind Monte Croce Pass.

June 3—Italians repulse Austrian attempts to dislodge them from the Monte Nero ridge; Austrians repulse Italians at several points on the Tyrolian and Carinthian frontiers.

June 4—It is officially announced that Italian mobilization is complete: in the operations against Rovereto, the Italians occupy Mattassone and Val Morbia in the Val Arsa; Italian artillery silences the forts of Luserna and Spitzverle; on the middle Isonzo fierce fighting is in progress; Italians hold the summit and slopes of Monterno.

June 5—A battle is raging on the western bank of the Isonzo River, in front of Tolmino, the key to the railway and main highway to Trieste; Italians are making steady though slow progress in Southern Tyrol.

June 6—Austrians are making a desperate defense at Tolmino; Italians fail in an attempt to cross the Isonzo River near Sagrado; viewing the situation as a whole, the Italians are making progress along a 150-mile front, smashing Austrian defenses at many points with artillery fire.

June 7—Desperate fighting continues for Tolmino; Italians are making a general advance across the Isonzo River from Caporetto to the sea, a distance of forty miles; Austrians recapture Freikofel.

June 8—Fierce fighting is in progress at the Isonzo River; severe fighting also is going on in the Friulian sector.

June 9—Italians take Monfalcone, sixteen miles northwest of Trieste; a fierce artillery duel is in progress at Tolmino; fighting continues at the Isonzo River.

June 10—Italians are in full possession of Monfalcone; Italians occupy Podestagno, north of Cortina; fighting continues along the Isonzo.

June 11—Italians take Ploeken, imperiling communications to Laibach; fierce fighting is in progress for Goritz, Austrians still holding the city; fighting continues along the Isonzo.

June 12—Italians push their advance almost to Rovereto thirteen miles southwest of Trent, and to Mori, eighteen miles southwest of Trent; Italians are advancing from Monfalcone toward Trieste; at points on the Carinthian frontier Austrians repulse Italians.

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