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New York Times Current History; The European War, Vol 2, No. 4, July, 1915 - April-September, 1915
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The English position is at present desperate.

The inability to land heavy artillery was at first compensated for by the protection given by the guns of the fleet, but the withdrawal of the ships from Ari Burnu leaves the shore forces resting almost on the water's edge without means of meeting attacks.

Heavy Turkish batteries are mounted on the surrounding heights.

These statements are made after a week spent in the Turkish field under the first personal pass issued to a newspaper correspondent by Field Marshal Liman von Sanders, the Commander in Chief of the Turkish Army.

The Turks are fighting confidently, aided by a few German machine gun squads.

The farthest advance made by the English at Ari Burnu is 1,000 yards from shore; at Sedd-el-Bahr, about two miles.

Have seen Forts Chanak and Kalid Bahr, and find they are still intact.

The net results of the English attempt to force the Dardanelles are at present almost nil.

The general impression at Constantinople and Berlin is that the attack as at present conducted is a failure.

The bombardment of March 18 was ineffectual, owing to the inadequacy of the landing forces, and the failure of the Entente powers to embroil Bulgaria against Turkey.

* * * * *

[By The Associated Press.]

KRITHIA, Dardanelles, June 17, (via London, June 19.)—The allied troops who landed at Sedd-el-Bahr, on the Gallipoli Peninsula, hold about ten square miles of the extreme southern part of the peninsula, the occupancy of which is maintained with the greatest difficulties.

The ground held by the Allies consists principally of a small plateau to the north of Sedd-el-Bahr and two adjoining ridges to the northwest, between which the Turks are pushing advance trenches.

The Associated Press correspondent, who spent two days in the trenches, found the Turkish troops in excellent condition and spirits, in spite of the fact that the Allies were using every conceivable means to carry on the operations, including bombs thrown from catapults and from aeroplanes.

From the Turkish station of artillery fire control the effect of the Turkish fire upon the allied trenches could be observed today, and the shells were reaching the mark. The sanitary and supply services of the Turks are being carried on efficiently. The number of wounded at the hospital bases at the front was small, although the fighting during the night had been fairly severe.

During the daytime both sides are usually inactive, the Turks preferring night bayonet attacks. Many Turkish batteries are in position, but the nearness of the opposing trenches makes their work difficult, and for the most part they are directing their attention to the reserves of the Allies and to changing shifts which are exposed at certain points. The Turks, in this, have the support of their heavy batteries on the Asiatic side, which, since the retirement of the allied fleet, work without fear of being molested, bombarding chiefly the allied right wing, composed of French, home, and Colonial troops.

Weber Pasha, the German General commanding the south group, gave the correspondent every opportunity to visit the Sedd-el-Bahr district, placing no restrictions whatever upon his movements. The result was a thorough inspection of the ground. Weber Pasha made no comment on the situation himself beyond saying that "the failure of the Allies to consummate their plan of forcing the Dardanelles is too obvious for discussion."

Weber Pasha, who is a member of the German military mission which undertook the improvement of the Ottoman Army organization, is fully confident that the Turks will be able to meet the Gallipoli situation, and that the Allies will never advance against the Dardanelles forts.

It has been ascertained that only a few German officers are active in the south group. German privates are employed in special lines.

Krithia, once a thriving village of about 4,000 inhabitants, is probably the most ruined place in all Europe. The Allies left no house standing during their bombardment.



THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

[American Cartoon]

An Old Time Aeronaut



[American Cartoon]

A Parthian Brick



[American Cartoon]

The Benevolent Assassin



[American Cartoon]

The Black Flag



[American Cartoon]

A Statesman's Exit



[American Cartoon]

"My Heart Bleeds for Karlsruhe"



[German-American Cartoon]

The Sandwich Man



[English Cartoon]

The Two-handed Sword



[German Cartoon]

Wilson's Wrapping Paper



[English Cartoon]

A Haul of U-Boats



[German Cartoon]

In the Carpathians



[German Cartoon]

The Sphinx on the Bosporus



[English Cartoon]

Twice Bitten—Thrice Shy



Italy vs. Austria-Hungary

The Italian Invasion and Italo-Germanic Differences

Official reviews of the first month, ending June 23, of Italy's war with Austria-Hungary are still lacking.[4] On May 24 it was officially reported in London that Italy had given her adhesion to the agreement, already signed by the allied powers, not to conclude a separate peace. Active war operations were begun by Austria on the same day; bombs were dropped on Venice and five other Adriatic ports, shelled from air and some from sea. The attackers were driven off.

[Footnote 4: In an Associated Press dispatch from Rome (via Paris) on June 23 one of the chief Generals in the Italian War Office was reported to have summarized the first month of the campaign about as follows:

One month ago the Italians invaded Austrian territory, uprooted the yellow and black poles bearing the Austrian eagle, and occupied the enemy positions along a front of 500 miles. An Austrian squadron bombarded the Italian coast on the Adriatic, and Austrian aeroplanes dropped eleven bombs on Venice.

During this month the Italians overran the whole of Friuli. The capture of Tolmino and Goritz, the two Austrian strongholds, is considered imminent, which would open the way to Trieste; while in the Alpine region in the province of Trent they have conquered peaks and passes, from which the picked Austro-Hungarian troops have been unable to dislodge them.

Austrian activity has been chiefly displayed in bombarding the Italian Adriatic towns.

From Vienna (via London) on June 23 the following Austro-Hungarian official resume of the operations of the first month of war along the Italian frontier was issued:

During the first month of the war the Italians have gained no great success. Our troops in the southwest maintain their positions as in the beginning, on or near the frontier.

On the Isonzo front in the fortified frontier district from Flitsch to Malborgeth, on the Carinthian ridge, and on all the fronts of Tyrol, all enemy attempts at an advance have collapsed with heavy losses.]

The rapid advance of the Italian armies which invaded Austria on the east had by May 27 carried part of the forces across the Isonzo River to Monfalcone, sixteen miles northwest of Trieste. Another force penetrated further to the north in the Crownland of Goritz and Gradisca. On June 4 the censored news from Udine, Italy, reported that encounters with the enemy thus far had been merely outpost skirmishes, but had allowed Italy to occupy advantageous positions in Austrian territory. The first important battle of the Italian campaign, for the possession of Tolmino, was reported on June 7.

A general Italian advance took place on June 7 across the Isonzo River from Caporetto to the sea, a distance of about forty miles. On June 12 reports from the Trentino indicated an Italian advance on Rovereto in Tyrol, thirteen miles southwest of Trent, and upon Mori, near by. Monfalcone was taken by the Italians on June 10—the first serious blow against Trieste—as Monfalcone is a railway junction and its electrical works operate the light and power of Trieste. In the extreme north, on the threshold of the Carnic Alps, after three days' fighting it was reported on June 10 that the Italians had swept the Austrians from Monte Croce and possessed themselves of Freikofel. The Austrian city of Gradisca was reported taken on June 11, as indicated in an official statement signed by Lieut. Gen. Count Cadorna, Chief of Staff of the Italian Army. The defenses of Goritz were shelled by the Italian artillery on June 13, and on June 14 the Italian eastern army had pushed forward along the Gulf of Trieste toward the town of Nabresina, nine miles from Trieste.



The Italian advance was checked—but not until June 16, more than three weeks after the beginning of the war—by an elaborate system of intrenchments prepared by the Austrians along the Isonzo River. On June 17 the Italians in the Trentino had arrived at the town of Mori, where their forces were blocked by the fortifications between that town and Rovereto. On June 18 a dispatch of The Associated Press from Rome reported that the Austrians had then so strengthened their forces that they were taking the offensive both from Mori and Rovereto against the Italians, who were encamped at Brentanico at the foot of Mount Altissimo, at Serravale, situated in the Lagardina Valley, and also in the Arsa Valley. Tolmino, on Austria's battlefront to the north of Goritz, was being heavily fortified by the Austrians with a garrison of some 30,000 men, this place being considered indispensable to their operations as the key to the Isonzo Valley. On June 20, the fourth week of the war, was reported by General Cadorna as marking a brilliant victory at Plava. But on the following day reports from Rome indicated that the Italians were encountering strong and better-organized resistance from the Austrians. On June 22 dispatches from the Italian front to Berlin declared that serious reverses had been experienced by the Italians in their attempts to storm the Austro-Hungarian line along the Isonzo River.

Two things have puzzled the public: First, the status of Germany in regard to Italy declaring war against Austria-Hungary, arraying herself on the side of the Entente powers, and pledging herself, in turn, as each of them had done, not to make a separate peace with the enemy, and, second, the apparent weakness of the Austrian defensive in the Trentino and on the eastern frontier of Venetia.

Diplomatic relations between Rome and Berlin have been severed, but neither Chancellery has yet (June 23) found the other guilty of an aggression sufficiently grave to warrant a declaration of war. There is nothing astonishing in this situation. A similar situation obtained between Paris and Vienna and London and Vienna long after a state of war existed between Germany and Russia, France, and England.

The Italian plan of campaign apparently consists (1) in neutralizing the Trentino by capturing or "covering" her defenses and cutting her two lines of communication with Austria proper—the railway which runs south from Innsbruck and that which runs southwest from Vienna and joins the former at Franzensfeste, and (2) in a movement in force from the eastern frontier, with Trieste captured or "covered" on the right flank, in the direction of the Austrian fortress of Klagenfurt and Vienna, only 170 miles northeast from the present base of operations—a distance equal to that from New York City to Cape Cod.

The initial weakness of the Austrian defensive, which will doubtless be strengthened as troops can be spared from the seat of war in Galicia, is due to the fact that the invaded regions are normally defended by the Fourteenth and Third Army Corps, which were, in August, sent with two reserve corps to defend the Austrian line in Galicia. To fill the casualties in these corps the drain on the population has been great, so that when Italy began her invasion the defenses of the country were chiefly in the hands of the hastily mobilized youths below the military age of 19 and men above the military age of 42.

During the last six months, when Vienna gradually came to realize that war with Italy was inevitable, the Austro-Hungarian military authorities enrolled a new army of men who had already seen military service, but, for various reasons, had not been availed of in the present war. They were men of an unusually high mental and physical standard and had received additional training under German officers. Their ages were from 35 to 40, and they numbered from 700,000 to 800,000. On the desire of the German War Office this new army, which should have been sent to the Italian frontiers, was diverted to Galicia toward the last of April, and since then has been the backbone of the Teutonic drive against Russia in that region.

Below are given a sketch of the Alpine frontier by G.H. Perris, appearing in The London Chronicle of May 29; Colonel Murray's article on Italy's armed strength, and the speeches of mutual defiance uttered by the German Imperial Chancellor in the Reichstag on May 28 and the Italian Premier at the Capitol in Rome on June 2.



The Armed Strength of Italy

By Colonel A.M. Murray, C.B.

The article presented below originally appeared in The London Daily News of May 21, 1915.

The organization of the military forces of Italy is based upon the law of organization of 1887 and the recruiting law of 1888. Modifications have been made in these laws from time to time in regard to the strength of the annual contingent trained with the colors and the duration of the periods of training, but the original laws have not been altered in principle, and have now had time to completely materialize.

Every man in Italy is liable to military service for a period of nineteen years from the age of 20 to 39. All young men on reaching the age of 20, if passed medically fit for military service, are divided into three categories—first, those who are taken by lot for color service; second, those for whom there is no room with the colors, and, third, those who are exempted from military service for family reasons specified by law. Men placed in the first category serve for two years with the colors, after which they go to the active army reserve for six years. Men in the second category are sent at once into the active army reserve for the period of eight years, after which both they and the men in the first category are passed into the mobile militia reserve for four years, and subsequently into the territorial militia for seven years, making nineteen years altogether. The men in the third category pass all their nineteen years' obligatory period of military service in the territorial militia, receiving no training whatever till they are called up to their depots when mobilization is ordered. The following table shows the periods of service of the men according to the categories in which they are placed by the recruiting authorities. The figures are years:

ACTIVE ARMY. RESERVE ARMY.

With In the the Mobile Territorial Tot. Categories. Colors. Reserve. Militia. Militia. Yrs.

First 2 6 4 7 19 Second — 8 4 7 19 Third — — — 19 19

In the above table the mobile militia corresponds to the German Landwehr, and the territorial militia to the Landsturm.

After deducting emigrants, men put back for the following year, those who are medically unfit, and one-year volunteers, the average number of recruits placed each year in the first category is approximately 150,000, in the second category 36,000, and in the third category 28,000. All men in the first category are fully trained, while those in the second category, who correspond to the German Ersatz Reserve, are only partially trained, being called up at the discretion of the War Minister for one or more periods of training not exceeding twelve months altogether during their eight years' service.

Last year's returns, which were published in the Italian press, gave the approximate war strength of the army as under:

Officers 41,692

Active army (with colors) 289,910

Reserve (including men of first and second categories) 638,979

Mobile militia 299,596

Territorial militia 1,889,659 Total war strength 3,159,836

According to a calculation, which need not be given in detail here, the above number of total men available includes upward of 1,200,000 fully trained soldiers, who have been through the ranks, with perhaps another 800,000 partially trained men of the second category, the remaining million being completely untrained men, who have passed all their nineteen years of obligatory service in the third category.

The organization for putting the above numbers of men into the field is as follows: The fully trained men are organized in four armies, each army consisting of three corps, one cavalry division, and a number of troops for the lines of communication. The twelve corps are recruited and organized on a territorial basis, each corps having its allotted area, as shown in the sketch, which also indicates the locality of corps headquarters. The Italian army corps, which is larger than that in other European armies, is composed of two active army divisions, with thirty guns each, one mobile militia division, brought up to strength from the territorial militia, one regiment of Bersaglieri, or light infantry, one cavalry regiment, one field artillery regiment of six batteries, (corps artillery,) and other technical and administrative units. The strength of the corps amounts to 50,000 men, with 8,400 horses and 126 guns, and this gives each of the four armies a strength of 150,000 men, 25,200 horses, and 378 guns, with the addition of a cavalry division of 4,200 sabres. The first line Italian army, therefore, which can be put into the field seven days after mobilization is ordered amounts to 600,000 men, 100,800 horses, 1,512 guns, and 16,200 sabres. But these cadres only absorb half the fully trained men called out on mobilization; duplicate corps will consequently be formed to take the place of the twelve first-line corps as soon as they have been dispatched to their concentration rendezvous. It is believed that sufficient guns have now been provided for these twelve duplicate corps, but it is unlikely that more than two cavalry divisions could be formed in addition to the four divisions with the first-line armies. These duplicate corps would be ready to take the field three or four weeks after the concentration of the first twelve corps. The above calculations show that within a few weeks after the declaration of war Italy can place in the field a force of 1,200,000 men, (24 corps,) and would still have 1,800,000 men of fighting age left at the depots after the field armies had been dispatched to the front.



The infantry are armed with the Mannlicher (1891) rifle, the field artillery with the 75-millimeter quick-firing Krupp gun, (1906,) and the mountain batteries, of which there are twenty-four, with a new 65-millimeter (2.56-inch) quick-firing gun of Italian construction. The heavy artillery is armed with a 149-millimeter field howitzer, also of Italian construction.

The organization of the Italian Army and the quality of the troops composing it were both tested in the Tripoli campaign, (1911-12,) and all military judges agree that the results prove the army to have reached a high standard of efficiency. The mobilization was only partial, but it was well carried out, and between October and December, 1911, 90,000 men, with 12,000 horses, were transported to Tripoli and Benghasi without a single hitch. Italian officers are well educated, and the men are brave and disciplined. Unlike the Austro-Hungarian Army, which is composed of men split into a variety of racial sections, the Italian Army is absolutely homogeneous, and the troops will enter the European struggle with the moral consciousness that they are fighting, not with aggressive intentions, but for the principle of nationality, which is the keynote to that marvelous progress which Italy has made since she became a nation in 1860.

The Italian Navy has ten up-to-date battleships in commission, all armed with twelve-inch guns, six of these being pre-dreadnoughts and four quite recently built dreadnoughts. These four latter ships carry a more powerful primary armament than the battleships of any other European country, the Dante Alighieri, the first of the type built, carrying twelve and the Conte di Cavour, Leonardo-da-Vinci, and Giulio Cesare thirteen twelve-inch guns mounted on the triple-turret system. Two more ships of the same class—the Caio Duilio and Andrea Dorea—are due to be commissioned this Autumn, and their completion will doubtless now be accelerated. Then there are four more battleships under construction, known as the Dandolo class—the Dandolo, Morosini, Mazzini, and Mameli—two of which are due to be launched in 1916 and two others in 1917. When completed these ships will be equal in gun power and speed to the ships of the Queen Elizabeth class, for they will carry eight fifteen-inch guns paired in four turrets—the triple-turret system having been abandoned—twenty six-inch and twenty-two fourteen-pr. guns, their speed being 25 knots. Besides these ten, or practically twelve, completed battleships, Italy has ten armored cruisers in commission and three twenty-eight knot light cruisers, but no fastgoing battle cruisers corresponding to those in the British and German Navies. She has also twenty-seven completed destroyers and thirteen thirty-two knot destroyers laid down, along with fifty-one torpedo boats and sixteen submarines, with four others building. With this fleet, which is half as strong again as the Austrian fleet, Italy can secure complete control of the Adriatic Sea and lock up the Austrian ships in Pola.



The Alpine Frontier

By G.H. Perris.

[This article appeared originally in The London Daily Chronicle of May 29, 1915.]

We have all learned a good deal of French, Russian, and Austrian geography in the last ten months; and, in the same sad school, we shall now become better acquainted with the region of mountain and plain which, through and for 140 miles east of Lake Garda, is the Austro-Italian borderland, and with the northeastern coast of the Adriatic, where there will be important side issues. There is this great difference, among others, between the Adriatic and the Alpine military problems: On the one side, the Germanic powers can now only assume the defensive; on the other, they can, and probably will, attempt the invasion of provinces dear not only to Italians, for their homes and a splendid galaxy of historic associations, but to cultivated minds throughout the world for treasures of art abounding even in the humblest towns and villages.

The irregularity of this northern frontier is the product of an unhappy history; it does not follow the line of the mountain summits or any other natural feature, and still less is it a limit marked by race or language. A glance at the map shows its salient characteristic—the piece of the Austrian Tyrol, from forty to sixty miles wide, which is thrust southward toward the great plain of Lombardy and Venetia, and toward the four provincial capitals, Brescia, Verona, Vicenza, and Belluno. The Trentino—as it is called, after the very ancient city of Trent, once the chief town of Tyrol, now a market centre dignified by many towers and poverty-stricken palaces and castles—is thoroughly Italian; but it still gathers much of its importance, as it has done ever since Roman times, from the fact that the best and oldest road from Germany and West Austria over the Alps runs through it to Verona. For nearly half a century one of the grandest of mountain railways has followed this olden track of conquest and pilgrimage, from Innsbruck over the Brenner Pass, through Botzen, and down the Adige Valley. More recently a branch line has been built which runs from Trent southeastward to Padua and Venice.

It is not only the Italian resistance to Austrian aggression and tyranny that has made this doorway into the lowlands about the Po a vast battlefield. From the Middle Ages onward France and Austria constantly fought out their quarrels here. In 1796, Napoleon, after routing Marshal Wurmser at Lonato and Castiglione, small towns to the south of the Lake of Garda, drove him up the Adige Valley to Trent, and then round the side track already named, the Brenta Valley, by Bassano back to Mantua. In 1848 the Piedmontese Army advanced upon the famous quadrilateral of fortresses, then Austrian, covering the entry—Mantua and Peschiera on the Mincio, Verona and Legnago on the Adige. Charles Albert was far from being another Napoleon; and the three days' battle of Custoza, when four weary and ill-found Italian brigades held out against Radetzky's five army corps, did not serve to turn the tide of the national fortunes. That year saw the first appearance of Garibaldi as a military leader and the accession of the present Austrian Emperor; and it is strange now to recall that in the war of 1859, when Lombardy was liberated by the French and Sardinian Armies, this same Francis Joseph was actually in command of the Austrian forces. The battle of Solferino, fought on a front of five leagues, along the hills to the south of Lake Garda, was a terrible butchery, even by the worst of modern standards, for in twelve hours 25,000 of the 300,000 combatants were killed or wounded. In the war of 1866 Garibaldi took a body of volunteers up the Adige; but the treaty which gave Venetia to the new Kingdom of Italy left the Trentino still to be recovered.

The Adige and Brenta Valley roads to Trent and Botzen are, then, clearly marked out for Italian effort in the present juncture; and if the Austrians have the advantage of innumerable defensive positions on the mountain heights, they have the disadvantage of very long and frail lines of supply and reinforcement. It may be supposed that the Alpine regiments, which are in some ways the flower of the Italian Army, will also attempt the lesser approaches to Tyrol from the west, by the Val di Sole and the Valtelline, and from the east from Belluno and Pieve. The Brenner railway, with its twenty-two tunnels and sixty large bridges, is peculiarly vulnerable. With many cities and good railways behind them, and a popular welcome in front, the Italian troops, on the other hand, will face the hill roads, now generally free from snow, with confidence.

Very different are the natural conditions on the only other part of the frontier where the hostile forces can well come to grips. The Alps gradually fall and break up into separate ridges as we pass east; and beyond Udine there is a flat gap, 50 miles wide, beyond which lies Trieste, with its fine harbor and predominantly Italian population. Further north, where the main line for Vienna passes the border at Pontebba, to penetrate the double barrier of the Carinthian and Styrian Alps, there can be little temptation to adventure on either side. But in the lowlands of Friuli a beginning has been made, the advance at one point, Caporetto, reaching as far as the River Isonzo, while Terzo, Cormons, and other small places have been occupied. If there is to be any large-scale warfare on the Alpine frontier, it must apparently occur either in this gap or in and about the Adige Valley, on the way to Trent.



"Italy's Violation of Faith"

By Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, German Imperial Chancellor.

[Speech in the Reichstag, May 28, 1915.]

When I spoke eight days ago there was still a glimpse of hope that Italy's participation in the war could be avoided. That hope proved fallacious. German feeling strove against the belief in the possibility of such a change. Italy has now inscribed in the book of the world's history, in letters of blood which will never fade, her violation of faith.

I believe Machiavelli once said that a war which is necessary is also just. Viewed from this sober, practical, political standpoint, which leaves out of account all moral considerations, has this war been necessary? Is it not, indeed, directly mad? [Cheers.] Nobody threatened Italy; neither Austria-Hungary nor Germany. Whether the Triple Entente was content with blandishments alone history will show later. [Cheers.] Without a drop of blood flowing, and without the life of a single Italian being endangered, Italy could have secured the long list of concessions which I recently read to the House—territory in Tyrol and on the Isonzo as far as the Italian speech is heard, satisfaction of the national aspirations in Trieste, a free hand in Albania, and the valuable port of Valona.

Why have they not taken it? Do they, perhaps, wish to conquer the German Tyrol? Hands off! [Prolonged cheers.] Did Italy wish to provoke Germany, to whom she owes so much in her upward growth of a great power, and from whom she is not separated by any conflict of interests? We left Rome in no doubt that an Italian attack on Austro-Hungarian troops would also strike the German troops. [Cheers.] Why did Rome refuse so light-heartedly the proposals of Vienna? The Italian manifesto of war, which conceals an uneasy conscience behind vain phrases, does not give us any explanation. They were too shy, perhaps, to say openly what was spread abroad as a pretext by the press and by gossip in the lobbies of the Chamber, namely, that Austria's offer came too late and could not be trusted.

What are the facts? Italian statesmen have no right to measure the trustworthiness of other nations in the same proportion as they measured their own loyalty to a treaty. [Loud cheers.] Germany, by her word, guaranteed that the concessions would be carried through. There was no occasion for distrust. Why too late? On May 4 the Trentino was the same territory as it was in February, and a whole series of concessions had been added to the Trentino of which nobody had thought in the Winter.

It was, perhaps, too late for this reason, that while the Triple Alliance, the existence of which the King and the Government had expressly acknowledged after the outbreak of war, was still alive, Italian statesmen had long before engaged themselves so deeply with the Triple Entente that they could not disentangle themselves. There were indications of fluctuations in the Rome Cabinet as far back as December. To have two irons in the fire is always useful. Before this Italy had shown her predilection for extra dances. [Cheers and laughter.] But this is no ballroom. This is a bloody battlefield upon which Germany and Austria-Hungary are fighting for their lives against a world of enemies. The statesmen of Rome have played against their own people the same game as they played against us.

It is true that the Italian-speaking territory on the northern frontier has always been the dream and the desire of every Italian, but the great majority of the Italian people, as well as the majority in Parliament, did not want to know anything of war. According to the observation of the best judge of the situation in Italy, in the first days of May four-fifths of the Senate and two-thirds of the Chamber were against war, and in that majority were the most responsible and important statesmen. But common sense had no say. The mob alone ruled. Under the kindly disposed toleration and with the assistance of the leading statesmen of a Cabinet fed with the gold of the Triple Entente, the mob, under the guidance of unscrupulous war instigators, was roused to a frenzy of blood which threatened the King with revolution and all moderate men with murder if they did not join in the war delirium.

The Italian people were intentionally kept in the dark with regard to the course of the Austrian negotiations and the extent of the Austrian concessions, and so it came about that after the resignation of the Salandra Cabinet nobody could be found who had the courage to undertake the formation of a new Cabinet, and that in the decisive debate no member of the Constitutional Party in the Senate or Chamber even attempted to estimate the value of the far-reaching Austrian concessions. In the frenzy of war honest politicians grew dumb, but when, as the result of military events, (as we hope and desire,) the Italian people become sober again it will recognize how frivolously it was instigated to take part in this world war.

We did everything possible to avoid the alienation of Italy from the Triple Alliance. The ungrateful role fell to us of requiring from our loyal ally, Austria, with whose armies our troops share daily wounds, death, and victory, the purchase of the loyalty of the third party to the alliance by the cession of old-inherited territory. That Austria-Hungary went to the utmost limit possible is known. Prince Buelow, who again entered into the active service of the empire, tried by every means, his diplomatic ability, his most thorough knowledge of the Italian situation and of Italian personages, to come to an understanding. Though his work has been in vain the entire people are grateful to him. Also this storm we shall endure. From month to month we grow more intimate with our ally. From the Pilitza to the Bukowina we tenaciously withstood with our Austro-Hungarian comrades for months the gigantic superiority of the enemy. Then we victoriously advanced.

So our new enemies will perish through the spirit of loyalty and the friendship and bravery of the central powers. In this war Turkey is celebrating a brilliant regeneration. The whole German people follow with enthusiasm the different phases of the obstinate, victorious resistance with which the loyal Turkish Army and fleet repulse the attacks of their enemies with heavy blows. Against the living wall of our warriors in the west our enemies up till now have vainly stormed. If in some places fighting fluctuates, if here or there a trench or a village is lost or won, the great attempt of our adversaries to break through, which they announced five months ago, did not succeed, and will not succeed. They will perish through the heroic bravery of our soldiers.

Up till now our enemies have summoned in vain against us all the forces of the world and a gigantic coalition of brave soldiers. We will not despise our enemies, as our adversaries like to do. At the moment when the mob in English towns is dancing around the stake at which the property of defenseless Germans is burning, the English Government dared to publish a document, with the evidence of unnamed witnesses, on the alleged cruelties in Belgium, which are of so monstrous a character that only mad brains could believe them. But while the English press does not permit itself to be deprived of news, the terror of the censorship reigns in Paris. No casualty lists appear, and no German or Austrian communiques may be printed. Severely wounded invalids are kept away from their relations, and real fear of the truth appears to be the motive of the Government.

Thus it comes about, according to trustworthy observation, that there is no knowledge of the heavy defeats which the Russians have sustained, and the belief continues in the Russian "steam-roller" advancing on Berlin, which is "perishing from starvation and misery," and confidence exists in the great offensive in the west, which for months has not progressed. If the Governments of hostile States believe that by the deception of the people and by unchaining blind hatred they can shift the blame for the crime of this war and postpone the day of awakening, we, relying on our good conscience, a just cause, and a victorious sword, will not allow ourselves to be forced by a hair's breadth from the path which we have always recognized as right. Amid this confusion of minds on the other side, the German people goes on its own way, calm and sure.

Not in hatred do we wage this war, but in anger—[loud cheers]—in holy anger. [Renewed cheers from all parts of the House.] The greater the danger we have to confront, surrounded on all sides by enemies, the more deeply does the love of home grip our hearts, the more must we care for our children and grandchildren, and the more must we endure until we have conquered and have secured every possible real guarantee and assurance that no enemy alone or combined will dare again a trial of arms. [Loud cheers.] The more wildly the storm rages around us the more firmly must we build our own house. For this consciousness of united strength, unshaken courage, and boundless devotion, which inspire the whole people, and for the loyal co-operation which you, gentlemen, from the first day have given to the Fatherland, I bring you, as the representatives of the entire people, the warm thanks of the Emperor.

In the mutual confidence that we are all united we will conquer, despite a world of enemies. [Loud and prolonged applause.]



Why Italy Went to War

By Signor Salandra, Italian Premier

[Speech in the Roman Capitol on June 2, 1915.]

I address myself to Italy and to the civilized world in order to show not by violent words, [cheers,] but by exact facts and documents, how the fury of our enemies has vainly attempted to diminish the high moral and political dignity of the cause which our arms will make prevail. I shall speak with the calm of which the King of Italy has given a noble example, [loud cheers, and shouts of "Long live the King!"] when he called his land and sea forces to arms. I shall speak with the respect due to my position and to the place in which I speak. I can afford to ignore the insults written in Imperial, Royal, and Archducal proclamations. Since I speak from the Capitol, and represent in this solemn hour the people and the Government of Italy, I, a modest citizen, feel that I am far nobler than the head of the house of the Habsburgs. [Loud cheers.]

The commonplace statesmen who, in rash frivolity of mind and mistaken in all their calculations, set fire last July to the whole of Europe and even to their own hearths and homes, have now noticed their fresh colossal mistake, and in the Parliaments of Budapest and Berlin have poured forth brutal invective of Italy and her Government with the obvious design of securing the forgiveness of their fellow-citizens and intoxicating them with cruel visions of hatred and blood. ["Bravo!"] The German Chancellor said he was imbued not with hatred, but with anger, and he spoke the truth, because he reasoned badly, as is usually the case in fits of rage. ["Hear, hear!" and laughter.] I could not, even if I chose, imitate their language. An atavistic throwback to primitive barbarism is more difficult for us who have twenty centuries behind us more than they have. ["Hear, hear!"]

The fundamental thesis of the statesmen of Central Europe is to be found in the words "treason and surprise on the part of Italy toward her faithful allies." It would be easy to ask if he has any right to speak of alliance and respect for treaties who, representing with infinitely less genius, but with equal moral indifference, the tradition of Frederick the Great and Bismarck proclaimed that necessity knows no law, and consented to his country trampling under foot and burying at the bottom of the ocean all the documents and all the customs of civilization and international law. [Cheers.] But that would be too easy an argument. Let us examine, on the contrary, positively and calmly, if our former allies are entitled to say that they were betrayed and surprised by us.

Our aspirations had long been known, as was also our judgment on the act of criminal madness by which they shook the world and robbed the alliance itself of its closest raison d'etre. The Green Book prepared by Baron Sonnino, with whom it is the pride of my life to stand united in entire harmony in this solemn hour after thirty years of friendship—[prolonged cheers and shouts of "Long live Sonnino!"]—shows the long, difficult, and useless negotiations that took place between December and May. But it is not true, as has been asserted without a shadow of foundation, that the Ministry reconstituted last November made a change in the direction of our international policy. The Italian Government, whose policy has never changed, severely condemned, at the very moment when it learned of it, the aggression of Austria against Serbia, and foresaw the consequences of that aggression, consequences which had not been foreseen by those who had premeditated the stroke with such lack of conscience.



As proof of this statement, Signor Salandra read the following telegram sent by the Marquis di San Giuliano to the Duke of Avarna (Italian Minister in Vienna) on July 25 last:

"Salandra, von Flotow, and myself have had a long conversation. Salandra and I emphatically pointed out to von Flotow that Austria had no right, according to the spirit of the treaty of the Triple Alliance, to make a demarche like that made in Belgrade without coming to an agreement beforehand with her allies."

In effect, [continued Signor Salandra,] Austria, in consequence of the terms in which her note was couched, and in consequence of the things demanded, which, while of little effect against the Pan-Serbian danger, were profoundly offensive to Serbia, and indirectly so to Russia, had clearly shown that she wished to provoke war. Hence we declared to von Flotow that, in consequence of this procedure on the part of Austria and in consequence of the defensive and conservative character of the Triple Alliance Treaty, Italy was under no obligation to assist Austria if, as the result of this demarche, she found herself at war with Russia, because any European war would in such an event be the consequence of the act of provocation and aggression committed by Austria.

The Italian Government on July 27 and 28 emphasized in clear and unmistakable language to Berlin and Vienna the question of the cession of the Italian provinces subject to Austria, and we declared that if we did not obtain adequate compensation the Triple Alliance would have been irreparably broken. [Loud and prolonged cheers.] Impartial history will say that Austria, having found Italy in July, 1913, and in October, 1913, hostile to her intentions of aggression against Serbia, attempted last Summer, in agreement with Germany, the method of surprise and the fait accompli.

The horrible crime of Serajevo was exploited as a pretext a month after it happened—this was proved by the refusal of Austria to accept the very extensive offers of Serbia—nor at the moment of the general conflagration would Austria have been satisfied with the unconditional acceptance of the ultimatum. Count Berchtold on July 31 declared to the Duke of Avarna that, if there had been a possibility of mediation being exercised, it could not have interrupted hostilities, which had already begun with Serbia. This was the mediation for which Great Britain and Italy were working. In any case, Count Berchtold was not disposed to accept mediation tending to weaken the conditions indicated in the Austrian note, which, naturally, would have been increased at the end of the war.

If, moreover, Serbia had decided meanwhile to accept the aforementioned note in its entirety, declaring herself ready to agree to the conditions imposed on her, that would not have persuaded Austria to cease hostilities. It is not true, as Count Tisza declared, that Austria did not undertake to make territorial acquisitions to the detriment of Serbia, who, moreover, by accepting all the conditions imposed upon her, would have become a subject State. The Austrian Ambassador, Herr Merey von Kapos-Mere, on July 30, stated to the Marquis di San Giuliano that Austria could not make a binding declaration on this subject, because she could not foresee whether, during the war, she might not be obliged, against her will, to keep Serbian territory. [Sensation.]

On July 29 Count Berchtold stated to the Duke of Avarna that he was not inclined to enter into any engagement concerning the eventual conduct of Austria in the case of a conflict with Serbia.

Where is, then, the treason, the iniquity, the surprise, if, after nine months of vain efforts to reach an honorable understanding which recognized in equitable measure our rights and our liberties, we resumed liberty of action? The truth is that Austria and Germany believed until the last days that they had to deal with an Italy weak, blustering, but not acting, capable of trying blackmail, but not enforcing by arms her good right, with an Italy which could be paralyzed by spending a few millions, and which by dealings which she could not avow was placing herself between the country and the Government. [Very loud cheers.]

I will not deny the benefits of the alliance; benefits, however, not one-sided, but accruing to all the contracting parties, and perhaps not more to us than to the others. The continued suspicions and the aggressive intentions of Austria against Italy are notorious and are authentically proved. The Chief of the General Staff, Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf, always maintained that war against Italy was inevitable, either on the question of the irredentist provinces or from jealousy, that Italy intended to aggrandize herself as soon as she was prepared, and meanwhile opposed everything that Austria wished to undertake in the Balkans, and consequently it was necessary to humiliate her in order that Austria might have her hands free, and he deplored that Italy had not been attacked in 1907. Even the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs recognized that in the military party the opinion was prevalent that Italy must be suppressed by war because from the Kingdom of Italy came the attractive force of the Italian provinces of the empire, and consequently by a victory over the kingdom and its political annihilation all hope for the irredentists would cease.



We see now on the basis of documents how our allies aided us in the Lybian undertaking. The operations brilliantly begun by the Duke of the Abruzzi against the Turkish torpedo boats encountered at Preveza were stopped by Austria in a sudden and absolute manner. Count Aehrenthal on Oct. 1 informed our Ambassador at Vienna that our operations had made a painful impression upon him and that he could not allow them to be continued. It was urgently necessary, he said, to put an end to them and to give orders to prevent them from being renewed, either in Adriatic or in Ionian waters. The following day the German Ambassador at Vienna, in a still more threatening manner, confidentially informed our Ambassador that Count Aehrenthal had requested him to telegraph to his Government to give the Italian Government to understand that if it continued its naval operations in the Adriatic and in the Ionian Seas it would have to deal directly with Austria-Hungary. [Murmurs.]

And it was not only in the Adriatic and in the Ionian Seas that Austria paralyzed our actions. On Nov. 5 Count Aehrenthal informed the Duke of Avarna that he had learned that Italian warships had been reported off Saloniki, where they had used electric searchlights—[laughter]—and declared that our action on the Ottoman coasts of European Turkey, as well as on the Aegean Islands, could not have been allowed either by Austria-Hungary or by Germany, because it was contrary to the Triple Alliance Treaty.

In March, 1912, Count Berchtold, who had in the meantime succeeded Count Aehrenthal, declared to the German Ambassador in Vienna that, in regard to our operations against the coasts of European Turkey and the Aegean Islands, he adhered to the point of view of Count Aehrenthal, according to which these operations were considered by the Austro-Hungarian Government contrary to the engagement entered into by us by Article VII. of the Triple Alliance Treaty. As for our operations against the Dardanelles, he considered it opposed, first, to the promise made by us not to proceed to any act which might endanger the status quo in the Balkans, and, secondly, to the spirit of the same treaty, which was based on the maintenance of the status quo.

Afterward, when our squadron at the entrance to the Dardanelles was bombarded by Fort Kumkalessi and replied, damaging that fort, Count Berchtold complained of what had happened, considering it contrary to the promises we had made, and declared that if the Italian Government desired to resume its liberty of action, the Austro-Hungarian Government could have done the same. [Murmurs.] He added that he could not have allowed us to undertake in the future similar operations or operations in any way opposed to this point of view. In the same way our projected occupation of Chios was prevented. It is superfluous to remark how many lives of Italian soldiers and how many millions were sacrificed through the persistent vetoing of our actions against Turkey, who knew that she was protected by our allies against all attacks on her vital parts. [Cheers.]

We were bitterly reproached for not having accepted the offers made toward the end of May, but were these offers made in good faith? [Laughter and cheers.] Certain documents indicate that they were not. Francis Joseph said that Italy was regarding the patrimony of his house with greedy eyes. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg said that the aim of these concessions was to purchase our neutrality, and, therefore, gentlemen, you may applaud us for not having accepted them. [Loud cheers.] Moreover, these concessions, even in their last and belated edition, in no way responded to the objectives of Italian policy, which are, first, the defense of Italianism, the greatest of our duties; secondly, a secure military frontier, replacing that which was imposed upon us in 1866, by which all the gates of Italy are open to our adversaries; thirdly, a strategical situation in the Adriatic less dangerous and unfortunate than that which we have, and of which you have seen the effects in the last few days. All these essential advantages were substantially denied us.

To our minimum demand for the granting of independence to Trieste the reply was to offer Trieste administrative autonomy. Also the question of fulfilling the promises was very important. We were told not to doubt that they would be fulfilled, because we should have Germany's guarantee, but if at the end of the war Germany had not been able to keep it, what would our position have been? And in any case, after this agreement, the Triple Alliance would have been renewed, but in much less favorable conditions, for there would have been one sovereign State and, two subject States. [Murmurs.]

On the day when one of the clauses of the treaty was not fulfilled, or on the day when the municipal autonomy of Trieste was violated by an imperial decree or by a lieutenant's orders, to whom should we have addressed ourselves? To our common superior—to Germany? [Laughter.] I do not wish to speak of Germany to you without admiration and respect. I am the Italian Prime Minister, not the German Chancellor, and I do not lose my head. [Loud cheers.] But with all respect for the learned, powerful, and great Germany, an admirable example of organization and resistance, in the name of Italy I declare for no subjection and no protectorate over any one. [Cheers.] The dream of a universal hegemony is shattered. The world has risen. The peace and civilization of future humanity must be founded on respect for existing national autonomies. [Loud cheers.] Among these Germany will have to sit as an equal, and not as a master. [Loud cheers.]

But a more remarkable example of the unmeasured pride with which the directors of German policy regard other nations is given in the picture which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg drew of the Italian political world.

Signor Salandra here read the portion of the German Chancellor's speech to which he referred, and added:

I do not know if it was the intention of this man, blinded by rage, personally to insult my colleagues and me. If that was the case, I should not mention it. We are men whose life you know, men who have served the State to an advanced age, men of spotless renown—[loud cheers]—men who have given the lives of their children for their country. [Loud cheers.]

The information on which this judgment was based is attributed by the German Chancellor to him whom he calls the best judge of Italian affairs. Perhaps he alludes to Prince Buelow, with the brotherly desire to shoulder responsibilities upon him. Now, I do not wish you to entertain an erroneous idea of Prince Buelow's intentions. I believe that he had sympathies for Italy, and did all he could to bring about an agreement. But how great and how numerous were the mistakes he made in translating his good intentions into action! He thought that Italy could be diverted from her path by a few millions ill-spent and by the influence of a few persons who have lost touch with the soul of the nation—[loud cheers]—by contact, attempted, but, I hope, not accomplished, with certain politicians. [Loud cheers.]

The effect was the contrary. An immense outburst of indignation was kindled throughout Italy, and not among the populace, but among the noblest and most educated classes and among all the youth of the country, which is ready to shed its blood for the nation. This outburst of indignation was kindled as the result of the suspicion that a foreign Ambassador was interfering between the Italian Government, the Parliament, and the country. [Loud cheers.] In the blaze thus kindled internal discussions melted away, and the whole nation was joined in a wonderful moral union, which will prove our greatest source of strength in the severe struggle which faces us, and which must lead us by our own virtue, and not by benevolent concessions from others, to the accomplishment of the highest destinies of the country. [Loud and prolonged cheers.]



Britain's Cabinet and Munitions

A Coalition Ministry with Lloyd George in a New Office

The formation of a British coalition Cabinet was announced on May 25, 1915, with the creation of a new office of Minister of Munitions, to which Lloyd George was transferred from the Chancellorship of the Exchequer. Below is given the official list of the new Ministers and their offices. In the third column are indicated the same offices as held under the late Liberal Administration. The eight members of the Opposition included in the new Cabinet are indicated by an asterisk:

Coalition Late Liberal Cabinet. Cabinet.

Prime Minister Mr. Asquith Mr. Asquith. Minister without portfolio Lord Lansdowne* —— Lord Chancellor Sir S. Buckmaster Lord Haldane. President of Council Lord Crewe Lord Beauchamp. Lord Privy Seal Lord Curzon* Lord Crewe. Chancellor of the Exchequer Mr. McKenna Mr. Lloyd George. Home Secretary Sir J. Simon Mr. McKenna. Foreign Minister Sir E. Grey Sir E. Grey. Colonial Secretary Mr. Bonar Law* Mr. Harcourt. India Office Mr. Chamberlain* Lord Crewe. War Office Lord Kitchener Lord Kitchener. Minister of Munitions (new) Mr. Lloyd George —— Admiralty Mr. Balfour* Mr. Churchill. Board of Trade Mr. Runciman Mr. Runciman. Local Government Board Mr. Long* Mr. H. Samuel. Duchy of Lancaster Mr. Churchill Hon. E. Montagu. Irish Secretary Mr. Birrell Mr. Birrell. Scottish Office Mr. McKinnon Wood Mr. McKinnon Wood. Agriculture Lord Selborne* Lord Lucas. Works Office Mr. Harcourt Lord Emmott. Education Board Mr. A. Henderson Mr. J.A. Pease. Attorney General Sir E. Carson* Sir John Simon.



The reconstruction of the Liberal Ministry that had ruled the British Empire for ten years was announced by Prime Minister Asquith in the following statement in the House of Commons on May 19:

I cannot say more at the moment than that steps are in contemplation which involve a reconstruction of the Government on a broader personal and political basis. Nothing is yet definitely arranged, but to avoid any possible misapprehension I wish here and now—as the House is to adjourn—to make clear to every one three things:

First, that any change that takes place will not affect the offices of the head of the Government or of the Foreign Secretary. [Cheers.] They will continue to be held as they are now. [Renewed cheers.]

The second is, there is absolutely no change of any kind in contemplation in the policy of the country in regard to the continued prosecution of the war with all possible energy, and by means of every available resource. [Loud cheers.]

The third and the last point—one of great importance, not only to my friends behind me, but also of importance no doubt to the Opposition—is this: Any reconstruction that may be made will be for the purpose of the war alone, and is not to be taken in any quarter as any reason for indicating anything in the nature of surrender or compromise on the part of any person or body of persons of their several political purposes and ideals.

That is really as far as I can go at the moment. Nothing definite has yet taken place. When and if an arrangement of this kind should become an accomplished fact the House will have the fullest opportunity of expressing itself, if it so desires, upon it. [Cheers.]

Mr. Bonar Law, leader of the Opposition, rose immediately after the Prime Minister and said:

I think it only necessary to say on behalf of my friends and myself that at the stage which this has reached our sole consideration in taking into account what further steps should be taken will be what is the best method of finishing the war successfully, and we shall leave out of our minds absolutely all considerations, political or otherwise, beyond the war; while, of course, if such an arrangement should take place, it is obvious our convictions on other subjects will remain unchanged, and will be settled when this danger is over.

CAUSES OF THE CHANGE.

At least four causes which were regarded as contributing to bring about a coalition Ministry, or War Government, are tersely outlined by A.P. Nicholson, Parliamentary correspondent of The London Daily News, as follows:

First—The quarrel between Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher at the Admiralty, a conflict which began with the undertaking of the Dardanelles expedition. Mr. Churchill carried the War Council on this, and it was undertaken before the Cabinet were informed. The Cabinet were committed to it by the movement of ships before they had any formal notification. Lord Fisher, for his part, considered that the enterprise should not have been begun unless it was supported by land forces, but he also was committed to it. Mr. Churchill was counting on the support of Greek forces on land, a calculation which was not justified by the event.

Lately the quarrel between Lord Fisher and Mr. Churchill proved to be irreconcilable, and Lord Fisher sent in his resignation at the week-end. It is now hoped that he will withdraw his resignation, and the possibility of Mr. Churchill replacing Lord Crewe at the India Office or taking another office is being discussed.

Second—The Cabinet have not been kept informed by Lord Kitchener as to the supplies of high explosive shells sent out to our troops at the front. It is the fact that huge supplies of shells have been and are being sent out, but the proportion of shrapnel is greater than the proportion of high explosive shells, and the army command require that the proportion of high explosive shells should be greater. The fact that the Cabinet have been to some extent in the dark of late on this matter accounts for some apparent discrepancies in recent Ministerial statements.

Third—The Opposition leaders were in possession of the facts as to the high explosive shells, and threatened a debate in the House of Commons, in which their statements should be proved. Such a debate would have gravely undermined the authority of the Government, and, coupled with the tendered resignation of Lord Fisher, and the consequent disappearance either of the First Sea Lord or Mr. Churchill, would in all human probability have led to the disastrous downfall of the King's Government in the midst of the national peril of this war, with consequences most lamentable.

Fourth—There have been on both sides some leading statesmen in favor of a coalition Ministry for the prosecution of the war. They are few, but influential. They perceived that the curious circumstances that had arisen offered a brilliant opportunity to achieve a coalition, and they seized the opportunity. It should certainly be assumed that they were actuated by national motives, since their action may have averted the downfall of one of the greatest Governments of modern times in a time of national peril.



Lloyd George's Appeal to Labor

In a speech at Manchester on June 4, and again on June 5, before the employers and workmen of Lancashire, the new Minister of Munitions announced his policy of discontinuing the methods of red tape that had hindered the mobilization of labor for the production of arms and ammunition. His speech at Lancashire appears below in full.

I have come here not for speech but for business, and I shall only indulge in speech to the extent that speaking is the essential preliminary to business. I placed yesterday before a meeting in Manchester my general views of the position, and I have very little to add to what I then said. But I have come here to appeal for the assistance of the men of Liverpool and the surrounding districts.

The situation is a serious one. It is as grave a situation as this country has ever been confronted with. You need have no special knowledge in order to ascertain that yourselves. A careful, intelligent perusal of the published dispatches in the newspapers must have caused you to come to the conclusion that this country is engaging one of the most formidable enemies that it has ever waged war against.

The issues are great, the perils are great, and nothing can pull us through but the united effort of every man in the British Empire. If you look at what our brave fellows are doing at the front you can see the perils there facing them, the trials, the privations, and they are doing it without flinching. ["Hear, hear!"] Never in the history of this country have our men shown greater courage and endurance than they have during this war. They have done all you can expect of mortal man.

We who are comfortable at home, free from privations, free from danger, let us, each of us, do his part as nobly as those heroes of ours are doing it at the front. [Cheers.] It would be horrible for us to think that those who fall fall through our neglect. It would be a still more ghastly reflection to think that those who fell have given their lives in vain through any slackness or selfishness on the part of any one of us in this land.

Yesterday we had a very important gathering of the employers and the representatives of labor in the great engineering firms in Manchester and other parts of this great county. The response made to our appeal was gratifying. Every man there showed a disposition to do all in his power to assist the country to pull through its difficulties triumphantly, and I feel perfectly certain that the same ready response will be given to the same appeal which I am now about to make to the men of Liverpool and the area surrounding it.

What makes Germany a formidable enemy is not merely its preparation for war, it is not merely its organization, potent as that is, but it is the spirit of every class and section of its population. You have only got to read the papers to see that as far as they are concerned they are all of them subordinating everything to the one great national purpose of winning victory for their Fatherland. That is the least we can do in this country for our land. [Cheers.]

I never doubted where ultimate victory would lie, never for a moment. Nor have I ever underestimated the difficulties. But although I have never doubted where victory would rest, all the same I know that victory will come the sooner for recognizing the difficulties there are.

You cannot remove difficulties without looking at them, and you cannot look at difficulties without seeing them, and that is why the business of a Minister is to point them out, and then to appeal to every section of the community to assist the Government in overcoming the obstacles in the way.

Now we want especially the help of those who can contribute to the increase of the munitions, the equipment, and the material of war. We want the help of employers, we want the help of the workers. We want employers and workmen to feel their responsibility in this matter. It is my intention to utilize as much as I possibly can the business brains of the community. I hope to get their assistance. Some of them will be at my elbow in London to advise, to counsel, to guide, to inform and instruct and to direct, but I want the help of the business brains in the localities.

This is no time for the usual methods of doing business with the Government. ["Hear, hear!"] I am assuming that Governments in the past have done their business in the most perfect way. This is not a time for the usual roundabout methods of Government business. ["Hear, hear!"]

We have got to trust business men in the localities to organize for us, to undertake the business in the particular locality on our behalf. We want to suspend during the war not merely trade-union regulations, but some Government regulations, too. ["Hear, hear!"]

We want rifles, we want guns, we want shells, fuses, chemicals, and explosives. There is one thing we want less of than usual, and that is red tape. It takes such a long time to unwind—[laughter]—and we can't spare the time. Therefore, the first thing I am going to ask you to do is to organize for yourselves in this locality, and in every other locality, the engineering resources, for the purpose of assisting the Government. You know best what you can do. I know the resourcefulness of the engineers of this country, I know, as the Lord Mayor has already pointed out, their adaptability. I want you to come together and form your own committee of management. Having done that, organize among yourselves the engineering resources of the locality, with a view to producing the greatest result in the way of helping our gallant forces at the front.

That involves a good deal more confidence and trust than usual. We have no time to go through the same processes of examination, of bargaining, as you get usually in the matter of Government contracts. ["Hear, hear!"]

Whatever is done has got to be done with promptitude. That involves our trusting to the integrity, to the loyalty, to the patriotism of the business men to do their best for us in these localities, and do it on fair terms. That is the first thing I have got to say to the business men of the community. I want you to regard this as your business as well as ours. This is not a Government entering into negotiations with you. You are the Government, you have got an interest in this concern, it is your concern, just as much as it is ours, and I want you to help us.

This is a business for all of us, and we want every business man in the community to give his very best to help the old country through in the great emergency and crisis. [Cheers.] That means that you will, as soon as you possibly can, get your committee of management, and, through that committee of management, organize your district for the purpose of producing such material of war, or such other component parts of any particular material of war, you can help us to produce.

I would make the same appeal to labor. I want them also to feel that this is their business. Should Germany win, God help labor! ["Hear, hear!"] It will come out of it worst of all. The victory of Germany will be the victory of the worst form of autocracy that this world has seen for many a century. There is no section of the community has anything like the interest in the overthrow of this military caste which labor has—["Hear, hear!"]—and the more they realize that, difficulties will vanish, obstacles will go, and bickerings and slackness. We have to get to work as one man to help to win a triumph for democratic free government against the autocratic systems of Germany and Austria. [Cheers.]

Now, I should like to say one or two words beyond what I said yesterday on this particular aspect of the business. I have had the privilege, both yesterday and today, of meeting some of the leading representatives of labor in Manchester and Liverpool. And let me say this: As far as the official representatives of organized labor are concerned, we have had nothing but help. The difficulty has been when you get beyond.

I am not saying a word about trade-union regulations during a period of peace. I have no doubt they were essential safeguards to the protection of labor against what otherwise might have been a serious interference with their rights and with their prospects. But as I have already pointed out to you, Government regulations have to be suspended during the period of the war because they are inapplicable in a time of urgency. The same thing applies to many trade-union regulations and practices. ["Hear, hear!"]

The first I should like to call attention to are those rules which had been set up for very good reasons to make it difficult for purely unsullied men to claim the position and rights of men who have had a training—that is true in every profession.

I happen, my Lord Mayor, to belong to about the strictest trade union in the world—[laughter]—the most jealous trade union in the world. If any unskilled man—and by an unskilled man we mean a man who has not paid our fees—if any man of that sort, however brainy he was, tried to come in and interfere with our business, well, we would soon settle him. [Laughter.] But if during the period of the war there were any particular use for lawyers—[laughter]—if you find that upon lawyers depended the success of the war, and it requires a good deal of imagination; even my Celtic imagination will hardly attain to the exalted height—[more laughter]—but if that were possible for a moment, do you suppose that even the Incorporated Law Society, the greatest and narrowest of all trade unions, could stand in the way of bringing in outside help in order to enable us to get through our work?

Well, now, the same thing applies here. If all the skilled engineers in this country were turned on to produce what is required, if you brought back from the front every engineer who had been recruited, if you worked them to the utmost limits of human endurance, you have not got enough labor even then to produce all we are going to ask you to produce during the next few months. Therefore, we must appeal to the patriotism of the unions of this country to relax these particular rules, in order to eke out, as it were, the skill, to make it go as far as it possibly can go, in order to enable us to turn out the necessary munitions of war to win a real and a speedy triumph for our country in this great struggle.

Now, the same thing applies to the work of women in the factories. There is a good deal of work now done by men, and men only, in this country which is done in France at the present moment in shell factories by women. Why is that? They have not enough men to go round. The men are working as hard as they can, for as long hours as they possibly can support, but in spite of that they would not turn out a sufficient number of shells and other material of war without doling out a good part of the work to women in those factories. Well, now, if there are any trade-union regulations to prevent the possibility of that being done, I hope during the period of war these will be suspended. ["Hear, hear!"]

Now, I am coming to another thing—and I am here to talk quite frankly—it is very much better to do so. ["Hear, hear!"] There must be no deliberate slowing down of work. I have had two or three very painful cases put before me. One was from an arsenal upon which we were absolutely dependent for the material of war. There was a very skilled workman there who worked very hard and who earned a good deal of money. He was doing his duty by the State. He was not merely warned that if he repeated that offense he would be driven out, I am not quite sure that he was not actually driven out.

The same thing happened in another factory. Now, in the period of war this is really intolerable. ["Hear, hear!"] We cannot do with it. We cannot afford it, I say again. There may be reasons, there might be very good reasons, that a policy of that sort should be adopted in the period of peace. I am expressing no opinions about that. I am simply stating the case of this particular emergency, and I am sure that the only thing in this emergency is that everybody should put forward all his strength in order to help the country through. [Cheers.]

Therefore, I do hope that whatever regulation, whatever practice, whatever custom there may be in existence at the present moment which interferes in the slightest degree in the increase of war material, will be suspended during the period of war.

We have given our undertaking as a Government, and that undertaking has been inherited by a new Government. That is that those safeguards which have been established by trade-union action prior to the war will be restored exactly to the position they were when the war is over, in so far as the action of the Government is concerned. We can only ask for a suspension of these regulations during the period of the war, then afterward the same process of discussion will go on between capital and labor as has gone on, I have no doubt, during the last fifty or one hundred years.

Those are two or three of the things which I wanted to put. The lives of our men at the front depend upon the amount of war material we are able to equip them with, success depends upon it, the lives of men depend upon it. Everybody ought to do his best. There is no room for slackers. ["Hear, hear!"] I don't want to get rid of the slackers, I only want to get rid of their slackness—[laughter and cheers]—and we really must.

In this war every country is demanding as a matter of right—not as a matter of appeal—as a matter of right from every one of the citizens, that he should do his best—[cheers]—and that is one of the problems with which we have to deal in this country. It ought to be established as a duty, as one of the essential duties of citizenship, that every man should put his whole strength into helping the country through. [Cheers.] And I don't believe any section of the community would object to it, if it were made a legal right and duty expected of every one. [Cheers.]

I don't know that I have anything further that I want specially to say to you, because I want to get to business as quickly as possible. Sir Frederick Donaldson of Woolwich Arsenal and Sir Percy Girouard are here to answer any question you may put to them on the business of the meeting. They can inform you on the technical side in a way that I can't pretend to. I can only ask you to help us. I know that appeal to you won't be in vain.

We are engaged in the greatest struggle this country has ever been precipitated into. It is no fault of ours. ["Hear, hear!"] We sought peace, we asked for peace, we avoided all the paths that led to war, but we should have forever been dishonored if we had shirked the conflict when it came. [Cheers.]

Harried into it, we are there to champion the deepest, the highest, the greatest interest ever committed to the charge of any nation. Let us equip ourselves in such a way that Great Britain through the war will be still great, and when the war is over it will be a Greater Britain than ever. [Cheers.]



Balkan Neutrality—As Seen By the Balkans

Inspired Press Opinions from the Capitals of Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania

THE GREEK VIEW.

From the Embros, an independent daily of Athens, of May 23, 1915.

In what degree the Triple Entente would have respected the rights of Greece had we entered the war before Italy's intervention is demonstrated by the conduct of the Allies toward Serbia. The whole of the Adriatic is now an Italian sea, by virtue of a mutual agreement between the Entente powers and Italy, and only the slightest hope of obtaining Durazzo and Cattero is left to Serbia.

Greece therefore must congratulate herself for holding back and watchfully awaiting developments. It is generally admitted that the European war will last long and that the new ally will not give a decisive turn to its final conclusion. Those, therefore, who have their swords sharpened will be always in time to join. In a struggle that has such a wide field of adventures those who will intervene later will be more welcome than those who have already joined and offered all the strength they possessed. And, lastly, if this war will not show in the end a single victor, then the interests of each one of the participants will be settled by a European congress, where, again, those who will have preserved untouched their forces will be the real victors.... Greece is not going to be neutral for a long time; meanwhile she must husband her resources and her strength up to the day when events themselves will force her to enter the war, whether she likes it or not.

A PLEA FOR WAR.

From the Patris, Mr. Venizelos's organ, of Athens, of May 14.

We say in one word that the dangers that threaten us as long as we are neutral are immensely greater than those which we might incur in joining in the war. Greece cannot accept a comparison with Bulgaria and Rumania. Bulgaria, by remaining neutral, is sure to receive the Enos-Midia line, and in case of co-operating with the entente powers she may also be sure of getting Dobrudja and Serbian Macedonia. Rumania, on the other hand, if neutral will take a slice of Transylvania, and if she sides with the Allies in the war, may obtain the whole of Bukowina. But Greece has no alternative. She must by political necessity act in common with the Triple Entente. Of course, by so doing she runs certain risks, but we defy the Government [of Mr. Gounaris] to prove that the dangers threatening Greece are less in the case of a protracted neutrality than in the case of her joining in the war.

GREECE AFTER ITALY'S INTERVENTION.

From the Athenae, the Ministerial paper, of May 25.

Italy has entered the war on the Allies' side, because in the territorial negotiations England and France outbid Austria and Germany. And now does any one imagine that the Triple Entente would hesitate to sacrifice Hellenic interests in favor of Italy even if Greece had been the first to indorse their cause? But have we not seen how the Serbian national aspirations have been sacrificed by the Entente in its effort to secure the co-operation of Italy? And has not the Entente sacrificed Greek interests when Italy was occupying Vallona? Was that a token of sympathy with Greek interests? And did ever the Triple Entente say to Greece that they would not allow Italy to impose her rule on Greek countries and Greek populations? And the twelve Islands of the Aegean, the Dodekanisos—have they not been shown to Italy as a present and reward for her co-operation whether or not Greece joined the Entente?

How could Greece, in such circumstances, abandon her neutrality and risk everything for the Allies?



BULGARIAN VIEWS.

FAVORING NEUTRALITY.

From Narodni Prava, the mouthpiece of the Liberal Party and the Premier of Bulgaria, Mr. B. Radoslavoff, April 1, 1915.

In his statement to the Sobranjie (the Bulgarian Parliament) the Prime Minister yesterday categorically said that those wishing to march with either side of the belligerents are free to do so, if they are courageous enough and if they are aware of their duties to the interests of the country.... The Parliamentary majority and the nation at large are satisfied with the policy of the Government, which consists in preserving a strict neutrality and the peace of the country and in developing meanwhile the patriotic and military spirit of the nation, in order that we may be ready when the time comes to act for the interests of the fatherland.

OPPOSING NEUTRALITY.

From Mir, organ of the Nationalists and of ex-Premier I. Gueshoff, April 26, 1915.

Greece is hoping to profit from the present situation without any sacrifices, or with as few as possible, and Venizelos fell because the Greek people did not wish to give the Allies the assistance he promised them. In order to explain and justify their stand, the Greeks found an argument in the Bulgarian danger.... "Do you want us to prove that we are not willing to play the game of Germany? Here are the proofs: We are ready to shield Serbia against any possible attack from Bulgaria and to help you, not against Turkey but against Bulgaria"—that is what the Greeks said and wrote to the Entente powers. And the chief newspapers of the Allies are full of articles trying to prove that the Bulgarians, under the guidance of Germany and Austria, are endangering the Balkan situation. According to what we learn, Germany is straining every nerve to incite an armed conflict between Greece and Bulgaria. In this way Germany hopes to guarantee Turkey against any possible attack from Bulgaria, and thus promote her own interests. To this fact we most earnestly call the attention of the Bulgarian people.

OPPOSING GREECE, SERBIA, AND RUSSIA.

From the Nationalist Kambana of Sofia, May 4, 1915.

Greece and Serbia are, first of all, threatened by Bulgaria, and they both know that they must step out of Bulgarian Macedonia. The struggle for Macedonia does not date from yesterday or today; this is an age-long struggle, which will end only when Bulgaria shall have assured her frontier, when Greece shall return to her peninsula, and when Serbia shall be entirely wiped off the map of the Balkans. Aside from the Greeks and Serbs, Bulgaria constitutes a danger also for Russia, inasmuch as we do not want to be the bridge for any further Russian expansion. Russian diplomacy has done everything in its power to alienate Bulgarian sympathy and to make us unfriendly to Rumania and Turkey; but Russia is today severely punished for her misdeeds. Russia, Serbia, and Greece are finding themselves in a pretty hard position, and are looking for our help. But we must not hurry. Every day that passes weakens our enemies, and the future of Bulgaria becomes daily brighter.

THE RUMANIAN VIEW.

A PRO-GERMAN OPINION.

From the Moldava of Bucharest, organ of the Conservative Party, of April 1, 1915.

For a long time public opinion in Rumania has been lulled into believing that we shall take Transylvania, but not a word has been said about Bessarabia. We do not know why our political predecessors wanted to create a strong barrier in the face of Russia, behind which live, condemned to perpetual isolation, 3,000,000 Rumanians. That territory which lies between the Rivers Pruth and Bug contains a population of more than 5,000,000, of which 3,500,000 are Moldavians; it comprises, also, the mouth of the Danube, fertile lands, an extended shore, and the City of Odessa itself. The budget of that part of Bessarabia which lies between the Rivers Pruth and Dniester amounts to 250,000,000 lei, ($50,000,000,) or nearly as much as half of the entire budget of Rumania. But this wealth is not used for the benefit of the country which produces it. There are neither schools nor highways nor hospitals in Bessarabia. Ignorance and misery are the sole companions of that population, every national sentiment of which is smothered under the sway of Russian absolutism.

We in Rumania are ignorant of all these facts because our education is such as to make us ignore such vital issues. But only because we do not know ought we forsake Bessarabia?... Or is it that the national ideal of Rumania is to live at the mercy of Russia, by abandoning old Moldavia?

FOR A BALKAN UNION.

From Le Journal des Balkans of the Liberal T. Jonescu, of March 13, 1915.

It is of the utmost importance that the Balkan States get together—quite apart from the present circumstances—for their own vital benefit. No matter what the outcome of the present war will be, the duty of the Balkan States is to act in unison, for mutual support and for the preservation of their future.

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