As I have said, the regular armament firms have taken on enormous contracts vastly in excess of their ordinary engagements in normal times of peace. We have also spread orders both in the form of direct contracts and subcontracts over a large number of subsidiary firms not accustomed in peace time to this class of manufacture. It will, I am sure, be readily understood that, when new plant is available for the production of war material, those firms that are not now so engaged should release from their own work the labor necessary to keep the machinery fully occupied on the production for which it is being laid down, as well as to supply sufficient labor to keep working at full power the whole of the machinery which we now have.

I hope that this result will be attained under the provisions of the bill now about to be placed before you. Labor may very rightly ask that their patriotic work should not be used to inflate the profits of the directors and shareholders of the various great industrial and armament firms, and we are therefore arranging a system under which the important armament firms will come under Government control, and we hope that workmen who work regularly by keeping good time shall reap some of the benefits which the war automatically confers on these great companies.

I feel strongly that the men working long hours in the shops by day and by night, week in and week out, are doing their duty for their King and country in a like manner with those who have joined the army for active service in the field. [Cheers.] They are thus taking their part in the war and displaying the patriotism that has been so manifestly shown by the nation in all ranks, and I am glad to be able to state that his Majesty has approved that where service in this great work of supplying the munitions of war has been thoroughly, loyally and continuously rendered, the award of a medal will be granted on the successful termination of the war. [Cheers.]



SAVIORS OF EUROPE

By Rene Bazin

[From King Albert's Book.]

I believe that King Albert and Belgium, in sacrificing themselves as they have done for right, have saved Europe.

I believe that in order to act with such decision it was essential to have a King, that is to say, a leader responsible to history, of an old and proved stock.

I believe that for such action a Christian nation was essential, a nation capable of understanding, of accepting, and of enduring the ordeal.

I believe that the first duty of the Allies will be to restore the Kingdom of Belgium, and that the example shown by the King and his people will be exalted in all civilized countries as long as the world reads history.



Britain's Peril of Strikes and Drink

By David Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer.

The gravity of labor disputes in the present time of national danger was dealt with by Mr. Lloyd George in a speech to his constituents at Bangor on Feb. 28, 1915, special reference being made to the Clyde strike. He declared that compulsory arbitration in war time was imperative, as it was "intolerable that the lives of Britons should be imperiled for a matter of a farthing an hour." This was essentially an engineers' war, for equipment was even more needed than men. Mr. Lloyd George went on to comment on the adverse effect of drinking upon production, and added: "We have great powers to deal with drink, and we shall use them."

I have promised for some time to address a meeting at Bangor. I have been unable to do so because Ministers of the Crown have been working time and overtime, and I am sorry to say that we are not even able to make the best of the day of rest, the urgency is so great, the pressure is so severe. I had something to say today, otherwise I should not have been here, and I had something to say that required stating at once. This is the only day I had to spare. It is no fault of mine. It is because we are entirely absorbed in the terrible task which has been cast upon our shoulders. I happened to have met on Friday morning, before I decided to come down here, one of the most eminent Scottish divines, a great and old friend of mine, Dr. Whyte of Edinburgh. We were discussing what I have got to say today. I remarked to him, "I have only one day on which to say it, and as that is Sunday afternoon I am very much afraid my constituents won't listen to me." He replied, "If they won't have you, come to Scotland, and we will give you the best Sunday afternoon meeting you ever had." But I thought I would try Wales first. [Cheers.] He told me that in the Shorter Catechism you are allowed to do works of charity and necessity, and those who tell me that this is not work of necessity do not know the need, the dire need, of their country at this hour. At this moment there are Welshmen in the trenches of France facing cannon and death; the hammering of forges today is ringing down the church bells from one end of Europe to the other. When I know these things are going on now on Sunday as well as the week days I am not the hypocrite to say, "I will save my own soul by not talking about them on Sundays." [Cheers.]

Do we understand the necessity? Do we realize it? Belgium, once comfortably well-to-do, is now waste and weeping, and her children are living on the bread of charity sent them by neighbors far and near. And France—the German Army, like a wild beast, has fastened its claws deep into her soil, and every effort to drag them out rends and tears the living flesh of that beautiful land. The beast of prey has not leaped to our shores—not a hair of Britain's head has been touched by him. Why? Because of the vigilant watchdog that patrols the deep for us; and that is my complaint against the British Navy. It does not enable us to realize that Britain at the present moment is waging the most serious war it has ever been engaged in. We do not understand it. A few weeks ago I visited France. We had a conference of the Ministers of Finance of Russia, France, Great Britain, and Belgium. Paris is a changed city. Her gayety, her vivacity, is gone. You can see in the faces of every man there, and of every woman, that they know their country is in the grip of grim tragedy. They are resolved to overcome it, confident that they will overcome it, but only through a long agony.

No visitor to our shores would realize that we are engaged in exactly the same conflict, and that on the stricken fields of the Continent and along the broads and the narrows of the seas that encircle our islands is now being determined, not merely the fate of the British Empire, but the destiny of the human race for generations to come. [Cheers.] We are conducting a war as if there was no war. I have never been doubtful about the result of the war, [cheers,] and I will give you my reasons by and by. Nor have I been doubtful, I am sorry to say, about the length of the war and its seriousness. In all wars nations are apt to minimize their dangers and the duration. Men, after all, see the power of their own country; they cannot visualize the power of the enemy. I have been accounted as a pessimist among my friends in thinking the war would not be over before Christmas. I have always been convinced that the result is inevitably a triumph for this country. I have also been convinced that that result will not be secured without a prolonged struggle. I will tell you why. I shall do so not in order to indulge in vain and idle surmises as to the duration of the war, but in order to bring home to my countrymen what they are confronted with, so as to insure that they will leave nothing which is at their command undone in order, not merely to secure a triumph, but to secure it at the speediest possible moment. It is in their power to do so. It is also in their power, by neglect, by sloth, by heedlessness, to prolong their country's agony, and maybe to endanger at least the completeness of its triumphs. This is what I have come to talk to you about this afternoon, for it is a work of urgent necessity in the cause of human freedom, and I make no apology for discussing on a Sunday the best means of insuring human liberty. [Cheers.]

I will give you first of all my reasons for coming to the conclusion that after this struggle victory must wait on our banners if we properly utilize our resources and opportunities. The natural resources of the allied countries are overwhelmingly greater than those of their enemies. In the man capable of bearing arms, in the financial and economic resources of these countries, in their accessibility to the markets of the world through the command of the sea for the purpose of obtaining material and munitions—all these are preponderatingly in favor of the allied countries. But there is a greater reason than all these. Beyond all is the moral strength of our cause, and that counts in a struggle which involves sacrifices, suffering, and privation for all those engaged in it. A nation cannot endure to the end that has on its soul the crimes of Belgium. [Loud cheers.] The allied powers have at their disposal more than twice the number of men which their enemies can command. You may ask me why are not those overwhelming forces put into the field at once and this terrible war brought to a triumphant conclusion at the earliest possible moment. In the answer to that question lies the cause of the war. The reason why Germany declared war is in the answer to that question.

In the old days when a nation's liberty was menaced by an aggressor a man took from the chimney corner his bow and arrow or his spear, or a sword which had been left to him by an ancestry of warriors, went to the gathering ground of his tribe, and the nation was fully equipped for war. That is not the case now. Now you fight with complicated, highly finished weapons, apart altogether from the huge artillery. Every rifle which a man handles is a complicated and ingenious piece of mechanism, and it takes time. The German arsenals were full of the machinery of horror and destruction. The Russian arsenals were not, and that is the reason for the war. Had Russia projected war, she also would have filled her arsenals, but she desired above everything peace. ["Hear, hear!"] I am not sure that Russia has ever been responsible for a war of aggression against any of her European neighbors. Certainly this is not one of them. She wanted peace, she needed peace, she meant peace, and she would have had peace had she been left alone. She was at the beginning of a great industrial development, and she wanted peace in order to bring it to its full fructification. She had repeatedly stood insolences at the hands of Germany up to the point of humiliation, all for peace, and anything for peace.

Whatever any one may say about her internal Government, Russia was essentially a peaceable nation. The men at the head of her affairs were imbued with the spirit of peace. The head of her army, the Grand Duke Nicholas, [cheers,] is about the best friend of peace in Europe. Never was a nation so bent on preserving peace as Russia was. It is true Germany six or seven years ago had threatened to march her legions across the Vistula and trample down Russia in the mud, and Russia, fearing a repetition of the same threat, was putting herself in a position of defense. But she was not preparing for any aggression, and Germany said, "This won't do. We don't like people who can defend themselves. We are fully prepared. Russia is not. This is the time to plant our dagger of tempered steel in her heart before her breastplates are forged." That is why we are at war. [Cheers.] Germany hurried her preparations, made ready for war. She made a quarrel with the same cool calculation as she had made a new gun. She hurled her warriors across the frontier. Why? Because she wanted to attack somebody, a country that could not defend herself. It was the purest piece of brigandage in history. [Cheers.] All the same there remains the fact that Russia was taken at a disadvantage, and is, therefore, unable to utilize beyond a fraction the enormous resources which she possesses to protect her soil against the invader. France was not expecting war, and she, therefore, was taken unawares.

What about Britain? We never contemplated any war of aggression against any of our neighbors, and therefore we never raised an army adequate to such sinister purposes. During the last thirty years the two great political parties in the State have been responsible for the policy of this country at home and abroad. For about the same period we have each been governing this country. For about fifteen years neither one party nor the other ever proposed to raise an army in this country that would enable us to confront on land a great Continental power. What does that mean? We never meant to invade any Continental country. [Cheers.] That is the proof of it. If we had we would have started our great armies years ago. We had a great navy, purely for protection, purely for the defense of our shores, and we had an army which was just enough to deal with any small raid that happened to get through the meshes of our navy, and perhaps to police the empire. That was all, no more. But now we have to assist neighbors becoming the victims of a power with millions of warriors at its command, and we have to improvise a great army, and gallantly have our men flocked to the standard. [Cheers.] We have raised the largest voluntary army that has been enrolled in any country or any century—the largest voluntary army, and it is going to be larger. [Cheers.]

I saw a very fine sample of that army this morning at Llandudno. I attended a service there, and I think it was about the most thrilling religious service I have ever been privileged to attend. There were men there of every class, every position, every calling, every condition of life. The peasant had left his plow, the workman had left his lathe and his loom, the clerk had left his desk, the trader and the business man had left their counting houses, the shepherd had left his sunlit hills, and the miner the darkness of the earth, the rich proprietor had left his palace, and the man earning his daily bread had quitted his humble cottage. There were men there of diverse and varied faiths who worshipped at different shrines—men who were in array against each other months ago in bitter conflict, and I saw them march with one step under one flag to fight for the same cause, and I saw them worship the same God. What has brought them together? The love of their native land, resentment for a cruel wrong inflicted upon the weak and defenseless. More than that, what brought them together was that instinct which comes to humanity at critical times when the moment has arrived to cross rivers of blood in order to rescue humanity from the grip of some strangling despotism. [Cheers.] They have done nobly. That is what has brought them together, but we want more, [cheers,] and I have no doubt we will get more.

If this country had produced an army which was equal in proportion to its population to the number of men under arms in France and in Germany at the present moment there would be three millions and a half in this country and 1,200,000 in the Colonies. [Cheers.] That is what I mean when I say our resources are quite adequate to the task. It is not our fight merely—it is the fight of humanity. [Cheers.] The allied countries between them could raise armies of over twenty millions of men. Our enemies can put in the field barely half that number.

Much as I should like to talk about the need for more men, that is not the point of my special appeal today. We stand more in need of equipment than we do of men. This is an engineers' war, [cheers,] and it will be won or lost owing to the efforts or shortcomings of engineers. I have something to say about that, for it involves sacrifices for all of us. Unless we are able to equip our armies our predominance in men will avail us nothing. We need men, but we need arms more than men, and delay in producing them is full of peril for this country. You may say that I am saying things that ought to be kept from the enemy. I am not a believer in giving any information which is useful to him. You may depend on it he knows, but I do not believe in withholding from our own public information which they ought to possess, because unless you tell them you cannot invite their co-operation. The nation that cannot bear the truth is not fit for war, and may our young men be volunteers, while the unflinching pride of those they have left behind them in their deed of sacrifice ought to satisfy the most apprehensive that we are not a timid race, who cannot face unpleasant facts! The last thing in the world John Bull wants is to be mollycoddled. The people must be told exactly what the position is, and then we can ask them to help. We must appeal for the co-operation of employers, workmen, and the general public; the three must act and endure together, or we delay and maybe imperil victory. We ought to requisition the aid of every man who can handle metal. It means that the needs of the community in many respects will suffer acutely vexatious, and perhaps injurious, delay; but I feel sure that the public are prepared to put up with all this discomfort, loss, and privation if thereby their country marches triumphantly out of this great struggle. [Cheers.] We have every reason for confidence; we have none for complacency. Hope is the mainspring of efficiency; complacency is its rust.

We laugh at things in Germany that ought to terrify us. We say, "Look at the way they are making their bread—out of potatoes, ha, ha!" Aye, that potato-bread spirit is something which is more to dread than to mock at. I fear that more than I do even von Hindenburg's strategy, efficient as it may be. That is the spirit in which a country should meet a great emergency, and instead of mocking at it we ought to emulate it. I believe we are just as imbued with the spirit as Germany is, but we want it evoked. [Cheers.] The average Briton is too shy to be a hero until he is asked. The British temper is one of never wasting heroism on needless display, but there is plenty of it for the need. There is nothing Britishers would not give up for the honor of their country or for the cause of freedom. Indulgences, comforts, even the necessities of life they would willingly surrender. Why, there are two millions of them at this hour who have willingly tendered their lives for their country. What more could they do? If the absorption of all our engineering resources is demanded, no British citizen will grudge his share of inconvenience.

But what about those more immediately concerned in that kind of work? Here I am approaching something which is very difficult to talk about—I mean the employers and workmen. I must speak out quite plainly; nothing else is of the slightest use. For one reason or another we are not getting all the assistance we have the right to expect from our workers. Disputes, industrial disputes, are inevitable; and when you have a good deal of stress and strain, men's nerves are not at their best. I think I can say I always preserve my temper in these days—I hope my wife won't give me away—[laughter]—and I have no doubt that the spirit of unrest creeps into the relations between employer and workmen. Some differences of opinion are quite inevitable, but we cannot afford them now; and, above all, we cannot resort to the usual method of settling them.

I suppose I have settled more labor disputes than any man in this hall, and, although those who only know me slightly may be surprised to hear me say it, the thing that you need most is patience. If I were to give a motto to a man who is going to a conference between employers and workmen I would say: "Take your time; don't hurry. It will come around with patience and tact and temper." But you know we cannot afford those leisurely methods now. Time is victory, [cheers,] and while employers and workmen on the Clyde have been spending time in disputing over a fraction, and when a week-end, ten days, and a fortnight of work which is absolutely necessary for the defense of the country has been set aside, I say here solemnly that it is intolerable that the life of Britain should be imperiled for the matter of a farthing an hour.

Who is to blame? That is not the question, but—How it is to be stopped? Employers will say, "Are we always to give way?" Workmen say, "Employers are making their fortunes out of an emergency of the country; why are not we to have a share of the plunder?" ["Hear, hear!" and laughter.] There is one gentleman here who holds that view. [Laughter.] I hope he is not an engineer. [Renewed laughter.] "We work harder than ever," say the workmen. All I can say is, if they do they are entitled to their share. But that is not the point—who is right? Who is wrong? They are both right and they are both wrong. The whole point is that these questions ought to be settled without throwing away the chances of humanity in its greatest struggle. [Cheers.] There is a good deal to be said for and there is a vast amount to be said against compulsory arbitration, but during the war the Government ought to have power to settle all these differences, and the work should go on. The workman ought to get more. Very well, let the Government find it out and give it to him. If he ought not, then he ought not to throw up his tools. The country cannot afford it. It is disaster, and I do not believe the moment this comes home to workmen and employers they will refuse to comply with the urgent demand of the Government. There must be no delay.

There is another aspect of the question which it is difficult and dangerous to tackle. There are all sorts of regulations for restricting output. I will say nothing about the merits of this question. There are reasons why they have been built up. The conditions of employment and payment are mostly to blame for those restrictions. The workmen had to fight for them for their own protection, but in a period of war there is a suspension of ordinary law. Output is everything in this war.

This war is not going to be fought mainly on the battlefields of Belgium and Poland. It is going to be fought in the workshops of France and Great Britain; and it must be fought there under war conditions. There must be plenty of safeguards and the workman must get his equivalent, but I do hope he will help us to get as much out of those workshops as he can, for the life of the nation depends on it. Our enemies realize that, and employers and workmen in Germany are straining their utmost. France, fortunately, also realizes it, and in that land of free institutions, with a Socialist Prime Minister, a Socialist Secretary of State for War, and a Socialist Minister of Marine, the employers and workmen are subordinating everything to the protection of their beautiful land.

I have something more to say about this, and it is unpleasant. I would wish that it were not I, but somebody else that should say it. Most of our workmen are putting every ounce of strength into this urgent work for their country, loyally and patriotically. But that is not true of all. There are some, I am sorry to say, who shirk their duty in this great emergency. I hear of workmen in armaments works who refuse to work a full week's work for the nation's need. What is the reason? They are a minority. The vast majority belong to a class we can depend upon. The others are a minority. But, you must remember, a small minority of workmen can throw a whole works out of gear. What is the reason? Sometimes it is one thing, sometimes it is another, but let us be perfectly candid. It is mostly the lure of the drink. They refuse to work full time, and when they return their strength and efficiency are impaired by the way in which they have spent their leisure. Drink is doing us more damage in the war than all the German submarines put together.

What has Russia done? [Cheers.] Russia, knowing her deficiency, knowing how unprepared she was, said, "I must pull myself together. I am not going to be trampled upon, unready as I am. I will use all my resources." What is the first thing she does? She stops the drink. [Cheers.] I was talking to M. Bark, the Russian Minister of Finance, a singularly able man, and I asked, "What has been the result?" He said, "The productivity of labor, the amount of work which is put out by the workmen, has gone up between 30 and 50 per cent." [Cheers.] I said, "How do they stand it without their liquor?" and he replied, "Stand it? I have lost revenue over it up to L65,000,000 a year, and we certainly cannot afford it, but if I proposed to put it back there would be a revolution in Russia." That is what the Minister of Finance told me. He told me that it is entirely attributable to the act of the Czar himself. It was a bold and courageous step—one of the most heroic things in the war. [Cheers.] One afternoon we had to postpone our conference in Paris, and the French Minister of Finance said, "I have got to go to the Chamber of Deputies, because I am proposing a bill to abolish absinthe." [Cheers.] Absinthe plays the same part in France that whisky plays in this country. It is really the worst form of drink used; not only among workmen, but among other classes as well. Its ravages are terrible, and they abolished it by a majority of something like 10 to 1 that afternoon. [Cheers.]

That is how those great countries are facing their responsibilities. We do not propose anything so drastic as that—we are essentially moderate men. [Laughter.] But we are armed with full powers for the defense of the realm. We are approaching it, I do not mind telling you, for the moment, not from the point of view of people who have been considering this as a social problem—we are approaching it purely from the point of view of these works. We have got great powers to deal with drink, and we mean to use them. [Cheers.] We shall use them in a spirit of moderation, we shall use them discreetly, we shall use them wisely, but we shall use them fearlessly, [cheers,] and I have no doubt that, as the country's needs demand it, the country will support our action and will allow no indulgence of that kind to interfere with its prospects in this terrible war which has been thrust upon us.

There are three things I want you to bear in mind. The first is—and I want to get this into the minds of every one—that we are at war; the second, that it is the greatest war that has ever been fought by this or any other country, and the other, that the destinies of your country and the future of the human race for generations to come depend upon the outcome of this war. What does it mean were Germany to win? It means world power for the worst elements in Germany, not for Germany. The Germans are an intelligent race; they are undoubtedly a cultivated race; they are a race of men who have been responsible for great ideas in this world. But this would mean the dominance of the worst elements among them. If you think I am exaggerating just you read for the moment extracts from the articles in the newspapers which are in the ascendency now in Germany about the settlement which they expect after this war. I am sorry to say I am stating nothing but the bare, brutal truth. I do not say that the Kaiser will sit on the throne of England if he should win. I do not say that he will impose his laws and his language on this country as did William the Conqueror. I do not say that you will hear the tramp, the noisy tramp of the goose step in the cities of the Empire. [Laughter.] I do not say that Death's Head Hussars will be patrolling our highways. I do not say that a visitor, let us say, to Aberdaron, will have to ask a Pomeranian policeman the best way to Hell's Mouth. [Loud laughter.] That is not what I mean. What I mean is that if Germany were triumphant in this war it would practically be the dictator of the international policy of the world. Its spirit would be in the ascendant. Its doctrines would be in the ascendant; by the sheer power of its will it would bend the minds of men in its own fashion. Germanism in its later and worst form would be the inspiriting thought and philosophy of the hour.

Do you remember what happened to France after 1870? The German armies left France, but all the same for years after that, and while France was building up her army, she stood in cowering terror of this monster. Even after her great army was built France was oppressed with a constant anxiety as to what might happen. Germany dismissed her Ministers. Had it not been for the intervention of Queen Victoria in 1874 the French Army would never have been allowed to be reconstructed, and France would simply have been the humble slave of Germany to this hour. What a condition for a country! And now France is fighting not so much to recover her lost provinces, she is fighting to recover her self-respect and her national independence; she is fighting to shake off this nightmare that has been on her soul for over a generation, [cheers,] a France with Germany constantly meddling, bullying, and interfering. And that is what would happen if Russia were trampled upon, France broken, Britain disarmed. We should be left without any means to defend ourselves. We might have a navy that would enable us, perhaps, to resent insult from Nicaragua, [laughter,] we might have just enough troops, perhaps, to confront the Mad Mullah—I mean the African specimen. [Loud laughter.]

Where would the chivalrous country be to step in to protect us as we protected France in 1874? America? If countries like Russia and France, with their huge armies, and the most powerful navy in the world could not face this terrible military machine, if it breaks that combination, how can America step in? It would be more than America can do to defend her own interests on her own continent if Germany is triumphant. They are more unready than we were. Ah! but what manner of Germany would we be subordinate to? There has been a struggle going on in Germany for over thirty years between its best and its worst elements. It is like that great struggle which is depicted, I think, in one of Wagner's great operas between the good and the evil spirit for the possession of the man's soul. That great struggle has been going on in Germany for thirty or forty years. At each successive general election the better elements seemed to be getting the upper hand, and I do not mind saying I was one of those who believed they were going to win. I thought they were going to snatch the soul of Germany—it is worth saving, it is a great, powerful soul—I thought they were going to save it. So a dead military caste said, "We will have none of this," and they plunged Europe into seas of blood. Hope was again shattered. Those worst elements will emerge triumphant out of this war if Germany wins.

What does that mean? We shall be vassals, not to the best Germany, not to the Germany of sweet songs and inspiring, noble thoughts—not to the Germany of science consecrated to the service of man, not to the Germany of a virile philosophy that helped to break the shackles of superstition in Europe—not to that Germany, but to a Germany that talked through the raucous voice of Krupp's artillery, a Germany that has harnessed science to the chariot of destruction and of death, the Germany of a philosophy of force, violence, and brutality, a Germany that would quench every spark of freedom either in its own land or in any other country in rivers of blood. I make no apology on a day consecrated to the greatest sacrifice for coming here to preach a holy war against that. [Great cheering.]

Concluding this speech in Welsh, Mr. Lloyd George said: "War is a time of sacrifice and of service. Some can render one service, some another, some here and some there. Some can render great assistance, others but little. There is not one who cannot help in some measure, whether it be only by enduring cheerfully his share of the discomfort. In the old Welsh legend there is a story of a man who was given a series of what appeared to be impossible tasks to perform ere he could reach the desires of his heart. Among other things he had to do was to recover every grain of seed that had been sown in a large field and bring it all in without one missing by sunset. He came to an anthill and won all the hearts and enlisted the sympathies of the industrious little people. They spread over the field, and before sundown the seed was all in except one, and as the sun was setting over the western skies a lame ant hobbled along with that grain also. Some of us have youth and vigor and suppleness of limb; some of us are crippled with years or infirmities, and we are at best but little ants. But we can all limp along with some share of our country's burden, and thus help her in this terrible hour to win the desire of her heart." [Loud cheers.]

Mr. Lloyd George and his party returned after the meeting to Llandudno, where today he will inspect the First Brigade of the Welsh Army Corps.

BRITAIN'S MUNITIONS COMMITTEE

LONDON, April 14.—The Times says this morning:

An important step has at last been taken by the Government toward the solution of the supreme problem of the moment—the organization of the national output of munitions of war. A strong committee has been appointed, with full power to deal with the question. It is to be representative of not merely one department but of the Treasury, Admiralty, War Office, and Board of Trade; in short, of the whole Government, with all its resources and authority.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer is to be Chairman, and the first meeting will be held today.

The work before the committee is nothing less than the organization of the whole resources of the nation for the production of materials of war. Hitherto, in spite of many warnings and some half-hearted attempts at organization, there has been no central, co-ordinated authority.

It is an open secret that it was during Lloyd George's visit to France at the beginning of the year that he first appreciated the scientific organization of labor which our Allies had already achieved. Not content with utilizing and extending the existing armament plant, the French have long since diverted several temporarily irrelevant industries to the main business of waging war.

With reference to the drink problem The Times says:

While the Government is apparently considering the expropriation of all the licensed houses in the kingdom, this far-reaching proposal has not at present gone beyond the stage of inquiry and consultation, and it is tolerably certain that it will go no farther unless it is assured of no serious opposition in the country.

The Parliamentary Opposition, the leaders of which have been consulted in a general way, are believed to stand by the principle which they followed since the war began, namely: They are not prepared to quarrel with any measure which the Government regards as necessary for the active prosecution of the war so long as no injustice is done to established interests.



Italy's Evolution as Reflected in Her Press

Italy has reached her present position through the development of a policy the steps of which have been brightly illuminated by the press of the Peninsula. The most important of these steps may be designated as follows:

First, the declaration of the Government to the German Ambassador at Rome on Aug. 1, 1914, that it did not regard the conflict begun by Austria-Hungary and Germany as a defensive war and hence not binding on it as a member of the Triple Alliance, and its subsequent declarations of "neutrality," of "armed neutrality," and of "a neutrality which is likely to be broken if the interests of the country demanded it."

Second, Premier Salandra's speech of Dec. 3 for "armed, alert neutrality," and the declaration in Parliament on Dec. 5 by Signor Giolitti showing that the declaration of Aug. 1 was merely a repetition of one conveyed to Austria in the Summer of 1913, when Austria had suggested that she aid Bulgaria in subduing Serbia.

Third, the arrival in Rome in December of the former German Imperial Chancellor, Prince von Buelow, as Extraordinary Ambassador to the Quirinal, for the purpose of keeping Italy neutral, and, when this seemed doubtful, to negotiate between Italy and Austria what territorial compensation the latter would render the former in order to perpetuate the neutrality of the Peninsula.

Aside from the influence of these official acts, which invited press comments, the Italian papers have paid keen attention to the conduct of the war, concerning which the Government could not, on account of its neutrality, offer an opinion. Among such incidents of conduct have been the British declaration of a protectorate over Egypt and the bombardment of the Dardanelles by the Franco-British fleet.

In order to weigh the full significance of the comments of the Italian papers on these subjects a word may be said concerning the status of the journals themselves:

The most conspicuous is the Idea Nazionale, a paper of Rome practically dedicated to intervention. Then comes the conservative and solid Corriere della Sera of Milan, whose Rome correspondent, Signor Torre, has peculiar facilities for learning the intentions of the Ministry. Both the Tribuna and the Giornale d'Italia are considered Government organs, but, while the former rarely comments with authority except on accomplished facts, the latter, although often voicing the unofficial and personal opinions of Premier Salandra, who is known to be privately in favor of intervention, also voices the sentiment of former Premier Giolitti, who is known to be for continued neutrality. The Stampa of Turin is a Giolitti organ.

The Osservatore Romano is the well-known Vatican organ, which naturally supports Austria, a Catholic country, where such support does not conflict too pointedly with the sentiments of Catholics in neutral countries. Other clerical papers with strong pro-German opinions and with German industrial backing are the Corriere d'Italia and the Popolo Romano. The Messaggero of Rome and the Secolo of Milan, influenced by important British and French interests, are for intervention at all costs. The Avanti is the Socialist organ.

CAUSES OF ITALY'S NEUTRALITY.

From the Corriere della Sera, Aug. 2, 1914:

Italy's decision to remain neutral is based on three causes:

1. The terms of the Triple Alliance call for Italy's participation in war only if Germany or Austria-Hungary is attacked by another power. The present war is not a defensive war, but one brought on by Austria-Hungary and Germany.

2. The spirit of the alliance demands that no warlike action be taken involving the three countries without full mutual discussion and agreement. Italy was not even consulted by Austria-Hungary and the course of events was brought to her knowledge only by news agency reports.

3. When Italy went to war with Turkey, Austria prevented her from acting with a free hand in the Adriatic and the Aegean, thereby prolonging the war at an enormous cost in men and money to Italy. Italy would be justified in acting in precisely the same manner now toward Austria-Hungary.

From Secolo, Sept. 3, 1914:

During the last few days we have assisted at a deplorable example of our Latin impressionability. The first German victories have made Italians waver, and Germany is taking advantage of the popular nervousness, and is working on public opinion in countless ways. Italy is invaded by Germans, who assert that Germany will issue victorious, and that her commercial and industrial activity will not be arrested. We are inundated with German letters, telegrams, newspapers, and private communications from German commercial houses, all asserting that Germany will win, and that Italy should keep neutral, to be on the winning side.

We are not of that opinion. We cannot lose sight of England. Germany knows that England represents her great final danger, hence the bitterness with which she speaks of England in all the above communications. England is not playing a game of bluff. She is not impotent by land, as Germany says, and may give Germany a mortal blow by sea. The war may possibly end in a titanic duel between England and Germany. In this case England will go through with the struggle calmly and grimly, smiling at difficulties and disregarding losses.

From the Corriere d'Italia, Sept. 17, 1914:

We do not know what Italy will do tomorrow, but we are of opinion that, in face of all eventualities, it is the elementary duty of patriotism not to trouble the calm expectancy of public opinion and not to mar the task of the Government, already difficult enough.

From the Messaggero, Sept. 18, 1914:

The Italian Nation is beginning to ask itself whether it ought to remain until the conclusion of peace in an attitude of resignation. It is necessary for us with clear vision to take our place in the fighting line. While the destinies of a new Europe are being decided on the battlefields of Champagne, Belgium, Galicia, and Hungary the Government is assuming a grave responsibility before the country in deciding to be disinterested in the struggle. The keen popular awakening which is manifested in demonstrations, meetings, and public discussions shows that growing preoccupation and varied uneasiness will not cease so long as the fate of the country is not decided at the right time by men who by temperament are best fitted to be interpreters of the soul and the interests of the nation.

From the Corriere della Sera, Oct. 4, 1914:

Many who now invoke a war of liberation complained at the beginning of August that Italy had not helped her allies. The declaration of neutrality then seemed the greatest act of wisdom performed by Italy for many years. Now, however, we must think of the future. Let us remember that the powers will only support our wishes when they have need of us. Gratitude and sympathy are mere phrases when the map of Europe is being redrawn. If Italy desire to safeguard her interests in the Adriatic she cannot postpone her decision till the last moment. Italy is isolated; the Triple Alliance treaty cannot defend her even if it be still in force. Italy and Austria, as Count Nigra and Prince Buelow said, must be allies or enemies. Can they remain allies after what has happened?

ITALY'S ARMED, ALERT NEUTRALITY.

From the Idea Nazionale, Dec. 3, 1914:

The day on which Italy will undertake to realize those aspirations she will find full and unconditional support. Great Britain is favorable to Italy gaining supremacy in the Adriatic, which is so necessary to her existence. If Great Britain needs Italy's support in Africa it will be only a matter of one or two army corps, and such an expedition, while having a great moral and political importance, would not diminish Italian military power in Europe.

From the Avanti, Dec. 4, 1914:

Premier Salandra's speech was Jesuitical. It contents the Jingoes by certain dubious phrases, while discontenting the Clerical and Conservative neutrals.

From the Corriere d'Italia, Dec. 4, 1914:

This much-applauded word, "aspirations," was not (in Signor Salandra's speech) meant to refer to any particular belligerent, and the Cabinet consequently has no program.

From the Stampa, Dec. 5, 1914:

Austria, before the war, disclaimed any intention of occupying Serbia, and her declaration cannot be disregarded by Italy, whose relations with Austria have been always conditional on the maintenance of the Balkan status quo, which Austria now threatens to alter. The Italian Government cannot ignore this condition, especially as during the Libyan war Austria menaced Italy, unless she desisted from bombarding the Albanian coast. Thus the Serbian situation may constitute a new factor.

From the Corriere della Sera, Jan. 31, 1915:

Italy's true policy is to come to a friendly agreement with the Slavs, which will guarantee their mutual interests. Italy wants a national settlement in the Balkan Peninsula, independent of the great powers. In no circumstances can Italy bind her lot to Austria-Hungary's policy.

BRITISH PROTECTORATE OVER EGYPT.

From the Idea Nazionale, Dec. 19, 1914:

The British Government's act merely sanctions a situation already existing in fact since 1882. In our governing circle it is not thought that the change of regime in Egypt will occasion, at least for the time being, any great modifications in public law in relation to the international statutes regulating the position of foreigners in Egypt.

From the Tribuna, Dec. 20, 1914:

The Mediterranean agreement, in which Italy, too, has taken part, implicitly recognized the actual status England had acquired in Egypt. Now the war has demonstrated the judicial incongruity of a Turkish province in which and for which the English had to carry out warlike operations against Turkey. The protectorate already existed in substance, and Great Britain might now even have proclaimed annexation.

From the Giornale d'Italia, Dec. 19, 1914:

Great Britain had for some months been preparing this event, which legally regulates a situation which has existed in fact. The present situation has been brought about without any disturbance, like everything that England does, in silence, neatly and without disturbing any one. Nobody can be astonished at Great Britain's declaration of a protectorate over Egypt.

THE DARDANELLES.

From the Giornale d'Italia, March 7, 1915:

It will be extremely difficult for Italy longer to remain neutral. The attack by the allied fleet on the Dardanelles has brought up three great problems affecting Italian interests. The first of these problems is the new rule to allow Russia access to the Mediterranean through the Dardanelles; the second concerns the equilibrium of the Balkans, and the third the partition of Asiatic Turkey, which affects the equilibrium of the Eastern Mediterranean. It is impossible for Italy to keep out of the solution of such problems unless she be satisfied to see not only the powers of the Triple Entente settle these affairs according to their interests, but also the small but audacious and resolute nation, Greece.

From the Messaggero, March 17, 1915:

The cession of the Trentino would be valueless if it implied the abandonment of Italian aspirations in Venetia Giulia, (land west of the Julian Alps,) in the Adriatic, and in Asia Minor, and submission to German policy. We cannot obtain by neutrality the territory we want, nor, if we renew the Triple Alliance, can we make an agreement with Great Britain for our security in the Mediterranean.

VON BUELOW'S WORK AND PLEA FOR INTERVENTION.

From the Corriere della Sera, Feb. 8, 1915:

Happily our aspirations in the Adriatic, our interests in the Central Mediterranean and in Northern Africa coincide admirably with the policy which it is easiest for us to pursue. Unless we profit with the utmost prudence, with the greatest circumspection, by the present rare opportunity which history offers us to set the finishing touches to our unification, to render our land and sea frontiers immeasurably more secure than they are, to harmonize our foreign with our domestic policy, we shall experience after the close of the war the darkest and most difficult days of our existence. The crisis through which we are passing is the gravest we have yet encountered. Let us make it a crisis of growth, not a symptom of irreparable senile decay.

From the Stampa, March 15, 1915:

There is surely no possibility of an Austro-Italian war without German intervention. If Italy attacks Austria, Germany will attack Italy; nor will Austria make concessions, for Austria, like Turkey, never changes her system, even when wrong.

From the Giornale d'Italia, March 19, 1915:

Italy either can obtain peacefully immediate and certain satisfaction of her sacred aspirations, together with the protection of her great and complex interests, or she can have recourse to the supreme test of arms. It is absurd to think that Italy, after seven months of preparation, when she is in an especially advantageous diplomatic and military position, will be satisfied with the Biblical mess of pottage or less—mere promises.

However negotiations go the great national interests must be protected at any costs. This is the firm will of the country and the duty of the Government. For fifty years Italy has made great sacrifices to be an element of peace in Europe. The equilibrium and peace of the Continent were broken through the fault of others against Italy's desire and without consulting her. Others have the responsibility for the present terrible crisis, but Italy would be unworthy if she did not issue with honor and advantage from the conflict. Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria are awaiting Italy's move and will follow suit. Thus Italian influence is great at this moment, which must be seized, as it is in her power to contribute to the formation of a new international combination.



SOME RUSES DE GUERRE.

By A.M. WAKEMAN.

(Respectfully submitted to the British Government.)

Great Churchill's plan to fool the foe is simple and unique— You only take a neutral flag and hoist it at your peak. Thereby a ship with funnels four looks just like one with two, Because the pattern has been changed on her Red, White, and Blue.

Now, cannot you improve on this, and so protect your towns, As well as all your gallant ships at anchor in the Downs? Old London, with the Stars and Stripes, might well pass for New York; And Baltimore for Maryland instead of County Cork.

To mouth of Thames (N-O-R-E) just add four letters more, Then hoist the Danish ensign, and, behold, 'tis Elsinore! And Paris will be Washington if, on the Eiffel Tower, They raise the flag of U.S.A., (a well-known neutral power.)

Your sailors might wear Leghorn hats, and out upon the blue, They'd look like sons of Italy, (at present neutral, too;) And, if upon your King the Hun would try to work some ill, With pickelhaube on his head he'd pass for Uncle Bill.



THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

[German Cartoon]

The Fatal Moment In America



[English Cartoon]

Top Dog



[German Cartoon]

England's "Splendid Isolation"



[English Cartoon]

The Sultan "Over the Water"



[German Cartoon]

Churchill's Flag Swindle



[German Cartoon]

May God Punish England!

]

[Italian Cartoon]

Speeches of the Kaiser in 1915



[English Cartoon]

Our Embarrassing Cousin



[German Cartoon]

John Bull at the Costumer's



[English Cartoon]

William o' the Wisp



[German Cartoon]

American Neutrality



[English Cartoon]

What the War Office Has to Put Up With



[German Cartoon]

Va Banque!



[Italian Cartoon]

The Final Earthquake—In Germany

]

[German Cartoon]

From the English Eating-House



[English Cartoon]

The Bread-Winner



[Italian Cartoon]

Italy's Neutrality



[English Cartoon]

Busy Packing



[German Cartoon]

In the Cause of Culture



[English Cartoon]

Queen Elizabeth in the Dardanelles



[French Cartoon]

The "Sick Man" At Home



[German Cartoon]

"The Cripple-Entente"



[French Cartoon]

Beware of the John-Bull-Dog!



[German Cartoon]

The Great Question



Facsimile of a Belgian Bread-Check



TO A GERMAN APOLOGIST

By BEATRICE BARRY.

You may seek and find if you will, perchance, Excuses for your attack on France, And perhaps 'twill not be so hard to show Why England finds you her deadly foe; There are reasons old and reasons new For feelings hard 'twixt the Russ and you, But talk as you may till the Judgment Day, You cannot ever explain away— Belgium.

You have used both speech and the printed word To have your side of the story heard, We have listened long, we have listened well To everything that you had to tell, We would fain be fair, but it seems as though You can't explain what we wish to know, And when lesser points have been cleared away, You are sure to fail us when we say— "Belgium!"

You may rant and talk about British gold, And opinions that are bought and sold, But facts, no matter how hard to face, Are facts, and the horrors taking place In that little land, pledged to honor's creed, Make your cause a luckless one to plead. There are two sides? True. But when both are heard, Our sad hearts echo a single word— "Belgium!"

We are not misled by the savage tales An invading army never fails To have told of it. There are false and true, And we want to render you your due. But our hearts go out to that ravished land Where a few grim heroes make their stand, And our ears hear faintly, from overseas, The wailing cry of those refugees— "Belgium—Belgium—Belgium!"



America's Neutrality

By Count Albert Apponyi

[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, March 28, 1915.]

The letter which follows was sent by Count Albert Apponyi to Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, and was written in the latter part of last month in Budapest. Count Apponyi, who is one of the most distinguished of contemporary European statesmen, was President of the Hungarian Parliament from 1872 to 1904. He was formerly Minister of Public Instruction, Privy Councillor, Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, and Member of the Interparliamentary Union.

I have been greatly interested in your account of American neutrality in the present European crisis. I must confess that I had seen it in a somewhat different light before and that some of the facts under our notice still appear to me as hardly concordant with the magnificent attitude of impartiality, nay, not even with the international duties of neutrality, which intellectual and official America professes to keep.

We cannot explain to ourselves that a neutral power should suffer the selling of arms and ammunition by its citizens to one of the belligerent parties, when no such selling to the other party is practically feasible; we cannot understand why America should meekly submit to the dictates of England, declaring all foodstuffs and manufacturing materials contraband of war, with not even a show of right and with the clear and openly proclaimed intention of starving Germany and Austria-Hungary; why, on the other hand, America should use an almost threatening language against Germany, and against Germany alone, when the latter country announces reprisals against the English trade, which, under given circumstances, can be considered only as acts of legitimate self-defense against an enemy who chooses to wage war not on our soldiers only, but on our women and children, too.

With all the respect we feel for the United States, we cannot find this attitude of their Government either fair or dignified. I offer these remarks in no spirit of uncalled-for criticism, but because I see how much the moral authority of the United States and their splendid situation as the providential peace makers of some future—alas! still far off—day has been impaired by the aforementioned proceedings. We cannot help considering them as so many acts of ill-disguised hostility against ourselves and of compliance with our foes. How can you expect, then, to have your good offices accepted with confidence by both belligerent parties when the times are ripe for them? It seems like the throwing away of a magnificent opportunity, and I think that those who, like yourself, cherish for your country the noble ambition of being some day the restorer of peace, should exert themselves to prevent practices which, if continued, would disable her to play any such part.

In your letter you strike the keynote of what I cannot help considering the partiality of Americans for the Entente powers. It is the idea that "in the western area of conflict, at least, there is an armed clash between the representatives of dynastic institutions and bureaucratic rule on the one hand with those of representative government and liberal institutions on the other." I can understand that it impresses some people that way, but I beg to enter a protest against this interpretation of the conflict.

Liberal or less liberal institutions have nothing to do with it in the west; the progress of democracy in Germany will not be stopped by her victory, it will rather be promoted by it, because the masses are conscious of bearing the burden of war and of being the main force of its vigorous prosecution, and they are enlightened and strong enough to insist on a proper reward. Rights cannot be denied to those who fulfilled duties involving self-sacrifice of the sublimest kind with unflinching devotion. No practical interest of democracy then is involved in the conflict of the western powers.

As to their representing liberal institutions in a higher or lower degree, I am perfectly willing to admit England's superior claims in that respect, but I am not at all inclined to recognize such superiority in modern France, republic though she calls herself. The omnipresence and omnipotence of an obtruding bureaucratic officialism is just what it has been under the old monarchy; religious oppression has only changed sides, but it still flourishes as before. In former times the Roman Catholic religion was considered as a State religion and in her name were dissent and Freemasonry oppressed; today atheism is the official creed, and on its behalf are Catholic believers oppressed.

Separation of Church and State, honestly planned and loyally fulfilled in America has been perverted in modern France into a network of vexations and unfair measures against the Church and her faithful servants; the same term is used and this misleads you to cover widely different meanings. In a word, it is a perfect mistake to consider modern France as the "sweet land of liberty" which America is. A German citizen, with less show of political rights, enjoys more personal freedom than is granted to a French one, if he happens to differ from the ruling mentality.

So stand things in the western area of conflict. But how about the east? You are kind enough to admit in your letter that "from this (the aforementioned) standpoint of course the appearance of Russia among the allies is an anomaly and must be explained on other grounds." Anomaly is a rather tame word to characterize the meaning of this appearance of Russia. I should hardly designate it by this term.

She does not "appear among the allies." She is the leading power among them; it is her war, as Mr. Tsvolski, the Russian Ambassador to Paris, very properly remarked: "C'est ma guerre." She planned it, she gave Austria-Hungary no chance to live on peaceful terms with her neighbors, she forced it upon us, she drew France into it by offering her a bait which that poor country could not resist, she created the situation which England considered as her best opportunity for crushing Germany. I must repeat it over and over again: it is in its origin a Russian war, with a clearly outlined Russian program of conquest.

Here, then, you have a real clash between two principles; not shades of principles as these may subsist between Germany and her western foes, but principles in all their essential features; not between different tints of gray, but between black and white, between affirmation and negation; affirmation of the principle of human dignity, liberty, safety, and negation of the same; western evolution and eastern reaction.

I wonder why those prominent Americans who are so deeply impressed by the comparatively slight shades of liberalism differentiating Germany from England and France are not struck by the absolute contrast existing between Muscovitism and western civilized rule as represented by Austria-Hungary and Germany; that they overlook the outstanding fact that while in the western area the conflict has nothing whatever to do with the principles embodied in the home policy of the belligerents, in the east, on the other hand, these principles will in truth be affected by the results of war, since a Russian victory, followed by a Russian conquest, would mean the retrogression of western institutions and the corresponding expansion of eastern ones over a large area and large numbers of men.

It is the consciousness of fighting in this war which has been forced upon us, against the direst calamity threatening our kind and on behalf of the most precious conquests of progress and civilization, which enhances our moral force so as to make it unconquerable. The hope which I expressed in my first letter, that Serbia's doom would soon be fulfilled, has been prostrated by the mistakes of an over-confident Commander in Chief; but that means postponement only and does not alter the prospects of war in their essentials.

Good progress is achieved in the campaign against Russia; a chapter of it may be brought to a happy close before long. The spirit of the country shows no symptom of weakening; it is really wonderful what a firm resolve pervades our whole people, though every man between twenty and forty-two stands in the field, and though the losses are frightful. Economically we hold out easily; the expenses of war are defrayed by inner loans, which give unexpected results; every bit of arable land is tilled as in time of peace, the old, the women and the half-grown youths doing the work of their absent supporters, neighbors assisting each other in a spirit of brotherhood truly admirable. In cases of urgent need we have the prisoners of war, whose number increased to nearly 300,000 (in Austria-Hungary alone) and to whom it is a real boon to find employment in the sort of work they are accustomed to.

The manufacturing interest, of course, suffers severe losses; but the number of the unemployed is rather less than usual, since a greater part of the "hands" is absorbed by the army. In a word, though the sufferings of war are keenly felt, they are less severe than had been expected, and there is not the smallest indication of a break-down. The area of Germany, Austria, and Hungary taken as a whole is self-supporting with regard to foodstuffs. The English scheme of starving us is quite as silly as it is abominable. England can, of course, inflict severe losses on our manufacturers by closing the seas against their imports and exports; but this is not a matter of life and death, such as the first reprisals of Germany, if successful, may prove to England.

Generally speaking, it seems likely that England will be caught in the net of her own intrigue. She did not scruple to enlist the services of Japan against her white enemies, but this act of treachery will be revenged upon herself. The latest proceedings of Japan against China can have one meaning only—the wholesale expulsion of the white man from Eastern Asia. The Japs do not care one straw who wins in Europe; they seized upon their own opportunity for their own purposes. England only gets her deserts; but how do Americans feel about it? Can America be absolved from a certain amount of responsibility for what may soon prove imminent danger to herself? Has not her partiality for England given encouragement to methods of warfare unprecedented in the history of civilized nations and fruitful of evil consequences to neutral nations?

To us, in our continental position, all this means much less than it means to you. It does not endanger our prospects. We feel comparatively stronger every day. Our losses, though enormous, are only one-half of those of the Entente armies, according to the Geneva Red Cross Bureau's calculation. The astounding number of unwounded prisoners of war which Russia loses at every encounter, and even in spaces of time between two encounters, shows that the moral force of her army is slowly giving way, while the vigor of our troops is constantly increasing. After six months of severe fighting our military position is certainly stronger than the position of the Entente powers, though the latter represent a population of 250,000,000, (English colonies and Japan not included,) against the 140,000,000 of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. Who can doubt on which side superior moral power fights? Who can doubt, therefore, what the ultimate result promises to be?

If it takes more time to bring matters to a decision—and a decision must be obtained at any price, if there is to follow a period of permanent peace—part, at least, of the responsibility for the horrors of the protracted war, for the slaughter of many hundred thousands more of human beings, rests on America. But for the American transports of guns and ammunition, the power of Russia would give way in a shorter time, considering her enormous losses in that respect and her inability to supplement them from her own workshops.

It is very edifying that American pacifists are exerting themselves against the current of militarism which appears to spread in their country; but wouldn't it be better still, more to the purpose and certainly practically more urgent, to insist upon a truly neutral attitude of the great republic, to protest against her feeding the war by providing one belligerent side with its implements? Do American pacifists really fail to see that their country by such proceedings disables herself from being the peacemaker of the future? Do they think it immaterial from the standpoint of her moral power, as well as of her material interests, how central Europe, a mass of 120,000,000, think of her, feel about her?

I hope my readers will not find fault with me for using such plain language. My well-known enthusiastic regard for the great American commonwealth makes it unnecessary that I should protest against the charge of meaning disrespect or anything else whatever but a sincere desire to state with absolute sincerity how we feel about these matters, in what light they appear to us. I think America must know this, because it is part of the general situation she has to reckon with when shaping her policies. I fervently hope these policies will remain in concordance with the great principles on which the commonwealth is built and with the teaching embodied in that farewell address which is read once a year in Congress and in which the greatest American emphatically warns his countrymen from becoming entangled in the conflicts of European nations.

A few words more about the future of Europe may be said on this occasion. I have read with the keenest interest your own and Mr. Carnegie's statements concerning a future organization of Europe on the pattern of the United States. My personal views concerning this magnificent idea have been expressed in anticipation in my America lectures of the year 1911. Allow me to quote my own words:

Analogies are often misleading, the most obvious ones especially so. Nothing seems more obvious than to draw conclusions from the existing union of American States to a possible union of European nations; but no fancied analogy is to be applied with greater caution than this one. The American Union's origin was the common struggle of several English colonies, now States, for their emancipation; unity of purpose was the main principle of their growth, union its natural result.

Europe, on the other hand, is, in her origin and in her present state, a compound of conflicting interests and struggling potentialities. Mutual antagonism remained the principle of growth embodied in the several national lives. The juridical formula of this system is the principle of national sovereignty in its most uncompromising interpretation and most limitless conception. As such it is the natural result of a historical growth mainly filled with antagonism; in the consciousness of (European) nations it lives as synonymous with national honor, as something above doubt and discussion.

Let me add to this the following remarks:

1. Any sort of union among the nations of Europe appears impossible if it is meant to include Russia. Russia represents eastern mentality, which implies an unadmissible spirit of aggression and of conquest. It seems to be a law of nature on the old Continent that eastern nations should wish to expand to the west as long as they are powerful. Not to mention the great migration of nations which gave birth to mediaeval organizations, you may follow this law in the history of the Tartars, of the Turks, and of Russia herself. The spirit of aggressiveness vanishes only when decay sets in, which is still far from being the case of Russia, or when a nation is gradually converted to Occidental mentality, which, I hope, will some day be her happy lot. But till then, and that may mean a century or two, any sort of union including Russia would mean a herd of sheep including a wolf.

2. What I hope then, for the present, as the most desirable result of the war, is a thorough understanding between the nations of the Western European Continent, construction of a powerful political block, corresponding to the area of western mentality, in close connection with America; such a block would discourage aggression from the east; it would urge Russia on the path of reform and home improvement. England would be welcome to join it, on condition of renouncing those pretensions to monopolizing the seas which are as constant a menace to peace as Russian aggressiveness is. So we should have, if not "the United States of Europe," which at present lies beyond the boundary lines of possibilities, a strong peace union of the homogeneous western nations. Alas! this result can be reached only by destroying the present unnatural connections, which mean the continuance of war till a crushing decision is obtained.

3. The American colonies of England did not think of union as of a peace scheme; they had been compelled into it by war, by the necessity of self-defense. It is only such an overpowering motive which has force enough to blot out petty rivalries and minor antagonisms. If union between States belonging to the same race and not divided either by history or by serious conflicting interests could be effected only under the pressure of a common peril, we must infer "a minori ad majus" that such a powerful incentive will be more necessary still to persuade into union nations of different races, each cherishing memories of mutual collisions and actually aware of not unimportant clashing interests.

The menace of aggression from the east has been brought home to us by the present war; gradually it will be understood even by those Occidentals who at present unhappily lend their support to that aggression. On this perception of the higher common interests of self-defense do I build the possibilities of a western coalition. But a time may come when Russia will be compelled to join it and to complete thereby the union of the whole of Europe; it may come sooner than the conversion of Russia to western ideas could be effected by natural evolution; it may come through the yellow peril, the menace of which has been brought nearer to us by the accursed policy of England.

Let Japan organize the dormant forces of China, as it seems bent upon doing, and the same law of eastern aggressiveness which is at the bottom of the present war will push the yellow mass toward Europe. Russia, as comparatively western, will have to bear their first onset; for this she will require Occidental assistance, and in the turmoil of that direful conflict—or, let us hope, in order to avoid it—she will readily give up all designs against her western neighbors, and she may become really western by the necessities which impel her to lean on the west.

But this may or may not happen. What I see before me as a tangible possibility is the great western block. It is the only principle of reconstruction after war that contains a guarantee of a permanent peace; it is the one, therefore, which the pacifists of all nations should strive for, once they get rid of the passing mentality of conflict that now obscures the judgment of the best among us.



Neutral Spirit of the Swiss

An Interview With President Motta of the Swiss Confederation

[From The London Times, Jan. 30, 1915.]

BERNE, Jan. 20.

The President of the Swiss Confederation is the symbol of a democracy so perfect that the man in the street is not quite sure who the President is. He knows that he is one of a council of seven, and that he is elected for one year, and that is all. In the Federal Palace, the Berne Westminster and Downing Street, the anonymity is almost as complete. Officers pass and repass in the corridors—one of the signs, like the waiting military motor cars at the door, of mobilization—but this does not change the spirit, simple and civilian, of the interior.

M. Motta, Chief of State for this year, is a man of early middle life. He is the best type of Swiss, a lawyer by profession, whose limpid French seems to express culture as well as candor. Nor could one doubt for a moment the sincerity of his speech. Speaking on the Swiss position in the war, M. Motta was anxious to remove the impression that it was colored, dominated by the existence of the German-speaking cantons, more numerous than the French. "Of course," he said, "we have our private sympathies, which incline us one way or the other, and there is the language tie—though here we are greatly attached to our Bernese patois—but I would have you believe the Swiss are essentially just and impartial, they look at the war objectively.

"We have good-will toward all the nations. Need I say that we respect and esteem England? Have you not found that you are well received? There is no antagonistic feeling against any one. Our neutrality is imposed upon us by our position, a neutrality that is threefold in its effects, for it is political, financial, and economic. Italy, France, Germany, Austria, are our neighbors; we send them goods, and we receive supplies from them in return."

We then talked of the army, of that wonderful little army which, at this moment, is watching the snowy passes of the Alps. Two years ago it is said to have impressed the Kaiser on manoeuvres; perhaps for that reason he has refrained to pass that way. Outside, in the slippery streets, over which the red-capped children passed with shouts of glee, I had seen something of the preparations; the men, steel-like and stolid, marching by, the officers, stiff and martial-looking, saluting right and left under the quaint arcades of this charming city. Colored photographs of corps commanders adorned the windows and seemed to find a ready sale. These things pointed in the same direction. Switzerland, posted on her crests, was watching the issue of the terrific struggle in the plains.

"We must defend our neutrality," the President said, "our 600 years of freedom. There is not a single man in the country who thinks differently. I am an Italian-Swiss, one of the least numerous of our nationalities, but there is only one voice here as elsewhere—only one voice from Ticino to Geneva. That we shall defend our neutrality is proved by the great expenditure on our army; otherwise, it would be the height of folly."

The President spoke of army expenditure, of the simple army system, of the reorganization which had been carried out some years before. Switzerland was spending L20,000 a day, a large sum for a small country. Since the day when the general mobilization had been decreed—some classes have now been liberated—Switzerland had spent L4,500,000. It was a lot of money.

The army, of course, was a militia; some few officers were professional soldiers, others were drawn from a civil career and were doctors, lawyers, engineers, and merchants. In 1907 the country had consented to lengthen the periods of training in what are quaintly called the "recruits' schools" and "rehearsal schools." In the former category the men do sixty-five days' training a year, in the latter forty-five.

"I assure you," continued M. Motta, "whatever sympathy the German-Swiss may feel toward Germany, the French-Swiss toward France, or the Italian toward Italy, it is nothing like as warm and as intimate as that which each Swiss feels toward his fellow-Swiss."

This was the national note which dominated everything. At first there was a little difficulty in the councils of the nation. Some showed a tendency to lose their balance, but that phase had passed, and each day, I gathered, purely Swiss interests were coming uppermost.

"And the press, M. le President?"

M. Motta admitted that some writers had been excessive in their language and had been lacking in good taste; but, on the whole, he thought the newspapers had impartially printed news from both sides, and he cited a list of leading organs—Switzerland is amazingly full of papers—which had been conspicuous for their moderation.

And then there was the question of contraband. Orders were very precise on the subject; the Cabinet had limitless power since the opening of the war; if there was any smuggling it was infinitesimal, and, as to foodstuffs, Switzerland regretted she could not import more for her own needs. The Government had established a monopoly and forbidden re-exportation, but supplies were not up to the normal. The route by the Rhine was closed.

Finally came the phrase, concluding the conversation: "Whoever violates our neutrality will force us to become the allies of his enemy." There could be nothing more categorical.



TO KING AND PEOPLE.

By WALTER SICHEL.

[From King Albert's Book.]

All the great things have been done by the little peoples.—DISRAELI.

Sire, King of men, disdainer of the mean, Belgium's inspirer, well thou stand'st for all She bodes to generations yet unseen, Freedom and fealty—Kingship's coronal.

Nation of miracles, how swift you start To super-stature of heroic deeds So brave, so silent beats your bleeding heart That ours, e'en in the flush of welcome, bleeds.

No sound of wailing. Look, above, afar, Throbs in the darkness with triumphant ray A little yet an all-commanding star, The morning star that heralds forth the day.



A Swiss View of Germany

By Maurice Millioud

M. Maurice Millioud, an eminent member of the Faculty of the University of Lausanne, Switzerland, has written an article of marked breadth and penetration in which he presents a quite novel view of the forces which, in combination, have brought Germany to its actual position. These forces are political, social, and economic; beneath and through them works the subtle impulsion of a national conception of right and might which the author sums up as the "ideology of caste." Want of space forbids the publication of the entire article. We give its most significant parts with such summary of those portions which it was necessary to omit as, we trust, will enable our readers to follow the general argument.

Humanitarians the most deeply buried in dreams yield with stupefaction to the evidence of fact. European war was possible, since here it is, and even a world war, for all continents are represented in the melee. Millions of men on the one side or the other are ranged along battle fronts of from 500 to 1,000 kilometers. We are witnessing a displacement of human masses to which there is nothing comparable except the formidable convulsions of geologic ages.

The world then was in formation. Will a new Europe, a new society, a new humanity, take form from the prodigious shock by which our imagination is confounded?

We can at least seek to understand what we cannot hinder.

This war was not a matter of blind fate, but had been foreseen for a long time. What are the forces that have set the nations in movement? I do not seek to establish responsibility. Whosoever it may be, those who have let loose the conflict have behind them peoples of one mind. That, perhaps, is the most surprising feature in an epoch when economic, social, and moral interests are so interwoven from one end of the earth to the other that the conqueror himself must suffer cruelly from the ruin of the conquered.

The Governments have determined the day and the hour. They could not have done it in opposition to the manifest will of the nations. Public sentiment has seconded them. What is it then which rouses man from his repose, impels him to desert his gains, his home, the security of a regular life, and sends him in eager search for bloody adventures?

This problem involves different solutions because it embraces a number of cases. Between the Russians, the French, the English, the Germans there is a similarity of will, but not, it seems, an analogy of sentiment. I shall undertake to analyze the case of Germany. It has peculiar interest on account of its importance, of its definiteness, of the comparisons to which it leads, and the reflections which it suggests. Numerous facts easy to verify and in part recent permit us to throw some light upon it and offer us a guarantee against hazardous conjectures.

Defining a caste as "a group of men bound to each other by solidarity of functions in society," such as the Brahmins of India and the feudal nobility, Prof. Millioud says that he will use the terms as equivalent or nearly equivalent to a "directing class." Quoting the article from Vorwaerts which led to the suspension of that Socialist organ and which "admits by implication that responsibility for the war falls on Germany," he proceeds to examine the origins of the influence of the war party and the interests it served.

Here we must have recourse to history. In Germany the dominant class is composed in part of an aristocracy by birth and of bourgeois capitalists, more or less of them ennobled. The interior policy of Germany since 1871 and even since 1866 is explained by the relations, sometimes kindly, sometimes hostile, of these two categories of persons, by the opposition or the conjunction of these two influences, and not by a struggle of the dominant class against the socialistic mass. That struggle, which is in France and is becoming in England a fact of essential gravity, has been in Germany only a phenomenon of secondary importance. It has determined neither the profound evolution of the national life nor the chief decisions of the Government.

In Germany, as is known, the abolition of the ancien regime did not take place brusquely as in France. After the revolution and the French occupation, the noble caste recovered all its privileges. It has lost them little by little, but not yet entirely. Even the liquidation of the property of the feudal regime was not completed until toward 1850. Napoleon made some sad cuts in the little sovereignties, but from 1813 to 1815 the princely families did their utmost to recover their independence. The greater part were mediatized, but their tenacity offered a serious obstacle up to 1871 to the establishment of German unity.

That unity was accomplished in despite of them, by sword and fire, as Bismarck said, that is to say, by the wars of 1866 and 1870. Care was taken, however, not to abase them more than was strictly necessary, for it was intended to maintain the hierarchy. What was wanted was a monarchical unity, made from above down, and not a democratic unity brought about by popular impulsion.

On the other hand, the smaller nobles formed, after 1820, a vast association for the defense of their rights, the Adelskette. Moreover, they could not be sacrificed, in the first place, because they had rendered invaluable services in the wars of independence, they had arisen as one man, and they had ruined themselves in sacrifices for the national cause, they had organized the people and led it to victory, finally because they served to restrain the high nobility whose domination was feared. They sustained the throne against the princes, the higher nobility against the democracy, the lesser nobility against the higher, the two forming an intermediary class between the monarch and the nation. That was the social conception which prevailed with those who were working to realize the unity of Germany, so that the nobility, lesser or higher, in default of its privileges retained its functions.

Treitschke, in his last lessons, about 1890, called it "a political class." For the bourgeois, he said, wealth, instruction, letters, arts. Their part is fine enough. The nobility is apt at governing. That is its special distinction. For a long time, in fact, the nobility has filled alone or almost alone the great administrative, governmental, and military posts.

Bismarck was the finished type, the representative par excellence of this class of men. He had their intellectual and moral qualities carried to the highest degree of superiority. But he underwent evolution after 1871, and his caste with him, under the pressure of general circumstances.

Bismarck was a Junker, a Prussian rustic, monarchist, particularist, agrarian and militarist. Each of his qualities is an attribute of a mentality of caste, a very curious one, not lacking in grandeur, but very narrow and not always adequate to the conduct of affairs.

Monarchist means anti-Parliamentarian. The fine scorn of rhetoric and even of public discussion, a conviction that democracy will not lead to anything beyond a display of mediocrity, that is one of the salient features of his mind. Patriotism conceived as an attachment to personal relations, as the service of one man, the subject, to another man, the King, and not the service of an anonymous person, the functionary, to an abstraction, the State, the republic, this was formerly designated by the word faithful, (feal,) which has disappeared from our vocabulary because it is without meaning in our present moral state.

The Junker is particularist, at least he was. The political and administrative centralization which the Jacobins achieved in France inspires him with horror. For him it is disorder. He sees in it nothing but a dust heap of individuals crushed beneath a formula. Even today, when the German accuses France of anarchy, that is what he means. He figures to himself the nation as a vast hierarchy of liberties, an autonomy of States within the empire, of provinces within the State, of communes within the province, of proprietors within the commune. Equality is equality of rank, of worth, of wealth, of force, but impersonal equality before the law is for him an unnatural thing, an invention of the professors which at heart he despises.

He is agrarian and militarist, that is to say, conservative and enamored of force. In 1830 four-fifths of the population lived by agriculture and the landlord governed his peasants patriarchally. He kept the conservatist spirit of a rustic, a very lively sense of authority and the military instinct. He had scant liking for distant enterprises or adventures. He was at once religious, warlike, and realist, knowing how to nurse his ambitions and to confine his view to what was within reach.

Bismarck for a long time was the decided opponent of naval armaments and colonial policy, in short, of imperialism. Even his projects for social reform—insurance against sickness, against old age—which have been accepted as concessions to modern ideas, were due entirely to his monarchical and patriarchal conception of the State. He copied the ancient decrees of Colbert as to naval personnel. He would have gone as far as assurance against non-employment. In the dominion of the King, he said, no one should die of hunger.

The Junker made a force of Prussia; he made Prussia itself. It was due to him that she passed after 1815 from the form of a Polizeistaat to the form of Kulturstaat, the latter only an expansion of the former. In place of a watchful, regulating, and vexatious State she became an organized State, the instructor of youth, the protector of religion, the source of inspiration for agricultural reforms, and all great commercial and industrial enterprises. This State was not an emanation from the national will, but the creator of a nation, the living and moving self-incarnation of the Hegelian "idea," that is to say, the Divine thought.

Of all the German aristocracy the noble of Pomerania or Brandenburg, the Prussian Junker, represented this social type most definitely. In the south the liberal tendencies—to be exact, the memories of the French Revolution—persisted far into the nineteenth century. But it is well known that German unity was accomplished by military force and against liberalism.

After 1871, and even after Sadowa, the problem of interior policy which presented itself was that of the "Prussianization" of Germany. At one time it seemed that Bismarck was on the point of succeeding in it. What was that national liberal party upon which he depended for so long? It was the old liberal party, with advanced tendencies tainted with democratic liberalism and even with cosmopolitanism, keeping up its relations with the intellectuals, the university men, who made so much noise with pen and voice about 1848 and later. They dreamed of the unity of Germany in the democratic liberty and moral hegemony of their nation, having become in Europe the sobered heir of the French Revolution.

Under the influence of Bismarck they sacrificed to their dream of unity, to their national dream, their liberal dream, and they secured for the Chancellor the support of the upper bourgeoisie.

It was indeed the Prussianization of Germany, but in that spirit and in that system contemporary German militarism would never have fructified. It was contrary to the characteristic tendencies of a monarchical State supported by a conservative caste, which was also particularist, military, and agricultural. A State of this kind tends to become a closed State.

What then happened? An event of capital importance which everybody knows, but of which we only now begin to see the consequences. It was the radical transformation of Germany from an agricultural to an industrial nation. In its origin this phenomenon dates from before the nineteenth century. By 1848 it had become perceptible. Since 1866, and especially since 1871, it has dominated the entire social evolution of the empire. Here, in fact, is the revolution. It partakes of the character of a tragedy, it has overturned the conditions of life throughout the entire German territory.

At the close of the War of Independence, four out of five Germans lived on the land, two out of three were engaged in agriculture. By 1895 the agricultural population was only 35.7 per cent. That, supported by industry and commerce, kept continually increasing. In 1895 it was 50.6 per cent.

This progress of industry and trade indicates the rise of a new class of the population, that of the capitalists. It seemed at first that their arrival would result in a dispossession of the nobility. For example, under the ancien regime the bourgeois could not acquire the property of the nobles. Toward 1880, for Eastern Prussia only, 7,086 estates of 11,065 belonged to non-nobles. They could have been acquired only with money. Capital was supplanting birth. Today even, in Prussia, five members of the Ministry, a little more than one-third, are bourgeois not enjoying the particle von.

The new dominant class encroached upon the ancient in two ways, by depriving it of its clientele and by acquiring a considerable weight in the State. "The weight of a social class" is the totality of its means of action, which it possesses on account of its numbers, its personal influence, its wealth, and the importance of the interests which it represents. The clientele of the agrarian nobility was essentially the peasants, who have continually diminished in number, the attraction of industrial and commercial employments having caused a great migration to the interior, to the factories, and the cities.

For many years this phenomenon has been disclosed by statistics and pointed out by economists and sociologists, but no remedy has been found. Today, although emigration abroad has much moderated, Germany has not labor for its tillage. It is obliged to import farm hands and even cereals. It no longer produces foodstuffs sufficient for its own support.

Moreover, the peasant who remains upon the soil is freed from the landlord, and agricultural production has become specialized—industrialized. There is the case, for instance, of that peasant woman who declared that she had not the time to wash her linen and who sent it to the steam laundry at Karlsruhe. Here is not merely an economic transformation, but a moral evolution. The agriculturist who no longer produces in order to consume but in order to sell, and who must live from the product of his sales, tries to produce as much as possible. He hires foreign labor to get from it all that he can. The impersonal relations of employer and employed replace the patriarchal traditions. Thus the land owner finds himself caught in the mechanism of the capitalistic system.