PRAISE FROM CANADA.

The Daily Standard of Kingston, Ont., commenting on June 11, says:

President Wilson's second message to Germany will rank with his first one as a document that at once convinces and convicts—convinces of the sincerity of the President that he is "contending for nothing less high and sacred than the rights of humanity," and convicts the nation to whom it is addressed of being responsible for the fact that the men, women, and children on the Lusitania were sent to their death under circumstances "unparalleled in modern warfare."

The note is not only dignified and statesmanlike, but it breathes a spirit of tolerance and Christianity that is as noteworthy as it is admirable. There is in it not even a suggestion of a threat, no word of bluster, no breath of jingoism. It is sound, sensible, firm, resolute, self-contained, magnanimous even. It does not incite to war, but, instead, appeals to the highest principles of justice and right.

But though the words are conciliatory and the spirit admirable, there is not the least abatement of the insistence upon the principles which the President formulated in his earlier message and laid down for the guidance of Germany and for the protection of the American people. The way is now open to Germany either for peace or for war. The decision is left with her.

FRENCH COMMENT.

The Temps of June 12 says:

Germany must choose between having the services of America in proposing to the Allies a moderation of their blockade, conducted with the strictest humanity, and the cessation of torpedoing neutral ships, the continuation of which exposes Germany to a diplomatic rupture with the United States, if not to war. Assuredly this prospect caused Bryan's resignation.

La Liberte says of the note:

It is in every way worthy of a great country conscious of its dignity, its rights, and its duties. It has not the tone of an ultimatum, since it is couched in courteous terms, but it is energetic, and it requires Germany finally to cease recourse to false expedients.

The Journal des Debats, in discussing the note, says:

The United States, representing in this case the civilized world, places the sacred rights of humanity above considerations of the military order, to which Germany subordinates everything. They are resolved, so far as concerns American subjects, to have those rights respected.

The essence of the note is, first, measures required by humanity must be taken, and afterward, if desired, will come discussions of a new regulation of naval warfare. If Germany insists on putting herself outside the pale of humanity she will suffer the consequences.

ITALIAN COMMENT.

The Corriere della Sera of June 12 compares the attitude of Secretary Bryan to that of former Premier Giolitti, leader of the party which sought to prevent war with Austria. It says Mr. Bryan's action probably will have the same effect in America that Signor Giolitti's intervention had in Italy, and that it will strengthen public opinion in favor of President Wilson.

It will give him greater power in this important moment, defeating men who are ready to lower the prestige and honor of the country.

The Tribuna says:

The United States, the greatest neutral nation, has with this document assumed a special role, that is, the defense not of a particular group or interest, but the interest of civil humanity; to guard those principles of common right which above any particular right constitute the sacred patrimony of humanity. She raises her voice, whose firmness is not diminished by the courtesy of the language.

We do not know if Germany will be able to understand the significance, but if she does not she will commit a grave error—the gravest perhaps in the immense series made by her in this war. Mr. Wilson seems to persevere in the hope that Germany will listen to the American admonition. Germany must not forget that the longer the hope the more violent will be the reaction.

The Idea Nazionale says:

The note is not only not a declaration of war or the prelude to a declaration of war, but a species midway of humanitarian sentimentalism and lawyerlike arguments which can have, at least for the present, but one consequence, that of encouraging Germany in intransigentism—that is, the maintenance of her point of view regarding naval warfare.



American Comment on Mr. Bryan's Resignation

THE NEW YORK TIMES of June 14, 1915, presented the following condensed quotations condemning unsparingly Mr. Bryan's retirement from the Secretaryship of State, gathered from newspapers throughout the United States, and classified according to their professions of political faith:

DEMOCRATIC NEWSPAPERS.

From The New York World.

Unspeakable treachery, not only to the President, but to the nation.

From The Buffalo Enquirer.

If Mr. Bryan goes on, he will share the detestation of the most despised character in American history.

From The Buffalo Courier.

The new note to Germany puts Emperor William and former Secretary Bryan in the same hole.

From The Utica Observer.

He turns tail in the face of a crisis and seeks refuge by counseling dishonor.

From The Louisville Courier-Journal, (Henry Watterson.)

Treason to the country, treachery to his party and its official head.

From The Portland (Me.) Eastern Argus.

Bryan's announced campaign has something of the character of submarine warfare.

From The Helena (Mon.) Independent.

As much mistaken in this instance as in years gone by.

From The Lexington (Ky.) Herald.

His propaganda is designed and intended "to defeat the measures of the Government of the United States" in violation of Section 5, [of the law of treason.]

From The Mobile Register.

If Germany is misled into actions still further violative of our rights, the resultant hostility will be very largely attributable to Mr. Bryan.

From The Columbia (S.C.) State.

The President's clear head may now be trusted the more that his methods of thinking are relieved of opposition in the Cabinet.

From The Montgomery Advertiser.

He will go back to his first love, agitation.

From The Richmond Times-Dispatch.

Wilson, not Bryan, strikes the note to which the hearts of the American people respond.

From The Savannah News.

The people are following the President and not Mr. Bryan.

From The Austin (Texas) Statesman.

Mr. Bryan's diplomacy has not been of the type that has inspired the confidence of the American people.

From The Charleston News and Courier.

The bald and ugly fact will remain—he deserted his chief and his Government in the midst of an international crisis.

From The Memphis Commercial-Appeal.

Mr. Bryan's views, turned into a national policy, would mean national suicide.

From The Brooklyn Eagle.

An obstacle has seen fit to remove itself; it has substituted harmony for discordance.

From The Boston Post.

Mr. Bryan has shabbily infringed that good American doctrine that politics should end at the water's edge.

From The Baltimore Sun.

The Germans torpedo one "Nebraskan." Oh, for a "Busy Bertha" that could effectually dispose of the other one!

From The Charlotte Observer.

The country simply was afraid of him.

From The Cleveland Plain Dealer.

He is a preacher of disloyalty.

From The Chattanooga Times.

The reason given for his resignation ... approximates disloyalty, if nothing else; a monstrous statement.

From The New Orleans Times-Picayune.

His voluntary resignation will give satisfaction.

REPUBLICAN NEWSPAPERS.

From The New York Tribune.

A man with such a cheaply commercial conception of the post held by so long a line of American statesmen was by nature disqualified for it.

From The New York Globe.

Instead of promoting a peaceful settlement, Mr. Bryan practically throws his influence in the other balance.

From The Syracuse Post-Standard.

Billy Sunday in the wrong niche.

From The Rochester Post-Express.

Amazement and contempt for him grow.

From The Pittsburgh Gazette Times.

He has not filled the place with dignity, ability, or satisfaction, nor yet with fidelity; a cheap imitation.

From The Pittsburgh Chronicle Telegraph.

The peace-piffle and grape-juice statesman.

From The Philadelphia Inquirer.

A peace-at-any-price man.

From The Wilkes-Barre Record.

An amazing, an astounding blunder.

From The Cincinnati Commercial Tribune.

The seriousness of the situation is all that prevents Mr. Bryan's foreign policy from being laughable.

From The Baltimore American.

The country wants no more vapid theorizing; it wants no more Bryanism.

From The Hartford Courant.

Those newspapers that said Mr. Bryan was in bad taste made a slight mistake. He is a bad taste.

From The Augusta (Me.) Kennebec Journal.

Impossible for a man of Mr. Bryan's ability and love of the limelight to remain longer wholly obscure in this national crisis.

From The Portsmouth (N.H.) Chronicle.

Childish policies and small politics, even if the Nobel Peace Prize is at stake, must not be considered by an American statesman.

From The Portland (Me.) Press.

There was nothing to do but get out and shut up.

From The Paterson Press.

He has dealt his country a stunning blow.

From The Lincoln (Neb.) State Journal.

It is characteristic of Mr. Bryan to shut his eyes to arguments and facts when he reaches the ecstacy of sentimental conviction.

From The Omaha Bee.

His action may have a weakening effect on our position.

From The Nebraska City (Neb.) Press.

Knowing his disposition to watch out for the main chance ... that Mr. Bryan will be a candidate for the Senate from Nebraska is almost a foregone conclusion.

From The Topeka Capital.

Represents only the personal idiosyncrasies of William J. Bryan.

From The Milwaukee Sentinel.

Calculated to create prejudice and misgiving against the American note and to mislead foreign opinion.

From The St. Louis Globe-Democrat.

Mr. Bryan could have found no better way of causing the President embarrassment at this crisis.

From The Minneapolis Tribune.

President Wilson has had his own way in State Department affairs, to the minimization of Secretary Bryan, almost at times to the point of humiliation.

From The Seattle Post-Intelligencer.

A pacifist temporarily bereft of reason and lost to sense of patriotic duty; a misplaced figurehead.

From The Portland Oregonian.

The archpriest of the peace-at-any-price party ... a poor staff to lean upon.

From The Albany Knickerbocker-Press.

Mr. Bryan must Chautauquahoot, as the rooster must crow.

From The Scranton Republican.

Prompt acceptance of his resignation was the proper thing.

From The Los Angeles Times.

The inefficiency and ineptness of the Secretary of State have been a reproach to the country.

From The Wilmington (Del.) News.

Far better if Mr. Bryan had retired long ago.

From The St. Paul Pioneer Press.

His retirement was merely a matter of time.

PROGRESSIVE NEWSPAPERS.

From The New York Press.

A sorry misfit in our Government—mortifyingly, dangerously so.

From The Boston Journal.

He appoints himself, though now a private citizen, the director of the nation.

From The Washington Times.

The only person who has been talking war and giving out the impression that he thought this note meant war.

INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPERS.

From The New York Evening Post.

How far he will carry his treachery by actual machinations against Mr. Wilson remains to be seen.

From The New York Sun.

Sulked and ran away when honor and patriotism should have kept him at his post.

From The New York Herald.

His convictions are all wrong; his retirement should be heartily welcomed by the country.

From The Philadelphia Public Ledger.

How much longer, as Cicero asked Catiline, does he intend to abuse our patience?

From The Pittsburgh Dispatch.

Bryan's obsession by the peace-at-any-price propaganda bordered on the fanatical.

From The Baltimore News.

A surrender to opportunism such as calls for a nation's contempt.

From The Chicago Herald.

As a private citizen he will be less a menace to the peace of the nation than he has been as Secretary of State.

From The Denver Post.

His services can be most satisfactorily dispensed with.

From The Kansas City Star.

Has not impressed the country as a practical man in dealing with large affairs.

From The Toledo Times.

He should support the President.

From The Terre Haute Star.

Now free to pursue the prohibition propaganda.

From The Newark (N.J.) Star.

The statement [Bryan's] is simply an effort to corral for himself a large voting element in the population.

From The Newark Evening News.

His narrow vision has overcome him.

From The Boston Traveler.

If war does come Mr. Bryan will be the one American held most responsible for the trouble.

From The Boston Globe.

Mr. Wilson has been relieved of one of his many problems.

From The Boston Herald.

Is certainly not inspired by a sense of loyalty to the party or the country.

From The Lowell Courier-Citizen.

Lagged superfluous on a stage in which he played no part beyond that of an amanuensis, and hardly even that.

From The Manchester (N.H.) Union.

Should mark the end of Bryanism in American politics.

From The Providence Journal.

He has bowed himself into oblivion.

GERMAN-AMERICAN PRESS.

Under the caption, "He Kept His Vow," the evening edition of the New-Yorker Staats-Zeitung, which for months had been referring to Secretary Bryan as "Secretary Bryan Stumping," as opposed to "Secretary Lansing Acting," said on June 9:

As unreservedly as we believe that he [Mr. Bryan] is sacrificing high office to a principle—something that seems to be incomprehensible not alone to American politicians; readily as we pay him tribute that a man in public life has again had the courage to act, despite the machinations of editorial offices, pulpits, and the counting rooms of money agents; clearly as we see again his latest act, the old Bryan, who can sacrifice nothing to utilitarianism, everything to an idea, no matter how fantastic it may be, nevertheless it must not be left unmentioned that his exit out of the Wilson Cabinet was under all circumstances only a question of time. Bryan may want to be a candidate in 1916, a rival of Wilson; there may be a political motive at the bottom of the dramatically staged resignation; the fact remains that two hard heads, Wilson and Bryan, could not permanently agree. One had to yield; one had to go. Just as Bismarck had to go when Wilhelm II. felt himself safe in the saddle, so Bryan had to yield as soon as Woodrow Wilson himself took the reins, all the reins, into his hand.

Whether the departure of Bryan will exercise great influence on the course of events, so far as relations with Germany are concerned, is an open question. At all events, the peace party in Congress and in the country as a whole has found a leader who is a fighter, who today still has a large following in Congress and out of it. And in Congress, through the masses, the question must finally be decided. Meanwhile, is it to be assumed without further ado that President Wilson himself stands diametrically opposed to the peace views of Bryan? We do not believe that. We are even today still of the opinion that Wilson desires war with Germany as little as does Bryan, the friend of peace, who has just let his deeds follow his words.

From the St. Paul Daily Volks Zeitung.

Bryan's stand for fair play forces his resignation. Bryan's resignation at this critical moment is the greatest service the Commoner has ever rendered his country, because it has aroused the people to see the danger of the foreign policy now pursued by the President.

From the Minneapolis Freie Presse Herold.

It is evident that Mr. Bryan, believing that Wilson and Roosevelt will be the next Presidential nominees, now sees the opportunity to secure the German vote for himself, but Mr. Bryan's hypocrisy will fool no one, particularly the Germans.

From Alex E. Oberlander, Editor the Syracuse Union.

Mr. Bryan will be a greater power for peace out of the Cabinet than in it. As a member of the Cabinet diplomacy muzzled him, but now as a private citizen he can and will be outspoken, and his voice for peace will carry far more weight than the manufacturers of war munitions, Wall Street, would-be Generals, Colonels, and Captains, and the jingo press.

From Paul F. Mueller, Editor Abendpost of Chicago.

The people will choose Mr. Bryan's side if the President persists on a way which may lead to war and must lead to dishonor.

From Horace L. Brand, Publisher Illinois Staats-Zeitung.

Mr. Bryan will have the support of all sane Americans on any reasonable proposition which will keep this country out of war. Mr. Bryan, with all his faults, evidently has his principles.

From the Waechter und Anzeiger of Cleveland, Ohio.

He would not be a man had he signed the death warrant for what he regarded as the crowning deed and success of his life's work. And, because this was asked of him, many a person will say the Scotch in the President's veins did not deny itself in the manner which compelled Mr. Bryan's resignation, although keeping up the appearance that it came of Bryan's own free will because of a disagreement over principles.

From the Colorado Herald of Denver.

Bryan's resignation comes as the biggest surprise of the year to all those of pro-German proclivities who were heretofore laboring under the impression that Bryan represented the spirit in the Cabinet that savored of anything but a square deal for Germany.

From the Illinois Staats-Zeitung of Chicago.

Mr. William Jennings Bryan, by his resignation and by his reasons of his resignation, caused us fear that President Wilson's second note to Germany would be full of thunder and lightning, and would lead at best to a severance of the diplomatic relations between the two countries, the friendship of which grew almost to be a tradition.

Our surprise is just as great as it is pleasant. The note of the President is in its tone sound and friendly, and excludes the possibility of hostilities. Germany, though she had many reasons to complain about a hostile disposition on the part of the people, the press, and the Government of the United States, will readily admit that our Government is in duty bound to protect American lives and American property, even though she should have been justified in torpedoing the Lusitania. President Wilson seems to be willing to admit such justification and invites Germany to submit her evidence. This means an invitation to further negotiations, to which President Wilson was apparently opposed in his first note.

From Charles Neumeyer, Editor the Louisville Anzeiger.

It is inexplicable why Bryan could reconcile the signing of the first note, which was of a much more assertive tone, with his sentiments and principles, and then refuse his assent to this one, characterized by dignified friendliness. Mr. Bryan must either have become extremely touchy and particular over night, or somebody must have been fooling somebody else. At any rate, the American note is a guarantee of continued peace as to the issues now pending.



Mr. Bryan's Defense

In a statement headed "The Real Issue" and addressed "To the American People," issued on June 10, 1915; in a second statement, appealing "To the German-Americans," on June 11; in a third, issued June 12, on the "First and Second German Notes," and in a series of utterances put forth on three successive days, beginning June 16, Mr. Bryan justified his resignation and offered what he styled a practical working solution of the problem of bringing peace to Europe. These statements were preceded by a formal utterance about his resignation, published on June 10. Their texts are presented below.

THE REASON FOR RESIGNING.

Washington, June 9, 1915.

My reason for resigning is clearly stated in my letter of resignation, namely, that I may employ, as a private citizen, the means which the President does not feel at liberty to employ. I honor him for doing what he believes to be right, and I am sure that he desires, as I do, to find a peaceful solution of the problem which has been created by the action of the submarines.

Two of the points on which we differ, each conscientious in his conviction, are:

First, as to the suggestion of investigation by an international commission, and,

Second, as to warning Americans against traveling on belligerent vessels or with cargoes of ammunition.

I believe that this nation should frankly state to Germany that we are willing to apply in this case the principle which we are bound by treaty to apply to disputes between the United States and thirty countries with which we have made treaties, providing for investigation of all disputes of every character and nature.

These treaties, negotiated under this Administration, make war practically impossible between this country and these thirty Governments, representing nearly three-fourths of all the people of the world.

Among the nations with which we have these treaties are Great Britain, France, and Russia. No matter what disputes may arise between us and these treaty nations, we agree that there shall be no declaration and no commencement of hostilities until the matters in dispute have been investigated by an international commission, and a year's time is allowed for investigation and report. This plan was offered to all the nations without any exceptions whatever, and Germany was one of the nations that accepted the principle, being the twelfth, I think, to accept.

No treaty was actually entered into with Germany, but I cannot see that that should stand in the way when both nations indorsed the principle. I do not know whether Germany would accept the offer, but our country should, in my judgment, make the offer. Such an offer, if accepted, would at once relieve the tension and silence all the jingoes who are demanding war.

Germany has always been a friendly nation, and a great many of our people are of German ancestry. Why should we not deal with Germany according to this plan to which the nation has pledged its support?

The second point of difference is as to the course which should be pursued in regard to Americans traveling on belligerent ships or with cargoes of ammunition.

Why should an American citizen be permitted to involve his country in war by traveling upon a belligerent ship, when he knows that the ship will pass through a danger zone? The question is not whether an American citizen has a right, under international law, to travel on a belligerent ship; the question is whether he ought not, out of consideration for his country, if not for his own safety, avoid danger when avoidance is possible.

It is a very one-sided citizenship that compels a Government to go to war over a citizen's rights and yet relieve the citizen of all obligations to consider his nation's welfare. I do not know just how far the President can legally go in actually preventing Americans from traveling on belligerent ships, but I believe the Government should go as far as it can, and that in case of doubt it should give the benefit of the doubt to the Government.

But even if the Government could not legally prevent citizens from traveling on belligerent ships, it could, and in my judgment should, earnestly advise American citizens not to risk themselves or the peace of their country, and I have no doubt that these warnings would be heeded.

President Taft advised Americans to leave Mexico when insurrection broke out there, and President Wilson has repeated the advice. This advice, in my judgment, was eminently wise, and I think the same course should be followed in regard to warning Americans to keep off vessels subject to attack.

I think, too, that American passenger ships should be prohibited from carrying ammunition. The lives of passengers ought not to be endangered by cargoes of ammunition, whether that danger comes from possible explosions within or from possible attacks from without. Passengers and ammunition should not travel together. The attempt to prevent American citizens from incurring these risks is entirely consistent with the effort which our Government is making to prevent attacks from submarines.

The use of one remedy does not exclude the use of the other. The most familiar illustration is to be found in the action taken by municipal authorities during a riot. It is the duty of the Mayor to suppress the mob and to prevent violence, but he does not hesitate to warn citizens to keep off the streets during the riots. He does not question their right to use the streets, but for their own protection and in the interest of order he warns them not to incur the risks involved in going upon the streets when men are shooting at each other.

The President does not feel justified in taking the action above stated. That is, he does not feel justified, first, in suggesting the submission of the controversy to investigation, or, second, in warning the people not to incur the extra hazards in traveling on belligerent ships or on ships carrying ammunition. And he may be right in the position he has taken, but, as a private citizen, I am free to urge both of these propositions and to call public attention to these remedies, in the hope of securing such an expression of public sentiment as will support the President in employing these remedies if in the future he finds it consistent with his sense of duty to favor them.

W.J. BRYAN.

"THE REAL ISSUE."

Washington, June 10, 1915.

To the American people:

You now have before you the text of the note to Germany—the note which it would have been my official duty to sign had I remained Secretary of State. I ask you to sit in judgment upon my decision to resign rather than to share responsibility for it.

I am sure you will credit me with honorable motives, but that is not enough. Good intentions could not atone for a mistake at such a time, on such a subject, and under such circumstances. If your verdict is against me, I ask no mercy; I desire none if I have acted unwisely.

A man in public life must act according to his conscience, but, however conscientiously he acts, he must be prepared to accept without complaint any condemnation which his own errors may bring upon him; he must be willing to bear any deserved punishment, from ostracism to execution. But hear me before you pass sentence.

The President and I agree in purpose; we desire a peaceful solution of the dispute which has arisen between the United States and Germany. We not only desire it, but, with equal fervor, we pray for it; but we differ irreconcilably as to the means of securing it.

If it were merely a personal difference, it would be a matter of little moment, for all the presumptions are on his side—the presumptions that go with power and authority. He is your President, I am a private citizen without office or title—but one of the one hundred million of inhabitants.

But the real issue is not between persons, it is between systems, and I rely for vindication wholly upon the strength of the position taken.

Among the influences which Governments employ in dealing with each other there are two which are pre-eminent and antagonistic—force and persuasion. Force speaks with firmness and acts through the ultimatum; persuasion employs argument, courts investigation, and depends upon negotiation. Force represents the old system—the system that must pass away; persuasion represents the new system—the system that has been growing, all too slowly, it is true, but growing for 1,900 years. In the old system war is the chief cornerstone—war, which at its best is little better than war at its worst; the new system contemplates a universal brotherhood established through the uplifting power of example.

If I correctly interpret the note to Germany, it conforms to the standards of the old system rather than to the rules of the new, and I cheerfully admit that it is abundantly supported by precedents—precedents written in characters of blood upon almost every page of human history. Austria furnishes the most recent precedent; it was Austria's firmness that dictated the ultimatum against Serbia, which set the world at war.

Every ruler now participating in this unparalleled conflict has proclaimed his desire for peace and denied responsibility for the war, and it is only charitable that we should credit all of them with good faith. They desired peace, but they sought it according to the rules of the old system. They believed that firmness would give the best assurance of the maintenance of peace, and, faithfully following precedent, they went so near the fire that they were, one after another, sucked into the contest.

Never before have the frightful follies of this fatal system been so clearly revealed as now. The most civilized and enlightened—aye, the most Christian—of the nations of Europe are grappling with each other as if in a death struggle. They are sacrificing the best and bravest of their sons on the battlefield; they are converting their gardens into cemeteries and their homes into houses of mourning; they are taxing the wealth of today and laying a burden of debt on the toil of the future; they have filled the air with thunderbolts more deadly than those of Jove, and they have multiplied the perils of the deep.

Adding fresh fuel to the flame of hate, they have daily devised new horrors, until one side is endeavoring to drown noncombatant men, women, and children at sea, while the other side seeks to starve noncombatant men, women, and children on land. And they are so absorbed in alternate retaliations and in competitive cruelties that they seem, for the time being, blind to the rights of neutrals and deaf to the appeals of humanity. A tree is known by its fruit. The war in Europe is the ripened fruit of the old system.

This is what firmness, supported by force, has done in the Old World; shall we invite it to cross the Atlantic? Already the jingoes of our own country have caught the rabies from the dogs of war; shall the opponents of organized slaughter be silent while the disease spreads?

As an humble follower of the Prince of Peace, as a devoted believer in the prophecy that "they that take the sword shall perish with the sword," I beg to be counted among those who earnestly urge the adoption of a course in this matter which will leave no doubt of our Government's willingness to continue negotiations with Germany until an amicable understanding is reached, or at least until, the stress of war over, we can appeal from Philip drunk with carnage to Philip sobered by the memories of a historic friendship and by a recollection of the innumerable ties of kinship that bind the Fatherland to the United States.

Some nation must lead the world out of the black night of war into the light of that day when "swords shall be beaten into plowshares." Why not make that honor ours? Some day—why not now?—the nations will learn that enduring peace cannot be built upon fear—that good-will does not grow upon the stalks of violence. Some day the nations will place their trust in love, the weapon for which there is no shield; in love, that suffereth long and is kind; in love, that is not easily provoked, that beareth all things, believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things; in love, which, though despised as weakness by the worshippers of Mars, abideth when all else fails.

W.J. BRYAN.

THE GERMAN-AMERICANS.

Washington, June 11, 1915.

To the German-Americans:

Permit me to address a word to you, as one American citizen speaking to fellow-citizens in whose patriotism he has entire confidence. It is natural that in a contest between your Fatherland and other European nations your sympathies should be with the country of your birth. It is no cause for censure that this is true. It would be a reflection upon you if it were not true. Do not the sons of Great Britain sympathize with their mother country? Do not the sons of France sympathize with theirs? Is not the same true of Russia and of Italy? Why should it not be true of those who are born in Germany or Austria? The trouble is that the extremists on both sides have mistaken a natural attachment felt for birthplace for disloyalty to this country.

The President has been unjustly criticised by the partisans of both sides—the very best evidence of his neutrality. If he had so conducted the Government as to wholly please either side it would excite not only astonishment, but misgivings, for partisans cannot give an unbiased judgment; they will of necessity look at the question from their own point of view, giving praise or blame, according as the act, regardless of its real character, helps or hurts the side with which they have aligned themselves.

The fact that the Administration has received more criticism from German-Americans than from those in sympathy with the Allies is due to the fact that, while both sides are at liberty under international law to purchase ammunition in the United States, the Allies, because of their control of the seas, have the advantage of being able to export it.

It is unfortunate that partisan supporters of Germany should have overlooked the legal requirements of the situation and have thus misunderstood the position of the Administration. The Administration's position has not only been perfectly neutral, but it could not have been otherwise without a palpable and intentional violation of the rules governing neutrality.

This Government is not at liberty to materially change the rules of international law during the war, because every change suggested is discussed, not upon its merits as an abstract proposition, but according to the effect it will have upon the contest. Those who wanted to lay an embargo upon the shipments of arms defended their position on the ground that it would hasten peace, but it is strange that they could have overlooked the fact that the only way in which such action on our part could hasten peace would have been by helping one side to overcome the other.

While the attacks made upon the President by the extremists of both sides were very unjust, it was equally unjust to suspect the patriotism of those who took sides. I feel well enough acquainted with the European-born Americans to believe that in a war between this country and any European power the naturalized citizens from that country would be as quick to enlist as native-born citizens.

As I am now speaking to German-Americans, I am glad to repeat in public what I have often said in private, and would have said in public before but for the fact that it would not have been proper for one in my official position to do so—namely, that in case of war between the United States and Germany—if so improbable a supposition can be considered—German-Americans would be as prompt to enlist and as faithful to the flag as any other portion of our people. What I have said in regard to German-Americans is an introduction to an appeal which I feel it my duty to make to them.

First, if any of them have ever in a moment of passion or excitement suspected the President of lack of friendship toward the German Government and the German people, let that thought be forgotten, never again to be recalled. I have, since my resignation, received numerous telegrams from German-Americans and German-American societies commending my action. I think the senders of these telegrams understand my position; but that no one may mistake it let me restate it. The President is not only desirous of peace, but he hopes for it, and he has adopted the methods which he thinks most likely to contribute toward peace.

My difference from him is as to method, not as to purpose, and my utterances since resigning have been intended to crystallize public sentiment in support of his efforts to maintain peace, or, to use a similar phrase, "Peace with Honor." But remember that when I use the phrase "Peace with Honor" I do not use it in the same sense that those do who regard every opponent of war as favoring "peace at any price." Peace at any price is an epithet, not a true statement of any one's position or of the policy of any group. The words are employed by jingoes as an expression of contempt, and are applied indiscriminately to all who have faith in the nation's ability to find a peaceful way out of every difficulty, so long as both nations want peace.

The alarmists of the country have had control of the metropolitan press, and they have loudly proclaimed that the prolongation of negotiations or the suggestion of international investigation would be a sign of weakness—and everything is weakness that does not contain a hint of war. The jingo sees in the rainbow of promise only one color—red.

Second—Knowing that the President desires peace, it is our duty to help him secure it. And how? By exerting your influence to convince the German Government of this fact and to persuade that Government to take no steps that would lead in the direction of war. My fear has been that the German Government might, despairing of a friendly settlement, break off diplomatic relations, and thus create a condition out of which war might come without the intention of either country.

I do not ask you to minimize the earnestness of the President's statement—that would be unfair, both to him and to Germany. The sinking of the Lusitania cannot be defended upon the facts as we understand them. The killing of innocent women and children cannot be justified, whether the killing is by drowning or starving.

No nation can successfully plead the inhumanity of her enemies as an excuse for inhumanity on her own part. While it is true that cruelty is apt to beget cruelty, it cannot be said that "like cures like." Even in war, we are not absolved from the obligation to remedy evils by the influence of a good example. "Let your light so shine" is a precept that knows no times nor seasons as it knows neither latitude nor longitude.

Third—Do not attempt to connect the negotiations which are going on between the United States and Germany with those between the United States and Great Britain. The cases are different, but, even if they were the same, it would be necessary to treat with each nation separately. My personal preference has been to repeat our insistence that the Allies shall not interfere with our commerce with neutral countries, but the difference on this point was a matter of judgment and not a matter of principle. In the note to Great Britain, dated March 30, this Government said:

In view of these assurances formally given to this Government, it is confidently expected that the extensive powers conferred by the Order in Council on the executive officers of the Crown will be restricted by "orders issued by the Government" directing the exercise of their discretionary powers in such a manner as to modify in practical application those provisions of the Order in Council which, if strictly enforced, would violate neutral rights and interrupt legitimate trade. Relying on the faithful performance of these voluntary assurances by his Majesty's Government the United States takes it for granted that the approach of American merchantmen to neutral ports situated upon the long line of coast affected by the Order in Council will not be interfered with, when it is known that they do not carry goods which are contraband of war or goods destined to or proceeding from ports within the belligerent territory affected.

There is no doubt that our Government will insist upon this position—that is an important thing, the exact date of the note is not material. My reason for desiring to have the matter presented to Great Britain at once was not that Germany had any right to ask it, but because I was anxious to make it as easy as possible for Germany to accept the demands of the United States and cease to employ submarines against merchantmen.

There is no reason why any German-Americans should doubt the President's intentions in this matter. I am sure that every one upon reflection recognizes that our duty to prevent loss of life is more urgent than our duty to prevent interference with trade—loss of trade can be compensated for with money, but no settlement that the United States and Germany may reach can call back to life those who went down with the Lusitania—and war would be the most expensive of all settlements because it would enormously add to the number of the dead.

Fourth—I hope that Germany will acquiesce in the demands that have been made, and I hope that she will acquiesce in them without conditions. She can trust the United States to deal justly with her in the consideration of any changes that she may propose in the international rules that govern the taking of prizes. The more generously she acts in this matter the greater will be the glory which she will derive from it. She has raised a question which is now receiving serious consideration, namely, whether the introduction of the submarine necessitates any change in the rules governing the capture of prizes. The position seemingly taken by Germany, namely, that she is entitled to drown noncombatants because they ride with contraband, is an untenable position. The most that she could insist upon is that, in view of the introduction of this new weapon of warfare, new rules should be adopted, separating passengers from objectionable cargo.

If the use of the submarine justifies such a change in the law of blockade as will permit the cordon to be withdrawn far enough from the shore to avoid the danger of submarine attack, may it not be found possible to secure an international agreement by which passengers will be excluded from ships carrying contraband, or, at least, from those carrying ammunition?

It would require but a slight change in the shipping laws to make this separation, and belligerent nations might be restrained from unnecessarily increasing the contraband list if they were compelled to carry contraband on transports as they now carry troops.

Personally, I would like to see the use of submarines abandoned entirely, just as I would like to see an abandonment of the use of aeroplanes and Zeppelins for the carrying of explosives, but I am not sanguine enough to believe that any effective instrument of warfare will be abandoned as long as war continues.

The very arguments which the advocates of peace advance against the submarine, the aeroplane, and the Zeppelin are advanced for them by those who conduct war. The more fatal a weapon is the more it is in demand, and it is not an unusual thing to see a new instrument of destruction denounced as inhuman by those against whom it is employed, only to be employed later by those who only a little while before denounced it.

The above suggestions are respectfully submitted to those of German birth or descent, and they are submitted in the same spirit to naturalized citizens from other countries. To the naturalized citizen this is the land of adoption, but in one sense it may be nearer to him than it is to us who are native born, for those who come here are citizens by voluntary choice, while we are here by accident of birth. They may be said to have paid a higher compliment to the United States than we who first saw the light under the Stars and Stripes. But, more than that, it is the land of their children and their children's children, no matter for what reason they crossed the ocean. They not only share with us the shaping of our nation's destiny, but their descendants have a part with ours in all the blessings which the present generation can, by wise and patriotic action, bequeath to the generations that are to follow.

W.J. BRYAN.

SEES CHANGE IN TONE OF PRESS.

On the same day with this outgiving Mr. Bryan issued a statement expressing his gratification over what he termed a change in the tone of the press regarding the note. The statement follows:

I am glad to note the change in the tone of the press in regard to the note to Germany. From the time the papers began to publish forecasts down to yesterday the jingo editors have been predicting that the matter would be dealt with with "great firmness"; that Germany would be told that there must be no more delay in the acceptance of this country's demands, &c.

Instead of waiting until the note was issued they put their own construction upon it in advance, and colored it to suit their own purposes. It is a relief to find the papers now emphasizing the friendly tone of the note, and pointing out that it does not necessarily mean war.

Something has been gained if the warrior journalists at last realize that the country does not want war, but that, on the contrary, it will support the President in his efforts to find a peaceful solution of the difficult problem raised by the use of the submarine against merchantmen.

In giving out his statement Mr. Bryan supplemented it with the following anecdote:

A Congressman replying to a jingo speech recently said:

"While I am personally against war, I am in favor of the country having what it wants. If the country wants war, let it have war, but let it first find out if the country does want war. If it becomes necessary to ascertain the sentiment of the country, I suggest that a ballot be taken; let those who want war vote for war and those opposed to war vote against it, and let the vote be taken with the understanding that those who vote for war will enlist for war and that those who vote against war will not be called upon until after those who want war have exhausted their efforts."

"I still believe," added Mr. Bryan, "in the right of the people to rule, and think the Congressman's suggestion might insure deliberate action on the part of the voters."

Mr. Bryan was reminded of the suggestion of some of his friends that in case of war he would be one of the first to enlist. He replied:

I do not want to talk about war, but on one occasion I enlisted to defend my country on the first day war was declared.

GERMAN-AMERICAN OPINION.

Commenting on Mr. Bryan's appeal, the evening edition of the New Yorker Herold on June 12 said:

The arguments which Mr. Bryan dishes up will not be agreed to by most citizens of German descent, but the open discussion of the various points can only be useful.

So far as influencing the German Government is concerned, we are convinced that in Berlin they will not forget for an instant how terrible a warlike conflict between the two countries would be, particularly for the Germans in America. In view of the many bonds of blood that link the German population of our country with the old Fatherland, a war with the United States would be regarded practically as fratricidal, as a calamity which, if in any way possible, must be avoided. Mr. Bryan may rest assured of this.

The influence of the German-Americans is required less in Germany than here, at this point and place, in the United States. Here the jingo press is raging and seeking to fire minds to war, not in Germany.

From the Detroiter Abendpost.

Mr. Bryan's proclamation will disappoint only those who hailed him when he published his reasons for leaving the Cabinet; but we find in his last document the confirmation of what we have always thought of the man and the politician Bryan, namely, that he considers all means right if they suit his political intentions.

From Charles Neumeyer, Editor Louisville Anzeiger.

Mr. Bryan's appeal directed chiefly to American citizens of German birth exhibits an astonishing lack of tact as well as lack of judgment. The former Secretary of State seems to be going on the presumption, like many other native Americans not actuated by a feeling of prejudice or race hatred, that German-Americans have left their hearts behind them in the old country and are, therefore, unable to feel as true American citizens should feel toward their country and everything involving its destiny.

Mr. Bryan's appeal, especially the one directed to German-Americans, will not, can not, and should not meet with the slightest response.

From the Colorado Herold of Denver.

Bryan's appeal to the Germans, while it may be classed as patriotic, was unnecessary, and Dr. Dernburg, Germany's special envoy, practically voiced the same sentiments in his farewell address in New York Friday night. Bryan's well-known prohibition tendencies, however, preclude the idea that he was bidding for German-American votes.

From the Waechter und Anzeiger of Cleveland, Ohio.

Mr. Bryan might well have abstained from issuing his statement to the German-Americans. To make any impression he should have explained why he now thinks it the duty of neutrality to furnish contraband to England, when in 1914 he stated in his Commoner that the President had blazed a new way when he, without conference with other nations, committed this nation to the policy that furnishing the "contraband of money" was inconsistent with the spirit of neutrality. What are the influences that have now changed his views? Mr. Bryan is neither frank nor consistent, hence not impressive.

A "SOFTENED" NOTE.

[The First and Second German Notes.]

Washington, June 12, 1915.

My attention has been called to a number of newspaper editorials and articles which, in varying language, asks the question, "Why did Mr. Bryan sign the first note to Germany, and then refuse to sign the second?" The argument presented in the question is based on the supposition that the two notes were substantially the same and that the second note simply reiterates the demands contained in the first. They then declare it inconsistent to sign one and refuse to sign the other. The difference between the two cases would seem obvious enough to make an answer unnecessary, but, lest silence on the subject be taken as an admission of inconsistency, the following explanation is given:

The notes must be considered in connection with the conditions under which they were sent. The first note presented the case of this Government upon such evidence as we then had. It was like the plaintiff's statement in a case, his claim being based on the facts as he presents them. I did not agree entirely with the language of the first note, but the difference was not so material as to justify a refusal to sign it. Then, too, I was at that time hoping that certain things would be done which would make it easier for Germany to acquiesce in our demands.

The three things which I had in mind which, in my judgment, would have helped the situation were: First, an announcement of a willingness upon our part to employ the principle of investigation, embodied in our thirty peace treaties; second, action which would prevent American citizens from traveling on belligerent ships or on American ships carrying contraband, especially if that contraband consisted of ammunition; and, third, further insistence upon our protest against interference of our trade with neutrals. I thought that these three things were within the range of possibilities, and that two, or at least one was probable.

Some weeks have elapsed since the first note was sent, and we have not only failed to do any of these things hoped for, but Germany has in the meantime answered and in her answer has not only presented a number of alleged facts which, in her judgment, justified the deviation which she has made from the ordinary rules applicable to prize cases, but she has suggested arbitration. A rejection of the arguments which she presented and of the allegations made, together with a reiteration of the original demands, creates a very different situation from that which existed when the first demand was made.

As I have before stated, my fear has been that, owing to the feeling existing in Germany, the Government might, upon receipt of such a note under such circumstances, break off diplomatic relations and thus create a situation out of which war might come without the intention of either side. I am sure that the President does not want war and I am confident that our people do not want war; I have no reason to believe that either the German Government or the German people desire war.

But war, a calamity at any time, is especially to be avoided now because our nation is relied upon by both neutrals and belligerents as the one nation which can exert most influence toward bringing this war to an end. If we were, by accident, to be drawn into the conflict, we would not only surrender the opportunity to act as a mediator, but we might become responsible for drawing other nations into this contest. When we see how one nation after another has been dragged into this war we cannot have confidence in the ability of any one to calculate with certainty upon the results that might follow if we became embroiled in the war.

No one would be happier than I if the President's plan results in a peaceful settlement, but no one was in position to say what effect our note would have upon Germany, or what results would follow if she, in anger, broke off diplomatic relations, and I was not only unwilling to assume the responsibility for the risks incurred—risks which no one could with any degree of accuracy measure—but I felt that, having done all I could in the Cabinet, it was my duty to undertake, outside the Cabinet, the work upon which I have entered.

I have no doubt that the country will unanimously support the President during the war, if so great a misfortune should overtake us, but I believe that the chances of war will be lessened in proportion as the country expresses itself in favor of peace—not "peace at any price"—but peace in preference to a war waged for the redress of such grievances as we have against Germany—at least against war until we have given to Germany the opportunity which we are pledged to give to Great Britain, France, and Russia—to have every difference of every character submitted to an international commission of investigation.

I would contend as earnestly for the application of the treaty principle to the Allies as I contend for it in the case of Germany. If the principle is sound, it ought to be applied to every country with which we have a difference, and if it ought to be applied at all I think it is better to suggest it in the beginning than to accept it later after a seeming reluctance to apply it.

I understand that Secretary Lansing has already given out a statement, correcting an inaccuracy which appeared in this morning's paper. I appreciate his kindness.

It is true that I saw the final draft of the note just before my resignation took effect, but it contained an important change. I had no knowledge of this change at the time my resignation was tendered and accepted. This change, while very much softening the note, was not, however, sufficient, in my judgment, to justify me in asking permission to withdraw my resignation.

As Germany had suggested arbitration, I felt that we could not do less than reply to this offer by expressing a willingness to apply the principle of the peace treaties to the case. These treaties, while providing for investigation of all questions, leave the nations free to act independently after the international commission has concluded the investigation.

W.J. BRYAN.

STATEMENTS ON THE WAR IN EUROPE.

Mr. Bryan on June 16 gave out the first of three statements about the present war, and in it he predicts that a conference will be held at the close of the conflict to revise the rules of international law. The present rules, in Mr. Bryan's opinion, "seem to have been made for the nations at war rather than for the nations at peace."

The statement contains a hint to President Wilson in the concluding paragraph which says that "in all history no other peacemaker has ever been in position to claim so rich a blessing as that which will be pronounced on our President when the time for mediation comes—as come it must." Its text follows:

Washington, June 16, 1915.

I shall tomorrow discuss the origin of the war and the reasons which led the nations of Europe to march, as if blindfolded, into the bloody conflict which now rests like a pall over the fairest parts of the Old World; today let us consider the war as it is and the injury it is doing to the neutral nations.

The war is without a precedent in the populations represented, in the number of combatants in the field, in daily expenditures, in the effectiveness of the implements employed, in the lists of dead and wounded, in the widespread suffering caused and in the intensity of the hatreds aroused.

No class or condition is exempt from the burdens which this war imposes. The rich bear excessive taxation and the poor are sorely oppressed; the resources of today are devoured and the products of tomorrow are mortgaged. No age is immune. The first draft was upon the strong and vigorous, but the Governments are already calling for those above and below the ordinary enlistment zone.

The war's afflictions are visited upon women as well as upon men—upon wives who await in vain a husband's return, and upon mothers who must surrender up the sons whose support is the natural reliance of declining years. Even children are its victims—children innocent of wrong and incapable of doing harm. By war's dread decree babes come into the world fatherless at their birth, while the bodies of their sires are burned like worthless stubble in the fields over which the Grim Reaper has passed.

The most extreme illustrations collected from history to prove the loathsomeness of war are overshadowed by new indictments written daily; the most distressing pictures drawn by the imagination are surpassed by the realities of this indescribable contest. Surely we behold "the pestilence that walketh in darkness and the destruction that wasteth at noonday."

Neutral nations cannot look on with indifference—the ties that bind them together are too strong, the relationship too intimate. This is especially true of the United States. We have a composite population, every nation of Europe having contributed liberally to our citizenship. These our countrymen, themselves born abroad or immediately descended from foreign-born ancestors, cannot but take a likely interest in the conduct as well as in the results of the war, and a still larger circle shares the concern of those directly connected. Not a soldier falls on either side but the sorrow expressed in his home finds an echo at some fireside in the United States.

But, aside from sentimental considerations, neutral nations suffer serious disturbances because of the war. Duelists, when dueling was in fashion, were careful to select a place where they could settle their personal differences without harm to unoffending bystanders, but warring nations cannot, no matter how earnestly they try, avoid injury to neutrals. As the nauseous odors of a slaughterhouse, carried on the breeze, pollute the air in every direction, so the evil influences emanating from these wide-extended battlefields taint the atmosphere of the whole political world. War is an international nuisance. Nearly every neutral nation finds new domestic problems thrust upon it and old problems made more difficult.

No American citizen can note without deep concern the manner in which war questions have intruded themselves into our politics—overshadowing economic issues and stimulating agitation in favor of enlarged appropriations for military and naval purposes. Business is deranged and expensive readjustments made necessary, while commerce with foreign nations is seriously interrupted. Fluctuations in price abroad are reflected in the markets of the United States. A fall of one cent in the price of cotton means tens of millions of dollars to our producers and merchants. Added to this, freight rates and insurance premiums have been increased to cover the greater risks incident to war.

Scarcity of ships is one of the greatest commercial embarrassments caused by the war. We have depended largely upon foreign ships to carry our commerce, and we could not but suffer when the merchantmen of one side were driven from the sea and a part of the merchant fleet of the other side was withdrawn for Government use.

The neutral nations are put to a great expense to preserve neutrality and are constantly in danger of being embroiled in the war without intention or fault on their part.

The rules of international law seem to have been made for the nations at war rather than for the nations at peace. It is almost impossible to alter these rules during the war, because any material change, affecting as it would the interests of belligerents, would be a seeming violation of neutrality. As soon as peace returns there will be a demand for an international conference on the subject. The presumption should then be given to peace, for peace, not war, is the normal condition. If nations are determined to fight they should, as far as possible, bear their burden themselves and not be permitted to transfer it to the nations which avoid war by resorting to reason instead of force.

Under the stress and strain of the titanic struggle in which they are engaged, each side has felt itself justified in encroaching upon the rights of neutrals. The ocean highways, the common property of all, have been to some extent appropriated for war purposes, and delicate diplomatic questions are forced upon the neutral nations. Just at this time, when these questions are most acute, the belligerent Governments are least able to deal with them with the calmness and poise which their great importance demands.

No wonder every neutral nation is increasingly anxious for the war to end; but of all the neutral nations ours has the most reason for the return of peace—most reason to set its face resolutely against participation in this war. This nation, the head of the neutral group and the sincere friend of all the belligerents, is in duty bound to set an example in patience and self-restraint.

In all history no such opportunity has ever come to any other nation as that which is destined to come to the United States. In all history no other peacemaker has ever been in a position to claim so rich a blessing as that which will be pronounced upon our President when the time for mediation comes—as come it must.

W.J. BRYAN.

"PREPAREDNESS" AND WAR.

That military preparedness provokes war is the conclusion drawn by Mr. Bryan in the second utterance in his series of three concerning the European conflict and war in general. It reads:

Washington, June 17, 1915.

The conflict now raging in Europe has been described as "The Causeless War," but since no one would be bold enough to lay the blame for such an unholy situation upon an overruling Providence, it must find its origin in acts for which man, and man alone, is responsible.

It is not a race war; on the contrary, the races are quite inexplicably mixed. Latin joins with Saxon; the Frank is the ally of the Slav; while in the opposing ranks Teuton and Turk fight side by side.

Neither is it a religious war. On the Bosporus the Cross and the Crescent make common cause; Protestant Kaiser and Catholic Emperor have linked their fortunes together and hurl their veteran legions against an army in which are indiscriminately mingled communicants of the Greek Church, of the Church of Rome, and of the Church of England.

Nor yet is it a rivalry between families. The leading actors in this unprecedented tragedy are related by blood, but kinship seems to be a negligible factor—it explains neither friendships nor enmities.

No. Race, religion, and family, each with many wars to answer for, can plead not guilty in the present inquiry. So far as can be judged, there appears upon the surface no cause that by any known standard can be regarded as adequate for such a cataclysm as we are now witnessing.

The notes that passed from chancellery to chancellery were couched in most friendly language. These notes could not have been intended to deceive. Sovereigns visited each other and were received with every evidence of cordiality and good-will. This hospitality could not have been insincere.

Each ruler declared that he did not wish war; would they all say this if an adequate cause for war had actually existed? They have all denied responsibility for the war—would they have done so if they had regarded the war as either necessary or desirable?

But there is even better proof, aye, indisputable proof, that no sufficient cause existed, viz., the conclusion to be drawn from inaction.

Would not these rulers have busied themselves trying to save their subjects by the eradication of the cause had they known of the existence of such a cause? Would they have spent their time in social festivities and in exchanging compliments had they known that they were on the brink of war? It is inconceivable! It would be a gross libel on them, one and all, to charge such a wanton disregard of their sacred duty.

What, then, was the cause? If I have correctly analyzed the situation, the war is the natural result of a false philosophy. Theories of life are invisible, but they control for good or for evil. They enter our very being, and may be as deadly to the moral man as germs of disease, taken into the body, are deadly to the physical man. The fundamental precept of this false philosophy is that "might makes right." It is not proclaimed now as loudly as it once was, but it is often acted upon in particular cases by those who would be unwilling to indorse it as a general principle.

The individual makes this maxim his excuse for violating three commandments that stand in his way; this maxim also leads nations to violate these same three commandments for the same purpose, but on a larger scale.

Strange that men should fail to apply to nations the moral principles which are now so generally applied to the individual units of a nation!

The tendency is to condemn the violation of these commandments, not in proportion to the injury done, but rather in inverse proportion. No one will dispute the validity of the injunction against covetousness as long as the object coveted is of little value or not greatly desired, but the last and all-inclusive specifications, viz., "or anything that is thy neighbor's," is sometimes interpreted by nations to except a neighbor's vineyard or a neighbor's territory. Covetousness turns to might as the principle to be invoked, and the greater the unlawful desire the firmer the faith in the false principle.

Conquest is the word used to describe the means employed for securing the thing desired, if the force is employed by a nation, and conquest violates the commandments Thou Shalt Not Steal and Thou Shalt Not Kill.

By what sophistry can rulers convince themselves that, while petit larceny is criminal, grand larceny is patriotic; that, while it is reprehensible for one man to kill another for his money, it is glorious for one nation to put to the sword the inhabitants of another nation in order to extend boundaries?

It is a mockery of moral distinctions to hang one man for taking the life of another, either for money or in revenge, and then make a hero of another man who wades "through slaughter to a throne, and shut the doors of mercy on mankind."

As in the case of the individual, the violation of the commandments Thou Shall Not Covet, Thou Shalt Not Steal, and Thou Shalt Not Kill, are usually traceable to the violation of the first great commandment—Thou Shalt Have No Other Gods Before Me—that is, to the putting of self before service of the Creator.

The violation of these commandments by nations is not always, but usually, due to selfishness—the putting of supposed material advantages before obedience to the Divine Law.

War is occasionally altruistic in purpose and the soldier always exhibits unselfishness of high order, but, as a rule, conflicts are waged for selfish ends.

The individual finds that Jehovah's justice cannot be evaded; for wrongdoing works its own punishment on the wrongdoer in the form of perverted character when he escapes the penalties of human law. The nation is as powerless to repeal or to ignore with impunity the laws of God—"Though hand join in hand they shall not be unpunished."

If I have made it clear that the doctrine that might makes right is the most common cause of war, we may pass to the consideration of a maxim quite sure to be applied in war, namely, that "like cures like"—the theory upon which retaliation rests.

The two are so closely allied that it is almost inevitable that those who indorse the former will resort to the latter—one representing the spirit of will, the other its most familiar manifestation. Rivalry for rivalry in wrongdoing—a neck-and-neck race to the bottomless pit. And yet there are many believers in the gospel of force, who have brought themselves to think that cruelty can be cured by greater cruelty—that the only way to win an antagonist away from inhuman acts is to surpass him in inhumanities. Absurdity of absurdities!

But might must find a pretext for arming itself; and what is the pretext? There was a time when men openly advocated war as a thing to be desired; commended it to each generation as a sort of tonic to tone up the moral system and prevent degeneracy, but we have passed that day.

Now all join in the chorus for peace. And how, according to the jingoes, shall peace be insured? "By preparedness," say these sons of Mars. Prepare, all prepare; equip yourselves with the most modern implements of destruction; arm, drill, get ready, and then stand with fingers on a barrel of a musket and preserve peace—you preserve it until some one, by accident or design, gives the signal—then all fall upon each other with cries for blood. Preparedness is the kindling; opportunity is the match.

We dare not trust the peace of the world to those who spend their time in getting ready for wars that should never come. Half the energy employed in preparing for war would effectually prevent war if used in propagating the principles which make for peace.

Instead of preventing war, preparedness provokes war, because it is impossible to coerce the people into bearing the burdens incident to continuous and increasing preparation without cultivating hatred as if it were a national virtue. There must be some one to fear; some other preparing nation that must be represented as plotting for war.

Hate sets up sham standards of honor and converts every wound into a festering sore; hate misunderstands; hate misinterprets; hate maligns its supposed adversary, while every contractor, battleship builder, and manufacturer of munitions of war applauds.

How can preparedness prevent war, if all prepared? Each step taken by one nation toward more complete preparedness excites the other nations to additional purchases and new levies, until all have exhausted their productive industries and menaced their moral progress.

The doctrine that preparedness will prevent war will not stand the test of logic, and the conflagration in Europe shows that it fails when tested by experience.

If any nation is without excuse for entering into a mad rivalry with the belligerent nations in preparation for war it is the United States. We are protected on either side by thousands of miles of ocean, and this protection is worth more to us than any number of battleships. We have an additional protection in the fact—known to every one—that we have the men with whom to form an army of defense if we are ever attacked, and it is known also that we have the money, too—more money than we would have if the surplus earnings of the people had been invested in armament. We not only do not need additional preparation, but we are fortunate in not having it, as now it seems impossible for a nation to have what is called preparedness on slight notification.

The leading participants in the present war are the nations that were best prepared, and I fear it would have been difficult for us to keep out of this war if we had been as well prepared as they.

Happily for our nation, we have in the White House at this time a President who believes in setting the Old World an example instead of following the bad example which it has set in this matter. What an unspeakable misfortune it would have been if in such an hour as this the nation had been under the leadership of a President inflamed by the false philosophy which has plunged Europe into the abyss of war.

W.J. BRYAN.

HOW TO END THE WAR.

The concluding argument of ex-Secretary Bryan for permanent peace among the great powers was published on June 18, 1915. The statement follows:

Washington, June 18, 1915.

Having considered the war as it is and the injury which it does neutrals, and then the origin of the war and the causes which led up to it, we are now ready to make inquiry as to the way out—that is, the means by which hostilities can be brought to an end and permanent peace restored. To state in a sentence the propositions which I shall proceed to elaborate: Mediation is the means, provided by international agreement, through which the belligerent nations can be brought into conference; time for the investigation of all disputes is the means by which future wars can be averted, and the cultivation of international friendship is the means by which the desire for war can be rooted out.

What are the nations fighting about? No one seems to know, or if any one does know, he has not taken the public into his confidence. We have been told, in a general way, that the Allies are fighting against "militarism" and in defense of "popular government," and that Germany is fighting in defense of "German culture" and for the nation's right to "a place in the sun." But these generalities are so differently interpreted as not to convey a definite idea. When the President offered mediation at the very beginning of the struggle the answers which he received from the various rulers were so much alike that one telegram might have served for all. The substance of each answer was, "I did not want war and I am not to blame for the war that now exists." But that was ten months ago; the question now is not whether those in authority in the belligerent nations did or did not want war then; we may accept their answers as given in good faith, but the important question is still unanswered. "I did not want war" may have been deemed sufficient at the time the answers were given, but the real question is, "Do you want war now? If not, why not say so?"

The months have dragged their bloody length along—each more terrible than the month before—and yet the crimson line of battle sways to and fro, each movement marked by dreadful loss of life. While warriors die and widows weep, the sovereign rulers of the warring powers withhold the word that would stop the war. No Chief of State has yet said, "I do not want war." No one in authority has yet publicly declared his willingness to state the terms upon which his nation is ready to negotiate peace. Are not these dying men and these sorrowing women entitled to know definitely for what their nation is fighting? Is it territory? Then how much territory, and where is it located? Is it the avenging of a wrong done? Then how much more blood must be spilled to make atonement for the blood already shed? Some day accumulated suffering will reach its limit; some day the pent-up anguish which this war is causing will find a voice. Then, if not before, the rulers in the war zone will pause to listen to the stern question, "Why do we die?"—the question which shakes thrones and marks the furthermost limits of arbitrary power.

And is not the outside world entitled to know the price of peace? Must the neutrals bear the penalties which war necessarily visits upon them, and yet remain in ignorance as to the issues at stake? Their trade is interrupted, their citizens are drowned, they are the victims of stray bullets—have they no right to know what it is that, being done, will draw down the curtain of this dark tragedy? Has any nation a purpose for continuing this war which it does not dare to state to the world, or even to its own people?

Surely neither side thinks it can annihilate the other. Great nations cannot be exterminated—population cannot be wiped out by the sword. The combatants, even though the war may have made them heartless, will shrink from the task of carrying this slaughter beyond the point necessary to win a victory. And it must be remembered that war plans often miscarry. Predictions made at the beginning of the war have not been fulfilled. The British did not destroy the German fleet in a month, and Germany did not take Paris in two months, and the Russian Army did not eat Christmas dinner in Berlin. But even if extermination were possible, it would be a crime against civilization which no nation or group of nations could afford to commit. If it is vandalism to destroy the finest specimens of man's workmanship, is it not sacrilege to engage in the wholesale destruction of human beings—the supreme example of God's handiwork? We may find cases of seeming total depravity among individuals, but not in a nation or in a race. The future has use for the peoples now at war; they have a necessary part in that destiny which mankind must work out together regardless of these ebullitions of anger. The Lord might have made all flowers of one kind, of one color and alike in fragrance—but He did not. And because He did not, the world is more beautiful. Variety, not uniformity, is the law among men as well as among the flowers. The nations which are actively participating in this war are what they are because of struggles that have lasted for centuries. They differ in language, in institutions, in race characteristics, and in national history, but together they constitute a great living bouquet that is of surpassing beauty.

We may put aside, therefore, as wholly impracticable, if not inconceivable, the thought that this war can continue until one side has annihilated the other. What, then, can be the purpose? The complete domination of Europe by one nation or group of nations? The absurdity of such a plan is only second to the absurdity of the thought that either side can annihilate the other. The world is not looking for a master; the day of the despot is gone. The future will be gloomy indeed if the smaller nations must pass under the yoke of any power or combination of powers. The question is not who shall dictate on land, or who shall dominate upon the sea. These questions are not practical ones. The real question is, not how a few can lay burdens upon the rest, but how all can work together as comrades and brothers.

Even if it were possible for one side to force the other side to its knees in supplication, even if it were possible for one side to write the terms of the treaty in blood and compel the other side to sign it, face downward and prostrate on the ground, it could not afford to do so; and unless the belligerents have read history to no purpose, they will not desire to do so. Time and again some nation, boastful of its strength, has thought itself invincible, but the ruins of these mistaken and misguided nations line the pathway along which the masses have marched to higher ground. Despotism has in it the seeds of death; the spirit that leads a nation to aspire to a supremacy based on force is the spirit that destroys its hope of immortality. Only those who are unacquainted with the larger influences can place their sole reliance on the weapons used in physical warfare. They see only the things that are transient and ephemeral; they do not comprehend the higher truth that "the things that are seen are temporal; the things that are unseen are eternal."

Christian nations need to read again Christ's prayer upon the Cross, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." All the participants in this war have sinned enough to make them anxious to exhibit that forgiving spirit which is the measure of the forgiveness which can be claimed.

When can peace be restored? Any time—now, if the participants are really weary of this war and ready for it to end. If any nation is not ready, let its ruler state in clear, distinct, and definite terms the conditions upon which it is willing to agree to peace; then if an agreement is not reached the blame for the continuance of the war will be upon those who make unreasonable demands.

What can be done by the advocates of peace? First, they can crystallize the sentiment in favor of peace into a coercive force, for public opinion at last controls the world. There is a work which the neutrals can do; they can offer mediation, jointly or severally. It is not an act of hostility, but an act of friendship. The Hague Convention, to which all the Governments are parties, expressly declares that the offer of mediation shall not be considered an unfriendly act. The duty of offering mediation may seem to rest primarily upon the United States, the largest of the neutral nations, and the one most intimately bound by ties of blood to all the belligerents. The United States did make an offer immediately after the war began. But why not again and again and again, until our offer or some other offer is accepted? Why not stand at the door and knock, as we would at the door of a friend if we felt that the friend was in need and that we could render a service?

But our action or failure to act need not deter any other neutral country from acting. This is not a time to stand on ceremony; if any other country, for any reason, no matter what that reason may be, is in a better position than we to tender its good offices, it should not delay for a moment. It is for the belligerents to decide which offer, if any, they will accept. I am sure they will not complain if, following the promptings of our hearts, we beseech them to let us help them back to the paths of peace.

Will they object on the ground that they will not consent to any peace until they have assurances that it will be a permanent peace? That suggestion has been made—I think both sides have expressed a desire that the peace, when secured, shall be permanent—but who can give a pledge as to the future? If fear that the peace may not be permanent is given as the reason for refusal it is not a sufficient reason. While no one can stand surety for what may come, it is not difficult to adopt measures which will give far greater assurance of permanent peace than the world has ever known before.

Second—The treaty in which they join should provide for investigation by a permanent international commission of every dispute that may arise, no matter what its character or nature. The United States has already made thirty treaties embodying this principle, and these thirty treaties link our country to nearly three-quarters of all the inhabitants of the world. We have such a treaty in force between the United States and four of the countries now at war—Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy. The principle of this treaty has been accepted by three other belligerents—Germany, Austria, and Belgium—although treaties with these nations have not yet been negotiated. These seven warring nations have indorsed the principle embodied in these treaties, namely, that there shall be no declaration of war or commencement of hostilities until the subject in dispute has been investigated by an international commission. Why cannot they apply the principle as between themselves? What cause of war is of such magnitude that nations can afford to commence shooting at each other before the cause is investigated? A treaty such as those which now protect the peace of the United States would give a year's time for investigation and report, and who doubts that a year's time would be sufficient to reach an amicable settlement of almost every difficulty?

Does any one suppose that the present war would have been begun if a year's time had been taken to investigate the dispute between Austria and Serbia? It will be remembered that Serbia had only twenty-four hours in which to reply, and it will also be remembered that during this brief time the rulers of the Old World endeavored to find a means of preventing war. If they had only had some machinery which they could have employed to avert war, how gladly would they have availed themselves of it! The machinery provided by treaty can be resorted to with honor—yes, with honor—no matter how high a sense of honor the nation has. The trouble has been that, while the nations were abundantly provided with machinery for conducting war, they possessed no machinery for the promotion of peace. A year's time allows passion to subside and reason to resume its sway. It allows man to act when he is calm instead of having to act when he is angry. When a man is angry he swaggers around and talks about what he can do, and he often overestimates his strength; when he is calm he considers what he ought to do. When he is angry he hears the rumbling of earthquakes and the sweep of the hurricane; when he is calm he listens to the still small voice of conscience.

Third—While the period of investigation provided for in our treaties will go far toward preventing war, still even a year's deliberation does not give complete protection. In order to secure the investigation of all questions without exception it was necessary to reserve to the contracting parties liberty of action at the conclusion of the investigation. War is thus reduced from a probability to a mere possibility, and this is an immeasurable advance; but the assurance of permanent peace cannot be given until the desire for war is eradicated from the human heart. Compulsory periods of investigation supply the machinery by which nations can maintain peace with honor if they so desire; but the final work of the advocates of peace is educational—it is the cultivation of the spirit of brotherhood condensed into the commandment "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Is it impossible to imagine a civilization in which greatness will be measured by service and in which the rivalry will be a rivalry in doing good? No one doubts that the lot of each member of society would be infinitely better under such conditions; why not strive to bring about such conditions? Is it visionary to hope and labor for this end? "Where there is no vision the people perish." It is a "death grapple in the darkness 'twixt old systems and the Word." The old system has broken down; it can let loose the furies, but it cannot bind them; it is impotent to save. The question is not whether the Word will triumph—that is certain—but when? And after what sufferings?

Thomas Carlyle, his voice rising clear and strong above the babble of Mammon, asked, in the closing chapters of his French Revolution:

"Hast thou considered how Thought is stronger than Artillery Parks, and (were it fifty years after death and martyrdom, or were it two thousand years) writes and unwrites Acts of Parliament, removes mountains, models the World like soft clay? Also how the beginning of all Thought worth the name is Love."

The truth which he uttered is still truth, and no matter who uttered it, the thought is the thought of Him who spake as never man spake; who was described in prophecy as the Prince of Peace; whose coming was greeted with the song of "Peace on earth; good-will to men," and whose teachings, when applied, will usher in the enduring peace of a universal brotherhood.

W.J. BRYAN.



Bryan, Idealist and Average Man

By Charles Willis Thompson

The subjoined estimate of William J. Bryan's character and public career, which appeared in THE NEW YORK TIMES of June 9, 1915, is by the hand of one of its staff writers who has specialized in American national politics.

The plain man of the prairie became Secretary of State when William J. Bryan did; the prairie then entered diplomacy, international controversy. The secret of all that has puzzled the land in his behavior lies in that fact. His hold on the West lies in the fact that he is in himself the average man of that country, with that man's ideals, aspirations, defects, and drawbacks. There seems nothing strange or funny in a Secretary of State who goes to New York and signs temperance pledges, or holds Billy Sunday's platform in Philadelphia, when you get a few miles away from the cities; and if it seems a little queer to New York to find the Secretary of State undertaking to demolish the Darwinian theory, there are plenty of regions where the Darwinian theory is regarded as a device of the devil to upset the Mosaic cosmogony. Chesterton says that Dickens never wrote down to the mob, because he was himself the mob; and Bryan never talked down to the men of the prairie for the same reason.

He is not a man of culture, nor of reading. He has been around the world, but when he came back the books and articles he wrote were such as might have been published as guide books or in encyclopedias; he could have written them without leaving home. Travel had no broadening or polishing effect upon his mind.

The vast influence he still has is due to the fact that the common man, with all his mistakes and gaucheries, speaks in him, and that when the common man hears his own thoughts spoken in Bryan's voice he knows that the accent is sincere. Bryan may have taken up this or that particular issue because it sounded like a vote-maker, but none of them represented the least divergence from his course as a whole, which has always been honestly bent in a certain plain direction. He never hesitated to be in a minority and never dodged a fight. He is an innocent theorist, who frequently goes wrong because of the simplicity of his mental processes; but he acts upon his theories, right or wrong, with an intrepidity and a whole-hearted courage in which the ordinary man sees the qualities he himself would like to have, and dreams he has. His mind is not broad, but it is strong; he is always sure he is right, and always ready to fight for his beliefs, and he keeps his hold upon his followers because he is not below them, and not much above them, and because they know he is honest and sincere.

In 1906, the Democratic Party, picking itself out of the wreckage of Parker's defeat, was yearning to reunite. "Big business," assaulted and bruised and banged about by President Roosevelt, was ready to come into line. Roosevelt or his candidate could be defeated in 1908 only by Democratic harmony. Bryan was abroad, traveling, and somehow his distant figure looked less appalling than the near-by figure in the White House. The East did not ask him to recant his radicalism, but only not to talk about it. He arrived in New York, and business went to hear him make a harmony speech. If he made it, business would support him for President. He made the speech; he declared for Government ownership of railroads. Business, roaring with pain, fell back into the Republican arms, and Bryan was defeated for President. No, Bryan is not an opportunist—not in things that really matter.